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PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES STRATEGIC RELATIONS:
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS
(2001-2014)
By
Muhammad Imran Rashid
PhD in International Relations
Session 2013-2018
Roll No. 04
Supervisor
Prof. Dr. Umbreen Javaid
Chairperson
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PUNJAB, LAHORE
ii
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award
of
Degree
Ph.D in
PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES STRATEGIC RELATIONS:
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS
(2001-2014)
Supervisor Submitted by
PROF. DR.UMBREEN JAVAID Muhammad Imran Rashid
H.E.C. Nominee Roll No. 05
Department of Political Science Ph.D
University of the Punjab, Lahore. Session:- 2011-2016
Department of Political Science
University of the Punjab
Lahore.
iii
DEDICATED To
My parents & family specially my daughter (Hijab Fatima)
for their endless love & cooperation
iv
DECLARATION
I, Muhammad Imran Rashid, Ph. D Scholar at Department of Political Science,
University of the Punjab, Lahore hereby declare that the present thesis titled
PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES STRATEGIC RELATIONS:
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS
(2001-2014)
has been written by me and is my original and personal work.
________ __________________
Dated Signature of Deponent
v
CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that present thesis titled PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC RELATIONS: MILITARY AND ECONOMIC
DIMENSIONS (2001-2014) has been written by Muhammad Imran Rashid
as the requirement for Ph. D degree in International Relations from the
University of the Punjab, Lahore. The research described in this thesis is original
work of the author and has been carried out under my direct supervision. The
thesis has been prepared according to the prescribed format for the award of the
degree under codal procedure of the University. To the best of my knowledge
the thesis is based on original research.
Prof. Dr. Umbreen Javaid
Supervisor
vi
CONTENTS
Sr. No. Page No.
List Of Tables Xiv
List Of Abbreviations Xv
Acknowledgements Xviii
Abstract Xix
Introduction Xx
Literature Review Xxii
Statement of the Problem Xxvii
Objectives of the Study Xxvii
Research Questions Xxviii
Significance of the Study Xxviii
Research Methodology Xxix
Chapterization Xxix
CHAPTER 1 Page No.
Theoretical Framework of Foreign Policy 01-34
1.1 Meaning and Definition of Foreign Policy 02
1.2 Objectives of Foreign Policy 04
1.3 Determining Factor of Foreign Policy 06
a) Internal Factors 06
b) External Factors 12
1.4 Pakistan Foreign Policy 15
1.5 Evolution of Pakistan Foreign Policy 16
1.6 Phases of Pakistan Foreign Policy 16
vii
1.7 First Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy 17
1.8 Second Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy 18
1.9 Third Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy 19
1.10 Fourth Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy 20
1.11 Fifth Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy 20
1.12 Sixth Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy 21
1.13 United States Foreign Policy 22
1.14 United States Foreign Policy after WW II 23
1.15 Post WW II United States Foreign Policy towards
South Asia
24
1.16 Pre-9/11 Challenges to Pakistan Foreign Policy 25
1.17 Post 9/11 Pakistan Foreign Policy towards United
States
27
1.18 Post 9/11 United States Foreign Policy towards
Pakistan
27
CHAPTER 2
History of Pakistan-United States Relations 35-111
2.1 United States Policy towards Subcontinent before
Partition
36
2.2 Indian Non-alignment Policy 36
2.3 Pakistan’s strategic significance 37
2.4 Formation of Pakistan-United States Diplomatic
Ties
37
viii
2.5 Pakistan-United States Relation in Early Years 38
2.6 Liaqat’s Visit to United States 40
2.7 World Situation and Regional Defense Alliances in
50s
41
2.8 Korean War 43
2.9 Path to United States Regional Security Pacts,
Economic Assistance and Pakistan
44
2.10 Eisenhower Doctrine and Mutual Security
Assistance Agreement
48
2.11 Pakistan’s Compulsions 50
2.11.a Security Issues 50
2.11.b Economic Problems 55
2.12 The United States Objectives 56
2.13 South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 59
2.14 Baghdad Pact 62
2.15 Bilateral Defense Agreement 1959 63
2.16 United States Aid to Pakistan (1954-1964) 64
2.17 Defense Assistance 67
2.18 U-2 Incident and Pakistan-United States Relations 67
2.19 United States’ Pro-Indian Policy 70
2.20 Pakistan’s Inclination towards China 74
2.21 Global Changes and Pakistan-United States
Relations
75
ix
2.22 Pakistan-United States Relations and Pakistan
India War 1965
76
2.23 United States Rapprochement to China 79
2.24 Pakistan-United States Relations and Pakistan
India War 1971
80
2.25 A Diverging Road 81
2.26 The Relationship Nadir 81
2.27 The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Renewal of
Pakistan-United States Relations
82
2.28 The Geneva Accord 91
2.29 Kashmir Insurgency 92
2.30 Nuclear Issue 93
2.31 Chinese Assistance for Missile Technology 96
2.32 Pressler Amendment 97
2.33 Brown Amendment 98
2.34 Kashmir Conflict and Kargil War 99
2.35 Pakistan India Nuclear Explosions and CTBT 101
2.36 Musharraf Take Over and Democratic Sanctions
103
x
CHAPTER 3
Post 9/11 Pakistan-United States Military
Cooperation
112-157
3.1 9/11 and the United States National Response 113
3.2 9/11 and Global Response 115
3.3 Pakistan-United States Relations on the Eve of
9/11
116
3.4 Pakistan’s Collaboration under United States
Pressure
117
3.5 Indian Factor 120
3.6 Post 9/11 United States Security Assistance for
Pakistan
122
3.7 Non-NATO Ally 123
3.8 Coalition Support Fund for Reimbursement 123
3.9 Slala Check Post incident and CSF 126
3.10 The Shakeel Afridi Case and United States
Assistance
126
3.11 Relevant Provisions in FY2013 and 2014 Public
Law
127
3.12 FMF Program and Arms Sales 129
3.13 Military Training 132
3.14 The Security Development Plan 133
xi
3.15 Assistance for Internal Security 134
3.16 Pakistan’s Assistance for United States 136
3.17 Air Bases and Logistic Support for United States 137
3.18 Intelligence Support 137
3.19 Military Actions in Pakistan 138
3.20 Operation Al Mizan 140
3.21 Operation Zalzala 141
3.22 Rah-e-Haq 141
3.23 Rah-e-Rast 142
3.24 Rah-e-Nijat 142
3.25 Zarb-e-Azb 143
3.26 The Drone Attacks 145
3.27 Do More Policy 148
CHAPTER 4
Post 9/11 Pakistan-United States Economic
Relations
158-184
4.1 Pakistan’s Economic Compulsions 159
4.2 Post 9/11 United States Economic Assistance for
Pakistan
161
4.3 Economic Support Fund 161
4.4 Restructuring and Reducing Debts 162
4.5 Kerry Lugar Bill 162
4.6 FATA Development Plan 164
xii
4.7 Economic Growth Program under USAID 165
4.8 United States Trade Assistance for Pakistan 169
4.8.a Pakistan United State Business Council 169
4.8.b TIFA and ROZ 170
4.8.c Trade Mission and Mango Project 171
4.9 International Aid 171
4.10 International Monitory Fund 171
4.11 Paris Club 172
4.12 Friends of Pakistan 172
4.13 Pakistan’s Economic Cost of WOT 173
4.14 Pakistan-United States Strategic Dialogue 174
4.14.a War on Terror 175
4.14.b Security 176
4.14.c Democracy 176
4.14.d Education 176
4.14.e Economic Growth and Prosperity 176
4.14.f Energy Cooperation 177
4.14.g Peace and Security 177
4.14.h Science and Technology 177
4.14.i Non-Proliferation 178
4.15 Second Round of Pakistan-United States Strategic
Dialogue
178
4.16 Third Round of Pakistan-United States Strategic 179
xiii
Dialogue
4.17 Fourth Round of Pakistan-United States Strategic
Dialogue
180
CHAPTER 5
Conclusion 185-190
5.1 Emerging Trends in Pakistan-United States
Relationship
188
5.2 Recommendations 188
5.2.1 For United States Policy makers 188
5.2.2 For Pakistani Policy makers 189
5.2.3 Recommendations for Researchers 189
BIBLIOGRAPHY 191-215
APPENDICES
xiv
LIST OF TABLES
SR NO PAGE #
1 Division of Army between Pakistan and India 54
2 Division of Navy between Pakistan and India 54
3 Division of Air Force between Pakistan and India 55
4 The United States Foreign Aid to Pakistan 66
5 Economic Aid by United States to Pakistan 66
6 FMF 131
7 Direct Overt United States Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan,
FY2001-2014
136
8 Fatalities in FATA: 2006-2014 145
9 Drone Strikes 146
10 Growth Performance of Real Sector 159
11 Sources of External Capital Flows to Pakistan 160
xv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AECA Arms Export Control Act
AEW Airborne Early Warning
AJK Azan Jammu and Kashmir
BCCs Border Coordination Centers
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CRS Congressional Research Service
CSF Coalition Support Fund
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DoD Department of Defence
EDA Excess Defense Articles
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FC Frontier constabulary
FFP Food For Peace
FMF Foreign Military Financing
FMS Foreign Military Sales
FoDP Friends of Democratic Pakistan
GWOT Global War on Terror
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
IMET International Military Education and Training
IMF International Monetary Fund
xvi
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence
KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LC Letter of Credit
LOC Line of Control
MT Metric Tons
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA National Defence Authorization Act
NPT Non-proliferation Treaty
PATA Provincially Administered Tribal Areas
PCCF Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund
PCF Pakistan counterinsurgency Fund
RBI Research Bank of India
ROZs Reconstruction opportunity Zones
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAM Stinger surface-to-air Missile
SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization
SIM Shura ittihad ul Mujahideen
SME Small and Medium Enterprises
SSG Special Services Group
TIFA Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
TNSM Tahrik e Nafaz e Shariet e Mohammadi
xvii
UN United Nations
US United States
USG U.S. Government
USTDA United States Trade Development Agency
WFP World Food Program’s
xviii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
All the praises be to Almighty Allah, the Creator of this universe, Who provided me
the spirit and strength to complete this thesis. I pay thanks to Him from the core of my heart,
Who always remains with me and has always been showing His blessing in all shades
throughout my life. This research would remain incomplete without the help, support and
good wishes of many people. I express my heartfelt gratitude to all them. Specially I am
thankful to my Research Supervisor Prof. Dr. Umbreen Javaid, Chairperson Political Science
Department, Punjab University Lahore, for examining the dissertation with encouragement
and she motivated me to complete this research. She upheld me when I was about to drown in
the fathomless ocean of disappointment forever. I am grateful for her learned guidance as
well as her sympathetic encouragement.
I am very thankful to my father M. Zakria Rashid who motivated me for further
studies, provided every financial and moral support along with precious advises and most
needed prayers for me in life, special thanks to my mother whose continued prays made my
work possible. Here I also want mention the moral support of my beloved wife Maryam
Imran who shared ideas deserves my deepest gratitude. She remained my prime source of my
inspiration through her considered encouragement to carry on my work patiently. My father
in law Gulam Mustafa Aasi also pushed me for the completion of this research as soon as
possible.
I am also thankful to the main library staff, Abdul Jabbar Awan librarian in the library
of Political Science Department, researchers of IPRI and ISSI, Prof. Dr. Robina Bhatti,
Director Institute for Global Learning California State University, USA and General (R)
Hameed Gul, Ex. Chief ISI, whom I visited personally and all of them guided me graciously.
I also appreciate sincere cooperation of Mr. Sohail Research Assistant and Mr. Yasar Rehman
Computer Operator of Center for South Asian Studies.
Muhammad Imran Rashid
xix
ABSTRACT
Pakistan United States Relations are vital since 1947. These relations varied from low to
moderate to high. After the inception of Pakistan in 1947, it required much support for its territorial
integration and frail economy. Pakistan faced much threat from Indian aggression. So Pakistan
joined Western Bloc and singed SEATO in 1954 and CENTO in 1955. It was the first phase of
Pakistan United States friendly relations when Pakistan improved its defense system under Truman
and Eisenhower administrations and became a vital state to secure western interests against
Communism in South Asia region. The phase of this friendly relationship continued till Kennedy
came into office. In 60s and 70sAmerican policy makers were estranged towards Pakistan and tilted
towards India. On the other hand, America strategically used Pakistan to improve her relations with
China and Kissinger made his secret tour to China in 1971. During 70s Pakistan American relations
were at the lowest ebb when America imposed Symington Amendment in 1976 and Glenn
Amendment 1977. Again Pakistan came onto front for American interest after Russia invaded
Afghanistan in 1979. In 80s Pakistan United States relations were very close as Pakistan became
‘Front Line State’ for America. In late 80s and 90s Pakistan United States relations again remained
estranged as America imposed several sanctions against.
The major area of this thesis consists of Post 9/11 Pakistan United States Strategic Relation.
This phase of relationship is unique one as America used stick and carrot policy against Pakistan to
join in American led war on terror. Pakistan provided unequivocal military and intelligence support
and also launched several military operations in country and handed over suspected activists of 9/11
to support operation enduring freedom. On the other hand, United States waived sanctions and
provided military and economic assistance to Pakistan. Pakistan had to pay heavy cost of this
relationship as about 80000 Pakistanis lost their lives and economic loss raised up to US $ 100. But
Pakistan was not fully trusted and American policy makers continuously repeated ‘do more’.
xx
Introduction
December 7, 1941 was a day that would have been history of shameful behavior for prior
eras of America when Japanese forces attacked American naval base in Pearl Harbor resultantly
2,333 American soldiers were killed. 11th
of September, 2001 would be such an infamy day for
the contemporary Americans. For current Americans, psychological oppression had been come
onto their harbor. President Bush affirmed as “The Pearl Harbor” of the Twenty First century
occurred (Griffin & Foreward, 2004). 9/11 suddenly turned over the components of the United
States‟ Foreign Policy as well as the procedure to handle the fear based oppressors. Therefore
Bush's Foreign Policy approach was widespread in its value and watched all universal exercises
as influencing American interests. By Noam Chomsky, the 9/11 frightened the sharp changes
over the span of history (Bush, 2001).
The tragic attacks on Twin Towers of New York and Pentagon severely affected
Pakistan‟s security and economic conditions. The 9/11 provided an opportunity for both the
states, Pakistan and United States, to become strategic allies in the war on terror (Chomsky,
2011). On 20th of September 2001, American President George W Bush, while addressing the
Congress, warned whole of international community as “every country, belonging to any region,
they all have to decide either they are going to stand with United States or they are with the
terrorists”. Further he said “any country that carries on to port or provides support to terrorists
will be reckoned as the aggressive government by United States”. The message was clear to all
states, especially Pakistan, which played an active role in Afghanistan's domestic policy.
Very after the terrible incident of September 11, Pakistan indirectly related to Al Qaeda's
actions. In addition, at that time Taliban regime supported Al-Qaida and Pakistan was forced to
xxi
choose support to terrorists group or the United States. The United States also urged Pervez
Musharraf to think about the choice to defuse the majority of militant groups associated with
Islamic extremists operating in Pakistan (Jenkins & John , 2011). In the war on terror, Islamabad
was forced to provide Washington the over flight and corridor rights to launch army operations
by using the naval ports of Pakistan, air bases and cutting of relations with the Taliban
government. Pakistan helped the United States to eliminate Al-Qaida hiding places in and out of
Pakistan (Musharaf, 2006).
In this regard, Pakistan provided its strategic and military support: four airports provided
to US forces for logistical assistance, Dalbadin, Pasni, Jacobabad and Shamsi (Daily Times, Jan
15, 2006). Similarly, the United States also obtained help from Pakistan to launch spying
activities in North and South Waziristan of the FATA, Chitral of Hindu Kush mountain region
and hilly areas between Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Devices were also used to monitor the
activities in border regions (Shahzad, 2004). In addition, Pakistan was assigned to help America
led forces to eliminate Al-Qaeda. To this end, Pakistan arrested various leaders of Al-Qaeda and
handed them over to United States agencies.
On the other hand, the September 11 incident allowed Pakistan to gain benefits due to its
support and cooperation with the United States in the war on terror. However, the arguments
demonstrated that these benefits had not resulted in any long-term commitment by the United
States to form a sound and strong and more active relationship with Pakistan but these gains had
political favor for Musharraf coup, financial support, military assistance and the United States
support to regularize Pakistan India relations.
The brittle financial scenario in Pakistan was the core element that compelled to help the
United States in the war against terrorism. Pakistan had already been passing through a crucial
xxii
phase due to American sanctions on the financial and military departments after Pakistan
conducted nuclear tests in May 1998 and diverting from the soft democratic developing process
by the establishment of the army government in October 1999.
By expanding Islamabad's cooperation in the war against terrorism, the US Congress
waived these sanctions, also provided significant military and financial aid to Pakistan. By the
Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, a considerable aid package of about $ 15.3 billion
had been allocated by Congress including about $ 8.3 billion to improve social structure of the
nation and nearly $ 7 billion for security plans (Kronstadt, 2014). In addition, by recognizing
Pakistan's role in the war against terrorism, in 2004, the United States declared Pakistan as a
major Non NATO ally among all states that, while not a member of NATO (Pillar, 2004).
In this respect, this study will analyze the current phase of Pakistan United States
relations in strategic ways such as cooperation in military and economic grounds, how United
States forced Pakistan and cause of Pakistan‟s mandatory cooperation in Global War on Terror.
The thesis consists of six chapters. The first two parts will consist of theoretical
framework and historical perspective of Pakistan United States relations. These chapters will
examine US strategy toward Pakistan and Pakistan‟s strategic compulsions. Later study will
focus on post 9/11 Pakistan United States military cooperation and Pakistan United States
economic relations. Finally, the last part emphasizes upon summary, suggestions and future
shape of relations between Pakistan and United States.
Literature Review
Rias Ahmad Khan (1990) in his book Search of Peace and Security, Forty Years of
Pakistan – United State relations, based on different articles written by eminent scholars
xxiii
provided comprehensive information on economic, security, peace, cultural and scientific
cooperation between Pakistan and America. Despite it is not focusing on the topic but it helps to
provide a comprehensive historical background to the new research.
Burke (1990) in Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy a historical analysis also provided inclusive
background knowledge of Pakistan United States relations from 1947 to 1989. The book explains
the points of Pakistan foreign policy when it came into being, which brought Pakistan closer to
Unite States. This book provides grounds to analyze the challenges and predictions for post 2001
United States foreign policy in the region. At first, the impact of post 9/11 international
collaboration in the region should be assessed. The major apprehension in Afghanistan and its
neighbors is highlighted by the fact that the strategic attention of the United States has been
abstracted by recent international actions in Ukraine, the growing emphasis on rebalancing of
Asia, the rise in Libya, and changes in Egypt etc. Finally, it is provoked that the reduction of the
United States going to happen without totally defeat of the Taliban or resolved to share power
and integrate into the policy of Afghanistan. Achieving this goal in a context of reduced troop
presence and no firm commitments to long-term economic support for donors makes it even
more daunting. Therefore, in such a setting, if the United States continues its regional
commitment, it will be completely critical and grave.
Khokhar (2014), in his short paper, briefly reviewed the regional tasks for the United
States and diagnoses in taking permanency in region in the future. The paper reviews American
tasks at various levels, but focuses on the crucial one for the region of stability along the way.
Same in view of the advances witnessed in Afghanistan until now, he argues that the potential
conclusion of firm engagement over the long term is important. With sustained attention,
achievements can be consolidated to transform Afghan society and the state in the long term.
xxiv
Markey (2013) reveals the tragic incident of 9/11 and later on Pakistan America
cooperation and with reference to Pakistan‟s core security dilemmas, international peace, nuclear
assets as well as relationships with China. Markey explores the main preferences of Pakistani
society that will relief to recognize its future; traces the fountains of Pakistan American relations
throughout the history from 1947 to 2001. He evaluates how Washington drafted policies and
applied in Pakistan since the terrorist attacks on the twin tower and Pentagon and examines
regional dynamics, especially the rise of China, possible shape of Pakistan United States
relations. It concludes with three options for United States future. Strategy: described as
defensive insulation, military cooperation and comprehensive cooperation. The book is helpful to
apply tools to shape good relationship between Pakistan and United States.
Markey, Armitage and Berger (2010) point out in their book United States
Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan have focused on the United States strategy to eradicate
and demolish the terrorists who seize the United States interests of its territory and prevent the
turbulence that would endanger the Pakistani state and jeopardize the security of the Pakistani
nuclear program. To achieve these goals, a stable Pakistan partner is required. Even during the
flood crisis and recovery of its socio economic situation, Washington should try to encourage
Pakistan to boost up its efforts to unambiguously combat terrorism and extremism. It is very
need to improve bilateral relations and contribute to the economic, political and military stability
of Pakistan. These are essential elements of this effort.
Wisner and Platt (2003) wrote on New Priorities in South Asia, United States policy toward
Pakistan, India and Afghanistan. South Asia may consist of less than half around the globe but
the attacks of September 11, 2001 affected all Americans. The strategy against the challenge to
American policy was designed and applied a comprehensive and constant methodology that
xxv
would set bilateral connections with major states in the region and provided the United States a
chance of encouragement in region.
Jentleson (2004) wrote a book “American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the
21st Century”. In this book he explains the academic framework, historical milieu, and essential
policy analysis for those having interest in American foreign policy in the twenty first century.
The book reveals the American choices to its Foreign Policy challenges in 21st Century. It
provides base to analyze American Foreign Policy since last many decades to current history
specifically after 2001.
Saghil (2002) wrote Restructuring Pakistan: A Global Imperative. The writer puts
charges on Pakistan and also blames that Pakistan supported terrorist activities. He also explains
and highlights the nuclear issues in this region.
The 9/11 Commission Report, the final report issued by National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, it is an authenticated material also a useful source. The
Commission inspected the facts and circumstances surrounding the September 11 attacks and
details recommendations to secure against future acts of terrorism, and a final report. The report,
in addition, mentioned the importance of Pakistan in the struggle against terrorism.
Musharraf (2006) wrote an autobiography In the Line of Fire when Pakistan was facing
severe challenges in war on terrorism with the United States of America. He has touched
different events and has revealed many of the record events, when he came into power on
October 12, 1999, the tragic event of 9/11, the attempts to assassinate him, the war on terror
issue of nuclear proliferation, the tragic earth quack and his initiation of moderation idea.
Sattar, (2007) has tried to recapitulate the rationale policy decisions since 1947 to 2005.
He has delineated the objective strategic considerations on the basis of which the government
xxvi
and its leaders made tough decisions. This book especially provides detailed and inside accounts
on post 9/11 policy which guides the future government of Pakistan to process of planning and
preparing a realistic policy for optimum results at another crucial juncture in our history.
Fairand Chalk (2006) wrote Fortifying Pakistan: the Role of United States for Internal
Security Assistance. In the book, authors offer a wide-ranging examination of Pakistan's internal
security situation, the implementation of its criminal structures and measure the impact and value
of the principal United States steps to support Pakistan and strengthen its internal structure. They
raise some critical questions about the United States assistance to President Musharraf and the
army; Supported by really notable fieldwork, this appropriate and detailed book offers a sharp
but objective study that is certain to be broadly read and hotly discussed by experts, intelligence
personnel, and policymakers in both the United States and Pakistan.
In 9/11 Synthetic Terrorism Tarpley (2004) explains about 9/11 truth movement, its
campaigners, organizers, filmmakers and demonstrators. This book has had the immense
historical merit of opposing those who have wanted to imprison the intellectual life of the world
in a grim new prison house of the human spirit, the evil 9/11 myth. He contends that the invasion
of Afghanistan, then under way, was not a military operation, but the organized bribing of the
CIA‟s old network of drug-lords and warlords, backed up with bombing and special forces as
enforcers. This book is, after all, an exercise in counterintelligence.
Hussain (2007) stated how President Pervez Musharraf, after September 11, 2001, vowed to
fight fanaticism in his country and since then put himself as a key ally in American "global war
on terror”. The first two chapters comprises of first part cover a lot more than just Musharraf's
decision-making following the 9/11. He also discussed Pakistan during the Bhutto and Zia era,
which is unconditionally vital in order to understanding current Pakistani situation.
xxvii
Deadly Embrace Pakistan, America and the Future of the Global Jihad was written by
Bruce Riedel. In this book writer point out the elements behind the current circumstances,
explaining how and why the history of Pakistan-United States relations has unfolded.. He
explains what the United States can do now to repair the damage and how it can avoid making
similar mistakes in dealing with extremists in Pakistan and beyond.
Statement of the Problem
Pakistan-United States relations have taken many twists since Pakistan‟s inception. These
relations varied from low level to high level on relative interest basis. The 9/11 has a long lasting
impact on the world political scenario. Even though the center of the incident was United States
but Pakistan was also shockingly disturbed due to her strategic importance. This thesis belongs
to Post 9/11 Pakistan-United States Strategic Relations. The United States has used coercive
diplomacy after 9/11 and Pakistan had to face very uncertain and difficult situation. The United
States was blowing hot and cold together. It was threatening Pakistan and also offering the
relaxation of sanctions. The United States has been using stick and carrot policy for Pakistan in a
very effective way. Convergence of Pakistan-United States interests after 9/11 consists of United
States demanded logistic support, release of military sanctions and economic support for the
revival of Pakistan‟s economy. During this phase there have been vicissitudes at the bilateral
level.
Objectives of the Study
To know about the Theoretical frame work of Foreign Policy.
To evaluate the strategic relations between Pakistan and United States after 9/11.
xxviii
To analyze post 9/11 military collaboration between Pakistan and the United States.
To have a panoramic view of both Pakistan and United States in terms of economic
cooperation.
To provide a ground for the policy makers in context of Strategic relations between
Pakistan and United States.
To visualize the future strategies between Pakistan and United States.
Research Questions
(i) How did 9/11 strategically affect Pakistan United States relations?
(ii) How did post 9/11 United States military aid supported Pakistan in crisis
management?
(iii) How did US economic aid, after 9/11, help Pakistan to develop its infrastructure?
(iv) What are the emerging trends in Pakistan-United State Relations after 2014?
Significance of the Study
Pakistan-United States strategic relations hold greater importance. This study will
highlight how 9/11 brings out the compulsions on both sides to remain allies. In United States
perspective, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) was meant to control the Al Qaeda-led global
terrorism and punish the culprits of the September 11 attack on the America. On the other hand,
Pakistan wanted to secure its military and economic interests. Furthermore, the dynamics of their
relationship after 9/11 with prospects of cooperation in future also form part of this study. At the
end, it will point out, in changing political scenario, new development in terms of strategic
relations between Pakistan and United States.
xxix
Research Methodology
The procedure adopted for this research is historical, descriptive and analytical. Mainly
the qualitative approach has been applied while some minor use of quantitative approach has
additionally been used where it is essential.
For collecting the data both primary and secondary source is used. Primary sources
comprises of official documents and statistics, office orders, notifications and reports of various
committees and commission, policies and memorandum discussion with senior officials
available at governments offices. While secondary sources based upon books, diaries, investigate
papers, periodicals, magazines, daily papers, reports of class, reports of different boards of
trustees and commission.
A rigorous analysis of data will not only to interpret the gathered information but also to
develop some theoretical framework of study, to answer the questions raised in the study and to
arrive at some conclusion for making safe and careful predictions and recommendations. The
time frame of the study is from 2001 to 2014.
Plan of Chapters
This thesis is divided in to following chapters
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1 Theoretical Framework of Foreign Policy
Meaning and Definition of Foreign Policy
Objectives of the Foreign Policy
Determining Factor of Foreign Policy
Internal Factors
xxx
External Factors
Pakistan Foreign Policy
Evolution of Pakistan Foreign Policy
Phases of Pakistan Foreign Policy
First Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy
Second Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy
Third Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy
Fourth Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy
Fifth Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy
Sixth Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy
United States Foreign Policy
United States Foreign Policy after WW II
Post WW II United States Foreign Policy towards South Asia
Pre-9/11 Challenges to Pakistan Foreign Policy
Post 9/11 Pakistan Foreign Policy towards United States
Post 9/11 United States Foreign Policy towards Pakistan
CHAPTER 2 HISTORICAL PERSPECIVE OF PAKISTAN -UNITED STATES RELATIONS
United States Policy towards Subcontinent before Partition
Indian Non-alignment Policy
Pakistan‟s Strategic Significance
Formation of Pakistan - United States Diplomatic Ties
Pakistan - United States Relation in Early Years
Liaqat‟s Visit to the United States
xxxi
World Situation and Regional Defense Alliances in 50s
Korean War
Path to the United States Regional Security Pacts, Economic Assistance
and Pakistan
Eisenhower Doctrine and Mutual Security Assistance Agreement
Pakistan‟s Compulsions
Security Issues
Pakistan‟s Economic Problems
The United States Objectives
South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)
Baghdad Pact
Bilateral Defense Agreement 1959
United States Aid to Pakistan (1954-1964)
Defense Assistance
U-2 Incident and Pakistan-United States Relations
United States‟ Pro-Indian Policy
Pakistan‟s Inclination towards China
Global Changes and Pakistan-United States Relations
Pakistan -United States Relations during Pakistan India War 1965
United States Rapprochement to China
Pakistan-United States Relations during Pakistan India War 1971
A Diverging Road
The Relationship Nadir
xxxii
The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Renewal of Pakistan-United States
Relations
The Geneva Accord
Kashmir Insurgency
Nuclear Issue
Chinese Assistance for Missile Technology
The Pressler Amendment
Brown Amendment
Kashmir Conflict and Kargil War
Pakistan India Nuclear Explosions and CTBT
Military Take Over and Democratic Sanctions
CHAPTER 3 Post-9/11 Pakistan-United States Military Cooperation
9/11 and United States Response
9/11 and Global Response
Pakistan United States Relations on the Eve of 9/11
Pakistan‟s Collaboration under United States Pressure
Indian Factor
Post 9/11 United States Security Assistance for Pakistan
Non-NATO Ally
Coalition Support Fund for Reimbursement
Slala Check Post incident and CSF
xxxiii
The Shakeel Afridi Case and United States Assistance
Relevant Provisions in FY2013 and 2014 Public Law
FMF Program and Arms Sales
Military Training
The Security Development Plan
Assistance for Internal Security
Pakistan‟s Assistance for United States
Air Bases and Logistic Support to United States
Intelligence Support
Military Actions in Pakistan
Operation Al Mizan
Operation Zalzala
Rah-e-Haq
Rah-e-Rast
Rah-e-Nijat
Zarb-e-Azb
The Drone Attacks
Do More Policy
CHAPTER 4 Post-9/11 Pakistan-United States Economic Relations
Pakistan‟s Economic Compulsions
Post 9/11 United States Economic Assistance to Pakistan
Economic Support Fund
Restructuring and Reducing Debts
xxxiv
Kerry Lugar Bill
FATA Development Plan
Economic Growth Program under USAID
United States Trade Assistance for Pakistan
Pakistan-United State Business Council
TIFA and ROZ
Trade Mission and Mango Project
International Aid
International Monitory Fund
Paris Club
Friends of Pakistan
Pakistan‟s Economic Cost of WOT
Pakistan-United States Strategic Dialogue
Second Round of Strategic Dialogue
Third Round of Strategic Dialogue
Fourth Round of Strategic Dialogue
Chapter 5 Conclusion
Emerging Trends in the Pakistan-United States Relationship
Recommendations
For US Policymakers
For Pakistani Policymakers
References
xxxv
References
Burke, S. M. (1990). Pakistan's foreign policy: an historical analysis. USA: Oxford University
Press.
Bush, G. W. (September 20, 2001). address to Congress.
Chomsky, N. ( 2011.). 9-11: Was There an Alternative? Seven Stories Press.
Fair, C., & Chalk. (2006). United States Internal Security Assistance to Pakista. Small Wars and
Insurgencies.
Griffin, D. R., & Foreward. (2004). The New Pearl Harbor. SanFrancisco: Olive Branch Press.
(Jan 15, 2006). Daily Times.
Jenkins, B. M., & John , G. (2011). The Long Shadow of 9/11: America's Response to Terrorism.
Rand Corporation.
Jentleson, B. W. (2004). American foreign policy: the dynamics of choice in the 21st century.
WW Norton.
Khan, R. A. (1990). In search of Peace and security: Forty Years of Pakistan–United States
Relations. Karachi: Royal Book Company.
Khokhar, N. I. (2014). Pakistan„s Strategic Environment. IPRI. Islambad.
Kronstadt, K. A. (2014). Congressional Research Service. The Library of Congress.
xxxvi
Markey, D. S., Richard, L. Armitage, & Samuel, R .B. (2014). US Strategy for South Asia.
Musharaf, P. (2006). In the Line of Fire. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Pillar, P. R. (2004). Terrorism and US foreign policy. Brookings Institution Press.
