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Derek Byerlee Oslo, Nov 28th, 2012
Land companies
52 %
Plantations 12 %
Ranching 30 %
Railway concessions
6 %
Total holdings 48 M ha
Christopher, 1985
The Original Land Rush at the Closing of the US Frontier, Oklahoma, 1893
Starts from 1st era of globalization from 1850
Rapid growth in Europe, N. America, Japan
Free movement of capital, labor and trade (to 1914)
Dramatic reduction in transport costs—land and sea
―Foreign‖ investments with land acquisitions
Includes imperial investments in colonies
Focus on industry structure and land rights issues
Lens of six commodities
Sugar, tea, rubber, bananas, oil palm, food crops
Particular attention to British and American FDI
Snapshots of the six commodities
Including update to today
Cross-cutting synthesis with respect to:
Major drivers of industry structure
Issues related to land rights
Conclusions
Sugar
cane
Tea Rubber Bananas Oil
palm
Grains/oils
eeds
Investor
takeoff
< 1850 1850-
1900
1900-30 1900-30
1990-
2012
1990-2012
Coordination
harvest &
processing
H H L H H L
Initial K H M L M-H M L-M
Potential to
mechanize
H L L M M H
Pioneering
risks
L M-H H M M-H L-M
Innovation H L L M M-H M-H
H=High, M=Medium, L=Low
Historical bête noire of plantation agric
Slave labor, later indentured migrants
Revolution in processing scale
From 200 ha (1860), 6,000 ha in 1929, up to 100,000
ha today in Brazil
FDI in high population density
Java--converted to leasing arrangement 1870
FDI in low population density
American investors in Cuba, Hawaii (up to 200 K ha)
Cuba: conversion of communal lands
Hawaii (5 US sugar companies legally bought 70% land)
Recent vertical integration to energy:
economies of scale in processing + mechanization
of production
Biofuels + standards
Initial investment $ 1+ billion
Cosan 600+K ha;(Shell 2x)
Addax (Sierra Leone)--$400 m, 2000 jobs
Thailand—competitive smallholders through
contract farming
But Thai companies in Cambodia large scale
From 1850s--large scale for export in India
Highly labor intensive (harvesting) and startup K
Major issues of labor rights even up today
Mostly established in forest areas (except Kenya)
New crop in new area—high failure rates
Early emergence of globally integrated
companies (brands)
Lipton, Tetley, Finlay, Brook Bond…
From 1950s--Institutional innovations for
greater equity
Sri Lanka—nationalized and then smallholder
contract with prices mediated by government
Kenya top exporter with 2/3 smallholders, who
also own factories and KTDA (with donor/gov
support)
India--Growing employee equity ownership in
companies (also Rwanda, Tanzania)
Wild to cultivated crop initially plantations
Labor (as for wild rubber!) and some land issues
Global companies early responding to
strategic industrial input
Also spectacular failures (Mexico thru portfolio
equity, Fordlandia 1 M+ ha)
Despite colonial policies, early emergence
of smallholders
Asia 40% smallholder by 1940, now 90%
Africa/Cambodia—LS but smallholders emerging
0 %
20 %
40 %
60 %
80 %
100 %
Esta
te
Esta
te
Esta
te
Esta
te
Sm
allh
old
er
Sm
allh
old
er
1922 1963 1978 1995 1964 "1995"
Rubber in Malaysia
Capital
Labor and management Land
Source: Barlow, 1997
Bête noire of the 20th century
Export industry by 3 companies
Land issues dominated (disease buildup and large
tracts for shifting plantations)--violence
United Fruit ownership of 1.4 M ha in CA in 1935
Exerted major political power
From 1960s, largely moved to contracted
medium scale family-based farms
New varieties for disease control
Political and shareholder backlash
African crop ‗cultivated‘
early 1900s
• Unilever to Congo (not
Brit. West Africa)
Malaysia/Indonesia
from 1970s
• Very large companies
with 600K+ ha, $1+ B rev,
8 of top world‘s top agric
prod companies
Smallholders role
• 40 % Indonesia, FELDA
-
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1961
1966
1971
1976
1981
1986
1991
1996
2001
2006
Mil
lio
ns
ha
Expansion of Oil Palm
Latin America
SE Asia
Africa
OPPORTUNITY
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
INDONESIA
Boom commodity for food uses
and now biofuels
Value of SE Asian exports of PO >
All agric exports Africa
• Africa imports $3.5 Billion!
