NIGERIA AND ITS IMMEDIATE NEIGHBOURS:

CONSTRAINTS AND PROSPECTS OF

Sub-Regional Security in the 1990s

Edited y Bassey E. Ate

and Bola A. Akinterinwa

Published by Nigerian Institute of International Affairs

in co-operat1on w1th Pumark Nigeria Limited [Educational Publishers]

PumarkNigerla Limited

1 Educational Publishers/

Contents

Foreword Preface and Acknowledgement Contributors

(!;.1 lntrod~ction: I_ssues in Nigeria's Security Relations with its lmmedaate Neighbours

,-:::-V BasseyE. Ate I....Y The Presence of France in West-Central Africa as a Funda-

mental Problem to Nigeria

8."tssey E. Ate 3. Borders and National Defence: An Analysis

A. I. AsiWI\IU 4. The Dynamics of Nigerian-Equatorial Guinea Relations from

Colonial Times to the Present Jide Osuntukun

5. Nigeria and Chad Margaret A. V~>~:l

6. Nigeria and Niger: The Mechanisms of Compatibility and

Consensus Emeka Nwokedi

7. Nigeria-Benin Relations: The Joys and Anguish of Bilateralism

Emeka Nwokedi

Pap vii ix xii

n

31

50

92.

103

121

8. Nigeria and Cameroun Bassey E. Ate. 140

9. Nigeria and Francophone States: Problems of Border Management between Borno State of Nigeria and the Republic of Niger, Chad and

Cameroun 164

Jsmael Mohammed 10. French Security Arrangements Witb Francophone Africa: Implica-

tions for Nigeria's Relations with its Immediate Neighbours 181

Bola A. Akinterinwa , 11. Frencb Economic Penetration of Nigeria: Its Security Implications 205

L.S.Aminu t{'ib.. Defence and Strategic Policy in Nigeria's Relations with ils Imme-

l/ diate Neighbours 221

Celestine Bnssey

cHAPTER 4

Th Dynamics of Nigerian Equatorial Guinea Rel:tions from Colonial Times to the Present

Proressor Jide Osuntokun

Ml~,:ranl U.OOur and Devrlopmrnt or Agriculture

The introduction of cocoa 10 Spanish held Fernando Po produced a shifl from trade inpalmoiltoplanlationagriculturc.Inthcla.slquarteroflhe 19thcenlurywhen Fernando Powasstill dominaled byEngli~h firms, labour became scarce as a result ufthegadual economic transformation of the island. Labour requirements of both Spanish and alien employers were inadequately met by the unsophisticated io­digeooll'ipeople,tbe Bubi. By the 1880s it became the usual practice for these English fillll$ and their Spanish hosts to encourage "Kru men" from Liberia employed in the various vessels plying the West African route, to accept employ­men! oo shore. Considerable numbers of Kru men were employed in this way and !he terms of employment were generally acceptable to those employed. Spanish mercantile firms also began to require more labour than the island could supply and coru;equently the Spanish government decided to pennit the transport of Kru meo oo the gun boats Prosperidad, Libcra and Conconlia that used frequently to visit the island. 1 The labourers must have been psychologically over-awed through their experience in these gun boats. After reaching Fernando Po, they were expected to remain nn the island for one year. Food was provided free and wages were in kind. The U\Ual payment was a Dane gun and asupplyof gun powder. These cooditioru; continued till llllout 1890 when thewide·spreaddestruction of oil palms, resulting from the production of palm wine, caused the trading communily to look for Dew exports. As pointed out earlier, cocoa began to take pride of place around this time. Io actual fact, the planting of cocoa on a commercial scale was first eoeouraged by the Engli5hman, Lynslager. The trade grew and Spanish and Por:'u~ese.colonists began to buy land extensively from the indigenous Bubi paying for 11 wrth pn and brandy. The results were quickly disastrous for the Bubi, wbo by 1905 were regarded as a degenerate race, well on the way to extinction.

Agricultural devdopmenr in Femando Po f~tced various constraints. There was little or no infrastructure on the island, thus hampering mobiliry of goods and the

small labour force aV<~ilalJle. The Spanish regime took no interest in linking the

capital with other rent res of settlements. San Car Ios, for example, had no road link

with Santa lsabel, a distance of thirty miles, with the result that goods had to be sent by sea to and from lhese important settlements. There was also constant

171f.' Dynamics of Nigerian Equatonal Guinea Rc/Qllmu: 51

Oun:~:~o;~~~:::~:t;:;eC:ea~r~:~~:a~::; !~~": 7 open to speru~at~ :~old their proper~ to their European competitors. Apa~ ;::r~:en:o~~pl seVeral Sierra ~man settlers a~d the British community were open t~ nation! anack from Spantards who mampulated the laws of nationa~ty d . prosperity of these "alien capitalists.'.2 But the greatest ptoblem ~;:rh:;:.~: facing Fernando .Po was shortage of la.bo~r. Even though only 3.5 per cent of the JandareaoftheLslan~was undercultLvahonbyi912,thequestionoflabourwas crucial to th~ economtc d~velopment of the island Unfortunately, for Fcmando Po, t~e ~enod the .Spamsh ~o~mme~t Wll.nted to embark upon agrieultura]

e~plmtatLOn of th.e ':'land comaded wttb the period of the intensification of

~~~~:~] ~~~;~:~~o;~::~~::d::;:::~~~::::;o~::::~ul:1 the neighbou.ring Portuguese Island ofSao Tome, which exported over sixty million pounds sterhng worth of cocoa, compared with six million pounds ~erling worth of cocoa produced in Fern::mdo Po in 1909.4 The reason for this gross disparity was availability of labour to Sao Tome from Angola which served as a humaa reservoir to the Portuguese Atlantic Islands, whereas Fernando Po did not have such a re.~ervoir on the mainland. Rio Muni was hardly in a position to supply labour to Fernando Po since Rio Muni itselfwa!l not yet pacified, and the Spanish government was not in effective occupation of the entire area. 11 became quite clear theft to all concerned that ifFernandoPowastodew:lop,labour must be sought somewhere in West Africa.

AfricaDlabourreguiterslirstmadethcirappearanceaboutlll%. About that time a Lagos.iao named Rcis begnn importing Yoruha labour from Lagos aad ljebu-Ode.5 The Yoruba soon decided that the oonditions in Fernano.lo Po were unsatisfactorysothissourceoflaboursupplydriedup. Somc450ofthemhadto be repatriated en masse at the CJptnst of the Spanish government when they\VCre

on illegal strike. About 1900, a Sierra Leonian by the name o[ Vivour ~arted to

bring labour in oonsidcrable numbers from Freetown, Monrovi.o. and Acaa. The Spaniards enacted in J9()(, a labour code and conditions improved for mig:raat workers. In spite of this the Sierra Lconian government put an end tu organised reCfuiting, apparently because they considered the methods used illegal. It was useless to seck supplies of labour in the neighbouring Camerou~ as the Gennan concessions were then employing nearly 40,000 Africans and \VC re even recruiti11g

labour from Liberia. Accordingly, the S!Jllniards sent a labour cummiS!.iun to Liberia. Thesuca:ssofthismissioncanbcguagedhythcfactthathyiWILherc

:: ~:,:a::n~:~~r~a;;~~lu.:~:;i;:~~en~:~l:~~JT::~ ~;~·;::,~u~~~: :.~:~:~ agreement whereby many thousand.\ of Angulans and Mol.amb"·l.ucan' haLl been

11

szNigDillandilslmmo!iJUeN~ . S Tome 811dPrincipc:. Before 190l,andparticularlyin

iodaarured for ~7 ;':.bourers from Liberia was done through private in.. ~~8'S(l5.~111• • UJII5(anccslhatoneGennan,AugustHurnplmayr,Wa:;

~riduak. ~~~ 1.01~-= with some Liberians. These rights were subsequently fi"'C" .eaw::c~ueotlyabrogated. African recruiters u.suaUywent into the ~and Jiokedupwilhcbiefswbo produced these: labourer a.od were

==~:montoSpanisbshipswilhoutpa~anytaxc.sto~eLibcrilll. I. Butfroaa 1897tbeLibcriangovernmealtnedtoconlroltbisnewsJave

~IJWI(Iins that contractors of labour should post -a $150 bond for =·and imposed a f"me of $100 for a labourer who might die in Femando ro. Tbc recruiter -was also to buy his lice~ for S250and _pay SS on each labourer. Jaspircofthcsc Jaws illegal ualfiCkingcontinued ~use11 was profitable. In 1903

tbe Liberiang~tsigned an agrtc:ment Wl~ !he German f"ll"lD ofWi~ers ADd Helm. The position of a bond wasw;u~aad ID rerum the compaaypromised tn repatriate 'time expired' labourers back_ t~ Liberi~. Workers were not to be pcnnined under any circumstance to rem am ID Libena for more than ~ years_ A similat agreement was signed with another Germaa f"arm WocrmaiUl Lime A. G. with tile important difference that the Woermann Company could ship their labourers to aaywhere outside Fernando Po. In the recruiting exercise the head­man SCCllled to play an important role and he and the Liberian national treasury

beaefited from this traffic either through payment of commission and taxes directly to tile headman, the ageots and the Liberian government, or through fraudulent means whereby some months' salaries were collected by agents before the

laboiiJ'erSieftLiberianshores.. TheGennan f"Lnnsthe.melvc.s made ~rofits ranging from 100 to 150 per cent through the same fraudulent methods. But another acconl wasligncd by Liberian and Spanish authorities in Fernando Po in 1905 to blocl the loopholes in the existing agreements. The Liberian authorities were 11ndcrso mucb international pressure that by 1908 they bad tightened things up 10

such 11.0 extent that the Spanish authorities began to fmd it extremely difficult to

reauitlabour. Wben the Spaniards tried to lap the labour resources of Rio M un~ 8

they met with failure, because Spani~b planters and traders in Rio Muni bad become sufficiently numerous that they were able to impress upon the authorities

that their labour needs were great enough to absorb all the available local labour supply. Since the British embargoed the cxpon of labollf from their colonies to Spaa.ish Guinea, the Liberi1n connectioa was revived again and after the Liberian

SccrcWy of State, Joscph J. Sharp, had toured Femando Po in 1913 and apparentJy

rcpolted favourably ahout the labour conditions, the two govelllJDcnts · ed a

~ur &grument inl9~4 ~rmitting Libcrilllllabourers to be recruited ro::rvice m Fernudo Po. The L1benan economy at this time was in a mess and b 1912 th country's economy had been put to international teccivuship bcUiuse ~ inabili~

Nlpia aad Eqaatort.l Galaa:1914- ... .,_..,_

===~=IF==::-~=~~ Afri~ .as a wbolc aad iD Ni&eria ia particulu. Tbc Spuiards bad beea-:...: ~people£romthc~panoi"N'Fria,particularlyialbt.Jabobart­tud wbcre labow- was abwadaat. The Spaniard& wuc ill tbc hlbil or .uia& cugcra~cd promilc5 or hi&b -acs wbX:b ~ acwr paid aad olllicliDalbt. f.act that tbc labourers wac goiaaiO fcnwulo Po. llisquiledarthar.liacc 1.8ZJ Fcroando Po had bceD bcavily dcpeDdeat DD Old Ca1abar aad bad 10 a~ CXICDI maiataUacd Ibis 5latc of depeDdcDcy e\'al up to tbe OUibralr; a( lliC 'fira World War. lnordertopucaacndtolbcilleplbiiiDIIDhllcbc:cweaaNiFril aadFemaadoPo.thcBritisbAdalirallywasaivcatbcpowcral"a.archaad~· OVU'SpallishshipsthatmightbcMIIpcclCdofiadul&io8ialbcblllllalllraffictrrbQ tbc N"!Frlaa aulhorittcs saw u a new slave trade.

When war broke out in Europe, it was quite clear tiYI tbc Nirpria-Fenwldo Po rdation was goiq to undergo a period of ll.raia. Tbc Gcrmaas had al-ys be-. iatcrcslcd iD Femando Po; they bad made ceoaomic: inroads into lbc islaDd, .ad the c:anyingtrade ohhe island wu larply in tbeir lwul&. TheSpanisb alllbarilic5 there were alsosolidlypro-GermiJI. The Germanscturiqtbcwar wen: IIIo 1llill& Pemaado Po as transmitting stations to pt in touch wilb their -.-sbips se-nen:d iD the Southern Atlantic ud the British also had ample ~dcnee to IIJIFII.Ihll. Spaniards were enpaed in p-nmning ror tbe Germans durina tbe period of hostilitiesia OermaoCimerouns.10 Even aftertheeoadusioaollaoitilitic.in 1916, tbe Spanisb authorities c:ontinucd to give sueeou to ddutcd Gerawa troops ud tbeir Afric:aa soldic:rswhowcre"intcmcd" in FcmudoPo, butMio.cn: _...., traiaiaa to re-occupy the CamerouOL Cons1111twas the eorrapoDdeaa: bdweea l...agosar~dLondoa Uldbetwcea Loadoa,PardandMadridoverthebollilcaniludc of the authorities 011 Fernaodo Po bland to .Uicd mi6tuy operatiom ia tbc Clmer011111. Although tbt fears of tht allied powers about SUt-niOII duou&b Feraaado Po came to notbinc, tbe faaatiU remaim Uaat FerDIDdo Po la tile b...a olahoslilepoww:rwasatbotaiatbcllt6boltbeBrilil.bautboril:iciilmNigcria. E~• a "aeuual" Fcnudo Po duriq die Pint World War caused eoaWdtrablc: bcart·

acbeiaN"rpria.11 . W"llbtllc eacl oflbc .... aad lbe iiDpositK. or a l.apr: ofNaliOIII. .......saae­

lllcc:a.eroa-. acbDiaillcndb)'llacBrililhudtbeFreada,tllt I£Girilyllpcc:lal FeJIIIDCioPo'squeatioal'alDded.lt~C~Cmatlwtllte¥Kualioafn•dlcc..r-

54 Nigoiaandiu Jmmedialt Ntighbollfr

of&tMJut16.<XXf1 ~=~~~f~~o~:r!~!o:'o ~~:r;;tr: 1916belpcdtoall~~ signingoltbeArmisticcaodthccndofho.stilitiesthe World.Wu;bu~WI fJa~urshortagchad tobefaocdagain;thistimenotin peren•ual qu~.u0.11 ~ whole of Equatorial Guinea. Labour from 1920 onwards Feroando Po ~~.·~ ;.0 Mu.o.i from Gabon and the Cai:Qerouns under French

::.;:t':.~ag:u,'~r:m ~bcria into Fernando ~o.cnotinued untill928 w~enit came

::::~o~~~;i~;:~~~~r:;;:~~~;r::~~:~:Cu~~ ~; ;;~~::og;:";; ~~::~~::;.;:;:!~;:~~~bee C~;!~~ ~!~~ ':,!~i:::n~des: ;~::::::~~~a:~:~ ~~~=~:~~~~se~a: ===:~~~~0~~:::~: of 1811our [tom 1928 compeUed the Spanish authorities to adopt other method$. Unorganised recruiling from various points on the West African coast stiU brought in labourers but in insufficient quantity. The island enjoyed a post-war boom during the 1921ls and as this neared its climax around 1929 various efforts were made to procure labour at all costs. In 1929 Madrid tried to beat the problem of shonage of artisaruo by unsuccessfully arranging th8t Rumania should send to FernaDdo Po skiUcd carpenters, smiths and mechanics. t4 In 1931the Chamber of Agriculture in Femaodo Po sent a missioo to China to recruit 'coolies' but the mission proved unsuccessful. Chil~en and women were consequently recruited into the labour force in Fernando Po and the judicial system that was used to brand all joblCS$ people as rogues seemed to have sufficed to induce labourers to go to the plantation until 1933 when the French government complained to the League of Nations of the treatment meted out to Cameroun labourers in Spanish Guinea. This in effect meant that the Spaniards could not cootiouc treating their subjects with the same kindofinhumanitypreYiouslyprevailingontheislandwithoutattractingintema­tional attention. A treaty to regulate the enlistment of Camerounians was signed between !be French and Spanish governments in 1934 and the Spaniards issued a Labour Code on February 15, 1915 containing a number of the provisions of the agreement. This decree fllstly, made provision for the supply of food and quinine for labourers and secondly, a Spanishcoruu/ dt CorriM! was appointed to Du ala to supervise and encourage reauiting but it seems, he had scant success. The French authorities seemed to have been equaUy dis.satisfied for they denounced the treaty inFehruaryl936. 15

In 1937, the fanners of the island began to look seriously for labour in Calabar and t~e part of the Clmerouns under British Mandate. The threat this posed to the secunt~ and pea~ of Nigeria was suclt that the go~mment set up a preventive

;:~~~:,n ~~e,:l;~:01~;~~~~~~~~a1~~io hum~ cargo to FernaDdo

service the police force was withdl11WD thus re5ulfinA .ave an ~m~ act on the illegal U'affie in men by canoe owners around the Cross RM~ Pl11dlca mooopoly of the

The Dynamics of M~rian Equarorial GumeG Re/IJhOfU 55

The traffic, i.ll~gal a5 it W8$, was _well D~bytbe rcaui~ers iaN" . S~sbaPthonUes andcmp\oyen; mFcnaando Po. ThcQ.Doe,sgeoeraD ~ ~

nvo)'S· The Spanish govcl'lliDCnt ud employen; paid rtci'U:crs 1a-_rL. ~ ~erling and. pesetas out ofw_hicb the "canoe mea" and paddlen~bot!:.: share. Theysupplcmcotedthi!;rev;ouebytradiogiucontn.ba.ad.

lt can thus be seen that the Sparuards £romaboutl890onwardsrccruitedlabour

z:;:o~5~i~~~~ ~!:.:~~:.~d ~~e~~ 111u:'!~~~~ch~:u~: ~=~:~r:d~~:~~:! ~~ ?,t::,i~~~:~~·:~~=~~!;:~~= which to operate. The~ JDwney was short and the rewards ~re considerable. Moreover,labour condttlons on the Island of Femando Po had M~ impro~d tlw. service on the island was not unattractive to people who ~re 1oblCS5 while ia Nigeria. The Spanish authorities knew that Nigeria was the Last ohvio!L~ MlUCO: of foreign labour and they were not pre~arc:d to fail since failure would IDeaJI the loos of 12,000 tons of wcoa and 3,000 Ions 6 of coffee exported annually from Fenumdo Po to Spain. These commodities Spain could not get in any other place beaUS£ she had scarce foreign reserves, most of which were committed to buying mditary hardware because of the internal political problems in S~Uin il5clf. In order DOt to fail, the Spanish authorities in Fernando Powere prepared to \iher:d~o;etbeir labour legislationinfavourofbellertreatmentforeontract\ahoureri>.

The only \;tbour codes that tried to regulate the conditions of labourers in Femando Po before the Second World War were the 1906 Rtglammfo dd TraiNljo fndigena, i.e. the Native Labour Code. This rode was described as provisional but it remained on the status books until 1940. The code was not completely illibcra~ it provided for a one year contract, a minimum wage, and al<.a made pnwision for keeping half the wage with the labour officer a~ saving.~ Nursin~ motben. and children under ten were not to be put to heavy work. There was th~ provision for free rations and housing. Men were cxpeded to work for ten hnun. and women eight hours daily. Labourer~, however, could not leave their employeB or ~n the plantations except with written perm~o;..~ion. This code applied to alien labourtn, but occasionally it was stretched to apply to the: Buhi population of the: island. In 1908, for example:, during one: of the recruiting ~hortagcs of labour, all Buhia DOl ~~ing one: hectare of land were compelled to enter temporary wntuct. The altc:mative W".!S forty days hard labour. The~ provis.ioru. wt:rc "'' han.hly enfurcrd that by 1910 the supposedly docile Bubi ofBalacbc area revultcd.17 In ~pile of the c:Oslenec oft he 'Rq:lam~n/otUI TrabQjo lndi~nQ of l'l()(, it ~enu I he planten;~rc not obeying the laws., for in 191.5 the Spanish aulhurities in series of c1hort;~tioB.ol and commands to planters made: it clear lhatthe planlcN \lo"erc nnt fulfillillfl.their sideoflhe[.,hourOOrgainespeciallythea.\pectth:.tenjninctllhcmtnpayhalft_hc wage of each ldbourer to the lahour offio:cr a.' ..a\in~. In ]Q2'1. thc_!1o_r-ant\h aulborilic~ tx-came w angl)' with '>~ltr!C planler~ wlw were ;~n·u..:d of ~"ng the islandan"c~ilrtpul.tllon" mtnnahnn;11\yth.1t lhcyt>t:p:anl!>lmpt.....-h~"'"linc:\lnr

The Dyrrum1cs of N!guiQ/1 E4wltonul Gui!Je11 ~ 57

~o;:;~:;.::~~~~~y~:~:~n~t~:ti~to~~~v:e:~~?,f:= =· ~ usage.' Polygamy th~ug.h countenanced was discouraged by a s~e~~~ of~ operating after the thu~ cspo_usal. There .was a hierarchy of nativecauru o;ul,aWw.