Platt, N., & Wisner, F. (2003). New Priorities in South Asia: U.S. Policy Toward India, Pakistan
and Afghanistan.
Saighal, V. (2002). Restructuring Pakistan: A Global Imperative. Manas.
Sattar, A. (2007). Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005. London: Oxford University Press.
1
Chapter No 01
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF FOREIGN POLICY
2
1.1 Meaning and Definition of Foreign Policy
The foreign policy concept can be extracted from the ancient societies. Having contact
with others was the basic need of the masses to achieve their political, social, and cultural goals
and interests. Resultantly the term foreign affairs or foreign policy emerged to attain and
preserve the mentioned objectives and interests (Padelford & Lincoln, 1976). Keeping in view
the importance of the foreign policy, no state can avoid it for securing national and international
interests. It will have to be a part of this system. In this way the state will have to be involved in
the system. But this involvement is conditioned after the obedience of well-defined principles
and limitations. All these principles and limitations affect the goals of the states to a larger
extent. In this age of perfection and specialization, every state possesses various determinants of
foreign policy. These determinants can be of multiple spheres i.e. regional, global, national,
economic, political and social. Most of the writers have described foreign policy as a basic tool
to run the state affairs. Its importance can be judged by the views of Kautilya who argues that
when a state does not involve in foreign affairs with its neighboring states it is like a ship that has
no radar to detect the direction rather it is directed by storms and sweep of events without any
direction and goals.
As for as the meaning of the foreign policy is concerned various writers have their
different viewpoints regarding the term foreign policy. For example Padelford and Lincoin
define the term foreign policy as dealing of a state with external environments. Actually foreign
policy consists of more than sum of official documents, records, actions and public declarations
(Padelford & Lincoln, 1976).
3
Lloyd Jensen explained Foreign policy as consists of a range of attitudes and actions that
a country takes to cooperate with the international community (Lloyd, 1982). Additionally it can
be judged through motivation and goals pursued by a state. Every state prioritizes and designs
the strategies through which it can achieve its goals and objectives.
Prof. F. S. North edge is of the view that foreign policy encourages the state to use
political influence that forces other states to exercise their powers within the limitations and
manners that is concerned with the particular state. In other words it is an interaction between the
forces originating outside the countries and those working within these countries (Northedge,
1974).
Prof. Joseph Frankel says that foreign policy involves the decision and action which
include to some significant level relations between one state and others (Frankel, 1968).
George Modelski thinks that Foreign Policy is a system of activities evolved by various
communities for expecting the changed behavior from other states and to adjust their activities to
the international level (Modelski, 1962).
Rodee opines that foreign policy comprises of principles that are formulated and
implemented by a group- which shape the patterns of behavior of a state doing its negotiations
with other states while protecting or furthering its interests (Rodee, 1976).
Research Staff of the Brookings Institution refer the term foreign policy as the complex
and dynamic political course that is followed by a nation in the establishment of its relations with
other states. According to the staff, foreign policy is a broad term that includes national
commitments of contemporary situation of national interests, intentions and principles of
accurate conducts that states profess (Brookings, 1953).
4
Hugh Gibson defines foreign policy as a comprehensive plan based on information and
practices to conduct government business with the other states. It is designed to promote and
protect the interests of a state (Khana, 2005). In fact, foreign policy is designed to ensure and
promote the national goals of a state based on information, knowledge, experience and planning
to generate relationships with rest of world. The development of foreign policy is really an
exercise of choosing the ends and means of a nation-state on an international stage (Shahid,
2006).
Parkash Chandra regards foreign policy as an essential element within a modern state. He
is of the view that without foreign policy a state can be run aimlessly that means that state is far
behind the stage of progress that can be seen in its neighboring (Chandra, 1994).
Cecil V Crab Jr. explains foreign policy as product of state‟s most vital elements. Foreign
policy based on two foundations: national objectives and resources of achievement. The contacts
between national goals and the way of achieving them is subject of the state craft. The
components of foreign policy of all nations are the same (Khana, 2005).
Mahendra Kumar says that foreign policy is a mixture of activities to achieve objectives
by relations with other states that are derived by the ideology of national interest (Chandra &
Arora, 2008).
1.2 Objectives of Foreign Policy
Almost every state has some objectives and goals which can be achieved through foreign
policy. Most important ones are as follows:
A state ensures the protection of its national and territorial integrity while running its
internal and external affairs. For that purpose, the strategy of status quo is generally
5
followed by the states. In case of upsetting the policy of status quo the state is branded as
revision that causes infuriation and suspicion among other member of international
community. In addition to that the state has to protect the interests of its citizens in its
internal and external matters. This strategy works for state to maintain its prestige
(Laumann & David , 1987).
It is one of the objectives of conducting foreign policy to maintain links with other
members of international bloc. The state adopts the policy of conflict and cooperation
towards the other members keeping in view the security of its own interests. For example
Pakistan has not recognized Israel as it supports Palestine and the Arab countries. Here
Pakistan has adopted the policy of conflict towards Israel while securing her economic
interests. Arab states have been supporting Pakistan in economic field. That‟s why
Pakistan is interested in strengthening her relations with Arabs without conducting
foreign relations with Israel (Finnemore, 1993).
Self-preservation is the primacy interest that is secured by different state through
conducting foreign policy. It includes security and welfare of the citizens. A state tries its
best to protect its people from the cultural invasion and ideological clashes. Diplomats
organize the programs through which the masses can be saved from by influence of the
foreign customs, tradition and socio cultural values (Lipschutz, 1995).
It is the main objective of every nation that all the masses should enjoy the economic
prosperity and development. So while building the relations, states agree to build
relations with those foreign states which can be supportive for grooming their economy.
For example Pakistan has always been interested in building relations with China in
Asian region, as it has been quite supportive for Pakistan in economic development and
6
prosperity. In modern era, most of the treaties and agreements are being signed by
different states only and only for securing their economic interests (Reichheld & Thomas
, 2001).
Foreign policy allows the states to exert the pressure for producing influence on other
states and reducing the influence of their competitors on concerned states. Post WW II
foreign policy of United States and Soviet Union can be regarded as the best example in
this context (Chandra & Arora, 2008).
1.3 Determining Factor of Foreign Policy
The foreign policy of a state is influenced by a number of dynamics. These elements can
be divided into internal and external factors. Of these factors, the most important ones are
discussed here.
a. Internal Factors
I. Geography: The geographical location of a state containing its fertility, climate, location
in relation to other land masses as well as water-ways etc. These are the major factors in
determining self-sufficiency of a country. Usually land locked countries and nations are
less self-sufficient in comparison to the counties that have access to warm-water or
located in the temperate region and far from superpowers. For example, United States
adopted policy of isolation in the nineteenth century due to its geographical location.
Whereas the importance of geographic location is recognized almost by all and sundry,
its position has significantly declined due to technological and scientific advancement.
Even the physical location of a state has a profound influence on the determination of its
foreign policy (Ward, 2006).
7
II. Size: The size of the territory of a state and its inhabitants has an impressive impact on its
foreign policy. Generally, the leaders and the general public of countries with a small
territory do not believe that their country has a great weight age in international affairs.
On the other hand, the leaders and the masses of the great counties are ready to assume
distinct responsibilities. However, sometimes even small states with heavy resources also
leave a profound impression on world politics. For example, Great Britain, a small state,
played an important role in world politics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The oil-rich states of the Middle East, even small ones, play a vital role in the
international political arena. Japan also a small state plays a leading role in international
relations. While large states such as Canada and Australia have not been able to pursue
foreign policy (Waltz, 1993).
III. Culture and History: By and large foreign policy is affected by the cultural and
historical traditions of a state. Usually the masses share a common culture and historical
background that helps the foreign policy makers to make it more and more effective. On
the contrary a nation having fragmented cultures and historical values cannot conduct the
effective foreign policy as compared to the former one. Prof. Roseau explains that
cultural factor affects the social unity to a greater extent that is too much necessary for
formulating and implementing the foreign policy effectively. Equally important is the
process through which public opinion is generated after encouraging common culture and
historical traditions, customs and values. It provides support for the policy makers to
manipulate many differences among their masses. As a result, it works for the
formulation of effective foreign policy (Hudson, 1997).
8
IV. Economic Development: The economic developed country profound great impact on
country‟s foreign policy. In general, the industrial advanced states are deeply involved in
affairs of other states because such countries have to import raw materials from other
states. The experts of advanced states also aware the current knowledge and technical
know-how (Chandra & Arora, 2011). Therefore, they keep friendly ties with their trading
partners. All this indicates close links between the groups and people of one state with
their counterparts of the other country. In addition, an industrial state is estimated to have
a higher gross national product and allocate more funds for external determination, viz,
economic assistance program, military projects and wide-ranging diplomatic
commitments (Chandra & Arora, 2011). Contrary to this, less developed countries are not
competent to actively participate in external affairs. The lack of advanced provisions in a
country checks it from taking advantage of the technological breakthrough abroad. Now a
days, the United States has become capable of pursuing a more dynamic foreign policy
and securing its national interests, owing to the basis of its high level of economic
growth. America has made vigorous practice of foreign assistance as a tool to secure its
foreign policy objectives and goals. It is a foundation of common understanding that,
recently, industrially advanced states or groups of states like G-7 effectively playing
comprehensive role in international politics as compare to other less developed or
developing states (Cooper, 1972).
V. National Capacity: The national capacity of a country also applies profound effect on
the foreign policy making process. National capacity of a state rests on its military
quality, its technical advancement and financial development. It is notable that the United
States which kept on chasing the policy of isolation till the start of the twentieth century
9
got profound contribution in the worldwide governmental issues mostly because of
marvelous move in her national capacity that to quick financial improvement. Though,
the foreign policy of Great Britain caught under great transformation in the Post World
War II period mainly for the most part because of decrease in her national capacity
(Furman, 2002).
VI. Social Structure: Social structure of a nation matters a lot regarding the formulation and
implementation of the foreign policy. If a society is divided into various groups on the
basis of wealth, religion, regional imbalances etc. It will find difficulties to run their
affairs properly with the other states as this division causes lack of cooperation among
these various groups. In this way it gives birth to the problems. On the other hand, a
homogeneous society possesses strong sense of national integration that helps it to pursue
the more effective foreign policy. During the WW II, Churchill was selected as a leader
by the British nation and he was obeyed in every aspect. The masses suffered a lot under
his leadership but it was the social solidarity that brought to the success. The impact of
social structure on foreign policy is clear and profound. But none of the scholars on that
foreign policy can ignore the external consequences of the internal social structure
because negative it may create much difficulties (Kissinger, 1966).
VII. Political Structure: Political system trends and tradition have a great impact on foreign
policy of every state. The strength of rules of foreign policy depends on the nature and
structure of political system. In case of an authoritarian system, it is very easy for a single
person to make decision as most of the powers are vested in his own hands. Decision
makers, political system, are considered isolated in decision making process if they have
limited knowledge and experience of the surroundings and information regarding recent
10
developments. All these lack hurdle in the way of the affairs of the state. If one looks at
the other side of the picture he will come to know that a state having democratic set up
will be conducting effective foreign policy as the principles and regulation of the foreign
policy will be the product of various minds. This type of foreign policy totally secures the
interests of the masses within a state. When the foreign policy makers follow the public
opinion, it brings prosperity in economic, political, social and cultural spheres. In some
case, even within the democratic system itself deference of political culture, structure and
nature impact the foreign policy to some extent (Geremek, 2008).
VIII. Leadership: Leadership plays a pivotal role in the formulation and implementation of
foreign policy of a country. Traits, possessed by a leader, are judged on the basis of his
knowledge and experience of international arena. If he or she is well aware of current
trends at regional and national levels, he or she will be able to formulize the foreign
policy just to secure the interest of his public. Role of leadership varies from state to
state. For example, in developed countries most of the leaders possess the abilities to
make their whole nation a unit that is the most important reflection of charismatic
leadership. When there is unity among the masses then there will be an easy task for the
policy makers to sign the agreements and treaties with neighboring and regional states
without any national or public pressure. In the other case, in developing nations,
differences of views among the public on the basis of religion, sects, social status and
political awareness become hurdle in the way of the proper functioning of foreign affairs.
Actually, the role of leaders is quite conditional with the social cohesiveness and political
consciousness. Both of these factors are enough to formulate the effective foreign policy
(Rosenau, 1997).
11
IX. Technology: In the modern era latest technology has become the most important tool to
groom the military and economic field of any state. Availability of the information
technology influences the foreign policy indirectly to a greater extent. Countries, having
advance technology, can be seen while exerting the impact of their technical how-know
on the nations with the lesser sources of this technology. The factor attracts the attention
of the regional powers that can be a quick action to build the relations with these powers.
It leads towards economic development in the first phase. Rosenau argues about the
importance of the technology that the technological changes can alter the militancy and
economic capabilities of a nation that directly affect its status and role in the comity of
nations (Rosenau, 1997). Countries like China, France, Germany and Japan are the
mentionable examples according to the nature of the factor. Having modern technological
developments, these states are successful in building the relations with other states
effectively. The technology is sole responsible for their rapid progress at international
sphere.
X. Public Opinion: Public opinion also plays a significant role in the formation of foreign
policy of a country. Some writers are of the opinion that the public opinion follows rather
guides the process of foreign policy making. First of all public opinion has a direct
impact on the politics and trends of governing in state. Both these can be considered the
milestones in the formulation of foreign affairs. A country possessing democratic form of
government can be able to extract the fruits of effective foreign policy as the democracy
allows the people to express their will for the betterment of the state. On the other hand,
monarchy and dictatorship do not allow the public to be a part of the discussion at
international level (Holsti, 1997). Resultantly, the decisions made by the single authority,
12
will be protecting and securing the ulterior motives of the same authority. At this stage,
there is a lesser chance for the quick and rapid development of the state. Additionally,
Totalitarianism causes the presentation of tarnished image of the state that prevents its
international relations to be flourished.
b. External Factors
Like internal factors there are some external factors which directly or indirectly affect the
process of foreign policy. Today, the world has become a global village in such a way an
incident occurs in one state have its impact on the other country in no time. Some of the salient
factors are explained here:
I. Alliance: Formation of alliances greatly affects the trends, principles and regulations of
foreign policy. In recent times the states are indulged in signing the agreements
particularly for achieving the military and economic security among the regional powers.
These alliances can create the ray of balance of power among the regional states. In
positive sense, the alliances can be supportive for various states to attain economic,
political and regional security. Formation of alliances is considered one of the most
important causes of the World War I when states found themselves insecure regarding
their defense and economic field. History is evident that these alliances furthered the
damage to the humanity. But, at present many nations are making alliances to curtail the
severity of heinous acts of terrorism. So alliances do not have single sided impact on the
foreign policy of a state, but they are bi-dimensional in their nature (Burke, 1990).
II. Power Structure: The colossal force structure prevails in the world affects the governing
trends of a state. It directly has that impact on the foreign policy of that state. In such
manner three potential outcomes can be imagined in the following way:
13
a) A number of forces may appreciate extra ordinary force status and their relations
might be founded on the basis of equalization of power framework.
b) There might be just two powers which rule the whole world and alternate states
are constrained to agree with either.
c) The states accomplish extra ordinary power status and towers at the shafts are
lesser ready to summon strict loyalty of those in the circle. The nature of power
structure prevails in the modern world substantially affects the foreign relations of
a nation. While highlighting this point Prof. Ronenau says that whenever a
country is situated in the pre-dominant chain of importance of world legislative
issue, rule representing its foreign affairs have tendency to be implemented in the
game plans whereby the great powers adopts to their contentions or generally
associate to casing and shape the real issue of the age. These guidelines may not
be expressly recognized and their operation as inputs may take numerous
structures that can affect the approach of the foreign policy makers largely
(Rosenau, 1997).
III. International Organization: It is the duty of a state to obey the international law,
treaties and contracts for conducting its foreign policy. It does not jeopardize its interest
just because of the ignorance of the importance of the ruling of these limitations. For
example a state cannot sign an agreement with another on the territorial waters before it
keeps in mind the principle and ways defined by the laws of sea. Similarly, no nation can
make consents with other states on the matter of regional security without consulting the
rules and regulation helpful in maintaining peace and balance of power in the region.
Therefore, at every stage of the process of foreign policy a state is confined to the
14
principles of international law that are considered to be supreme one to govern the states
affair in a good way (Finnemore, 1993).
IV. Reaction of other States: It is part of the process of foreign policy making that is
related to the response of other states towards its conduction of foreign relations with
other nations. The step can earn enmity for the policy making of a particular state that can
bring the state to the brink of destruction. For example, when Hitler attacked Poland in
1939, the British policy makers were at the fault as they forgot the intensity of the
reaction of Hitler. Later on it was confessed by those policy makers that to support
Poland at that time caused a colossal damage to the United Kingdom at military and
economic level. Same was the case with Japanese when they attacked Pearl Harbor
without keeping in mind the severity of the American reaction. Later on, in 1945 Japan
had to face the worst phase of destruction for the particular foreign act (Chandra & Arora,
2011).
V. World Public Opinion: International opinion about the trends of governance within a
state plays an important role in determining its foreign policy. It depends upon the nature
of the world public opinion either it goes in favor of the interests of the specific state or it
further fuels to the fire to make the foreign relations more complicated for the state. Most
of the writers are of the view that it was the hostile world public opinion that directed the
Americans to bring changes in external affairs regarding Vietnam war. As a result, the
world public opinion re-strikes the states to exercise their powers while living within the
framework of international (Page, 1983).
15
1.4 Pakistan Foreign Policy
Abdul Sattar writes that foreign policy is a useful tool to secure better future for a state
(Sattar, 2010). Like other states, Pakistan‟s basic motive is to secure its interest in the region as
well as in other community of the nations. Since the inception, Pakistan‟s foreign policy has
been formulated evolving around the four major constants.
1. Soon after independence, it was quite difficult for Pakistan to protect and secure itself as
a newly emerged state. Therefore all the attentions were paid to achieve security and
survival.
2. Tension ridden relationship with India constrained the policy makers to conduct the
policies that could be helpful in preserving territorial integrity as India had attacked
couple of times and tried to manipulate some of the territories linked with Pakistan.
Keeping in view the threat of insecurity to the territorial integrity, Pakistan signed Mutual
Defense Assistance Agreement in 1954 for strengthening its position in that geo-political
environment (Jalal, 1994).
3. Pakistan has been dependent on the West for its economic welfare and growth. For that
purpose Pakistan signed a number of pacts with the Western states. For example,
Pakistan provided the commodities to the initiators of the Korean War in 1950 under an
agreement. It caused boosting Pakistan economy rapidly (Amin & Ahmar, 2009).
4. After inception, there was a great threat to the identity of Pakistan. As a Muslim state it
was necessary for the government to preserve the religious values in their pave form. For
that the policy makers took initiatives to build cordial relations with the whole Muslim
bloc. The effort bore the fruit and attracted the Shah of Iran to visit Pakistan. It
16
encouraged the Pakistan Political elite to maintain the pure shape of the Islamic
Teachings that was like an obligation to preserve their Islamic Identity (Amin & Ahmar,
2009).
1.5 Evolution of Pakistan Foreign Policy
Pakistan is situated in South Asia. It stretches to India, Middle East through Persian Gulf
and Central Asian states via Afghanistan and China. The pre-British invaders came from Central
Asian States as they had a motive to manipulate the territories of Baluchistan and the NWFP
(now KPK). Further, Pakistan‟s geo-strategic location is of great importance that played a vital
role during the cold war era. Pakistan was on the front to dismantle the „evil empire‟ of Soviet
Union. This historic Pakistani support to the United States started from 1960s when the United
States used Pakistani air bases to launch their spy operation against Soviet Union. In later years
of 1970s, Pakistan was sole responsible for the restoration of Sino-US diplomatic relationship.
Thus Pakistan continued to play the role of fall guy (Ziring, 1990).
After 9/11 attacks Pakistan is working with the Americans collectively, they have
launched war on terror to curb the menace of terrorism. This was resulted in relations between
Pakistan and United States. However, it is considered that Pakistan has been trapped by a large
group of non-state actors who have presented the tarnished image of Pakistan in international
arena (Ahmed, 2009).
1.6 Phases of Pakistan Foreign Policy
Unlike many countries in the world, Pakistan was not initially engaged in imperial lurch.
Its founding father Quad e Azam was greatly committed to the principle of co-existence (Sattar,
17
2010). Pakistan got independence on August 14, 1947 after the long struggle against the British
imperial authorities in the beginning and from dominant majority of Hindus. The Muslim
majority areas struggled hard to protect separate their economic, political, religious and cultural
identity (Sattar, 2010).
Since its creation, Pakistan's foreign policy has been the prey of the balancing process
due to the turbulent political history, religious heritage, geostrategic importance and economic
potential of the region. All these factors left various marks in Pakistan‟s foreign policy and
created a number of problems that affected global security environment. During this process
Pakistan had to go through an uninterrupted series of wars which were more than sufficient to
cause a severe territorial setback. As a result, Pakistan lost its eastern wing in 1971. Even today
the impact can be seen that creates many difficulties for Pakistan to survive in hostile neighbor-
hood.
The main phases of Pakistan‟s foreign policy are as follow:
1.7 First Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy
The main foreign policy decision that was made by the Pakistani government was about
the Indian unfriendly demeanor shown in refusal to give Pakistan‟s share in the assets of British
India including ordnance factories, etc. Keeping in mind the end goal to secure its autonomy, the
newly born state needed those assets. For this reason the legislature approached the United States
in Oct. 1947 for an advance of $ 2 billion for security gains and economic restoration. In spite of
this move, United States did not backing to the level of interest, yet it was not unsympathetic and
exhibited a straight forward sum for economic support (Sattar, 2010).
18
From 1947 to 1953 was the duration in which the support granted to uncommitted outside
arrangements not committed one. Amid this period, taking after three principle issues impacted
the formulation of Pakistan foreign policy;
1. Foreign affairs and domestic issues were discussed in the annual meetings of Muslim
League. These foreign decisions contained transcendently the cases concerned by the
Muslims.
2. First governor general Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was against the recognition
of Israel and Dutch tyranny of Indonesian liberty.
3. The newly emerged Pakistan had to repel and the Indian propaganda and to compete the
hostile neighbor.
Foreign policy met with ill fate when the Charismatic leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah and
his follower Liaqat Ali Khan were no more in 1948 and 1951 respectively. Death of the former
one left a big gap for leadership. There was a political chaos in Pakistan as all three institutions
had become tools in the hands of political elite who wanted to fulfill their ulterior motives while
ignoring the welfare of the public corruption, nepotism and feudal mindset were the major
elements in 1950s. Those caused a severe set-back to the process of foreign policy.
1.8 Second Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy
Second phase of Pakistan foreign policy is characterized with tilt and leniency of
Pakistan towards America to get financial support. In return, the Americans were signing peace
agreements with Pakistan regarding the unsatisfied condition of the Middle East and Arab states.
The motive behind these agreements was the access of America to the petroleum of these
regions. In mid-1950 Pakistan needed to join the Western sponsored military alliances to
19
maintain its regional, global and domestic affair. Due to the beneficial geo-strategic location of
Pakistan, the Western bloc particularly the Americans leant towards it for making it the partner
of the containment policy that was projected at either the break up or the steady mellowing of the
Soviet Union under containment pressure from America. This policy of making alliance left
everlasting impact on the polity of Pakistan. Most of the decisions were made without assuming
or assessing the public opinion. During 50s once Hussain Shaheed Suharawardi tried to express
the motives of foreign policy but in 1960 these motives were bearing more than $ 5 billion as an
economic and military aid (Malik, 2005).
1.9 Third Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy
Ayub era can be assumed as third phase or stage of Pakistan‟s foreign policy. In early
years of Ayub regime the American were in favor of Pakistani military commander but later on
Pakistan rejected to build cordial relations with Indians that was totally against the interest of the
Americans. Second, during Sino-India war of 1962, Pakistan supported China that caused the
infuriation which can be observed in the 1965 Pakistan-India war when the United States not
only imposed the economic sanction also denied the military support that was promised
according to the early defense pacts. As an architect of Pakistan United States relations, Ayub
Khan simultaneously offered the India a Joined Defense Pact under the American pressure.
Against this act of Ayub, protests were launched by the public that changed Ayub‟s priorities
(Durrani, 2009).
During the border skirmishes between China and India in 1962, Washington delivered
substantial military assistance to India, neglecting Pakistan's fears that weapons might be used
20
against it, as was proved in 1965 war. As a result, the policy of the alliance was modified
(Soherwordi, 2009) .
1.10 Fourth Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy
Fourth phase of Pakistan‟s foreign policy is associated with the fall of Dhaka in 1971
(Sattar, 2010). It was the result of some administrative and political issues in those years when
Pakistan was in a race to attain nuclear capability. It was need of the hour as India has acquired
capability that can be seen in 1974 when Indira Ghanhi agreed her cabinet to make nuclear tests.
Now, Pakistan‟s security as an Indian neighbor was at danger. For that purpose Bhutto moved to
the Middle Eastern states and the Arab states (Ziring, 1990). He thought that it was the only way
to get economic support of the mentioned states for the preparation of atomic bomb. Already
Pakistan has been suffering from the lowest ebb of relations with America since 1960s, so the
Americans took some strict actions against weak Pakistan militarily and economy. French supply
of reprocessing plant to Pakistan furthered fuel to the fire. United States Secretary of State,
Henry Kissinger opposed all the decisions made by Islamabad with respect to the nuclear
developments. Resultantly, United States imposed economic sanctions on Pakistan in 1979
consequently United States Embassy was burnt in Pakistan (Hasnat, 2011).
1.11 Fifth Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy
General Zia-Ul-Haq was the man who followed the foreign policy of Bhutto in his early
year but later he moved towards the Americans but all in vain. In the beginning, Zia was of the
view to gain military and economic aid from the United States and its ally Saudi Arabia (Shah,
1997). For that purpose, Zia had to fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The super
power moved towards Pakistani Border. After negotiation and consideration, Pakistan accepted
21
United States cooperation and assistance. These cordial relations came to an end when Bush
imposed sanctions under Pressler Law. In addition to that all the pending loans and welfare
assistance was rejected to be provided to Pakistan. Pakistan had to bear the severe impact
because of the censure on economic and military assistance, transfer of F-16 aircrafts were
withheld. On the other hand weapons spread at public level that gave birth to the Kalashankov
culture in Pakistan. Furthermore, Pakistan got isolation when it recognized the Taliban regime,
conducted the nuclear tests and a dictator stood to run state affairs in 1999 (Anwar, 2013).
1.12 Sixth Phase of Pakistan Foreign Policy
9/11 attacks were responsible for changing political and geo-strategic trends in the world
during 21st century. Pakistan was not an exception at that time who could avoid that change.
Pakistan was adopted as a front line ally by the United States which was to fight the US led
global war on terror. The incident changed the American approach towards the South Asian
region. Before 9/11 the American approach was Indo-centric. But after the event it became
Pakistan-centric as America could not find the better ally than Pakistan to fight with Taliban in
Afghanistan. Therefore, from here the restoration of Pakistan United States relations starts. That
was the stage when Pakistan was given and promised to give huge military and economic aid.
The current situation of Pakistan‟s foreign policy is the direct result of the 9/11 attacks. Since
Pakistan had become the partner of the American policies of war on terror, therefore, it had to
pay a heavy price because Pakistan became a theater of war, resulted there is political instability,
moral and social degeneration, economic turmoil and poor law and order situation here.
22
1.13 United States Foreign Policy
The United States foreign policy in post WW-II has undergone complete transformation
and replaced traditional pattern of United States foreign policy by new assumption and
principles. Even the strategies and methods for the usage of the foreign policy objective have
experienced complete change. Be that as it may, before examining America's foreign policy
since 1945, it should be appropriate to have a thought regarding the basic principle of American
foreign policy before 1945.
America because of its peculiar geographical location remained completely cut off from
the political conflicts and pursued a policy of isolation.
(i) United States did not aspire for any economic privilege, or other territorial benefits.
Naturally, there was no clash between the American interests and the interests of other
powers. This accounts for complete absence of hostility towards other states.
(ii) The ethical and democratic principles occupied an important position in America‟s
foreign policy. Not only its domestic but even international actions were greatly
influenced by values like dislike for exploitation and tyranny, belief in individual liberty
and equally dedication to rule of law among nations, peaceful settlement of international
disputes, etc. (Chandra & Arora, 2011).
However, in the present century it was not feasible for the United States to pursue policy
of isolation. The United States was involuntarily involved in the two world wars. It may be
observed that United States was forced to jump into the fray because of the serious conditions
created by the division of world into two hostile camps on the eve of the World War I.
23
Somewhat similar position prevailed on the eve of the WW II which compelled United States to
actively participate in the war.
1.14 United States Foreign Policy after WW II
In the post WW II period, the United States was compelled to modify its foreign policy in
view of the far reaching change in military technology and changed international political scene.
The factors which compelled the American leaders to modify their policy were the following:
(a) In the post 1945 era the world came to be dominated by two Super Powers, United States
and USSR, while other powers like Britain, Germany, France,, Japan, etc. became very
weak due to enormous destruction wrought by the WW II. Most of these lesser powers
turned supporters of one of these two powers. As a result, these two Super Powers were
involved in a number of conflicts either directly or indirectly.
(b) The development of military technology resulted in remarkable change in the role of the
sea power and air power, etc. In the new context security considerations came to occupy
a prominent role in the foreign policy formulation. The two powers felt that considerable
degree of mobilization for war must be maintained in peace time since it shall not be
possible to mobilize the military machine over-night. This naturally involved a change in
relationship between the military establishment and domestic institutions. The military
leadership came to occupy a more prominent position in the both super powers.
(c) The ideological differences between the two Super Powers holding belief in rival social
system and political ideas, also aggravated the tension between the two and created
mutual distrust in each other‟s ideas. Each tried to popularize its own political values and
24
opposed and suppressed the ideology of the other. Ideological appeals were skillfully
utilized to mobilize the people (Chandra, 1994).
1.15 Post WW II United States Foreign Policy towards South Asia
The United States took interests in South Asian region after World War II. Initially, the
United States tried to approach India but India was reluctant to join US bloc and it participated in
„so called‟ non-aliened block. Then US drew its attention towards Pakistan. The United States
projected itself as the defendant of Pakistan on Kashmir issue that had strained the situation
between Pakistan and India. But later on, the evidence showed that the United States adopted a
neutral position on Kashmir, leaving the issue to settle down by mutual cooperation,
apprehending that if the United States would play an active part to resolve the issue her relations
with India would be affected. However, despite these disparities, the United States provided
financial and economic aid to Pakistan (Rotter, 1994).
This „honey moon‟ period was over when United States provided massive military
assistance to India in Sino-India border war of 1962 and the Pakistani protest was ignored. It
strained the relations between Pakistan and the United States. From 1965 to 1970, the United
States did not take interest in South Asia due to her involvement in Vietnamese War. In 1971 the
United States once again showed its interest in South Asia on behalf of Pakistan. The United
States sent her aircraft carrier „the Enterprise‟ close to the Indian shore in the Bay of Bengal and
warned to intervene in the war if India tried to attack on West Pakistan (Jabeen & Mazhar,
2011).
During 1970s, again the United States did not take keen interest in South Asia but the fall
of Shah in Iran provoked America to move towards South Asia to protect its hegemonic interest
25
in the region. In 1979, Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan also turned the United States
to take interest in South Asia. So the United States took steps to set up its presence in ocean
adjacent to the region, upgraded its base in Diego Garcia and acquired new bases in Oman and
Somalia. It once again tried to rope Pakistan within the ambit of its global strategy and supplied
large quantities of sophisticated arms to Pakistan. It supported Afghanis to pull out Soviet Army
form the territory (Anwar, 2013).
The pro-Indian stand of the United States was clear that is reflected in its position on
Kashmir. This does not mean that the United States disregards the strategic importance of
Pakistan. Washington tried to maintain friendly relationship between Pakistan and India. It has
been trying to develop amity between India and Pakistan. Under these circumstances the United
States over looked its stand on issues like nuclear nonproliferation treaty, Missile Technology
Control Regime, terrorism, human rights. The United States was able to play this role because of
mutual suspicions among China, India and Pakistan.
1.16 Pre-9/11 Challenges to Pakistan Foreign Policy
In Post-Cold War period world scenario brought a crucial situation. It was the result of
the dynamic aspect of American foreign policy to impose economic sanctions and
withholding the delivery of weapons to Pakistan. It was proved good for Pakistan as
access to Central Asian States was opened up as a new world whereas civil war in
Afghanistan was posing serious threat to Pakistani interests in Central Asia (Ahmar,
2001). Pakistan foreign policy of that era, are as under:
26
The disputed Kashmir had been affecting the Pakistan‟s relations with India. The nuclear
in South Asia paved the way for economic prosperity. There has also been increased
security threats among the two particular states.
