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Outline Prisoners Dilemma Security Dilemma Structural realism (Waltz) Structure forms a wedge between intentions and outcomes Why relative gains matter Three types of interactions among states Implications of realism for international relations Review of realism

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Prisoners Dilemma How structures can prevent actors from getting their desired outcomes How individuals pursuing clear incentives in pursuit of self-interest leads them to behave in ways that lead them NOT to best achieve those self-interests Examples in international relations: Arms races, trade wars, pollution problems

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Rows perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) R gets 2 yrR gets 10 yr Confess (Defect) R gets 0 yrR gets 5 yr

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Columns perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) C gets 2 yrC gets 0 yr Confess (Defect) C gets 10 yrC gets 5 yr

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Overall game COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) C gets 2 yr R gets 2 yr C gets 0 yr R gets 10 yr Confess (Defect) C gets 10 yr R gets 0 yr C gets 5 yr R gets 5 yr

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Rows perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) R gets 2 yrR gets 10 yr Confess (Defect) R gets 0 yrR gets 5 yr What should Row do?

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Rows perspective COLUMN Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) R gets 10 yr Confess (Defect) R gets 5 yr First, assume Column confessed. What should Row do?

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Rows perspective COLUMN Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) R gets 10 yr Confess (Defect) R gets 5 yr If Column confessed, Row clearly prefers to Confess.

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Rows perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) ROW Silence (Cooperate) R gets 2 yr Confess (Defect) R gets 0 yr Now, assume Column stayed silent. What should Row do?

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Rows perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) ROW Silence (Cooperate) R gets 2 yr Confess (Defect) R gets 0 yr If Column stayed silent, Row still prefers to Confess.

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Rows perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) R gets 2 yrR gets 10 yr Confess (Defect) R gets 0 yrR gets 5 yr So, no matter what Column does, Row prefers to Confess!

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Columns perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) C gets 2 yrC gets 0 yr Confess (Defect) C gets 10 yrC gets 5 yr What should Column do?

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Columns perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) C gets 10 yrC gets 5 yr First, assume Row confessed. What should Column do?

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Columns perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) C gets 10 yrC gets 5 yr If Row confessed, Column clearly prefers to Confess.

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Columns perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) C gets 2 yrC gets 0 yr Confess (Defect) Now, assume Row stayed silent. What should Column do?

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Columns perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) C gets 2 yrC gets 0 yr Confess (Defect) If Row stayed silent, Column still prefers to Confess.

Slide 17

Columns perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) C gets 2 yrC gets 0 yr Confess (Defect) C gets 10 yrC gets 5 yr So, no matter what Row does, Column prefers to Confess!

Slide 18

Overall game COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) C gets 2 yr R gets 2 yr C gets 0 yr R gets 10 yr Confess (Defect) C gets 10 yr R gets 0 yr C gets 5 yr R gets 5 yr BUT, since both Column and Row confess, they end up both getting 5 years,

Slide 19

Overall game COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW Silence (Cooperate) C gets 2 yr R gets 2 yr C gets 0 yr R gets 10 yr Confess (Defect) C gets 10 yr R gets 0 yr C gets 5 yr R gets 5 yr BUT, since both Column and Row confess, they end up both getting 5 years, even though they both would prefer 2 years!

Slide 20

Nuclear arms race Soviets Dont Build Nukes Build Nukes US Dont Build Nukes Sovs secure Arms Control US secure Sovs super-secure US overrun Build Nukes Sovs overrun US super-secure Sovs insecure/poor Arms Race US insecure/poor BUT, since both US and Sovs build nukes, they end up insecure AND poor even though they would prefer greater security at less cost

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Causes of Security Dilemma Anarchy/self-help structure of intl system Lack of trust Misperception and miscommunication Ambiguity regarding offense/defense of military forces and actions

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Aspects of PD & Security Dilemma Relative gains concerns Even if only absolute gains concerns, cooperation still difficult Role of trust Role of iteration Role of external sanctions Role of number of actors Role of information Role of diffuse reciprocity

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Structural realism Structure forms wedge between intentions and outcomes people do not get what they strive for Structure composed of: Ordering principle anarchy Relative capabilities distribution of power Structure dictates outcomes Relative gains concerns dominate

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Structure as a wedge What we expect (and dont need to explain): Intentions Outcomes

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Structure as a wedge What we expect (and dont need to explain): Intentions Outcomes What we dont expect and must explain: Intentions Outcomes

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Structure as a wedge What we expect (and dont need to explain): Intentions Outcomes What we dont expect and must explain: Structure Intentions Outcomes

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Structural realism What it explains: Continuity / consistency of conflict across race, religion, time, culture, technology, etc. DIFFERS from a claim that war stems from human nature

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Why relative gains matter Country ACountry B No trade100M GDP Trade pact (year 1) 120M GDP130M GDP Trade pact (year 2) 110M GDP + 100 tanks 110M GDP + 200 tanks War by B on A (year 3) Status (year 4) 0M GDP + 0 tanks 220M GDP + 100 tanks

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Three types of interactions among states Harmony Independent decision-making produces GOOD outcomes Conflict Independent decision-making produces BAD outcomes Cooperation Interdependent decision-making produces GOOD outcomes (in context where independent decision- making WOULD HAVE created bad outcomes)

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Implications of Realism for International Relations How realists interpret and predict the world If states are getting along, its harmony not cooperation States, being concerned with relative gains, will not risk interdependent cooperation States may form international institutions BUT Only accept rules they would have followed anyway States may comply BUT its because Rules codify existing or expected future behavior Hegemonic states force them to Easy cases of coordination games

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RealismInstitutionalismDisenfranchised Focus what is being explained? Conflict Actors who are considered the main actors to watch? States are primary and act as unitary rational actors Goals what are the goals of the main actors? Survival, security, and hence, power Means what means do actors use to achieve their goals? Military force is usable, effective, and fungible Organizing Principles how is the international system organized? Anarchy and self- help Dynamics what does process of international relations look like? Acquisition and balancing of power