i

Pakistan-US Relations: An Analytical Study

(1977-1988)

By

Qaiser Mehmood

Department of History

Quaid-i-Azam University

Islamabad

2020

ii

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in History

Department of History

Quaid-i-Azam University

Islamabad

2020

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Dedicated to:

my parents

who made me strong enough

to face the world

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Acknowledgments

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful, who made me able to accomplish

my Ph.D thesis.

First, I am also much thankful to my supervisor Dr. Razia Sultana whose guidance

served as a lighthouse for me throughout my research work. It is true that without her guidance,

support and encouragement, I was not able to accomplish this huge task. I am also much

thankful to Dr. Tanveer Anjum, the Chairperson, Department of History, whose encouragement

always made me able to organize my research. I am also grateful to Dr. Ilhan Niaz, Dr. Rabia

Umer Ali and Farooq Ahmed Dar whose kind support encouraged me at every stage of my

research work.

I also want to thank my seniors Dr. Muhammad Anwar Khattak, Dr. Mazhar Hussain,

Dr. Khalil Ahmed and Iftikhar Ahmed who treated me like a younger brother and guided me

throughout my research work. I am also thankful to my class fellows Akhtar Rasool Bodla,

Zafar Mohi-ud-din, Zahir Shah, Sajid Khan, Abrar Zahoor Bhatti and Zameer Hussain, who

treated me like a brother and helped me at every occasion. I am also thankful to my respectable

Principals of F.G Public School, Murree Cantt, Saif Ullah Khan Khalid, Ayub Khan Khattak

(Late), Muhammad Irfan Khan, Shah Ali Azam Bokhari, Anar Gul Wazir, Shazia Khanum,

Liaqat Ali and Fazal-e-Yazdan, who co-operated me in every possible way.

I am also thankful to the staff of the Central Library QAU, Islamabad, National Public

Library, Islamabad, Cantonment Board Library, Rawalpindi, National Assembly Secretariat,

National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad, Dr. CC and Mabel L. Criss Library, University of

Nebraska Omaha, Centre for Afghanistan Studies Library, University of Nebraska and Press

Information Department, Islamabad for giving me full co-operation in taking full advantage

from valuable books, magazines and newspapers.

I am also much thankful to Higher Education Commission of Pakistan, which gave me

an opportunity to visit University of Nebraska, Omaha (United States) through International

Research Support Initiative Program (IRSIP). This visit helped me in interacting with US

intellectuals and common people to enrich my knowledge. In this regard, I am also thankful to

Dr. Patrick McNamara, Director International Studies at University of Nebraska Omaha, who

invited me to the US and helped me in every possible way in improving my dissertation. I am

thankful to Sherjan Ahmadzai, Director Afghan Studies, UNO and other staff of University of

Nebraska Omaha especially Lori Arias, Kasey Davis, Vickie Stone, Connor Willingham and

Elizabeth Schwartz for extending full cooperation during my stay at Omaha. I also cannot

ix

forget the assistance, I received from my US settled Pakistani friends Waheed Alam and

Muhammad Yasir. I cannot forget the co-operation that I received from my brothers and their

families. I am also much thankful to my wife Afshan Noreen, my sons Muhammad Muneeb

Qaiser and Muhammad Moeed Qaiser, who missed some golden moments of their lives without

me.

And the last but not the least, I am thankful to my father Sub Maj (Rtd) Mazhar Hussain

(Late) and my mother Hameeda Begum (Late) who always prayed for my success. I am missing

my parents greatly on this occasion as they always desired me to complete my Ph.D. I once

again thank Almighty Allah whose help was always with me throughout my research.

Qaiser Mehmood

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Abstract

This dissertation is about Pakistan-US during 1977-1988 which is considered as an important

period for both the countries. The relation between Pakistan and United States remained

significant for the politics of South Asia since Pakistan’s independence. Pakistan refused USSR

invitation and preferred to build good relationship with United States as it appeared as the

declared atomic superpower of the world after testing its atomic weapons during Second World

War. Later during 1950s, Pakistan joined some military defence agreements with the US such

as Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, SEATO and CENTO. During Ayub regime, these

relations became even stronger. Bhutto, a communist leader, was the foreign minister of

Pakistan and was interested in building good relationship with USSR. When he himself became

the Prime Minister, he went ahead in this regard. Bhutto’s this step was not liked by the US

and later the start of Pakistan’s nuclear program, the relations between Pakistan and the US

reached to the lowest level. US pressurized France to stop atomic deal with Pakistan and

imposed economic and military sanctions on Pakistan. During first couple of years of General

Zia’s government, US continued same policy of pressurizing Pakistan to cease its nuclear

program and sign Non-Proliferation Treaty. But Islamic revolution in Iran and Soviet attack on

Afghanistan created unfavourable political scenario for the US in South Asia. US had to relax

its policy regarding Pakistan and assisted it to help Afghan militants to stop Soviet forces in

achieving its objectives. Pakistan’s military and economic aid was resumed, and Pakistan’s

nuclear program went off screen. Afghan crisis with all its bad impact on Pakistan’s society

proved to be a blessing in disguise as Pakistan accelerated its nuclear program and

accomplished it under the umbrella of Afghan crisis. US and Pakistan joined together and

helped Afghan mujahideen in every possible way to defeat Soviet army. The intensity of the

resistance offered by the Afghan mujahideen was unexpected by the USSR. Due to this

resistance, international pressure and internal political disharmony of the USSR, Soviet

government started thinking of withdrawal from Afghanistan. UN played key role in resolving

Afghan issue through Geneva Accord after a long process of negotiations. When USSR was

defeated and its army went back, US lost interest in the region which resulted in internal

political unrest within Afghanistan which not only affected Afghanistan but Pakistan and the

world as well. US again starting pressurizing Pakistan regarding its nuclear program and again

imposed military and economic sanctions. This dissertation covers all these events in detail and

some suggestion for improvement have also been mentioned.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AA Anti-Aircraft

ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

BJP Bhartia Janta Party (Hindi)

BVD Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (Dutch)

CENTO Central Treaty Organization

CGEC Canadian General Electric Company

C-in-C Commander-in-Chief

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

EBDO Elected Bodies Disqualification Order

ECNEC Executive Committee of the National Economic Council

EEC European Economic Community

ERL Engineering Research Laboratory

FDO Physical Dynamics Laboratory

GE General Electric

GRU Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye (Russian)

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IJI Islami Jamhoori Itehad (Urdu)

IMET International Military Education and Training

IMF International Monetary Fund

INFT Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence

KANUPP Karachi Nuclear Power Plant

KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Russian)

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KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pashto)

LCA Light Combat Aircraft

L-o-C Line of Control

M-o-U Memorandum of Understanding

MQM Muhajir Qaumi Movement (Urdu)

NAM Non-Aligned Movement

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSG Nuclear Supplier Group

NWFP North-West Frontier Province

OGDC Oil and Gas Development Corporation

OIC Organization of Islamic Conference

PACE Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission

PDPA People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan

PIDC Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation

PINSTECH Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

PNA Pakistan National Alliance

PNE Peaceful Nuclear Explosion

PPP Pakistan People’s Party

PRODA Public and Representative Office Disqualification Act

RAW Research and Analysis Wing

SAARC South-Asian Association of Regional Cooperation

SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

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UNGOMAP United Nation Good Office Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan

UNHCR United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees

UNSC United Nation Security Council

UNGA United Nation General Assembly

US United States

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VLF Very Low Frequency

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Map of Pakistan

Source: https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/pk.htm

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Map of USSR

Source: https://www.ribttes.com/ussr-countries/

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Political Map of Afghanistan

Source: http://www.acitymap.com/vectormaps/afghanistan-political-map/

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Physical Map of Afghanistan

Source: http://www.freeworldmaps.net/asia/afghanistan/map.html

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Contents

Acknowledgements.……………………………………………………………….. viii

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………….. x

Abbreviations.……………………………………………………………………… xi

Map of Pakistan…………………………………………………………………….. xiv

Map of USSR……………………………………………………………………….. xv

Political Map of Afghanistan……………………………………………………….. xvi

Physical Map of Afghanistan……………………………………………………….. xvii

Contents……………………………………………………………………………... xviii

Introduction.………………………………………………………………………… 1

a. Literature Review………………………………………………………………. 2

b. Assumptions vis-à-vis Pakistan-US Relations…………………………………. 9

c. Contribution of this research …………………………………………………... 10

d. Research Methodology…………………………………………………………. 10

e. Organization of the Study………………………………………………………. 11

Chapter No. 1: An Overview of Pakistan-UR Relations……………………………. 13

1.1. Pakistan-US Relations After Independence (1947-1958)………………………. 13

1.2.Pakistan-US Relations During Ayub Khan’s Regime (1958-1971)………………30

1.3.Pakistan-US Relations During Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Era (1971-1977)…………..46

Chapter No. 2: Afghan Conflict………………………………………………………54

2.1. Background of Soviet Attack on Afghanistan……………………………………54

2.2. Pakistan-US Interests in Afghan War and their Convergence……………………71

2.3. Pakistan as Front-Line State in Afghan War……………………………………...81

Chapter No. 3: Geneva Accords……………………………………………………….90

3.1. Developments Leading to the Accords……………………………………………90

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3.2. Pakistan and the US Role in Geneva Accords…………………………………..108

3.3. Impact of Geneva Accords on Pakistan-US Relations…………………………..127

Chapter No. 4: Impacts of Pakistan-US Alliance…………………………………….136

4.1. US Military and Economic Aid to Pakistan………………………………….….137

4.2. Indian Factor……………………………………………………………………..147

4.3. Pakistan- US Joint Assistance to Major Resistance Groups in

Afghan War…………………………………………………………………..165

Chapter No. 5: US Concerns Regarding Pakistan’s Nuclear Program……………….174

5.1. Pre-Afghan Period……………………………………………………………….174

5.2. During Afghan War……………………………………………………………...194

5.3. Post Afghan War Period…………………………………………………………206

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………214

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………….221

Interview Questionnaire……………………………………………………………...231

Appendices…………………………………………………………………………...234

1

Introduction

At the time of the division of the subcontinent, the world had just managed to

get stabilized after the menace of the World War II. After the killings of millions of

people in atomic blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world leaders started thinking

about the methods to save the world from such havoc in future. Earlier League of

Nations was formed for the same purpose which was later transformed to the United

Nations (UN), the largest organization of the present day. The most powerful countries

at that time i.e. US and USSR, which were once busy in a war for superiority, started a

cold war. With the emergence of Pakistan and India as independent nations on the map

of the world, both tried to win the favour of India to exercise greater influence in the

region. But Indian leadership was aware of the factual position of the world politics and

decided to remain non-aligned. Therefore, as final option, both US and USSR sent

invitation to the government of Pakistan for the then Prime Minister’s official tour.

Pakistani leadership took time to decide and finally Prime Minister Liaquat Ali

Khan refused USSR invitation and visited the US. It was the very first official contact

of Pakistan with any of the two superpowers of the world. This very first official move

of Pakistan was due to some factors. One of which was the strong economic condition

of the US as compared to the USSR. Needed to strengthen the weak inherited economy,

Pakistan preferred the capitalist US as compared to the communist USSR. The second

factor was indeed fear of India which forced Pakistan to think of military agreements

with the US. These military agreements had adverse impact on the thinking of Indian

leadership. India was agreed to resolve Kashmir issue according to the resolutions of

the UN but after the agreements of SEATO and CENTO, Indian government retreated

from its stance and regarded Kashmir as their vital part and blamed that Pakistan was

busy in making military relations with the US to free Kashmir through power1. The

third factor was that Pakistan got independence from the British which was a close ally

of the US. Therefore, Pakistan preferred to extend hand of friendship towards the US

instead of USSR. Fourth and the significant factor was that US was technologically

advanced and had reliable military equipment as compared to the USSR.

Later, Pakistan’s strategy proved to be complete failure when it did not receive

any major military assistance from the US during its confrontation with India in 1965

1 Mussarrat Jabeen & Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, Security Game: SEATO and CENTO as Instrument

of Economic and Military Assistance to Encircle Pakistan, Pakistan Economic and Social Review

Volume 49, No. 1 (Summer 2011), pp. 109-132

2

and 1971. Economic and political outcomes in Pakistan since its independence are a

mixture of inconsistencies. It is usually believed that economic growth can take place

only in the presence of political stability, but in Pakistan it has been observed that it is

directly related to Pak-US relationships so far. Whenever Pakistan got military and

economic aid from the US, it was considered that Pakistan’s economy was progressing.

Similarly, whenever the US government imposed economic sanctions on Pakistan, it

was considered that Pakistan had a crumbling economy. Therefore, Pakistan’s relations

with the US remained a significant factor affecting Pakistan’s foreign and domestic

policies which was obvious during Afghan War.

a. Literature Review:

Arthur Paul Afghanistan Collection organized by Center for Afghanistan Studies at

Criss Library of University of Nebraska Omaha is a big source of primary and

secondary documents related to the history of Afghanistan. It contains over 20,000

books and primary documents in Dhari, Pashto and English language. It also has a huge

collection of US newspapers of 1970s and 1980s containing news reports and articles

related to Afghanistan’s political history and about Soviet-Afghan war. There is a

collection of debates of US House of Representatives and speeches of US presidents on

different forums. The complete drafts of Geneva Accords held for the resolution of

Afghanistan issue are also available there.

Omaha Public Library also has a vast collection of primary and secondary

documents related to Pakistan-US early and later history. Its all the three branches (W.

Clarke Swanson, Maple and Milton R. Abrahams Branch) contain over 1,50,000 books,

news articles, journals and recorded speeches of US Secretary od States, US Foreign

Ministers and US Presidents. Omaha Public Library, W. Clarke Swanson Branch has a

huge collection of US House of Representatives debates and a year-wise collection of

UN Security Council’s Resolutions.

Omaha World Herald is the leading newspaper of Omaha. It also has a reasonable

collection of newspapers and magazines of 1970s and 1980s. Its visual department

contains thousands of pictures and videos related to US history from 1950s onwards.

Omaha World Herald also has a vast year-wise collection of its own original copies

which are good source of news reports regarding early and later US history and major

events happened in the world.

3

The National Assembly Library of Pakistan has a collection of more than 85,000

volumes of books, debates of the National Assembly of Pakistan and foreign

parliaments, reports of the Federal Government and the United Nations, Gazettes of

Pakistan and other documents, including periodicals and publications brought out by

the Assembly Secretariat. Along with these precious documents, this library also

includes the debates of foreign parliaments including British House of Commons,

Indian Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, US House of Representatives and US Senate.

A lot of books have already been written on this subject. Jonathan S. Addleton’s

The Dust of Kandahar: A Diplomat Among Warriors in Afghanistan2 is a personal

account of Ambassador Addleton, who served as US Ambassador and witnessed the

events of Afghan War during his stay in Afghanistan. He recorded his personal

observations about US army soldiers, Afghan militants and religious leaders of

Afghanistan during his meeting with them.

Artem Brorovik is a Russian journalist who had been covering the Afghan War

during his stay in Afghanistan. He is eyewitness of the major developments in Afghan

War. His book, The Hidden War: a Russian Journalist’s Account of the Soviet War in

Afghanistan3 is a valuable source of the event. He describes in his book the incidents

happened during the war with full integrity.

Daniel S. Markey’s “No Exit from Pakistan: America's Tortured Relationship with

Islamabad4” is a good book that tells the story of the tragic and often distressed

relationship between the US and Pakistan. This book is a good explanation of the main

developments in Pakistani society that will help define future of Pakistan-US relations.

It also traces the sources of Pakistani anti-American sentiment through the history of

US-Pakistan relations from 1947 to 2001. It also analyzes the regional dynamics due to

the rise of China and its effect on US-Pakistan relations. The book explains the ways

through which US can reduce the mistakes that were made in the past.

2 Addleton S. Jonathan, The Dust of Kandhaar: A diplomat among Warriors in Afghanistan, (Annapolis,

Maryland: Naval Institute Press), 2016. 3 Artem Borovik, The Hidden War: a Russian journalist’s Account of Soviet War in Afghanistan, (New

York: Grove Press), 1990. 4 Daniel S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationships with Islamabad, (London:

Cambridge University Press), 2013.

4

A.Z Hilali’s “US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (US

Foreign Policy and Conflict in the Islamic World)5” provides a comprehensive study of

the US-Pakistan partnership under the Reagan administration. It also explains the

reasons of Pakistan's involvement in the Afghanistan war and the US backing to avoid

Soviet advancement. According to the book, Pakistan was of much significance in

Afghan war as assistance to the freedom fighter was not possible without it and Pakistan

also provided access to its military bases to use against the USSR. This book also

explains the consequences of this war on its domestic politics.

Teresita C. Shaffer and Howard B. Shaffer produced a great work, “How Pakistan

Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster6”. It is a great book to

understand the complex relationship between US and Pakistan. This book tells that the

nature of the foreign service and lack of continuity in the State department made it much

easier for Pakistanis to exploit Americans.

“Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military7” written by Hussain Haqqani examines

the backgrounds of the relationships between Islamist clusters and Pakistan's military,

and determines the nation's journey for identity and security. It also outlines the ways

the military has sought US funding by making it’s the need of the time during any kind

of crises. This book offers an alternative view of political developments since the

country's independence in 1947.