It was compulsory for Pakistan to maintain its position in the region that needed
innovative changes to get a suitable position in the comity of nations in general and
among regional states in particular.
Revival of economy was also a serious challenge to Pakistan‟s foreign policy. To achieve
the disposition of the self-reliance on one hand and to retrieve the economic sovereignty
on the other hand by maintaining cordial relations with world economic forums like as
World Bank and IMF was required.
The next one was to develop cordial relations with neighboring countries like Iran, China,
India, Central Asia and Russia as well as Muslim Gulf states and most importantly in
resolving the current foreign policy complications situated in Afghanistan to eliminate
the regional tensions and establishing regional peace. It means Pakistan had to follow
new phase of foreign policy keeping in mind the Indian policy to isolate Pakistan from
SAARC and struggle for regional grouping like Growth Triangle excluding Pakistan.
The major Post-Cold War foreign policy challenge was the security of the country at both
internal and external level. Every target operation came into Pakistan creating huge
difficulties in the way of development. Pakistan allied itself with major powers and
international developed community. But no world power rescued Pakistan.
Political instability was also a serious challenge to Pakistan Foreign Policy. Internal
stability and political integration was eroded seriously by terrorist activities. One man
27
decision to support US led War on Terror intensified the ethnic and sectarian strives
resulted in further political instability (Akbar, 2011).
1.17 Post 9/11 Pakistan Foreign Policy towards United States
Following the 9/11, Musharraf addressed Pakistani nation to justify his decision, in the
country‟s moment of crisis to join the coalition against terrorism (Haniffa, 2001). Musharraf
highlighted four critical concerns about:
(a) The security of Pakistan from external aggression and its stability,
(b) The revitalization of Pakistan economy,
(c) Pakistan‟s strategic assets like as nuclear and missile assets,
(d) At the end, The Kashmir Cause (Musharraf, 2002).
1.18 Post 9/11 United States Foreign Policy towards Pakistan
It was September 11, 2001, when four airplanes of the United States were hijacked. Two
of these planes were crashed into the World Trade Centre, one was crashed into the building of
Pentagon. The remaining one was restrained and forced down in the field of Pennsylvania before
it could complete its mission. It was the first attack ranked as number one because of its severest
nature in the American history. The Americans took no time to investigate the matter and blamed
Al-Qaeda for that heinous act of terrorism. The United States put pressure on Taliban
government to give up Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. When Taliban refused to do so, the
Americans began to plan an invasion against Taliban government of Afghanistan (Barker, 2012).
28
As Afghanistan is a landlocked country, the United States required bases, airspace and
logistical support from neighboring countries to launch operation against Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan. The United States has been negotiating with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan for support, but the United States desperately needed Pakistan support. Most of the
fighter aircrafts and many of the troops and supplies came from ships in the Indian Ocean.
Pakistan and Iran were the countries that bordered both with the Indian Ocean and Afghanistan.
However, Iran was not assumed as a trustworthy ally. On the other hand Pakistan had close
relations with Taliban government of Afghanistan while she had strained relations with the
United States. Therefore, the Bush administration sought to gain Pakistan‟s support though
coercive diplomacy (Collins, 2008).
As Afghanistan is the landlocked country, therefore, the United States found it difficult to
launch its operations against Al-Qaeda and Taliban. The United States started negotiating with
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan for getting geo-strategic support in the region, but the
United States could not get desired succeed in this respect. Then all the attentions of the
Americans were directed towards the Pakistani support to have access to the Afghani areas.
Pakistan is linked with Indian Ocean and Afghanistan. When the America launched operation,
most of the aircrafts and troops were brought through the Indian Ocean in Pakistan from where
they were sent to Afghanistan through various borders. Pakistan‟s support proved helpful in
restoring the peaceful and cordial relations with America. On the other hand Pakistan had lost its
relations with Taliban in Afghanistan and at that time Pakistan‟s foreign policy makers preferred
to go after the policies of the American without judging its long term impacts.
The United States foreign policy towards Pakistan was in terms of coercive diplomacy.
Prior to further detail, the theoretical description of coercive diplomacy is as following:
29
Alexander George described coercive diplomacy in his book, Force and Statecraft.
According to him coercive diplomacy is an attempt to reverse actions that have already been
occurring or have been undertaken by a rival. Coercive diplomacy “tries to initiate behavior by
fear of the consequences”. So, it is clear that the United States has been insisting Pakistan to
change its foreign policy. Further George explained coercive diplomacy as essentially a
diplomatic strategy backed by the threat of force (George, 2013). Clearly there was a threat to
use of force from the United States against Pakistan if Pakistan refused to support the United
States in war on terror.
George explained in his book, five areas of critical importance for successful coercive
diplomacy:
The coercing power must convey more highly aggressive to achieve its committed
demands than the adversary opposing them;
A Careful attention must be paid to what is demanded from opponent;
The threat must be credible and sufficiently potent;
There should be the offer of positive incentives with carrots or incentives combined with
threats; And
It is necessary to decide that the feeling of urgency to be created in the mind of the
opponent to comply with the requirements (George, 2013).
The research has explained “military and economic” dimensions of foreign policy. The
United States used coercive diplomacy to achieve her military objectives. On the other hand
Pakistan provided logistic support, air basis and blanket flyover to get its „military‟ and
„economic‟ goals. Pakistan gained military equips to strong her security needs and security
collapse. On the verge of 9/11 Pakistan‟s economic condition was very poor so 9/11 proved a
30
chance to revive its economy. Broadly speaking the researcher is helpful for understanding the
Pakistan United States relationship and strategic depth regarding post 9/11 era.
31
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Anwar, M. F. (2013). US Sanctions Against Pakistan: Rationale and Impact . Pakistaniaat. A
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Khana, V. (2005). Foreign Policy of India. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd.
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35
Chapter No 02
HISTORY OF PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS
36
2.1 United States Policy towards Subcontinent before Partition
After World War II, United States policy towards South Asia was to contain Soviet
Communism and to enhance search of energy resources. According to a strategic report the
presence of oil reserves in the region raised the importance of the area (Husain, 1987). For the
quest of these interests United States took deep interest in the matters of South Asia and
struggled for good relations with each country.
In history, United States view of Asian affairs was limited to eastern countries like China,
Japan and Pacific. The British inspired Americans in focusing its attention on Subcontinent.
British Policy towards newly born Pakistan was unsympathetic whereas British Indian relations
were in good terms. America also preferred India due to its size and as a significant contributor
against Soviet Union (Rao, 1985).
2.2 Indian Non-alignment Policy
India avoided the rivalry of superpowers due to its non-aligned policy. India adhered the
policy of non-aligned by the name of world peace but policy became the source of many ups and
down in Indo-US relationship. J. Dulles, American Secretary of State, remarked during his visit
to India that Soviet Communism had strong influence through the interim government of India
(Jabeen & Mazhar, 2011). President Truman said that he did not believe it (Tribune, January 18,
1947). First American Ambassador Grady to India commented after his meeting with Jawaharlal
Nehru that India wanted friendly ties with the United States but it had some fears about United
States economic penetration (Rao, 1985). Despite a long desire for mutual relations, India did not
support the American policy of Soviet containment. India was even more active than Stalin‟s
37
threats for security of Pakistan (Rao, 1985). But India, on the other hand, avoided any alliance.
As Nehru commented, “If there is a cold war today, certainly we are neutral, it does not matter
who is right or wrong we will not join in this exhibition of mutual abuse” (Nehru, 1952).
2.3 Pakistan’s Strategic Significance
After failing to get backing from India, the United States policy makers moved to
Pakistan. Americans came to know the strategic importance of Pakistan‟s physical position
particularly as a possible bomber base on the Soviet Union‟s Southern flank. This opinion
eventually let close between the West and Pakistan (Cohen, 2005). Pakistan acquired its strategic
importance when US joint Chief of Staff noted significance of Karachi and Lahore areas “as a
base for air operations‟ against the Soviet Union and as a staging area for forces engaged in the
defense or recapture of Middle East oil areas” (Sattar, 2006). Pakistan is the point at which the
alliances geographically converged and thus was a linchpin in their continuity. Initially the
American attitude was based on defeating the communist extension. Very after the establishment
of Pakistan, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff highlighted the geostrategic significance of
Pakistan. They regarded Karachi and Lahore as bases for launching air strikes against the Soviet
Union. It was also an important strategic area for the defense of oil reserves in the Middle East.
The Pakistani army is thought to be the best force in the region (Arif, 1984).
2.4 Formation of Pakistan-United States Diplomatic Ties
In American views, geographical position was very significant (Sattar, 2006). George
Marshall, Secretary of State, wrote to President Truman on 17 July 1947, “Pakistan with a
population of seventy million persons will be the largest Muslim country in the world and will
38
occupy one of the most strategic areas in the world.” After creation of Pakistan, President
Truman sent a good-will message to Muhammad Ali Jinnah “I wish to assure you that the new
dominion embarks on its course with the firm friendship and goodwill of the United States of
America” (Venkatramani, 1984). Jinnah also answered positively as he foreknew the burning
need of military equipment for the armed forces and economic support for the country in general.
Mr. H. Ispahani was Pakistan‟s first ambassador to Washington. On October 8, 1947, he
presented his credentials to President Truman and said to him that the Pakistanis are the off
springs of the great Muslim rulers from Central Asia and the Caucasian Mountains. Since the
latter was inherit home of the Americans, both nations have same lineage. Truman responded
“We stand ready to assist Pakistan in all appropriate ways which might naturally benefit our two
countries and the world and we have profound hope for continuing peaceful and constructive
collaboration between Pakistan, her sister dominion and other countries”(New York Times,
November 27,1947).
2.5 Pakistan-United States Relations in Early Years
After World War II, bipolar system produced a constant competition in world politics as
Russia and America struggled to enhance their power. United States policy makers were also
trying to find conformance between United States interests and geographical importance of
Pakistan (Sattar, 2006). Even before partition, on 17 July, 1947, George Marshall, secretary of
state, confirmed that “the area Pakistan in south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of
the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union” (Husain,
1987).
39
In 1947, safeguarding resources had to be appropriate between India and Pakistan, but
India intentionally hampered the share granted to Pakistan as India sought to weaken the new
state. It further proposed to dispense durably on the state recently conceived in as before the
calendar as October 1947. The Maharaja of Kashmir had marked development of State of
Kashmir in the Indian Union. Lord Mountbatten said that once peace had been restored in
Kashmir and its domain would be robbed of “thieves” the subject of state promotion would be
settled by reference to the general population (Husain, 1987). By measures, India was trying to
stifle Pakistan in its underlying stages. On the northern fringe, Stalin had gouged the very idea of
Pakistan and tried to reinforce the Afghan pioneers in 1946 by challenging the legitimacy of
Durand Line, drawn by British India and Afghanistan in 1893 to define the boundary between
the two nations. Jinnah was sensitive to this danger. Since the isolation season, the Durand line
was reaffirmed by the Afghan in 1919, 1921 and 1930 (Husain, 1987).
Due to its strategic importance and list of crises, Pakistan was offered partnership.
Pakistan gratefully accepted it. In the same while Pakistani leaders also tried to endorse the
strategic importance of the country. Ghulam Mohammad, Finance Minister, looked forward to
economic assistance to meet the country's economic problems. He approached the American
Chargé d 'Affaires Charles W. Lewis in Karachi, but he did not have the power to promise. He
advised that Pakistan should prepare an estimate of compulsory assistance, which should be sent
to Washington and then attributed to the Pakistani ambassador in Washington. On the other
hand, Lewis informed to the Secretary of State. After approval, Jinnah appointed Mir Laik Ali as
his special representative to negotiate with officials in Washington. Laik Ali and Ambassador
Ispahani visited officials at various levels for the loan of US$ 2 billion. Although Laik Ali
underlined the Soviet Union's threat to the northern border of Pakistan, the State Department did
40
not give a clear answer. However, it was proposed to Pakistan to submit a request for more
comprehensive assistance. The request comprises of US$ 700 million for industry, US$ 700
million for agriculture and US$ 510 million for defense equipment and infrastructure. An amount
of US$ 2 billion has been agreed for five years. But State Department officials were not ready to
provide a regular source of funding for Pakistan's growing needs (Venkatramani, 1984). Looking
back, it is noted that Ghulam Mohammad began the concept of a huge dependency on American
aid.
2.6 Liaqat’s Visit to United States
Washington invited Indian Prime Minister Nehru in 1949 that antagonized Pakistanis. In
vice versa, counter move from Moscow by which Pakistan was invited. But Soviet Union did not
send a congratulatory note to Pakistan on its inception. It was also imagined that the Pakistani
Prime Minister had no positive attitude towards Communism. Liaquat Ali Khan discussed such
views with American ambassador in Pakistan also pointed to the failure of Pro-American Chiang
Kai Shek in China (Jabeen & Mazhar, 2011). Furthermore he communicated his fear that the
next prey might be India. He also expressed his fears in the current situation that Pakistan would
be the last bulwark between the Middle East and the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister
advocated that Western support is indispensable to Muslim states, just as assistance had been
provided to Turkey and Greece (Venkatramani, 1984). But there was no positive response from
Americans. On June 8, 1949 Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan announced the
acceptance of an invitation from Moscow by saying, “Pakistan cannot afford so long wait, she
must take her friends where she finds them” (Burke, 1975). In response to this move,
Washington called Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan to meet President Truman (Venkatramani,
41
1984). Liaquat Ali khan rejected Soviets invitation after receiving American invitation (Ghori,
2007 ). Prime Minister Liaquat Ali khan impressed the Truman administration by his zealot
speech in Congress. He pointed out the security issue of South Asia, expressed goodwill gesture
for Americans, the need for friendly relations with free and peaceful nations. He informed
Congress that no hazard or philosophical pace could avert Pakistan from its chosen path to the
free world, democracy (Jabeen & Mazhar, 2011). A journalist from America, Water Lipperman
illustrated that both the states, Pakistan and America had different lifestyles but both the states
were responsible for peace and well-being for humanity, could not respond completely without
the help and guidance of the other (Lipperman, 1950). Prime Minister Khan presented Pakistan‟s
geostrategic significance for the stability of Asia. Liaquat Ali Khan presented Pakistan‟s
importance in a better way, its policies and difficulties, yet he could not get help in military
assistance, private capital and investment.
2.7 World Situation and Regional Defense Alliances in 1950s
In early fifties, regional ups and downs compelled the United States to reconsider its
military measurements and protected Asian states from Soviet Communism influence. In 1949,
the fall of Pro-American and Nationalist government in China was a challenge to American
prestige. It was a clear symbol of Communist development. In early 1951, the rise of the anti-
American Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran instigated American antagonism. To
prevent Soviet military advancement towards the Persian Gulf and Near East Asia, CIA toppled
the Mossadegh regime in 1953 and reestablished the government of Shah Mohammed Pahlavi
(Bagby, 1999). The main interest of the United States was to secure the Persian Gulf, which is
the richest oil reserve in the world.
42
In Europe, Soviet penetration was stopped by collective security agreements under North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). But in Asia such provisions were not conceivable. People
living in Middle East and Southeast Asia were not ready to be a part of bipolar rivalry. Since
long times, most of Central Asian and other Asian states had been ruled by the same dictators or
rulers that had cultural similarities. America tried to bring this region under its influence for the
protection of Western interests.
In February 1951, to secure strategic influence in South Asia, American policymakers
recommended the effective military alliances that would require strong position in Turkey, Iran
and Pakistan. The Pakistani forces would build up to meet the strategic requirements. In
February 1951, US ambassadors conducted a meeting in Colombo (Sri Lanka), supported
involvement of Pakistan in the defense of Middle East (Kux, 2001). Ambassador George
McGhee was much impressed by the Pakistan‟s positive response to back United States
determinations to check Communist influence in South Asia. Thus, America announced limited
military assistance for Pakistan (McMahon, 1994). In April 1951, the British and American think
tanks recommended the support for Pakistan to protect area. In May 1952, Paul Nitze, an
American official, endorsed American presence in the region since the British put aside regional
security (McMahon, 1994).
At the beginning, India desired for economic support from the United States, but Indo-
American relations were at low ebb because India criticized the United States when it did not
recognize China's participation in the War of Korea. Notwithstanding this set back, Washington
provided economic assistance to India during its food shortage 1950-51. The granting and
withholding of economic aid was the effective tool of American policy (Bowles, 1954). This
policy varies from country to country. India did not recognize the Japanese peace treaty in San
43
Francisco and it lost respect in Washington while Pakistan approved the treaty and won respect
in Washington (Choudhry, 1975).
2.8 Korean War
Pakistan United States relationships were being developed during the Liaquat‟s state visit
to America in May 1950, in the mean while North Korean Communist activists invaded South
Korea. After the Korean Communist attack on South Korea, United States offered logistic
assistance to South Korea and the United Nation Security Council asked all state members to
provide assistance to defy the North Korean aggression. Twenty one Nations reacted positively
to provide forces including India. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan condemned this incident in
the UN that earned praise for Pakistan. The United States requested Pakistan to provide forces
for the UN coalition forces but Pakistan refused. In May 1951 Chines forces counter attacked on
UN coalition forces. Once again the United States request Pakistan to send its troops to assist
South Korea. Now Pakistan was ready to provide the assistance if the United States would give
full time assurance for Pakistan‟s safety. But The United States was not ready to accomplish
such obligation as it had not done so for any of the twenty one states. Pakistan lost the
opportunity as it did not provide support free-world in Korean War. The United States
considered that Pakistan did not commit to broader relations for defeating the Communism.
Contrary to this, India deployed her forces in Korea to normalize its relations with the United
States (Nandi, 2012).
44
2.9 Path to the United States Regional Security Pacts, Economic Assistance
and Pakistan
The penetration of communist philosophy into Southeast Asia and the formation of
socialist China made the United States proactive to take the initiative to follow the policy of
containment. American stakeholders have taken many steps to prevent the communist threat in
the region. Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, Four Point Program and NATO alliances were the
series of measures. To pursue the above mentioned Programs, American assisted the nations and
contributed in world affairs (Jabeen & Mazhar, 2011). This also shows the firm support to Asian
and the Middle East states to become allies. After all, the alliances were focused to prevent
Communism. The United States affirmed the allied countries to provide military, economic and
technical assistance. The strategy was a way to cover Communist without American forces. The
United States find out new ways of its involvement in the global affairs.
After the Korean War, Washington was in struggle for search of new allies. By the end of
1952, the Truman administration also launched Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO). In
November 1952, American Admiral Arthur visited Pakistan to discuss with Pakistani
stakeholders. These discussions were way to defense treaties between the two countries (Burke,
1975).
On May 9, 1953, John Foster Dulles departed a long tour to allied states. During 23-24
May, he visited Pakistan to make fixable situation. The Pakistani stakeholders showed their
commitment against communist. The Pakistanis were ready to join the alliance as Ayub Khan
argued that the United States would fill the gap left by the British (Kux D., 2001). Dulles also
declared the borders of communist China on the northern territories held by Pakistan, and on the
45
northern border of Pakistan, one can see the Soviet Union. Pakistan is on the verge of Iran and
the Middle East and guards the Khyber Pass (Sattar, 2007). He appreciated Pakistan‟s efforts and
became Pakistan‟s staunch supporter for a collective security agreement.
Dulles discussed with Indian Prime Minister about Indo-American relations. However,
discussion on military collaboration in Middle East or Southeast Asia failed because Nehru did
not join any military bloc due to policy of non-Alignment. Later on Dulles said “One of my
clearest impressions was that of the outstanding and sincere friendship which leaders of Pakistan
feel for the United States. Further he remarked “I was greatly impressed with their Pakistanis
approach to understand the world problem and they will defy the hazards of communism”
(Singh, 1985).
In July 1953, „security alliance‟ plan was approved by American National Security
Council. In 1953, during his visit to Washington, Ayub Khan tried to persuade President
Eisenhower for collective security links. Ayub assured him by saying “Pakistan will stand by
you if you stand by Pakistan” (Jabeen & Mazhar, 2011). Later on Ghulam Mohammad also
visited the United States for collective security links but both leaders failed at once. The
atmosphere changed in December 1953, when Vice President Richard Nixon visited Pakistan, he
provided military aid to Pakistan (Singh, 1985). Under Dulles proposals, Pakistan signed
Northern Tier with Turkey on April 2, 1954, Pakistan with Turkey and the United States played
as a leading role in mutual defense arrangement of the „northern tier‟.
The pro-American stance caused the United States assistance to Pakistan. The United
States also provided one million tons of wheat valued of US$ 74 million. It was rapidly delivered
to Karachi (Sattar, 2007). The United States used political, diplomatic and economic tools to
measure communism invasion in Asia. The United States adopted the enormous reprisal policy
46
to counter the Soviet danger. The United States also supported the emancipation from Soviet
controlled European states. On the other hand United States supported European colonial
policies. In such a way the United States played a leading role in world affairs. However, the
United States maintained it without being labeled as an advocate of colonialism (The New York
Times, April 30, 1952).
Due to strategic location, Pakistan was an important country. Pakistan also had
significant impact in South Asia and Middle East as well as in the Afro-Asian bloc. The United
States considered Pakistan would advocate US-led policies. The internal infrastructure of
Pakistan was not good but its relations with the United States were better. The American-
Turkish-Pakistan accord was a chain of the Northern Tier Plan (The Economist, March 17,
1956).
In pursuit of strong defense, Pakistan reviewed its options to obtain military equipment
from the United States. Ayub Khan moved to Washington in September 1953 to discuss the
assistance program. Abub said “Military Assistance to Pakistan is matter of mutual benefit in the
defense of the area in which Pakistan is situated (Choudhry, 1975).” On October 22, 1954 in
another round of talks, Ayub was able to get military equips aid. On another occasion Military
Assistant, General Olmsted supported Ayub Khan (Chopra, 1992)).
Pakistan was seeking military aid to make itself militarily strong against any aggressive
move towards Pakistan‟s political and ideological freedom. Pakistan needed moral as well as
material strength. On Feb. 22, 1954, Prime Minister of Pakistan Muhammad Ali declared that
Pakistan had made a legitimate interest to the United States for military help inside the breaking
points of United States common security lawmaking body. The ask for was made in the wake of
considering the way that Pakistan would coordinate with other well-disposed nations and it could
47
give an essential commitment towards the quality and security of the area. All things considered
the underlying strides had as of now been brought by close collaboration with Turkey (Alqama
& Tariq, 1989).
Mr. Mohammad Ali guaranteed that the United States military assistance would be used
for maintaining and promoting stability for the defense of Pakistan and it would enable Pakistan
to contribute in the UN collective security system. Pakistan would utilize this assistance
especially to manage its internal security, self-preservation or to allow it to take an interest in the
resistance of the fringes or in UN collective arrangements and measures (Curl, 1955). Besides it
was guaranteed and stressed by PM Mohammad Ali that Pakistan had noble intention towards
each state and American Assistance would be utilized just for defensive purpose instead of any
aggressive move. Pakistan would not set out towards any act of aggression of hostility against
any other country.
On July 21, 1954, the Defense Department established a military advisory group, in
Pakistan, under the headship of Brigadier General William T. Sexton. The foundation of the
mission was purported in the possibility of making ready for the dispatch of the American
military supplies and hardware to Pakistan, as per reports that may be add up to US$ 70 million
amid the first year (Jabeen & Mazhar, 2011).
Mr. Nehru showed his reaction against this grant and remarked on March 1, 1954, that
this provision of military aid by the United States to Pakistan would create a grave situation for
India and even whole Asian states, it adds to our tensions, it makes it much more difficult to
solve the problems which have confronted India and Pakistan (Rai, 1981). Furthermore he
warned that Pakistan‟s joining of this aid deal would damage the Kashmir issue. Ambassador C.
Bowles and Senator William Fulbright opposed the aid deal but it was concluded in spite of
48
Indian opposition. India reacted while President Eisenhower replied that the United States would
be cautious to do anything in Pakistan that could create unrest in India (New York Times,
November 15, 1953). All of the above shows that the United States has never wanted to make
India angry. India, however, made an excuse for organizing a plebiscite on the Kashmir issue.
The Indian President expressly stated in his Parliament that any American aid to Pakistan would
affect the Kashmir issue. The United States assured India that the Pakistan United States mutual
defense pacts would never constitute an obstacle between the United States and India (Rao,
1985). In fact, the United States had its interests in both countries. It involved in a balance
between the two.
2.10 Eisenhower Doctrine and Mutual Security Assistance Agreement
After Korean War, Eisenhower Doctrine was the core strategy for United States foreign
policy. The main objective of the Eisenhower Doctrine was to support the nations that were
repelling Communism. Several military and economic alliances were signed under the New
Doctrine. The key objective was to restrain Communist involvement. Such coalitions were the
essential share of American strategy. The Eisenhower doctrine symbolized the determination to
prevent the Soviet Union from gaining control of oil-rich area of West Asia (Rao, 1985). The
new phase of regional defense alliances was the „New Look‟ of the Republican Administration.
„New Look‟ consisted of military and economic assistance as well as political involvement.
Eisenhower Administration sustained that United States would not be an invader whereas it had a
massive nuclear capability. Dulles clarified the policy by using the phrase „massive retaliation‟
(Curl, 1955).
49
Mutual defense assistance had been launched to help a state to protect itself as an ally
(Stebbins, 1956). In 1950s, Pakistan and the United States became close friends through the
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. This agreement included membership of SEATO,
CENTO and Bilateral Assistance Agreement. As indicated by the Mutual Assistance Program,
the sum and character of help understanding was to be dictated by the American Military mission
which visited Pakistan by the end of March 1954. The Mission presented its report to State
Department after making a spot survey of Pakistan military necessities (Soherwordi, 2009).
The mission was to discharge its responsibilities assumed by the United States under
Mutual Defense Assistance agreement. Its task was to draft detailed recommendations
concerning the way of the United States Program of Military Assistance to Pakistan, by the
participation with armed force of Pakistan. On the decision, Pakistan was welcomed in all over
the free world. But Indian reaction against this development caused dismay. Prime Minister
Nehru criticized and stated that American aid to Pakistan would lead towards war and a step
which would bring war right to our door (The Pakistan Times, January 6, 1954). Further he
expressed his views by saying that Pakistan took a wrong step by accepting the proposed aid
package.
In order to minimize the friction in Indo-US relationship, Eisenhower assured Nehru that
the proposed military package for Pakistan would never be used against India. The United States
\would no longer wait to approach for Indian assistance. In the meanwhile, Eisenhower offered
arms supplies to India but Nehru did not accept by saying “if we object to military aid being
given to Pakistan, we would be hypocrites and unprincipled to accept such aid. Moscow also
50
protested over deal but Pakistan rejected by saying “Pakistan never intended to provide military
bases to the United States” (Rai, 1981).
2.11 Pakistan’s Compulsions
Pakistan associated with West mainly due to the following factors.
(a) Security Issues
(b) Economic Issues
2.11. a Security Issues
Security, safety and defense are the most important objectives of humanity. The Foreign
policy of South Asian States, their interactions and relations with super powers during the cold
war had been considerably influenced by the regional discord.
Geo-Strategic location of Pakistan in the region is the most important\ as compared to
any other state in South Asia. In 1947, the inception of Pakistan was a result of the partition of
British India. Soon after the creation of Pakistan, it has been troubled by an identity crisis.
Pakistan consisted of East and West wing was the most troublesome aspect. These two parts
separated by more than thousand miles by the territory of Indian. Moreover, the external
environment of Pakistan was not peaceful due to its hostile neighbors; India and Afghanistan.
The four times larger India‟s hostile attitude created dangerous situation against Pakistan and
there had been oppressions about Indian determination to dictate the political and economic
sphere in the region and to engulf Pakistan. Pakistan was in amid of two dangers, India and
Communism, therefore it joined the Western defense bloc as an insurance against both (Bruke,
1974).
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The most Pakistanis believed that India was the brought about the most imminent threat
to Pakistan's security as India accepted Pakistan not more than the part of Indian Union and
looked for Pakistan to lose its separate existence until the forever. According to DAWN if the
concern of the West was the control of Chines Communist same as the main concern of Muslim
Pakistan was the containment of activist in Hinduism (Dawn, 1963).
Because of her size, India is the greatest nation in the South Asia. That is the reason the
small neighboring nations of India perceive much as a imperial state, determined to take the
entire South Asian region under its hegemony (Burke, 1975). After partition, Indian hostility
attitude appeared inauspicious. Professor Keth B. Callard wrote that Indians felt that the
establishment of Pakistan was tragic mistake which still might be revised (Callard, 1957).
Radical Hindu Mahasabha was talking about undividable India or gathering of India of the
separated areas for peace. Maulana Azad and Sardar Patel foresaw the division as short lived and
thought that Pakistan would not supportable for long time (Brands, 1972). The Orthodox Hindus
believed that meager economic condition, unsustainable resources and lack of administration of
newly born Pakistan would collapse soon. Nehru discussed with Josef Korbel, UN
representative, “We want to cooperate and work towards cooperation and one day integration of
both the states will inevitable come. It will be in four, five or ten years- I don‟t know” (Rai,
1981).
India has been attempting for utilizing power and undertaking forceful activity against
Pakistan. This forceful measure frequently occurred at the time of settling Pakistan-India
territorial disputes. Soon after the freedom, the state of Junagarh consented with Pakistan. The
Indian government seriously retaliated against Junagarh on the plea that 80% population of the
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state was Hindu which opposed to accede with Pakistan. India proposed to hold choice in said
state under the organization of Indian and Junagarh but Pakistan did not agree. Resultantly,
Indian forces seized Junagarh forcefully. A similar circumstance happened in Hyderabad when
the condition of Pakistan was plunged with sorrow inconvenience over hopeless and
inconvenient passing ceaselessly of Quid e Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah.
Since 1947, Kashmir is another sticking point between Pakistan and India. The conflict
over Kashmir is the greatest hurdle in the way of long-term peaceful relations between India and
Pakistan. The Kashmir issue has irritated the relations between both the states on Kashmir issue,
Pandit Nehru assured but did not fulfilled. He said that the Kashmir would be decided by
plebiscite. Maharajah Hari Singh supported him and ascended Kashmir with India. Furthermore
he said “We will never be back, we are prepared, when peace, law and order have been
established to have a referendum under international umbrella like the UN. We want it to be a
fair and just reference to the people and we shall accept their verdict” (Sayyed, 1967).
Strategically Kashmir is the most important integral part of Pakistan. India had never
positive for holding plebiscite in Kashmir as she was fully aware of Muslim majority that would
vote in favor of Pakistan. Indian defense minister remarked “we would lose it. Kashmir would
vote to join Pakistan” (Rai, 1981).
Pakistan supported self-determination right of Kashmiris and demanded paramount
factors in basic question of accession, either with Pakistan or India, let them decide by the wills
of Kashmiris by holding plebiscite. But Indians knew very well that holding the plebiscite would
fan the flames of communal urges which would engulf the whole India (Sayyed, 1967). Pakistan
53
battled three wars on Kashmir issue, in 1948, 1965 and 1999 but the matter still lingered
unresolved also creating a threat to Pakistan.
At the northern border, Stalin worked out the very concept of Pakistan and fled to launch
Afghan leaders by questioning the legality of Durand Line, demarcated in 1893 by the British
Indies and Afghanistan to define the border between two countries. Jinnah was sensitive to this
historical danger. Since the demarcation, the Durand line has been endorsed by successive
Afghan governments: 1919, 1921 and 1930 (Husain, 1987). Afghanistan, under the pretext of
Pakhtunistanstunt, has launched an endless barrage of antagonistic propaganda against Pakistan
(Rubin & Siddique, 2006).
The uncertain inner situation of Pakistan after Jinnah's passing away, death of Liaquat Ali
Khan in 1951 and the succeeding politician lacking the popular vote dragged Pakistan to look for
the big powers. Pakistan was in dire need of military help to build up the nation and survival
against Indian hostility. Pakistan's top priority was to build the strong national defense. Since
Pakistan did not get her assigned share of the hardware from the British Indian, in this way, there
was a need to plan armed force. India, being the bigger state than Pakistan, involved the mass
share of the assets. The military assets were divided between Pakistan and India as following:
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Table No. 1 Division of Army between Pakistan and India
Army
India Pakistan
Armored Regiments
12 6
Artillery Regiments
15 8
Transport
34 17
Hospitals 82 34
Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey, Movement of Pakistan (Islamabad 1968-1969), Statistical Section
Table No. 2 Division of Navy between Pakistan and India
Army
India Pakistan
Sloops
4 2
Frigates
2 2
Mine Sweepers
12 4
Trawlers
4 5
Source; Pakistan economic survey, Movement of Pakistan(Islamabad 1968-1969), Statistical section
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Table No. 3 Division of Air Force between Pakistan and India
Army
India Pakistan
Fighter Squadrons
7 2
Transport Squadrons
1 1
Military Stores 3 2
Source; Pakistan economic survey, Movement of Pakistan(Islamabad 1968-1969), Statistical section
India handed over Rs. 60 million to Pakistan in debt of ordnance factories (Mishra,
1984). It was difficult for Pakistan to meet defense expenses due to its divided territory.