Billions at stake
• Big Asian companies investing
in Africa (> 3 M ha)
• 200-300 jobs/1000 ha
• Much potential for smallholders 0
1 000 000
2 000 000
3 000 000
4 000 000
5 000 000
6 000 000
7 000 000
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Area sown by type of producer (ha)
Private
State Owned
Small Holders
Most state-driven for food security
UK post-war Tanzania (G/Nut scheme), Australia
Krushchev‘s Virgin Lands program (50+ M ha)
Universal failures—economic, social, environ!
Some private but short lived
‖Bonanza farms‖ in US—converted to family farms
Tropics of Australia--failed
But large private investment only since 1990
(LA, RUK) (see Deininger&Byerlee. Rise of large farms)
Latin America
Mostly national (El Tejar, Los Grobos, Adecoagro, Cresud, SLC,
Brasilagro, Agricola, Cosar, Maggi)
Argentina: Top 30 companies total 2.4 m ha (mostly rented).
El Tejar (grains)—Argentina/Brazil 600k+ ha Argentina+
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan
―Superfarms‖. Ukraine: Top 40 companies manage 4.5 M ha;
Russia: Top 30 companies 6.7 M ha (mostly home grown companies)
Ivolga (grains)—Russia 650 k+ ha
Africa
Much FDI but very heterogenous (med. size 40,000 ha)
El Shaikh Mustafa El Amin Co (grains)—Sudan 250 K ha
Semi-mechanized farming schemes 1960s+
Investors from Gulf, state credit, and World Bank
(Similar scheme in Ethiopia)
Converted up to 11 M ha to large farms
Average over 1000 ha, some farms >200,000 ha
Problems well documented
Trampled on rights of local pastoralists, land conflicts
Created few jobs
Soil degradation and destruction of natural environment
Technolog
y
Size
(ha)
Yield
(t/ha)
Cost
($/t)
Existing Company 8000 0.5 277
Large farm 400 0.4 495
Smallholder 20 0.5 204
Zero
tillage,
fertilizer
and others
Large farm 400 4.0 125
Smallholder 20 3.0 143
Source: Min of Agriculture, 2009
-1.25% pa
0.76% pa
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
Yie
ld (to
ns p
er H
a)
Sorghum Sesame
Mechanized rainfed system, Sudan; Lose-
lose investments
SS AFRICA—18 M HA 2005-
11
Food 25 %
Biofuels 43%
Integrated food/fuel
20%
Wood & fibre 10%
Other 2 %
Source: Schoneveld, 2011
Biofuels
• Jatropha
Integrated
• Sugarcane, oil palm
Food
• Rice (+ maize, soy)
Wood and fibre
• Plantation forestry
• Rubber
• Cotton
MODELS TO TAP
EXTERNAL CAPITAL, TECH,
MARKETS HISTORICALLY
Investors directly manage
large-scale production
Contract farming with
existing smallholders
Smallholders vertically
integrate forward through
cooperative mills s etc
State provides services to
SHs through marketing
boards
Move toward contracts
• Bananas, oil palm + cotton,
oilseeds etc
Move toward cooperatives
• Tea + coffee (Colombia)
Parastatals for markets,
technology
• Cocoa (Ghana), cotton (BF)
Move toward large scale
• Food crops (recently)
Basic economic drivers
Commodity and market characteristics
Pioneering risks
Labor scarcity
Innovations favoring larger scale
Bad economics
Policy biases on land and capital
Beyond economics
Misplaced faith in large scale
Post-production scale and logistics
Timely processing of raw material (plantation crops)
and coordination costs
Processing scale translates to production scale
Spatial concentration to minimize transport costs to mill
Also specialized logistics for fresh products
Bananas and other horticulture, extensive beef cattle
Demanding standards and certification
Fixed cost per firm, traceability for process standards
High value products, but now also bulk commodities
Commodity roundtables, biofuel standards
Why not contracting?