“India, Pakistan, and the United States: Breaking With the Past8” is a valuable

source about Pakistan-US relations which is written by Shirin Tahir Kheli. This book

examines the relationship among the United States, India, and Pakistan over the last

fifty years. It discusses India and Pakistan's place in the Cold War, regional coalitions

and alignments of South Asia, clashes within the region, and the scenarios of nuclear

proliferation. According to the author, the US always keeps its focus on this region in

case of some crisis like USSR occupation of Afghanistan and in the period on nuclear

issue and this policy must be changed. The cold war diverts the attention of Pakistan

5 A.Z. Hilali, “US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (US Foreign Policy and

Conflict in the Islamic World)” (Routledge), 2005. 6 Teresita C. Shaffer & Howard B. Shaffer, “How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the

Roller Coaster, (United States Institute of Peace), 2011. 7 Hussain Haqqani, “Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military”, (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace),

2005. 8 Shirin Tahir Kheli, India, Pakistan, and the United States: Breaking With the Past, (Council on Foreign

Relations), 1997.

5

and India to some non-issues and economic developments lags. US must change its

policy towards the most populous nations of the South Asia.

“US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension”9 written

by Hafeez Malik is an analytical study of the US influence which has been described as

the imperial system as against a policy of imperial subjugation. The imperial system

regulates the affairs of the world politically, economically, and in international trade.

While the US power grew progressively through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,

it is now at its peak. This analysis deals with US relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan

and highlights the fact that both states have forged new asymmetrical alliances with the

US which serve the strategic interests of the United States but also protect the security

interests of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Another valuable book focusing on Pakistan-US differences over Pakistan’s nuclear

program was written by Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott Clark. The name of this book

is Nuclear Deception: The Dangerous Relationship Between the United States and

Pakistan10. It reveals the narrowness of American policy towards Pakistan over the last

thirty years. This narrowness compelled Pakistan to start its nuclear program and to

complete it under the umbrella of war against the USSR. This book is based on hundreds

of interviews over the past decade in the United States, Pakistan, India, Israel and the

Middle East, Europe, and Southeast Asia by authors who are the two of the world's most

resourceful investigative journalists.

Pakistan: A Hard Country11,is a valuable book on Pakistan’s foreign policy written

by Anatol Lieven that reveals that in the past decade Pakistan has become a country of

enormous significance to its region, the US and the world. Pakistan is also central to

the hopes of jihadis due to its large army with nuclear weapons. The active participation

of jihadis in Afghan War is because of the same hope. The author considers Pakistan

as highly complex and poorly understood country.

9 Hafeez Malik, US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension, (Oxford

University Press), 2008. 10 Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott Clark, Nuclear Deception: The Dangerous Relationship Between the

United States and Pakistan, Walker Books, 2008. 11 Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country, Public Affairs, 2012.

6

Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin

Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 200112 narrates the history of the

hidden wars in Afghanistan that added fuel to Islamic militancy and resulted into the

September 11 attacks. This book is based on reliable research and firsthand

interpretations by key government, intelligence, and military personnel both foreign and

American. This book well explains the details of the secret history of the CIA’s role in

Afghanistan, the rise of the Taliban, the emergence of bin Laden, and the failed efforts

by US forces to find and assassinate bin Laden in Afghanistan.

Harold A. Gould’s The South Asia Story: The First Sixty Years of US Relations with

India and Pakistan13 carries a series of brief sketches of the dealings of twelve US

presidents since Franklin Roosevelt with the countries of South Asia especially, India

and Pakistan, from World War II to present day. It suggests that US foreign policy was

influenced by comprehensive political-historical outlines as well as the personal urges

and preferences of the elected president at any given point in time. In this way, though

political considerations which underlie their individual actions and define their

contexts, foreign policy was also influenced by their unique personalities, levels of

awareness, and intellectual gifts.

Olivier Roy’s book “Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan14” is a valuable book

about the detail of mujahideen groups involved in resistance against Soviet army. He

not only mentions the contribution of these groups in Soviet-Afghan war but also

describes their brief history. We can also find a lot of detail about the leadership of these

resistance groups. He divides the nine mujahideen groups into 6 Sunnis and 3 Shia

backed forces.

Ashok Sharma’s “Indo-US Strategic Convergence: An Overview of Defence and

Military Cooperation”15 is also a good source of information about US-India strategic

cooperation. He divides US relations with India into two phases. The era before cold

war was of not much significance but in the post-cold war era these two countries came

12 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet

Invasion to September 10, 2001, (New York: Penguin Press HC) 13 Harold A Gould, The South Asia Story: The First Sixty Years of US Relations with India and Pakistan,

SAGE Publications Pvt Ltd, 2010. 14 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, (Cambridge: University Press), 1990. 15 Ashok Sharma, Indo-US Strategic Convergence: An Overview of Defence and Military Cooperation,

(New Delhi: KW Publishers), 2008.

7

close to each other. That is why both the countries hold joint military exercises and

signed a lot of military and economic agreements.

“Soviet Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics”16 is a worthy book written

by Hafeez Malik. This book contains the detail about Pakistan’s relation with the Soviet

Union before Soviet-Afghan war and it also focusses about mutual relations between

the two countries after the disintegration of USSR. This book reveals that although there

is a key role of Pakistan in Soviet defeat in the war against Afghanistan but still there

are a lot of opportunities for both countries to bring both countries in close ties.

“Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia-ul-Haq”17 is jointly written by

Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter. This book has a complete detail of the causes and

events led to Zia’s coup and detail of Pakistan’s role in Soviet Afghan War. This book

explains the political measures taken by General Zia especially for the reconstruction

of political and Islamic system in Pakistan. This book is a great source of knowledge

about General Zia’s role in the Pakistan and international politics.

Henry S. Bradsher’s “Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention”18 throws light

on the Afghan Communism. It starts from 1950s and ends on Najeeb’s death in 1992.

The author used extensive interviewing, a wide range of source materials, and access to

Soviet archives. All these efforts of the writer make this a comprehensive account.

“Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World”19 is a valuable book

written by the last president of USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev. In this book, he admits the

mistakes committed by the government of the USSR in managing its domestic and

foreign policy. He advises the Soviet ruling class that instead of attaining the

communism throughout the world it is better to achieve scientific technology for the

welfare of the masses.

16 Hafeez Malik, Soviet Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics, (London: McMillan Press Ltd),

1994. 17 Shahid Javed Burki, Craig Baxter et.al, Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia-ul-Haq, (New

York: Westview Press), 1991. 18 Henry S. Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, (Karachi: Oxford University Press),

2001. 19 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, (New York:

Harpercollin Publishers: 1987).

8

“Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982”20 is a

valuable book written by Muhammad Hassan Kakar. He was a professor at Kabul

University and scholar of Afghan affairs at the time of Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.

He is an eyewitness of most of the events surrounding Soviet invasion. He described

the events of war between poorly armed Afghan mujahideen and highly equipped

Soviet army. He brought first-hand knowledge of war events in his book.

“The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State”21 written

by Barnet R. Rubin is about the Afghan crisis from the time when it was regarded as a

vital event and was a focus of the super powers of the world till the time it was totally

ignored and left unattended. It also contains the detail about the role played by the

international and regional powers in the process of dialogue for the settlement of the

crisis.

“The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan”22 edited by Amin Saihal and William

Malley is a beautiful collection of articles written by different authors. This book

explains the causes and events of Soviet-Afghan War and its effects on the internal

politics of Soviet Union. It also describes the complete development of negotiations

that resulted in Geneva Accord. It also contains the post-war effects on Afghanistan.

M. Riaz Khan is a former Pakistani diplomat, who was present in almost all the

meetings held for negotiating about the settlement of Afghan crisis. His book “Untying

the Afghan Knot”23 relates the inside story of the whole process of negotiation. He

explains in the book the interests, position and behind the scene role of the five major

players of the whole drama, i.e. Afghanistan, resistance groups, Pakistan, Soviet Union

and the United States.

Robert G. Wirsing’s book “Pakistan’s Security Under Zia 1977-88”24 is a

comprehensive book on the era of General Zia-ul-Haq. This books chiefly contains the

steps taken by Zia’s government to enhance the security of the nation. This book

20 Muhammad Hassan Kakar, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and Afghan Response, 1979-1982,

(California: University of California Press), 1997. 21 Barnet R. Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, (London: Vale University), 1995. 22 Amin Saihal and William Malley (ed.), The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, (New York:

Cambridge University Press), 1989. 23 M. Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers), 1993. 24 Robert G. Wirsing, Security Under Zia, 1977-88” (New York: St. Martin’s Press), 1991.

9

comprises of the visits and statements of General Zia and the interviews of the key

individuals.

Steve Coll is an American journalist who is the author of a great book “Ghost

Wars”25 on Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and afterwards. This book relates the secret

operations of CIA against Soviet troops from 1979 to 1989, defeat of USSR in Afghan

war, rise of Taliban and emergence of Osama Bin Laden and efforts of CIA to cope

with him.

“Pakistan’s Foreign Policy”26 written by S.M Burke and Lawrence Ziring is also

an informative book on Pakistan’s foreign policy. It describes the detail of initial era of

Pakistan’s foreign policy making, the era of Ayub Khan, Bhutto’s role in foreign policy

making and impacts of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Pakistan’s foreign policy.

b. Assumptions vis-à-vis Pakistan-US Relations:

When we go through existing literature, we know that Pakistan always cooperated

with the US whenever need arose for the US and the Pakistan-US relations were

unilateral and controlled by only the US. Whenever US had its own interests, Pakistan

was provided with money, ammunition and everything of its vital need. But after the

accomplishment of the US task, Pakistan was totally ignored. This thesis challenges

such assumptions and regards them as partially true. The other side of the Pakistan-US

relations depicts that every time when Pakistan and the US worked together, there was

a significant interest of Pakistan too and Pakistan’s government whether under Liaqat

Ali Khan, Ayub Khan, Bhutto or General Zia did not only assist the US but also

achieved policy objectives set in the national interest.

There is also another assumption that only reason that forced Pakistan to build good

relationships with the US was its fear of India. This thesis also challenges this

assumption because US never assisted Pakistan when it was busy in war against India.

The wars of 1965 and 1971 are the best examples in this regard.

Another assumption which is challenged in this thesis is that Pakistan and the US

are natural allies as both the countries are in a good position to fulfil the strategical

requirements of each other. But if we look at the map of the world, we come to know

25 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, (New York: Penguin Press), 2004. 26 S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, (Karachi: Oxford University Press),

1990.

10

that Pakistan’s natural alliance may be with the USSR and China as these countries are

Pakistan’s immediate neighbors and are in a better position to assist Pakistan during

crisis.

c. Contribution of this Research:

This thesis focusses on the causes that diverted the attentions of the Pakistan’s

government towards the US instead of its immediate neighbor, USSR. After World War

II, the US had exerted its superiority over the USSR because of having destructive

weapons which were used to conclude the World War II. This was one reason for which

Pakistan decided to join the US soon after independence although Pakistan also had

invitation from the USSR. Secondly, it was long standing desire of Russia to reach out

to warm water seaport. Besides, its economic conditions were not as good as the US,

therefore, Pakistan’s government thought it could gain better economic or military

benefits from the US as compared to the USSR.

This thesis explains the facts that not only the US used Pakistan to achieve its

foreign policy objectives, but Pakistan also took economic and strategic advantage from

the US to a great extent. Although it seems that US defeated Soviet troops in

Afghanistan by using mujahideen through Pakistan. But if we look at the other side of

the picture, the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan would not be in Pakistan’s

interests as Pakistan did not have good relations with the USSR. A pro-Soviet Afghan

government was also not in favour of Pakistan as it would be a source of acceleration

of the issue of “Pashtunistan” which might be a source of unrest in KP and Baluchistan.

Therefore, to serve the US as a front-line ally was also of significant interest for

Pakistan.

At the time of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan was trying to accelerate

its nuclear program which was against the will of the US to make the world nuclear

free. Pakistan’s this step was also challenging Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) therefore

US pressurized France to cancel nuclear agreements with Pakistan. At that time, Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan was a blessing in disguise for Pakistan. Being closer to the US

in the alliance against USSR gave Pakistan an opportunity to accelerate its nuclear

program and achieve nuclear technology. So, both US and Pakistan got full advantage

of military alliance against the Soviet troops.

d. Research Methodology:

It is a qualitative study a bit of mix with quantitative. The case study methodology

is used in this thesis to analyze certain internal and external factors which were

11

responsible to bring the two countries closer on some occasions and at extremes on the

other. A lot of primary and secondary documents have been consulted to shape this

research work. Primary documents include the original reports, official letters,

assembly debates and official memorandum. I also got opportunity to interview Sherjan

Ahmadzai, the Director of Afghan Studies, University of Nebraska Omaha and Tom

Hutson, a retired US Consulate and a close friend of Robin Rafael, the US Ambassador

to Pakistan who died along with General Zia in an air crash. I also got a chance to meet

with Dr. Patrick McNamara, the Director, International Studies, University of Nebraska

Omaha and Dr. Thomas E. Gouttiere, Dean Emeritus of International Studies Program,

University of Nebraska Omaha. Gouttiere worked for ten year in Afghanistan serving

as Peace Corps volunteer, a Fulbright fellow, Executive Director of the Fulbright

Foundation and Head Coach of Afghanistan National Basketball team. Later, he also

served in Afghanistan after being appointed by the US State Department, as Senior

Political Affairs Officer on the UN Peacekeeping Mission to Afghanistan in 1996 and

1997.

e. Organization of the Study:

This dissertation has been distributed in five chapters. The very first part is the

introduction of the study. It also includes the literature review and assumptions about

the Pak-US relations in Pakistan. It also gives the scope of the current research and the

research methodology used in this research. The first Chapter explains the brief history

of the Pakistan-US relations by distributing it in three phases i.e; from 1947-58, under

Ayub Khan (1958-69) and under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971-77).

The second chapter is very significant as it focusses on the most important event

happened during the period of my research is the Soviet-Afghan War. In this chapter

the background of Soviet attack on Afghanistan has been described in detail. It

comprises of the events that led to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In the second

part of this chapter a detail of Pakistan and US interest in Afghanistan are described in

detail and in the last phase of this chapter, the causes have been explained in detail

which make Pakistan able to act as the front-line state in the Afghan War.

The third chapter covers the Geneva Accord of 1988. The first part of this

chapter explains in detail the developments which resulted in Geneva Accord. In the

second part of this chapter, the role played by the Pakistan and the US in bringing all

the affected parties to table for peaceful negotiations on the solution of the Afghan

12

crisis. In the last part of this chapter the impacts of Geneva Accord on Pakistan and the

US have been explained in detail.

The fourth chapter explains the detailed impact of Pakistan-US relations on both

the countries and on the whole region. The first part of this chapter presents a detail of

US military and economic aid to Pakistan. The second part of this chapter is about the

role played by the Indian factor on Pakistan-US relations. In the last part of this chapter,

the details are given about nine major resistance groups which were supported by

Pakistan and the US in fighting against the USSR.

The fifth chapter focusses on the US concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear program.

The chapter has been divided into three parts; that is Pre-Soviet period, during Afghan

war and Post-Soviet-Afghan war. It is clear from the given detail how harsh was US

policy towards Pakistan’s nuclear program before and after Afghan crisis. But during

Afghan crisis, the US officials turned a deaf ear to Pakistan’s advancement in nuclear

field. Surely, Pakistan had managed to accomplish its nuclear program during the same

period as during that period, the focus of the US was Soviet-Afghan War and not the

Non-Proliferation of nuclear power in South Asia. The last part comprises of conclusion

of the dissertation, followed by bibliography and appendices.

13

Chapter No. 1:

An Overview of Pakistan-US Relations:

1.1. Pakistan-US Relations After Independence (1947-1958):

This chapter focusses on the steps taken by Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan’s

government in shifting Pakistan’s axis of foreign policy towards the US despite having

been invited by the USSR. After Liaqat Ali Khan Pakistan saw some Governor Generals

and Prime Ministers for quite a little period so they did not get enough time to progress

in foreign policy making. This chapter also covers the steps taken by the governments

of Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din, Malik Ghulam Muhammad, Muhamad Ali Bogra,

Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, Malik Feroze Khan Noon and Iskandar Mirza. Although

nothing notable advancement had happened in quite a short spell of the above-

mentioned Pakistani rulers, but their regimes cannot be ignored at all.

It was necessary for a newly born country to construct such a foreign policy,

which would help in ensuring its safety from impending security threats to its

sovereignty. For this purpose, the country was bound to establish sound working

relationship with the then existing super-powers. Pakistan after independence had to

face a strong rival in the form of India just on the eastern borders. The newly born

country had to go through a war with India on Kashmir Issue, a year after its

independence. Although Pakistan was not able to indulge in war because Pakistan

needed major economic aid to strengthen its military. In a letter by Quaid-i-Azam

Mohammad Ali Jinnah contained in the memorandum of October 1947 and was

conveyed to Laik Ali, who was special diplomatic representative of Jinnah. According

to this letter it was declared that now Pakistan was in immediate need of $170,000,000

for its army, $75,000,000 for Air Force and $60,000,000 for Navy. Moreover, $700

million for industrial development, $700 million for agricultural development and $510

million was sought for defence etc.27. Despite such economic and military challenges,

Pakistan entered a war against India. It was quite difficult but necessary because when

Kashmiri people opted to align with Pakistan, Indian forces entered Kashmir and

captured it. It was a great loss for the newly born Pakistani nation so Quaid-i-Azam

decided to react to the Indian aggression militarily in a strong way. Pakistani Army,

27 W.N. Brown, The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 3rd ed., (Harvard: Harvard

University Press, 1972), 32.

14

with the help of Kashmiri Mujahideen managed to release some portion of Kashmir

before the ceasefire was announced by India on the direction of the United Nation (UN).

This incident was enough for Pakistan’s policy makers to realize the need of

establishing close relations with the greatest powers of the world. That was the time of

the start of a cold war between the existing super-powers of the world, the United States

of America (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). USSR was a

socialist country and US was a capitalist nation, so the world divided into two rival

ideological blocks. Geographically both US and USSR were at quite a huge distance

and it was not possible for each of them to restrict the other. Besides, both the super-

powers were also in search of their allies in the world including South Asia. Foremost

choice for both the countries was clearly India as it was not only quite big

geographically, but it had a large army as compared to Pakistan and large military and

economic resources as well.