~~~~':~n:~~~~~~:_:~i~~~:l ::~~:;~~~:fo~~==!Z ~~=~t;r:~u~.~~~:; ~:::~::;a~~:~.tl was thcit aim to acludc Europa~~

The territorial administration was based oo separate adnunistration for Fenw.­do Po and another one for Rio Muni and the remaining ~ands.. Tbe g~ took little interest in Africao educatioo thougb catholic miMiooary societies~ allowed to operate in Spanish Guinea. Before the Second World War then, ooc can conclude that Spain was beginning to take more iotercst in Sp.lnish Guinea not for altruistic reason but solely for purposes of ~loit.ation. Statemeob ol the Spanish "mission" in Africa were being made that it began to s.cem tllat tbc k •••

rod of the exploiter has been so swathed in altruistic profCiiStOM t.b:~ttt h<l5 come to look almost like an umbrella.'' 18 1t was, however, clear that !.LIIa: FctnaDdoPo

W<15 dependent on migratory labour which gave the island a transieot!Wure, tbe full impact of Spanish Administration was never really felt ami even up till1940, "pidgin English" continue to be the fi11gua frw~cu of the island. TbiS dcpcadella: on migratory labour made Fernando Po almlllit a no-man's island and made bu future not only oconomically19 doubtful but also politically un.safe.ZD

lt is generally aeoepted that when people move voluntarily from one place to another, they must be doing so beca~ the recip1ent area must ha~~~: $DIIIClhiq

more than the lrn;ing area to offer. This wuultl be true not only with reprd to

internal m•gration, either rural-urban, or urban-urban m1~rallon, but alaowbr.a international boundariu arc invulvcd. The migratory phenomenon could be cs­plametl in t.he!ioCIISC of"pu.\h"and"pull" factors. "Push" tnthe w:UJeof~

favourable cunditiuru; at hume anU "pull" in the !i.Cru.c of~ usuroed fa~ur.bk

condition in the receiving are~U. Pulitical opprep,ion, lack uf ec.oDOIIlic opp:w­tunitie~ shortage of land in particular, could lc11d to emdU5 of a people to IIIOlher more f:~vourahle are:~. There i.~ of coun.e the "ethnic Pull"; tllat is people teod lo

m1grate to an area where repre~o~;nt:~tiVl:~ of the ('Arent ethnic group alrady en\.led. 21 Thc~.e fact on apphed in the caw: of lahour migration to Femuldo Po

from l'Oigeria R1ght fr11 m IRUI to the ~Vl: ufthe Sccn.nd World_ War, Nigcri.an lahour bad alwayl

played an impnrt~nt role m the econmme wcU-hemJo~Jern~ndo Po. Byl914,_£or eumple, there were JU,(O} Nigenan~ in FerMJido Po ThiSiahc~r came IILiia)y frnm Owerri, Calahar, OJuja, Omt&lla ... d Cameroun ~n.cn m that Ofda ~ il!lport:~no: TheK11CndiviuoM~Jibebipcr.lrCO"WlilllrlluWC:n:Owan, Ah:~h,Ekrt,Ar .. po, Bende,lkot-DJC-Qe and U)'U. Tbaealc.aaretbdJypopu­lated to tht e.llenttbatll .... IUkl bt d!ifiCI,L[ttu ruis.ltbc argumCDt tlul ~ IJII

-·

58 MftM_.ditsi~N~ of 11 aid fadOfl musilll emignlioo. The second factor 9las

Jaod \WSOOe or!::toroc:ruilmbySpanisbl~~udemployerafor tbe libcl'al pa)IIIMI fer03DC1oPo.Z3 The lbirdtacror drMoa labourers loFefllujd~ 1D111 bf'O\IPI ':, c:ollectioo ia Nipria This was boroe our by tile fact 0 Po ~ ~,.u..:UY~ rrosoAugustto Oct~r~ch wasalsotbepe!:: :;-:-coJieclioo. There WIS also rbe fact that N'Fnao labourers eaP&ed io

luctllivt.;:,::;:: ~ inrerprdcd usugesliog tbat conditioos ia Feroa.do Po::sogoodtbiiN".,uiaos1'oWC~IOibepla~lalargcaumbers.rar . i93'7IDCI 1938 the Spaniard 1'oWC faced watb the perenn1al proble10 of IICUdty :)lbout. "Ibis was primarily due to ill·lrtalmtDI ofN"J8Crian n~~OIIals there and

