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Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL) STEFAN SCHMID (AALBORG UNIVERSITY, DENMARK) IEEE EURO S&P, PARIS, FRANCE APRIL 2017

Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

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Page 1: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation

KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY)

LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

STEFAN SCHMID (AALBORG UNIVERSITY, DENMARK)

IEEE EURO S&P, PARIS, FRANCEAPRIL 2017

Page 2: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

Networking Equipment is Critical• It forms a technological foundation for communication

• It contributes to the economy

• Vital for national security

Page 3: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

Backdoors, exploits and 0days in Networking Equipment

Page 4: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

Backdoors in SDN equipment• Does that introduce new attacks?

• Can we detect backdoor activity?

Page 5: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

Software Defined Networking (SDN)is a networking paradigm

● Separated planes● Centralized model

Data plane

Control plane

Switch

Controller

Page 6: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

SDN Teleportation:An attack previously not possible

Traditional Networks

Software Defined Networks

Teleportation

Data plane

Control plane

Controlplane

Page 7: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

SDN Teleportation poses several threats● Bypass security mechanisms

● Attack coordination

● Exfiltration

● Eavesdrop

Page 8: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

The Teleportation Model

1)Switch to Controller

2)Controller to Switches

3)Destination Processing

Switch

Controller

(1) (2)

0110... (3)

Switch

Page 9: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

Teleportation Techniques• Out-of-band Forwarding

• Flow (re-)configurations

• Switch Identification

Page 10: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

Out-of-band Forwarding Teleportation● Complete packets from one

switch are teleported to

another switch

Packet-in

Packet-Out

Page 11: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

Flow (Re-)Configuration Teleportation● Exploit the controllers

centralized control to

reconfigure the network

when a host moves across

the networkPack

et-in

Flow-add Packet-in

Flow-addFlow-delete

Page 12: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

Switch Identification Teleportation● Impersonate the

Datapath-ID to

communicate

information Hello

Features-request Features-request

Features-reply

(DPID

=1) Features-reply (DPID=1)

Hello

Page 13: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

Attacks using Teleportation● Bypass firewalls, IDS and IPS

● Exfiltration

● Man-in-the-middle

● Rendezvous/Attack coordination

Page 14: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

Teleportation Bandwidth

Page 15: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

Countermeasures● Packet-in-Packet-Out Watcher

● Audit-Trails and Accountability

● Enhanced IDS with Waypoint Enforcement

Page 16: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

Conclusions● Introduced a conceptually novel SDN attack

● Teleportation enables several attacks

● Teleportation has high quality and throughput

● Suggested Teleportation countermeasures

Page 17: Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation · Outsmarting Network Security with SDN Teleportation KASHYAP THIMMARAJU (TU BERLIN, GERMANY) LIRON SCHIFF (GUARDICORE LABS, ISRAEL)

Questions