At that time Harry S. Truman was the President of the United States of America

who belonged to Democratic Party. His government had some reservations vis-à-vis the

division of the Sub-continent because according to US policy makers a united India

could have been more beneficial for the US to use it to contain the growing impact of

USSR in the region28 therefore US was in search of a strong ally that might help US in

a better way to accomplish her task. India and China were two emerging powers of the

region, which were in the good books of the US due to their large manpower and vast

resources. But after independence, China announced to be a communist country and

moreover it did not have any kind of affiliation with USSR or the US as it was going to

remain non-aligned so US totally diverted her attention towards Pakistan and India29.

Both countries were newly born and were passing through the phase of establishing a

sound foreign policy according to their guiding principles of founding father and the

need of the hour as well. Pakistan and India were indulged in serious confrontation due

to the Kashmir issue30.

Pakistan was although short of resources as compared to the India, but it had a

strategically important location. It had a border with China and with Afghanistan it had

the largest border comprising of 2600 km. Due to this, some former US officials

28 Zubaid Ahmed Firdousi, Eagle Over Pakistan, (Lahore: Book Traders, 1988), 44-45. 29 Kathleen Gough & Hari P. Sharma ed., Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia, (Lahore: Sang-e-

Meel Publications, 1975), 133. 30 Keeping Pakistan’s need of establishing sound relationships with a strong nation, Quaid-e-Azam had

delivered his message to the people of the US in February 1948 through the following words, “Islam and

its ideals have taught us democracy. It has taught equality of man, justice and fairplay to everybody30.

15

emphasized the importance of the geographical location of Pakistan. According to them,

Pakistan would prove a better ally as compared to any other country of the region due

to its location31. As a result, US President Harry S. Truman was impressed by the idea

of establishing relationship with Pakistan. In this regard, he asked the American

Counsel General in Morocco to go to Karachi with the message of warm greetings to

Quaid-i-Azam on behalf of the people of the US and proposed to open the US

diplomatic mission in Karachi32.

Quaid-i-Azam was of the view to establish good relations with US. His early

death (Sep 11, 1948) deprived him to build the base of Pak-US relations. The death of

Quaid-i-Azam was a great blow to the newly born nation. He was the chief actor of

policy formation of Pakistan and had the capability to do that in quite an effective

manner. He had a charismatic personality and was highly regarded in Pakistan for being

the founder of the nation. Quaid-i-Azam had done a lot but much more was yet to be

done to meet the challenges faced by Pakistan not only internally but in the field of

foreign policy making as well. Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din replaced Quaid-i-Azam as

Governor General, but he did not have an influencing personality as compared to the

Prime Minister Khan Liaqat Ali Khan. The destiny of Pakistan was to be shaped by

Liaqat Ali Khan and he was the right man to do the job at that time. In early 1949,

Joseph Stalin, the head of USSR invited Liaqat Ali Khan on an official visit to USSR.

Hence, USSR was the first ever country to invite the head of Pakistani government33.

Liaqat Ali Khan showed a cold response to his invitation. Although, he accepted the

invitation, but he did visit USSR. Instead, he visited US when he was invited in 195034.

In fact, Liaqat Ali Khan was busy in handling the internal issues of the country at that

time which did not allow him to visit any country. However, his denial to visit the USSR

gave the impression to the USSR that he was not interested to get closer to a socialist

nation. But when in 1950, US President Truman invited Liaqat Ali Khan and Indian

Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru to have an official visit to US, Liaqat Ali Khan

immediately accepted the offer and visited US. His visit to the US gave the impression

to the USSR that Pakistan was more interested to build relations with the US instead of

USSR. On the other hand, the thing which persuaded Liaqat Ali Khan to accept the

31 Firdousi, Eagle Over Pakistan.,42. 32 Qutubuddin Aziz, Jinnah and Pakistan, (Islamabad: Islamic Media Corporation, 2001) 142. 33 Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 1947-1958; An Historical Review, (Islamabad: Institute of Research,

1992),198. 34 Ibid.

16

invitation of Truman was that he was of the view that Nehru, through his impressive

personality could manage to win the support of US, he therefore, quickly left for US35.

Liaqat Ali Khan, during his visit to US, stressed on the geographical location of

Pakistan and he also mentioned about the fighting qualities of the Muslim warriors

against communists36. Liaqat Ali Khan was trying to win the support of US. The time

was so crucial that Pakistan could not afford the expected US-India alliance, as Indian

ill intentions were not hidden. Most of the Indians thought Pakistan, a “tragic mistake37”

and they were ready to go to any extent causing harm to Pakistan. Therefore, Liaqat Ali

Khan, being fully aware of the development on the external world, was not ready to

lose this opportunity to bring before US officials, the advantages of US alliance with

Pakistan.

On April 3, 1950, according to a US Department of State policy statement, the

main objectives of US relations with Pakistan were mentioned as,

“Our principal objective in our relations with Pakistan is the

orientation of its government and people toward the US and

other western democracies and away from the USSR. We

desire its further development as a politically and economically

healthy state adhering to democratic principles. In the

international sphere, we seek to encourage peaceful,

cooperative relations between Pakistan and its neighbors, and

the informed and voluntary association of the Government of

Pakistan with our international objectives.”38

International situation tilted in Pakistan’s favour, when on the night of 24 and

25 June 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea39. This was the start of cold war but

this time in Korea. In fact, in December 1945, united Korea was administered by a US-

Soviet Union Joint Commission which was agreed by both countries in Moscow

Conference. Their aim was that Korea should be run by a joint trusteeship for five years

and would be granted independence in 195040. But this idea was not welcomed by the

35 Firdousi, Eagle Over Pakistan, 61. 36 Ibid. 37 Mushtaq Ahmed, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, (Karachi: Oxford University Press,1968), 6. 38 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V,

Document no. 611.90D/4–350 39 Vidya Dhar Mahajan, International Relations since 1914, 7th ed. (New Delhi: S. Chand Publications,

1987), 330. 40 James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War. (New York: Harper Perennial, 1990) 25-

26.

17

people of Korea, so riots started in the country41. The right-wing Representative

Democratic Council was led by Syngman Rhee. He had arrived in Korea with the US

military. He also opposed the trusteeship and argued that Korea had already suffered

from foreign occupation for quite a long time so it should be given full independence.

General Hodge, the Commander of US military government in Korea began to distance

himself from the proposal. It was strange that this proposal was originated with his

government.42 US thought that it was no more possible to keep Korea under the control

of the Commission so a General Election was held in South Korea on May 10, 1948

and Syngman Rhee was elected as President of South Korea43. On August 25, 1948

elections were held in North Korea as well and a pro-Communist government led by

Kim Il Sung was formed with the help of USSR44. But the situation went worse when

Rhee eliminated the pro-Communist politicians from the politics of South Korea. This

was a disappointing situation for the pro-Communist people living in the South Korea,

so they decided to start a guerilla war against the government. They left their homes

and went to the hilly areas45. USSR forces left Korea in 1948 and as per agreement US

forces also left Korea in 1949. By 1949, South Korean forces managed to reduce the

active number of communist guerrillas in the South from 5,000 to 1,000. But Kim II-

Sung was not aware of the situation and he believed that the guerrillas had weakened

the South Korean military and it was the right time for a North Korean invasion on

South Korea. He was also expecting full support of USSR under Stalin. For this

purpose, in a visit to Moscow he tried to persuade Stalin for an expected invasion on

South Korea in March 194946. Stalin was not interested in getting indulged into any

kind of conflict at that time. He was not in favor of any kind of war in Korea as regional

political situation did not allow it. First reason was that China had been facing internal

dispute as Communist forces were still fighting in China. Moreover, the second but the

most important was that US forces were still present in South Korea and their

withdrawal from the region was expected in June 1949. Stalin was a wise man and knew

41 James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year. United States Army in the Korean War. 3.

(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army) 3, 18, 22. 42 Sheila Miyosi Jager, Brothers at War – The Unending Conflict in Korea. (London: Profile Books,

2013), 41,42. 43 Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War, 26. 44 Carter Malkasian, Carter, The Korean War, 1950–1953. (Essential Histories. London; Chicago: Fitzroy

Dearborn, 2001), 13. 45 Richard W. Stewart, ed., "The Korean War, 1950–1953". American Military History, Volume 2.

(United States: Army Center of Military History, 2005), CMH Pub 30-22. Retrieved August 20, 2007. 46 Kathryn Weathersby, "Should We Fear This?" Stalin and the Danger of War with America, (Cold War

International History Project, 2002), Working Paper No. 39. 3-4.

18

it well that to start any kind of confrontation would not be in favour of USSR47. US

forces evacuated South Korea at the time agreed upon already. USSR was closely

examining the situation and arranged the first ever nuclear test in September 1949.

There was also a big change in China which was resulted in the form of victory of

Communist forces. This was a great satisfaction for the USSR government that US did

not provide any kind of resistance for the Communist forces in China. US also did not

show much interest in China’s internal political situation. Meanwhile, Russian

government managed to decode a message of US government to its Ambassador in

Moscow according to which US was no more interested in the internal politics of Korea

as well48. That was the time Stalin was waiting for. He started a more aggressive attitude

towards the politics of Asian region and launched full support to the newly formed pro-

Communist government in China under the leadership of Mao. USSR established an

alliance with China and promised economic and military aid as well through Sino-

Soviet Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty49. USSR did not only assist China, but

it also gave full military support to the North Korean government. USSR aided North

Korean army with tanks, aircraft guns and other heavy weapons and thus made its army

quite strong as compared to the South Korean army. South Korean army was supported

by the US, but it was equipped with small and light weapons as compared to North

Korea50. This was what USSR wanted to plan that was to make North Korea quite

strong militarily as compared to the South Korea and to plan military interference in

South Korea in future. In April 1950 the time had come Stalin had been waiting for. He

gave full permission to Kim Il Sung to start a military invasion of South Korea, but the

problem was that USSR was not willing to come forward openly to avoid any kind of

confrontation with the US51. But there was an expectation of unforeseen circumstances

in case of some sound military reaction from South Korean side. So, Stalin advised Kim

Il Sung to seek support from China in this regard. A meeting was held between Kim Il

Sung and Mao in May 1950. Mao was not willing to have confrontation with any state

as it was a newly born country and the government was much focused to make China

strong enough so that it could survive in the comity of nations. Moreover, he was

thinking that US might jump into the war and China being a new nation did not have

47 Ibid., 3. 48 Ibid., 9,10. 49 Ibid., 11. 50 Allan R. Millett, The Korean War: The Essential Bibliography. The Essential Bibliography Series,

(Dulles, VA: Potomac Books Inc, 2007), 15. 51 Weathersby, Should We Fear This?, 10.

19

any capability to start any kind of confrontation with the US. But on the other hand,

China needed economic and military aid in its initial stage to put the country on the way

to progress. These aids were promised by the USSR through military and economic

agreements. Instantly Mao agreed to help North Korea in its invasion of South Korea

and put a huge army at Korean border52. On having satisfaction from the commitment

of Mao, USSR sent some experienced military personnel of high command in North

Korea to make a military plan for the expected invasion. On June 25, 1950 North

Korean army launched a military attack by crossing 38th parallel, the boundary drawn

between North and South Korea53. US alleged North Korea of shattering the peace of

South Korea. In fact, US President Truman was not prepared for the situation because

US lost interest in the region. With the formation of another pro-Communist

government in China, US were thinking of some other option to contain Communist.

Japan was the only country which according to the US high officials could serve as US

military base to counter Communists. US was more desirous of protecting Europe from

Communists and it was working on this agenda. But on the other hand, there was a

chance of the start of world war in case of Chinese and Russian involvement in the war.

Therefore, US decided to intervene. According to Kim Yong Jin;

"The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile

Korea led directly to President Truman's decision to intervene...

The essential point... is that the American response to the North

Korean attack stemmed from considerations of US policy toward

Japan.”54

Although Soviets were not directly involved into the war but US were expecting

their role in some way or the other. Therefore, US President Truman mentioned his

state’s feelings in these words;

“If we let Korea down, the Soviet[s] will keep right on going

and swallow up one after another.”55

UN Security Council also played role according to the wish as of US. It declared

North Korean action to be a breach of peace and called for cease-fire56. On June 25,

1950, UN passed a resolution (Resolution No. 82)57 according to which North Korea

was unanimously condemned for starting armed intervention in South Korea. Just two

days after this that was on January 27, 1950, UN passed another resolution (Resolution

52 Barnouin, Barbara; Yu, Changgeng, Zhou Enlai: A Political Life. (Hong Kong: Chinese University

Press, 2006), 139-140. 53 Stokesbury, A Short History of Korean War, 14. 54 Yong-jin Kim, Major Powers and Korea. Silver Spring, (MD: Research Institute on Korean Affairs,

1973), 46. 55 http://www.history.com/topics/korean-war as retrieved on January 18, 2017. 56 Mahajan, International Relations Since 1914, 400. 57 Appendix-I

20

No. 83)58 according which the member states of UN were requested to provide full

military assistance to the republic of Korea. Getting advantage of such kind of role from

the UN it was easy for US to send its army to the region. Moreover, on the same day

Truman ordered US naval and air forces to help South Korea. On July 04, 1950, Soviet

Deputy Foreign Minister accused US for getting involved in the war directly and

assisting South Korea so openly59.

US President Truman later explained in detail the cause of US intervention in

Korean War in these words;

“Communism was acting in Korea, just as Hitler, Mussolini

and the Japanese had ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I

felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall, Communist

leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our

own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way

into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free

world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threat

and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors.”60

That was very crucial time for US. She had to defend her stance regarding

Korean War in the UN and among the community of nations. For this purpose, US

needed supporters that could support her action at any of the world’s forum in a clear

manner. US was expecting such kind of support from India. To her disappointment,

India did not only oppose US on this occasion but also on Japanese Peace Treaty61. This

treaty is also known as San Francisco Treaty as it was signed by 48 countries including

Pakistan in San Francisco, United states on September 8, 1951. This treaty was signed

between Japan and Allied Powers. According to this treaty the imperial status of Japan

was ended, and compensations were allocated to the allied people who were the

prisoners of war and were affected by Japanese war crimes. UN played its vital role to

get this treaty signed according to its charter and other human right declarations. A good

thing for the US was that Soviet Union signed this treaty. The other main Communist

country that was China was not invited to the conference because of internal political

disturbances, a kind of war was in progress in China. Indian government was invited to

the conference, but it refused the invitation and did not participate62. India was of the

view that this treaty was imposing limitations on the national sovereignty of Japan as

58 Appendix-II 59 Andrei A. Gromyko, "On American Intervention in Korea, 1950". Modern History Sourcebook. (New

York: Fordham University, July 4, 1950), Retrieved December 16, 2011. 60 Harry S. Truman; Robert H. Ferrell, The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman. (Boulder: University

Press of Colorado, 1980) 61 Firdousi, Eagle Over Pakistan , 60. 62 Social Studies: History for Middle School. 7–2. Japan's Path and World Events, 2.

21

well on its independence by terminating its imperial status63. On June 9, 1952, Japan

and India signed a mutual agreement called the Treaty of Peace between Japan and

India and according to this treaty it was agreed upon by both countries that Japan had a

dignified place among the comity of nations and it had equal right as free nation as the

other countries were enjoying at that time64. By signing the Japanese Peace Treaty,

Pakistan took full advantage of the situation and managed to attract the attentions of

US. Liaqat Ali Khan agreed to send Pakistani troops to Korea under the supervision of

UN65. US was pleased with such a clear support from Pakistani Premier but this

agreement of Liaqat Ali Khan could not get practical form because Pakistani officials

persuaded him not to earn enmity of USSR and China by sending troops to Korea66.

However, US welcomed Pakistan’s stance on Korean War. US also desired to make

India and Pakistan to reach to some conclusion on Kashmir issue. On February 4, 1952,

US said in a memorandum of understanding that,

“I discussed the importance of Dr. Graham’s making another

effort in India to settle the Kashmir dispute. The President

approves of his going and has sent him word to that effect.”67

On February 22, 1951, an Anglo-American resolution was brought before UN

Security Council in which it was suggested that Kashmir dispute should be submitted

to the International Court of Justice for arbitration. This resolution was accepted by

Pakistan, but India denied it68. This resolution showed that US had also started thinking

positively about Pakistan. In the same year, Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State

for Near East and African Affairs also supported the idea of Pakistan-US alliance and

for this purpose, he asked Major General Olmstead of Pentagon to initiate the matters

with Pakistan69. Henry Byroade presented several reasons in this regard including the

fighting qualities of Pakistani soldiers, the strategic location of Pakistan airfields, which

would be a better relieving point for US planes after aerial attacks in the USSR’s

territory70. Liaqat Ali Khan was going well with the US but unfortunately, he was

63 P.V Narasimha Rao, Nehru and Non-alignment, Mainstream Weekly. 2009-06-02. Retrieved October

31, 2009. 64 Manmohan Singh, Dr. Manmohan Singh's banquet speech in honour of Japanese Prime Minister,

(New Delhi: Prime Minister's Office, April 29, 2005), Archived from the original on December 12, 2005.

Retrieved March 28, 2014. 65 Ibid., 63 66 Ibid. 67 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d649, Retrieved on January 27, 2017. 68 Safdar Mehmood, Pakistan Political Roots and Developments (1947-1999), (Karachi: Oxford

University Press, 2000), 188. 69 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969), 55. 70 Ibid.