tbe ioeoavertibilil:y ofSpaaisb pesdas IS I resuJI: of DOD•recogrtltioa Of f"raacisr:o FtMICO'sregilaebyGreat Britain. Evea the preseace of Nigerians iD Pema.c~o Po w.silkplas Car as !.be Brilish aulboriti~ were coace~. Recruii:IDCDI of labour to anywhere was forbidden by the N'"~JeniD Labour _Ordioaa~ No. 1 ofl929,aad

~~~;;;!!=e~to:..::~=a~~~f=d=:~ ':~ 'Ni&eriaD' people bid heeD goiag to Peroando Po illegally from 1828 ODWards. Heac:c, io t939aa adroiaistntive ofi"ICCJ" was sent lo Puoaado Po by lbe govern­meal ~Nipria,IO ~labour coadilioDS oa tile island 111d 1o evolve io collaboration with lbe S~ aulborilies measures which would enSure lbc Mlfarc ofNipriaa labourers.35 "lbismiaioA laidlhe foUDdatioo for tbc Anglo­Spaoilb labour accordsiped io 1942, bUirqotlalioa ofwbicb began ia 1940, which Wlli desigaed to strwo-lioe relatioll5 berweeo N"lpria and Puoaodo Po.

Various reasons led to lbe sipin&oftbi&apeemeaL The British were uxious about the rhrear of lhe possihk use of Fcroaaclo Po against British territories by lhe Axis powers, siPCC it was cw:n rumoured thal Spanisll territories were UDder Nazi inHueac:e and lbat there was 1 group leader (Purbtcr) for the Germao National Sociali~Worken Party in Pemaudo Po. whose name was gjvca as Dr. Joseph Woraer. The N"'ltriaft·Pemudo Po labour accord was tbcrcrorc aepliarcd ia the splrit or ADglo-Spani&b reapproacbmeataod ia consideration of Great~rilain'swor.ldwid~interesrs.17 Atthewnetimelhe British were prepared IO COlWder offcns~. adiOft against Fernando Po if Spaia went over the Axis powers, and the Br~llsb Admira1ty even commented lh 1 1 • caplurcFeroancloPoshouldnotbeabeavycommit . a a nava operation lo oa lhe i.dand w.u not mote thao 2011. As iho ~~~:c:e.thcnuftl~r.ortroops Conuaaucler·in-ChierSoutho£thcAt1anl" . b point, the Bnllsh Naval OIJic:e or the Colollial OrfK:C. aod 10 th~: :;.:ereacetocithertheForeign lllliiO}'Uicc, ordered H.M.S. Drqoa to proc:ecd peat embarrassment and Brilisb nationals with rhe cxcepeion o£lbc v; ·Con. 61h~uly, 1940 to evacuate aU were no1 given prior inrormatiOJI abnutthil :d ~~· The Spanish authorities

ey made the riabt dedudion by

The Dyru1mies of Nigeritua EqutiiJ)riJd GIIU!u IW«iau 5e

::~;~f~; :c;:l:::~~:~~=~~oca;dmdSpuiab tbem to the Spaniards wbo were iD any case S)'Dipalhetic to the Ge DOl: elldear di.scJUninated agaiast:British nationals in Feruando Potbrougbout =::s: of the war, or perhaps ~use of it, the British -nt ahead to negotiate a labo!u ueat)' with Spain con~ru1ng Feruando Po and Nigeria fro111 1940 to 1942. lbc ostensible reason for thiS agreement was to prevent illegal trafficking in labouten. The: British claimed that;

... the object of these negotiations with Spanish gO\IU!Imc:at was to regularize what bad become a large seale traffic in iaboUJ and to ea. deavour to eliminate the unscrupulous native 'blac:k birdet' wbo carucd a lucrative livelihood by kidnapping the ignorant pea:;aat:s from the Ibo andlbibioareas ... 30

The question to ask iswbythe British bad to wait until the time of the_.. tn IISC Nigerian labour to bail Spain out of possible desertion to and military co-opuatioa

with the axis powers against the allies. One can of course argue~~ the British recognized that if they did not do anything at that time the problem would get out

of band since the number of Nigerians on the island was oa the incrc:asc.3' ID December 1942 a lreaty was signed betwc:cn Nigeria and the Spanish

authorities in Femandn Po to obtain a regular supply ol healthy labou.rus. The agreement stipulated that only labourors over the age of 16 could be rcauiled. Records and photographs of eacb labourer were kept at Calabar and Santalsabcl The labourer could be recruited to work in agriculture, industry or forestry. The duration of the contract was initially one year for bachelors and two yu.rs for a married man who went with his wife. The contract was renewable for the ume number of years., but in the case of a bac:hclor, he mw.t fir~\ return to Nigeria before

taking up another contract. Adequate rations and shelter were to be provided free. An agricultural labourer was to be paid !I a month and others c:amed 40 pet cent

more. Half of lhis money was to be paid to the labourer and the remaining half was to be deposited at the office o£lbe Curador colonial of Femando Po who held the

money in trust for the labourer until the expiration or termination of the contratl;

money accruing to the labourer was then to be paid by the DitTCtion dr: M12CW1dD or treasury. There was even some provision for protestant and muslim missionarica to work with Nigerians in Fenando Po. Any illegal immigrants were to be repatriated at Nigeria's expense:. The most important daUM: in all the treaty Will

clause XXVIll wbieh stated illfu alia " ... .if the employer falls to fulrd IDY ol bil afore-mentioned obligations in respect of the reJnlriation of a worker uadlor his family, the said obligation s.haU be performed by the govemmcnt of FetD&Ddo

Po.'.l2

aoN;,MM~~iUI~NdgltiiOIUS

IKkr this apemau N"!priulabourers could be recnaited for WOrk . V ud Rio Mwli aDCI tbe oilier Spanish Islands. Tbe·wwkiog Ull>cr.

IIIJIIIo Po Alpervised by a labour oftic:e at Calabar. AI the rcqllclt Of tbe ~ ~ tbcfind ofMesst~ Joha HoJtaad Company wu appo~ the ~ £or recruitiaglabout for the Spanish cbaP:Iber of commerce in Pt.rQaq ~ ::HoltdidDOI:oalyra:ruitdirccdY.ilalsofannedout.recruilingtoN"~ .b.-recruiterS-J3.r1u: N'agerianp-enuDcnt allowed~ rea-w~~nt of any 0 11mbeq r:l!abCJurcrS JICII ~ 250 1 111011th. The Spanish aulbontJcs aimed at Jllaiq.. raiDiaS a labour £orcc of approziDWdY 14.000 mcD. A£ the nonaal duratiOJa of a labuaraJIIUXIMI eigllleeamoDihsor two years, abou16,000 or 7,000 l'C:cUriti ~be required cac11 ,ar to replace mea whose contracts had Qpired_ Tbe ...-bcl"rlrc:aailsasuaiJyfdl bclowtbcaumber ~uired, and in fact oaly 1,431)1' IIICDolfil::illlyembarbdiDc.labarial944.0n~aiFenwadoPo.,therecnuts .re usua0y placed ia. (J'aiiSil camp aad wcre disln"buted to their res~ emploJer5 dcr c:ompliaacc with medical aad po1ke formalities. Tbe papers ri'OID tbe police and .-1icaJ authorilies with the copy of the contract could then be baDdcd by tile worker OYCJ to the employer for safe keeping. Withou( these doc::wDeaU the laboarcr would DOl be able to leawe the islaad by orthodox DICaas ad lbc miliwy coa1r01 or tbc islaDd was such that it was virtually impossible for llialtoUvebyc:aDDe.

A.tbou&fl immipatioa was CODtJOUcd by 1be 1942 treaty, yet D.lepl b'affic:kiDg c:oatillllcd. Four polllllk llcrliagwas lhe price paid per labourer illcplly &mugled iD. The .awe rl die wortcr - Dlhltally CODDCded with ofi"JC.i.al admiaistraticm. oltbecok!aywlaic:hfor IDOilloftbistimcwasc:orrupt. veaalud iaeflidcoL The dlid"~C~C~~~rpollhelaboura-waslhcAfriciiiG!IIIrdiiJw/OIIilllaadpolic:c.forc:c.

Tbclcpcoplc9o~Crelhecauscofanach~suffcriagbUitbeirooyofitall

Wll5 that lUll)' of them were N"!priam.15 AJI'fcmploycr c:ould h~ne aay of his labourers placed iD prima for as loqas be liked widl or without flogiDg.

ne 1942 apccmc~~~. .,. 111 Wllllitipted w• m aU respects. n salis&ed nobody. TbcSpuisb 1uthoriliesriptlydbmed lhal: tbcydid aot get tbeadeq.we supply of llbour promised them wuler lhe lrcll)'. Members of the Pcmudo Pa ~ofCoaut.erc:c badlovilir.CII•bu iD 194410 discuss what steps collld be takeo 10 IIDP~cm: ~ n&c ot recruitmcat. The impresaicm tt.c N"~~Crillll ptenUDC~~t JOI ~thcirYI&IIwalhlt wbilccmpiOJIUifullyrCIJiscd their dcpcadcacc oa

r::==~oo:=c:..~v.:uasatWactorycou~tionsfor S)JIIQish~<Mmmcalpaidiasuflicicatlllcalioatocom~lints Will ~-~·n: llbourofJ"ac:er•DdsllllwedliUicialcrar.whilcre · . ID.I u 7

ewriUealoptialouc:hwitbrdltioaaotmca=~No~cpswcre olllbo~B~II"Ictcdbdorctbctre~~y,tbcrelllioasof et or died aad lD the case aotrec:embaspropc:rtyuaJc&stbcycllimedil.iaperscm.~dcccued~could FctDindoPoudNigcrilwasinrrequcntand'IUy~=

fheDyr!amicsofNigerituJ~Guliu41WotJons 81

vdY 111uch cut off from .their home~; during. the period of their contr.c:t. 11 Will

~suchas.~wbkbwuelargelyoutsidetheCODlroloftbe=~~

iiD~ ==ive amd.itioos io Fernaacio Po led 10 ~ o( bbour ~tlyled to luerativeDesi. of the smuggli..og~ The longaod~ c:oastJioeofN"JFria made it.pbysicallyimpo&SI.O!e for tile aulhoritict.to ~ lbr.

:::;:e=:e~:r·:.:~:::~~~ 9t'il)adraWP i.a 1944 follOWlllg aD ordu from the CoiiiiDi:aioDer of p~ th.t lbr. practiee of firing across the boW5 of caDOCS lo force lbem to Slop was to cease.

Tbc:se canoes engaged io the iUicit traffic operated D:Q;tly from the IIClWork of

aeebio~daround~cstuary~thc~Rnv.~Wiagc$ofOroaandlkaog ~ particularly11otonousfor thisoperaboD..Aboutmtyocem-goin&CUJoes~ regularlYeugagediD.thetr:aflicfrolll theN".geriaallide.Tbt&aooeswuepropellcd by about tCII paddlers aDd usually carried up to thirty~ ud took filteeo. to tweDty bours for the journey from Calabar to Santa lsabd. Apart from labouren the ca~~oc:s arricd palm oil, kernel, rubber, yams, garri, motor-cycle tyres ud drugs. Tbe profits on all these co111111oditie~; were such as to justify the smugglers' riU.. 011 the Spanish side the wbole traffic was dealt with io aD organized ud official basis. Calloes paid habour due~; at 5aDta lsabel ud cargoes were customcd. On arrival in the habour the "Captajnsn of these CBIIOeS were met by officials of the }1UJ14 M Aba.stos wbo bought the cargoes 1U1d organised the distribution of labouren. Smugglen were paid i.a Spanish currcacy ud they had therefore to 111rn IDOil of their e.aruiiip ioto Spmisb goods wbicb they then smugicd back to NiseriL Braady and perfumes appeared to be the chief cargoes carried. In Yiew of thil

smugl.iDg, the Nigerian government considered denouncing the 1942 qrecmeut. Bill it was felt that repudiation of the agreement would lead to awbolesale~oa to smuggl.i.ns of labour by canoes which although still continuing would greatly

increase if official rcauiting were to come to an end. Repudiation of the agrecmcot, 111orcover, would not cause 1111y serious iaconvenieoec to the Spaniards. wbo 'WOUld SliD be able to obtain labour iUegally. Repudiation would on the other band pill aa end to any immediate hope of securing the improveiiiCDI in conditions., bcrM:ver slight that # ~~~ay be, which the British claimed tbe apee111c:nt was designed to secure. Tbc: Brilisb realized that tbcy could therefore not repudi..te the apeemeat atJd that c:ffccbve patrol of the c:oas1 would also have to wait until the end of tbe war; the IIWI iA dwge ruefully eoiDIIICntcd " ... if- Cllll ultimately obtain th.M COIIb'ol,- daall be able: to threaten the wbole basis o[Fernando Po's ec:onomyud we ought theD to be able: to male them do wbat we liltc:.'.l6

More galling was the p-o-Axis sympathy of the authorities in Femando Po during the war cspedaDyof the Governor-General, Don Mariano Alonso. In-treat· lltCIIt of N"JFrian lebourcn was iAW.Wely related to pro-Am fee~ of the~ administratjon. The Utdon Jack was not respected and the Brtisb Coual1

82 Nitftrlo (llld its rmmtdiatr: Nr:ighboun

carDyingi~=d~~:Sn :::~r~m&e~~ry~~c::=;:~ ~O,::'Iill~ ~~=;;.~r hand gave prominent publicity to Germa~ and ltalia?, eonua:::!:

. British

""~· • a1s wishWg to leave tbc zone of Santa lsabel were obliged to obtain Brit~ ;::Is on each occasion. This included the British Vice-Consul of the 5:::: wbercas Germans had rreedom of movement everywhere on the island. Other aati·British actionsohheautboritie&indu~d the arrest on 13th February, 1943 o(

the British chaplain in his missiou house ID ~an Ca~l.os because according to the S ish authorities his mission house was 10 a. oulitary zone! ne Methodist ~ssioa had a heavy taxatioa imposed OD the~ m 1943 ao~ ~ek-datcd to 1932. Nigerians were also [rcquCIItly arrested £or spym~ Cor th~ B'_ltash. !he British also suspected tbat Spanish and German agetllS were m~~trat1ng Into. Nagcria uDder the guise that tbcy were repatriated labourcts. The Brtllsh even cla1med that the wife of the German Consul in Santa Isabcl was once seen to be buying passages for agents posing as labourers to return toNigeria.38 The British were quite concerned about the security aspects ohhc pro-Axisstance ofFcrnando Po. This was rightly 50, ~there was a small number of Nazis in Fcrnando Po including the Gcnnan Consul who had dirca cypher communication with Germany. The offiCials of the administration of Femando Po were fai&Dgists who were unfriendly to BritaiQ. There were resident in the islud several hundred Pro·German Kamerun soldiers in the Spanish Guardio col011isl. Some were refugees and selllers from the Camcrouns who had emigrated there since 191639 and bad been joined by others. These people hadformcdaPro-GermaqorgallizationcalledKanaenm Eingebom1111 Dnllsdrt: Guinnlt:n ~fllbl (Unicm or Camcrouns natives friendly to the Germans). The Germans were using these people for espionage in Nigeria and German propaganda was actually pttiog into Niscria by 1944.40 It is of course to be ~cd that the British -re not objective in their criticism or pro-Gcrman fcclmporthe local administration. Although relations were far from cordial, they ~rcagravated bytbcfKI.that some of the British Vicc-Consul'scommunicatioDS ;:';!.!~e Governor-General of Spanish Guinea were couched in hardly courteous

G:::;ilish consoled th~msdves by believing that the anti-Britisb policy of the

and abcc~~;~~~!~~;o~~u:.~ was 11 pc~nl one though certainly aided abnoat every disgruntled Ni&crian tat!:!~~~=• so~ly thal.he saw:' a spy in no doubt sure of the devil they were dcalins~h Th ume. ~ the1r~fficaals were cxa.mple, ap1ly desaibcd the situation wbca ~ cBrtash_coosuiJDDuala, for British Vicc-Co115ul hod to COIIdud busincu with ~c that 10 Femaado Po the wos -t one time a house paioter like 1 cena" He · · · 8 Govemor·GCDeral who precisely the amount of brccdi~ and cduw~· rr Adolpb Hitler, and who has

1011 ooe 'NOUld capect from Spaaisb

The Dynamics af Nigerillll Equflloria/ GWI!eo Relatiotu 63

aflisa'l· .. :.41 Some: British officials blamed the spiaelessnc:ss of their home mmc:nt for the tmsatidat.tory condition in Feruaodo Pn. They argued

~:ando Powbicb relied on Nigeria ~ot only for labo11rbut for food should= bavt: been aUowed to pose a secllrlly threat to Nigeria. One British official

declared:

... it is only too apparent that the time has come for the mus which is femando Po to be cleared up in our OWD interest and thoscoithe few decent and rational minded Spanish colonists who remain, and it is obviow; too that it is the British government who have gollo do the

~~:::~==~~~Y~-~4~woflhc: fact oftbe strongpositioo which Great

"Jbe hostile attitude to the British, however, began to change foUowiogthe coUapsc of Mussolini's Italy, a sign which was read as portents of things to come 00 lhe island. In fact by March 1945the achninistratioo ootbe island was not only giving publiciryto British victories, but also co-operating with Nigeria to stop the ~r­tation of palm oil from the Nigcr Delta to Fernando Po as well as commodity and labour smuggling to Fernando Po.43 In spite of the mutual antr.gonism, the 1942 labour agreement remained in force throughout the period of the war, but neither sidereallycnforcer.lit,withtheeffectthatalltheaimsfornegotiatingandsigning the agreement remained, as can be seen unfulflikd on both si~ Nevertbele&s, this agreement remained in force without any revision tmtill950. The reasons for this were quite apparent. Firstly, the tempo of nationalist agitation after the Secood

World War rose in Nigeria. This was charadcrilocd by strikes, sucb as the one in 1945. Organisation of nation-wide: nationalist parties and the emergence of a politician like Nnamdi Azikiwe who possessed enough charisma to attract oational following were important developments of this period. These gave the B~idl administration much to think nbout. Emigration to Femando Po was seen U a safety valve. Secondly, the aw;terity which was nea:ssilated by the war bad mack many of Nigeria's infra.~tructural needs so acute, the cost when taken cumulatkdy became liO burdensome that all efforts of the government were directed to solviD&

these problems and they har.l no time for revi5ion of the Fc:mando Po • Nigeria

labouragrecmcntuntill950. The revised agreement of 19.'i0trall$ferrer.lthe conc~n to recnUt labour in

Nigeria from the British firm of John Holt and Company Limited to the ADclo­Spanish employment agency. This agreement also contained a dausc to n:pabim illegally reauitc:d labour 111 Nigeria. This in fad WillS a clear indica~on tbal. tbc Spaniards whose agents u...cU to "kidnap" people from the: Crou. Rnoa ua. o(

Nigeria .and ship them to Fc:mando Po were quite contented with tbe availiNc manpower on their island and were trying to avoid uy cause for ~ will!

64 Nif!ViQ (llld its Jmmediolt Ntigl1boun

Ni erian authorities. This 1950agrecment wasvirruallythesarn~as the improPer

eJorcW !942 agr:r:;o~:~~:~a::e::~e~t::~:d~:~.:~:::ner~ :~;;~:t:~~: labourers must Conform with conventions of the Intern::~

La~~P~~~;~:~o;Ueemcnt, aUegations of iU-~eatment of Nigerian Warkers continued to be made by returning ~bourers. ;rn•s prom~~ a ~legation led b)<

:k;::'~!-~~-~;: ~!~~~~,0~~~~ s~~- ~k:~o!et; :C'~~:g~~~:: !:a!~~: round Fern~ndo Po by the Sp_a~ish ~uth.orities who made su~e only the 80od

~:;';~~0~e:~~i=~:;otr~~ vt;~~gi~~:~~IL:~ :~d~~~t ~: ~~~~r:=;::e ~ delegation, however, achieved some mea.sur~ of success smce ~t was able to advise that salaries of the labourers should be raiSCd and that soctal and education•! ser;ices for the labourers and their children should be improved. This concerned provi5ionofWuc.ationalandreligiousfacilitiesinEnglish.Finally,thedelegatioo recommendW th~t a register of all Nigerian workers in Fernando Po should be properly kept. All these recommendations were incorporated into a revised agree­ment in 1954. Another delegation led byChiefF.S. Okotie-Eboh went to Fernando Poinl956ontheinvitatiolloftheisland'sall(horities.Thcresultofthisvisitwasa 25 per cent pay rise for Nigerian workers a~d t?e payment of ca,&itat~on fee of live pounds sterling on each labourer to the N1genan government. Thts money was then shared between the Fedeml and Eastern regional government in lieu of the tllllcs payable by these Nigerian workers in Fernando Po. The agreement also made provision for increased recruitment of Nigerian labour for plantation agriculture in Fernando Po. Up to a maximumofSOOcould be recruited monthly from Nigeria. It is of course clear that Nigeria was not as wealthy as it is today when oil revenue bas made Nigeria a relativdy affluent n~tion at least in Africa, but the acceptance of this capitation fee by the Federal and Eastern regional governments in a way made the Nigcrii!D government an accomplice in the degradation of Nigerian labourers ia Fernando Po since it wns big business for the government to keep Nigeria11labour in Fern undo Po no mauer what the situation there was.

The Spanish authorities for reasons better known to themselves again invited the Nigerian go~ernmentto send yet another delegation in 1957 led by Chief J.M.

Joh~n. The delegation reported widespread ill-treatment of Nigerian labourers,

eX~tve hours of ~rk, ~U.egal d~duction from wages and failure to supply food ratl~n& The delegallon VISited R1o Muni for the first time. (A thing that uxzles

one 15 :-v_hy the ~ige~ian authoritie~ never thought it fit to invite the Fema:do p 0

=~:i~:t~ :~~~::~a:i::~de:~::a:r~ thou.~ Nigeria was the beggar·

indude payment of compeiiSIItion in cases of ~=~::,a~ce:~?t, ~r_stly, to

ooo·tre.aty labourers; secondly, to prohibit long periods of deten~on ~~~~~:!'n:

The DynDmics nf NigrriDfl E'{IJDforiD{ Guit~eD Re/4tiolu 65

. cases where labourers were accused of crimi.aaJ o«cnca; third! . ;ss S)'Stem for NigcriaD workers.4S TbcgovelllmCDt Dcverthcle,/~lbolisbtbc nlllDbcroflabourers recruited for FeruandoPocouldiofac:tbcinCI"case.d. ~: . spite of the fact that some members of the ddcptioo bad sharp! . . .

~uman cooditio~ under which $0me of the labouren WOtked ~=:: laotatioos on the island.. In rcspollSC the gt)VCnlmcotscot a N"~gcriao labo fficu

~0 the te~tol)' mainly to deal with labour problems aod to look after the .:;;an ol the Nigenan labourers.

the~~~;;;~~~=~~:~:=~=::~::~~~ tuallapses of '".d.tvtdual pl~ters some of who were in fad: brought to book by the Spanish authonlles on the island. Furthermore, the govclllmcolS of Nigeria llfld

Fernando Po agreed that the labour contracts were mutually bcodicial if ootto individuals at least to the two contracting governments. N"~gcrians wbo'MJuld U.vc been unemployed at home were ga.i.o.fully employed m FernaDdo Po at1d both the Federal and East regionaJ governments m addition dcriYcd pcamiary benefits lroal this. On the other hand Feroaodo Po which had remained starved of Labour for a long time was able to embark OD planned Bgricultural. dcvelopmcol Even wbco opposition to conditions OD Fernaodo Po was aired, it was with the purpose of amelioration and nooe of the critics of the labour cooditioos oo the island ever suggested a complete halt to rcauitmeDt.

Nl~rla and Equatorial Guloea from Independence to Civil War With the approach o£ independence in Nigeria following on the wake of Ghana's

independence in 1957 the labour relations between Nigeria and Fcrnando Po began to assume new dimensioii.S. Tbe transformation from a colonial state into full sovereignty in Nigeria was bound to affect the relations and what used to be a

colonial problem became a diplomatic problem. The signs of the future relationship

became evident, when on the eve of Independence, Tht Pilot, the official organ of

the National Council of Nigeria and the C&merouos and a junior partner m the

Federal Coalition Government, carried an editorial calling on the Federal Govern­

ment to op<: n negotiation with Spain for the purpose of annexing Femando Po which the paper claimed was geographically part of Nigeria. ot6 With Nigeria becoming a

sovereign stale in October 1960 under the leadership or Sir Abubakar Talawa

Balewa advocates of annexation or Femando Po must have thought that they had

a cban~ of forcing their will on the Federal Government. The NCNC which had advocated this course of action controlled the foreign aiTain department through

its nominee Jaja Nwaebukwu as foreign minister. But because of the nature of the

coalition gO\'Crument the NCNC never really enjoyed absolute control Una: the

Federal Prime Minister bad tbc overaJI control of and responsibility for foreip

66 Nigtrio (l!ld its Immediate Neighbours

....Ji decisions.. One can see from recent studi~ on Nigeria's foreign policy oil th' t:""' C'J th N' eria followed a low profile pohey usuaUy referred 10 as .. IS

~:dern.:~t"! "functional approach," in her r~l.ations with her neighbours.~ policy meant that there was consci~usly ~~~ ~ht1cal arm-twisti~g; rather than do this, auempts at regional co-operauoo ep.•tomiS_ed by the f~~at•oo of such bodie& as the Chad Basin Commission and ~he NJ.g~T Rtver CommiSSIOn, were made. 47 All attempts 10 instigate aggressive acll~ aga•nst Fema~do Po by a combined Pat­liamentarya,tion and press campaign fortheaonexallon of what one of the papers referred 10 as the "Goa" of ~ea failed for several reason.~. Nigeria was 1101 united enough to pursue a dynamic foreign policy. -~ne re~gnises the fact that foreign policy could in factbeusedtofosterthe spmt ofu~1tyat home, but this would have been a realistic policyi!Fernando Powas a sovere1gn and weak African

country. The fad was that Femaodo Po was still prote~;ted by the might of Spain and Spanish authorities at this time were using the bogey of possible Nigerian

territorial covetousness of Femando Po to persuade nationalists there that the sow:reigntyofFernandoPowouldbe threatened whenever the island removed itself

from the protective security umbrella of Spain. The Nigerian government was apparently convinced that the reports ofill·treatment were euggerated since it was logiCillly argued that if conditions were as bad as they were made outto be Nigerians would not be going to Fernando Po either as contract labourers or as illegal

labourers smuggled into the island by the hazardous means of manually paddled CiiDOCS. Finally, Nigeria was not the only interested African country that could lay claim to Femando Po. The Camerouns which was nearer the island than Nigeria,

was up for partition, purchase or annexation. The campaign for annexation of Femando Po which began in 1961 and reached its crescendo in 1965 and had its affects on the government of the day.ln 1961 four Nigerians were shot in Rio Muni

by the local militai (known as tbeJuventuds). This forced the Federal Government not only to lodge a strong protest but also to ask for permission to send a high-rank·

ing dclogation led by the Federal Minister of Labour, ChiefModupe J. Johnson, to

visit Equ~torial Guinea. The delegation investigated the complaints of the workers and recommended revision of the 1957 agreement. The visit resulted in further

amelioration of lahour conditions such as the permanent abolition of the Pass Law

which made it comp_ul.~ry for all Nigerians to carry passes while moving about on thel51and, the prohJbJtmnoflong detention without trial forN"~gtrian offenders

and finally ~ a~eemcnt by the Spanish authorities in Femando p0 to paymenl of ~;ompensatJon m case.s of permanent or partial physical disab"lily Th Ni . go~rnrne~t warned its critics after signing this agreement I which :as ~gena: rc:VIeWC~ m_ 1963, that further criticisms of Femando Po were i [ ag produ~;tJve,_m '.he 5COSC thal constant emphasis on I he fact lhal N" n _act counler­

bered the J.DdJg<.'noUs people were bringing them into pbys!"~7ti:~n:7~

Thll Dynamics ofNflllrirm £qutllarial Gub:.e. Rllllfiotu 67

==~:=:uee=:::::::ro~':i~!!:~;hccri5isiuN"~IDd rtviCW as stipulalcd bylhc 1963 accord. ~cd anyfwtbcr

Wllh_t~oul~rcak_orlh~cMI~rlheproblemtook adilfercnllllrllandiS!;wncd sco-pollucal dimCDsaons IQVOiving as in• the FirSI llDd Scc:olld w Id w slralqie localion o£Femaodo Po in rclalinn In Nigeria. Brigadi ~:m, lbc: lht lirst Nigerians 10 be eommissKmcd as an officer in lhe then :ritish-lcd one or

was ap~inlcd Consul to S~~~~ l~bcl_in November 1966, no doubl wit~~

;::~:;~~:a;:::;:;;~~:==~·:;~~~~~,;:':::':~~:~ r::':::~;:-~=a~~n=4;v~ :':::::::\:~~~;::: =~~::~ sympathy with !he Easlem Nigerian cause not only ~bin the immigrant mm­mun.ity but also within the oR"Jcial circle as wr:ll.

Wilh the altainmCDt of indcpcadcncc by Equatorial Guinea in Odobcr 1968 Collowed by the withdrawal o£ Spanish ClpCrtise and managcmcal, workiq condt­tions began to deteriorate on the island. Equatorial Guinea's govcn~menttricd to wriggle oul o£ I his difficult Pll'ition by virtually repudiating the agrccmenl con­cluded between NiJeria and Spanisb Guinea because. Francisco Maci;u Nguema, the head or government in Equatorial Guinea, said that the labour agrcc:mcot was ootiD line with his government's policies. Meanwhile, the civil war puvcn1cd any rc-ncgotialion. During the civil war, wbcn Femando Po wu51ill a Spanish territory the island was used by lhc lnlernational Red Cross and the Catholic Relid Orpnisallion "caritas" to £cny Cood and, u claimed by the Ni&crian authorilics. am~s and war malerial to "Biafra." Even when Equatorial Guioca auaiacd sovereign &talus, inlernatinnal prC55Urc by France and the catholic World Will

mounted to force Fcmando Po 10 aranl COIICCiliion 10 lhcsc £orei&a powers aad organisations lo enjoy earo.-lcrritorial jurisdiction on tbc isl.Dd wilh the &OlD

purposcofhelpinglhesc.ccssionisJ: forces in Nigeria. Tbe~mmcoto!Equllorial Guinea asked 1he Red Cr055and "Ciritu" to CCI5C ihcir opcrllions oflhe illand.50

nis was followed by the c.slablishment of a telex link bctwccn Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea at tbc Cllpcnst of Nigeria. A Federal Commislioncr, Al-baj

Aminu Kano laler visited the island in Oaohcr 1969 on behalf of the Federal Military Government and President Francisco Maciu N111ema was giYcn a rmte

from the Nigerian bead of stale, General Yakubu Gowon, inviting the (ormcr not to remgnisc Biafra and to pay an official visit to Nigeria. The Nigerian CQVO)' io

Santa Isabcl fek tbe innucn" of the Nigcrlan immigrant population oa tbe island was so very importanl in foreign polic:y decision at least M it affcdcd Nigeria, tlur.l

he urged his home zOVCJDmeotto ask eilher Aothony Aliika, the Administralor of the East Central State, or Dr. Numdi Azikiwc. the former head o( 5lille ol NiacrNI

68 MgrrratmdttslmmcdialcNttshbouiS

who had ju~t deserted the "Biafran" cause to join the Federal cause, to visit the islondtownvincethe lgbo people that the Federal Government was not emharking

oPagepocidalcampa•gnagaillstthem.

NlgerlaaPdEquatorla1Gulnea:1970-1980

President FranciscoMaciasNguem~ ~Jcarly_wai~ed untii_A~gust 1_970 _when the war was over bdorc coming on a state VISit to N1gena. By th_•s t1me N1genan labourers whose contracts had expired numbered about 30,000 m Santa lsabel which hat~ been renamed Malabo by the nationalist government. The Equatorial Guinea