Therefore Pakistan was rightful to turn towards United States and Muslim countries seeking
support for its differences with India. But there was no positive response from United States and
other Muslim States to back up Pakistan, consequently Pakistan bitterly disappointed. The
perpetual conflict with India caused a great setback and weakened the internal security and
financial sustainability of Pakistan. There was no choice for Pakistan except the West to align.
So Pakistan‟s foreign policy tilted towards the West for the chances of benefits.
2.11.b Economic Problems
Economic development is the main objective of any nation. The hunt for security was the
primary pre-occupation of Pakistan‟s foreign policy architects. However, it was strictly
associated to develop the economy of Pakistan. Economic assistance was direly needed to
develop the economy of Pakistan. To accelerate the pace of economic development had always
been focused by Pakistani think tanks.
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At the time of inception, Pakistan's industrial unit was at alarming situation. It was not
just in the defense field that Pakistan, as compared to India, received very few, even less than her
allotted share from British India also a similar example was reconsidered in the economic sector
too. The Indian National Congress focused to create as much hurdles immediately after the
creation of Pakistan causing early dismay for new born state, Pakistan. Pakistan's economy
basically based upon agribusiness. In West Pakistan, cotton was the primary harvest though rice
and jute were the main yields of East Pakistan. Pakistan's internal infrastructure was very poor to
up rise financial needs. Most of industrial units went to India that ended up being a serious
obstacle in financial development. Indeed, even there was no jute process in West Pakistan, one
jute process in East Pakistan was creating expansive amount of jute on the planet, out of 395
cotton plants of British India came just fourteen in Pakistan. The electricity generating capacity
was 75000 kilowatts. Just 69 banks were out of four hundred and eighty seven left in Pakistan.
The lack of capital, technical sources, insufficient mineral and power resources enhanced
economic problems. The Indian government likewise held the Pakistan shared from Reserve
Bank of India up to over Rs. 50 million (Mushtaq, 2009). In such fragile condition, Pakistan was
in much need of financial support and cooperation from other developed nations. In the quest for
foreign advisors in textile field, engineering, medicine and education compelled Pakistan to
look ahead towards West particularly to the United States.
2.12 The United States Objectives
The location of South Asian region is near to Soviet Union. So the Soviet penetration
caused a constant threat to nations which lie close to the Soviet territory. Soviet policy experts
struggled to spread Communist ideas and also its territorial influence.
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Until World War II, the American policy makers had little concern in South Asia due to
British control over the area. Americans did not give the region much significance. But after
defeat of pro-Americans in China, the victory of Communist attained the Congressional
attention. The Americans rushed to influence and control over the region. The United States
wanted to deter the communist in the region. Thus the United States policy of communism
containment was the prime interest of the United States foreign policy (Campbell, 1992). Since
the end of the Second World War, the continuous strain between the big two superpowers gave
the idea of influence in almost all parts of the world. In the pursuit of its global objectives, the
United States afraid of losing its influence to contain Soviet and Chinese moved in South Asian
and adjacent areas.
Being the oldest functional system of democracy, United States always took interest in
the democratic future of every country in world political system. Therefore, the United States
supported for the independence of the nations or states had fallen prey of Soviet influence.
Being a democratic chief, the United States treated Communism as a contagious disease which
would carry its contamination throughout the world. The US also under estimated the Soviet
Communism as gambler which had been playing gambles in the history (Kux, 2001).
The United States focused to deter the Communism expansion throughout the world. The
United States policy of containment came on the surface under the 'Truman Doctrine'. The
Doctrine was issued in response to the immediate circumstances which the United States
confronted abroad (Germain, 2003). The challenge comprised of two folds, first due to internal
political crisis which was accompanied by the threat of Soviet intervention in Greece and second
the Soviet pressure directed against the Turkey. Truman believed that the danger being faced by
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Greece and Turkey couldn't be put aside, in this manner, it was necessary to portray the Soviet
expansionist and mediation throughout the non-Communist world. It had turned into a
worldwide challenge that should have been countered with worldwide strategies. The United
States support to Turkey and Greece was a set pattern of consequent response to Communist
pressures. The doctrine compelled the United States to fight against any new effort by the Soviet
Union to develop its circle (Crabb, 1968). The United States successfully launched communist
containment strategy, not only response to endangered Greece and Turkey but also to Korea and
South East Asia as well as in Europe. The United States deployed forces in the Western Pacific
to encircle Communism. Under „Four Point Program‟ the United States also helped the nations
through technical and economic assistance.
By applying all effective tools, United States provided military and financial aid to weak
states that became an permanent feature of the American foreign policy. In early 1950s, the
United States turned towards South Asia with a pro-active approach to resolve the difficulties
and problems of the region. To find the reliable friends, J. F. Dulles the Secretary of State,
enhanced the worth of Mutual Defense Assistance Program to conduct secret operations. The
United States moved towards South East Asian region and offered India to become ally but there
was absolute refusal from India. United States contacted Pakistan. Pakistan was alleged by
American choice as a dependable bulwark against Communism (Khan, 1983).
By expansion of Cold War and containment policy of Communism, the United States
enlisted Pakistan in the list of collective security arrangements. Pakistan already being frightened
by Indian threat, without wasting the time, aligned itself with the United States to meet its
security requirements. For America, the alliance functioned as base to expand the scope of the
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containment policy. For Pakistan, these alliances served as political, military and economic
strength vis-à-vis India.
2.13 South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)
The mid 1950s was marked as the rise to the propensity towards an elaborate system of
alliances for reciprocal assistance and collective defense. Pakistan was fully aware of a period of
interference and being flanked by hostile neighbors. Pakistan could not keep up her security
because of the limited resources. Therefore, Pakistan joined SEATO on September 8, 1954 with
seven other states from the world; Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand
and the United States of America were likewise included (Nanto, 2006).
Formal planning, on SEATO, was started after the Churchill‟s visit to Washington in
June 1954. After Dulles-Eden meeting on April 1954, it was announced that the United States
and UK were going to take part in alliance with other concerned courtiers by examining the
options to establish a mutual security within the context of United Nation charter, to secure the
peace, security and freedom of South East Asia as well as Western Pacific. The United States
and Western powers, established a regional defense organization, wanted greater number of
interested nations members for the treaty (Colbert, 1977).
In 1954, the containment strategy was planned after the French downfall in Indochina.
The Eisenhower administration took various steps to make strong military, economic and
political situation of the region besides its aims to ouster Communism. In September 1954, a
meeting of representative eight countries was held at Manila (Philippines) aimed collective
security formation and peace in South East Asia. As East Pakistan fell into the region, Pakistan
signed the defense agreement in Manila on 8 September 1954. The pact was focused on regional
60
peace and economic concern (Singh, 1985). Pakistan joined the pact to meet its needs in general.
But the US limited itself only containment of Communism. At Manila, Pakistan Foreign Minister
Zafrullah Khan remarked that the accord would not valid only to contain Communist
(Washington Post, September 7, 1956). In later 1950s, it was often contended that mutiny rather
than direct violence, had become the main danger to regional security (Greene, 1968). Article 2
of the SEATO bounded the participants to act against an external assault. To achieve the
objectives of the treaty, the parties can maintain and develop their individual and collective
ability to counterattack against their territorial integrity and political stability (Acharya, 2001).
The members of the Organization decided to improve their free institutions, cooperating
on economic aid and technical assistance which would finally contribute to their social wellbeing
and economic prosperity. Article 3 explains that “the parties undertake to strengthen their
institutions and to cooperate with one another in further development of the economic measures
including technical assistance designed both to promote economic progress and social welfare
and to further individual and collective efforts of the governments towards these ends” (Acharya,
2001). Article 10 highlights the responsibility as “any member state can withdraw at one year‟s
notice”.
Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra said that Pakistani responsibilities were under the
United Nations charter and not against to worldwide commitments. Pakistan favored every
financial agreement for Southeast Asia on the grounds that SEATO would no longer its charm
and attraction for other Asian states without having economic strategy. The Chines government
restricted the SEATO by proclaiming it as forceful and antagonistic to China (Rais, 1977).
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However Pakistani PM effectively disclosed to Mr. Chou En Lai that Pakistan could never enter
in any aggressive plan against China. Pakistan was not against China (Shukla, 2013).
PM Muhammad Ali also expressed his feeling that Pakistan had joined SEATO for the
solution of its issues with India. In light of the Indian objection, Pakistan's participation in the
Pact was inappropriate since East Pakistan was never threatened by communism. Pakistan put
aside this objection and joined SEATO (Rao, 1985). Washington tried to calm India as President
Eisenhower wrote a letter to end Indian reservations regarding the United States targets.
However, the United States press condemned Nehru for opposing assistance to Pakistan (Jabeen
& Mazhar, 2011). During negotiation on SEATO, Chester Bowles, the American ambassador to
India, wrote, “Arm supply to Pakistan could be used against India and would lead to great
instability in the Middle East and Asia”. He said forcefully to maintain balance of relations with
both the states but Washington refused his observation (Rao, 1985).
In the later years, Indo-US deference relations changed as many when US Congress
reviewed Indian fears as overstated. India no more complained that defense assistance to
Pakistan would lead an arms race between Pakistan and India. In Pakistan, pro-communist and
other extremist political elements opposed to join American bloc as well (New York Times,
April 10, 1957). On the other hand a lot of the Pakistanis blamed Nehru for pushing Pakistan into
the western bloc (Rao, 1985). P M Mohammad Ali remarked that Pakistan had weapons for its
security interests (Daily Dawn, February 25, 1954). In fact Pakistan sought protection against
India. But it was not recognized by America due to its positive tilt towards India.
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2.14 Baghdad Pact
The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954 prolonged to the Baghdad Pact. On
February 24, 1955, Turkey and Iraq signed an agreement on mutual assistance in Baghdad. This
move was assented by United Kingdom, Pakistan and Iran. In 1958 Iraq withdrew itself from
Baghdad Pact then it renamed as Central Treaty Organization. In August 1959, the headquarters
shifted to Ankara. There were total 8 articles with 2 interpretative letters. Iraq and Turkey singed.
Baghdad pact on 24 February 1955 for mutual defense. They requested Pakistan to join but
Pakistan reluctantly join due to the United States and its military might. But Britain influenced
Pakistan and the United States pushed Pakistan to sign the agreement. Pakistan formally assented
the treaty on September 23, 1955 (Jabeen & Mazhar, 2011).
The CENTO was a chain in the compatibility of Pakistan's approach to make more
grounded its security inside the structure of the United Nations Charter. In the light of Article 51
of the United Nations Charter, the nations can participate for their security and protection. Such
measure be produced to offer results to this collaboration may from the subject of special
agreements for each other (Mahmood, 2004).
The treaty was concluded for a period of five years and could be restored for further five
years and it on condition that any individual state could pull back from the treaty. Any signatory
state may pull back from the pact to inform other states in written with the notice of six month
prior to expiration of any of the above mentioned period in which case of Pact remains valid for
other parties (Mahmood, 2004) (article 6).
The United States was willing to counter communism in all regions, nations or group of
nations. The Baghdad Pact was launched to provide military and economic assistance. American
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ambassador James Richard clarified during his visit to the Middle East and Pakistan in 1957
“American policy in the Middle East was not intended to establish any sphere of influence”.
However, it seemed to be compulsory to fill the power vacuum.
Secretary of State, Dulles stated in Congress that the United States tried to keep peace
through diplomacy not by ruthless force (Rao, 1985). Pakistan was the country that has effect on
the United States to fulfill the Middle Eastern Doctrine. But the United States did not agree to
fulfill the provision of agreement even during the war involving Israel and the Arab States
(Sattar, 2007). The United States had been working for a treaty but did not ratify the treaty to
maintain its informal observer status. However, the United States actively contributed in the
various organs of the alliance. In 1958, with a minor addition in Baghdad Pact, the name was
changed to CENTO.
The Soviet authority news agency Tass reported that CENTO was more hazardous
weapon of American imperialistic designs. Mr. Khrushcheve objected the CENTO by saying that
it was created against peace. On reaction to this announcement Prime Minister Mohammad Ali
said that we had repeatedly made it clear that the Baghdad Pact was an absolutely security
agreement. It is not coordinated against any nation at all. Nor has any aim of permitting any
nation to set up bases in the country or to utilize its region for any aggressive purposes (Daily
Dawn, December 12, 1955). This is the right which each nation must enjoy under the United
Nations charter which the USSR also subscribed.
2.15 Bilateral Defense Agreement 1959
After Iraq withdrawal from Baghdad Pact due to Iraqi Revolution in 1958, Secretary of
State Dulles assured that the United States would continue support to the members of CENTO.
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On March 5, 1959 the United States signed a new defense treaty „Bilateral Defense Agreement‟
with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey.
The United States regarded the agreement for its vital national interest. On the other hand
Pakistan‟s independence and integrity was crucial. President Ayub said, “We had to look for
allies to secure our position” (Khan A. , 1969). Pakistan became an ally of United States,
provided necessary facilities to United States in the region. Furthermore, the United States also
promised as provide in Article 1 of the treaty as “regards as vital to its national interests, world
peace, the preservation of independence and Pakistan‟s territorial integrity”. The United States
also vowed to take appropriate action comprising the use of force as specified in „Joint
Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in Middle East‟. According to Article 2, the United
States swore to help Pakistan in the protection of its national autonomy, integrity and economic
improvement. The United States committed to help Pakistan in case of animosity was more
particular than any past agreements including SEATO and CENTO. Be that as it may, Pakistan
endeavored to benefit the opportunity to fulfill the agreement in 1965 and 1971, but the United
States didn't honor its obligation (Sattar, 2007).
2.16 United States Aid to Pakistan (1954-1964)
The United States provided much aid to its aliened states as being a resourceful power
because the United States had global objectives behind these aid programs. Eisenhower
submitted a report in Congress on January 28, 1959. It declared that the United States foreign aid
program was a bargain for the Blandishments of the Communist. The United States conferred
that there would be no peace and progress on the planet until each country become strong in
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military and economic field. While answering to a question on financial aid to developing
nations, Eisenhower said that the United States help had diminished the hazard off internal
collapse, chaos or loss to the community of free world (Mushtaq, 2009).
Pakistan got the enormous said from the United States by going into the Western based
alliance, in the fields of:
Technical Cooperation
Defense Support Commodity Aid
Flood Relief and Project Assistance
International Cooperation Administration (ICA)
Development Loan Fund under ICA
International Development Association (IDA)
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Mushtaq, 2009).
The International Cooperation Administration was an appropriate defensive, technical
cooperation, surplus agricultural program including emergency grants of wheat and different
surplus foods and development loan program to meet the requirements which were specified by
the Government of Pakistan. Pakistan got grants and loans during second five year plans.
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Table No. 4 United States Foreign Aid to Pakistan
Pre 1
st Plan (1947 – 55)
Million Dollars
1st Plan (1955-60)
Million Dollars
2nd
Plan (1961-65)
Million Dollars
Grants Loans Grants Loans Grants Loans
173.887 35.00 468.109 198.336 230.485 864.448
Total 208.887 Total 666.445 Total 1094.933
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey, Movement of Pakistan (Islamabad 1968-1969)
Till 1964, Pakistan received total $ 379.6 million as economic aid.
Table No 5 Economic Aid by United States to Pakistan
Fiscal Years Million Dollars
1953-57 567.2
1958 163.2
1959 235.0
1960 301.3
1961 172.0
1962 438.5
1963 438.6
1964 379.6
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey, Movement of Pakistan (Islamabad 1968-1969)
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2.17 Defense Assistance
During 1954-1964, Pakistan received military weapons worth of $ 630 million and $ 619
million for the betterment of military infrastructure. Pakistan was permitted to get military
equipment worth of $ 55 million. (Khan, 1983 (edit). The flow of aid helped Pakistan to boost up
her air bases, ports facilities and military installations. The United States also provided Sweepers
named as „Mahmood‟, „Mujahid‟, „Mubarak‟ and „Munsi‟ to Pakistan under Military Assistance
Program. The US also initiated Military Assistance Training Program for the study of “Hot
Plastic Application Techniques” (Epstein & Kronstadt, 2011). This technology is used for anti-
fouling paints to prevent marine growth on the ship‟s gull. Under the United States Off sure
Procurement Program, the United States acquired military apparatus from other countries for
the Pakistani forces.
2.18 U-2 incident and Pakistan-United States Relations
The puerile behavior of Pakistan‟s Policy makers led to the U-2 incident. Already, in the
wake of Bilateral Agreement of 1959, the Chinese warned the Pakistani ruling clique that
permission to the United States to establish military bases under the Agreement was absolutely
opposed to the interest of peace in Asia and itself for Pakistan. This incident also proved the
„blind adherence‟ of the Ayub Government to United States cold war policies.
Pakistan suffered seriously by going into an agreement with the United States since
Pakistan by moving nearer to super powers, lost the sympathies of the others. Communism was
not any more threatening Pakistan as compared to India dangers. The situation however
additionally weakened when a most ridiculous and historic event happened in Pakistan and
Soviet Union relations in May 1960. Pakistan gave United States 'Badaber Air Base' near to
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Peshawar for its U-2 flight. In 1960, U-2 plane take off from Pakistani territory for Soviet Union.
Francis Gary Powers shot down by Soviet rocket close Sverdlovsk and he was caught.
Kharushchev encircled Peshawar and warned Pakistan that Soviet Union would pound Peshawar
with rockets if the incitement was rehashed (Burke, 1975). Pakistan got another confrontation
and also ended the negotiation with Soviet Union for petroleum exploration in Pakistan. Soviet
Union voted twice against Kashmir issue in the UN Security Council. The U-2 incident let Ayub
Khan‟s regime to review Pakistan‟s positions (Brands, 1972).
The Russian Premier announced in the Supreme Soviet on 5 May 1960 that Soviet Union
had captured a spying aircraft, U-2, over Sverdlovsk. He did not say clearly about flight station
but issued a most serious warning. “The governments of Turkey, Iran or Pakistan, the countries
bound to the US in the aggressive CENTO bloc are playing with fire, for retaliatory blows will
hit these countries and they will pay for their short sighted actions” (State Department, May 23,
1960). Khrushchev‟s hard statement was followed by a series of lies by the US who left Pakistan
helpless in that condition. The State Department immediately denied the flight of any spy
mission. It stated that the U-2 was probably a NASA meteorological plane that had taken off
from Turkey and was reported missing, its pilot might have lost consciousness through lack of
oxygen (State Department, May 23, 1960). A statement from NASA explained flight had
operated from bases in Alaska, England, Germany, Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, Okinawa and the
Philippines since 1956. NASA owned Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot was a civilian employed by
Lockheed Aircraft (State Department, May 23, 1960). In fact the plane did not belong to NASA
but to the CIA and Gary Powers was not employee of Lockheed but of CIA Lincoin White, the
Director in the State Department once again stated with great emphasis “now our assumption is
that the pilot blacked out. There was absolutely NO deliberate attempt to violate Soviet airspace
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(Wise, 1961). The Pakistani Foreign Office also denied by saying that Soviet leaders appeared to
have a „pathological conviction‟ that foreign bases existed in Pakistan. The allegation made by
Mr. Khrushchev so far as it refers to Pakistan was, therefore, wholly incorrect. Khrushchev
revealed that Gary Powers had been captured alive and to his testimonial statement he had flown
from Turkey to Peshawar to Bode in Norway, taking photographs of sensitive Soviet military
installations, when he was shot down (Daily Dawn, May 8, 1960).
The US State Department not having known that the pilot was captured alive, had to
admit that a U-2 probably had flown over the USSR to obtain information. Such flights were
necessitated by the „excessive secrecy‟ practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free
world by apprehension over surprise attack and by legitimate national defense. However there
was no authorization of any such flights as far as the authorized in Washington were concerned
(State Department, May 7, 1960). On the other hand Pakistani Foreign Office remarked that U-2
did not fly from the army airbase of Pakistan and Gary Powers never stayed in Pakistan. All the
allegations were false and baseless. President Ayub Khan also ordered an inquiry into the
situation and stated that if the Soviet allegations were found to be correct, a protest would be
lodged with the United States. Whereas Khrushchev warned Pakistani Counselor specifically that
Peshawar had now been marked on a map and put a circle around it by the Soviet defense forces.
In future if Peshawar was used as a base against the Soviet Union then immediately retaliatory
measures would be taken (Daily Dawn , May 11, 1960). The People‟s Republic of China
criticized the U-2 incident as Eisenhower‟s criminal attitude (Peking, 1960).
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2.19 United States’ Pro-Indian Policy
The United States has always been generous in providing military and economic
assistance to Pakistan. No doubt this assistance added Pakistan‟s defense capability and
flourished Pakistan‟s economy, but Pakistan United States relations underwent extra strain due
neighboring counties like India, Soviet Union, Afghanistan and China.
It is clear that United States was attracted in good relationship with India but there was no
positive response from Indian stakeholders. The United States was compelled to move Pakistan
as there was no option elsewhere. Then again United States Republican Administration needed to
amplify their companionship towards Pakistan. However the example of relationship was not
trailed by the Democratic who dependably offered need to India considering her as most
persuasive and effective vote based system in South Asia (Malik, 2016).
There are witnesses of a marked change in United States administration. An event of
great importance happened after the result of the mid-term election in 1958. Republican Party
suffered a devastating defeat. The powerful Democrats caught further 13 representative in the
Senate and 45 in the House of Representatives. The decision of the American public was clear.
They were obviously disappointed with the inside and outside approaches of the Eisenhower
administration. “The greatest discontent of 1958”, the St. Louis Post-Despatch commented on
the November elections, “focuses on the conduct of foreign policy by John Dulles (The St. Louis
Post, November 6, 1958). The election greatly changed the shape of Congress.
It virtually completed the elimination from the Senate of the Republican class of 1946,
the bitter men who had been elected on platforms charging the Democrats with softness towards
Communism and with “Twenty Years of Treason”. After November 1958, Senators Knowland,
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Bricker, Jenner, Malone, McCarthy and others were gone. New men came in who were more
interested in living than in dying in an anti-Communist holocaust (Fleming, 1961). The mood of
the electorate could be judged from the elections of William H. Meyer, “the first Democrat to be
elected to Congress from Vermont in several generations.” who had campaigned for an end of
nuclear tests, for banning the H-bomb and for the recognition of Red China (Kux, 2001).
The Pakistan United States collaboration was the consequence of the cold war. The
weariness of the American people with the cold war and the removal from Congress of important
cold war warriors, strong supporters of Pakistan in the United States like the Senate Minority
Leader, Senator Knowland, were bound to bring changes in that alliances. It was written on the
wall that a readjustment in American policy towards Pakistan, as towards the cold war, would be
forthcoming. In the mid-term elections of November 1958, what made the Americans wreak
their wrath on the foreign policy of John Foster Dulles was the growing concern among them
about the repeated recessions in the economy which by 1958 had put set back the annual rate of
economic growth close to 2%. The resignation of J. F. Dulles in April due to illness and then his
death in May 1959 were also significant from Pakistan‟s point of view. His death not only ended
the Dulles Era of single minded commitment to the containment of Communism, brinkmanship
and military pacts, but also removed a great friend of Pakistan from the American Political
scene.
The imposition of army rule in Pakistan by Ayub Khan coincided, with the sweeping
victory of Democratic Party in the mid-term elections of November 1958. As the Army took over
political power in Pakistan, the foreign policy „experts‟ of the Democratic Party, who had never
supported the American policy of befriending Pakistan at the expense of alienating India, now
with added strength in the Congress, started criticizing America‟s alliance with Pakistan. The
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natural ambivalence which exited in America‟s common man towards military dictatorships,
although the Unite States government never hesitated to prop up and support dictatorships
around the world for its own political interests, created a good ground for spreading the new anti-
Pakistan feelings. Uneasiness was voiced by many influential American newspapers about
America‟s military alliance with Pakistan and with the Army‟s taking over political power in
Pakistan. The Wall Street Journal typified these sentiments “perhaps the alliance will continue,
that the Pakistan the United States is allied with this morning, the day after the coup is certainly
not the Pakistan it has been relying on for the defeat of democracy” (The Wall Street, October
10, 1958). According to The New York Times, a supporter of an alliance with Pakistan and of
US policy towards South Asia, criticized the role of the United States equipped Army in Pakistan
politics and, by implication, military aid to that Army (The New York Times, November 30,
1958).
There was an obvious change in the United States system of control after Kennedy
assumed responsibility of the White House in 1961. He never enthusiastically built up a
sequence of collusions against Communism. He viewed China as America's principle foe
however rather than collusions trusted the better show of Western political and financial
strategies would contain Communism (Hanhimaki, 2004).
His Indian approach was more liberal than towards Pakistan as Kennedy considered India
an extraordinary provincial power. The arrangement of Chester Bowles as Kennedy's Special
delegate, induced worries in Pakistan since he was outstanding a professional Indian. Therefore
Kennedy brought a beginning with master Indian approach by undertaking a program of
expansive scale economic support to India. Aid Consortium 1961-63 was started with US $ 1045
million share. Interestingly, just $320 million were allocated for Pakistan around the same time.
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Justifiably Pakistan got embittered over it on the grounds that the aid given to India was nearly
the measure of what Pakistan got (Mustafa, 2016).
Pakistan was at critical juncture regarding its foreign relations with United States while
India was regarded as „favored nation‟ for that Pakistan had to compromise on its security and
alignment with the United States to defend the free world. At that time, Pakistan had to bear a
colossal damage as compared to India who had been neutral during Cold War. All the loyalties
of Pakistan towards the West during Cold War were ignored while making policies. “Neutrality
was not even regarded with any degree of skepticism, has now become more attractive to
Washington probably because of the support its champion receive from Moscow” (Sherwani,
1960).
The American strategy to supply armed equipment to India not only damaged the spirit of
the agreements, concluded between Kennedy and Ayub rather raised India as the major enemy of
Pakistan in the South Asian region. Though the Americans promised not to use the arms against
Pakistan yet Pakistan was still under the threat of the lost balance of power in the region. All the
promises were not to be fulfilled. Pakistan‟s role in SEATO and CENTO against Communism
had been the major point of the critics. In an interview to American Broadcasting Company,
Ayub Khan said “Now our future of Pakistan United States relations is uncertain. We, really are
committed to defend so powerful India” (The Pakistan Times, May 22, 1960). Washington‟s
efforts to boost India and left Pakistan forced the leadership in Pakistan to pay attention towards
the beneficial offers by Peoples Republic of China.
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2.20 Pakistan’s Inclination towards China
An effective neighboring nation China, on September 21, 1949, proclaimed as People's
Republic of China. On January 4, 1950, Pakistan recognized People's Republic of China.
Initially, China regarded Pakistan as antagonistic neighbor in light of the fact that Ayub Khan
favored India in Sino-India struggle in 1959 (Iqbal & Khalid, 2011). Likewise Ayub sent the
recommendation to India for aggregate courses of action in Sub-Continent. He said that he could
see unmistakably the inflexible push of the North to warm water of the India Ocean. This push
will undoubtedly increment, if India and Pakistan continued quarreling with each other
(Sherwani, 1960). In any case, unfortunately India did not welcome the Ayub's vision. So as to
evade the Sino-Indian inconveniences, Pakistan moved for the clear boundary with China. On
October 12, 1962, Sino-Pakistan border talks started in Peking and on February 22, 1963,
northern boundary was demarked and border dispute was settled peacefully (Javaid & Jahangir,
2015).
In July 1963, Ayub Khan cautioned that if the Western forces kept on strengthening
India's military might, small countries of Asia would be constrained to take shelter under
Chinese protect. At Bandung Conference in 1955, PM Bogra guaranteed Chou En-Lai that
Pakistan never caught any hostility against China and any aggressive activity which may be
pushed by the US against China under SEATO. Pakistan China relations invigorated by a twelve
days visit of Prime Minister Hussain Shaeed Sohrwardhy in September 1956. In December 1961,
Pakistan voted in favoring China's participation in the United Nations. The Sino-Pakistan
agreements were added to civil aviation and trade.
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The United States was not pleased with Pakistan‟s tilt towards China. American
remarked “Pakistan is playing with in inviting a militant Communist nation to her door step in
Asia” (Syed, 1974). Americans considered China as her rival state. George Ball, Assistant
Secretary of State visited Pakistan to inquire the depth of Sino-Pakistan relationship. However
Pakistan cleared it that Pakistan would start friendly relations with China as crises effected Sub-
Continent.
Opposing to this friendly relationship, on April 25, 1965, US President Johnson suddenly
postponed scheduled visit of President Ayub also exerting economic pressure on Pakistan to
postpone the meeting of Aid Consortium after two months. America was criticizing Pakistan‟s
relations with China in wrong way (Afridi & Khan, 2016).
2.21 Global Changes and Pakistan-United States Relations
Post World War II, Pakistan United States relationship was the result of Communist
containment strategy. By the end of 50s, a number of factors changed Pakistan‟s interests. The
emergence of China as an international actor was a positive factor, being new policy option for
Pakistan, at odds with both Soviet Union and India. China as a less ideal lessened the United
States distraction with regulation and, subsequently, Pakistan's pertinence as a major aspect of
that control methodology. In the meantime, the Eisenhower administration was looking for lost
relations with India, the same pattern was reinforced as pressure developed between New Delhi
and Beijing (Chandra, 2016).
Pakistan exploited Sino-Indian hostility by creating friendly relations with China. On the
other hand Pakistan China relationship were denunciations for Washington, therefore, it caused
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serious problems in Pakistan United States relations. During Indo-China border war, Indo-US
rapprochement also heightened Pakistan‟s concern. United States rearmed India against China
but Pakistan protested as it would be most probably used against Pakistan. In addition, in 1964,
India took numerous steps to merge Kashmir territory into Indian federation (Mushtaq, 2009).
To the mid of 1960s, the Vietnam war became priority for American think tanks. In
Pakistan it had become common practice of leaders to criticize American policies. This strident
tone of the public against President Lyndon Johnson caused him to reconsider the Pakistan
United States pacts. To compound American suspicions, Pakistan refused American requests for
assistance in Vietnam. Though United States got the support from South Korea, Thailand,
Philippine, Australia and New Zealand to combat Communism challenges in Vietnam but could
not meet the targets. This added further slump in Pakistan United States relationship. The United
States also viewed Pakistan China relationship as a threat to her in interest in Vietnam.
2.22 Pakistan-United States Relations and Pakistan India War 1965
In Pakistan, the development regarding consortium meeting of 1964, rendered moot.
Response to such United States policy, President Ayub had authorized the foreign office, the
army and other intelligence agencies to restart „defreeze‟ Kashmir issue. A secret office headed
by Foreign Secretary was established. Foreign Minister Bhutto suggested Ayub Khan to adopt an
aggressive strategy. In December 1964, Indian Kashmir policy and political integration into
India, alarmed the situations. Pakistan responded quickly in hard-liner, Kashmir became just
another Indian state and the world might forget about the problem. By enthusiastic concept of
wars of national liberation, secret office recommended a somewhat similar strategy in Kashmir.
Bold steps were taken for infiltrating a large number of Kashmiris (Azad Kashmir), into Indian
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held Kashmir. The objective was to instigate revolutionary situation in the Kashmir Valley. An
expected severe Indian response, the Pakistanis believed, would raise trouble in Kashmir Valley
as well as anger the Muslim world. Pakistani stakeholders knew the situation that the United
States and other international pillars would not feel easy and force for serious negotiation over
the disputed territory.
After Indian war with China in 1962, India seemed as much frail country and it was
against this background that the Kashmir cell (secret office in Pakistan) thought the strategy
made sense. During frail Shatri‟s government the reputation of Indian Military was at nadir due
to its poor performance against Chinese forces and in Rann of Kutch encounter. On the other
hand Pakistani army was well equipped by United States assistance and training. India, however,
had started a major defense buildup after the Chinese debacle. Given Indian‟s far larger
economic base, it was only a matter of short time for India to acquire and train her army on
modern lines. In that case Pakistan would probably lose its military advantage. As Bhutto wrote
in May 1965, the current “relative superiority of the military forces of Pakistan in terms of
quality and equipment” was in danger of being overtaken as India‟s defense buildup progressed
(Kux, 2001).