22

assassinated in Rawalpindi on October 16, 1951. US also felt the loss of Liaqat Ali

Khan greatly and sent his message of condolence to his wife in these words,

“I send you sincere condolences, in which Mrs. Truman

and our daughter join me, in your great sorrow which has

come so suddenly and under such tragic circumstances.

Pakistan which under the Prime Minister's wise leadership

has met and overcome so many obstacles in taking its place

in the world family of nations, has suffered a grievous blow.

I know the people of Pakistan, whose qualities have been so

clearly reflected in the progress of your country, will carry on

with calm steadfastness and wisdom. To you I wish to convey

my sorrow and that of your many American friends in the loss

of your husband”71

After the assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan, Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din became

second Prime Minister of Pakistan. He continued pro-American policy of Liaqat Ali

Khan. At the time of the worst famine in Pakistan, US provided wheat to meet the

requirements of the people on the request of Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din72.

On January 20, 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower became the President of the United

States. He was a Republican although the former President Truman was having a broad-

based desire to have Eisenhower as a candidate for the presidency on behalf of

Democratic Party but Eisenhower at the time of US elections in 1952 disagreed with

Democrats especially with Truman’s desire and declared that he and his family would

be Republican forever73. Eisenhower's main goals in office were also like his

predecessor, Truman as he also wanted to keep pressure on the Soviet Union and reduce

federal deficits. In the first year of his presidency, he threatened the use of nuclear

weapons as he was willing to keep the Korean War so limited or to bring it to

conclusion. He initiated his policy of nuclear deterrence as he was willing to stop a

heavy budget which was formerly spent on purchasing nuclear weapons. He was also

of the view of reducing the budget which was spent on traditional army and to spend

most of the budget in meeting US deficits and other projects of welfare. But he started

some other military fronts as he ordered coups in Iran and Guatemala74. He also gave

major aid to help the French in the First Indochina War, and after the French were

defeated he gave strong financial support to the new nation of South Vietnam75. US

71 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13951 Retrieved on January 19, 2017. 72 Firdousi, Eagle Over Pakistan , 64. 73 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890–1952,(1983),

512. 74 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dwight_D._Eisenhower Retrieved on January 21, 2017. 75 Ibid.

23

military was ordered by him to support the pro-Western Taiwan and continue the

advancement for the isolation of the People's Republic of China76.

History of Pakistan-US relations entered in another phase when in April 1953,

Governor General Malik Ghulam Muhammad dismissed Nazim-ud-Din’s ministry and

in spite of appointing a new Prime Minister from existing National Assembly, he called

back Muhammad Ali Bogra, Pakistan’s Ambassador in US. Bogra was appointed as

new Prime Minister of Pakistan even when he was not a member of Pakistan’s National

Assembly77. Mohammad Ali Bogra was a Bengali politician and served as ambassador

of Pakistan in Burma, Canada and the US. He was not a well-known political figure of

the country so at first, he was not willing to assume the office but later he agreed. He

had strong ties with the US government78. The circumstances revealed that the dismissal

of Nazim-ud-Din was at the direction of US because US wanted some more

advancement on Pakistan’s side regarding US relations with Pakistan. In his less than

three years tenure, he signed many treaties and agreements with the US and tried his

best to make both US and Pakistan come closer to each other79. The most important of

these agreements include SEATO80 and CENTO81. On the other hand, he was willing

to negotiate with India about the resolution of mutual issues the major of which was

Kashmir dispute. His first meeting with Indian Prime Minister was on June 2, 1953 in

a ceremony held for the coronation of Queen Elizabeth-II in United Kingdom.

Afterwards both the leaders exchanged state visits. Bogra was also interested in

advancement of Pakistan’s relations with China. He got the opportunity to meet with

Chinese President in Bandung Conference in 1955. This was the very first high-level

contact between Pakistani and Chinese governments.

Pakistan had already accepted US President Truman’s four-point programme

and receiving aid under Colombo Plan and in this regard, Pakistan received the biggest

aid in 195382. US was willing to bring Pakistan to an agreement. For this purpose, US

imposed conditions on Pakistan regarding getting aid under Colombo Plan. In February

1954, National Security Council of US approved aid for Pakistan on the condition that

Pakistan would increase cooperation with Turkey a NATO member and Pakistan and

76 Ibid. 77 Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1976),

64-65. 78 History in a nutshell (II) - The News on Sunday. Retrieved on April 4, 2016. 79 Ibid. 80 Appendix-III 81 Appendix-IV 82 Firdousi, Eagle Over Pakistan, 65.

24

Turkey declared on February 19, 1954 to examine the possibilities of joint action

against any aggression83. In March 1954, an American military survey team under the

leadership of Brigadier General, Henry F. Myers reached Pakistan to get first-hand

knowledge of requirements of Pakistan armed forces84. US knew Pakistan with fully

equipped military could serve US better against any kind of Soviet aggression. For this

purpose, Pakistan was given B-57, Sabre F-86, F-104-star Fighters along with

establishment of a complete armored division, an independent armored brigade and a

new naval base85. Pakistan-US cooperation, which had been growing with great pace

reached at its peak by mid of 1954, when on May 19 Mutual Defense Assistance

Agreement was signed between Pakistan and US86. According to this agreement, it was

announced that US would not hold any military base in Pakistan87. After this agreement,

Pakistan became a reliable US ally.

US was contended on having Pakistan’s cooperation through Mutual Defense

Assistance Agreement but US wanted Pakistan to go one step forward and assure US

her commitment of cooperation in case of any advancement of communists. Therefore,

on September 8, 1954, Pakistan entered in another agreement with US and other

countries that was SEATO88. This treaty was according to Truman’s Doctrine was quite

willing to block the Communist impact on the South East Asian region89. According to

SEATO, it was agreed that in case of any kind of aggression against any of the member

countries, other members would help her, but US had some reservations about the final

draft of the agreement because US was ready to help the member countries only in case

of communist’s aggression. Later, US agreed to react after consultation with other

signatories, in case of aggression other than that of a communist country90. This Pact

could not do well militarily as most of its members did not contribute well in this regard

due to the reason that it had no proper chain of military command91. On the other hand,

SEATO contributed better to counter the social and cultural issues of the member

83 Salamat, Pakistan 1947-1958; An Historical Review, 201. 84 Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 87. 85 Ibid. 86 Salamat, Pakistan 1947-1958: An Historical Review, 39. 87 Firdousi, Eagle Over Pakistan, 83. 88 Aslam Qureshi, Anglo-Pakistan Relations, (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1976), 157. 89 Cal Jillson, American Government: Political Development and Institutional Change. (Taylor &

Francis, 2009), 439. 90 Ibid. 91 John C. Blaxland, Strategic Cousins: Australian and Canadian Expeditionary Forces and the British

and American Empires, (Montreal: McGill Queen's University Press, 2006), 138.

25

countries92. Another cause of the failure of this organization was that although this

organization was formed keeping in view of the countries of South East Asia, but

majority of the countries were not South East Asian. The decision to join the agreement

was a joint decision of Pakistan Army’s high command and political leaders93 but no

one was ready to accept the responsibility. General Muhammad Ayub Khan, the

Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army at the time of SEATO agreement, disclosed in

his book, “Friends Not Masters” that he, being the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan

Army was kept in dark and he was informed after signing the agreement and accepting

the membership94. It was a dilemma of our nation that no one was ready to admit his

responsibility on matters of great national concern. But it was not possible for any of

the army, the bureaucracy or the politicians to keep the other totally in dark on such

important issues. If anyone denied his responsibilities, he was just trying to escape from

reality. Moreover, in the beginning of 1970s SEATO had lost it military importance to

a great extent. Pakistan was also dismembered, and East Pakistan emerged as

Bangladesh and got the status of an independent country. So, Pakistan left this Pact in

1972. A few years after on February 20, 1976 SEATO was formally dissolved95.

In the next year, in July 1955, Pakistan joined Central Treaty Organization

(CENTO) formerly known as Baghdad Pact or Middle East Treaty Organization96. This

was an agreement of same kind as that of SEATO whose chief aim was to contain

communism. US did not take part in it initially but in 1958 it joined the Treaty after

getting approval from Congress. Initially its headquarter was in Baghdad but when on

July 14, 1958 Iraqi government was overthrown in a military coup and General Abdul

Karim Qasim became the new Iraqi ruler, he withdrew Iraq from the treaty so its head

office was shifted to Ankara. Its name “Baghdad Pact” was also changed to “CENTO”.

But on the formation of this treaty and participation as a member, Pakistan had to face

opposition not only from inside the country but also from the Muslim world. Maulana

Bashani from East Pakistan was the biggest critic of Pakistan’s agreement with the

US97. President Nasser of Egypt also opposed Baghdad Pact and he accused Pakistan

92 John K. Franklin, The Hollow Pact: Pacific Security and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

(Michigan: ProQuest, 2006), 183. 93 Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 83. 94 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967), 168. 95 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Students' Britannica India, Volume Five. (India: Popular Prakashan, 2000),

60. 96 Firdousi, Eagle Over Pakistan, 89. 97 Ibid., 92.

26

of becoming a part of activities creating division in the Arab world98. It resulted in a

serious damage to one of the main objectives of Pakistan’s foreign policy, as Pakistan

wanted to create an Islamic bloc to get the championship of the Muslim cause99. India

was also much concerned about this agreement. Indian Prime Minister Nehru expressed

his views about the agreement in the following words:

“The Baghdad Pact concerns us more closely and affects us. If on

our left and on our right armies begin to mobilize or there is stock

of military pacts, then we cannot close our eyes to it or remain silent

over it”.100

Pakistani policy makers were having a misconception that US would help

Pakistan in case of Indian attack. The agreements made by US were only to contain the

expansion of the communists. This treaty also could not perform in a better way as it

also did not have proper chain of command. It had some major success in establishing

cultural and scientific research institutions such as:

i. CENTO Conferences on Teaching Public Health and Public Health

Practice

ii. CENTO Cultural Works Programme

iii. CENTO Institute of Nuclear & Applied Science

iv. CENTO Scientific Coordinating Board

v. CENTO Scientific Council

vi. CENTO Symposia on Rural Development

This treaty had almost lost its significance in 1979 so on March 16, 1979,

Secretary General of CENTO Kamran Gurun formally announced to call a meeting of

the council to dissolve the organization. On the other hand, despite the cold response of

Liaqat Ali Khan to Stalin’s invitation some years back, USSR was still ready to

construct close relations with Pakistan. In 1956, Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan,

participated in Pakistan Republic Day’s celebrations and said that the fate of Kashmir

should be decided according to the will of Kashmiris101. This was a better gesture

showed by a high USSR official on an important occasion and on crucial issue.

Moreover, he also offered help in establishing Steel Mill in Pakistan102. This was a vital

98 Ayub, Friends Not Masters, 156. 99 Salamat, Pakistan 1947-1958: An Historical Review, 33. 100 Mahajan, International Relations Since 1914, 343. 101 Firdousi, Eagle Over Pakistan , 94. 102 Ibid.

27

chance for Pakistan to return to the policy of neutralism, but Pakistani leadership was

impressed by the West and could not follow the call of the time.

Prime Minister Bogra was doing well vis-à-vis political development in

Pakistan. He formed some constitutional provisions known as Bogra Formula which

were welcomed by both East and the West Pakistan. The assembly was trying to have

checks and balance on the powers of Governor General which Ghulam Muhammad did

not agree to and he dissolved the Constitution Assembly in 1955103. This action of

Governor General was challenged by the Speaker of assembly, Maulvi Tamizuddin.

Supreme Court of Pakistan also regarded Governor General’s decision as illegal. Major

General Iskandar Mirza replaced Malik Ghulam Muhammad as Acting Governor

General of Pakistan because he took leave from his office due to ill health. A few days

after Iskandar Mirza dismissed him and assumed the office permanently. On August

12, 1955, Iskandar Mirza forced Muhammad Ali Bogra to resign from the office.

Chaudhry Muhammad Ali became the new Prime Minister of Pakistan on

August 12, 1954. He could not find much time to concentrate on international politics

and Pakistan’s foreign policy as he remained busy in coping with domestic politics.

Although it was great success for his government that the first ever constitution was

given to Pakistan despite that he could not stop rifts that were present within his party,

Muslim League. Some of his party members of assembly who had difference of opinion

left him and a new party was formed named as Republican Party and they claimed of

having majority of assembly members with them. His own party insisted him to have a

check on Republican Party for the smooth functioning of the party. But Muhammad Ali

refused to do so and replied that he was in Prime Minister’s office to look upon the

matters of the whole nation and not of the party alone. As a disappointment, on

September 12, 1956, he resigned from both from the office of the Prime Minister as

well from his party. In October 1956, Pakistani Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed

Suhrawardy was the first Pakistani Premier to realize the need of the policy of

neutralism. Although, he initiated pro-western foreign policy and was known as the

pioneer of Pakistan’s policy regarding US which is still followed by the governments

of Pakistan. Chinese government officially invited Pakistani Premier to visit China and

in October 1956, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy visited China and became the first ever-

Pakistani high official to pay an official visit to China104. He also started Pakistan’s

103 “History in a nutshell -II”, The News on Sunday", Retrieved April 04, 2016. 104 Mushtaq Ahmed, Government and Politics in Pakistan, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1978), 61.

28

Embassy in Peking. Two months after Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai also paid an official

visit to Pakistan in December 1956105. Suhrawardy received some reservations from

Washington, but US was quite committed to provide full military support to a country

which might be facing armed aggression. According to White House Press Release on

January 5, 1957, US reaffirmed its policy in these words;

“The United States regards as vital to the international interest

and world peace the preservation of the independence and

integrity on the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the

President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is

prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group

of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from

any country controlled by International Communism”.106

Due to strong assurances from the US, Suhrawardy was motivated to forge

stronger military ties with the US. In this area the riskiest step was Suhrawardy took for

the US during his tenure was the establishment of facility of air base at Badaber, which

is about 16 km from Peshawar, for the US to fly U-2 Spy plane which was an

intelligence plane specially designed to gather intelligence information about a certain

area. US needed this facility which was quite helpful in having intelligence information

about the communist countries. For such kind of policy in US interests, his government

got full economic support from the US. Some policies of Suhrawardy were not

welcomed by the junior leadership of his party so he lost the support of his party.

Business community and private sector of Pakistan was also not happy with his

economic policy. Foremost he was showing resistance in the way of President Iskandar

Mirza who was willing to control the democracy by himself. At last being depressed

from the political scenario, he resigned from his office on October 17, 1957 just one

year after assuming the charge107.

Later, on October 17, 1957, Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar (I.I. Chundrigar) took

the charge as Prime Minister of Pakistan. The time was very tough for him as he was

going to be the Prime Minister of a coalition government in which the representation of

his party was not enough to have full control of the government. Soon, Republican Party

which was also a vital part of the coalition raised opposition to his government. By

taking full advantage of the political situation, Iskandar Mirza dismissed him from his

office on December 16, 1957, just two months after he assumed the charge.

105 Haris Raqeeb Azeemi, 55 Years of Pakistan China Relationships, Pakistan Horizon, (Karachi:

Pakistan Institute on International Affairs, 2007), 109-124. 106 White House Press Release, January 5, 1957, Text is also in United States Department of State Bulletin 107 Suhrawardy and the resignation. Story of Pakistan. Retrieved January 21, 2017.

29

Prime Minister Malik Feroze Khan Noon took the charge of the office as Prime

Minister on December 16, 1957. He was keen to continue Pakistan’s membership of

the Commonwealth as he was also against reliance on American aid on Indian

aggression108. Moreover, in a meeting held in Ankara in January 1958, Pakistani Prime

Minister admitted that the major threat to Pakistan’s security was not the communists

but the neutralists109. But Feroze Khan Noon could not get enough time as prime

minister due to imposition of martial law in the country by Iskandar Mirza. General

Ayub Khan who was the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan’s army was appointed by

him as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Later, Ayub Khan sent Iskandar Mirza on

a forced exile from Pakistan. Ayub Khan ignored the services of Iskandar Mirza which

he had done for Ayub Khan. His first and foremost favor which he had done for Ayub

Khan was that he recommended his name for the first native Commander-in-Chief of

Pakistan. When Lieutenant General Douglas Gracey completed his term and got retired,

Liaqat Ali Khan wanted to appoint native army chief. As per general criterion, the

names of four top senior most army generals were reviewed which include Major-

General Iftikhar Khan, Major-General Akbar Khan, Major-General Ishfak-ul-Majid,

and Major-General NAM Raza110. The name of Ayub Khan was not there as he was

one of the most junior most army generals. The name of Major General Iftikhar Khan

was approved as first ever native army chief of Pakistan army. But unfortunately, he

died in a plane crash while he was returning from UK after the completion of a staff

course. By taking full advantage of the opportunity, Defense Minister Iskandar Mirza

put forward the name of Major General Ayub Khan for the post of Commander-in-

Chief. He argued about Ayub’s loyalty to the nation and full determination to his job.

Therefore, Ayub Khan got promotion as Lieutenant General and got the unmatched

honor to be the first ever native Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan army although even

his name was not present in the first list presented for nomination.111

The coldness in Pakistan-US relations started during 1957-58. The main reason

of this coldness was the change of US policy regarding South Asia after change in US

interests. US focused her attentions towards relationship with India, which forced

Pakistan’s rulers to think about the changing world scenario. US had reservations about

108 Mushtaq, Government and Politics in Pakistan, 136-137. 109 Mahajan, International Relations Since 1914, 344. 110 A.R Siddiqui, "Army's top slot: the seniority factor". The Daily Dawn, Pakistan, April 25, 2004,

Retrieved on April 10, 2012. 111 Ibid.