~~~~am:: ~~!;:n:~a~: ~~;e~~~:;~ sti~~:i::~nt~hi~~d~~:~l~~:cr~~;~:~:: th~msdvcs to make arrangements with the Nigerian Natinnal Shipping Line to evacuate the stranded N1gcrians. The Nigerian governme.nt while paying part of the bill a~kcd the Equatorial Gui11ca'sgovcrnment to pay 1ts ~hare which was put at N152,000,sJ but this bill was never settled. While thi.\ problem rem;1ined,

Equatorial Guinea approached the Nigerian government to review the 1963 agree­ment. Negotiations were therefore commenced and as in 1%3 representatives of both governments met in Lagos in January 1971 to discus~ the detaib of a new agreement. This was signed on January PT72. The new agreement raised the minimum ageofwnrkers from 18to 21, eliminated corporal punishment, increased wages and capitation fees, provided for a minimum w:~ge of Nlli per month in additiontofrcchousing,medicalcare,fullypaidsickleave,increascdannuallcavc and substantial daily food ration. The labourers were not to he subjected to

arbitrary arrest, or detentio11 for more than one month without trial. It was also stated that when a Nigerian was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for an offence under Equatorial Guinea law not recognised by Nigerian law, the worker involved shall immediately be repatriated to Nigeria at his own expense.52 The new agree­ment provided for the setting up of a mixed commission of four, two from each Country, to deal with breaches of the labour agreement. The Federal Government also stated that tbe government or Equatorial Guinea should :~ceept the fact that they were not doing Nigeria a favour by employing a large number of Nigerians as work~rs in their country and thatthegovernmentofEquatorial Guinea must accept

and 11 was_ accepted by them that they would bear full responsibility for any co_ntravent10n of the agreement reached in Lagos on 29th April 1971. But the