The Operation Gibraltar was started to defreeze the Kashmir problem, infect weaken
Indians to resolve, and bring India to the dialogue table without provoking a general war (Gohar,
1970). Operation Gibraltar began on August 5-6, 1965, in short order Indians gained the upper
hand. Even though the intruders were able to cause a certain amount of disorder and disruption,
few Kashmiris cooperated and Indian security forces were able to capture many of the
infiltrators. It was clear by late August that Operation Gibraltar was failing. Ayub, himself, cut
his losses and decided to cut off Indian troops in Kashmir. Komer alerted President Johnson that
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“having failed to spark a war of liberation via a Kashmiri uprising, [the Pakistanis] may now feel
they have got to enter the lists directly forestall a humiliating failure (Komer, August 31, 1965).
UN Secretary General U Thant struggled to normalize the hostilities. Secretary Rusk
called in the Indian and Pakistani ambassadors for negotiation. As the war expanded, both states
(Pakistan and India) charged that the other was using American supplied equipment, contrary to
US promise that the use of weapon not be permitted. Meanwhile, Johnson decided “given
existing strains in relations with both parties, not to engage in direct pressure on either Pakistanis
or Indians for time being, but to place primary reliance on the UN (State Department, September
2, 1965). In his September 4, 1965, response to a message from Ayub, the United States
president urged Pakistan to accept U Thant‟s call for an end or war (State Department, Sep. 4,
1965).
On next day September 6, 1965, skirmishes turned into a full scale war. India struck and
a crossed the international border in the Punjab to reduce pressure on Kashmir, launching several
divisions on Lahore border, which lay only fourteen miles from the frontier. Ayub and Bhutto
met with McConaughy on the same morning to inform him officially about the Indian aggression
and begged for United States support. Presenting the US envoy and aid-memoire, the president
called on the United States to take immediate actions, under the Pakistan United States bilateral
agreement 1959 and the November 5, 1962. The Pakistani Broadcast stated “as Pakistan has
become a victim of aggression by armed attack on the part of India, the Government of Pakistan
requests the Government of the United States to act immediately to suppress the aggression”
(State Department, September 6, 1965). When McConaughy stressed the role of UN, Ayub
contradicted “You cannot hedge or hide from this obligation” (State Department, September 6,
1965).
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Washington observed and after a “volcanic” reaction in the US Congress, President
Johnson suspended military and economic assistance to India and Pakistan on September 8, 1965
(State Department, September 8, 1965). On September 9, 1965, McConaughy and Bhutto argued
vehemently after the United States envoy formally advised that Washington was embargoing
arms shipments. Bhutto vehemently charged that this action did not the prospects for peace.
Washington was rewarding Indian aggression, he stated, and badly treating an ally dependent on
US military equipment. So profound seeded against American opinion expanded in Pakistan and
the United States lost what it saw to be its lone genuine unmistakable advantage of the
association with Pakistan. After the war, the United States and Pakistan endeavored to revive
their relationship however a lasting faction had happened and a lot of this sharpness towards
America was apparent.
2.23 United States Rapprochement to China
After Nixon came into power in 1968, Pakistan-United States relations altogether moved
forward. President Nixon and Kissinger, National Security Advisor and then Secretary of State
watched Pakistan as a vital platform to build up contacts and standardize relations with
Communist China. Nixon transformed United States foreign policy. He found a way to begin
strategic relations with China. Nixon changed the parity of force by building up relations with
China to pressurize the Soviet Union to acknowledge détente (Mushtaq, 2009). President Nixon
asked for President Yahya Khan for the assistance in opening a dialogue with China. He used
diplomatic channels that brought about a secret visit of Kissinger to China and eventually
President Nixon officially visited China (Abbas, 2004).
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2.24 Pakistan-United States Relations and Pakistan India War 1971
Unfortunately, Pakistani support to the United States for establishing the friendly
relations with China caused the internal problems that infuriated India and resulted in another
war in 1971. American President and Henry Kissinger both were observing the damages caused
by the Indian authorities in the case of Bangladesh. It led towards one of the worsening problem
of that time i.e the issue of the refugees. Pakistan did never want to face these types of problems
on the basis of provincialism but at that time it had to face due to external factors. United States
President did not support in this war because Congress forced him to stop all kind of assistance.
But American diplomatic pressurized India to avert from military actions in West Pakistan
(Chohan, 2004).
West Pakistani troops responded to the Bengali Nationalist movement in a way that
attracted the concerns around the globe and put a huge pressure on Nixon administration to grant
aid to Pakistan. But Pakistan was deserted at the point whereas India availed the opportunity to
get closer to the Nixon administration. Internal crises got a worst shape and it take no time to
break out the war between Pakistan and India. Both the President and Kissinger were well aware
of the fact that war was the basic tool for India to maintain its legitimacy on Sub-Continent.
Nevertheless, the US was not ready to interfere in war against India as Pakistan expected under
the Cooperation Agreement 1959 (Kux, 2001).
Soon after 1971 major concerns of the Americans were the containment of Communism,
Vietnam War, establishment of relations with China and regional security. In fact, United States
could not attack India directly, so it launched a campaign to support Pakistan indirectly after
passing a couple of grants for aiding Pakistan particularly during the days of war. On the other
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hand, the Americans were supporting the Indian forces to get control over the beneficial situation
of Bengal that resulted the loss of Bangladesh from the hands of West Pakistan.
2.25 A Diverging Road
After the fall of Dhaka it was Bhutto who led his country towards the nuclear
development. During his tenure Pakistan did never have good relations with America. Pakistan
left SEATO that was the first step towards the alteration of Pakistan foreign policy. Then with
the fall of Shah of Iran in 1979 Pakistan got separation from CENTO was the worst phase for the
lowest ebb of the United States-Pakistan relations. Bhutto not only blamed the Americans for the
happening of fall of Dhaka but he also attracted the universal attention towards the matter that
was a kind of declaration of separating from United States. After leaving SEATO and CENTO
Pakistan joined NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) from which it was expecting to build cordial
relations with the Islamic bloc. Some writers are of the view that Zia also followed the policies
of Bhutto that was a green signal towards the economic and social prosperity of Pakistan at
international level (Shah, 1997).
2.26 The Relationship Nadir
In mid 70s Pakistan and America relations were cool and the United States was worried
on the nuclear developments of Pakistan. It had observed that Pakistan was unable to promote
democracy effectively. As a result, President Ford lifted the embargo on United States sales from
Pakistan and India. It allowed the United States to sale its lethal equipment for war. It caused a
danger for the regional security for both the Indians and Pakistanis. United States got success to
fulfill its ulterior political motives to some extent.
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During this phase of relations United States again preferred India. Carter‟s human rights
policy was exacerbated by the execution of Zulifkar Bhutto. Situation worsened in 1979 when
the Symington Amendment (Foreign Assistance Act 1975) enforced against Pakistan because of
import of equipment for the Kahuta Laboratory. The Amendment barred economic and military
assistance to Pakistan unless an official certificate that Pakistan had not obtained any nuclear-
enriched material. Furthermore Pakistan-United States relations were at the lowest ebb on wake
of burning of United States embassy in Islamabad and murder of United States citizens by mob
on November 21, 1979. The violence sparked by a false report that the United States did not
participate to flame the Grand Mosque.
2.27 The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Renewal of Pakistan-United States
Relations
Just four weeks later, on Christmas Eve 1979, the Soviet forces marched into Afghanistan
to oust powerful Hafizullah and installed pro-Russian Babrak Karmal as a President. The Soviet
action shook the world. Carter‟s longed for quest or détente abruptly ended and Cold War started
once again. The United States interests and attitude towards Pakistan changed. As Thornton
expressed it as “overnight, literally Pakistan-United States relations changed dramatically” (State
Department, May 1984).
Soviet ambassador approached Zia and requested him to understand the event. He stated
that Soviet forces had entered Afghanistan in a limited manner for a limited time period at the
invitation of the Kabul government. Kux D is of the view “Moscow might refuel that insurgency
in Baluchistan and could create trouble elsewhere inside Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistanis
doubted that the Soviets would actually invade Pakistan, since Moscow might fear a United
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States military response. Moreover it was intelligible that the Soviet actions would stir
opposition, especially in the Muslim states as a naked violation of the UN Charter. It would be
possible, he thought, to mound a major diplomatic counterattack against Moscow” (Kux, 2001)
President Jimmy Carter called to his Pakistani counterpart and reaffirmed the Bilateral
Security Agreement 1959 and offered to fortify Pakistan's security. With Soviet warriors at the
Khyber Pass, Pakistan had turned into a Front Line state. After aid was suspended in 1979 over
nuclear development encroachment, Carter administration and Congress expected to pick
whether to supersede the present enactment that blocked arms deals or help to a country that was
connected with making nuclear weapons. On January 6, 1980, Deputy Secretary of State Warren
Christopher communicated that the United States and Pakistan were defied with an “exceptional
condition” suggesting the Russian attack on Afghanistan (WASHDC, June 16, 2011). On Feb. 1st
1980, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance requested an “exception to existing legislation” from the
Senate Appropriations Committee. It is clear that policymakers were trying to make the case that
the situation in Pakistan was whatsoever, and the Glenn-Symington Amendment that barred aid
to countries pursuing nuclear programs needed to be lifted for nuclear proliferation could flow
into Pakistan (gateway.proquest.com). A State Department cable message to several American
embassies, the circumstances in Southwest Asia were portrayed as "exceptional" and, Carter
administration had endorsed military and financial assistance to Pakistan, the United States
government would still maintain its policy of pressing for a haul to Pakistan‟s nuclear program
(WASHDC, June 16, 2011).
President Zia with other officials alleged the Soviet invasion as a chance to enhance the
army‟s capabilities. By Z A Hilali “Zia and his colleagues took the decision to get involved in
Afghanistan because they saw it as militarily and economic profitable” (Hillali, 2005). To
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modernize Pakistan's outdated weapons and defense system would also serve as an deterrence to
India and in addition Pakistan needed strategic depth in Afghanistan. Zia imagined that, if the
Soviet Union could be removed from Afghanistan then it would be easy for Pakistan to install
friendly government in Afghanistan. Pakistan would pick up impact in the area by
comprehending decades-old outskirt debate furthermore by staying away from a pro Indian
government in Afghanistan.
After a lot of consideration Zia decided the line of action that he would consistently
follow. Pakistan would contradict the Soviet activity openly, would provide shelter to Afghan
refugees, would offer public support for the resistance and would give clandestine military
assistance to the insurgents while denying that it was doing so (Arif, 1998) The US spelled out
the following four point agenda during meeting with Agha Shahi:
1. To make the costs to the Soviet Union of the Afghan operation high enough so that
Soviet Leaders will be deterred from thoughts of similar advantures in the future.
2. To maintain the assistance agrement of 1959 which "gives a sound premise" for
collaborating against the risk from the north"
3. To offer Pakistan $ 400 million of military and economicaid over the coming two years
(President Carter, be that as it may, particularly turned down giving propelled F-16 air
crafts, which the Pakistanis had requested).
4. To maintain the United States concern about Pakistan's atomic program even though the
administration planned to seek authority from Congress to waive sanctions (State
Department, January 12, 1980).
The United States planned a $ 400 million aid package, divided equally between military
and economic aid, Zia rejected it as “peanuts” (gateway. proquest.com, February 24, 1981). Zia
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criticized it by saying that the offer was “devoid of credibility and durability” (Cronkite, 1980).
Zia referred that Pakistan had become a non-aligned state and would not enter into an entangling
aid relationship. Zia even threatened accommodation with the Soviet Union (Hillali, 2005). In
February 1980, he expressed if the United States would help Pakistan, let it come entire hoard.
Moreover he expressed "to accept such a meaningless level of aid, will only provoke the
Russians without really getting a defense against them". Pakistan needed arms deals, and the 400
million dollar offer was not even a drop in the ocean (Hillali, 2005). In spite of the fact that the
primary offer from the United States was rejected. The aid to the mujahideen that trickled in
Pakistan under Carter turned into a push under President Ronald Reagan and the military
relationship and diplomatic relations between Pakistan and the United States increased
dramatically (Huffman, 2012).
The foreign policy of Reagan administration widely differed from that of Carter‟s.
Reagan was markedly more active than Carter for friendly ties with Pakistan. Reagan “super-
hawk” called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” (americanforeignrelations.com). Rather than
fully embracing the concept of containment, Reagan went further by advocating „rolling back‟
any advancement of Communism. This principle applied to the Soviet Union‟s presence in
Afghanistan. To counter the Soviet army in Afghanistan, Reagan took the steps as the transfer of
conventional arms “an essential element of its United States global defense posture and an
indispensable component” of American foreign policy (97th Congress, Session, 1981). Reagan
stated “the United States cannot defend the Free World alone; it needed the help of its friends
and allies, especially „Third World‟ countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, to deter and
combat Soviet aggression” (97th Congress, Session, 1981). On account of Pakistan, Reagan
trusted that refusing Pakistan by cutting off aid would not impact the completion Pakistan's
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atomic program; and rather, American policies would be more viable on the effective if Pakistan
provide a testimonial certificate. With a more far reaching strategy concerning arms transforming
to Pakistan than Carter, Reagan and Zia were much better suited to make a mutually beneficial
relationship based on arms deals (Huffman, 2012).
More than 300 Soviet aircrafts crossed the Afghan border with Pakistan in 1981; Zia
immediately emphasized the geostrategic importance of Pakistan to the United States by
reminding the policymakers that Pakistan is situated on back door of oil rich countries that could
not be neglected (Kraft, 1981). Pakistan demanded the requirements for latest security system
and capacities to underscore. The advantage to the United States of giving those progression to
Pakistan.
Agha Shahi, Pakistan Foreign minister, viewed this emerging relationship in emotional
terms. He also reminded the Americans that the relationship had not yet been consummated
(Shahi, 1981). He cleared that the marriage would take place under specific conditions; a
relationship in perspective of military sales, not just a military pact, with the objective that
Pakistan could up hold non-aligned status and the sale of sophisticated weapons specifically the
F-16 aircrafts which had been a sour point in the Carter Zia relationship. Pakistan considered the
Five Year Plan proposed by the United States comprises of $ 3.2 billion of credit significantly
aid more satisfying than the previous $ 400 million (Shahi, 1981). In spite of the fact that the
plan must be endorsed annually by Congress, the aid program ingrained a sense of trust in the
Reagan administration.
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Next in July, the officials of Ministry of Defense and Joint Staff Committee met
American officials of all the military wings to evaluate Pakistan security needs. It was also
decided how the United States could support Pakistan's border security. Officers of the Pakistani
Air Force visited America to examine air bases of the F-16 aircraft (Joint Statement: , July 13-16,
1981). Pakistan was offered forty F-16s as the final step to strengthening the Pakistan United
States relationship. However, the offer of F-16s to Pakistan caused to trouble Pakistan. The
transfer of such modern aircrafts additionally stressed policymakers on account of the
conceivable impact on United States-Indian foreign relations. By 1982, the Reagan-Zia
relationship became further friendly. Reagan wrote in his diary, “He‟s Zia a good man (cavalry).
Gave me his word, they are not building an atomic or nuclear bomb” (Brinkley, 2007).
Pakistani officials in Islamabad were stressed that if Pakistan confronted animosity from
India, the United States could stop assistance to Pakistan. Furthermore, Pakistani government
authorities were worried that the United States would abandon its efforts in Afghanistan and
therefore forcing Pakistan to manage its relations with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan without
its most effective ally (Huffman, 2012). These worries compounded by the difficulties arising
from the finalization of the F-16 sale.
The greatest step toward solidifying the arms deals with Pakistan happened in 1982, but
the American military presence increase in the region and both Pakistan and the United States
participated and shared intelligence. President Zia promises to share information gathered by
electronic surveillance to the United States to strengthen the military collaboration. The military
collaboration between the United States and Pakistan demonstrated the friendship between the
heads of state and the "durability and credibility". President Zia addressed to Reagan in a
meeting at the White House on 7 December, emphasizing common interests and a “friendship
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mature enough to withstand differences of opinion and mirrored by the very candor and sincerity
of our mutual exchanges” (Haq, 1982). Thus the Pakistan United States diplomatic relations
were strengthened by military connections.
The CIA Headquarters predicted the security of American latest weapons in Pakistan
from being granted to China unless a proper and “genuine strains make" for comfortable
relationship in the United States Pakistan. Pakistan was asked to withhold its military weapon
development from. Pakistan signed the security of military information agreement with the
United States (Huffman, 2012).
The United States realized that Pakistan and India had atomic projects that were not
observed to the degree that the United States needed and the United States extraordinarily
associated Pakistan with endeavoring to utilize its atomic innovation for weapons. A State
Department prepared documents in 1984, highlighting the “emphasized Islamabad and New
Delhi to continue their dialogue to normalize their strained relations”. The United States was not
just interested to normalize the strained situation between Pakistan and India in view of atomic
weapons but also in light of the fact that the differences drove India to swing to the Soviet Union
for military supplies to proceed the atomic race in the subcontinent. The constant tensions
between Pakistan and India frequently meddled by the consideration on Afghanistan. In the
meanwhile, Reagan and Zia devoted to review the Pakistan United States relationship.
Kux D states “The success of the Pakistan United States relationship was at peak in 1986.
Congress approved a six-year program totaling 4.02 billion dollars in total aid to Pakistan. Of
this, 1.74 billion dollars would be for foreign military sales (FMS), 340 million dollars provided
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in early 1986” (Kux, 2001). Reagan remembered the requirements stressed earlier when Zia
refused Carter‟s 400 million dollar offer because Zia believed it lacked durability.
The Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Juneju reassured Reagan that Pakistan's atomic
program was not intended to prepare explosive devices. This guarantee was vital on the grounds
that Pakistan's aid had been based on either presidential or congressional waiver certificate since
1979. Reagan also acknowledged a commitment between India and Pakistan not to preemptively
strike each other's nuclear installations while further encourage two-sided peace talks between
Pakistan and India. President Reagan cleared it that he sported peace process in Southwest Asia
particularly the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
In the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration sought a way to provide Soviet weapons,
Kalashnikovs and non-American small arms to the mujahidin to ensure a level of denial to all of
Pakistan in particular. In the mid-1980s, however, there was a shout in Congress, particularly
Charlie Wilson, a Texas representative, forced the Reagan administration to provide more
sophisticate and effective weapons to the Mujahedin. Most notably was the latest Stinger surface
to air missile (SAM) which was introduced to the mujahidin. Because of these rockets, the
Mujahideen were able to fight the Soviet helicopters that had ruled the space and ground of the
Afghan. The US Congress supported it and the CIA provided 250 launchers and 1000 rockets to
mujahidin (costing approximately $ 200,000 each) (Hillali, 2005). The first victory of the
Mojahedin was recorded on 25 September 1986 when a group of Mujahideen fired their Stingers
to ground three Soviet aircraft near the Jelalabad runway. These Stingers had been used against
the Soviet forces until it was withdrawn from Afghanistan. This level of support and cooperation
with the mujahidin was a level of the realization of relations between Pakistan and the United
States.
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In 1986, the United States offered weapons to the mujahidin against Soviet forces in
Afghanistan. In 1987, a couple challenges incapacitated the United States-Pakistan relationship.
The FMS part of the six-year plan was unexpectedly delayed because obstacles obtained the
congressional waiver to the law expecting aid to countries looking for after unsupervised nuclear
activities (Kux, 1987). Around the same time, a Pakistani based Canadian, Ashad Pervez, was
captured for illegal export of steel used in atomic applications (MLinton, 2011). Nuclear issues
puzzled the relationship between the United States and Pakistan as a more assertive claim that
could be used to stop any type of aid to Pakistan, which in this way would risk United States
attempts to help the mujahidin. Tensions between Pakistan and India continued to focus US
decision-makers when a bill presented in Congress to provide Pakistan with an Airborne Early
Warning System (AEW). At a House of Representatives hearing before the Foreign Affairs
Committee, politician weighed the balance between the aggravation of the armed challenge on
the subcontinent, reassuring India that the best structures of the AEW class were ready to use
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and remaining "Trustworthy resource of the military
aid" in Pakistan (100th session of congress, 1987).
Huffman explains, although, the relationship between Pakistan and the United States
remained intact in 1987 and cooperation between Pakistan and the United States regarding the
war in Afghanistan continued. 1988 marked the imminent collapse of the relationship. The latest
achievement of the United States and Pakistan was forced to withdraw the Soviet forces decided
in the Geneva Agreements. The proposed agreements required a standardized relationship and a
"good neighbor" between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the United States emerged as watchdogs
and enforced schedule of the Soviet withdrawal (Huffman, 2012).
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2.28 The Geneva Accord
In September 1987, Soviet Union announced, privately, that her troops would leave
Afghanistan within one year. Furthermore, in the same month, United States-Soviet official talks
were held in Washington and Soviet Union announced publicly that “Soviet troops would leave
Afghanistan over a twelve month period after agreement was reached on ending external aid to
the mujahideen. Soviet Foreign Minister, Shevardnadze, no longer insisted on a political
settlement as a condition for the departure of Soviet forces. The situation was suitable for an
agreement. But after the withdrawal of Soviet Army from Afghanistan, the Pakistan-United
States differences came into surface when Armacost remarked “Our main concern was getting
the Russians out. Afghanistan, as such, was remote from major US interests. The US was not
much interested in the internal Afghan setup and did not have much capacity to understand this”
(Kux, 2001). On the other hand, Pakistanis regarded the nature of the government in Kabul of
major importance. According to Raphael, the US ambassador, United States focused on the
Soviet withdrawal whereas Zia and ISI felt that after eight years of war Pakistan was entitled to
run its own show in Kabul (Cordovez & Harrison, 1995).
On April 10, 1988, four days before the accord was signed at Geneva, a heavy explosion
rocked at Ojirri Camp located near Islamabad. More than one hundred people diet and eleven
hundred injured due to heavy explosion. On April 14, 1988, Shevardnadze, Shultz, Noorani and
Afghan envoy Abdul Wakilin dividually signed the Geneva accord under the supervision of UN
Secretary General De Cuellar at Geneva. The signing ceremony was so simple that everyone was
muted at spot. Also four delegations never came together and Riaz Ahmad remarked the
situation as there were no smile and little celebration (Khan R. A., 1990). Still the agreement
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marked a major milestone in the Cold War. For the first time since the Austrian State Treaty of
1955, the Soviet Union backed from its controlled territory.
2.29 Kashmir Insurgency
In late 1990s, after the end of Russian war in Afghanistan, irk-some dispute errupted
between Pakistan and India on Kashmir. This issue had become severely dangerous and it
created bitterness in the Pakistan India relations. This episode of insurgency occurred after
Benazir took office and created friendly relations with Indian government.
In 1987, Kashmiris youngsters, after the of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah in 1982, began
uprising and armed struggle against India as it was not granting the right of self-determination to
Kashmiris since 1948. Thirteen party alliances came into being to increase the pressure on India
to accede with Pakistan. Another group of Jammu and Kashmir, emerged to make public
opinion. Kashmiri masses supported these groups using „intefada‟ move against occupied troops
in Valley. These „mujadin‟ attacked stones at forces and damaged official vehicles and violated
rules.
As insurgency increase in Valley, Indian security forces used all equipment to press down
the rebellion. Indian forces used Iron hands to put down the insurgency. Although Pakistan was
not a main culprit in launching the insurgency yet it had become difficult for Islamabad to resist.
On the other hand Pakistan support Kashmiris politically and morally. Frustrated Indian Army,
unable to put down the uprising, and Indian government blamed Pakistan for the trouble in
Valley. As India raised its forces in Kashmir, latest gun and other weaponry frequently used
against Kashmiri sand tension increased on Line of Control (LOC), de-facto border line Pakistan
and India (Mushtaq, 2009).
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In early 1990, deployment of large scale troops by India intensified the situation. Even
Indian Prime Minister V. P Singh warmed the temperature publicly by announcement the
possibility of war between India and Pakistan. On the other hand, in Washington, Undersecretary
of State, Kimmitt warned a growing risk of misunderstanding which could lead events to spin
dangerously out of control (Basrur, 2008).
2.30 Nuclear Issue
On May 8, 1974, India shocked the global community by detonating its underground
nuclear explosions at Pokharan in Rajasthan Desert. Indian Government declared it “peaceful”
and also said that it was not a result of pursuing a nuclear weapon program. The violation of
Non-Proliferation Treaty 1968 was worried by Indian agitation. Pakistanis remarked that if a
country like India could hold nuclear bomb then Pakistan might well try to follow (Leventhal,
1998).
Pakistan was the country which effected more by Indian nuclear tests. Pakistani Prime
Minister, Bhutto called it “a fateful development” showed determination that his country would
not be blackmailed. Furthermore P. M. Bhutto promised that Pakistan would move on to start
nuclear program but it would not seek to explode a device (Binder & Teltshc, 1974). The United
States experts were in favor of Bhutto‟s pledge that limited technology would be provided to
Pakistan. Prior to this, Bhutto told Pakistani scientists that he would move forward to develop a
nuclear weapons capability to ensure its security against India (Weissman & Krosney, 1981).
Since long time, Bhutto longed for acquiring nuclear weapons for Pakistan. On March 11, 1965,
he told the news reporter that Pakistanis would „eat grass‟ if necessary in pursuit of nuclear
capability if India developed it (Keatley, 1965). Being a foreign minister, Bhutto supported to
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purchase a nuclear fuel reprocessing unit from France. But Finance Minister, Defense Minister
as well as Ayub Khan opposed the idea unenthusiastically. Bhutto consistently highlighted the
need of nuclear capability that Pakistan should not fall behind India (Bhutto, 1969).
To meet country‟s technical requirements Bhutto issued the instructions to start work on
nuclear program. Bhutto put it as top priority and continued his ambition to match India.
Pakistan‟s attempt for nuclear capability had become a major source of friction between
Islamabad and Washington.
Apprehensions of nonproliferation supporters remarked that India had set an example for
other countries to install nuclear program. Furthermore the Americans were worried by French
and West Germans nuclear deal with Pakistan. Pakistan also signed contracts with Brazil,
Argentina, Taiwan and South Korea to develop its nuclear weapons. The United States
concerned Pakistan‟s nuclear deals with France and West Germany were troubling the United
States. By United States coercive diplomacy Argentina, Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan
abstained from nuclear deal with Pakistan. Pakistan also did not sign Non-Proliferation Treaty
and was not ready to allow international inspection team to inspect the program (Kux, 2001).
In early 1976, Secretary of State, H Kissinger discussed the matter directly with Bhutto in
New York. He suggested that Pakistan should postpone its nuclear program and offered
international nuclear fuel reprocessing facility. American President also supported the
Kissinger‟s proposal. Pakistani stakeholders refused to defer the project. Prior to further bid,
Kissinger moved on to Pakistan and offered by using stick and carrot policy. Secretary of State
offered 110 A-7 attack bomber which the Pakistani air force intensively desired to improve its
strike capacity. Kissinger also threatened indirectly upcoming Democratic President would adopt
tougher policy, regarding nonproliferation, that might set an example of Pakistan (Kissinger,
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August 2, 1976). Bhutto reaffirmed and declared on a meeting with Kissinger on a dinner at
Lahore that Pakistan could not in any way curb the reprocessing program.
To tighten up nuclear policy, Congress amended the foreign Assistance Act, Section 669
and 670, projected by Glenn and Symington to stop the assistance to non-NPT signatory states.
Pakistan had to face economic assistance cutoff by new legislation. Pakistanis firmly moved on
to enhance defense capability against India and rejected US conventional arm package (Oklay,
1999). Bhutto, secretly, carried on technically more difficult route towards a nuclear explosive
capability. In 1975, Dr. Abuld Qadeer Khan was appointed as in charge of the secret effort to
produce enriched uranium for nuclear weapons (Weissman & Krosney, 1981).
Zia followed Bhutto‟s nuclear policy. In September 1977, Joseph Nye, nuclear specialist,
arrived in Pakistan to offer to sell A-7 attack bomber instead of persisted with buy fuel reprocess
project from France. He warned Pakistan that US would cut off economic aid under Glenn
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. Zia refused to bow down and also did not accept
economic assistance of $ 50 million than $ 69 million per annum. On the other hand, Carter
administration did not take action against Indian nuclear device. A top level Pakistani said if the
US had applied sanctions against India, it would not have minded so much. Moreover, it did not
impose sanctions against India while it did so against Pakistan (Kux, 2001).
In August 1979, Foreign Affair Advisor, Agha Shahi, told Congressman that Pakistan
had no intention to make a bomb and pursued electric power generation. Shahi, further, said to
the news that Libya and other Arab countries were funding the program to make an Islamic
bomb was absolute fantasy (National Security Archives, 1991). During Afghan crisis on May 13,
1981, Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a six years waiver for sanctions package
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that barred assistance to Pakistan. For this purpose Reagan had furnish a testimonial certificate to
House of Foreign Affairs, regarding that Pakistan was not developing nuclear program.
2.31 Chinese Assistance for Missile Technology
Pakistan and China have delighted in well-disposed and commonly helpful relationship
throughout the decades. Pakistan provided services to connect Beijing and Washington in 1971,
and additionally an extension to the Muslim world for China in the 1980s. China's proceeding
with part as a noteworthy arms provider for Pakistan started in the 1960s, and included building
weapons industrial facilities in Pakistan, and additionally providing arms. In September 1990,
China consented to provide Pakistan M-11 surface-to-surface rockets. The United States
cautioned Pakistan about it. Despite the fact that it is not an individual from the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), China took after the confinements of the MTCR, bans for
exchange of rockets innovation with a scope of more than 300 kilometers and a payload of more
than 500 kilograms. In August 1993, the United States imposed sanctions on 12 Chinese and
Pakistan companies for two years as it came to know that China had transferred to Pakistan the
prohibited missile technology. Washington Post reported in July 1995 that the United States
intelligence agencies had proven that China provided Pakistan M-11 ballistic missile. Besides, in
February 1996, a report published in the United States press on leaked United States intelligence
report faulted that China sold „ring magnets‟ to Pakistan, which could be utilized as a part of
enrich uranium for atomic weapons (Kux D. 2003). Pakistan denied it but on November 21,
2000, the United States imposed sanctions for 2-year on the Pakistan Ministry of Defense and
Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Organization. In September 2001, the US
State Department again forced 2-year sanctions on a PRC organization and Pakistan's National
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Development Complex. The PRC organizations allegedly conveyed 12 shipments of parts for
Pakistan's Shaheen rockets in mid-2001.
2.32 Pressler Amendment
In 1989, Howard Schaffer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, gave confirm before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and
Pacific Affairs that aid to Pakistan should to be stopped because of non-proliferation activities.
Beside it he expressed that Pakistan knew the outcomes of obtaining the atomic devices in this
manner to authorize against aid should to be stopped, however atomic abilities improvement
proceeded in Pakistan furtively (Lohaleker, 1991). Nonproliferation supporters focused on
Pakistan because it was more prominent than Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. As there were some
measures on nuclear programs, like South Africa declared that it would stop its nuclear device,
Brazil and Argentina signed a nonproliferation treaty in 1990 (Chari, Cheema, , & Cohen,
1990).
Regardless of Pakistan affirmation that its atomic program was just for "peaceful
purposes," the US Congress forced the Pressler amendment in 1990. In October 1990, President
Bush was unable furnish certificate to Congress that Pakistan did not have an atomic plant.
Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, the Pressler amendment, required to stop all
types of arms deals and even Pakistan's earlier bought of military hardware. Thus United States
withheld the F-16 air craft that Pakistan had requested in 1989, twenty-eight of which had as of
now been acquired (CRS, 28 May 1998).
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2.33 Brown Amendment
American President Bill Clinton attempted to prove the way to cooperate with Pakistan. It
is the most important to note that Clinton actively found solution of partnership with Pakistan
and he sought to counter the traditional perception in Pakistan that Democrats were “anti-
Pakistan and pro-India” (Hillali, 2005). Clinton signed the law for one-time exception to the
Pressler amendment in January 1996, which allowed the United States to assist Pakistan over
300 million dollars-worth of military hardware (CRS, May 28, 1998). This aid bundle
additionally included financial help, compassionate support, help on Anti-Narcotics, evacuating,
lack of education, hostile to psychological warfare and provincial peace keeping exercises. It
additionally prompted to resumption of military trade under International Military Education and
Training, eight joint activities consistently, exchange of military officers from every field to go
to staff courses in the other nation furthermore rebuilding of advantage of Overseas Private
Investment Corporation and Trade and Development Assistance to support American exchange
and private capital interest in Pakistan.
