Our chief weapon is surprise: a quantitative study of historical ...ismor.com/ismor_archives/33ismor_archive/presentations/...Air manoeuvre (AM) has been a major operational tool since

Our chief weapon is surprise:

a quantitative study of historical

air manoeuvre operations

Paul R. Syms

Dstl D&SA, Portsdown West, UK

33 ISMOR, 26–29 July 2016

DSTL/CP96839

© Crown copyright 2016 Dstl UK OFFICIAL

29 July 2016

Abstract

Air manoeuvre (AM) has been a major operational tool since the start of World War Two (WW2). Army HQ tasked

Dstl with providing evidence for the shape and continued development of the UK’s AM capability. Three primary

questions were developed:

1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the different AM methods?

2. How sustainable are AM forces?

3. What command, control and communications (C3) are needed for AM forces?

Three methods were used to address the problem: historical analysis (HA), manual wargaming and computer-

based simulation. This paper focuses on the HA.

A database of 347 AM operations was compiled, and the study compared their casualty rates with those from

similar-sized ground-only operations. It specifically attempted to separate casualties incurred during insertion from

those in subsequent combat on the ground, and to examine the effect of achieving surprise on casualties and

mission outcome.

The study concluded that AM forces, using both helicopter insertion or parachuting as appropriate, offer a unique

capability that is just as relevant as it was in WW2. The study quantified the contribution of maintaining a

technological edge over the enemy to AM mission success, as well as that of maintaining the all-important element

of surprise.

UK OFFICIAL © Crown copyright 2016 Dstl

29 July 2016

Founding concept

“Where is the prince who can

afford so to cover his country with

troops for its defense, so that ten

thousand men descending from

the clouds might not, in many

places, do an infinite deal of

mischief before a force could be

brought together to repel them?”

– Benjamin Franklin, 1784


29 July 2016

Question and methods

• Army HQ questions on air manoeuvre operations

– How best to undertake them?

– What C2 is needed?

– What logistic support is needed?

• Three methods used to address problem:

– historical analysis (HA) of air manoeuvre operations

– manual wargaming of an air assault with 16 AA Bde

– computer-based simulation

• This paper focuses on the historical analysis


29 July 2016

UK OFFICIAL

Historical

analysis

CH-21s deliver South Vietnamese paratroopers on Op. Chopper,

Vietnam, in 1962

© Crown copyright 2016 Dstl

29 July 2016

Historical AM operations database

• One-year HA study

– two-thirds of effort devoted to gathering and ‘cleaning’ data

• 231 data points for initial report, now 347

– most data are from open sources

• Hardest question: was an operation an AM operation?

– defined as moving troops into contact using aircraft

– study excluded helicopter support to GM operations

• Hardest data to source: post-2000 operations


29 July 2016

• 59 operations (17%) by UK and Commonwealth

AM operations by nation

UK OFFICIAL

59

39

231165

1935

127

23

Britain

France

Germany

Israel

Japan

Netherlands

Rhodesia & SA

Russia/USSR

USA

Other nations

n = 347


29 July 2016

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

19

30

19

40

19

50

19

60

19

70

19

80

19

90

20

00

20

10

No

. o

f o

pe

rati

on

s

Decade starting ...

Raids

Landings

258 landings

88 raids

AM operations through time

UK OFFICIAL

World War 2

1939–45 (29%)

Vietnam War

1962–75 (28%)

Soviet Afghan

War 1979–89


29 July 2016

• Median landing was by 600 troops, median raid 112

AM operations by force size

UK OFFICIAL

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

<1

00

100–200

200–500

500–

1k

1–2k

2–5k

5–10k

10–20k

20–50k

>5

0k

No

. o

f o

pera

tio

ns

AM force size category

Raids

Landings

n = 347

Mean = 1350

Typical AM

battalion size

Typical AM

division size

Typical AM

coy size


29 July 2016

UK OFFICIAL

AM insertion analysis

3 Sqn 2 SAS with a C-47 Dakota before Op. Galia, Italy, in 1944


29 July 2016

14

147

147

5

16

144

FW TALO

FW parachute

FW para+FAL

FW para+RW

Glider (only)

FW para+glider

RW air assault

n = 347

• First RW air landings in mid-1950s

Insertion methods


29 July 2016

14

147

147

5

16

144

FW TALO

FW parachute

FW para+FAL

FW para+RW

Glider (only)