emtence of t~csc clauses did not eliminate abuses, and the ~ecruitment of

~~~~~~rs was m fact suspended in 1973 because of breaches of the 1971 agree-

car~~~e::r:!~:::~7~:~:~~~~:~n~;~~=l ~elegation t_o Eq~ato~al Guinea to for labour and all those rC$ident in th p oblem facmg Ntgenans recruited

delegation was 110 more than ·• .... a ea~a~guun:~f ~~a~~~~~~n~~~~=n 7;::~::

1111: Dyllamic.r of Nigeriall EqrlDIOrial Gulllta RtlalrOIU 69

meted out to Nigeria~ by officials and people of Equatorial Guinea ,,s, Th result of this wa.s a revtewofthe agreement in 1974, buttheud thingis'th~ fae~th~

~:r~~!!:0~1;:~ ~: ~::~~::~~7:: !::c;n~:~:: :u?1~; ~ve not ~n at Santa lsabcl_(Malabo): By 1974 when the agreement w:: revie~utho::r labourers remamed unpat~ for long periods up to six months or more:;: some

;::~:~: :~t~~1n:::~~~n ~~~u~~~~h~::!;em~~t:~s~~ ~:'t1;!~0::~~~ ~~~:;:;; 1~~ ~~ttt~~ ~~~~·r :l~U:e!i;! t:e ~~~~~;;~ ~n~e :~echo ~~:ta;J;g~~e:;. Amba~~d~r demanded to sec hts corpse he was prevented from doing so. The authonttes tn Fcrnando Po seemed to have been angered by what they regarded as Nigeria's meddlcsomencss in their internal affairs and they seemed determined to put an end to this. The Nigerian community was subjected to all kinds of abuses dimaxiug in the humiliat~~n of the Labour Attache, Mr. 0. Ambah, and his family on 27th February, 1975. The Labour Attache was ordered at gun point and without previous notice to leave his house. On hearing this the Ambassador sent two of his senior members of staff, Mr. Anjorin, the Principal Labour Officer, and Mr. Odumusu, Head of Chancery, to investigate the cause of eviction and arrest of the Labour Attache. The response of the Malabo government wa.oo the arrest of both men and detention by the Police, although theyv.tre later released. A Nigerian embassy car was seized on 23rd March, 1975 and the car was never found in spite ofstrongprotcstsbytheAmbassador.

Whatoneconmakeofthesecventsisthatlawandorder~medtohavebroken

down in Fcrnando Po. But in fairness one must point out that the plight of Nigerians as well as that uf the Bubi has become worse since independence. lt is one of the ironiesofhistorythatAfricans,bothnativcandcxpatriate,reccivedrelativelymorc humane treatment at the hands of Spanish authorities than at the hands of fellow Africans. The regime of Francisco Macias Ngucma has been cbaraCieriscd by brutality and police terror of which Nigerians have been among the vidi!IU). With a deteriorating economy it wa~ clear that even the normal ad10inistrative functions of government became difficult to carry out and the Jaw enforcing agenciCi!i beca10e laws unto thcm~elves. It was obvious therefore that Nigerians were no longer safe in Fernando Po. With the planned withdrawal of Nigerians from Fcrnando Po which ended early in February 1976, Nigeria decided to cut economic ties with Equatorial Guinea. During the evacuation the government used not only her merchant navy but also gun-boat~ and air force planes apparently to demonstrate that any overt ad of brutality aguin.~t departing Nigerians would not be tuleratcd. The combined air and sea operation to evacuate about 25,000 Nigerians remaining on the i~land and the amount involved in rcsettlelncnt cost the government about

tbrechundrcdmillionnaira. The read ion of the Nigerian press was predid.ablc. One newspaper commen­

tator advocated military action or economic strangulation or both. lt went on that

70 Nigttifl and iu Jmmedit~le Neighbours

. . · n must be rcle:ased along with others for the pur

aD N"~=:~nt:::llthe entitlements of Nigerians must be calculated~~ ~andtheirmovalllepropertyrcleasedandthattheexodusmustbesupe~ ~highly placed Nigerian diplomatic office~; s~nl from Lagos and that if EquatOrial

. Gtndonm~s molesled those sent .... then the exodus should be GulP~ by combined teams of Nigerian army .... " The paper also called far

;:c apology by Equatorial Guinea and the payrn~nt of adeq~atc co.rnrcns.ation to the families of those who had been ~ordered m Equatorml Gumea. Other editorial opinions said the time for repnsals had at last come_, and that " ... no

gove7t:~i~ 7~~ ~::: =~~7a:eryry~;t~~h~~:~;! :~m~r:~~~:~~ ~:~:i~~~~~ to ~ile most oflhe N" rian dailies called for military ad ion against "thi.'i Hitler

of Equatorial Guinea,~ other newspapers put the whole qu~stion of Nigerian migrant labour in wider perspective. They referred to the scnes of humiliations JDCted to Nigerians in Ghana, Zaire, Gabon, Cameroun, Dahomey, Sudan and Saudi Arabia, and c.allcd on the government to repatriate these people back to Nigeria, as one of the editorials put it," ... in these countries they constitute a potential target [or possible future abUK .• .'.60The government was quick to point out that the position of Nigerians in each of llle countries cited above was different from that of Equatorial Guinea, that there was no c.ause for alarm, that many ohhe so-called Nigerians io these countries had acquired foreign citizenship and that .sbould they want or be forced to come home normal con.~ular services would be provided; but that io the case of Equatorial Guinea, Nigerians were faced with possible physical liquidation which the government was oot going to allow.

Many people io Nigeria wcrc dissatislied with the failure of the nUlitarygovem· ment to deal with Fcrnaodo Po militarily. But it seems the government was using the economic weapon to achieve the same end. The government was aware of the fact that with tile )a!;! ~lane or ship-load of Nigerians leaving. Fcrnando Po begins the process of cconom1c dcc:line and imminent bankruptcy. Shortage or labour was bo~od to lead to the cocoa, coffee and banana plantations reverting back to bush. Tb11 would put Femando Po back into the stagnant situation or 1900s when all devclop~nt~l sc~em:s. collapsed as a result or labour shortage. With prosperity at home m .N~g~:na ariSing from the oil boom and the massive development and

~=~~:rS:~~~Ii~~ ~~';%;: ;n7ntive to seek employment in

emigration, other West Africans hiVe been com~n a:; ~the~ ~an be a source or

~pull~infa':"uro!Nigeriaandthepushracto~wasr;-c'la ID l~rge nu~bers. nc1gbbours mcludmg Fernando p0 itself Fern nd p om Olher Impoverished to attrad labour from other West Af~n a ~ 0 was going to find it difficult

against NigcrillllS was widely published· an:Oa:n~ es~ally si.Dcc the brutality to use her inOucncc to prcventlabourc:S from W 1:r":" Was then strong enough to work in Femando Po. The result of this was the ~rn~n countries [rom going

me In Fcmando Po and the

T1rc Dyllanucs of Nigcna•r Equatorial Gubrea R.e/alians 71

revenue aceruin~ to her from the plantations.was no longer available 10 meet. the day-to·day requrrements o.f government. Thrs eventuality was bound to lead to politi~al uphe.aval on ~he rsland. Th~re was already growing opposition to the sadist re .Fnancrsco .M a eras Nguema regr.me a~d the remnants of the indigenous Bubi populatrun of L~c rsland were demandmg drssolution of the Union with Rio Muu.i where the Prc.~rdent came fr~m. The Fang ~rom the Mainland seem to have taken over power and the Fernandr~os ~re notlrkely to accept this indefiu.ite\y.lf they would, tl.rey would be the first m hrs~ory to accept permanent subjection to an alien

:~~~~ll~nfo~~:~t:ri~eG~~~::n!;~: :~c:.;:: ~=:~& ~~~i=~ :t::C: to th~ Camerouns and Gab~n, with which ~acias.Nguema has been condueti!IS a runmng propaganda campargn.lt would be rn the mterest of Nigeria to be in toueb with these two governments in case this unnatural union called Equatorial Guinea dissolves into its natural and separate geographical entities. In this case Nigeria, knowing fully well that Femando Po would need her labour, technical how-how and above all economic aid, should be in a strong position to edge Femaodo Po into union with Nigeria. The force of strategy demands no less an action if Nigeria must play a role in the sub-region commensurate with her size. population, economic resources and power. One thing that is cenain is that Nigeria cannot for long allow this noating dock of an island, strategically positioned, to fall into the hands of enemies of Africa. The transfer of the voice of America transmitters from Kaduna from where they were upelled by the Murtala Muhammed/Obasanjo government to Fernando Po raises the question about the potential danger this island poses to Nigeria. There was also evidence of increasing Chinese presence6t on the island, but it i~ not going to be difficult for Nigeria to deal with either China, the Soviet Union or the United States firmly over Fernando Po. There might come a time when America's dependence on oil e~ports from Nigeria.might be used as quid pro q1w to their withdrawing from Fernando Po. The Chinese and the Soviets would not forfeit their friendship with Nigeria in order to win that of a transient state like Equatorial Guinea. What is clear is that Nigeria has a role to play in the future of Fernando Po, but the question to ask is whether Nigeria has the will, the skill and the men to make sure that the fate of Fernando Po is not decided in Washington, Moscow or Beijing, and now Pretoria but in Lagos.

What constitutes the modern Republic of Equatorial Guinea is made up of the islands of Fern an do Po (Macia Nguema) Corisco, Annobon, Elobey Grande, and Elobey Gluco and the Rio Muni on the mainland between the ~epubli~ of the Camerouns and Gabon. The total area is about 128,060 sq. mrles. ThiS area, although claimed by the Portuguese since the 15th cen~ury w_as.not incorporated into the Spanish empire until the hey days of European u~~nahsm.at the~~ of the 19th and opening years of the 20th centuries. The BrrUsb colonral admimstra­tion in Nigeria realised the strategic import~~ of the Island of femando Po to the well-being of Nigeria but because the Bn.tls.h had ~e command of the ~u~h Atlantic. it was prepared to let the island remam m Spanish hauds as long as Bnlaln

72 ~.,ulillfm"'rdiMtNdfhbollt:f

lnS-u~dlhallheS.":=~~=r~::a:~~~0r~:r;::~;~~~:; 111e asser1ion ofs;n~ rrol and iDOueaceovcr Femando Po.Furthel"lrlore the J891Jswiel:"h~n islaod r:aincd for a Ions cime in rhe han~s of rhe John Holt

CCOIIOIIIY ~ rcas of the island under cocoa planta11on were owned by ~~~;YAa;ica:~:oclaimcd Brilish cirilens~i.p. Bul ins~lc oCB~ilish inOucnce libc ha bccauseofchislheSpanishaulhOZ"liiC5roundJtco:nvcnJenlloplayol(