Secretary of State Peter commented that Pressler Amendment was a counter item to
United States intrigue and Pakistan couldn't be requested that incapacitate itself singularly within
the sight of an antagonistic neighbor like India that had atomic capacity. Accordingly Brown
Amendment completely supported Pakistan. Brown Amendment came into being at full scale in
July 1997 when Senate passed another bill: "Remote Operations Appropriation Bill" that
explained the implementation. Despite the fact that this act was enforced but cosmetic effect of
Pressler Amendment was not replaced. Brownback reflected the controversial way of providing
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aid to Pakistan in light of pre-requisite and expectations. At that time, American policymakers
implemented a conditional and unsteady aid policy.
2.34 Kashmir Conflict and Kargil War
Once again, the perpetual conflicts between Pakistan and India over Kashmir began. It
posed serious threats to regional stability. In April 1990, the war like situation in Kashmir
seemed to indicate a new war between Pakistan and India. India deployed about 200,000 soldiers
in front of 100,000 Pakistani soldiers on Line of Control (LOC). The troops were ready to attack
as the armies were only 200 meters away.
American policymakers were worried on the situation in South Asia when they knew that
India and Pakistan had atomic weapon. The American struggle constantly squeezed both the
states to determine the Kashmir issue by rapprochement and strategy, not war. White House
selected Robert Gates, the Deputy National Security Advisor, a unique agent to Pakistan and
India. From 19-21 May 1998, the missions normalize the temperature on both sides by opening
“political dialogue” (Ganguly & Kapur, 2008).
In Islamabad, Gates met to President Ghulum Ishaq Khan and Army Chief General
Aslam Beg and threatened Pakistan with the aftershocks of war. Washington repeated that
Pakistan was the failure in every situation of war with India and in case of Pakistani initiative
over the LOC, the United States would end all military support and help to Pakistan.
Additionally, it was demanded that Pakistan should to stop supporting terrorism in Indian-held
Kashmir and embrace certainty building relations with India. So the current situation would not
be raised and future crises could be stopped. Government officials in India got a comparative
message, however underscored that Pakistan's support for mujahideen in the disputed territory
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was the root cause of turmoil in Kashmir, and relations between Pakistan and India must be
normalized after it halted these exercises. In June, Indian troops started to pull back, trailed by
the Pakistani strengths (Huffman, 2012).
Again in 1999, mujahdin of Azad Jamu Kashmir crossed the LOC into the Kargil of
Indian held Kashmir, attacked on Indian forces in guerilla fighting and hoisting pressures
amongst Pakistan and India. On July 4, 1999, PM Nawaz Sharif met with President Clinton, to
talk about a Pakistani withdrawal from the circumstance (Branch, 2009). Clinton purportedly
told Sharif, if Pakistan pulled back its troops from Kashmir, the United States would express
help without acclaim. Otherwise the United States would be compelled to move freely toward
India (Branch, 2009). The president guaranteed that Sharif's assignment endeavored to utilize
trap dialect to propose that Clinton by one means or another ought to value a Pakistani
withdrawal or that Pakistan itself did not have to pull back, in light of the fact that the contenders
in Kashmir were truly mujahidin warriors masked as fighters. After extreme discussion and
discretionary thinking, Sharif consented to pull back, however predicted that he would pay a
heavy domestic price for the concession.
Once again, the American played a positive role in settling the contention as another full
scale war that was prevented by dialogue. However, it was just as a customarily reactionary
strategy of the United States. Despite the fact that the United States had truly supported bilateral
negotiation between Pakistan and India yet have been not able settle their disparities and go to a
concurrence on the Kashmir issue. In this manner, the United States utilized the strategy of
"crisis management" in regard to the frequent crisis between Pakistan and India (Adnan &
Fatima, 2016.).
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2.35 Pakistan India Nuclear Explosions and CTBT
On May 11 and 13, 1998, India conducted a series of five underground atomic tests,
Despite U.S. furthermore, world endeavors to control the circumstance. Pakistan responded,
asserting five tests on May 28, 1998, and an extra test on May 30. The unannounced tests created
hype at worldwide and also a serious setback for two decades of the United States struggle for
nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia (Sondhi, 2000).
In May, 1998, President Clinton forced military and economic sanctions on India and
Pakistan, under section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). Humanitarian assistance,
food and other agricultural commodities were exempted from sanctions. In November 1998, the
United States Division of Commerce published a list of more than 300 Indian and Pakistani
government agencies and companies suspected to work on nuclear, missile and other weapons
programs (Kux, 2003).
Pakistan was less affected than India by the sanctions, since most United States aid to
Pakistan had been cut off since 1990. Then again, Pakistan's much smaller and weaker economy
was more in risk from the impacts of the sanctions. The United States strategy experts consider
the constant weapons race between India and Pakistan was representing the undoubtedly
prospect for the future utilization of atomic weapons. In May 1974, India led its first atomic test.
Pakistan increased atomic capacity sometimes in the 1980s. Both nations have aircraft for
conveying weapons. India has short-extend rockets, Prithvi, and was developing an intermediate
range ballistic missile (Agni) with heavy load to carry an atomic warhead. Pakistan had gained
technology for short range missile, Shaheen and medium-run rockets, Ghauri, capable to carry
small nuclear warheads (Kux, 2003).
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Proliferation in South Asia is the consequence of rivalries. India had been looking to
accomplish deterrence against China, and Pakistan trying to pick up this capacity in pursuit of
balance of power against India. India and Pakistan are non-signatories of the Non-multiplication
Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India continually rejected both
treaties, instead of a global nuclear disarmament regimen. Pakistan had maintained that it would
sign the NPT and CTBT when India did so. After the 1998 tests, the United States set following
five steps for India and Pakistan in order to avoid a destabilizing nuclear and missile
competition:
Stop further atomic testing and sign and ratify the CTBT
Stop fissile material production; cooperate in FMCT negotiation.
Refrain from deploying or testing rockets or nuclear weapons
Maintain and formalize restraints on sharing sensitive goods and technologies to other
counties
Reduce bilateral tension including Kashmir (Mushtaq, 2009).
By a series of measures, Congress has been gradually waiving sanctions on Pakistan and
India coming about because of their 1998 atomic tests. In October 1999, Congress passed H.R.
2561, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000, and it was marked by the President
as P.L. 106-79 on October 29. Title IX of the act gave the President power to postpone sanctions
applied against Pakistan and India after to the atomic tests. In a presidential powers, the
President postponed economic sanctions on India. Pakistan, be that as it may, stayed under
sanctions under Section 508 of the annual foreign assistance appropriation act as a consequence
of the October 1999 coup. The Foreign Operations Export Financing and Related Appropriations
103
Agencies Act, 2001, gave an exemption under which Pakistan could be given US foreign
assistance funding for basic education programs (P.L. 106-429; Section 597).
2.36 Military Take Over and Democratic Sanctions
On 12 October 1999, Pakistan's armed forces under the command of General Pervez
Musharraf made a bloodless coup that dismissed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and put him under
house arrest. The upset took after a few weeks of rumors of a power struggle between Sharif and
Musharraf. In this manner, Sharif seemed to have settled his disputes with Musharraf, however
Sharif changed army command when Musharraf was on a visit to Sri Lanka. Two days later, on
October 14, General Musharraf suspended the constitution and the parliament and placed himself
as Chief Executive. On October 18 broadcast a speech to the country, Musharraf swore to: in the
long run reestablish civilian control; reform corrupt government institution, revive the country's
economy; reduce troops on the Indian border; use restrain in nuclear weapon policy and promote
a moderate form of Islam. Nawaz Sharif and six other were accused of attempting murder and
kidnapping for refusing access to the return plane of General Musharraf and 200 different
travelers from Sri Lanka to Karachi on 12 October. America encouraged the military government
of Pakistan to give direct and reasonable access, and fair trial of the previous executive and set a
timetable for the reconstruction of democracy (Pattanaik, 2001).
Finally the “democratic sanctions” were imposed in October 1999 after Musharraf coup
the administration (Hussain, 2005). Infect, these sanction were too weak to be effective at
influencing Pakistan's actions, but strong enough to be seen as an affront (Hussain, 2005). In the
meantime, the US offered Pakistan no incentive to change. Without United States financial
104
assistance, Pakistan's institution weakened, it gathered huge debt and the development of radical
Islamic groups.
105
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Chapter No 03
POST 9/11 PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES MILITARY
COOPERATION
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3.1 9/11 and the United States National Response
December 7, 1941 was considered a day of disgrace for previous generations of America.
September 11, 2001 proved such a day for contemporary Americans. The modern world has
never observed an attack on American soil as a huge and devastatingly tremendous event as that
of 9/11 (Simon, 2001). Kellner said "The Americans will always remember where they were and
what they were doing when they heard American Airline Flight 11 struck the North Tower of the
World Trade Center and a few minutes after a flight United Airline 175 hit the South Tower.
After a while third flight, American Airlines 77, struck the Pentagon and United Airline Flight
93 hit the area of Pennsylvania after an effort by travelers to overcome its culprits. The attacks
were abruptly broadcasted to a global audience that was suspicious of how the September 11
attacks hit New York and Washington, the two capitals of “globalization”. The number of deaths
was relatively surprising as a large number of individuals from 45 countries were killed in the
first place, for example, the attack on US soil since the War of 1812. inhabitants of the entire
country rushed to the place of occurrence to rescue victims having banners on their windows to
show patriotism soul and support President Bush and his foreign policy" (Kellner, 2003). For the
new generation, war on Terror came to the American door steps. President Bush announced it as
the Pearl Harbor of the twenty-first century (Griffin & Foreward, 2004). National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice compared it again to Pearl Harbor. Bush compared the post-9/11 with
the global political scenario to that of the Cold War. Many thinkers have said that the "new
century" began with the brutal attack of 9/11 instead of 1 January 2001 (Guihong, 2003).
The massive destruction brought changes at legislative level too. The Congress passed a
bill on fourteenth of September (P.L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 2001) by which President Bush
could use all the essential powers against those nations, association or people who prepared,
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arranged, conferred or helped the terrorist attack (Lambeth, 2001). On September 20, 2001,
President Bush delivered a speech at Congress, in which he commented and demonstrated the
American an ardent response and portrayed a strong hit back by saying that whether convey their
Americans enemies to the cost of their enmity, at the cost of "Either you are with us or with
terrorist groups. From this day any state or country supporting or sponsors the terrorists will be
treated by the United States as foe” (Bush, 2001). On September 23, 2001, the President issued
Executive Order No. 13224 to block the property and transaction with 27 organizations or
individuals who committed terrorist acts or simply they could support the cause of terrorist
(Kundi., 2007).
Terrorist attacks of September 11 quickly changed both the content of Bush
administration‟s foreign policy and the process to meet the terrorists. As a result President
Bush‟s Foreign policy was universal in scope and viewed virtually all International actions as
affecting American interests. He adopted what might be called a Comprehensive American
Globalism by the moral outrage against the attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. In
other words Bush committed United States to fight against terrorism by all means. 9/11 brought
about a „revolution‟ in his agenda, it might transformed and let US to a re-evaluate of her
security policy. According to Noam Chomsky “The „9/11 signaled a sharp change in the course
of history” (Bush, 2001).
Bush‟s National Security Strategy released, set three tasks for post-September 11th
American grand strategy;
(i) To defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants.
(ii) To build cordial relations with the great powers for promotion of peace.
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(iii) To extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent and
defense against tyrants (White House, 2002).
George W. Bush in his address to the US Military Academy at West point on June 1,
2002, declared that America could not always rely for her security on traditional strategies of
deterrence and containment. Instead, he claimed that faced with the perils posed by the
terrorist networks, US must strike first before the danger had materialized (Sarwar, 2009).
3.2 9/11 and Global Response
US suffered a brutal attack and immediately set out to build an international coalition.
Within the first 24 hours the United States received a UN Security Council Resolution
authorizing the use of force. The Security Council adopted two resolutions, resolutions No 1368
of September 12, 2001, simply condemned the attack and later on another Resolution No. 137,3
affirmed the right of self-defense in its preamble (Booth & Dunne, 2010).
America also used the regional security platform, NATO, which invoked Article V for
the first time in its history which was applied after the Bush slogan "Global War on Terror". It
held a meeting in Brussels on 14 September where it was decided that Article V would apply if it
were resolved that the attacks of September 11 were coordinated from abroad against the United
States. It must be considered an activity guaranteed by Article V of the Washington Treaty
(Booth & Dunne, 2010). The provision of ANZUS Treaty for assistance officially invoked for
help by Australia. Besides 46 statements originated from multilateral organizations legitimized
the United States right to attack terrorist bastion. Actually 9/11 united the anti-terror states of the
world and associations to attack the terrorist supporting countries (Smith, 2003).
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European states took the path of unconditional compromise to the US ally. Europe took
way of participation as well as conditions of different land masses offered the United States in
operation Enduring Freedom Resultantly:
USSR was the first state that offered the United States its technical support and use of its
air space.
China and India also offered America the information sharing and logistic support.
Several states offered the United States their support to launch air strikes and landed
force to contain terrorism.
A number of offered services to be a part of multilateral associations with respect to the
American security after 9/11.
A lot of states offered intelligence support to the United States (Marshall, 2010).
After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States immediately accused the
founder of Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, of being suspected and prey to a war in Afghanistan, the
place of Al Qaeda refugee under the Taliban government. The Americans initially asked the
Taliban authorities to extradite the leader of al-Qaeda who had full access to the terrorist
preparation camps. President Bush has strictly commented that the Taliban government should
surrender the terrorist or participate in his fate. He also said no compromise would be made in
this respect. He said the Taliban must act and act instantaneously (Lansford, 2002).
3.3 Pakistan-United States Relations on the Eve of 9/11
On the eve of 9/11, Pakistan and United States were experiencing the lowest ebb of
relations. The components of mistrust have been assuming their part to formulate effective
foreign affairs between these two states. Economic aid was dried up due to the implication of
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Pressler Amendment. In May 1995, the Brown Amendment was approved by the Senate and
foreign relations committee that was another sanction in Foreign Assistance Act 1961 (Anwar,
2013).
Couples of sanctions were imposed on Pakistan since she had attained the capability of
nuclear bomb. Pakistan faced hurdles but did not stop its tranquil atomic project. The wrath of
America was raised when Pakistan tested the nuclear bombs as the reaction of Indian nuclear
explosions. The United States imposed sanctions while accusing Pakistan for atomic
proliferation. Furthermore political sanctions were also imposed after Musharaf‟s bloodless coup
that restricted more Pakistan United States relations. Pakistan was also blamed on the grounds
that it was one of the three states which recognized and had diplomatic relations with Taliban
regime in Afghanistan (Lodhi, 1998). To worsen the matter, Unites States was creating close ties
with Pakistan‟s most hated neighbor, India. Other than being the objective of various sanction,
Pakistan had little in the way of international relations with the United States.
Pakistan‟s domestic situation was in shambles. It had a weak institutional structure, a
stillborn political process following a recent coup, an underdeveloped economy, a poor
educational system, and internal tension with Islamist extremism on the rise. According to the
World Bank, Pakistan was in a “position of extreme vulnerability” due to its immense debt and
struggling economy and its emaciated public education system resulting in a 44% literacy rate
which helped spur the rise of Islamic extremism (Christine, 2004).
3.4 Pakistan’s Collaboration under the United States Pressure
The United States chose to hit hard. The US Congress warned Pakistan to join hands in
the manner "you are with us or otherwise the iron hands could use parallel to the terrorists”.
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Bush used coercive tactics and warned Pakistan to give all potential support to attack the Taliban
government. In this situation, Pakistan considered that it had no choice but to participate in the
war on terror. The United States adopted a clear strategy for Pakistan either support the
American cause or support the terrorists who had caused a real setback to mankind at the
beginning of the twenty-first century (Woodward, 2002). After the cruel global policy of Bush,
various American authorities had not ceased pressurizing Pakistan. There was a coercive
diplomacy by a delegate chaired by the Secretary of State. He explained that Pakistan was
threatened to face a brutal end if it refused to support. Richard Armitage has included that in case
of refusal Pakistan would be bombed back to the stone age (Musharaf, 2006).
On 13 September 2001, the US President Cabinet meeting announced if Pakistan did not
help the Americans in the war on terrorism, it could be assaulted (Woodward, 2002). US
Ambassador Wendy Chamberlain presented a list of the following seven demands to Musharraf.
1) To stop al Qaeda at the border,
2) US should be provided the blanket landing rights to conduct operations,
3) Provide territorial and naval access,
4) Provide intelligence;
5) Publicly condemn terrorist attacks,
6) Cut off recruits and supplies to the Taliban and
7) to break diplomatic relations with the Taliban and help the US to destroy Osama Bin
Laden (Collins, 2008).
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On September 14, 2001, a harsh message from the American Secretary of State made
Musharraf surrender to demand instantly to the other disbelief of the United States officials also
believed that some of them would have been negotiable. President abruptly agreed to support and
followed all the seven demands. It was surprising for Powell who shared his response gladly with
member of National Security Council who were attending a meeting at the White House.
Americans expected that it would be easy for Musharraf to assent two demands and be persuaded
for further but would never accept whole at all. Musharraf approved all demands (Woodward,
2002). Musharraf justified this stance by the help of corps commanders and other politicians. On
19th September 2001, he disclosed five motives to justify his “unstinted” cooperation with the
United States. These include:
1) Pakistan‟s Integrity and Solidarity;
2) Economic uplift;
3) Incapability to Counter the America;
4) Security to Pakistan‟s Strategic Nuclear and Missile Assets;
5) Kashmir Cause (Musharraf, 2006).
Pakistan provided access to numerous military bases and helped to establish a number of
facilities including bases of Pasni, Dalbadin and Shamsi and predator basing at Jacobabad and
Shamsi handed over to American. America bedded down 50 aircrafts and 2,000 coalition
military personnel over the bases Pakistan also provided fuel and 35,000 troops to secure these
bases and border area (Mustafa, 2010). It also provided human intelligence to coalition forces
that proved a lot more supportive to make their technical intelligence. Chamberlain, the
American Ambassador in Pakistan, admired Pakistan for its “unstinting support” throughout the
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war. Another American Officer said that Pakistan gave more support, caught a number of
terrorists and helped America more than any other nation in the Global War on Terror (Mustafa,
2010).
3.5 Indian Factor
Fear of India has always been the most dominant factor of Pakistan‟s security and foreign
policy. Indian hegemonic policies in South Asia in all of her neighbors have further strengthened
this fear factor. Not only India and Pakistan fought three regular wars of 1947-48, 1965, and
1971 but also episodes like Runn of Kuch dispute, deployment of forces in 1987, Kargil War and
Indian forces deployment in 2003-04 etc. Serious tensions have always been there. Kashmir
dispute has emerged as flash point. Indian leadership has always been very vocal regarding the
very inception of Pakistan that is the Two Nation Theory and despite their broken promises in
the UN, has been blaming Pakistan as a terrorism state supporting the terrorist activities in
Jammu and Kashmir. In contradiction to UN resolution India condemns the Kashmir‟s freedom
struggle declaring it a terrorist movement. Indian leadership decided to exploit the incident of
9/11 to divert this uproar against Kashmiris and Pakistan and openly declared to follow the
United States policy of pre-emption in Kashmir. Parliament attack was also an abortive struggle
by Indians to collaborate the matter. With a view to denying foreign support to Pakistan, anti-
Pakistanism in United States and elsewhere is in consonance with the Indian strategy (Akhtar,
2008).
The Indian government quickly clasped the events of September 11 and joined the US-
led global coalition against terrorism. New Delhi thought that the Taliban‟s indirect involvement
in the attacks and Pakistan's support to the Taliban would provide it the best opportunity and
121
“hoped for an alliance with the United States to make Pakistan a terrorist state” (Crane, Michael ,
Samir, & Chritopher, 2010). Assuming, Pakistan would never withdraw its support for the
Taliban, the Indian government offered unprecedented logistical support and support to the
United States operations in Afghanistan. Indian leaders have also tried to persuade the United
States to form a coalition of democracies under the mandate of waging a war against global
terrorism (Tariq, 2002). India has tried to combine the issue of the war against terrorism and
Kashmir.
Musharraf instantly joined the United States coalition as the coalition reliance on Indian
air basis could cause risk for Pakistan‟s security. Musharraf thought if Pakistan did not support
the United States, America would welcome India. India would gain a golden opportunity with
regard to Kashmir. The Indians might be tempted to undertake a limited offensive there or more
likely (Musharaf, 2006). He closed country‟s airspaces for hours to enable American forces to
make preparations and deploy its troops at military basis. He assured the Americans that
Islamabad had isolated its former Taliban allies in favor of motives of the war on terrorism
(Hussain, 2004). Furthermore he said “failure to participate in coalition would allow India to
move freely pursue its objectives to undermine Pakistan‟s interests in the region” (Musharraf,
2002).
The emergence of Pakistan as a front-line state in the global campaign against terrorism
has caused enormous consternation in New Delhi. Several senior officials of the Indian
government have publicly stated that the United States was prepared to pursue its own restricted
program and that India should fight alone against terrorism (Tariq, 2002). Indian had also said
that Pakistan, which had helped the Taliban to secure their forces, whose intelligence agencies
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had close contacts with Al Qaeda, disagreed with radical Islamic groups fighting jihad against
Indian forces in Kashmir.
3.6 Post 9/11 United States Security Assistance for Pakistan
Before 9/11, the United States had barred the deal of military tools and supply of spare
parts to Pakistan but after 9/11, Pakistan became America‟s ally in the war against terror. On
22nd
of September 2001, the restrictions were removed and all the sanctions were waived.
President Bush declared “I hereby determine and certify to the Congress that the application to
Pakistan and India of the sanctions and prohibitions contained in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (G)
of section 102(b)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act would not be in the national security
interests of the United States. Furthermore, pursuant to section 9001(a) of the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act, 2000 (Public Law 106-79), I hereby waive, with respect to Pakistan
and India, the application of any sanction contained in section 101 or 102 of the Arms Export
Control Act, section 2(b)(4) of the Export Import Bank Act of 1945”. The American Senate
passed a bill (S. 1465) on October 4, 2001 (Kundi., 2007).
The United States provided US$ 17 billion military assistance during 2001-2014
including US $ 2 billion of military aid that had been proposed through last round of strategic
dialogue in 2014. The major part of security related assistance included reimbursements, arm
sales; military training and internal security assistance that amounted to US $ 8.1 billion. The
remaining was invested in other development programs (Hussain M. , 2014)
123
3.7 Non-NATO Ally
In June 2004, President Bush assigned Pakistan as a noteworthy non-NATO partner of
the United States under section 517 of Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. He announced “I
therefore assign the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a noteworthy non-NATO partner of the
United states for the reasons for the Arms Export Control Act” (Weiler, 2013). The
Comprehensive South Asia policy reported on March 23, 2005, that was the primary ever such
approach proclaimed for the locale (Rizwan, 2010). Quickly, the approach bury alia declared that
a yet-to-be indicated number of F 16 aircraft would be provided to Pakistan.
3.8 Coalition Support Fund for Reimbursement
Pakistan is viewed as a vital accomplice of United States in war on terror. Since 9/11,
America has been supporting Pakistan for counterterrorism exercise to kill the havens of
aggressors, upgrade security and get the objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom through
Coalition Support Fund that give help to commonly concurred the cost caused by Pakistan in this
war. Congress, in 2002, reserved millions of dollars to pay back Pakistan and different nations
facilitating American counterterrorist activities. Since 2001, roundabout half of financial
transfer, from Coalition Support Fund (CSF), was made to Pakistan. Till June 2014 the total
amount paid was nearly$10.7 billion. Out of this amount, only 2% was provided for navy and air
forces while 98% was paid for Pakistan armed force under CSF (Mustafa & Bashir, 2014). As
per Defense Department that CSF utilized for 1,00,000 troops occupied with FATA, for clothing,
housing, armament. Pakistan was, likewise, paid for reimbursement of air bases and seaports. In
2010, Richard Holbrooke, a US Special Representative to Pakistan and Afghanistan stressed that
60%-65% of Pakistan's ask for, under CSF, was provided (Kronstadt, 2012).
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Indirect fifty-three percent of the American aid to Pakistan was provided for direct
reimbursement for the expenses of Pakistan's military exercises along the Afghan border through
the CSF program. Pakistan received about $10 billion under CSF since 2001, making it the
biggest beneficiary from America (Saleem, 2015). Since the package started, Pakistan has
guaranteed repayment for such activities as:
• Maritime Patrol and interdiction
• Combat air strikes and close air support
• Airlift technology and air traffic control
• American Army's surgical operations in FATA
•Enhanced management requirements at the Pakistan's Armed forces Headquarters (Johnson
& Michael , 2014).
It was noticed that Pakistan has been rewarded liberally for genuine costs; costs have
been now and then evaluated at what equivalent activities would have taken a toll the United
States' military. Different critics also noted that CSF payments have remained or increased
despite a decline in Pakistani military operations taking after peace deal with militant. In any
case, large CSF payouts, Pakistan's military have not performed well in counterinsurgency
campaign in FATA (Cohen, 2005). CSFs go directly to the Finance Ministry, where they can be
utilized as the administration wishes. Many critics have contended that CSFs serve as little more
than a bribe to secure Pakistan's continued participation in the global war on terror.
According to Bush administration and military officials interviewed by the New York
Times, a great part of the American money was not making its way to frontline Pakistani units.
Money has been diverted to fund weapons frameworks intended to counter India, not Al Qaeda
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or the Taliban. The United States has paid a huge amount of dollars in inflated Pakistani
reimbursement claim for fuel, ammunition and other costs (Rohde, 2007).
DoD has been securing the program against these reactions. DoD authorities legitimized
that budgetary system of Pakistan is poor to support the required results. They also explained that
CSF payment should not scale up or downsize with operations deployed in FATA in light of the
fact that the program pays for the settled costs managed from troops conveyed in FATA. Since
Pakistan consistently expanded the quantity of regular armed forces and FC personnel in FATA,
the costs should increase even if they are conducting major operations. Proponents of the CSF
program additionally take note of that it was a reimbursement program not intended to build
capacity at full scale. While recognizing that Pakistan was most likely utilizing CSFs to purchase
system to fight against India, they contend that they have no capacity to impact how these
expenditure were utilized in light of the fact that the assets have a place with Pakistan once they
achieve Pakistan Finance Ministry. DoD authorities additionally noted Pakistan's huge setback
figures and express appreciation to Pakistan's commitments in any event to some extent since, it
assumes control over a year to repay Pakistan. They also contend that the United States needs to
repay Pakistan for its expenses on the off chance that support the United States in Afghanistan
(Johnson & Michael , 2008). Supporters of this program likewise say that since it is the single
biggest program by which cash is exchanged to Pakistan, it should to be comprehended in the
more extensive feeling of Pakistan-United States collaboration. DoD authorities who bolster the
program most unequivocally inferred that the program could be taken care of, to urge Pakistan
for better result (Pakistan Times, October 7, 2015).
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3.9 Slala Check Post incident and CSF
The raging reaction to the deliberately killing of 24 Pakistani warriors at Slala Check Post
by NATO forces on November 26, 2011, Islamabad cut the NATO supply by which reciprocal
relations were set "on hold." The relations then remained to a great extent solidified in starting
months of 2012. In July 2012, transactions, at last, prevailing with regards to settling the stop and
the NATO supply was opened. The breakthrough came after a phone call to Foreign Minister
Hina Khar in which Hillary Clinton said, “We are sad for the losses suffered by the Pakistani
military” (Epstein & Kronstadt , 2012). The State Department showed that regular citizen help
streams were kept amid the seven-month time frame.
In light of reviving the NATO supply, the Administration pronounced that America
would give $1.18 billion in Coalition Support Fund (CSF) military repayments to support
Pakistan amid the period July 2010-May 2011 (Epstein and Kronstadt, 2012). The installment,
the first since December 2010, rose to 60% of the $1.88 billion asserted by Pakistan for that
period. In late 2012, the Defense Department issued advance $688 million CSF installment for
the period June-November 2011. Congress did not mediate and gave CSF installment with no
arrangement (Kronstadt and Epstein, 2013).
3.10 The Shakeel Afridi Case and United States Assistance
Dr. Shakeel Afridi was a doctor and had been working with the American Spy Agency,
CIA. He endeavored to gather DNA tests from Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad where American
troops struck to pursue Osama in May 2011. In May 2012, a tribal court sentenced him to 33
years in jail (The News, Jan 12, 2012). Congress responded extremely reflecting significant
outrage at news of Afridi‟s detainment. Soon after one day to this, Senate Subcommittee
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affirmed a change to the State and Foreign Operations Appropriations 2013 that United States
would withhold $33 million ($1 million for every year of the sentence) of asked for Foreign
Military Financing help to Pakistan (Epstein, 2013). Representative Rand Paul was among the
Members who have requested to stop all remote help to Pakistan until Dr. Shakil was liberated
and the charges dropped moreover he pushed for the Subcommittee to incorporate the
arrangements in his bill (S. 3576) (State Department, September 20, 2012).
In September 2012, the bill was defeated by the proportion of 10-81. A few members of
the Congress apprehended to the issue. In Senate, facilitate authorize were issued like the
pending S. 158 would naturalize Dr. Afridi as a US resident, and S. 164 would deny promote US
help to Pakistan until it discharged and the charges dropped. A pending House resolution with 18
co-supports (H.Res. 86) expressed the feeling of the House that Afridi was an American „hero‟
and should to be immediately released from Pakistan. In April 2013 House meeting on the
Administration's FY2014 foreign affairs, one member asked Secretary of State John Kerry to
what extent the United States would utilize "quiet diplomacy" in an effort to see Afridi freed.
The Secretary answered that cutting off aid to Pakistan would not be a solution; instead of a lot
of differences in the relationship Pakistan was supporting the American interests (State
Department, April 17, 2013).
3.11 Relevant Provisions in FY2013 and 2014 Public Law
The National Defense Authorization Act (NPAA) for fiscal year 2013 enforced the
provision P.L. 112-239 before the 112th Congress adjourned. The Act contains limitations,
conditions and waiver powers for reimbursements from the Coalition Support Fund and the
Pakistan Counter-Insurgency Fund (PCF). Encourage the preconditions for confirmation of most
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types of US aid under section 7046 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1982 (PL 112-74),
and the certificate requirements for most of the security aids contained in section 203 of the Act.
Partnership strengthened with the Pakistan law of 2009 (PL 111-73) (P.L. 111-73).
Section 1227 of the FY2013 NDAA limited CSFs to Pakistan to $1.2 billion in the fiscal
year (2013), furthermore ceased last reimbursement fund for the seven-month (November 2011-
July 2012) when Pakistan had barred NATO supplies. Payment of FY2013, CSF to Pakistan
can't be made unless the Secretary of Defense ensures that proper security was given to supply
route and until Pakistan took numerous steps against al Qaeda, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and
other activist groups. The Secretary may waive the certificate requirements in the interest of the
United States National Security. Section 1228 of the Act required the Secretary of Defense, in
interview with the Secretary of State, to ensure that Pakistan was supporting to counter IEDs,
participating on counterterrorism endeavors, and not detaining Pakistani citizens, including Dr.
Shakil Afridi (Kronstadt and Epstein, 2013).
Section 1211 of the pending NDAA for FY2014 (H.R. 1960), passed by the full House on
June 14, 2013, would limit FY2014 CSF reimbursement to Pakistan to $1.5 billion. Besides,
disbursement of such funds would require the Secretary of Defense to certify that Pakistan is
keeping up the security and not interfering with the development of American shipments along
its supply route (Kronstadt and Epstein, 2013).
Section 9013 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY2014 (H.R. 2397),
introduced in the House on June 17, 2013, would prevent any FY2014 CSF payment to Pakistan
unless the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State certify that Pakistan
is supporting US counterterrorism efforts in the region including anti-Indian group Lashkar-e-
Taiba.
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The FAULT Act, H.R. 1922, referred to House committee on May 9, 2013 would restrain
assistance to Iran, North Korea, Syria, Egypt, and Pakistan on the finding that United States tax
payer "should not be distributed to those who try to do harm to Americans or our allies,"
(Congress, 2013) and that Pakistan was considered among those nations that have been engaged
in activities undermine the security and foreign policy objectives of the United States The bill
would also require the President to end Pakistan's status as a Major Non-NATO Ally.
3.12 FMF Program and Arms Sales
United States has been providing huge amount for arm sales and grants to Pakistan since
2001 including various things useful for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, and
additionally number of "first-class" stages more suited to convention weapons. In dollar value
terms, the bulk of purchases have been made with Pakistani national fund, although American
grants have obscured these in recent years. According to Pentagon, total Foreign Military Sales
agreements with Pakistan worth of $5.4 billion for FY2002-FY2014 (Defense Department,
2015). Congress has provided about $3.6 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for
Pakistan since 2001, more than 66% of which has been distributed (State Department, May 4,
2015). These funds are used to purchase American military equipment to update for longer-term.