FW para+glider

RW air assault

n = 347

• First RW air landings in mid-1950s

Insertion methods

UK OFFICIAL

42% FW

parachuting

41% RW

landing


29 July 2016

Insertion observations

• Parachuting has greater ‘reach’ than RW assault

– substantial effort moving helicopters into theatre

• Many AM ops scaled down because insufficient lift

– e.g. Op. Varsity (Rhine crossings, in 1945)

– many in Vietnam and Afghanistan suffered ‘hot-and-high’

• ISTAR of DZ/LZ crucial: terrain and enemy

• Logistics difficult for >3-day AM operations

– e.g. partly responsible for Arnhem failure (in 1944)


29 July 2016

• Mean DZ/LZ elevation: 338m ASL, 90%-ile: 980m

0

20

40

60

80

<30m

30

–100m

100–250m

250–

500m

500–

750m

750–1000m

1000–1500m

1500–2000m

2000–2500m

2500–3000m

>300

0m

No

. o

f o

pe

rati

on

s

DZ/LZ elevation (m AMSL)

n = 231

Mean = 338m

Insertion elevations


29 July 2016

• Mean DZ/LZ elevation: 338m ASL, 90%-ile: 980m

0

20

40

60

80

<30m

30

–100m

100–250m

250–

500m

500–

750m

750–1000m

1000–1500m

1500–2000m

2000–2500m

2500–3000m

>300

0m

No

. o

f o

pe

rati

on

s

DZ/LZ elevation (m AMSL)

n = 231

Mean = 338m

Insertion elevations

UK OFFICIAL

Afghanistan:

600–3200m

90%-ile:

980m

Vietnam uplands:

200–1200m


29 July 2016

Insertion losses

• From environment, enemy AD, and ‘hot DZ/LZs’

• Mean aircraft losses: 5.0% lost, 8.3% damaged …

– hugely biased by WW2 losses

– Post-WW2: 1.6% lost, 3.4% damaged

• Mean personnel losses: 0.9% killed, 1.8% injured

– again, biased by WW2 losses

– Post-WW2: 0.2% killed, 0.6% injured

• Unopposed landing losses very low (≈0.2%)


29 July 2016

UK OFFICIAL

Success

and failure

CH-21s collect South Vietnamese paratroopers

on Op. Chopper, Vietnam, in 1962


29 July 2016

Probability of AM success

• Winning is partly subjective, but …

• Overall AM P(success) was 74%

– P(success) on a landing was 77%

– P(success) on a raid was 66%

• Comparable ground operations P(success) was 71%

– assessed over a similar sample of battles


29 July 2016

• Trend is for ‘mass’ to increase success

P(success) by force ratio

UK OFFICIAL

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

<0

.2:1

0.2

–0.5

:1

0.5

–1.0

:1

1.0

–2.0

:1

2.0

–5.0

:1

>5

.0:1

% A

M s

uc

ce

ss

AM force ratio category

n = 347 (excludes unopposed operations)

Mean success = 71%

Many here

are raids


29 July 2016

• Mean AM force losses: 23% (KiA + MiA + WiA + PoW)

0

20

40

60

80

100

0–

5%

5–

10

%

10

–1

5%

15

–2

0%

20

–2

5%

25

–3

0%

30

–3

5%

35

–4

0%

40

–4

5%

45

–5

0%

50

–5

5%

55

–6

0%

60

–6

5%

65

–7

0%

70

–7

5%

75

–8

0%

80

–8

5%

85

–9

0%

90

–9

5%

95

–1

00

%

No

. o

f o

pe

rati

on

s

% air manoeuvre losses

n = 219 operations

AM operation loss spectrum


29 July 2016

• Mean AM force losses: 23% (KiA + MiA + WiA + PoW)

0

20

40

60

80

100

0–

5%

5–

10

%

10

–1

5%

15

–2

0%

20

–2

5%

25

–3

0%

30

–3

5%

35

–4

0%

40

–4

5%

45

–5

0%

50

–5

5%

55

–6

0%

60

–6

5%

65

–7

0%

70

–7

5%

75

–8

0%

80

–8

5%

85

–9

0%

90

–9

5%

95

–1

00

%

No

. o

f o

pe

rati

on

s

% air manoeuvre losses

n = 219 operations

AM operation loss spectrum

UK OFFICIAL

Median:

8.2% When AM ops fail,

they can fail

catastrophically.

When AM ops

succeed, losses

can be very low.