~~~:.'~·=esiS :~:~'::~~?h~;r :;pt:c:.~~;.·:: t~ ~':~~~ ~~=: :~•;::e=olsalc.Germanjournallhe~ialscitscJ_•riftinJune 1901 made

~~~!~~;':;n!;;;oC:I~11~;~r~~~=::~~~~~~~~~::~n;:!~::~: Zanzibar while 1he Germans held Tangan)'lkD on~~~ mamland.

Nigeria _ Fcmando Po rclalions during 1he avil war years, as was lhe case durin&: 1he first and 1he Scrond"Woz-ld Wass ~um~ geo-polilical dimensions. Unlike in the IWO previous connicls I he con1cnd1ng parlles were not two Europcao powers hul in ibis car-e il was indcpcndcnl Nige~a ~gains! Spa~~sh island. oll tbe Cua.sl uf Nigeria and chc Camcrouns. The N.gcr1an authonllC5 knowmg the 51raCqio; importance of Fcmando Po p051ed IS consul Brigadier Basscy of the Nigerian army lo lhc island. AI the lime of his arrival at Sanla lsabcl, IS Slalcd earlier, 1here were about 100,000 people on the island or Fernando Po 85.000 o[ lbc5c were Niscrians aad out n£ this over-whelming Nigerian population 56.6 pcrccn1 were Jgbo. 63 This of course meanl 1ha1 the oflicial and unoflicial opinion in 1he island was pro-Biafra.In CSSCJICC in the wars from 1914-18, 1939-45, and the civil war or 1967- 1970 Nigerian authorities were £ora:d to protect iiS soft U11dcrbclly from 1he dagger poinlcd at it from Fcrnando Po.

Perhaps because ofthe diplomatiecomplications which the NigcrianJBiafra c:iv:il war posed loSpain, Fernando Po and Rio Muni and I he other smnlllslets became an1ndcpcndcnl Repuhlie ofEqualori11l Guinea in 1968 - under a government led by Fernando Macias Ngucma. Before lhis lime the ca1hoJic: relicC organisation "Caritas' had conver1cd lhe island into a noatingdock for Biah supply. The French govcrnmcnl which provided covert mililary aid for Bia£ra also used the island to ferry weapons, ammuniti011 and supplies 10 Bia£ra in spite o£ inCCSADt prot.csl by Nigeria. The role or Fernando Po could no1 have been otherwise: in a war diat was prcscnled IO Europe by the Biafran propaganda led by the Geneva based publicity outfit 'Mark Press' as a war between M11Siim Nigeria ud CalholicBiafra. Christian Biafra's 011ly oiT~cc was ~rcscnlcd os a small counlry jusllyslruggling to be free. It lherefore rcqu11c:d considerable pressure, c:.ojoling and offer of financial assis­lance ~rorc the government could end lhe offensive operations. ne Spa.a..isb pJantat1on owners from 1970s onwards began to withdraw rro the· • riolousislandthenunder_'hejackbootsofMaciuNgucllll'sdid:orsh=~ economy collapsed and In order lo be on top of affairs the head or slate after

The Dynamics of Nigcnan Equalarial Gurnca Rdmroru 73

changing the name oft he is_land of~ernandoPoto "Macias Nguema" after himself and Santa Jsabe~ the c:"Plla~ to Malaho" to no apparent eff«t embarked 011 wholesale_ massacre of his opponen~ Most of those massacred ~re the Bubi wbo were the 1nde~enous ~~pie of the ISland. The Fan,: mainlander.; fro~n Rio Muni

where the ~res1de~t o~~atedextendedthisbrutalitytotheNigerianlahourersa.nd even the diplomatic ~1011. The effect of this was the evacuation in 1975 oflS,OOO

~~:n::~a~~~=-~~:~:~~=b:~t~:~:i~~r:~=-ThelackofmilitaryactionbyN'r.geriacaaonlybeexplainedbytbea.ssas.sinalionin February 1976 of the Head of State, General Murtala Muha.mJiled,jtW; at the lilne the evacuation ofNigeriaDS from Fernando Powas completed. But for the accideDt of history it would have been impossible for the governmeDt of Nigeria togoagallw. the jiogoistic campaigns against the island ofFernando Po mounted by the Nigerian press. The suspicion of Anglo-A~t~ericaa involve~t~ent in the assassination of General Mwtala Ramat Muhalllllled led to cooliog of relations betweeu N"ageria and those two countries. The general resentment against the United States led to the closure by the Nigerian government of the Voice of America's traiiSmitters in Kadu.na. The Americans, as if to rub salt into Nigeria's wound& and with the collllivao.ce of cash strapped Equatorial Guinea, installed the transmitter.; removed from Kaduna at Malabo. This aga.io. u.nder-scored the strategic importance of

Femando Po to Nigeria. The recent aUeged construaion of 1 South African air/oaYlll base in Femando

Po has finaUy brought the future relation of Nigeria to thi.s island squarely to the fore of Nigeria's foreign policy.

Colonel Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, President of the Supreme Military Council of Equatorial Guinea came to power on Jrd August, 1979 when be put an eo.d to the brutal and murderous dictatorship of his uncle, President Macias Npema. The new ruler promised to rule for three years before returning the country to eoostitu· tional rule. Little did be know that he had a herculean task. The economy was ill ruiDs and the sovcreigo.ty of the country was threatened when Spa.iD tried more or less to rccolonise the country by demanding control of the ministries of Defea.cc, Education, Agriculture, Health and Ecoo.omie Development. As a counter poise to Spanish pressure the Equatorial Guinea President asked for immediate eniarsc· meat of the Nigeria mission and ako entered io.to 1 joiot coiDIDi.Won agreement with Nigeria in April1982. Tbisjoio.t conun.issioneovered:

(a) Culture (b) Commerce

(c) Mercbant marine (d) Telceommwlication&.PostaiScrvices

(e) Agric:ukurc (f) Friendship and good neighbourliness

74 Nigtlill t~~~d iU tmmtdialt /kifhlloun

(&) fishinJrigbrs.nomcntionofairserviccagreemc:nlap~rcntlybecaUSe surp~isingly. ~~ere ~5 .1 wiU be lopsidedly in favour of Nigeria. But perhaps lh Equa!orial a_waca_ c 1 ~ Gu.incans wanted was the friendship and good ne.,: IIIOSI inlcrcstlllg thmg ~~eh they bad signed with all their neighbours. They Were bollrliness ~emen: 1oldcvelopmc:nl aid of300 million dollar:; for three yea 115iiiiJ_f~~~:~=~e: not from Nigeria alone but rr?m all fric:~dly countries. r$ (J9B2 . d UNDPsponsorcd conference was held m Geneva m 1982 in which

T~i:~~nslrume~~tal in conve)'in& t~ Quin_c:an team to Geneva in an aircrart ::u:d at the instance of the Equatonal Own~ govern.ment. Bcc:a~c or the importance which Equatorial Guinc:a was assumtng. Prwd~nt Sh:asar~ on 2Stb tbru !982 set up 1 Presidential Task F01c:c: OD Equatonal Gutnca. Initially,

=c tu7iorcc was faced with implement_ing the deeisioo to e_nla~gc N"Jgetia's mission in Equatnrial Guinea, regular shOWIII~ of the: Oas_ by lh~ N.gc:nan Navy and

:,;!:~~::;:u~=~s:l::::~;t:~~~ou~::;;;::;~::~ Sui perhaps the most impol1aot aspc:d oi the: task force work was to ncutraW;e the innucncc of Spain in Equa101ial Guinea and this she did by rescuing the govern­ment of Equatorial Guinea from total dependence OD Spain. This task was aided by multilateral effort $pearhcaded by the UNDP whicb was able to put a total padlag.: of aid of 71 million dollars at the disposal of the Equatorial Guincan government.

N"~geria singlehandedly proposed to c:sbblish tek:pbonc: links between Malabo and other places such as Luba and Moka oo the island of Bioko at a paltry sum of about half a million doUII'L Unfortunately this commitment f"cllthrough because olchc collapse of chc world oil market and ill disastrous effect on the Nigerian eaHIOmy. The Nigcrian-Equat01ial Guinea reJacion has beeR charaderised by missed opportunities. For eumplc when Colonel Mbasogo beld a referendum to

«nM:rt his military diclaton;hip into a civilian prcsideacy, he invilcd President Shapri to install him as President oo Oc:tobet 12, 1982 but lhis golden opportunily was DOl seized with two hands. This wouJd have been an opportuniry to dea1Dn5trate lhat Equatorial Guinea was a client stale. But apparently Presideat Sbapri wu advised against this becluse the refueadum result was disputed. NeverthcJcss Nigeria did nol bavea viable alternative to Mbasago. Evc.a though it ~-generally ka?W". that the Bubis of Bioko WCftl unhappy with him and were tncl•ac:d lo rebellion •f they c:ouJd find a credible leader there was no such leader

and even tho~lherefere~u.m wasvirtuallyboyc:ottedio Luba the second largest town on .the ~slaad of Btoko there was general acquiescence with Coloucl

Mba~ s regt~. lt could_ not have been olhetwisc, considering the brutaJit of ~:::::.us reg~me, a brucalttythatwustillveryfresh in the miDdsofaU Equac!al

The i>ytiMdCS of Nigerirm Eqt4GIOrilll Guit!ttl Rt4uimu ?S

~~::.:r,~es::;:~:::::~::~:~;~=:;:~':~~!:~~~:C~r~: of Equatorial GU1~ea as ~bown by~e offer o( assistance not only by the traditional

::;;~e~~::~o~~:~u~6:':f:~~~~~~=:::;:~css:;:ce the Soviet Union 50, North K~rea. offered to train some anoy companies, a..:. ::~l~s;::s:l~ ;~:;:;:.::~=~~~~ri~ta~::!~::: ofplanmng and admuustrat100. Even the Camerounlans and Gaboncse ~re DOl left behind, with Yaounde training Equatorial Guinea diplomats wbilc Ubreville also entered into a joint commission with Equatorial Guinea. Ev.:n while aU thi$ was hap(JCning President Mbasogo through Nigeria's mission in Malabo conti.ouc4 tostressitscountry'spreferenceforNigeria'sassistanecapp.arcotlyrealisinglhat Nigeria was so weighed down by its internal problems that she could nO( possibly have any territorial ambitions on Equatorial Gui.oca. Even though Vice President AICJC Ekwuemc visited the island and the mainland for the installation in October 1982 of President Mbasogo, Nigeria's attitude to Equatorial Guinea was charac­terised by caution. Although President Shagari himself aco::cpted to visit Equatorial GuineainFebruary1983butbeeauseofinfraS\ructuralanddcfeneelapse5andin spiteofthcprescnccofMoroecantroopsonthcislandofBioko,thevisitcouldoot take plaec. Apart from the question ofstruetUTal and security inadequacies in Equatnrial Guinea, the Nigerian President was also pre-occupied with re-clcaioo bccall5e his four year term which commenced in 1979 was then comins to an end. Unless a major problem affecting Nigeria's security happened in Equatorial Guinea, the question of a prc~idential visit wa~ therefore out of the question.

But the human prohlcm of contact between two neighbouring oouotric:l; coo· tinued to rear iL~ head. The question of recruiting labour in Nigeria for the rehabilitation of cocoa pla11tation.\ in Equatorial Guinea c.ame up s.cvcral times for discussion. This was p~rt1eularly so because early in 1984thc Equatorial Guinea government issued a decree on the reclamation of abandoned properties in Equatorial Guinea. Sinu: these properties were mostly properties of Nigerians, people in the traditional recruitingg.rounds ofSooth-Ea.~tcrn Nigeria began to show interest in going to Equatorial Guinea to claim back their properties and also lo search for jobs. The down turn in the Nigerian economy all.o made the work of illegal recruitment of labourers easy. The whole operation in 1984 was bcins co-ordinated by one Italian Senor Julio who· opcratctl under the code name Casaflftu~ca with the port of Or on as the centre of his ad.iviti~s. Labourers were bci.og rccru..ited to work on the cocoa farms for a paltry sum of NRO for a month which was inadequate to keep hody antl soul together by Equatorial Guinea living slalldard. Attempts were made to stop thi.!. illegal smuggling of labourer~ ~ea~ the N"~FriiiD government ~ averse to s.ceing a return to the pre-1976 Mtua\IOD

when: Nigerians were ueated as beasts of burden. The new Nige~Un miMion was

76 Nigri~QIIdils /mmedirne Ntifhboll"

alsooppose~~~~7:;;!:!1~:'::~;~~a':da:~::~~~~u:;eo~~::;:hi1Q)~z~ 1~ ~Ue thcN"IgCriangovcrnmeDttried to persuade itscitizcru; 1 Ill fide =~economic situatioll iD Nigeria from 1984 onwards continued to ~~a: .11

~~out iaall directions. The rnig:ralion to _EquatoriaJ Guinea ~sjllSI one li~= :Wes~aliOD of ouiWird pusb by an qgre&SIVC ~p.le who fe~t siiDed Under the IMFiDspired slructural adjustrnCDI pr~me Wll~ liS redUction or labour force in lhe public sector, reduction of subs1d.es and sca.l1ng down of all social welfare

schcr:~igcriaos wbo wished to risk !~c~ lives whil_c bei~ lcrried into Bioko

:=:~~=:~~::~~~~~=~!o.:O~~?C::~~::c~;:or::: problCIM. To obviate tbis probbns Col Mbasogo, the Prcs1dent on January 2nd 1985 took Equatorial Guinea into the FriUic zone and subsequenlly bcca111c 1 IIICDibcr of the French assisted Central African Economic and Customs Unioa.. The immediate eiJcct. of this was that the local currcac:y Bipkwclc was replaced by Ceauai African Francs aDd lbus the local currcacy ceased to have value. ne iauocdiate impact of this moDCCarych;mgc was the sudden rise iu the cosl of 8oods and scrvioes by up to 85%. Even though salary increases were approved but they were not tmDmcnsurale with the rate ofinDalion. This moPetaJy cbangc was also accompanied by uni'Ciitraincd 5111ugling oi goods and victuals into EquatoriaJ Guiocamainly from Niscria. Apparently exploiting the situationsomcdisgruntlcd elements .,;thin the armed forces tried to overthrow the govcrnmenL While touringthcProvi.ncc ofRioMuni, a group of discontented soldiers led by Col. Mba O~~a~~a, 2nd Vice-Prime Minisler and Obiang Ngucma's uncle allcmpted to seize paM:r. This curious111isadvcnturewhidl was undertaken with the coUaboralion or UcutCII.Inl Mba Esono Alejaadro, 2nd in command orthe rnililary detachment in Bata and younger brother of Colonel Mba Onana was uncovered and aborted by joint Morocx:an and French security forces. The death toll in this abortive coup was!ll and reprisals were sure and swift with the culprits being shot. ne problems ofEquatorial Guinea were maay. There was hardly any private eslablishmenl and the. public SCGior was so unwicldly that salaries were rarely paid on time. The ~e was also weak and because of its reliance on international aid, the country did n~ relapse. to the barbarism oft he previous regime when dissenl wu met with organ~sc:~ mur~er and brutality. As long as the political and economic siluation ia Equatonal o_u1nca remained in this parlous state the Equatorial Guinea govern­men! would J~mp at any straw in order to keep aDoat. The government was therefore making dcspc.ratecfforts to secure food, financial assistaJiee and any kind ohustenanccfrornasdiSparatcagroupofeountriensEgypt Tog S d" A b" _Yupslaria. and c;vcn Soulh Africa. The lirst inkling ora. S~th ~;~: 1

1 ranaa., ID Equatonal Gumca came on the wake of the abortive d' P cse oe of the ~conomy. The South Africans were initially re::~c:lat and lhec:_olla~ opcrat1ons bu1 by the second half or 1986theywcre glaringlyo;r~i=:~=~~:.

71•c [ly>lamic.r of Nigcriall Equatorial Guillta Rtlalioru n

fo! :~:~~~;hJ~~~i~~:~~~sul~hn~!~:~~~!~C:i~~ ::l~taryd:craft clearly ~~;h this new situalion, the Nigerian government quickly rC::~ised ~eargo, da~ger posed to Nigeria's security in view of our past neglect ofEquat~i~ ~=

~:~~~~:1i ~~i~e:.~;;. s!:w;;.n~ ~h:d ~~;n:~~n:~. :t~~=~:e ~:U~~:~: :o~~:t~~~Gu:~~.e ~~e::~~~~; ~~~~~~ ':~ ,:n~.:~n!;C:~ta~ enough for Nigeria's Ambassador but the way out would have been ton_ g these living condit~oo.s. But for the fact ~hat the defence section of the :rove continued to funct1on on the ground, senous security gaps in our information a: Equatorial Guinea would have been created. It was perhaps because oh he sudden realisation ofthc security problem of Nigeria's relation to Equatorial Guinea that the former defence Attache Nary Captain F. B. J. Porbeni was appointed Nigeria's Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea. On receiving his mCMage about South Africa's presence in Equatorial Guinea, the Ambassador was asked to enquire about the possibility and desirability of: (a) Sea manoeuvres involving ships of the Nigerian Nary and tho.o;c of Equatorial

Guinea. (b) Tradcinge~reises involving Nigerian airforce planes and Guincan nary ship

andGuineanairdefeneeunit. (c) Anyothermanoeuvresthatmightbedeemednec::asarybyEquatnria\Guinea

underamilitaryunderstandingandeo-opcration withNigeriawhic::bbadled tothctrainingofEquatoriaiGuineanstudentsinvariousNigerianmilitary schools.

The Equatorial Guinean authorities obviously acting on advice from her newly found friends rejected out of hand the idea of joint militaryuercises. But even then the heat was on the Equatorial Guineans especially from the Nigeriaa prCM. Ambassador Porbeni was called by the foreign ministry of Equatorial Guinea to comment on several newspaper headlines alleging the presence of South Afrians in Equatorial Guinea. The Ambassador tried to explain that the government of Nigeria was not in control of the press and that the Nigerian press in their patriotic duty was free to comment on an )thing that touches the well being of their country. The Equatorial Guineans however denied the presence of South Africans on their soil and the Nigerian envoy was $Cheduled to $CC the President of Equatorial Guinea at their own insistence, but this was later cancelled apparently because o( pressure on the President not to kowtow completely to Nigeria. HOWC'Ier, the Equatorial Guinean government decided to itnd a high powered preside~:~tial delegation to see President Ibrahim Babangida and explain the situation to b.im. The Nigerian envoy on the spot put our problematic relations with Equatorial Guinea on our tardiness as a nation. He raised several thought provoking questiom about the missed opportunitie.s. He asked why Nigeria did not have a re.sideat Amha'l..o;.ador in Malabo for ten years until1986. Wbereu Camerouns omd Gabon

78 NPilllditslmn~lM:igh/IOlln

:~:..::!::?,"~:!~;,;:~:~::~~·:~:!:?,:;~~ a~rpon: ro:~d ~d. scheduled for Lagos smcc 1983 had nol me1 aod lhc r 11& of thcjoinl com•n.u:~'\cans 10 1raiasoli1C: of their diplomalli in Lagos wu~DCQ o(lhc Equ~lotla h o:.C,golialcd and signed agrccmcnls on shipping. POSt I Dot

lakeD u~a~:~~i:a: services were le~ ill abcya.nc:c. ne request for lbc s:l:: ICie«uul od clS 10 Equa1orial Gu•nca was also aborted as a result of lack ~~=~(~om !he Nigerian cad. Evca tbepromiscofa milli?A Nai~acr~: :f..e offered by Nigeria during tbc Donors COJJfcrcn~ ~ Equator•al GuiDCa Was lllllllladcavailablc. Adnlittcdlyti~wcrchard for N~~Cna u f~m 1.982onwards. but for national security and palrwuc reasons govcrn~nt of N•gcna could haVe subsidised 011c oflbc privalc airlines in the counuyto Oy Into Malabo once a WCck iaslcad orallowins 1hc Frcneh airli.nc U~A to s1cal thcsh~. ne way Nigeria hili

~=:e:co~:~~;:re~:=~:o;~~~~;;ti:~;~::,:~:~:::~~=~::: scriou.snCM bur long on diplornal'sslruggle for po.mnp and conference atlcndanee allbc cxpe.w: ofgDVI:mmcnls ia such uaimagi.nable pJaccs in the world including UlaoBatorinoutcrMongolia.

Prcsidcnl Mbusogo visil:cd Nigeria in January 1987 and many of these outstand­ing issuCli ~~~~:re disc:uSKd with him at lhe highest level. President Mbasogo was Wawa Nigeria, especially the airforcc base in Makurdi,the Nigerian army instaJ. Jatio.DS io Kaduna and lhe NIY)' base in Lagos. He was no doubt imprcs.sed by the lilllgllagc of not saying much but saying evcrylhing. The question o( economic aid was raised and promises were made lo him. Bulthe question of a defence pacl wilh him was raised and discussed and answer was awailcd from him al'lcr reaching Malabo. Rclllioos~ conlinucdto be rcasonabJygood 1ha1 in May 1987,thc Equat01i111 Guincan President requested for an aircraft to carry his dcJegation to lhc 23ld OAU meeting in Addis Ababa. Even lhougb the aircraft was provided, lhc GuiDCIIn head of stale Cor personal reasons did not make the journey. His delegation led by his forcip minister Marcelino Ngucma Onguenc made the journey and had a private session with ProfcssorBolajiAkinycmi, Nigeria's forclga minister lo llSiiUrc him of his country's friendship towards Nigeria as wcll as to invite him to visit Malabo as SOOD as possible. Akinycmi quickly took up the offer and visitedBioloon2SthAugustl987.

Mr. Mareelino ~gue~ Onguen~, the Equatorial Guincaa foreign minister welcomed Prof .. Akinycm1, and dcsmbcd Nigeria-Equatorial Guincan relations as cxa:Ucnl: He said lhatthe two acighbouring countries share an identily of opiaion on ~any wues notably lnd~peadcnce for Namibia, opposition to aPartheid Soutb Afnca, '.uppon f'": convca•ng an intemalional coafcrcncc on the debt roblem ~nfron11ng the Th1rd ~orld .. Rclerringto the lastjoiot commission met~ held

::~r~~h~~:::~~! ~:::a~islu enumerated the following ~as

TI1e Dynamics af Nigoitlll Equ~:~totial Gulllu RelanOIU 79

(a) !~:~:~tgd~~fi~~=~~a~~~~;~~;:~:~:~~ ~~~~~:.to !he

(b) ~:;;:;; a~::~:':a~~:n f~~;a~t:!:~ teacl!ers wilb each being deployed lo

(c) ~;~:c~;:~r~~~;~h~=oe:aa6b~~ o~~~::~~:~:v:~ti~; ~b~~~~alla~ ~ce Thursdaypro~ionally. a CYC:ry

(d) Line of credit req~ested by the government of Equatorial Guinea.

~ri ~~::n:g::~:~~v~'::7~:~~~~~~~~~ia~:~i.ncan e~y to Abuja.

Prof. Akinyemi agreed with his Guinean counterpart about shared values and goalsbutthattbeGuineansmustalwaysbearthisinmindwllendealingwiththird parties. Akinyemi then called on Equatorial Guinea to join hands with Nigeria in discouraginginimicalexternalforcesthatwereunhappywithNiieria'sprindpled stand on apartheid. He said the disagreement between Nigeria and Equatorial Guineasbouldberesolvedwithintheframeworkofbrotherlyrclationshipsucl!lh.at theensuingfavourableatmospherewould encourage Nigerian priwte in~en~ On specific issues, Profe.s.sor Akinyemi replied: (a) That lhe on·goingTeehnieal Aid Corps Scl!eme in Nigeria would take careo(

Equatorial Guinean's request for teachers. What Wll5 required was for Equatorial Guinea to make her request and also guarantee accommodatioo for the number of teachers requested for.

(b) On the line of credit requested, Prof. Akinyemi announced that the Nigerii.D ministry of Finance and the Central Bank had given their approwl and that it was left In the appropriate Guinean authority to submit to Nigeria the list of articles which were needed from Nigeria against the line of credit.

(c) With request to moving the Equatorial Guinean Embassy toAbuja,Akinyemi said land would be made available on the bas~of reciprocity. He al&osaid the Federal Government would build some chanceries which can be rented by countries that were unable to build their ehancerie5 immediately ia Abuja.

(d) On shared views on international problems, Prof. Akinyemi said this should be reflec:ted in joint meetings about strategy whether at the OAU or at the

UNO. Even tbougb the Equatorial Guineans did not know that Professor Akinyemi'•

visit had been planned on a short notice because or the information received io I...agos that the El]uatorial Guineans wanted to clo~ the Nigerian Navy training teams base in Malabo, he told his Equatorial Guinean counterpart that such a m~ would ~nd wrong signals., but the Equatorial Guinean foreign min~er said they did not plan such a move especially si~t:e Ni~eria had previnu.~ly generously donated a navaluaining boat to Equalunal Ciumea and had also !.CD! a te.am In train the El]uatorial Guineans. The confusion claimed Sen.or Marcelino "W1L!. due to tbe fad that they were under the impression that Ni~ena "?nted to bandovt;r the payments for the service to an impecunious El]uatonal Gume.a.

80 Nfgtrialllld ;u /mmtditlle Neighbours

EvencuaUy, lhe Equacorial Guinea government by che end or 1987 N' • Naval ralinp 1o withdraw because or Ccar or Nigerian in\111 . asktd t~ th~=ency or Nigerian n~pa~ callins £or military actio~ llglli::~~~Gwi?& Guinea. By the end or 1987 lnlclll.gcnce rcpor1 on Equator•al Guinea 10riaJ

uring. The faces or the situation was as Collows. lltas not rca;.e repor1 confirmed that a cere aiD DaYid Hilton was nmre Eqlllltorial Guinea as Souch ACrica's 'h"fF d'Afft~in. He had "embassy'' ]oc:alcd oo a major avenue iD the Guinean capita

11 Equalorial Guinea date back to a couple or years when he opened a "ranch" . Mola. He was later joined by a team of South Aftican ranchers at Moka, ~ kilomeues away from Malabo.ll was generally bcJievcd thac the ranch sei\ICd 1 11 a cover eo a missile base or South ACricao mililary observation station W:~~ would permit Souch Africa to c:oatrol the entire Gulf o£Biafra. This of course war, POI the first cime Coreip oati011als bad been injcclcd into Equatorial Guinea. la the pas1, there bad been all kinds of foreign nationals namely Americans, Chinese, Koreans and Russian opcrativu. AU the communisl.s bad left be£ore the advent of che Souch African's. The Equatorial Ouincans cootiaued to maiatain their ignorant innocence about the CJCistence of South Africans located in the "Holy VaUics." However, where the dynasty of the "King Bioko" of the BubisstiU lives was well known to lhc intelligence community. What was ool koowa was the use the South Africaru; wanted to put their hold OD Moka to. SoDIC Cell it was lo assist South Afriam aircral'ts on lheit loogjouroeys from Johannesbursto Europe. This was noll5enscs because Soulh Africa was alreadyenjoyins Ibis throush the c:o-operalion ofC&pe Vcrdc,Jvory Coast, GabOD, Central Africa Republic, Malawi and Zaire. If ic was for mere commercial air operation the banning of Ambassadors or a selected group of counlrics includins Nigeria from visitins Moka was instructive. Furthermore, lhc Ni&crian Ambassador was restricted along with others to 15 kilomccrcs from Malabo.

Apart from Moka, it was also obvious that the South Arric:ans were using the harbour at Luba (formerly San Carlos) a very wide natural harbour which is ideal fnr a submarine base, for transhipping of gunds into and out of Bioko. The South African's presence by 1988 was an established fact. They arrived in 1985 or 1986. ~y raised a modem ranch in vaUics of Moka South of the island of Bioko., SS kdomelrcs away from Malabo. Several unmarked and unrcsistered hercules planes laoded regular!~ al Malabo. ?irpor1 ~th varinus tons of cargoes. These cargoes were off loaded 1nlo huse m1btary vehicles driven by South African young soldiers. Most of the heavy vehicles were shipped to Luba port about40 kilometre to Moka andfromwhc:retheymovcdwherevertheydcsiredonthelsland M 0 'dH'I the leader oflhe _soul~ African t~m s~okc Spanish vcrywel~si~: he:: als101~;; several years rcs1dent m Argcntma wh1ch until reo:ntJy had n~ only co-operated

TheDynamicsofNtguifiiiEqufllorUJ/G~o~illuR~ 81

with fascist regime~; in Europe but ab.o embraced the racist regime ia Pretoria. In