30

weak civil governments in Pakistan, which made US change its policy towards

Pakistan. A strong government in Pakistan was badly needed by US for accomplishment

of her objectives in the region. General Ayub Khan was called to Washington and after

his visit in May 1958, he said that several vital military problems had been solved112. A

few months after Ayub’s visit to US, everyone came to know about what kind of vital

military problems, Ayub Khan was pointing to a few months back. Ayub Khan

dismissed the government and imposed first ever Martial Law in the country’s history

through the President Iskandar Mirza. Before taking this step and taking control of the

country, General Ayub Khan consulted with CIA Chief Allen Dulles and important

officials of Washington State Department113. With the imposition of Martial Law, first

phase of Pakistan-US relations came to an end.

1.2. Pakistan-US Relations During Ayub Khan’s Regime (1958-71):

Era of first ever long military rule had begun in Pakistan as a result of Ayub

Khan’s coup. Ayub Khan, who remained a frequent visitor of US almost every year

from 1951 to 1958114, took over the government as Chief Martial Law Administrator

on October 07, 1958 and then on October 27, 1958 he assumed the charge of the

President of Pakistan115. Due to Ayub Khan’s relations with the US, it was an

assumption that his accession to the presidency and government might be on the

direction of US. Moreover, to hide this fact from the world, US ambassador in Pakistan

reacted sharply and asked some pointing questions from Ayub Khan regarding the

safety of Iskandar Mirza, the former President of Pakistan which made even Ayub Khan

upset116. Ayub Khan also continued the pro-American policy that was what needed by

the US and for the same purpose Pakistan was pushed into a long era of Martial Law.

Previously, Pakistan had been passing through political destabilization due to

frequent change of governments. Before Ayub Khan, in just 11 years of history after

independence there were four Governor Generals and seven prime ministers. Liaqat Ali

Khan was the only Prime Minister who remained in his office for four years till his

assassination in 1951 but in next eight years people of Pakistan witnessed six Prime

Ministers. Most of them hardly passed two years in their office and I.I Chundrigar was

the one who just spent two months in his office. Every time the reason for dismissal of

112 Firdousi, Eagle Over Pakistan, 103. 113 Ibid, 99. 114 M. Asghar Khan, We,ve Learnt Nothing From History, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 54 115 Safdar Mehmood, Pakistan Political Roots and Developments, 54. 116 Asghar, We’ve Learnt Nothing from History, 15-16.

31

the premier was interpersonal or official rivalry between Prime Minister and the Head

of State. This political instability in Pakistan could not allow it to formulate a firm or

long-lasting principle for foreign policy making. However, Ayub Khan’s rule continued

for more than ten years. Although he was a military man and did not have much

acceptance from the internal forces in the beginning but soon, he managed it.

Ayub Khan was a wise man so he used two main approaches to rule the country

during his first few years. First, he took steps to get rid of severe opposition against

him. For this purpose, he introduced PRODA and EBDO the two ordinances which

were used to crush the opposition. According to this act the government officials having

involved in corruption, misconduct or inefficiency or some other activities against the

decorum of his office would be excluded from the public office for a period of 15 years.

Most of the time, this ordinance was used to pressurize the government officials in

police or involved in administration to fulfill the government’s interest117. The Elective

Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) was also introduced in the country to authorize

special tribunals to prosecute politician for any kind of misconduct. But the problem

with this law was that the term “misconduct” was not completely defined. So, it is just

the government to have its different definitions on different occasions and for different

politicians. This act was used against more than 7000 politicians including former Prime

Minister of Pakistan, Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy118. Being a military man Ayub

Khan did not have much acceptance among the comity of nations as well besides among

majority of the people of Pakistan who were fed up of this kind of instability in Pakistan

when political victimization was at its climax. No one was there among the ruling class

to look towards the condition of the masses. Ayub Khan knew he could rule long only

if the middle-class would be happy. In this regard he aimed at the removal of certain

anti-social practices from the country especially against the women and children. In the

broader view, he also focused at eliminating corruption, smuggling and black

marketing. Press and Publication Ordinance was amended in 1960 according to which

print media (the only news media at that time) was instructed to follow some rules and

regulations;

“The ordinance stated that after a security deposit had

been demanded from a printing press, the deposit could

be forfeited and even the printing establishment could be

asked to stop publishing any book or newspaper if the matter

contained therein tended to:‘ (a) contain reports of crimes of

117 Peter R. Blood ed., Pakistan: A Country Study, 6th ed., (US: Federal Research Division, Library of

Congress, 1995), 45. 118 Ibid.

32

violence or sex, produced in a manner which was likely to

excite unhealthy curiosity or urge imitation or which might

incite interference in the administration of law or with the

maintenance of law and order or which might encourage non-

payment of taxes, including land revenue; (b) incite or

encourage the commission of an offence of murder or any

offence involving violence or amounted to an abetment of the

same; (c) directly or indirectly condemn the creation of

Pakistan or advocate the curtailment or the abolition of the

sovereignty of Pakistan in respect of all or any of its territories;

(d) bring into hatred or contempt the government established

by law in Pakistan or any class or section of the citizens of

Pakistan; and (e) create feelings of enmity between the people

of the two wings of Pakistan.’119

Similarly, the activities of non-governmental organization (NGOs) and student

and other unions were also closely monitored. They were not allowed to be involved in

political activity. Even the Imams120 were directed not to include any political matter in

their Friday or Eid121 sermons. The important issue that was prevailing at that time was

the sense of inferiority among the people of the East Pakistan. This aroused some

grievances in their hearts. The seed of these grievances was sown at the time when after

independence, Quaid-i-Azam announced Urdu to be the national language and Karachi

to be the capital of Pakistan. The gulf between both East and West Pakistan widened

day by day and it was needed to eliminate these differences. Ayub Khan tried his best

to appoint Bengalis on the major posts in the East Pakistan because they were aware of

the language and culture of the region. He also declared Dhaka as the legislative and

the newly constructed Islamabad city as the administrative capital of Pakistan. He also

invested a lot of money for the welfare and to boost the economy of the East Pakistan,

but private sector was still hesitant to invest money there. His measures could not reduce

the gulf between the two wings of Pakistan.

A couple of months after assuming the office of the President, Ayub Khan

released his foreign policy statement. On December 23, 1958, Ayub Khan emphasized

the need of close relations with US122. He was also considering the communism as a

danger to Pakistan. In an interview, Ayub Khan said,

“It is no inconceivable that one of the dangers is that the communist

weed will have the power to bring direct military pressure to bear.

This is self-evidence. They have the capacity. I do not say that is

119

http://www.dawn.com/news/579244, Excerpt: Freedom of expression, From In paper Magazine ,

Published on Nov 07, 2010, Retrieved on January 31, 2017.

120 Muslim religious leaders who leads the prayers 121 Muslim religious festival 122 Firdousi, Eagle Over Pakistan, 105 .

33

their intention”.123

US was contented with Ayub Khan’s foreign policy vis-à-vis US so economic

aid to Pakistan had been increased to a great extent. Ayub Khan was a military man so

his foremost intention was to make Pakistan’s army even stronger than before. He was

also aware of the fact that this could only be possible with the assistance of the US. So,

he started a pro-American policy. It was due to his policy that US aid to Pakistan, which

was 61 million dollars in 1958, was raised to 184 million in 1959124. Ayub Khan though

not a politician but a military man who took over the control of the country by violating

the existing constitution of the country, so his rule was not justified. He needed firm

support to get rid of strong opposition. So, he had to rely on US to resist his political

opponents in the country with iron hands. In this context, a bilateral agreement was

signed between Pakistan and US on March 05, 1959125.

But with the start of next decade there happened a big incident which raised

problems for Pakistan at international level. As US, was concerned with the activities

of USSR and China and for this purpose it managed to use Badaber Base of Peshawar

for monitoring radar signals and taping radio traffic in the areas of USSR and China126.

Interestingly the US plan to have an eye on the communists’ activities was exposed on

May 01, 1960. A US spy plane U-2 along with its pilot, Francis Garry Powers were

downed and captured in USSR. Soviet Premier, Nitika S. Khrushchev took the control

of the whole affair directly in his own hands127. It was a great setback for US as well as

for Pakistan. The incident was enough to invite USSR’s anger against Pakistan. Soviet

interest in this matter at such a high level revealed the fact that USSR had intentions to

teach Pakistan a lesson for providing US her own land to use against USSR. Keeping

the possibility of a severe reaction from the furious USSR, Pakistan’s Foreign

Secretary, Muhammad Ikram Ullah declared that Pakistan had no knowledge about the

incident. He also assured that Pakistan would protest US on finding the US involvement

in the incident128. On a visit to United Kingdom Ayub Khan met American CIA Chief

who told Ayub Khan of the whole incident and Ayub Khan replied that he was

expecting this incident some day and the same had happened.

123 Sahba Zulfi, Ayub Khan, (Ashraf Zafar Publishing House, 1964), 133. 124 Aslam, Anglo-Pakistan Relations, 99. 125 Firdousi, Eagle Over Pakistan, 106. 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid., 116. 128 Ibid.

34

USSR Secretary General Nikita Khrushchev threatened Pakistan to attack

Peshawar. In response to this threat Ayub Khan publicly offered his apologies129. Ayub

Khan was expecting more offensive attitude from USSR side so he took this step to

normalize the mutual relations. He advised Pakistan’s Foreign Office to facilitate the

state visits of USSR Foreign Minister and Premier on the condition to reduce bilateral

relations with the US130. The incident of U-2 spy plane made Pakistani government

think of returning to the policy of neutralism because Pakistan was not able to earn

enmity of any of the two superpowers. That the reason that after six months of the

incident it was known that Pakistan accepted the offer of Soviet technical assistance in

the field of oil prospecting131. Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Minister of Oil and Gas and

Natural Resources of Ayub Khan’s government persuaded Ayub Khan to enter

economic and technical cooperation with Soviet Union132. According to Zubaid Ahmed

Firdousi Bhutto’s meeting with Soviet Prime Minster Khrushchev was fruitful.

“During the course of negotiation, Soviet P.M Khrushchev remarked

that Pakistanis are beautiful people but make ugly decisions to

which Mr. Bhutto meaningfully replied that this time an ugly

Pakistani has come to take a beautiful decision”.133

There was a great break through regarding Pakistan-USSR relations in March

1961 when an agreement was signed between the two countries and as a result of this

agreement, Pakistan managed to set up Oil and Gas Development Corporation (OGDC)

in October 1961134. Soon after independence the relations between and USSR were not

bad as USSR accepted Pakistan as the member of the UN General Assembly in

September 1947135. Later, in May 1948, diplomatic relations were also established

between the two countries. During the same year, there was a meeting between Soviet

Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan in which matters

regarding trade and economic relationship were discussed in Paris136. After

independence Pakistan needed huge financial support which was not possible for the

USSR to manage. So, Pakistan had to see towards the developed countries of Europe

and North America. However, the economic exchange between Pakistan and USSR

129 Feroze Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, (Stanford University Press, Nov 7,

2012), Retrieved November 4, 2016. 130 Ibid. 131Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 173. 132 Firdousi, Eagle Over Pakistan, 114-115. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid. 135 Kamenev N. Sergery, Russia-Pakistan Economic Relations: Influence on Security in South Asia,

Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 63, No. 2, (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, April 2010), 19-

34. 136 Ibid.

35

started when USSR began to deliver flour to Pakistan and got cotton and jute from

Pakistan in exchange137. But when Pakistan started looking towards establishing strong

economic relations with US and Great Britain then mutual relations between Pakistan

and the USSR became weak. So, the job which could not be done in the initial phase

was on its way in Ayub Khan’s regime.

Pakistan was also willing to establish good relations with China. Pakistan was

the first Muslim and the third non-communist nation to recognize China. In May 1951

both the countries established mutual diplomatic relations138. But there was a need of

more progress in this regard. The positive development in Pakistan-China relations

started in 1961, when during his visit to US; Ayub Khan supported the idea of Chinese

entry to the UN139. On the other hand, while addressing to the US Congress, Ayub Khan

proudly declared that Pakistan was the only country where US army could land140. In

fact, US was annoyed with Pakistan’s stance taken regarding Pakistan’s relations with

USSR and China. That was the reason, Ayub Khan thought it necessary to give

assurance of using Pakistan’s land whenever needed by the US.

John F. Kennedy became the 35th President of the United States on January 20,

1961. He belonged to Democratic Party. Kennedy was young and energetic leader and

was willing to bring positive change in US domestic and foreign policy. In his inaugural

address he said in this regard;

“ I ask the nations of the world to join together to

fight what is called the "common enemies of man:

tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself……. All this

will not be finished in the first one hundred days. Nor

will it be finished in the first one thousand days, nor in

the life of this Administration, nor even perhaps in our

lifetime on this planet. But let us begin……"Finally,

whether you are citizens of America or citizens of the

world, ask of us here the same high standards of

strength and sacrifice which we ask of you”.141

Kennedy administration was also satisfied with Ayub Khan’s government.

Lyndon Johnson, Vice President of US under Kennedy’s administration also regarded

137 Karachi Chamber of Commerce Report, September 20, 1952. 138 Azeemi, 55 Years of Pakistan-China Relationship, 109-124. 139 Safdar, Pakistan Political Roots and Developments, 205. 140 Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, 1. 141 John F. Kennedy, "Inaugural Address on January 20, 1961". (US: John F. Kennedy Presidential

Library), Archived from the original on January 11, 2012. Retrieved January 22, 2017.

36

Ayub Khan as dependable ally during his tour to Asia142. It was expected that US new

President wanted to establish good relations with every country including China, to

fight the common dangers to humanity. If we look at Pakistan’s relations and closeness

with China, then we come to know that at that time Pakistan was the only nation that

could serve as a bridge in bringing US and China closer to each other. In the US some

policy makers were having soft corner for China because China could be the best market

for any country as it was having the largest population in the world. Moreover, China’s

economy was growing day by day and it was another factor which US policy makers

were considering important. For Pakistan, the relations with China were quite

significant as Pakistan found a substitute superpower which could make Pakistan’s

military even stronger by providing latest military weapons to Pakistan Army. For Ayub

Khan it was very important to build a strong army, fully equipped with weapons and

modern technology. For a kind gesture, Pakistan voted in favour of China concerning

the restoration of a legitimate status of China in the UN143.

When Pakistan was starting to make her relations better with China, India was

preparing ground for confrontation with China. In April 1962, India-China border

confrontation reached at its peak and US jumped into the matter and favored Indian

stance and started supply of arms and ammunition to India on large scale144. US

President John F. Kennedy wanted that Pakistan should assure India that she would not

attempt to get any kind of advantage from Sino-India War so that India might be in a

position to move her army from Pakistan’s border and depute them on Chinese border

but Ayub Khan refused to accept it145.

Indian Prime Minister Nehru was quite contented with what US government had

been doing for India. In his letter to the US President, Nehru thanked him in these

words,

“My Dear Mr. President, I write to thank you for the generous

approach which the United States Government has made in

regard to the assistance to India for her Third Five Year Plan.

The United States Ambassador here has informed us that at

the meeting convened by the World Bank, the United States

Government offered a thousand million dollars by way of aid

to India for the first two years of the Third Five Year Plan.

This aid is in addition to the large quantities of wheat and rice

which have already been promised under PL-480. A special

142 Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan, 167. 143 Azeemi, 55-Years of Pakistan China Relationship, 109-124. 144 Ahmed Shuja Pasha, Pakistan Ki Kharja Policy: Aik Ijmali Jaeza, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel

Publications, 1990), 170. 145 Firdousi, Eagle Over Pakistan, 131.

37

feature of the United States aid to India's development plans,

which we appreciate greatly and which is of particular value

to us, is that repayments in foreign exchange have been

reduced to the minimum……………… May I thank you again,

Mr. President, for your generous approach to our problems and

also for exercising your country's great influence on the other

participants of the aid programme so as to raise the quantum of

aid to a level which will be commensurate with India's needs

for the execution of her Third Five Year Plan”.146

Ayub Khan, during his visit to US informed Kennedy about Pakistan’s

reservation regarding US military aid to India on Sino-India border conflict in the

following words,

“Arms assistances to India would only encourage her remain in

occupation of areas which did not belong to her and prospects

of any just settlement of the dispute (Kashmir) would be eliminated”147

In reply to Pakistan’s reservations regarding US aid to India, US State

Department assured Pakistan that US had given the aid to India only to restrict China

and India would not use the aid against Pakistan148. Pakistan’s reservations were not

baseless because the aid given by the US to India was not ignorable. It was consisted of

construction of new airfields along the northern borders, extension of existing airfields

and provision of strong radar system149. Moreover, US and UK approved 100 million

dollars to provide India with military equipment150. Sino-India War was a border

conflict but US was greatly concerned with it. US was so blind in her policy of

containing China that she gave a huge support to India. It was rather an Indian trick to

get aid from US apparently for using against China but for damaging Pakistan. Later,

India used the same military equipment against Pakistan in 1965 war.

India had three main objectives to start the war with China. First, India was

trying to know the intentions of China about India. Secondly, India wanted to know the

response of the USSR that whether USSR would back India against China or not. Third

and the foremost was that India was trying to win the sympathies of the US government

in case of fighting against a communist nation151. India managed to accomplish its third

objective more effectively as compared to the first two as India got a lot of military and

economic support from the US.

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Bhutto was the chief builder of Pakistan’s pleasant

relations with China. In March 1963, he went to Peking and signed a border agreement

146 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d19, Retrieved on January 26, 2017. 147 Ayub, Friends Not Masters, 130. 148 Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 163. 149 Ibid., 157-59. 150 Ibid., 151 George W. Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi, (London: Faber and Faber, 1963), 89.

38

with China152. This agreement affected Pakistan-US relations. US was not happy with

the agreement. In August 1963, US openly criticized this agreement because US was of

the view that Pakistan had provided China a window to peep into an open world153. US

did not confine her anger to just verbal criticism but she went a step forward and

postponed 4-billion-dollar aid for Pakistan, which had been approved to modernize

Dacca airport154.