Pakistan was also given United States defense supplies as Excess Defense Articles (EDA). The
United States has provided 20 percent of its total post-9/11 help to Pakistan through various
security cum plans. The biggest of these has been the FMF program. Since 2005, America gave a
"base program" of $300 million every year at first. By FMF, Pakistan has acquired various things
that evidently have enhanced its counterinsurgency abilities (Kronstadt, 2008).
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By contradicting to this program, critics noted the propensity for Pakistan to get
conventional weapons that were not terribly useful for counterterrorism purposes, including $227
million in FY 2008 FMF to support Pakistan's F-16s mid-life upgrade program in contravention
of congressional requirements that FMF just be used for counterinsurgency preparing and
equipment. Pakistan had purchased used American Air Force jet, F-16s. Pakistan also arranged
the three P-3B airplane to be modified to carry the E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning suite,
but the transaction has not moved beyond the notification stage. Major Excess Defense Articles
granted to Pakistan since 2001 have included 14 F-16A/B combat aircraft and 16 T-37 military
trainer jet, with an additional 20 pending. In addition to get through FMF, Pakistan has spent
some $4.6 billion on foreign military sales (FMS), again with a focus on conventional platform
(Fact Sheet, 2015).
The following table shows the major United States arms deal to Pakistan. The column
(value) gives the total cost of the program, and the second (FMF), the extent to which this cost
was underwritten by the United States. In some case, the United States has covered the entire
cost of the whole expense of the program, but the sale of F-16 air craft, Pakistan has borne the
total cost. DoD has characterized many of Pakistan's major acquisitions (e.g., F-16 fighters, P-3C
patrol aircraft, and anti-armor missiles) as having significant antiterrorism applications. Thus, the
Department of State claims that, since 2005, FMF funds have been used exclusively for
counterterrorism efforts (Boucher, 2008). The department‟s “broad” definition has come under
fire from those who believe that United States funds could be used to build specific Pakistani
capabilities like nuclear capability instead of counterinsurgency in FATA. In this testimony to
the Senate Investigation Committee, Lawrence J. Korb said that the bulk of foreign military
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financing (FMF) had been used to purchase the major weapons systems such as F-16 fighters and
other aircraft, anti-ship, and antimissile capabilities (Korb, 2007).
Post 9/11, Major Excess Defense Articles granted to Pakistan have shown in the
following table.
Table No 6 FMF
Source: Kronstadt, &Grimmett, 2013
Quantity Equipment
Value $
M
FMF $ M
8 P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft and refurbishment 295 295
5250 TOW anti-armor missiles 186 186
5,600 Military radio sets 163 163
6 AN/TPS-77 surveillance radars 100 100
20 AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters 48 48
60 Mid-life upgrade kits for F-16A/B combat aircraft 891 108
115 M-109 self-propelled howitzers 87 53
18 F-16C/D Block 50/52 combat aircraft 1,430 0
500 Advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles 629 0
100 Harpoon antiship missiles 298 0
600 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles 95 0
6 Phalanx close-in naval guns 80 0
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3.13 Military Training
The United States has also provided training and security tactics to Pakistan forces
through the International Military Education and Training program. This package of relationship
allowed the United States to host officers from foreign militaries. International Military
Education and Training (IMET) enhanced professionalism and the development of generally
positive relations between the states and officer-to-officer relations. This training and trade
program indicated a great deal to offer Pakistan as a result of the part the Pakistani Army. It
additionally gives a method for social trade and advancement of the Pakistani Army. In October
2002, first joint Pakistan United States military exercise, "Inspired Gambit III", were conducted,
approximately 120 officers participated from each country (Kronstadt, 2008).
From 2002 to 2004, a US$1 million IMET package was granted to Pakistan every year.
This sum was later multiplied. Joined States, consequently, gave US $ 2 million through five
year support package (Zeb, 2004). In 2006, 725 combined Pakistani military work force profited
incorporating 106 armed force officers in different sorts of United States military preparing help.
In a large portion of these cases, Pakistani officers and troopers were told in the utilization of
most recent military equipment obtained by Pakistan (State Department, 2006).
There is another activity taken to improve counterinsurgency capacity, under Security
Development Plan, of Pakistan Army's world class commando Special Services Group (SSG)
unit and its helicopter versatility unit, the 21st Quick Reaction Squadron. SSG is, by a wide
margin, the most reasonable for counterinsurgency operations since it is the best unit of the
Pakistan Army. Joined States likewise gave preparing to more than 370 Army officers in an
extensive variety of administration and advancement programs for counterterrorism, knowledge,
coordination‟s, therapeutic, flight wellbeing, and military law (US Embassy in Islamabad, Feb.
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13, 2010). The F.B.I. additionally prepared various previous Pakistani armed force officers and
others in what is known as the "Arachnid Group" a casual insight gathering unit that is
particularly centered around observing the exercises of Pakistani Islamist bunches (Kronstadt,
2008).
The United States Embassy in Islamabad and American Central Command likewise
started the program for preparing the Frontier Constabulary. FC is a Federal Paramilitary force
under the Ministry of Interior however is under operational control of the Pakistan Army's XI
Corps. It includes two separate units, FC Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (K P) and FC Baluchistan, isolate
Inspectors General control each and its consolidated end quality is 80,000. FC officers are taken
from the Pakistan Army. In FY 2007-08, Department of Defense gave over $200 million to the
plan. The program was focused on expanding, training and equipping FC. The United States
planned to construct two training centers (one in Baluchistan and other in K P) where 30
American trainers, Special Operations Command, would train around 8,400 personnel, using the
"train the trainer" approach (State Department, 2006). DoD has explained to build an intelligence
ability with FC to exploit their linguistic skill and information of the human terrain (Hilali,
2009).
3.14 The Security Development Plan
The Security Development Plan is a program expected to upgrade Pakistan's capacity to
secure its borders with Afghanistan. It was a six-year program including different components.
The fundamental target of the program was to “permanently prevent militants and militants
exploiting from Pakistani territory as a „safe heaven‟ for attacks in Afghanistan Pakistan
(Negroponte, 2008). One significant element of the plan focused on expanding, training, and
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equipping FC. While FC KPK is overwhelmingly Pashtun, FC Baluchistan includes many who
are not ethnically Baluch. FC KPK has been deployed for several years in largely effective
operations against militants in FATA (Kronstadt K. A., 2010).
Another part of the Security Development Plan was the construct the six Border
Coordination Centers (BCCs). BCCs were proposed to facilitate NATO, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and the United States for a "common operational picture" of the border region and to develop
bilateral efforts to curtain Taliban developments (Negroponte, 2008). A "common picture"
should build confidence and enhance cooperation between the Afghan and Pakistan forces. As
per plan, three BCCs were to be based on Afghanistan domain along the Durand Line and three
on Pakistani side. By plan, one has been constructed so far on Afghan domain at the Torkham
border. Another area, on Afghan domain, has been indicated for a moment BCC. Pakistan has
gotten to be fruitful to fabricate BCCs on its domain. However Pakistan did not choose security
contact in BCCs (US Defense Department, May 2008).
The following arrangement of the Security Development Plan is to prepare the
counterinsurgency unit, SSG and its helicopter mobility units, the 21st Quick Reaction Squadron,
to enhance its capacity to fight in FATA and different parts of the Afghan border areas. SSG is
the most appropriate unit for counterinsurgency operations.
3.15 Assistance for Internal Security
The United States Departments of State and Justice gave assets to Pakistan's battle for
counter narcotics and enhance the capacity of law enforcement agencies. The United States
internal security plan consisted of the following:
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• To impart advanced management and leadership expertise to high ranked police officers
and basic investigative skills training to lower ranking police officers.
• To start finger print system for identification and forensic examination and set up a
national criminal database.
• To encourage better cooperation among law enforcement agencies, immigration, border
control, and other agencies responsible for internal law and order (Christine Fair and
Chalk, 2006).
The United States struggle to improve Pakistan's counter narcotics capabilities
overlapped with efforts to strengthen Pakistan's control over the Afghan border. Anti-smuggling
efforts involve the provision of ground and aerial inspection, the construction of in-out points
and poppy eradication. In spite of these projects, the weaknesses of Pakistan's law enforcement
agencies, the limited number of United States personnel on the ground, and the geographic and
topographical challenges posed by the area along made it difficult to achieve required results in
these regions (Christine Fair and Chalk, 2006).
Furthermore, according to Tittle III of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L.
111-32; H.Rept. 111-105), the State Department assumed $400 million for the newly established
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF). This total was provided to support Pakistani security
forces to their counterinsurgency efforts (Epstein & Kronstadt , 2012). The House
Appropriations Committee recommended that the funding be in the DOD appropriations for
FY2009 and that the Secretary of Defense authorities would expire with the expiration of the
funds. An extra $400 million was appropriated inside the State Department appropriations to be
made available as of September 30, 2009, for its Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund
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(PCCF). The committee recommended that the Secretary of State authority would be assumed in
current financial years (2009).
Table No 7 Direct Overt U.S Aid and Military Reimbursements to
Pakistan, FY2001-2014
3.16 Pakistan’s Assistance for United States
Instantly after 9/11, Pakistan was quick in announcing unequivocal support to US in war
against terrorism. Pakistan expressed complete solidarity with the United States in war on terror
in all structures and was eager to give moral support as well as logistic support and its military
basis. Pakistan's contribution allowed the coalition forces to make huge progress in the war on
terror, and has been recognized over the world. Pakistan has been serving as an indispensable
base and a travel point during war on terror. As United States Defense Department announced,
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"Pakistan has been giving base and over flight permission for United States led coalition forces
occupied in Afghanistan" (State Department, 2006). The United States Ambassador in Pakistan,
Chamberlain, said Pakistan provided unstinting support (Collins, 2008).
3.17 Air Bases and Logistic Support for United States
On September 24, 2001, “Pakistan agreed to provide blanket flyover and landing rights,
access to naval and air bases and petrol supplies” (Collins, 2008). Pakistan offered military bases
and also assisted for a number of services including intermediate stabilizing bases in Jacobabad,
Pasni, Dalbandin and Shamsi. Jacobabad, Shamsi bases also have been used for Drones as well
as 50 planes and 2000 coalition soldiers (Ansari, 2009). The airbase at Jacobabad had been vital
for US military tasks and the airport of Dalbandin was a key forward operational base. More than
57,000 United States military attacks have originated from Pakistani territory. Pakistan provided
2/3 of its airspace as air corridor to United States (Sanj, 2006).
In 2001 Pakistan also signed an agreement with the United States by which Pakistan
vowed to provide America all out support in logistics. Pakistan has been providing key player in
logistic support. More than 75% United States and NATO supplies passes through Pakistan
which includes gas, food, military equipment etc. Pakistan also provided fuel to aircraft be
around of daily 100,000 gallons (Sanj, 2006).
3.18 Intelligence Support
As indicated by provision, Pakistan provided intelligence support to American
alliedforces in Afghanistan, most note alby human intellignce which coalition forces badly
needed to complete its technical intelligence. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been
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supporting in various phases of operations. In 2002 joint operations between the ISI and CIA
have let to the capture to the high profile leaders of al Qaeda and Taliban pioneers. Khalid Al –
Attash a Yemeni was captured, who was needed for the bombing at US Cole. Other important
achievement was the capture of Ramzi Bin Al Shibh, who was apparently required in 9/11
attacks. Significant suspect of 9/11 Khalid Sheik captured by the operators of ISI and CIA in
2003. In 2003, Bush announced that more than 2700 aggressors purportedly connected with Al
Qaeda were captured in 60 nations, Pakistan have captured 500 Al Qaeda connected activists
more than whatever other nation (Khan, 2009). Amjad Farooqi who was included in the
assassination attempt of Ex-President Musharraf and he had likewise close connections with the
Mullah Umar and Osama bin Laden was gunned down the Pakistan police in 2004. As per a
report Pakistan gave more than 369 of the 689 caught aggressors to the United States (Khan,
2009).
3.19 Military Actions in Pakistan
Since 2001, Pakistan Army remained busy to face the security challenges and restore
peace by manipulating revolt and activism in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan as rebellion is
one of the hostile to the security, socio-political stability and economic prosperity of
Pakistan (Khan Z. A., 2014).
In the post 9/11 situation, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf focused on Al-Qaeda
and other foreign warriors as a part of the United States led Operation Enduring
Freedom. The Taliban were crushed in Afghanistan however could not be disposed of.
Their resistance changed into an uprising and a furnished battle against the outside
strengths and their nearby supporters. Pakistan gave wide range land, air, and seaport
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access, and in addition a large group of other strategic and security concerned
arrangements.
In mid-2002, Pakistani security forces began counter insurgency strikes against foreign
activists and their strong network in FATA. But, as the war broke out in Afghanistan,
several local insurgencies started to show up at first glance in the Pakistani side. At the
point when Pakistan extended its scope of operations, neighborhood extremists moved
here and there crosswise over FATA and adjacent areas. In July 2002, Pakistani forces
marched into the Torah Valley in the Khyber Agency and later, in 2004, Pakistani forces
propelled an operation in the valley looking for danger monger bastions in South
Waziristan and Wana valley as endeavors to incite the tribal rulers to handover outside
activists (Chechen, Uzbek and Arabs). In late 2007, several local militants joined the
hands with TTP, under the leadership of the South Waziristan based Baitullah Mehsud.
Under the umbrella of Mehsud, activists began fierce suicide attacks on Pakistani forces
and civilians throughout Pakistan (Jones & Fair, 2010).
Since the 9/11 scene, as indicated by an estimate, there is every tenth day attack in
Pakistan (Hali, 2011). As per Philip J. Crowley, United States Assistant Secretary of
State, "there was no nation that had suffered more significantly from terrorist than
Pakistan" (Frontier Post, 2010). As per the Express Tribune, "Pakistan has lost 49,000
lives since the merciless assaults of September 11, 2001. More than 24,000 individuals
both civilian and military work force were executed in psychological oppressor assaults
amid the period somewhere around 2001 and 2008. The most recent six years have
demonstrated costlier, in human terms. Another 25,000 or more individuals kicked the
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bucket amid military attacks against Taliban guerillas in the anxious tribal areas since
2008 (The Express Tribune, March 13, 2014).
Pakistani operations since 2001 were:
Operation Al Mizan (2002)
Operation Zalzala (2008),
Operations SherDil,
Rah-e-Haq,
Rah-e-Rast,
Operation Rah-e-Nijat
Operation Zarb-e-Azb
3.20 Operation Al Mizan
In 2002, Operation Al Mizan was lauched that included a few littler operations. Pakistan
conveyed 70,000-80,000 forces in FATA. The army cordon off the area for 13 days and launched
search operation in Wana. Associated Taliban and various aggressors including Nek Mohammad
Wazir, Noor-ul-Islam, Haji Mohammad Sharif, Maulvi Abbas and Maulvi Abdul Aziz
surrendered (Khan A. M., 2004). Moreover, Pakistan deployed the Frontier Corps and XI Corps,
based out of Peshawar, under the charge of Lieutenant-General Muhammad Safdar Hussain.
President Musharraf also visited the area to have a personal campaign to lead. On 26 March,
General Safdar Hussain declared victory: "We have finished the mission that was given to us,"
he declared (Khan A. M, 2004).
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3.21 Operation Zalzala
In 2008, Operation Zalzala (Earthquake) was launched in South Waziristan. Zalzala
aimed at clearing several areas held by Mehsud activists. The goal was to catch or dispense with
key activists in Mehsuds “network that challenged the writ of the government. In the coming
months, the armed force cleared the vast majority of the ranges of Spinkai, a Mehsud fortress,
and possessed a few towns and residential areas (Abbas, 2008). Operation Zalzala had cleared
most parts of South Waziristan, and disturbed some planned suicide attacks. The armed force
seized computers, weapons, improvised explosive devises and propaganda material. As indicated
by a report, security forces annihilated more than 4,000 houses in South Waziristan in January
2008 alone. Be that as it may, Operation Zalzala dislodged around 200,000 local people, bringing
on huge enmity (Ali, 2008). A progression of assaults on government organizations, including
ISI, Frontier Corps and armed force, spurred the armed force to hit back (Khan A. , 2007).
3.22 Rah-e-Haq
Armed force launched another operation to diminish activist components. The operation
Rah-e-Haq started on October 25, 2007 in Swat against Taliban-led insurgents to evacuate Swat
region. Between October 25 and November 7, 2007 the militants held control of the beautiful
valley of Swat. Taliban began anti state activities like ban on female education, over throw the
legal framework of judiciary, shut down of hairstyling parlors, controlled neighborhood radio
stations and applied their own rule and regulations for the area in other words it could be said
that Taliban had set up a state with in a state (BBC, 2013).
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3.23 Rah-e-Rast
In 2008 the pioneer of TNSM Moulana Fazlullah, nicknamed "Mullah Radio" had strong
connection with TTP which had solid connections with jihadi group of Asmatullah Shaheen
Bhittani. In February 2009, Baithullah Mehsood joined the Afghan Taliban, primarily Maulvi
Nazir, to frame Shura Ittihadul Mujahideen (SIM) and Mullah Omer as their Amir-ul-Mumineen.
On February 14, 2009 the KPK government consented to a peace concurrence with TNSM. For
temporary agreement the Taliban were agreed and the administration allowed the usage of
Shariah in the locale in this way violence was ceased (Aziz, 2010).
In the last week of April 2009, Pakistan military forces started another operation, Rah-e-
Rast, against non-state actors and groups in Malakand agency of KPK. The choice of operation
was made after the disappointment of two agreements, first with the Mullah Fazlullah who led
the local Taliban group, and second with Sufi Muhammad head of Tahrik e Nafaz e Shariet e
Mohammadi (TNSM). Taliban had declined to take after the understanding, to set out their
weapons even after the declaration of the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation in the entire locale. Taliban
challenged the writ of government and attacks on security forces including Pakistan Army, FC
and police. Prior to the dispatch of the security operation keeping in mind the peace
understanding was still in place, militants carried out 18 terrorist attacks in Swat, Dir and Buner
regions of Malakand division in the month of April (Rana, 2009).
3.24 Rah-e-Nijat
Operation Rah e Nijat was begun in summer 2009. In Operation Rah-e-Nijat, Pakistan
Air Force led surgical sticks in South Waziristan amid summer 2009. Yet, amidst emerging the
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viciousness, the Pakistani Army started ground operations in South Waziristan on October 17,
2009, with gunship helicopter and fixed wing aircraft (Mehsud, 2009).
The eleventh Corps was overall command, with three divisions: the seventh put in
Miramshah; the ninth in Wana and the fourteenth deployed to Jandola. The main objective of
these operations was to crush the TTP strongholds at Ladha, Makin, and Sararogha as these
zones were viewed as their bastions (Mehsud, 2009). Pakistani ground troops led inquiry and
freedom operations in significant territories of South Waziristan, for example, the Central
Waziristan street through Ahmad Wam and Ragha. By December 2009, Pakistan Army hold the
greater part of Ladha, Makin, and Sararogha (Daily Dawn, December 28, 2009).
The forces prevailed with regards to disturb TTP and occupied the control center of
Mehsud tribal in South Waziristan. The forces, additionally, secured the control of other
authoritative spots of TTP, key line of communication in South Waziristan, including Sararogha,
Makin, and Ladda. By January 2010, Pakistan Army physically washed away various towns of
South Waziristan and captured overwhelming weapons from activists (Dawn, January 2, 2010).
3.25 Zarb-e-Azb
After various operations, the terrorist fled into safe houses in North Waziristan. The
terrorists groups used NWA as a base to battle a war against Pakistan that had hampered the
national life; blocking her financial advancement that created colossal helpful and different
misfortunes. The ISPR expressed, "Utilizing North Waziristan as a base, these fear based
oppressors has pursued the war against the condition of Pakistan and had been upsetting our
national life in its whole measurement, hindering our economic development and causing
enormous death toll and prosperity" (Dawn, June 16, 2014). So in 2012 Pakistani stakeholders
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conducted a meeting to sought out solution of menace of terrorism. All Parties Conference was
held on ninth September 2013, in which a determination was passed for beginning the dialogue
with the Taliban as a first option to counter terrorism (tribune.com.pk). But, all efforts to engage
the militants seemed fail while terrorist attacks continued. In late 2013, the political leadership in
Pakistan forewarned for a military operation against terrorists which was named Operation Zarb-
e.-Azb.
A long awaited Operation Zarb-eAzb was launched on fifteenth June 2014 in NWA.
Operation Zarb-e-Azb in NWA was begun to restore peace in settled areas of Pakistan. So it was
guaranteed that this operation would expel fear mongering totally from Pakistani soil and battle
would be proceeded till the end of last psychological militant. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
swore that the Operation Zarb e Azb would finish up just with the total defeat of the insurgents.
Furthermore he said "We will change the destiny of this nation and by no means will the nation
be permitted to serve as a safe haven”.
Following table shows the figure about the number of killed and injured in Pakistan after
9/11.
Table No 8 Fatalities in FATA: 2006-2014
Years Civilians SFs Militants
2001 41 13 41
2002 32 70 110
2003 18 24 46
2004 24 52 19
145
2005 9 19 32
2006 109 144 337
2007 424 243 1014
2008 1116 242 1709
2009 636 350 4252
2010 540 262 4519
2011 488 233 2313
2012 549 306 2046
2013 319 198 1199
2014 159 194 2510
Total 4464 2351 20147
Source: SATP, *Data till March 15, 2015
3.26 The Drone Attacks
America has used drones to hit terrorists. The United States uses drones in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Currently in Pakistan, it has been used systematically for the anti-terrorist technique
to eliminate blame for having participated in psychological terrorism exercises. Gary Solis, a
professor at Georgetown University, says: "In our present armed conflict there are two drone
offensives one is directed by our soldiers in the theaters of war and the other in Pakistan by the
Central Intelligence Agency" (Solis, 2010). Drone Attacks around Durand Line are the
expansion of post-9/11 war from Afghanistan to Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan has
146
launched a number of military actions in the tribal areas to resist al-Qaeda and other settled areas
of Pakistan to reduce the terror activities.
The Bush administration had been frustrated by the failure of the Pakistani government to
contain al-Qaeda and Taliban activists taking refuge in FATA. In addition, the United States
leaders have trusted that militants have been used FATA region as "safe haven" to launch cross
border attacks against the United States and NATO troops. Under these conditions, the Pentagon,
in 2004, was secretly allowed to attack al-Qaeda attackers in Pakistan (Goraya. & Mazhar,
2011). Harold Koh of the United States Department of State comments that "drone strikes are
legal for the privilege of self-preservation." As Koh said, "the United States is involved in a clash
with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban." Thereafter, it could resort to self-protection under international
law (Japan Times, 21-03- 2010).
The CIA operates drones from the CIA headquarters or from its bases in Khost (Sohrab
& Choudhry, 2012). For the most part, the UAVs used MQ-1 Predator and all the later MQ-9
Reaper terminate AGM-114 Hellfire rockets. The following table shows the total drone strikes in
remote areas of Pakistan. The Obama administration has significantly increased and intensified
the strikes of drones against Al Qaeda and its partners.
Table No 9 Drone Strikes
Year
Number of
Drone Strikes
Militants Civilians Others Totals
2004 1 3 2 2 7
2005 3 5 6 4 15
2006 2 01 93 0 94
147
2007 4 51 0 12 63
2008 36 223 28 47 298
2009 54 387 70 92 549
2010 122 788 16 45 849
2011 73 420 62 35 517
2012 48 268 5 33 306
2013 26 145 4 4 153
2014 22 145 0 0 145
Total 391 2436 286 274 2996
counterterrorism.newamerica.net, 20-02-2016
According to a report, the United States agencies have proclaimed that UAV attacks have
proved a slow but consistently effective tool for expelling Al Qaeda leaders (Ignatius, Dec. 17,
2010). According to Vice President Joe Biden, "Al Qaeda and its allies are indeed on the run"
(Feinstein., 2011.). Other Americans also noted that the UAV attacks have created confusion
among the Taliban.
Contrary to what has been said above, some American political figures and scholars have
condemned the drone strikes. The US official Dennis Kucinich argues that "the United States is
violating international law by performing drone strikes against a country that has never attacked
the United States" (Dawn, September 14, 2008). Gary D. Solis, a professor at Georgetown
University, stressed that since the start of the operation, civilians had been directly involved in
148
armed conflicts; They had become "unlawful combatants" and finally prosecuted. (McKelvey,
2011).
The Pakistani public protested these attacks because it was a violation of its authority.
But according to the Daily Telegraph, the Pakistani intelligence services secretly agreed to
provide information to the United States about the allies of the militants. The government of
Pakistan would permanently denounce the attacks publicly (The Daily Telegraph, 18 May 2013).
However, on October 4, 2008, the Washington Post revealed the report that there was a secret
agreement between the United States and Pakistan allowing these drones attacks (Washington
Post, 04-10-2008). Anne W. Patterson, a former US ambassador to Pakistan, said that the
country's political elite has permitted strikes in tribal areas (Ahmed, 2014). Washington often
claims that drones attacks are made with Pakistani support which is justified with respect to
international law. Article 20 of the United Nations explains the states liability for an
internationally unlawful act, declares a valid unlawfulness of the act in respect of the first State
to the scope that the act remains within the limits of consent.
3.27 Do More Policy
Post 9/11 Pakistan United States relations contained stress and strains in light of the wide
difference in their observations and strategies. The recent Pakistan –United States convergence
contains solid components of divergence as well. The tribal territory has intensified the US
dependence on Pakistan and divergence is greater than even. Even during this phase of
engagement, there has been vicissitude at the bilateral level and Pakistan is not completely
trusted. In spite of energetic effort, Pakistan seems to have failed to convince US regarding
149
designed role to eradicate Al-Qaeda network in FATA. But, the United States has been
increasing pressure to 'Do More' since 9/11 (Ahmed N. , 2012).
In this episode of relationship, there is trust deficit between the states. Though Pakistan
changed its pro-Taliban approach but the United States remained doubtful and alleged that
Taliban were still receiving strategic and logistic support inside Pakistan (Kakar, 2014). Some
American senior authorities additionally talked in such stresses that elements of Pakistan's
insight offices may help Taliban and maybe even Al Qaeda (Dao, 2003). In October 2003, Peter
Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense, said "There are elements in Pakistani government
whom we think have pre 9/11 approach including radical Islamic framework that spews out
fighters into Kashmir and also into Afghanistan" (Jabeen, 2009).
Pakistan is the "most allied ally" of America and has been playing an indispensable role
as front line but the frustration is arising among the military officers on both sides because aid
produced neither battle field success nor great trust. The United States officials asserted that the
Pakistani government had lacked sufficient commitment against enemy (Steinhoff, 2009).
Amember from American think tanks association, Rand Corporation, Seth Jones said “American
equipment is not being used in a sustained way. Moreover he said the Pakistan armed force is not
extremely effective" (Jones S. G., 2012). Congressperson Evan Bayh said "we make a greater
place of refuge with an instable government" (Knowlton, 2013).
There is a common believe within the United States in both executive branch and
Congress, that Pakistan must „do even more‟ than it was currently doing. As US Under Secretary
Nicholas Burns, put it directly, "We would like to see a more sustained and effective efforts by
the Pakistani government to defeat terrorist forces on its soil. Al Qaeda remains a powerful force
150
inside Pakistan, similar to the Taliban. Defeating these enemies is vital to our efforts to defeat
terrorism in South Asia and around the world" (Burns, 2007). American Congress demonstrated
its frustration with Islamabad's counterterrorism efforts (Tellis, 2008). In 2007, the House of
Representatives advanced to force the condition by demanding that Pakistan must struggle,
trying every conceivable push to prevent the Taliban from working in areas under its sovereign
control as the cost for continued with US aid (Roxana, 2007).
Bush Administration which has been a staunch supporter of Musharraf government,
started to discuss secretly and publicly about Pakistan's contribution in war on terror. In summer
2008, President Bush took secret unilateral action and authorized American military to invade an
ally (Iqbal, 2008). He permitted Joint Special Operation Command, a branch of military, to make
covert attack into Pakistan territory. Other analysts have proposed stronger form of provision
such as smart sanctions directed at Pakistan army an attempt to make Pakistan pro-active to
follow counterterrorism obligations (Washington Post, March 15, 2007).
In 2009, resetting the bilateral relationship under Obama administration was
implementing the bipartisan Kerry-Lugar bill, which enhanced the three times normality
assistance and set condition demanding more responsible action by Pakistan. The Obama
administration provided assistance to the Pakistani military, but with strict conditions of „do
more'. The arrival of further American troops in Afghanistan was additionally a consistent
pressure on Pakistan to "do more". Washington has additionally been increasing immense
pressure on Pakistan to extend its operation to North Waziristan and focus on the Haqqani
network and different militant groups in the region.
151
Once again „do more‟ demand was made by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton when
unsuccessful attempt of the Times Square incident repeated by activists. She said that if an
unsuccessful event like the bombing of Times Square which was obviously the craft of an
uninitiated individual, might prompt her to think about the severe consequences for Pakistan
(The Nation May 16, 2010). On January 24, 2014, the US President Barack Obama urged
Pakistan to show it is "serious" about crushing extremist networks operating on its territory,
saying the most recent mass killing of students need for decisive action. Obama communicated
the crackdown on extremists was "the right policy" but was quoted as saying that Pakistan "can
and must" take more effective and numerous action (The Express Tribune, January 24, 2015).
The US president praised the security forces but said more should to be done to eradicate Islamic
radicalism.
152
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158
Chapter No 04
Post 9/11 Pakistan-United States Economic Relations
159
4.1 Pakistan’s Economic Compulsions
After the end of the Cold War, the Pakistani economy moved under the weight of a huge
external debt. Pakistan is an agricultural country, but its agricultural sector has been severely
affected by drought. The industrial sector was also sick as well as private and foreign investment
was very low. These factors were responsible for constraining growth well below the 6-7 percent
range that led to the risk of a significant increase in poverty in the country (Hilali, 2009).
Pakistan's main textile export was suffered back by an eruption of canceled orders that damaged
all sectors of activity in the country.
Pre 9/11 Pakistan‟s economy can be seen from the following table:
Table No 10 Growth Performance of Real Sector
Pakistan‟s feeble and flimsy economy was heavily depended on various external capital
flows. The main official and private sources of capital flows in Pakistan can be seen in the
following table.
160
Table No 11 Sources of External Capital Flows to Pakistan
Pakistan the economy of an elitist state, economic survey of Pakistan 1999
The external capital flow into Pakistan affected badly after its nuclear explosions in 1998.
All the official donors IMF, World Bank, ADB and Japan put off their aid and imposed sanctions
on the economy of Pakistan (Hashmi, 2005). Consequently, the balance of payment became
highly susceptible and the country‟s debt situation had been deteriorated. In Pakistan the public
debt was Rs. 802 billion in 1990 which grew up to Rs. 2971 billion in mid-1999. As the external
debt had almost doubled from 1990 to 1998 from US$ 22 billion, it reached almost $ 43 billion
(including foreign currency deposits of nearly US$ 11 billion) by 1998 (Hilali, 2009). In
addition, the country was overloaded with more external debt of $ 21 billion in 1998 (Sattar,
2005).
From 1998 to 2001, Pakistan's economic situation deteriorated dramatically. Foreign
exchange reserves have not been sufficient due to the lack of financial discipline in the country
(Hussain, 1999). The International rating agencies had been downgraded Pakistan to a selective
default level. In addition, the events of September 11 affected directly or indirectly the Pakistani
161
economy and regular orders were canceled or postponed, investors lost confidence and banned
traveling to Pakistan, and it also became difficult to go abroad.
So reviving the economy was an urgent task for Pakistani stakeholders. Over extension
and various international sanctions had taken a toll on Pakistan economy. Low economic growth
rate was one of the compulsions for Pakistan‟s readiness to cooperate with United States led war
on terror. The economy of Pakistan was to collapse before being rescued by massive aid. On
September 19, 2001, Musharraf made a speech to nation and justified his decision to join the
international coalition by identifying economic priorities for government.
4.2 Post 9/11 United States Economic Assistance for Pakistan
Musharraf quickly and essentially decided to support America after the incidents of 9/11.
America was given access to Afghanistan through Pakistan‟s territory and airspace paid
important dividends to Pakistan. America bailed out Pakistan and also lifted sanctions. Pakistan‟s
support in war on terror rewarded with a new phase of relations to boost up its fragile economy.
United States, European countries, Japan and other countries of the region opened up their
markets for Pakistan. Specially, United States economic support and financial help pushed
Pakistan‟s economy to grow and up stretched the country‟s foreign capitals to US $ 12.7 billion
as compared to $ 1 billion in 2001 (Sengupta, 2005). Pakistani textile items were given greater
admittance to the United States‟ market. A detailed analysis of United States economic
assistance to Pakistan is as follows.