~~~:::s;:~h~::y::~ ~r:~~~~; ~~~~~:~~utbl~=~ ;aisc eau I~ in the cool hil~ of_Moka ~thout suco;alt wn ha:::.•dc.ar:: a: south Afncans had a radm h~k equipment to keep in contact with Malabo aod South Africa. The freedom wh1ch theSouthAfrieansenjO)'W.in Equatorial GW.U:. was allegedly due to the fact that they had paid 20 million dollars into tbe private aecountofCol.Mbasogo.

The cresa:ndo ~~press ~ticism reached a head by April 1988 and the IICW

~i~;:~;;~e~~7c;;;~:~ ,r:~~~~e;:r~~~!ri~I~~~~::~~~~=:=~ from the foretgn mmiStry. The delegatton Including the writer saw South African fighter aircrafts parked on MalabQ airport. After being kept in the g~mmcat gue~;t-bouse for a whole day, the President finally gave audience to General.lke Nwachukwu. General Nwachukwu impressed on the President that the presence of South Africans, civilian or military was unacceptable to Nigeria. Col. Mbasogo finally owned up ands;aid some South Africans, ab<;tut four in number came tofann in his country. He also u.id thcyhadenteredwithlrish, Sw\!;s, Argentinian and British pa5Sports. He said if he had been warnedbeforebyhis "'brother" Babangida be would never have fallen into their trap. He promised that they would soon be Cllpclled. But tot he dismay of the delegation his foreign minister Senor Marchelino Nguema Ongweno denied again the presence of South Africans in Bioko and be had to be sharply reminded by General Nwaehukwu that as a foreign minister he should not be seen to be contradicting his head of ~tat e. Nigeria put tremendous pressure on the EljUatorial Guineans, particularly at the liberation committee of the OAU in Harare and at the Silver Jubilee celebration of the OAU in Addis Abaha in \9118. Resolution~ were tabled and endor:.c:d by the OAU to condemn any overt or covert relations with South Africa by member r.ta\es. Within a period of four month\, three Nigerian dclegatiOrL\ visited Bioko. A military delegation tbat was supposed to go wa~ however rduscd by the Equatorial GuineaM on the groundsthatthcydidnothaveamilitarypactwithNigcriaandthatinanyas.etbe South Africans had been expelled from Bioko. Nigeria enlisted the support of friendly countries like Zaire and the CameroUIL\ to put pres.sure on Equatorial Guinea. Whether these pressures have worked or not is a moot 4uestion. What is however certain is that Equatorial Guinea is very unlikely in future to enter into agreements which may dirct11y or vicariou_\ly threaten the ~eurity of Nigeria. Diplomacy ha.\ worked for now and the government of Nigena in ~pile o[ what i!. an obvious provocation h~\ ~hnwn trcmcmlou\ restraint. Thi.~ rewaint may actual­

ly be due to several factur\. A 1mlitary government may be UIL\Ure ~[ t.he e~«L!. o[

::~~r~:::~:~~~~:~:c~~~~~~~sti~~~~i:;o;~;7~p:~i~~ct~::~~~i~::::~

Nigeria's nerenu Policy What then are the policy implications? To fully understand this, it will he necessary to discuss Nigeria's perception of threat to her security in the future and what i~ to

!:!::~n:c~pl~;nsl!~~;i~;:~~h!" n:l:~~ ~:d~o~~:g J:l.:~c~~~c:;; established as dcterming the future or Nigeria's deJcnce policy.

(aJ Dl~rLocalion:

The naiUrc of our frontier!;, the relative size and wealth of our neighbour~ have some effects on our defence system. Nature has made it that we enjoy the advantage!> of population, wealth and perhaps power over our ncighboun. with whom we sh:uc common boundaries. While some of us may be quite satisfied to accept this situation or query our need for Slnmg armed forces, it may be necessary to remind those who may like to hold this view that our neighbours arc also IIWirc ohhis situation and the subsequent effects it may have on their ~ counl~cs. The options open lo them are to accept our hegemony which

:r;:;~~·~:~~~:':ri~u~=:~l;t;eO:~~;~:~n:!~;~::u~r:li:! policy, whichever oplion~ they may decide to choose., it is bound to have effects onourdclcnccli)'Stem. (b) Ntll•miiResuurct::

Tomaintaintbccapabllitytofigbtata~alwarinthccve I r . Ni . DIUSI COnlinUc IO teali.w tbat abunda.nt IIOUrCC.S r ~ agg:rCSSIOil,• lgcna sound industrial base are ncce&sary. 0 &""", raw malcnals and

Tile Dytlumks of Nigmarc Eq!lUIDrial Guirr~a Rdalums 83

(t} Populutiou:

ra:~:~~=~~:a~l;~:t~=~:;s;~~:=~ ::r:~;,:p~a:~ ~~e~~::: ~~= ~:;~~;:~ t~ne ~:::~~:u::~hi~ ;:,::~~~e:~~~~=t:;:nanc: ~~:~~~:l~~u:~~:~~a;;~~~:ei~~~~~~~~~ue~~~i:~~!n!:~~ availabletousformoblhsatlonasopposedtotheovcrallpopulationoftbe country. (d) Teclmologicaf S/UJidlUd:

Modern military operations require sophisticated annament and skilled man­power to operate them. The credibility of our armed forces in the 1980s will be dependent on their technical proficiency. Lack of technical proficiency in thearmedforccswillforcetheeountrytoadoptstrategiedoarinethatfaYOur.; muscled manpower as a subs!itute to sophistication in weaponry. (e) The 01aracrcr of our People: DefeatisdefincdinthemodernsenseasthelossofwiUtofight.SomeCQuntrics give up faster than othersintheeventofconfrontationwithasuperioror determined force. The staying power of our will is dependent on a number of social, political ami ideological factors which are so complex that they can be prone to miscalculations. Given this situation ourbestapproaehwillbeto always assign low "weight age" to our own forces lllld higher to our po!ential enemies during the states of our defence planning but to demand from the armed forccsthewilltoexeeuteourplansdespitetheseeming.lyapparent odds. (/) PofilicalSystcm: ltisoursincerehopethatourpoliticalsystemofthel980swillcontinuetobe inharmonywiththevaluesoftheNigerianpeople.Oncethisisso,thcehanccs of breaking our national will becomes e!!lrcmely slim. lt is important to beat in our minds th:u our armed forces can only sustain long operation if they tontinuctobclcdandinspiredbyavcrypopulargovernment.

(g) Commurucutwn aud Transpolfalrorr: Armed forces make e!!lensivc ru.e of roads, rails, water air and teleeom­muniortion networks during operations. The extcnsi~cness of these systcrm as prc.sently available in the country wil~ p~ovidc fie~~ility and mobility to o~r armed forces during tactiorl and loS~St1eal operat1ons. The gOVI:rnment s determination to continue the improvements on cornmuoication and transportationsy.;tcm in the country will be good assetstoour defence system.

(:Jbil~:!c~~~rent military superiority over our. neighhou~~ in the West African sub-region may render leadership relat~~y le.<os rmportant, lhe relationship between our civilian leaders and the m1lrt:uy commandcn, the

NigerioaodEquatoriaiGulnen:LookinglotheFut~rc: . The foregoing ,1rticuJ.otJOn of Nigeria's ddcoce pohcy s~ould _mform wba.tevcr recommcnd:otiononcc.lnmJkeun tbcfutnreo~our rclatoonWJth astrateg•cally positionedlslandhkeFcrnandoPo_oneofonrne•ghboursonwhatonc_cancaHo~r Adantic"fronticr." A.ssugg~;stcd m the study quoted above, our n~;oghhours 1n order 10 dclcr u~ tend to cul!ivatc the friendship of a powerful patron, Nigeria, Gabon and the Republic of the Cameroun:; arc the three countnes mw.t directly mterested m the future of Equatorial Guinea. R1o Muni share~ contiguous boun­daries with both the Camcrounsand Gabon, while thclsland Fcrnando Po (Bioko) isniTshnrcnfNigeriJandtheCamcrouns.lnordcrtodctermincthccourscofour policy, Nigeria must therefore take account ofthercsporu;cto our move by the Camerouns and Gabon Jnd their patron France.

At the best of times Nigerian-Camcrouns relations have been characterised by hnstility.Thilprobablywdsdueinthcpasttothrcefactnrsviz:

(i) France's pcr~:~;ptinn of Nigeria's ambition as a dominant regional power and the general Anglo·phnhi~m characteristic of French politics especially during the Prcsiden<..y of Ocncral Charles de Gaullc. General de Gaulle seemed to cxteml his ;tnli-English sentiments to all Anglophone countries muchasNigeriaandC.m;ulaforcxample.

(ii) Tile tliscnvcry of oil in Omnncrdal quantities in the uncharted Rio·dd· Rey b~•in where the hound My between Nigeria and the Camerouns was and isstillnntmutuallyagrccdupnn

(iii) The personality of rormer Presitlent Ahidjo. Ahidjo was widely known lo have his origin in Nigeria's Adamawa emirate and Kano ;md ::apparenlly to pro": a~d ~~~ert. hi_s Camcrnun\ n;1tinnality he was unnecessarily very hostile to N•ccnJ. Hts hnntetlctlu~:<~tiun made him a pawn in the hands of the French s;.vernm~nt. Although the C.nncrnuns was not a member of the French Commumty(Cmmmmawe Froucaw!) the equivalent of the Commonwealth of n.aunns, ~s ~matter ofdcliherate policy and as a concession to Western

;r:::~'";;e~c~he ar~idc of ~nio~1, it nevertheless had a military pact with fora:srcmarned •ntheCamerouns after independencx:, al·

. Tlre.DyullmitsofNigerillll£qullrOI1aiGuU.ca-Re/Qcrotn 1?6

~:;;~~~~~~~:~in a~:~:;: :e:~;: A~;:; ;:~:=:::• Sla~~~~ ~~ stated that the Camerouns of all former French . Olad. lt1111151 be

:i:~::~==~~·;:::;:::;;h:~w;:~t~:il~at;:~=~=!~~ Nations; Franco-Camcrounian rdationwas~:e:~~~~rthtUrtited ~~~:~; ~;~~~~=-~:~~~~f-r!:cee~QJnomy and Qlrrency (the Cl' A;::)~

B;::::~~~c~tt~h~!~ ~;:::h~ns~:t~ee:~~~ ~e was ~Ut«ede<f by Paid

same close relations with France under Biya as it was un~ co~:~:r Th~re was the an aborlivc coup U'ctat on 4th April, 19M. This QJUp at:cm~ ):n~~~::~wu people from the Northern part of the Camcrouns aEF:rentl · · by ex-pres~dent Ahidjo ~ml with coven French support. W"rth y~~:;~~~~~ the dissrdents Paul ~'Y" moved fil.\tto replace the French with Israelis as his main

:t:7 !~;:;:n.fo~~i:~'~'l:~c::~~:~i:tho~s~~~~ hi:~~~:; ':~~~~:e\~: Kippur war of 1973 was consumatcd by a Camcrounran-lsracli military pa<;t,

following the visit to Yaounde bySimon Pere~> the hracli Prime Mimster in 1986. Paul Biya bdon~ to a new generation of Camcrouni.m lco~dtt'!.hip. He is a nationalist who places Camcrounian interest a hove th,rt ul France and the rw of Africa.

The questions to ask then are: WouhJ the Camcroun't>ul up with thc.po;MJbL~I)' of a South African base in Fernaodo Po'! Is South Afn..:a'~ presence in Fernando Po part of the conces.~ion demanded by Israel knowing how dose lsrad and South Africa have been over the years? Does the Camcrounian government want to deter Nigeria by being in league with hreal openly and with South Ahicacovcnlythroug.h their proJO;yin Equatmial Guinea? Would public opinion in theCamerouru.support this obviously Machiavellian policy of dinning with the devil as loag as Camerounian intcrc't i~ 11mtccted? What would the Camcnmru; gain if it pushes Nigeria into a war ewer fcrnando Po? Nigeria's official status :u B frontline state intheSouthcrnArricancqu;~tionmakcsthcprc.scnceofSouthA[ricanmilitaryoiL

Fcrnando Po a casu:; belli ju.~t as the presence of USSR's missiles in Cuba in \962 posed direct threat to the r.ccurity of the United States.