In the US there occurred a tragic incident of President Kennedy’s death. He was

assassinated in Dallas, Texas, at 12:30 pm Central Standard Time on Friday, November

22, 1963, while he was on a political trip to Texas to smooth over frictions in the

Democratic Party between liberals and conservatives. The same day just after two hours

Lyndon B. Johnson the Vice President of US took oath as the next President. US District

Judge Sarah T. Huges took oath. It was so quick ad strange that it raised suspicion of

conspiracy against the government155. He might be of the view that in case of quick

transfer of power to the new President would prove to be a cause of stability among the

grieved nation. But some people in the US took this quick step in other way. To get rid

of conspiracies Johnson formed a Commission headed by the Chief Justice Earl Warren

to investigate the cause of the assassination of Kennedy156. The Commission, after

extensive investigation, reached to the decision that Lee Harvey Oswald who

assassinated Kennedy was alone in this act. But this decision could not stop the

conspiracy theories regarding Kennedy’s death for decades or even till this time157.

US Ambassador to India wrote a letter to the President on December 27, 1963

in which he told the President about some consequences as a result of the US interest

in establishing very close relations with Pakistan. He writes,

“When John Foster Dulles decided in late 1953 to arm Pakistan

as the “strongest available anti-Communist power in South Asia

and the Persian Gulf area” I and many others who know the area

well vigorously dissented for a variety of reasons—all of which,

I believe, have been vindicated by events:

1. From the outset Pakistan would view the arrangement not as

an alliance against the Communists, but as a source of United

States assistance against India;

152 Safdar, Pakistan Political Roots and Development, 206. 153 Muhammad Ahsan Chaudhry, Pakistan and the Great Powers, (Karachi: Oxford University Press,

1970), 43. 154 Shaheen Arshad, Rejection Alliance, (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publishers, 1972), 103. 155 JFK Assassination Coverage – Part 2: Lyndon B. Johnson Sworn in". Retrieved December 21, 2013. 156 Robert Dallek, "Presidency: How Do Historians Evaluate the Administration of Lyndon Johnson?".

History News Network. Retrieved June 17, 2014. 157 Robert D. Chapman, "The Kennedy Assassination 50 Years Later", International Journal of

Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, (US: Routledge, 2014), 615–619.

39

2. As fears of US-strengthened Pak forces develop in India, the

political strength of the anti-American, pro-Soviet, Krishna

Menon group would be sharply increased to our grave

disadvantage;

3. The likelihood of settling the Kashmir dispute (which was very

nearly accomplished in February 1952) would be diminished to

the disappearing point;

4. The Soviets, looking for an ultimate balancing factor to China

in Asia, would be given a wide open opportunity for a close

political, economic, and military relationship with both

Afghanistan and India with unpredictable but clearly unfavorable

results to our interests”158

Growing relationship of US and India forced Pakistan to make better relations

with China and USSR. Ayub Khan paid an official visit to China in two consecutive

years i.e.; 1964 and 1965159. Pakistan’s advancement in relations with China was not a

positive sign for US. The policy makers in Washington had started thinking of an

alternate option. In April 1965, Ayub Khan became the first head of state of Pakistan to

visit USSR and during his visit Soviet Union agreed to help Pakistan in her Five-Year

Plan160. Ayub Khan’s visit to USSR arose US anger at its peak. To add an insult to

injury Pakistan also refused to support US policy in Vietnam, which made US President

Lyndon B. Johnson very much annoyed161. On July 1, 1965, US refused to give aid to

Pakistan for Third Five Year Plan162. Two months later, in September 1965, war

between Pakistan and India started which lasted for a couple of weeks. This was a very

crucial time for Pakistan. India had gathered many arms on her confrontation with

China a few years back. But Pakistan was totally relying on US in this regard.

Unexpectedly, US cut off military aid to Pakistan and India following the outbreak of

the war163. It was an alarming situation for Pakistan. Pakistan was not able to fight a

long war with India. The expenditure incurred by Pakistan on war were approximately

2710 million rupees, which were almost double of that of 1360 .9 million rupees which

were kept for defense in 1965-66 budget164.

War of 1965 was a great blow to the economy and development of Pakistan. All

the development projects, which were initiated by the Basic Democracy System in

Pakistan, were ceased due to non-availability of money. After a severe damage to

Pakistan’s economy during 1965 war, Pakistan needed immediate financial assistance.

158 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d350, Retrieved on January 27, 2017. 159 Safdar, Pakistan Political Roots and Developments, 207. 160 Firdousi Eagle Over Pakistan, 137. 161 Chaudhry, Pakistan and the Great Powers, 43-44. 162 Safdar, Pakistan Political Roots and Developments, 207. 163 Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 167. 164 Pasha, Pakistan Ki Kharja Policy; Aik Ijmali Jaeza, 78.

40

For this purpose, Ayub Khan decided to remove US reservations about Pakistan. He

visited US in December 1965 to assure his loyalty and in return get US assistance, but

he was disappointed165. The diversion of US from Pakistan’s affairs provided USSR an

opportunity to bring wandering Pakistan closer to her. Soviet Premier Kosygin invited

Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri to Tashkent where in

January 1966 Tashkent Pact was signed between Pakistan and India166 according to

which it was decided that both countries would release the occupied areas of each other.

This agreement was not welcomed even among Ayub Khan’s cabinet. His Foreign

Minister, Bhutto was so annoyed at the Pact that he resigned from his office. Bhutto

was of the view that the war which Pakistan had won in the battlefield through the

bravery of Pakistan’s armed forces was lost on tables due to poor diplomacy.

US turned a cold shoulder towards Pakistan and remained a spectator during all

this process. As a result of US cold response, Pakistan started to boost her relations with

China. It was a fact that China was most suitable for Pakistan in containing India as

China had bitter experiences with India itself and as well as it had a common boundary

with India. Pakistani government could not dare to establish good relations with China

in the past, as it did not want to invite US anger. However, it was the right time to bring

Pakistan and China closer. The rulers of both the countries responded to the call of the

time. On March 23, 1966, at the ceremony of Pakistan’s Day Parade, Chinese tanks and

aircrafts were displayed167. The relations between Pakistan and China grew more. From

September 1967 to 1971 more than fifty cultural delegates were exchanged between the

two countries and in February 1971, China agreed to help Pakistan in the construction

of Karakoram Highway168. It was the time when Pakistan and China became the

friendly nations of the region.

In 1969, the Sino-Soviet border clash affected mutual relations of China and

USSR to a great extent169. US administration was changed and on January 20, 1969,

Richard M. Nixon assumed the office as the 37th President of the US. He belonged to

Republican Party. Richard M. Nixon was also quite active while working as Vice

President of the US under Eisenhower. According to Irwin Gellman;

“Eisenhower radically altered the role of his running mate by

presenting him with critical assignments in both foreign and

165 Chaudhry, Pakistan and the Great Powers, 46. 166 Safdar, Pakistan Political Roots and Developments, 192. 167 Ibid., 208. 168 Ibid., 208-09. 169 Ibid., 215.

41

domestic affairs once he assumed his office. The vice president

welcomed the president's initiatives and worked energetically to

accomplish White House objectives. Because of the collaboration

between these two leaders, Nixon deserves the title, "the first

modern vice president.”170

After assuming the office of presidency, he said;

“In these difficult years, America has suffered from a fever of

words; from inflated rhetoric that promises more than it can

deliver; from angry rhetoric that fans discontents into hatreds;

from bombastic rhetoric that postures instead of persuading.

We cannot learn from one another until we stop shouting at

one another, until we speak quietly enough so that our words

can be heard as well as our voices.”171

For Pakistan it was quite a good change because Nixon was in favour of

Pakistan-US relations and he arranged the replacement of Pakistan’s outdated weapons

with the latest ones172. Moreover, with the help of Pakistan, US also wished to establish

pleasant relations with China and for this purpose President Nixon sent his envoy Henry

Kessinger to China via Pakistan173. Pakistan, US and China troika was not acceptable

to USSR and India so India decided to employ aggressive policy against Pakistan.

But the difficult time for Ayub’s Khan started when in 1967, after resignation

from the office Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto established a new political party named as Pakistan

People’s Party. This party was formed based on socialist ideology. Its main slogan was

Roti, Kapra Aur Makan (Food, Clothing and Housing). This was so attractive for the

poor masses that it gained popularity instantly174. Bhutto toured throughout the country

to get support from the masses. He raised a strong voice against the economic, foreign

and internal policy of Ayub’s government. Soon he managed to get overwhelming

support from the masses and politicians in West Pakistan, but he could not get any

popularity in the East Pakistan.

Internal politics of Pakistan got another turn when Agartala Conspiracy Case

was framed against Mujeeb-ur-Rehman and some serving and retired army personnel.

They were blamed to be involved in conspiracy against united Pakistan. They were

alleged to seek the assistance from the Indian government to dismember East Pakistan

170 Irwin Gellman, "The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon”, (Yale: Yale University

Press, 2015), 102–120. 171 “Nixon Becomes President". 1969 Year in Review. United Press International, Retrieved July 16,

2014. 172 Firdousi, Eagle Over Pakistan,167. 173 Ibid, 167-68. 174 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/ppp.htm, Retrieved January 28, 2017.

42

from the West Pakistan. As it was further mentioned that this conspiracy meeting was

held in Agartala, a city of India, therefore it is popularly known as Agartala Conspiracy

Case175. The people of East Pakistan were already having grievances to have been

discriminated. They took it as a case filed by the West Pakistan against the East

Pakistan. Soon country wide mass movement started in favor of Mujeeb-ur-Rehman.

The intensity of this movement was so high that the government was forced to withdraw

this case.

Mujeeb-ur-Rehman was doing quite well in the East Pakistan and his party

Awami League was having full support there. But in contrast to Bhutto he was popular

in the East Pakistan and did not have any support in the West Pakistan. It is a matter of

quite interest that Ayub Khan did not have any kind of political assistance from either

of them. Meanwhile Mujeeb also presented his six points which were as follows;

i. There would be a federal parliamentary system based on direct adult

franchise and representation of provinces would be based on population in

the federal legislature.

ii. The federal government will be restricted only to foreign affairs, defense

and currency. And even regarding foreign affairs, the dealings of economic

matters would rest with the provinces.

iii. There would either be two different currencies for the two wings or one with

separate Federal Reserve systems for each wing.

iv. The power of implementation and collection of taxes would lie with the

provinces. The federal government will be given enough shares to fulfill its

tasks of foreign affairs and defense.

v. There would be separate accounts of foreign exchange earnings for each

wing.

vi. The East Pakistan would be given the authority to have a militia or

paramilitary force solely under its provincial government176.

Some of these points were practicable for the government but others were not

acceptable in any case. With the presentation of these points the movements against the

government led by Mujeeb and Bhutto were so accelerated that the government arrested

both the politicians. This decision of the government was not good because despite

175 http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Agartala_Conspiracy_Case, Retrieved January 31, 2017. 176 http://historypak.com/six-points-of-sheikh-mujib-ur-rehman/, Retrieved on January 31, 2017.

43

having control over the situation it made the matter even worse177. Later, Ayub Khan

released both the leaders and tried to remove the differences with political parties. For

this reason, he organized a Round Table Conference and invited all major political

entities of the country including Bhutto and Mujeeb. But this conference could not bring

any positive results. A mass movement was started throughout East and West Pakistan

demanding Ayub’s resignations178. Consequently, on March 25, 1969, Ayub Khan

resigned from his office and invited Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan army, General

Yahya Khan to run government affairs as Chief Martial Law Administrator179.

The new Pakistani President, General Yahya Khan assumed the office on March

25, 1969. To get a support from the political leaders, he announced that general

elections would be held soon, and the government would be handed over to the people’s

representatives. General Yahya Khan fulfilled his commitment and elections were held

on December 7, 1970. The election results were not in favour of the country. Bhutto’s

party got unmatchable majority in the West Pakistan and could not get even a single

seat from the East Pakistan. Similarly, Mujeeb’s party got an overwhelming victory in

the East Pakistan but could not win even a single seat from the West Pakistan.

Formation of a consensus government in Pakistan was not possible as both Bhutto and

Mujeeb were strictly against each other. General Yahya Khan was having a soft corner

for Bhutto. This was very pinching for the people of the East Pakistan, so a situation of

internal anarchy was produced in the East Pakistan. Ultimately, Bhutto decided to form

a government in the West Pakistan and Mujeeb decided to form government in East

Pakistan. India and USSR were closely witnessing the political developments in

Pakistan. Soviet Union was already having reservations about Pakistan due to its

alliance with the US and role which Pakistan played as a bridge between China and the

US. India and USSR supported Mujeeb and took full advantage of the prevailing

situation and produced a kind of civil war in the East Pakistan.

In January 1971, Indian Fokker Friendship Plane was hijacked and was brought

to Lahore, which was later proved to be a drama of RAW to disgrace Pakistan among

the comity of nations180. Pakistan was looking towards US to provide support but in

July 1971 during his secret visit to Beijing, Dr. Henry Kissinger openly supported India

177 James Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Pakistan. (Infobase Publishing, 2009), 196, Retrieved November

4, 2016. 178 Ibid. 179 M. K. Akbar, From Jinnah to Sharif, (New Delhi, Mittal Publications, 1997), 39. 180 Safdar, Pakistan Political Roots and Developments, 193.

44

against Pakistan181. After Kissinger's secret visit to China in July 1971, India and the

Soviet Union on August 9, 1971 signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

According to this treaty it was agreed that both countries would launch full support to

each other on having attacked by some other country182. This agreement was against

the US policy of containing USSR. US President Nixon was willing to launch support

for Pakistan on this crucial stage by lifting arm embargo against Pakistan, but it was

approved by US Congress. Pakistan just remained waiting for US assistance but on the

other hand India and USSR managed their objective of harming Pakistan. In 1971, war

was imposed by India on Pakistan. Pakistan’s military did not get any support from the

people of East Pakistan and it was not possible to send extra military assistance because

between East and the West Pakistan there was a long Indian territory. Consequently,

Pakistan was dismembered, and Bangladesh appeared on the map of the world183.

During the whole crisis, the Nixon Administration was constantly advising Pakistani

government to solve the problem through negotiation, but Yahya Khan was confident

to solve it with the power of the military. He forgot that military only had power with

the support of the people. But in the East Pakistan, army lost the support of masses. US

also had established direct contact with the Bangladeshi government in exile in Calcutta

without informing Pakistan. Yahya Khan also made some efforts to settle the matter

through dialogue but Mujeeb was not having confidence in Bhutto and Yahya.

Furthermore, he had full support from India. Instead of bringing the situation to

settlement India added fuel to fire and made it even worse. Later, President Nixon, in a

report to the US Congress, stated that,

“It is clear that a political process was in train, which

could have been supported and facilitated by all parties

involved, but, obviously India had no such intention to

subscribe to any peaceful solution”.184

Pakistan was not well-prepared to handle the situation, so it lost its eastern part,

which appeared on the map of the world as Bangladesh. US gave Pakistan full moral

support and condemned Indian action in UN185. There was also a danger of the presence

of Soviet Navy in the Bay of Bengal, so US decided to move its Seventh Fleet to Indian

181 Zulfiqar Khan, A Retrospective Perspective on Pakistan-United States Relations: 1947-1977, IPRI

Journal XIII, no. 2, (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Research, 2013), 34. 182 S. M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies, (Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press, 1974), 209. 183 Agha Shahi, Pakistan's Relations with the United States, in Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan,

Iran and Afghanistan, ed. Hafeez Malik, (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), 165. 184 Richard Nixon, US Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace, (Washington

D.C: Nixon's Third Annual Foreign Policy Report to the Congress, February 9, 1972), 145-146. 185 Ibid., 234.

45

Ocean and Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal on December 10, 1971186. But it was quite

late because by that time India got the objectives and managed to produce such kind of

situation which later resulted in the creation of Bangladesh.

The period of first ever Martial Law lasted from 1958 to 1971, which contained

a mixture of coldness and warmth in Pakistan-US relations. In the beginning, US gave

full support to Pakistan, then for a span of approximately five years, US totally ignored

Pakistan. But during the last phase of the era, US not only established better relations

with Pakistan but also decided to get Pakistan’s assistance in letting US come closer to

China.

The era of Ayub Khan was quite important for Pakistan-US relations. When

General Muhammad Ayub Khan after having full control over the government in a

bloodless coup in 1958 announced his views regarding the foreign policy of Pakistan

and considered Pakistan as the most allied ally of the United States. During this era

Pakistan became more pro-west. In the beginning Pakistan’s was totally tilted to the US

and Britain because Ayub Khan was of the view that Pakistan could not make progress

without the resolution of Kashmir problem and that was not at all possible without the

help of the Western Bloc. Pakistan was facing two major problems at that time. First

and foremost was the unresolved Kashmir issue and the second was the security threat

from neighboring country, India. Both problems were inter-linked because if Kashmir

problem would not unresolved then India would be the constant security threat to

Pakistan, but after the resolution of Kashmir problem India would no more be a security

threat to Pakistan. United States was having its own objectives of its relations with

Pakistan. Its aims were to restrict communism in the region and to provide full

economic and military support to Pakistan to maintain her independence in an area

threatened by communism. During his whole era, Ayub Khan remained busy in fighting

for a solution of the Kashmir issue on one hand and on other hand he was kept on

searching to get aid from US and some other countries for the development of economic

and military sectors of Pakistan. During the same period while Pakistan was a member

of SEATO and CENTO, which were non-communist pacts, it was also emerging as a

strong ally of China, one of the two major communist powers. Pakistan was also on

good terms with the Soviet Union. Trading off between superpowers was like playing

with fire which Ayub Khan tried and the nation faced the consequences.