29 July 2016

Achieving surprise

• Surprise is highly desirable (but hard to assess)

– reliable data for 189 operations (first wave only)

• Achieved on 82% of occasions


29 July 2016

80%

11%

9%

Surprise

Win

Draw

Defeat

Achieving surprise





29 July 2016

80%

11%

9%

Surprise

Win

Draw

Defeat

36%

40%

24%

No surprise

Win

Draw

Defeat

Achieving surprise




UK OFFICIAL

P

Why are AM forces so effective?

• Most post-WW2 ops against insurgencies

– no integrated AD, some lacking MMGs and mortars

• AM success from training and surprise

– almost all AM ops are by ‘elite’ forces

– very hard to measure ‘eliteness’ objectively

“Our two chief weapons are fear, surprise, and

ruthless efficiency!”


29 July 2016

UK OFFICIAL

Effects of technology

French engineers on Op. Serval unload a dozer from an

MSP at Tessalit, Mali, in 2013 (armyrecognition.com)


29 July 2016

0

20

40

60

80

–2.5 –2.0 –1.5 –1.0 –0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0

No

. o

f o

pe

rati

on

s

AM technology advantage (arbitrary units)

Technology advantage

UK OFFICIAL

Technological

parity 15%

Technological

disadvantage 13%

(mostly WW2)

Technological

advantage

72%

n = 199 operations


29 July 2016

0

20

40

60

80

–2.5 –2.0 –1.5 –1.0 –0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0

No

. o

f o

pe

rati

on

s

AM technology advantage (arbitrary units)

Technology advantage

UK OFFICIAL

Technological

parity 15%

Technological

disadvantage 13%

(mostly WW2)

Technological

advantage

72%

52%

success

66%

success

79%

success

n = 199 operations


29 July 2016

P

Observations on technology

• AM technology advantage improves success

– most recently in sensors and C3 technology

– likely to be eroded in future

• Anti-armour technology now more portable

• Engineering plant key to clearing runways for TALO

– demonstrated by France in Mali in 2013

– requires underslung or stressed platform technology


29 July 2016

UK OFFICIAL

Conclusions

UH-1 Iroquois s collect US airmobile troops in Vietnam, in 1967 (Wiki Commons)


29 July 2016

Conclusions

• Air manoeuvre is a unique capability

– surprise is essential

– ISTAR of DZ/LZ is crucial, as long as surprise maintained

• Maintaining FW and RW airlift is essential

– ‘mass’ increasing force ratio improves success

• Technological advantage improves success

– delivering indirect fire support and light armour

– delivering enabling C3ISTAR and engineering technologies

– countering enemy AD


29 July 2016

References and some sources

BRAGG R. & PUGH H. (2013) ‘History of Military Operational Parachute Jumps’ published online at kdcnova.com

CARLAND J.M. (2000) ‘Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966’ US Center of Military History, Washington, DC: 410 pp.

COLE R.H. (1995) ‘Operation Just Cause, Panama’ US Joint History Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC

COLE R.H. (1997) ‘Operation Urgent Fury, Grenada’ US Joint History Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC

FLANAGAN E.M. (2002) ‘Airborne: A Combat History of American Airborne Forces’ Presidio Press, New York, NY: 452 pp.

FREEDMAN L.D. (2005) ‘The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. II: War and Diplomacy’ Routledge, London: 849 pp.

GLANTZ D.M. (1984) ‘The Soviet Aiborne Experience’ US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Combat Studies Institute Research Survey No.4

GRAU L.W. (ed., 1996) ‘The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan’ Frunze Combined Arms Academy, Moscow; translated by the Foreign Military Studies Office, Ft. Leavenworth, KS; National Defense University, Washington, DC: 272 pp.

OTWAY T.B.H. (1951) ‘Airborne Forces’ HMSO; Imperial War Museum, London, 1990: 489 pp.

MARSHALL S.L.A. (1962) ‘Night Drop: the American Airborne Invasion of Normandy’ Battery Press, Nashville, TN; re-published by Jove Books, NY: 391 pp.

QUARRIE B. (1991) ‘Airborne Assault: Parachute Forces in Action, 1940–91’ Patrick Stephens Ltd., London: 216 pp.

SHURKIN M. (2014) ‘France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army’ RAND report for Project HQD136504, Santa Monica, CA

WOOD A. (1990) ‘History of the World's Glider Forces’ Patrick Stephens Ltd., London: 312 pp.


29 July 2016

UK OFFICIAL

16 Air Assault Brigade paratroopers parachuting from a C-130J (MoD)

Questions?


29 July 2016

Documents

Our chief weapon is surprise: a quantitative study of historical ...ismor.com/ismor_archives/33ismor_archive/presentations/...Air manoeuvre (AM) has been a major operational tool since