The situation caDs for direct di~cu..'i.~ion with the Camcrouru; w that there is M miscalculation on tbat government's part. 11 L~ quite clear that Equatorial Guinea would not embark on such a dangcwus poli~o-ywithout thcCameroUDSir.nc:rwiq._~ perhaps approving it. The Camcrouru; would !hen have to be _told tbat this_~ unacccp:ablc:. Nigeria must also use her considerable ecooonu~ kYcragc ~tb France and with Israel which inspite of severance of diplomatic ties doG co.wd­erab1e business in Nigeria. Spain the former imperial power in Fernando ~o.as.a matter of diplomatic nicety needs beapprai~d of the situation. Ellu.;r.tonallownca

86 N~n·aamJstsfmmcdiar~NeiFftbOllfl into the Frcn~h ~rbit hy joining the

'"'cc t9115 h~• bysub~tstutmg the CFA franc,;

L' oiS""" cur reil~ · f hat it ron.sidcrs hc:a:~~~~~~n~t:;~~~;~~!~e~~~~ a dloicc bctwccn_~u:::~t;::ruing to these countries from_ participating in the iJDiliC~SC coonomtc Until rc~ntly more pcugcot automobiles were bought in

~;~;:~h::";;!~cc and he~ ~~:~~c:;:~~~;~~:~::..,~·:;~~~F~~:~~~~~ eompanies like Bc;:;~s;:~s:i:tc (jcncralcctc.,doroari_ngbusinc,.,; in Nig..,ria which

t~cd;,:~~~:~:~.:;t a fro;: 10 1=~c~:;;~:~~:i:i~fa~gp~:i~~at~:~i~: ~~~:;~ King to N•gcr~a sho~[ .~:;h conrpaniessuch as Dizcngorf, and Solei Boneh have

~~~~~:~~~:~:7t~a; nr~rkcr that is potentially ri~hcr_than all r~c French WJ;.St

~~::~ 7~·;:,~;t~:~~;:~~~n~ ~v~ryh~~~'.to~h:n~~~~ t~~d:::!r~~~~:~: ~n~ ~:::i:!S:ti;~11aJ~~h::~~~~~~~~!;~~~:~~~~ri=~~;~ ~~~:;rd;:v:t~~-e s'~u~•~e;~a;; :::~~=r~~~~~~~o~:~ ~=!~'t~~ :::n~r~;:~~~~:~~s~cn~~l s!~r~:s~ ~;~:~sti: arc too far from Nigeria thus making it ~ible for her airer~fls Jo_be ~owne~ by Nigeria'~ fighters should they embark on an~ adventure a_gam~t Ntgena. T.hiS is whyNigeriacannolaffordtositbyandtoywtthhersecuntywtthSouthAfncaat herbackyardinFcrnandoPo.

Interdicting Fernando Po of cou/"lic doe.~ not completely eliminate the South African threat. As of now South Africa does not have any aircraft carrier, even if it does, the days of the surface fleet are however numbered because of their I'LIInerabitily to aerial anack. This realisaJ ion has even forced the Pentagon to begin to think seriously of concentrating on submarines. The South Africans h:we a few ofth~, and it~ not bcyuud the capacity of the Nigerian nary to perfect their anli-suhmarinccapabtlity. Evenasubmarineborneallackonourcoasl pales in importana: when compared to the damage an air·borne aUack on all vital areas of Nigeria using Fernando Po as takc·off point.

Once aU the appropriate steps have been taken then Nigeria must put her own house in order. The security of our ports, particularly Calabar, Port Harcourt and l...llgos must be guaranteed. This can be done by strengthening the naval h<tM~.~ in thesc:arcasandaequiringmorepatrolboats,eruisersandbauleshipsand alta..:k ~ans~tts .. The recent aequi,ition of an armed wing by the nary is a ~tcp in the ~ldirectlon.ButthisshouldnolbeseenasasubMituJeforastrongairfor..:cth<~t JSreadyandabletoallad:anddeterenemics.Ourdcfeneeandoffencccapabilitiel. m~. he pal~bly fdt in our territorial waters and by our neighbours. By constant

;~:~~~~:a~~:e·:~l::ed~f:;:l:::~:::a~~;,~:ed Forus, Nigeria must make it

Tire Dyuamics of Nrgeria11 Equara,.a/ G~W~ea ReJ.nro.u 87

k~~:cg::;r~~~~~ ~~t:~ea~::s;~~ :~s~~~~~r~~~t~bze_in Fernandoro~mu.t ::Ould be {oro::d ~o defend ou_r natio~al interest. The r~~~ ~~::: e~ we

und;a~~::~i~il:~ :r~~~:a~n~~~~c~:n~ n~e~~:ugh, unl~ N:~i~~ ~~tcd .,.u~t he considerable and a:e~iblc. ·~igeria eann~t ~:~~h;~~:~,~~ ~~i~~:~::,:~~ ~:~s ::cd~~l ~~~~~\~ns::~::•:;:;:~~~~e~~hintiabou~ one hour

~quatorial Guinea would cllil;t as pr~ntly constituted lies in~h~~:::~: f:;:~:n~nstt;:t:~a; :~;:;~h~: =~~~:yo~:::~~~~~on of the

the security a~d economic well bei~g of NigeriaY lt just may :]] ~h~ EquatorialGurneaaspre~ntlycoru;trtuiCd.posesadangerr~otonlytohersclfbut to Nigeria and the rest of m dependent Afnca. The Indian go~rnment diMnem­bcrmcnt of Barrgladc.sll from Pakistan may prOV!;: a useful lesson for us and if

Fernando Po is to be separated from Rio Muni, the Camerounsand Gabon should beinvitcdtothelinalobsequi~ofEquatoriaiGuinea. Theporntofacolldominium arrangement hy Nigeria and the Camerouns running the affairs ofFcrna~~do p0 is out of the question because historically oondomination administratio11 has neo,w worked because of in-built oonnict in the arrangement. This ~uggestio11 is made becaus~;thecurrerrtpolieyofFinancialblackmailandalongshoppinglistbcing dangled bdoro the Nigerian government by the government or Equatorial Guinea mayinthelongrunprovecostlierthanoutrightanneu.tionandanendcanthusbc put to a troublc~ome relationship. The recent ddrcczing oft he Southern Afria.o situation, it should be noted, will not change the 6trategicimportanee of Equatorial Guinea Island or Bioko, the strategical location Ill's a vis Nig1:ria would always be available for political and military exploitation by Nigeria's rOC5. This i5to ~y the problem would remain as a permanent feature of Nigeria's roreign policy problem. Nolu

\. F. 0. 371!26'JOtl, C. W. Michie, H. B. M. VkeConsu\cncl. in B. H. Bourd~\on to Rt. Hon. Lord Loyd or Dolobran, Secretary or State ror the Coloniu, 4

January\941. 2. I. K. Sundiata prelude tu Scumlal: Lihcria and Fcrnando Po 1880-I<J.\O)oumaJ

of Africa/! History XV 1974 p. 100. J H. R. Rudin, Gt!mrall:> ill tilt! Camt!rowu 1884-1914: A Ccut Stlldy Ill Modtm

lmpt!ria1ism; Yale Univ..-r,ity Press 1938, pp. 315-316.

~: ~-~~~~~;;;~~:_'~~~~:it Vice Consul in Santa lsahel, endo.ln B. H

Bourdillon to C. 0. 4 January 1941. 6. I. K.Sundiataop.c:il.,p Jtrl.

1. 1. K.Sundialll :;~i!;~~rcodc issued in 1906,articlc38adjurcds 8. ~i'!:!~;'ofliCCJSiomcetlabournccdsoffcrnandoPoby01fiQaJ~

inJ. Anglo-SpaDish Relations in WC&t Africa during th 9. :';~::~~SJ·. Vol. VII. No. 2, June 1974 p. 292. c Jli~ 10.Jidc0siPIIokuB,!bid,p.2'96. u.JidcOsUlltoJcun./IJid.P. 301·

;~ :r:~tokun, "Nigcria-Fcmando Po ~lalion•• in A. B. Akinyemj Ed. Nigtlitltmdlht Wodd, NIIA, Lagos 1976 .. ~c also M. B. Akpa.n, Liberia and the Univef541 Ncgo Jmprovc~ent ~~~on. The badtgro~nd to the at.o,.. tion o!GarvcyscheiiiC for Afncan t:Oiomsahon. lounrfll of A/t~Ctnl Histmy X1lf Ji91J,p.l21.

14. F.0.371/269(111,op.dl. 15lllid. J6.Jbid. 17• F. 0. 371/26908. C. W. Michic.,op. dl. 18,/bid. 19. Value or exports from Fcmando Po.

1~:. I "" I 1931 I 1932 I 1933 I TbcJe 6gures rdled dce6ning labour supply, par1icularly the 1931 rlg\lrt refkcts tbc 510ppaae oC labour recruitment in Uberia. See F. 0. 37U49640. Research Depanmcnt, 1st February, 1945.

20. C.O.S831248,Reponinsthemigration ofGermansfromthe Camerounsuoder British Mudale to Fcmando Po in August1939.

21. Forfulldisc:IWiion olthissceSamir Amin,Modem Mi,-otioll in West Africa 0. U.P.l.ondon,l974,pp.68-69.

22. F.0.371J269011,C. W.Miehieop.cil., outofiO.OOONigerians OwclliproviDCecontributed SO% Calabar 38% Ogoja ID% Camcrouas(Britisb) J%

nlbid. Onitsba. 1% TbeSpantsh labour officer pays £1 slerling and 150 Pesetas. In additioo

!~mp.r co.alributcs IDOihcr ISO to 450 Pesetas for a labourer safely Pt5Ct::: 11 Fernando Po {The Pound Sterling's official rate was Ll "' 45

21- =~;,!:~~~~~: ~!':::d~':!nr:::~:. No. I sptdlicaUy~ zs. ~:::.nlo!e:o:!!:~;.:~·(~!!:!n~::!~:=tddfQ& by B. H.

Zti· C o. SB3f240 WAFF Intelligence rcpon for half ,c:.r ending 31 Dec:embcr

~ .. 371/24SIO. ViscountHalifax,Sc:c:rctaryofStateforForc:ipAff.a' s· 27. M;. Fc:terson, British Ambassador to Madrid, 7 February t940. •rsto 11

28. f~~:~~~~:~~amfromGOYc:morofNigc:riatoSecmuyofStatc: Z9. F. 0. 371134771, R. Plc:Yan (Comite Nationalc: Fr:~ncai!ol: to F. 0. 22Januuy ,..,. 30 C 0. 651153. Annual Report of the Department of Labour forth~ year 1944. :n: Tol.al populatiOR o(the Island in 1942 was 23,0110 com(!O!ol:d .,_~ r11tlow&:

European African Spanish 1,000 Nigerian 11,000 Portuguese SOO Fn:nch Camcmunian\ 2,000 Germans 2S Buhi (indigenous Africans) 2,500 English 4

l,S29 ll,SOO sec F. 0. 371134771, British Consul-General in Duala to F. 0. 30Juat,00. 32. Anglo-Spanish Labour agreement concemiDgNigc:ria.arr.dEquatorWGui:nca,

December 1942, Clause XXVIII 33. Nameo(Recruitcr Arcao(Rccruiting

I. RobcrtOji 2. BaSM:y Okon Udo 3. A.I.WiUiams 4. B.A. Eliom Eyamba S. Bf)'SOn U£0l Elulrudo 6. J.S.Uranta 7. G.U. Anige 8. Johny E. Etim Walker 9. T.D. Ngawuchu

10. Emmanucl Ono Oji 11. J.C.Sosco 12. Michael Anyanwu 13. Uka Ogbu Uka 14. Peter Oboonaya 15. Ef10111NkopNruk

See C. 0. 657153, op. cit.

Co1laharDivision UyoDiW.ion Ekei/E.tinam AbakDivision Opobo Division Opobo Division lkot-Ekpene/ARO/ITV Division lkoi.-Ekpcnc/Enyong AbaDivision OWcrri DiW.ion Owcni Division BcndcDivision Bcndc:Divisioo Okipi DiW.i011 Orlu Dislrict ofOkigwi. DisiYioo

Montbly Owx• ,.

20 ,. "' 40 40 so ,. ,. ,. ., 2l

" so

"

90 Nlgtlltl und liS Jnunedttlft Nrighbour.J

J4.1bul. 657153 L.1bourReportfori944. 35· ~ ~- 37~772• c. 0. to F. 0. 10 August.' 1943. ~ F: O. J?t/)4nl, Brit~h Consul-General m Duala to F. 0. JOJune, 1943_

:· :::Jid~ Osuntokun, "Anglo·Spanish_ rel_ati_ons dur~ng the First World War" · op. "'· Sec also Jide ~suntokun, Mgcna 111 the Fvsr World War, Lon&man

Londcm J979(forthcommg). . . 40_ f_0_ 371139601,GovcrnorofNtgenato:.O.l7May,1944.

41. F. o. 3711)4nl, Brit~ll Consul-Ge~eralm Duala to F. 0. 30Junc, 1943.

4z. F. 0.371!34712.Rc:sident Min~ttrlDAccratoF. 0. 12July,l943.

43. F. 0. )71/495911, British Vice-Consul in Fernando Po to F. 0. 31 March, l94S.

44_ Bolaji Akinycmi "Nigeria and Fernando Po 1958·1966: The Politia;oflrreden. tism: AfriL:ut Affair~: The Quuttcrlyloumulofthc Royot Africun Society, Vol. (>9,No.276,Julyi970,p.2311.

45. Federal Ministry of Informal ion New; Release No. 180, February 6 1976. 4<•. WestAfne~ml'llo4 7January,1958. 47. SupoOjcdokun, ''The Anglo-Nigerian entente and its demise 1960-1962" Slaff

Seminar Papers School of African and Asian Studies 1970-71, al Lagos Univcr~ily Lihrary, sec also Mahmud Tukur: Nigeria's External Relations: The lJN '" a forum ami policy medium in the conduct of foreign policy (kluhcr J9W · Dcccmhcr 1%5. ABU Zaria. Institute of Administration puhlk:11inn

48. ~cc Dm~· T.-i<'lftlpfr 2XJmJu01ry 1%3 and 7 August 1963. West African Pi/019 Fchru •• ry I'J62,Sm!day 77mcs Ul February 1962 and 2.'i February 1%2 Sw1day Po!it1Aprill%2andi1Marchl962.

49. Nil,'f:IIU/1 Ob!iCiver, Brigadier Bassey's interview, 24 November 1%9. 50. New Ni1,<eriu11 24 January I 'X•? al'o Nigeriw1 Momil1g Po!il 14 October 1969. 51. Federal Minislry oflnformalion News Rclca5e No. 142, Lagos 31;1976. 52. Tc~l of Agreement, Federal Ministry of Information; Release No. 94, January

211,1?71. 53. Fcd("ral Minislry of Information Release No. M Fehruary 6, 1976 . . '>4./hid

5.~ ''""· 56. FcdcraltiuvcrnmcntsiOJtcmeutun21Januaryl?16 51. HuwwnTimcsJ;mu:tryl.l, I'J76,Ji.]

511. M~o<eriu11 Ommides 12 January l'l7f•, 'cc abo Daily Ski::tch 14 January 1976. 59. Mg.:riuliStumlurt/14Januaryl'l1t..

(.0 . .Sec Ntw Nifi'!rt'tlll January24 1976 ~L~o Nigrriwl Stulldurd 141:1 1976 f•l. PRO/C0520/II Briti~h A~nha:o..~ador lo Berlin 1~ F. o. 5th July ~:Z Sec ~!so

~~:;~~~~~;;:>Cr~:~:~ ~;~~'.'~.-7trl'"' Rtlatlmu: The Diplomacy or

Tht D)'rtamia of Nifuja11 &,us!orial Guillca Rd~rlkms 91

62- ~:~~u;::!"ai;~,:~u~=;~!:~:=~t~'~:.~~:: ~';,!':. 291-301.

63 pROJC0S83118/43993. German inteDigcacc rcpon on MS Bremcn c.ap:uu.d · b)' (Jeocral Olarla DobeU in Duala. !llh Oaobcr 1914. See ako A. ~Un·

tokun: Nigeria ill U!t Finl World Wwl..ongman London 1979.

64. A study prcscn~ed at NIPSS on.22ad February 1980 on the nature ohhrcaato (lligeria's seeunty by the followmg: Jemibcwon D. M. (Brigadier NA); Falopc J.K.(Air ConamodorcNAF),Dan10adami M. (Commissioaero(Police NPF), Babangida I. B. (Brigadier NA).

6S.Ibid. 66. lA ea11p d'ttol manqut du 6Awil 1084; Dossier prcsente par le ministere de

l'in£ormation et de la culture de la Republique du Cameroun. 61. Sec Jidc Osuntokun, "Relations between Nigeria aad Femando Po from

colonial times to the prescnl" in A.B. Aldn)Ud (ed.) Nigrria fllld lht World:

Rtt~dil!p ill Nigeri1211 Fordgn Policy (lbadao OUP (c) 1978), pp. 1·12.