186 Firdousi, Eagle Over Pakistan, 167.

46

1.3. Pakistan-US Relations During Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Era (1971-

77):

Bhutto was the first Prime Minister of Pakistan after the separation of East

Pakistan. Bhutto had to do a lot of spade work. He had to raise the morale of the nation,

who was depressed after the Fall of Dhaka. He had to take confidence building measures

most significant of which to do was the reshaping of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Bhutto

had been involved in foreign policy making of Pakistan since the time he was the

Foreign Minister under Ayub Khan’s administration. He had certain reservations about

Pakistan’s close contacts with the US and total deviation from other great nations such

as USSR and China. Although US were constantly publicizing that they were with

Pakistan during the event of the war of 1971, Bhutto had a different opinion. He was

not happy with the US role in 1971 war and thought that United States was capable to

stop India from interference in internal matters of Pakistan. Moreover, US could also

stop India from assisting the Bangladeshi leaders who were against the union of

Pakistan. That was the reason Bhutto was of the view that Pakistan should not depend

totally on the US and should look towards other options like China, USSR and some

important Muslim countries without annoying US187. Bhutto was foreseeing Pakistan

as the leader of Muslim nations and an Islamic superpower of the world. But on the

other hand, he realized that Pakistan’s strong relations with the US were also necessary

regarding the economic and security needs of the country. Therefore, Pakistan

continued its participation in CENTO and other defence pacts with the US. Later,

Bhutto also offered Washington naval base facilities at Gwadar, on the Baluchistan

coast188. But US did not accept this offer because the policy makers of US were not

having pleasant view about Bhutto. This was due to lack of international diplomatic

approach on the part of Bhutto. Having some reservation about Bhutto, US managed to

find another reliable ally in the form of Shah of Iran as it was in a better geographical

position to assist US in fulfilling its objects especially in the Gulf region189. Bhutto was

of the view that whatever technological assistance was required to establish a strong

military could be managed with the help of the US. This was the basic objective of

Bhutto’s relations with the US.

187 Blood, Pakistan: A Country Study, 245. 188 Zulfiqar, A Retrospective Perspective on Pakistan-United States Relations, 37. 189 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution Of An Influence Relationship,

(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 56.

47

Soon after the Fall of Dhaka in 1971, CEATO was not working well so Pakistan

left CEATO190. This act of Pakistan showed that it had no wish to retain enmity with

the communists. US already had showed intentions to establish good relations with

China with the help of Pakistan. After this great change in US policy about China if it

had to restrict communists, it only meant to contain USSR only. Like all the other heads

of government of Pakistan, Bhutto also had to mention in his first speech that Pakistan

would establish good relations with US but at that time the issue of foremost importance

was to take steps to release many prisoners of war from India. For this purpose, Shimla

Accord was signed between Pakistan and India in July 1972 in which it was agreed that

both the countries would release the prisoners of war and in addition to that both the

countries would regard the Line of Control of Kashmir as drawn on December 17,

1971191. It was a temporary remedy of Pakistan and India relations. Without a just

solution of the most burning and significant issue between Pakistan and India i.e.

Kashmir issue, it was not possible for both the countries to come closer enough to

eliminate the possibility of any other war in future. Bhutto was aware of the fact. That

was the reason, he stated after signing Shimla Accord that

“Along with many other issues between Pakistan and India, there is

another issue whose solution is obligatory for durable peace and this

issue is Jammu and Kashmir.”192

Bhutto’s government had to face another challenge in July 1973 but this time

on Pakistan’s western border. Sardar Dawood, a pro-communist, deposed Zahir Shah,

King of Afghanistan and became ruler of Afghanistan with the help of Soviet Union

and pro-communist elements of Afghanistan193. In his first ever speech, Sardar Dawood

raised the issue of “Pashtunistan”194. The presence of pro-communist government at

western borders meant the presence of communist threat in the west.

Bhutto paid an official visit to US in September 1973195 to open a new era of

friendship. Many bilateral issues were discussed in this visit. Bhutto fought the case of

Pakistan effectively to win US sympathies and hence to start a new phase of Pakistan-

US relations. In a statement during Bhutto’s visit, US President Nixon remarked about

Pakistan as,

190 Shahid M. Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy; A Reappraisal, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000),

78. 191 Pasha, Pakistan Ki Kharja Policy; Aik Ijmali Jaeza, 110. 192 Ibid, 112. 193 Adam Warner, West Asia; Walking on a Tight Rope, (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review,

August 13, 1983), 30. 194 Safdar, Pakistan Political Roots and Developments, 219. 195 Ibid., 235.

48

The integrity of Pakistan was a corner stone of American foreign policy196.

The world had been passing through the period of change. Old alliances were

coming to an end and new alliances were being established. USSR and China, which

were having common ideology, were at daggers drawn as a result of border conflicts

and US, which had been trying to restrict China at one time, was interested in forming

US, China and Pakistan troika. To get full advantage of the changing political scenario,

Pakistan, in 1974, started a campaign for making South-Asia, a nuclear free zone and

this campaign proved fruitful when it earned great support throughout the world and a

majority of the members of UN General Assembly voted in its favour197. The campaign

lost its momentum when India made nuclear tests probably after being annoyed at the

great support received by Pakistan in her campaign for a nuclear free, South-Asia.

Indian nuclear tests were thought provoking for US because it was suspected

that Pakistan might try to start her own nuclear program to create the balance of powers

in the region. It was the need of the hour for US to take some steps to minimize the

chances of the start of a nuclear war between two important countries of the region. US

had imposed embargo on the sale of lethal arms to India and Pakistan on the outbreak

of Indo-Pak war198. It was feared that this embargo might compel Pakistan and India to

turn to alternative options to meet their Defense requirements besides the communist

factor was the biggest threat to US in this regard.

Nixon resigned from his office due to Watergate Scandal on August 9, 1974

which was a well-known political scandal. This scandal was about misuse of power by

some top officials of Nixon’s government. After a detailed investigation by the US

Congress this scandal was proved to be true and Nixon had to leave his office. After his

resignation, Vice President Gerald Ford assumed the office of the President and was

sworn in as 38th President of the US.

Bhutto paid an official visit to USSR in October 1974, which was proved much

fruitful as Pakistan succeeded in getting USSR’s help for the establishment of

Pakistan’s Steel Mills199. This was a great advancement in Pakistan-USSR relations. On

the other hand, this advancement was rather painful for US as she was going to lose an

old ally and much painful was the fact that her ally was going in the lap of her worst

enemy, the USSR. US was not going to lose Pakistan easily and she wanted to facilitate

196 Ibid. 197 Ibid., 233. 198 Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 279. 199 Safdar, Pakistan Political Roots and Developments, 219.

49

Pakistan with any kind of relief which might stop Pakistan’s further advancement

towards USSR. So, in February 1975, US decided to lift the embargo from Pakistan and

India200. This decision was in favour of Pakistan as Pakistani weapon were US oriented

but on the other hand, India had purchased most of her weapon from Soviet Union and

lifting of embargo was not of much benefit for India.

Indian attitude regarding Pakistan was very aggressive especially after

successful nuclear tests so Pakistani Prime Minister, Bhutto thought that only a nuclear

Pakistan could manage to cease Indian aggression towards Pakistan. The problem

before Bhutto regarding initialization of Pakistan’s nuclear program was the non-

availability of required funds, technology and expert professionals, qualified enough to

establish Pakistan’s nuclear program. Although, there were a lot of obstacles in the

beginning of this project, yet Bhutto rendered it Pakistan’s priority. A nuclear program

was a matter of life and death for Pakistan. In this regard, Bhutto repeatedly said,

“Pakistan would eat grass if necessary in order to develop the

nuclear bomb.”201

It was obvious that Bhutto wanted to develop Pakistan’s nuclear program at any

cost. It was the only way, which could help Pakistan to re-establish the balance of power

in South-Asia, which had been shattered by India through her nuclear blasts. The hope

of the establishment of Pakistan’s nuclear program got life when Bhutto was told that a

Pakistani scientist named Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan (AQ Khan), who had been working

as nuclear scientist in Netherlands at that time, could be a better choice for Pakistan to

develop her own nuclear program. Bhutto showed interest in meeting with AQ Khan.

For this purpose, AQ Khan came to Pakistan on the request of Bhutto202. A meeting

was held between AQ Khan and Bhutto in which Bhutto told him about his intentions.

Nothing was finalized in this meeting but when AQ Khan was about to leave for his

job, Bhutto requested him not to go back and to permanently stay in Pakistan to do

something important for the country. In reply to Bhutto’s request AQ Khan agreed203.

AQ Khan was a patriot and he had the ambitions to do something for his homeland. On

AQ Khan’s decision, Bhutto became much excited. He thumped his fist on the table

and said,

“I will see the Hindu bastards now.”204

200 Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 279. 201 Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal, 78. 202 Zahid Malik, Dr. AQ Khan and the Islamic Bomb, (Islamabad: Hurmat Publications, 1992), 61. 203 Ibid., 62. 204 Ibid.

50

Consequently, Pakistan’s nuclear program started in 1976 and to let AQ Khan

work independently without any pressure, Bhutto gave him full control of the project

on July 31, 1976 and placed it directly under Prime Minister205.

Regarding the start of Pakistan’s nuclear program and Pakistan’s agreement

with France Bhutto writes in his book,

“After three years of intense negotiations, the Nuclear

Reprocessing Plant Agreement was signed between

France and Pakistan in March 1976. France was fully

satisfied on the safeguards. The Agreement was

concluded between my government on behalf of Pakistan

and the government of President Giscard d’Estaing on

behalf of France, The International Atomic Energy

Commission at Vienna confirmed the Agreement. The

United States representative on the Commission voted in

favour of confirmation. The necessary confirmation and

approval by the International Atomic Energy Commission

would not have come if the Commission was not

completely satisfied with the safeguards. In August 1976,

I rejected the counter proposals of the United States. At

that time, the French Government expressed its indignation

over American interference. A consistent position was

taken by France on the original Agreement until 5th July

1977.”206

Pakistan was going to do, what the US not liked. At that time all the nuclear

states were non-Muslims and the world, especially the US could not bear a Muslim

nuclear power. So, when US got knowledge of advancement of Pakistan in her nuclear

program, US wanted to get it terminated just in the start. For this purpose, in August

1976, US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who was a Jew, pressurized Bhutto by

threatening that US would make a horrible example of him if Pakistan went ahead in

her nuclear program207. US threats could not influence Bhutto and carried on the nuclear

program with more zeal. AQ Khan selected a loyal team for this great project to reach

the destination of making nuclear bomb. By then, one after the other, a lot of fronts

were opened for Bhutto. His concentration diverted from nuclear program to some other

challenges faced by his government internally and externally. Especially, law and order

situation was created in the country by internal political elements which he had to

grabble with.

Meanwhile, in the US general elections a Democrat, Jimmy Carter was elected

as the next President of the US. He assumed the office of President on January 20, 1977.

205 Ibid., 63. 206 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, If I Am Assassinated, Reproduced in PDF by Sani H. Panhwar for

www.bhutto.org, Retrieved January 26, 2017, 149. 207 Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal, 80.

51

On the other hand, in Pakistan, the political situation became worst during mid-1977,

when Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won the General Elections and Bhutto

was re-elected as Prime Minister of Pakistan. The opposition parties refused to accept

the election results and alleged Bhutto’s government of rigging and demanded fresh

transparent elections. The opposition parties with common demands joined hands to

formulate a nine-party Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) against Bhutto and to attract

people’s attraction, the slogan of enforcement of Islamic system in Pakistan was raised.

Countrywide strikes, processions and bloodshed challenged the legitimacy of the

government. The whole situation became much serious and resulted in the termination

of Bhutto’s government after a successful military coup of Pakistan Army under Chief

of Army Staff, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq on July 5, 1977. Bhutto was accused of

a political murder and was hanged to death according to the decision of Supreme Court

on April 4, 1979.

Bhutto was having some reservations about Henry Kissinger as he quotes his

conversation with him in August 1976 in these words,

“Dr. Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State for the United

States, has a brilliant mind. He told me that I should not

insult the intelligence of the United States by saying that

Pakistan needed the reprocessing plant for her energy needs.

In reply, I told him that I will not insult the intelligence of

the United States by discussing the energy needs of Pakistan,

but in the same token, he should not discuss the plant at all.

The General got the lemon —”limbo”— from the President

of France. Pakistan got the “ladu”. PNA got the “halva.” I

got the death sentence. What difference does my life make

now when I can imagine eighty million of my countrymen

standing under the nuclear cloud of a Defenseless sky?”208

Within one year of the threat, Bhutto despite winning the elections could not

manage to save his rule as well as his life. The Bhutto’s book “If I am assassinated”

also tells about US involvement in Bhutto’s removal in these words,

“There is also evidence that Bhutto was threatened that if

he went ahead with acquiring the plant in its weapons grade

form, he would be overthrown and might face worst consequences.

There are two sources of evidence in support of the threat, apart from

others that there might be. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Assistant Professor of

Political Science at Temple University, USA, says in an article

published in Asian Survey (Summer, 1978) that during her research

on the subject of this agreement, “one source” told her that the “out

going American ambassador (in Islamabad) had gone so far as to tell

Bhutto bluntly that if he did no back down he would no longer stay in

power.” It was after this exchange that the United States is alleged to

208 Bhutto, If I Am Assassinated, 151.

52

have supported opposition candidates in the March 1977 elections

and to have encouraged the street agitation that ensued.

Bhutto’s own statement is the second source. In the course of the

statement he gives a very vivid account, too vivid and convincing to

be fake, how his own minister for production warned him of the peril

to his office and personal safety if he persisted in acquiring the

reprocessing plant.”209

Bhutto had also mentioned in open about the interest that US was showing to

remove him from his office due to her keen interest in the development of Pakistan’s

nuclear program. On April 28, 1977, in a combined session of the parliament, Bhutto

had said in his address,

“They demand my blood. I am the symbol of solidarity and unity of

Pakistan. They want to push me out.”210 US shunned all the allegations of Bhutto. On April 29, 1977, a representative of

US Foreign Ministry had said,

“We are fully aware of the allegations about backing the opposition

in Pakistan and US interference in country’s politics, but all these

allegations are baseless.”211

Pakistan’s nuclear program was one of the causes of Bhutto’s downfall.

Bhutto’s commitment regarding making Pakistan a nuclear nation was not hidden. AQ

Khan, in a statement after Bhutto’s removal, mentioned about the significance of

Bhutto’s role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear program in the following words,

“If there was no Bhutto there would have been no Kahuta Plant. Had

Z.A Bhutto remained in power for some more time Pakistan would

have become a nuclear power.”212

The last phase of Bhutto’s era was the worst period for Pakistan-US relations

because for the first time in the history of Pakistan-US relations, some high officials of

both the countries had openly exchanged harsh languages for each other. This worst

period came to an end as a result of General Zia’s military coup. During Bhutto’s period

United States supported Pakistan, despite the arms embargo because Pakistan was

considered to be an important US military ally against communism. Pakistan also

played a role as a bridge between US and China. It was Pakistan that assisted President

Richard Nixon in making his first visit to Peoples’ Republic of China. During 1971’s

war, US Pakistan was of the view that being an important military ally US would

provide with arms and military aid not only to assist Pakistan against Indian interference

but in order to discourage India from penetrating further into the cities of Pakistan.

Pakistani policy makers were thinking that losing Pakistan meant losing an important

209 Ibid., 21. 210 K.M. Arif, Zia-ul-Haq Kay Hamrah, (Islamabad: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1996), 11. 211 Ibid., 118. 212 Malik, Dr. AQ Khan and the Islamic Bomb, 11.

53

ally in the Soviet war. It was also in Pakistan’s favour that Bhutto was a close and

respected friend of US President Richard Nixon although he was considered as a

socialist. Later, when Jimmy Carter, an anti-socialist, won the presidential election of

US, he announced to seek a ban on nuclear weapons. At that time, Bhutto lost the

favours which he enjoyed during the period of Nixon. Bhutto was having a strong will

to create a Muslim bloc to get an impact on the world politics. Carter did not appreciate

his policies and placed strict embargoes on Pakistan. However, Bhutto managed to

continue Pakistan’s nuclear program and purchased items to enhance Pakistan’s nuclear

project which was regarded in the western bloc as his atomic bomb project. On this

advancement, President Carter and his administration allegedly threatened Bhutto to

stop the progress in atomic proliferation and research. But Bhutto refused to do so

because he was of the view that Pakistan would be able to restrict Indian aggression

only by having atomic weapons. The whole scenario was responsible for the creation

of a gulf between Pakistan and the United States. At the end these differences between

Carter and Bhutto led to the elimination of Bhutto at the hands of General Zia.

54

Chapter No.2:

The Afghan Conflict:

In this chapter the details about one of the most important periods of security

cooperation between the US and Pakistan have been discussed. This period began after

the Soviet’s attack on Afghanistan. This issue is of great significance due to its lasting

impact on the regional geopolitical situation and especially because of Pakistan’s

internal security dynamics. The security situation during the Soviet assault of

Afghanistan was the main cause of the present security problems that are faced by

Pakistan and Afghanistan even today. This issue was also responsible for the current

US military conflicting interests in region. This chapter tackles with focus on Pakistan’s

geopolitical and security problems at the start of the Soviet-Afghan War. It analyses the

tactical imperatives of both US and Pakistan in establishing a close military coalition

especially in the shape of collaboration of Pakistan and US intelligence agencies. As

Pakistan and US having common interests vis-à-vis Afghanistan which was a main

reason of the US’s cols stance on Pakistan’s other important security concerns including

Pakistan’s nuclear programme. The chapter also analyses in detail, the gains in

conventional military capability, accrued by Pakistan through the fruitful security

alliance with the US.