Transactions costs of organizing farmers, enforcing
contracts, guaranteeing standards etc,
versus
Transactions costs of acquiring land, supervising labor
Anomalies today
Large scale--cotton in Ethiopia
Contracts for grains (Olam, Ghana Grains partnership)
First movers—New products in new areas
Technological risks
Highest for domestication—historically rubber and oil palm,
today Jatropha
Costs--specialized infrastructure and services
High rates of failure for ―greenfield‖ projects
Fordlandia, Mexico rubber boom, grains in Africa &
tropical Australia, CDC experience
PPPs for R&D, infrastructure reduce risks
e.g., Brazilian Cerrado, tree crops Malaysia
Risks decline over time—favors small-scale
Very low population density areas
High real cost of finding labor favors large scale
mechanized farms
Few possibilities to contract as locals often lack crop
agriculture experience
Settlement schemes high cost (e.g. Ethiopia)
Again large farms are often passing stage
Investment attracts spontaneous migration
Indonesia, Cerrado of Brazil
Innovations that reduce
diseconomies of managing
very large operations • GMOs, zero tillage
• IT & satellite ‗supervision‘,
• Innovations to audit hired labor Professional management and skills
Some very large farming
companies appear to be
globally competitive (Brazil,
Argentina)
Cheap land
State mediated ‗concessions‘ that encourage risky
investments, speculation, and extensive production
Cheap (subsidized) capital
Subsidized credit and government credit lines
Brazil to the 1980s, Indonesia
Market failures of services to smallholders
Finance, insurance, input markets
State-driven schemes
• Nearly all failed
• 1940s--smallholders
could have supplied UK
oil needs
Private investors faith
in ‗modern‘ technology
and large machinery
(and lack of faith in
smallholders)
•
Russia, Ukraine
Infrastructure and services, land/labor ratios,
favored large scale
Opportunity for FDI to fill large investment gap
Latin America
Farm structure in Cerrado today reflects credit,
labor and land policies, 1950-80
Argentina‘s ‗pools de siembra‘ reflect historical
ownership-tenancy relations on the Pampa from
1900
Labor rights rather than land rights were
the major issue
Land issues increased in 20th century with growing
land scarcity and larger operations
Labor issues decreased with stronger labor laws,
monitoring, and enforcement
Food security
Problem in more densely populated areas—
Caribbean
Humid tropics—tree crops more productive and
food crops sometimes integrated
Often uncultivated ‗frontier areas‘
Often explicit on rights of cultivators but not forest
users or pastoralists (wastelands!)
(and biodiversity and climate mitigation values of
forest not yet recognized)
Low priced land concessions frequently
abused
Rampant speculation in commodity booms
Actual use >> concession area (5% for tea)
Advocates for minimum land price from 1830s
Treatment of local land rights highly
variable
Explicit recognition by some early on
Aborigines Protection Society formed in 1837
Sometimes also strictly implemented (e.g. British
West Africa)
Checks and balances from metropolitan power
French commission of enquiry in 1927 in Indo-China
But often investors applied pressure to relax
rules—tensions within colonial governments
Under market pressures--Poor land governance
and inequality lead to abuses regardless of FDI
Even where not FDI, local investors usurp land rights
Henequen producers Yucatan, contract sugar producers Cuba
Even where smallholder, problems under strong market
pressures
Cocoa in Cote d‘Ivoire
Even where land fully titled, lack of other
resources may lead to under-valued land
transfers
Hawaii, NZ
Often good practices on paper with
requirements for:
Prior surveys to demarcate existing users
Auctioning of land concessions
Transparency
Screening investors to weed out speculators
Show investments on ground to maintain concession
Include out-growers
But often lacked capacity and will to implement
Implications for RAI principles?
Not new– surge in FDI strongly relate to
commodity booms
But big shift from N-S to S-S investments
No easy generalizations
Commodity characteristics x land/labor ratio x
institutions (x political power structures)
High failure rates and significant social and envir
issues in short term but in long term, may seem
successes (also CDC review)
Hard to assess successes/failures in the short term
Take the long view—sometimes more favorable
outcomes
Recognize role of capital, tech, markets for risky new
industries
Role of the state to reduce risks and level/tilt
the playing field for smallholders
Priority to improving land governance, equality
and administration
Needed with commercialization regardless of scale
Build capacity to implement and monitor
Appears to have worked for FDI and labor rights
Large in land area, capital invested and sales (often ~
$US1billion farm prod)
Sime Darby (oil palm)—Malaysia, Indonesia and with 600 K ha +
(220 k planned in Liberia)
Cosan (sugar-ethanol)—Brazil with 300k+ ha and 300k ha of
contract growers (double with Shell)
Fibria (pulp)—Brazil, 500 k+ ha Eucalyptus
El Tejar (grains)—Argentina/Brazil 1,000k+ ha Argentina+
Ivolga (grains)—Russia+ 1,000 k+ ha
El Shaikh Mustafa El Amin Co (grains)—Sudan 250 K ha
Mostly home grown companies operating regionally
(Also large companies in horticulture and livestock)
HISTORY OF LARGE-SCALE
FARMS IN AFRICA
UPLAND RICE INVESTOR IN
LIBERIA, 2009
1940s—British groundnut
scheme in Tanzania
• Overlooked smallholders
1970s—Sudan mechanized
schemes
1980s--Saskatoon on the
savannah—wheat in Africa
2000s—Investors in food
grains in Africa