Upload
others
View
1
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Pacific Southwest Blackout on September 8, 2011 at 15:27
IEEE PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada, July 24th, 2013
Dr. Milorad Papic [email protected]
1
PES GM 2013, Vancouver, Canada July 24, 2013
Outline
1. Generic Scenario for a Blackout Event
2. Impact of September 8th Blacout
3. History of WECC Disturbances
4. Lessons Learned
2
IEEE PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada, July 24, 2013
1. Generic Scenario of a Cascading Blackout
3
1 2 6
3
5 4
0 0 – System State Before
Blackout
1 – Contingency Conditions
2 – Triggering Events
3 – Power Flow Surges, Voltage
problems, Overloads
4 – Protection System Trips
Lines, Transformers, Generators
5 – System Separation, Instability
and Voltage Collapse
6 - Blackout System State
IEEE PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada, July 24, 2013
1. Cascading Event – Various Definitions A cascading failure is a process, in which an initiating event/failure increases the stress of other system components, resulting in their overloading above the limits for which they were designed.
NERC definition: The uncontrolled successive loss of system elements triggered by an incident at any location. Cascading results in widespread electric service interruption that cannot be restrained from sequentially spreading beyond an area predetermined by studies.
A cascading outage is defined as the event in which an abnormal cascading processes develop in power systems, when every disturbance triggers a next one, and so on, result in blackouts, i.e. mass-scale tripping of generating sources and disruption of electricity supply over large areas.
CFTF definition: Cascading Failure is a Sequence of Dependent Failures of Individual Components that successively Weakness the Power System
4
IEEE PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada, July 24, 2013
1. Pre-Event State (state-0)
Normal (Pre-Event) Operating State In this state the operating parameters of BES lie within acceptable limits. However
noticeable deviations of parameters were observed during the blackouts
Extreme conditions (summer & winter peak)
Weakened topology (important equipment out of service)
Natural Disasters and Extreme weather
Does the system operate reliable in this state? The term “reliable operation” means operating the elements of the bulk-power system within equipment and electric system thermal, voltage and stability limits so that instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of such system will not occur as a result of a sudden disturbance or unanticipated failure of system elements.
5
IEEE PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada, July 24, 2013
1. Triggering Events (state-3)
Various N-1 (overload, protection failure, short-circuit..) Failure of Equipment
Malfunctioning of protective devices
N-k simultaneous outages
Other Causes Extreme weather, Lighting
Human Error
Lack of situational awareness
Operational planning error
Control system error
6
IEEE PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada, July 24, 2013
1. Cascading Event - Progression The outage of the overloaded components can progress either
slowly (steady-state progression), or quickly (transient progression).
The transient progression usually involves voltage instability, frequency instability and small signal instability (power oscillations) and its time scale is between seconds and several tens of seconds. The examples are blackouts in US-West on July 2, 1996 and the most recent one in India on August 31, 2012.
The slow progression involves line tripping between fairly large time intervals, in order of minutes. In this case the line tripping occurs either after exceeding a short-term emergency line loading limit or the line sags and short-circuit between the line and trees takes place. The examples of the slow progressing cascading is the blackout in France on December 19, 1978, initial phase of the NE US blackout on August 14th, 2003 and blackout in Italy on September 28, 2003.
IEEE PES General Meeting, Vancouver,
Canada, July 24, 2013
7
2. Impact of September 8, 2011 Blackout in AZ-CA Region
About 2.7 million people affected.
7.89 GW of load interrupted
6 -12 hours to fully restore all loads.
Average load interruption time: 8.1 hours.
WECC peak load: ~130 GW.
Affected area peak load:~17 GW.
PES GM 2013, Vancouver, Canada July 24, 2013
8
Affected Area
9
2. Affected Area Electric System
Path 49 (EOR)
Path 46 (WOR) Path 43
Path 45
Path 44 WALC
APS
IID
CFE
SDGE
Serrano Devers
PV
North Gila
Imperial V Miguel
HS
SCE Path 42
PES GM 2013, Vancouver, Canada July 24, 2013
P2
P3
P4
P5 P6
P7
P6
2. Pre-Disturbance Conditions on Paths in affected area
Path in Affected Area Path rating Path Flow & ( %)
Path 44 (South of S.O.) 2,200 MW 1,302 MW (78%)
Path 45 (SDGE-CFE) 800 MW S>N, 408 MW N>S
241 MW (60%)
230 kV S Line (part of Path 46)
239 MW 90 MW (38%)
500 kV H-NG Line (part of path 49)
1,800 MW 1,397 MW (78%)
SDGE Import SOL 2,850 MW 2,539 MW (89%)
Path 42 (IID-SCE) 600 MW E>W -40 MW
10
PES GM 2013, Vancouver, Canada July 24, 2013
2. Main Contributing Factors to SW Outage₁
Impact of sub-100 kV facilities
Not studying/coordinating effects of Protection Systems and RAS during contingency
Not providing effective operator tools and instructions for reclosing lines with large phase angle differences
Failure to recognize IROLs
PES GM 2013, Vancouver, Canada July 24, 2013
11
₁FERC/NERC Report
3. WECC Disturbances 2002-2012
IEEE PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada, July 24, 2013
12
48%
12%
3%
2%
5%
1%
8%
4%
1%
1% 1%
14%
Relative Contribution to Risk by Cause (%)
Vandalism/Physical Attack
Severe Weather
Equipment Failure
Fire
High Wind
High Temperature
Separation/Islanding
Fuel Deficiency
Loss of Transmission
Cyber Attack
No Load Lost 42%
0-100 MW 10%
100-300 MW 23%
300-1000 MW 21%
1000-2000 MW 1%
2000-5000 MW 1%
> 5000 MW 1%
Uknown 1%
Relative Contribution to Risk by Size of Interrupted Load (%)
3. WECC Disturbances 2002-2012
IEEE PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada, July 24, 2013
13
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
9 9 17
12
23 25 26
19
32
69
49
Dis
turb
nav
ces
Disturbnaces Reported by WECC TOs 2002-2012
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3 Severity Risk Index
4. Lessons Learned What did come from Blackouts?
• 1965 – Marked the beginning of fundamental change in the electric power industry. Regional reliability organizations and the NERC were formed to monitor and promote electric system reliability. The impetus for the EMS advanced applications came from this blackout.
• 1996 – Disturbance reports propose 32 recommendations for August 10 outage and 24 recommendations for July 2 outage. As a result of these recommendations WSCC has developed:
– new Voltage Stability Criteria, Undervoltage load shedding strategy, and reactive power reserve monitoring methodology.
– Seasonal Studies
– The impetus for the mandatory membership in reliability councils and enforced compliance with reliability criteria came from these two blackouts.
• 2003 – Task Force Final Report proposes 14 Recommendations relating to
– Strategic Initiatives (Strengthen the NERC Compliance Enforcement Program,…)
– Technical Initiatives (Improve Operator and Reliability Training…)
– Actions to Improve Reliability (Voltage and Reactive Management,…)
• 2011 – The Final Joint NERC/FERC Report propose 27 Recommendations relating to
– situational awareness; next-day planning; seasonal planning; near- and long-term planning;
– impact of sub-100-kV facilities; Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROL).
14
PES GM 2013, Vancouver, Canada July 24, 2013
Questions????
?
Note/Disclaimer Presentation represents the
views of the presenter
And does not necessarily
represent the views
Of the Idaho Power Co.
15
PES GM 2013, Vancouver, Canada July 24, 2013