4.3 Economic Support Fund
After 9/11, under the section 620 E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended
on September 22, 2001 and authorized President Bush to assist the states and organizations in
162
order to promote economy. The Economic Support Fund (ESF) was requested under this
authorization represented a significant proportion of United States assistant to Pakistan. For the
first time in November 2001 “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 2001 (P. L. 107-38)”
consisted of $ 600 million in cash transferred to Pakistan under ESF (Rizwan, 2010).
For the first of five years aid plan, in 2004, President Bush requested the Congress for aid
package of US$ 3 billion for Pakistan which was started in 2005 (Cohen, 2005). Annual
payments of US$ 600 million are also divided into military and economic assistance for fiscal
year 2005-09. As part of the Administration Plan for Pakistan, it was agreed that 200 million
dollars of ESF each year (two-thirds of the program) would be provided in the form of "budget
support". Direct economic aid programs include health, education, food, promotion of
democracy, improvement of human rights and benefits for trade preferences (Kronstadt, 2008).
4.4 Restructuring and Reducing Debts
After 9/11, the United States formalized the agreement restructuring Pakistan‟s $3 billion
debt by one year later, at a signing ceremony on August 23, 2002 in Islamabad (Bokhari, 2002).
Furthermore, In April 2003 United States reduced Pakistan‟s bilateral official debt by US$1
billion. In addition to this, Pakistan requested additional debt reduction and about US$500
million more bilateral debt was reduced in financial year 2004 (Hilali, 2009).
4.5 Kerry Lugar Bill
After the first five year aid package, 2004-2009 the United States offered new format of 5
year economic assistance program. The new bill, “The Enhanced Partnership Act of 2009” is
known as Kerry-Lugar Bill. It was moved in Washington on January 6, 2009 and passed by the
Senate on September 24, and the House of Representatives on October 1 at last the President
163
Obama signed it on October 15, 2009 (K-L Bill, 2009). The bill put certain conditions to be met
by Pakistan such as not to back the terrorist and extremist groups, pull to pieces their bastions,
firm control on military by the civilian stakeholders. Specifically, Section 101(a) provides that
“The President is authorized to provide assistance to Pakistan to support the consolidation of
democratic institutions; to support the expansion of rule of law, build the capacity of government
institutions, and promote respect for internationally-recognized human rights; to promote
economic freedoms and sustainable economic development; to support investment in people,
including those displaced in on-going counterinsurgency operations; and to strengthen public
diplomacy” (Kerry, May 2009).
It was a prime example of “smart power” (Dawn, October 6, 2009) because it uses only
civilian economic aid to achieve an overall effect that is greater than the sum of its parts.
Economically and civil, this bill tripled non-military aid to US$ 1.5 billion a year for five years.
A projection of the levels of assistance to be provided to Pakistan under this Act, broken down
into the following categories:
(i) Civil liberties
(ii) Political rights
(iii) Voice and accountability
(iv) Government effectiveness
(v) Rule of law
(vi) Control of corruption
(vii) Immunization rates
(viii) Public expenditure on health
(ix) Girls‟ primary education completion rate
164
(x) Public expenditure on primary education
(xi) Natural resource management
(xii) Business start-up
(xiii) Land rights and access
(xiv) Trade policy
(xv) Regulatory quality
(xvi) Inflation control
(xvii) Fiscal policy (Strategy Report, 2009).
In order to receive this aid, Pakistan must have to meet an annual certification to US
Congress that army and spy services are genuinely cooperating. The bill also places condition to
ensure that money is used for intended purposes. There were differences in Pakistan Army and
civilian government on conditions approved by the United States. Hence part of it was to fund
the public sector development projects, in this way it supports Benazir Income Support Program
and Higher Education Commission scholarships.
4.6 FATA Development Plan
The tribal region of Pakistanis remote, separated, poor, and exceptionally conventional in
social practices. The social and financial privation of the tenants supposedly makes the region a
particularly attractive breeding ground for violent extremist. The United States assisted
development initiative for the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas launched in 2003 by the
following task to improve quality of education, develop healthcare services and increase
opportunities for economic growth and micro-enterprise specifically in Pakistan western tribal
areas, (USAID, 2010). USAID for FY2001-07, around 6% of U.S. financial aid to Pakistan has
been assigned for undertakings in the FATA ((Kunder, 2007).
165
The Bush Administration asked Congress to keep subsidizing a proposed five-year, $750
million aid, planned for the FATA started in FY2007. The plan was to support Islamabad's own
ten-year, $2 billion Sustainable Development effort there. Corruption is endemic in the tribal
area and security conditions are poor that Western nongovernmental contractors find it extremely
hard to work. "Half of the allocated funds likely would be provided to administrative costs"
(New York Times, December 25, 2007).
4.7 Economic Growth Program under USAID
The role of USAID program in Pakistan has been playing very effective role. After eight-
year delay USAID revived its Mission in Pakistan in July 2002. The organization's strategy
developed in consultation with Pakistan counter partner focused on education health,
administration and economic development. Currently USAID has direct funding relationship
with some 40 partners or associations covering all components of the USAID portfolio in
Pakistan. Almost half of the project is headed by Pakistanis. The activities and achievements of
USAID in Pakistan, since 9/11, can be summarized as following:
1 Since 2003, USAID supported the provision of 404,390 microfinance loans to
predominantly rural population in remote areas and to small business that required bigger
microfinance loans.
2 USAID supported small and medium enterprises (SME) in the pearls and gems, dairy,
marble and rock, cultivation, furniture, and surgical instruments parts, prompting to the
speculation of over $110 million in private and public funds and generating policy
reforms to improve SME intensity.
166
3 USAID assisted formers in remote areas of Baluchistan to increase their income by 23
percent through upgrades to their water asset administration, the introduction of water
efficient crops and modern animal husbandry and feed and rangeland management
practice.
4 USAID completed wind and solar energy resources assessment maps to assist the
Government of Pakistan in responding to its energy needs and develop renewable energy
resources (USAID Fact sheet, January 2010)
5 Earthquake Reconstruction Program the US Government has been on the forefront of
relief and reconstruction since the October 2005 earthquake struck Pakistan's Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (K P) and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) areas. Along with other
donors, the United States provided medical and social relief to US$2. 6 million survivors
and helped them come back to their communities. USAID's US$200 million, five year
Earthquake Reconstruction Program was rebuilding 56 schools and 19 health facilities
destroyed by the earthquake reviving and improving education and human services
benefits via preparing educators and medical staff to reestablish jobs with extended
economic opportunities and helping the population come back to their past way of life.
(Reality sheet Earthquake, January 2010)
6 The Entrepreneurs project expanded market opportunities for micro and small
enterprises. Through this project, USAID anticipated impacting at least 12,000
entrepreneurs, of which 75 percent would be ladies. Achieving the objective requires
building up the capacities of NGOs and private sector and working with micro and
smaller scale enterprises to significantly scale up their operations.
167
7 The Trade project helps to improve the environment in Pakistan, resultantly the export
enhanced, more competitive enterprises and increased employment opportunities. The
project will work through policy level intervention, capacity building and support to duty
free zones and firms in these zones engaged in export (USAID certainty Sheet, 13-01-
2011).
8 The Firms project helps develop a dynamics, internationally competitive business sector
in Pakistan that was increasing export, employing more people and producing improved
value and improved value added products and services. Project works at the policy level,
with business sectors and services providers to support efforts to improve the capacity of
production and competitiveness.
9 Pakistan continues to face major challenges to need the education needs of its citizens.
Today approximately 20 million school age children don't have access to quality
education and literacy rates are extremely low (69 percent for men and 44 percent for
ladies). USAID programs guaranteed that approximately 900,000 school age children
were able to attend class. More than 3,000 education administrators and 12,000 educators
were trained in administration and teaching techniques to improve educational quality
and increase student learning process. USAID created 89 new research and training
programs under Pakistan The US Science and Technology program (USAID reality sheet
for Education, 2010).
10 After the bilateral Strategic Dialog meetings in Islamabad, US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton announced $21 million in USAID-supported project to boost Pakistan‟s
agricultural productivity and to open new market opportunities
168
11 In Nov 2010 USAID announced another $90 million contribution to the UN World Food
Program's (WFP) and Pakistan flood response operation, increasing the United States
Government (USG) provision of emergency fund assistance to flood affected Pakistanis
to $230 million. As part of the $90 million contribution, USAID's Office of Food for
Peace (USAID/FFP) is providing Title II in-kind emergency food assistance valued at
$45 million, including more than 37,000 metric tons (MT) of wheat flour, 6,100 MT of
vegetable oil, and 2,700 MT of peas. USAID/FFP is complementing its in-kind food
assistance with a $45 million grant from the Emergency Food Security Program, which
will allow WFP to meet immediate food assistance needs by purchasing food in local
markets, including approximately 70,000 MT of wheat in Pakistan (USAID Reality
Sheet, 2011).
12 On November 10, 2010 USAID provided $5.1 million to early recovery programs in six
of the most severely affected in Sind and Baluchistan regions. Through the program
approximately 20,000 individuals took interest in real cash-for-activities to prepare form
land for the winter planting season and rehabilitate irrigation infrastructure. Furthermore
the grantee provided 1,000 small business across six districts with cash grants, valued
between $100 and $400, to restock things lost during flood, repair damaged machinery
tools needed to carry out business functions.
13 Including (mid Nov. 2010) USAID commitments add up to USG help to Pakistan has
expanded to almost $562 million. The United States has also provided other civilian and
military in-kind assistance, valued at approximately $89 million as halal meals, pre-
fabricated steel bridges and air support to and within Pakistan.
169
4.8 United States Trade Assistance for Pakistan
US found a way to promote and support Pakistan's trade which can be summarized as
following:
4.8.a Pakistan United State Business Council
United States Chamber of Commerce officially launched the US Pakistan Business
Council (USPBC) On September 30th, 2002. The United States-Pakistan Business Council was
the main private sector association of the United States companies with business and investment
interest in Pakistan. The Council is a part of South Asia Affairs division of the US chamber of
Commerce in Washington, DC, and is run under the administrative aegis of the Chamber. The
primary role of the US Pakistan Business Council is to encourage a more prominent attention to
business opportunities in Pakistan and further to expand United States foreign direct investment
in Pakistan. The Council brings together American and Pakistani business leaders for
constructive discussion of business conditions and policy related issues. Mr. Willard A. Laborer,
Senior Vice President of International Affairs at the US Chamber of Commerce said, "The
Chamber considers the United States-Pakistan Business Council to be a solid appearance of
developing American business interest in Pakistan" (Akhtar, 2003).
Business relations between the Pakistan and United States have developed significantly
in parallel with the two counties' strategic alliance. The United States is one of Pakistan's most
important trading partners and the Musharraf government was working to encourage trade-
friendly policies for Pakistan in the United States in order to support the United States business
ventures in Pakistan (uspbc.org, 2010). The United States-Pakistan Business Council played a
key role in providing the United States companies with the information they have to put
170
resources into Pakistan. The United States business provided the primary source for foreign
investment in Pakistan, constituting 41% of total foreign direct investment in the last years. Now
more than seventy United States companies are productively engaged in Pakistan (uspbc.org,
2010).
United States authorities have also worked to create an enabling framework for American
investors to explore economic opportunities in Pakistan. OPIC has offered a credit of $300
million for business in Pakistan. The United States EXIM bank also offered a Letter of Credit
(LC) facility of $125 million through the business banks of Pakistan and has approved financing
of $372 million to Pakistani International Airlines to purchase the Boeing air ship (Fact Sheet,
2010).
4.8.b TIFA and ROZ
The Pakistani economy was greatly helped by United States to provide a favorable
market access package for certain Pakistani exports textile which a critical commodity for
Pakistan and employ a large part of the industrial workforce. In June 2003, The Government of
Pakistan marked “Trade and Investment Framework Agreement” (TIFA) with United States
which is an important towards a Free Trade Agreement. Reconstruction Opportunity Zones
(ROZs) that was to facilitate further development in business. The ROZ program provided duty
free access into the United States market for certain goods and production in approved areas and
potentially created significant employment opportunities. In March 2008, more than two years
after the initiative, was announced under the section S. 2776 of forging assistance act 1961.
171
4.8.c Trade Mission and Mango Project
During the fourth round of strategic dialogue in 2010 Hillary Clinton announced Trade
Mission to Pakistan. "United States will organize and sponsor a visit by American business
leaders to Pakistan. The Trade Mission will be aimed at facilitating new business ties between
American and Pakistani firms with the objective of creating new economic opportunities in both
countries. Moreover she announced Mango Export Project. United States will support a three
year infrastructure program in partnership with leading mango farms in southern Punjab and
northern Sind as well as finance infrastructure such as hot water treatment of facilities sorting
and grading machines, blast chiller and storage facilities”. On June 15, 2010 US began the
process that allowed for trail shipment of Pakistani mangoes to the United States (State
Department 2010).
4.9 International Aid
Pakistan's support to coalition opened up new vistas of participation at world level.
International aid was provided to Pakistan, a sum of US$ 3 billion including grant, write off
bilateral debt and humanitarian assistance.
4.10 International Monitory Fund
Before the end of 2001, IMF was satisfied with Pakistan's financial advance (The
Economist September 22, 2001). International Monetary Fund (IMF) negotiated new loan
packages for the country. Pakistan received another amount of US$ 1.7 billion from international
financial institution sponsored by United States and US $ 700 million per annum in bilateral
assistance (Los Angeles Times, November 16, 2003).
172
4.11 Paris Club
By the end of 2001, The Paris Club additionally declared that it was satisfied with
Pakistan's economic progress (mofa.gov.pk, 02-01-2011). In 2002, the United States led Paris
Club efforts to reschedule Pakistan's debt on generous terms.
4.12 Friends of Pakistan
The Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP) was established in New York on 26
September 2008 at the side line of the United Nations General Assembly session, [PR. No.
356/2009] as a forum for the purpose of extending support to the elected dispensation of the
country in its efforts to consolidate democracy and support nation-wide social and economic
development damaged due to war on terror. The initial meeting, in Abu-Dhabi, was co-chaired
by the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan (geo.tv,
November 17, 2008).
On 17 August 2009 FoDP donors pledged $ 5.28 billion to stabilize the strife-torn
country (Hilali, 2009). On 24 September 2009 after the 64th session of the General Assembly in
which UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon appealed to the international community to help
Pakistan handle terrorist threats and the issue of internal displaced persons (IDPs). It was
stressed on this occasion “While Pakistan remains committed to eliminate the menace of
terrorism and determined to become an anchor of peace and stability, it needs the ethical,
material and political support of its companions and partners (Hali, 2011).
However, sources said, only a fraction, just over a $1.0 billion or 25 percent of the
promised amount had so far been received by Pakistan with many of the Nations espousing
friendship releasing the amount of either at a snail‟ space or not at all in 2009 to 2010. There is a
173
deepening trust deficit in view of Islamabad's failure to execute crucial economic reforms and a
sudden a shift to donors‟ towards the humanitarian works in the local floods affected areas as
major reasons for the change in attitude exhibited by FoDP.
4.13 Pakistan’s Economic Cost of WOT
Pakistan's economy, which has already been fluctuating due to numerous constraints like
the international economic collapse, political instability and financial mismanagement, had
suffered innumerable damage. Since Pakistan has been supporting the United States in war on
terror, the insurgency in Afghanistan has spilled over into FATA and other settled areas of
Pakistan. The Afghan fugitives are the source of numerous acts of violence and terrorism that
plague the whole country. While the terrorist activities are on the rise, the economy is sliding
downward, the much needed foreign investment is not forthcoming and the development of the
country is being adversary affected. The cumulative economic loss is moving on day by day into
billions of dollars.
Various factors like war on terror, indigenous suicide attacks and rehabilitation of
internal displaced persons (IDPs) consumed a sizeable portion of the governmental financial
resources, thus widening the fiscal deficit and hampering economic growth. With the ever
looming threat of terrorist violence, normal business require more time and extra security for
their transactions. Unfortunately, due to the terrorist activities, the image of the country has been
affected severely. Subsequently, there has been reluctance on the part of several countries to
issue visas to Pakistanis. This has affected a broad spectrum of society including businessman,
students and professionals who want to study of work abroad and bring proactive wealth back to
the country in the form of remittance. There has also been negative impact on Pakistan's trade
174
links with other countries. Simultaneously, investors were not ready to come in Pakistan even
foreign governments discourage their citizens from traveling to Pakistan either for business or
any other purpose.
Terrorism created uncertainty, reduce confidence and increase risk perception that turned
into lower rate of investment and economic growth. Pakistan has lost precious lives and
infrastructure but also a loss of more than $100 billion since 2001(Iqbal & Lodhi, 2014).
4.14 Pakistan-United States Strategic Dialogue
Various other frameworks of agreements were signed and forums were created to
continue the relationship, but in general they not functioned well. The Pakistan United States
strategic dialogue was the umbrella under which the various rounds of discussion were held. It
was launched in April 2006 and was intended to broaden relationship between Pakistan and
the United States beyond the narrow focus on defense to include increased commercial,
educational, technological exchange, cooperation on energy, science. The strategic dialogue is
run by the US State Department and Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Energy cooperation
was included in part to improve Pakistan‟s discontent with the United States effort negotiate an
agreement on civil nuclear deal with India. The United States offered Pakistan grants for coal
mining and power generation project. However Pakistan considered these offers meager. The
dialogue did not successful in balance in shifting the balance of United States assistance away
from defense to other areas. The relatively low priority that the United States and Pakistani
governments have ascribed to issues that are not related to security is reflected in the period
when dialogue began: spring 2006, the initiation of the post 9/11 Pakistan-United States
partnership. Pakistani interlocutors contended that the Pakistani government had largely
175
undermined that forum because any “strategic dialogue” would have adverse domestic impacts
(Fair, Crane, , Christopher , & Spirtas, 2010).
Many Pakistanis have objections on the Indo US nuclear deal of July 19, 2005 and the
United States support to India in atomic innovation. Pakistan, a non-NATO partner, expected
unbiased treatment. Thus, Pakistan had been squeezing for an atomic collaboration as the United
States had with India. In any event, the United States has not consented to the issue. Finally,
strategic dialogue has been attempted by the United States to offer the new format of
engagement to ensure mutual trust, mutual respect and to remove the trust deficit.
On February 22, 2006, President Bush said "Pakistan now has the chance to compose
another section in its history and the United States needs to manufacture an expansive and
enduring key association with the general population of Pakistan" (certainty document, 31-03-
2006). The President of America, Bush and the President of Pakistan, Musharraf launched a
strategic dialogue. The process of dialogue between Pakistan and America was launched in 2006
when President George W. Bush visited Pakistan on his way back from India. Bush and
Musharraf committed to attempt the steps for economic growth and prosperity, energy, peace
and security, social development, science and technology (State Department, 2006). Strategic
discussion moved on the following points:
4.14.a War on Terror
The United States and Pakistan cooperated in the war on terror including along the
Afghan Pakistan border
176
4.14.b Security
The Bush administration promised to provide $ 1.5 billion in foreign military funds to
Pakistan for the period 2005-2009.
America also promised to support Pakistan's barrier needs through leadership offers.
To alleviate the path for the non-NATO partner, President Bush also declared America's
goal to advance the possible supply of the F-16 contender air ship to Pakistan
(presidentofpakistan.gov.pk, 30-12-2010).
4.14.c Democracy
The United States reinvigorated Pakistan's efforts to develop strong, transparent and
representative democratic institutions open to participation by all Pakistanis as well as
conduct elections that reflect the will of Pakistani people and that meet international
stander.
4.14.d Education
The US Fulbright scheme for Pakistan has extended to beyond the earth.
The United States and Pakistan decided to establish a bilateral dialogue to enhance
instructive collaboration between Pakistan and America.
4.14.e Economic Growth and Prosperity
To establish and implement strong financial sector controls that can defend against illicit
finance.
To Facilitate Pakistan's economy growth through increased trade and investment links
with the United States and within the region and global economy through a
comprehensive economic dialogue encompassing bilateral cooperation for Pakistan‟s
economic development.
177
4.14.f Energy Cooperation
A high level meeting was held to introduce a energy working relationship for energy
assistance and also to investigate approaches to provide energy needs for Pakistan's
development and reinforce its energy security.
Both the governments started working relationship together to create public and private
cooperation for energy sources.
4.14.g Peace and Security
Both the states built a strong working relationship to promote shared security objectives,
advance local dependability and contribute global security.
Continued vital US security help to meet Pakistan's genuine needs and reinforce its
capacities in the war on terror.
Deepen two-sided coordinated effort in the fields of defense training, joint exercise,
defense procurement, technology transfer and universal peacekeeping.
Decided to build the recurrence of defense policy discussion to strengthen collaboration
in the identified sectors.
America and Pakistan promised to work for peace, security, and stability in the South
Asia region and beyond.
Both have also advanced in the context of cooperation in global institutions, including
UN on issues of common interest.
4.14.h Science and Technology
Various measures have been taken to increase cooperation in science, technology and
engineering.
178
Both states promised to improve values, Pakistan was also offered research to promote
education in science and innovation.
Pakistan and the United States have established a Joint Science and Technology
Committee to develop synergistic activities and linkages between logical and mechanical
groups and organizations of both countries.
To improve environmental risks in Pakistan through the trade of specialists and the
creation of common links and commitments with the relevant US foundations.
4.14.i Non-Proliferation
Pakistan has benefited from support in non-expansion efforts and has strengthened.
Advance Pakistan's enforcement of its new tariff control law, including ownership of
implementation guidance and the founding of another tariff authority.
Provide assistance to the United States through the second line of the Ministry of Energy
and the Department of Homeland Security (presidentofpakistan.gov.pk, 30-12-2010).
4.15 Second Round of Strategic Dialogue
In September 2007, in Islamabad, the second meeting of this series was held under the
joint leadership of Mr. Riaz Mohammad Khan, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan and Mr. John D.
Negroponte, Assistant Secretary of State. During dialogue Negroponte said "Our association
with Pakistan and the Pakistani people is essential”. Pakistan has for some time been a solid US
partner, but now never before, Pakistan remains as an imperative and vital country on the planet
(mofa.gov.pk, 28-12-2010).
179
In the second phase of discussion, four areas were distinguished: education, science and
technology, energy and economics. Both the states agreed on the need to improve intelligence
sharing and understanding with reference to the assessment to the assessments in the National
Intelligence Estimate of July 2007 (intelwire, 2010).
4.16 Third Round of Strategic Dialogue
Both the states held Third Round of Dialogue on September 29, 2008 in Washington
D.C. This session was held under the supervision of Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah
Mahmood Qureshi and Assistance Secretary of State John Negroponte..
Qureshi and Negroponte reaffirmed their responsibility for an essential, long-term and
long-term organization in Pakistan and America based on shared qualities and a typical push to
advance peace, security, reliability, flexibility and success Pakistan and the region. The main
elements of the discourse are the:
The United States pledged to provide Pakistan with the preparation and equipment it
expected to combat terrorism, including support to enhance counter-insurgency and
counter-terrorism capabilities in Pakistan and to increase participation in the Pakistani
security forces.
During the strategic dialogue, both sides spoke about the territorial and universal issues
of normal plot. The United States has expressed its support for the recommencement of
the Jirga proceeding with Afghanistan.
The reciprocal discussion on economic issue of August 2008, both countries indorsed the
commitment to increase economic participation. Pakistan laid out its economic
adjustment and changes to cultivate financial development and opportunity.
180
The United States decided to continue efforts to advance the adoption of the
"Reproductive Opportunity Areas".
Both parties stressed the need to develop provincial collaboration and the combination in
the energy sector. They reiterated their devotion to meet Pakistan's growing energy needs
by increasing specialized assistance and advancing interest in the division of Pakistan's
energy.
Co-operation in education, science and technology has been inspected and the two
projects aimed to better organize the energy and education.
In the light of dedication of President Bush issued the instructions to improve to
agriculture sector, strengthen its horticultural sector and improve its food security.
Both sides determined to understand their long - term vision of the Pakistan - US vital
partnership (Mofa, 2010).
4.17 Fourth Round of Strategic Dialogue
This round of dialogue was on March 24-25, 2010 in Washington. The agenda of this
phase of negotiation was entirely different from previous sittings. Qureshi said "we, Pakistan and
US have moved from a relationship to an association". Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton
defined it as "one more day taking after a long time of faulty relationship" (Pakistan US
Dialogues, 2010). Surprisingly, it was raised to peaceful level co-led by Hillary Clinton and Shah
Mahmood Qureshi. In addition, the Chief of Staff of the Army of Pakistan, General Ashfaq
Pervaiz Kayani, was a fundamental element. This shows the aspirations of the Americans to
speak together with the general organization of the Pakistani civilians and military. Particular
divisions were discussed, including impermeability, culture and leadership, and consideration of
181
usual resources in the country would be expanded. As showed by the substances sheet as to
Pakistan United States Bilateral Strategic Dialogue:
The United States would reserve for Pakistan to improve Gomal Zamdam, the Sat para
dam and small dams in the Baluchistan. Hillary announced a multi-year Water Program
for Pakistan to improve Pakistan‟s ability to increase efficient management and use of its
scares water resources and improve water distribution. The first phase of the water
program covers seven projects coasting over $ 270 million.
The United States guaranteed the Pakistan Parliament to support public-private
partnership planned to improve the social status of women to run agriculture affairs and
the program would emphasis on preparing Pakistan women to supervise dairy enterprises
and cooperate locally and all around.
USAID provided $100 million to Small and Medium Enterprise Access to Finance
Program. The program enhanced capability of private sector, corporate visionaries and
vocations in Pakistan, with consideration for the tax-deferred regions of the country.
Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, announced $ 120 million for rehabilitation of
Pakistanis affected by the operations in FATA to revive their lives. In addition, she stated
that the United States would give $ 65 million to the legislative branch of Pakistan's
treasury trade program to help families whose homes were totally or to some extent
damaged. A normal number of 23,000 housing units were injured or struck by fighting in
the tribal area administered by the federal government and Khyber-Paktunkhwa.
182
The Secretary of State of the United States further said that the US Trade Development
Agency (USTDA) would initiate pilot project and comprehensive study to assess the
significance and use of TIGER (Trade Information Gateway Real-Time Exchange).
The US helped Pakistan to develop gas sector. It supported for proper supply of gas to
power house and its advancement for country‟s growth. Also the United States provide
assistance to improve legal administration, economic system and infrastructure bearing in
mind the ultimate goal of attracting more attention to build these assets ( Fact Sheet, June
2010).
183
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185
Chapter No 05
CONCLUSION
186
Ever since the inception of Pakistan, Pakistan-United States relations have ebbed and
flowed, varying from low to moderate to high depending upon the basis of United States interests
in the region. During 60s, 70s and 90s, the relation were estranged and during 50s, 80s and
recently seem to be engaged. 9/11 brought about a revolution in American Foreign Policy which
was universal in scope and viewed very thing as affecting American interests.
Pakistan was the biggest recipient of jolts and tremors which shook New York for its
strata-geo importance and thus changed the nature of this relationship with the United States
slogan “you are with or against us”. The Doctrine of using carrot and stick policy forced Pakistan
to reconsider its priorities both at domestic and international horizons. Pakistan became an
important ally to the United States as a “Front Line State” in the war against terrorism and
United States was awarded an unprecedented cooperation to use its territory, Air Basis in a bid to
identify, detain and exterminate these elements who were posing a threat to the United State. The
Afghanistan border was tightened and all logistic support offered.
In response, Pakistan gained its worth as the most allied ally in 2004 and was given
significant benefits in defense. It could also store United States military equipment and
participated in defense development programs. The United States provided total $ 25 billion
between 2001 and 2014. About 60% of the Collision Support Fund Program for Pakistan has
gone to direct reimbursement for the costs of Pakistan Military activities along Afghan border.
After 9/11 the United State not only bailed out Pakistan but also lifted sanctions. Thus
opening new vistas in economic cooperation with the United States, Europe, Japan and other
countries, the importance of Pakistan was recognized and following steps were taken.
Waived and suspended sanctions;
187
The United States provided Pakistan $ 8 billion in cash;
USAID reopened missions;
US$ 1.5 billion provided as debt relief;
The creditor countries of the Paris Club helped to negotiate a highly denominational
debt rescheduling program for bilateral debt.
There is also considerable divergence in the United States Pakistan convergence. In this
saga of the relationship, there has always been trust deficit between two states. Despite strenuous
efforts, Pakistan has not been able to commence United States regarding its designed role to
eradicate terrorist network. This is despite the fact that Pakistan has faced terrorist attack every
10th
day more than 26000 soldiers have laid down their lives and about 48500 civilians have lost
their lives. Terrorism created uncertainty, reduced confidence of the investors and increased risk
perception which resulted in a lower rate of investment and lower economic growth. US $ 100
billion have been lost by Pakistan and the total post 9/11 United States and its allies assistance
has been US $ 25 billion only.
Despite this much suffering that Pakistan had to bear, the relationship between two states
have estranged since the death of 3 Pakistani soldiers on 3rd
September, 2010, in Kurram Agency
by NATO helicopter and later on Salala Check post incident on 26 November 2011 turned the
relationship more tense. A strong protest was launched and NATO supplies were stopped for
months. The issue was settled but in bitterness. Operation Neptune Spear (death of Osama bin
Laden in Abotabad) was another episode to estrange the relationship between the states.
Differences over the Kerry Lugar Bill have also affected and enhanced this estrangement where
civilians and military establishment have then strong reservations. Drone attacks aggravated the
situations even further and there was a furor from the general public. So the twist is obvious.
188
5.1 Emerging Trends in Pakistan-United States Relationship
Over the past decade, Pakistan has actively parted in the war on terrorism. In this phase
of engagement Pakistan has suffered enormous causalities and witnessed a deterioration of the
security situation and the weakening of the economy. After September 3, 2010, Pakistan US
relationship moved away when NATO helicopters killed 3 Pakistani soldiers in Teri Mangal,
Kurram Agency. As a reaction Pakistan stopped supplying NATO for ten days. NATO gunships
also fired on Salala check post and 26 causalities of Pakistan army personnel. There was a lot of
protest in Pakistan over the incident. The two states settled the issue through negotiation, but by
bitterness. Kerry Lugar Bill was also a cause of differences. The Pakistani political elite and the
military establishment have differences on the issue. In this bill, the United States forced
sanctions on military activities. The increase of drone attacks is also a major challenge that
increased the distance. Pakistan has been demanding the end of the drone attacks. The death of
Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad was one of the major issues that created distance in Pakistan
America relations. In the light of above differences, Pakistan American relations are turning to
estrange as previous.
5.2 Recommendations
5.2.1 For United States Policy makers
The American elite must understand that the elements of extremism in Pakistani society
have aroused during Afghan-sponsored Jihad hosted by the United States. This cannot be
eradicated during the night by military pressures and actions. Infect, this is a long and broad
process that includes institutional strengthening, economic rehabilitation, improved facilities,
struggle against poverty, industrial growth, agricultural development, educational modernization
189
and democratization of Political behavior. All of this must begin extraordinarily in parallel
structure. The United States should not be held hostage to its famous military complex and
should act as a responsible global actor, otherwise the current phase of the Pakistan-US
relationship appears to be on the brink of a critical point that can be a perilous for the regions and
world peace.
5.2.2 For Pakistani Policy makers
Since its inception, Pakistan faces one crisis after another, jeopardizing its survival. After
debacle of Dhaka, Pakistan, once again, is facing huge challenges in the shape of war on terror. It
is true that Pakistani society and even establishment have their own and different views on the
very concept of war on terror, its strategies and its costs and benefits. Ironically, General Zia
started this division and Musharraf continued it. These Pakistani rulers are considered the
founder of such legacy and seemingly opposed in their ideologies. Both followed a strong policy
partnership with the United States. This study, categorically, indicates dangerous turnaround
towards which relations between Pakistan and the United States evolve rapidly.
Therefore, Pakistani policy-makers should not put all eggs in one basket. They must find
and lookout the prospects for a more sovereign and liberal foreign policy through strategies of
self-sufficiency, economic resources and just independent governance, and also through the
support of natural allies such as China and the Muslim world.
5.2.3 Recommendations for Researchers
This study „Pakistan United States relations‟ has its limits based on level, time duration
and resources etc. The study focused on Post 9/11 Pakistan United States Strategic Relations;
Military and Economic Dimensions. It is recommended that further study on the relationship
190
may be carried out by personally visiting America and archive centers and decision makers. In
addition, this study can be widely used for the relevant quarters in Pakistan, world political
analyst and researchers will find it innovative for a more comprehensive approach.
191
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