The fallouts of the Soviet-Afghan War have also been discussed in this chapter.

In short, this period is an excellent example of a security relationship between a

superpower with universal interests mainly to reduce the impact of communism on the

region and a third world country with regional security concerns regarding India, its

immediate rival located just on the eastern border. There was no other option except

victory for both Pakistan and the US. For the US defeat meant the alarming impact of

communism over this most important region having great strategic importance and for

Pakistan meant not just losing the war but the longest secure border with Afghanistan

as well.

2.1. Background of Soviet Attack on Afghanistan:

Afghanistan is in the southwest region of Central Asia. Its total area is 655,000

square kilometers. It contains about 5400 km long border with former USSR, about 800

kilometers long border with Iran, about 2200 km long border with Pakistan and only

about 70 km long border with China. Afghanistan’s border with Soviet Union chiefly

consists of two rivers (Amu and Panj rivers) and their canals. The boundary with Iran

55

is comprised of some plains, hilly areas and deserts, while Afghan border with Pakistan

and China largely runs through mountains213. No big ocean touches Afghanistan so it

is called a land locked land. The closest main water reservoir is Arabian Sea that is also

about 500 km away from it. Geographically, Afghanistan consists of subtropical

mountains and deserts. Mountains cover most of the land of this country. According to

an estimate about 85 per cent of its land is mountainous. The mountain ranges are

approximately in the middle of Afghanistan and divide the country into northern and

southern region. The most important mountain ranges in Afghanistan are Hindu Kush

Mountain and Suleiman Mountain range and the height of these mountains is from

2,000 to 7,750 meters. Because of its mountainous geography, Afghanistan is ideal for

guerilla warfare. Traditional war is not easy in the region especially for the troops who

are not well acquainted of the mountainous pathways. The mountains at Afghanistan

border adjacent to Pakistan are not as tall and their heights vary from 2,000 to 3,500

meters214. Between these mountains there are slender dry valleys. People of Afghanistan

use these valleys to come to Pakistan and India.

On Soviet-Afghan War, there was not a decent system of roads which was below

20,000 km all over Afghanistan. A little part of these roads was cemented and remaining

was consisted of just sand or dirt. Travelling on most of the roads in Afghanistan was

very problematic. In winters, these roads were impossible to run traffic due to heavy

snow and lot of tunnels and mountain-sections which also get covered with snow.

Rivers have most of water from March to April and in spring and during the July to

August due to melting of snow. River Amu is the only river which is not possible to

cross throughout the year. All the other rivers do not have enough water and can be

crossed during some time of the year when water in them reaches to less than two feet

deep. Afghanistan just have less than 5% of forests which is much lower than the

standard forest covered area. This is the main cause of rain shortage and land erosion

which results in wears and tears of road structure as well. The country has subtropical

in some season and sharply continental on the other. On the average the month of July

is the hottest when temperature remains between 30° to 52° Celsius and February is the

coldest month during which temperature ranges from -2° to -14° Celsius215.

At the time of Soviet invasion, jobs were also not available to meet the

requirement of the people. Therefore, over 85 percent of the population of Afghanistan

213 Theodor E. Wilson (ed), The Soviet Afghan War, (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 1. 214 Ibid., 3. 215 Ibid.

56

was involved in agriculture. Main part of agriculture of the people was consisted of

farming and domestic animals kept by the nomadic people. Export of carpets, rugs,

dried fruits and medicinal plants were the only mean of foreign exchange, but it had

also been reduced due to chaos in the country. Population of Afghanistan at the time of

Soviet-Afghan War was 17 million (at present it is 37 million) and about 25 people per

square kilometer was the density of the population. In the main cities this density was

many times greater than the average density. For example, in Kabul population density

was about 300 people per square kilometer and in Heart it was about 150 people per

square kilometer216. There were people from over 20 nationalities belonging to several

language groups. Pashtuns were the major group, comprising of approximately nine

million people which are more than half. Other key ethnic groups in Afghanistan

comprise Tajiks (six million), Uzbeks (1.5 million), Hazars (1.5 million) and Turks (0.5

million). Most of the people are Muslim out of which 90% (15 million) were Sunni

Muslims and 10% (2 million) were Shia Muslims217. The behavior of typical military

operations and fight, using the prevailing principles and guides of the Soviet Armed

Forces, was almost impossible given the enormously hard physical and geographic

conditions218.

216 Ibid., 5. 217 Ibid., 6. 218 The people of Afghanistan are known as “Afghan” and there are two historical evidences in this

regard. According to the first evidence, when Bakht Nasr captured them the people living in Afghanistan

used to weep and cry loudly and these acts are pronounced in Persian as “Aaho Faghan”. So the people

of Iran started to call them Aaho Faghan or Afghan218. According to second evidence it is said that it was

one of the forefathers of these people whose name was “Afghan” and they got the name from him. The

history of Afghanistan reflects to eighteenth century when Afghan King Nadir Shah Durrani’s rule ended

after his assassination by one of his own guards. The Persians were against the rule of Nadir Shah Durrani

and the guard who killed him was also Persian. At that time Ahmed Shah Durrani was the commander

of Abdali regiment of Afghan army which was deployed at Kandhar. On having the news of the King’s

death he rushed to the palace to know the whole matter. He was having an expectation of attack so he

took the royal seal and Kohi Noor diamond which were with the dead body of the deceased king and

rushed back to Kandhar. According to Willem,

At the time of Nadir's death, he commanded a contingent of Abdali Pashtuns.

Realizing that his life was in jeopardy if he stayed among the Persians who had

murdered Nader Shah, he decided to leave the Persian camp, and with his 4,000

troops he proceeded to Qandahar. Along the way and by sheer luck, they managed

to capture a caravan with booty from India. He and his troops were rich; moreover,

they were experienced fighters. In short, they formed a formidable force of young

Pashtun soldiers who were loyal to their high-ranking leader.

Ahmed Shah Durrani managed to capture Ghazni, Herat, Kabul and Khurasan with the help of

his trained army that was mainly constituted of Tajiks, Qazalbash, Durranis and other Pashtuns. He

needed money and other goods to run his army in an effective manner. First of all he looted a few trade

caravans trading between India and some cities of Afghanistan and Iran. Later on when he got reasonable

power he had a series of attacks on Delhi. From 1748 to 1767, he invaded Delhi for seventeen times and

looted a huge sum of money and other goods. This shows his ambition for getting money to run the affairs

of his poor country. Ahmed Shah Durrani conquered Delhi and took over parts to the subcontinent.

Afghanistan state was also born as a result of his attack.

57

When the British were governing the Indo Pak subcontinent, they confronted

for several times to capture and take Afghanistan under their dominion. But they failed

to do. That is why they viewed it as the buffer zone between the British and the USSR.

It saved both the super-powers to come face to face with each other. This part of the

land had been a cause of great attraction for the superpowers of the world. For the US

this land could help the best to block the Russians and for the Russians this land was

meant more than their life. Being enclosed by the cold and ice-covered seas, USSR had

three possibilities to reach the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.

First was through China, the second was through Iran and the third one was through

Afghanistan. China was not appropriate country for the USSR to attack as it was an

emerging superpower and had great manpower available to fight against an external

invasion. Moreover, it was a communist nation and to confine it was against the aim of

USSR. Iran was also not an appropriate choice because it faced an Islamic revolution

freshly and turned Islamic Republic. Afghanistan got considerable geopolitical

importance during the period of cold war between US and USSR in mid-twentieth

century. Although USSR was surrounded by seas including East Siberian Sea, Barents

Sea, Kara Sea, Laptev Sea, Bering Sea, and mighty Arctic Ocean but all of them are

frozen, so it was not possible for the USSR to use them for trade. The only way suitable

Afghanistan had to pass through different wars with the British. Then Amir Abdul Rehman tried

to unify this country through internal invasions which was distributed among several independent tribes

and regions. For this reason Abdul Rahman is regarded as “Iron Amir” among the people of Afghanistan.

He had a soft heart for the people of Afghanistan so he had much love in the hearts of the people. Even

on his death bed he advised his successors in the following words;

My sons and successors should not try to introduce reforms

of any kind in such a hurry as to set the people against their

ruler, and they must bear in mind that establishing a

Constitutional Government, introducing more lenient laws,

and modeling education upon the system of Western universities,

they must adopt all these gradually as the people become

accustomed to the idea of modern innovations.

The British fought a number of battles with the people of Afghanistan to include this region

under their control but they could not do so due to the fighting spirit of these people. At last in 1893, the

British after complete failure in including it in its dominion accepted its existence. On November 12,

1893, Sir Mortimer Durand established a 2430 kilometer long border with the British dominion. This

was a single page agreement which was signed between Amir Abdul Rehman, the Afghan ruler, and Sir

Mortimer Durand. That is why it is regarded as Durand Line. Throughout the British rule in the

subcontinent this region served the role of a buffer state between the British and the Soviet Union. It was

also quite interesting fact about Afghanistan that from 1880 to 1979 no foreign invader could capture any

of Afghan cities. Moreover this region remained under the rule of Durrani Pashtuns from 1747 to 1978.

This shows the fighting spirit and qualities of Afghans as well as Durrani Pashtun warriors. The most

alarming this for Afghanistan was that there was no proper rule of transfer of powers. If a ruler died then

the fight for rule would start and as a result of this fight they would lose many precious lives. During the

whole period up to 1978 only three rulers could manage to transfer their power to their sons in a smooth

manner and these were Ahmed Shah Durrani, Nadir Shah and Abdul Rehman Khan.

58

for trade routed to the Arabian Sea through Afghanistan and Pakistan. So, both US and

USSR started aid programs for Afghanistan. Afghanistan was peaceful and stable under

Zahir Shah who was given the title of “Father of Afghanistan” and prior to him the

people of Afghanistan gave this title to Ahmed Shah Durrani219.

At the time of Pakistan’s freedom on August 14, 1947, one of the most

significant problems faced by Pakistan was the matter of the border with Afghanistan.

The British signed a border agreement with Afghan King, Abdul Rahman according to

which in 1893, a British diplomat and civil servant, Sir Mortimer Durand demarcated

Durand Line220. This border was of most significance due to the common relations

between ethnic groups existing on either side. These tribes were so unevenly distributed

that Durand Line also bifurcated their lands and tribes. So, Durand Line was not

accepted by the tribes in its true sense. After its demarcation many infiltrations were

observed during the British rule as well221.

At the time of partition, the decision about KP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) was

determined in Pakistan’s favour by a referendum. Bust some chaos was observed when

Afghan government and its ethnic ally Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan of the Congress

raised the demand of third option including the choice of being an independent state or

to join Afghanistan222. But on June 17, 1947, referendum was held, and a large majority

of the people voted for joining Pakistan. But the Afghan Government and Khan Abdul

Ghaffar Khan with full support of Congress argued that Durand Line was drawn

according to an agreement between Afghan government and the British. As the British

had left so the agreement had lost its significance. Pakistan was not a party of the

agreement so the Durand Line was no more active and should be removed to give the

people of same ethnicity a chance to live together as an independent state or under the

government of Afghanistan223. All the princely states of the region including Dir, Swat

and Chitral also joined Pakistan by signing the instrument of accession224 but Ghaffar

Khan continued with his demand and kept on raising it. He and his supporters had clear

knowledge of the fact that they did not have the support of most of the population.

Basically, their motives behind this demand were no other than the instability of

219 Ibid., 510. 220 Peter Tomson, The Wars of Afghanistan , (New York: Public Affair Publishers, 2011), 41. 221 Ahmadzai Sherjan (Director, Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska, Omaha),

Interview by Qaiser Mehmood, Tape Recording, Omaha, United States, February 10, 2017. 222 Cheema Pervaiz Iqbal., Pakistan’s Defence Policy 1947-1958, (London: McMillan Publishers, 1990),

50. 223 Sherjan, Interview. 224 Cheema, Pakistan’s Defence Policy 1947-1958, 51.

59

Pakistan. At the time of independence of Pakistan Indian National Congress was the

ruling party in KP and the government was led by Dr. Khan Saib, the brother of Khan

Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Quaid-i-Azam let his government continue after partition but after

one week of the creation of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam dismissed his ministry and Khan

Abdul Qayyum Khan of Muslim League became the new Chief minister of KP225. This

was a great setback for Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his sympathizers in Afghan

government.

For this reason, the Afghan government was not in favour of the new country

along with the Congress Party and its sympathizers. Therefore, all of them tried to

weaken Pakistan. The Afghan government succeeded to establish decent relations with

both the US and the Soviet Union. US stopped its support to Afghanistan when it got a

trustworthy ally in the form of Pakistan. But the USSR expanded a sound impact in

Afghanistan with the passage of time226. In the past, the strength of the British did not

let USSR to think about entering Afghanistan. But in 1947, when British left the region,

USSR got the opportunity to expand its influence in Afghanistan227. US just assisted

Afghanistan in developing its agriculture in early 1950s in the plains along Helmand

River and constructed Kandahar Airport but USSR assisted Afghanistan in many

domains including in building dams, airfields, schools and irrigation schemes. The

relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were becoming worse and touched to its

peak, when in 1961 when Afghan Prime Minister Sardar Daud raised the question of

Pashtunistan. He also had support from Pakistani politicians on this issue including

Bacha Khan and his party. His notion of Pashtunistan was not clearly defined so it was

not welcomed by most of the people of KP. Moreover, some Baluch tribes in Pakistan

wondered why Sardar Daud included Baluchistan within Pashtunistan without their

endorsement228. Basically, Sardar Daud took benefit of the reservations which Baluch

tribes were having against the government of Pakistan. But that was related to interior

administrative matters only. However, after this development, Ayub Khan decided to

close the border with Afghanistan in August 1961229. US also had concerns about Sardar

Daud’s actions which he was taking to please USSR. US President Kennedy and his

administration was conscious about it and in 1961 US National Security Council

225 http://www.nazariapak.info/Quaid-e-Azam/Provincial-affairs.php, Retrieved February 7, 2017. 226 Sherjan, Interview. 227 Peter Tomson, The Wars of Afghanistan, 88. 228 Ibid., 95. 229S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, (Karachi: Oxford University Press,

1990), 207.

60

memorandum it was declared that US should try to resolve the border issue of

Afghanistan with Pakistan and some steps should be taken to encourage Afghanistan to

curtail its dependence on the USSR concerning military training and equipment230. That

was the reason, several hundred Afghan military officers were invited by the US to

participate in International Military Education and Training (IMET) program in the

United States231. US provided major assistance to Afghanistan in the field of education.

More than 2000 Afghan students were invited to the US to get education from

elementary school through college. Major part done by some universities of the US

including, Columbia University, Indiana University, the University of Wyoming,

Southern Illinois University and University of Nebraska at Omaha232. The Center for

Afghanistan Studies located at University of Nebraska Omaha is one the example of

those developments233.

Sardar Daud’s attitude was autocratic and he even crossed the King in making

decisions which were not liked by the King Zahir Shah. So, in 1964, Sardar Daud was

asked to step down by the king, and a new constitution was passed which offered liberal

democracy to replace Sardar Daud’s sturdy and strict regime. At that time USSR had

expanded its influence in Afghanistan through KGB (USSR intelligence agency) and

GRU (also a USSR intelligence agency)234. The new constitution introduced by Afghan

government also helped the communist sympathizer to gain power. Therefore, the

People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was founded in 1965, with active

KGB’s involvement, under the leadership of Nur Muhammad Tarakai235. Noor

Muhammad Tarakai had established his close relations with KGB in 1951 when he was

recruited by this agency and given the code name as “Nur”236. He also worked as the

press and cultural attaché at the Afghan embassy in Washington in 1953 and then on

Soviet directions, Tarakai worked as translator at the American embassy’s US aid

mission from 1956 to 1958 and later on in 1962-63 he worked at US embassy in

Afghanistan and his job was to translate the important news from the Afghan press and

to send its summary to Washington237.

230 Peter Tomson, The Wars of Afghanistan, 94. 231 Ibid. 232 Sherjan, Interview. 233 Ibid. 234 Peter Tomson, The Wars of Afghanistan, 92. 235 Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the

Talibans, 1st ed, (Cambridge: De Capo Press, 2002), 228. 236 Peter Tomson, The Wars of Afghanistan, 92. 237 Ibid., 93.

61

PDPA became much powerful in the country soon. It was the right time for KGB

to move towards the plan of achieving communist objectives in the region. The first

step in this regard was probably to get rid of the King Zahir Shah who was having close

ties with the US. But the problem was that Nur Muhammad Tarakai was not capable to

complete this task. However, Sardar Daud was the right person to do this job as he had

a vast experience of administration during his prime minister ship and he also had close

relations with some military high officials who could be more effective in launching

this plan.

Sardar Daud was not happy with Zahir Shah’s decision of removing him from

the office of Prime Minister. Later, in 1964 constitution of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah

made one provision which was later known as “Daud Clause”. According to article 24

it was approved that no member from the Royal House should participate in any

political party and to take the important office within the country such as Prime Minister

or minister, member of parliament, Justice of Supreme Court238. The whole situation

infuriated Sardar Daud Khan and he started making secret planning against the

government with the help of KGB. Sardar Daud planned to dethrone King Zahir Shah,

when he was on an official visit to Italy in 1973. Sardar Daud managed to do it without

a single drop of blood with the support of KGB, PDPA and other closely related military

elements within Afghan army239. Zahir Shah had to take asylum in Italy.

At that time Soviet interference had touched to its peak in Afghanistan but after

assuming sole power, Sardar Daud tried to reduce Soviet influence in the country. He

took steps which were not welcomed by the USSR. He started to shape good relations

with Egypt and Saudi Arabia which were not pro-communist. Moreover, he also tried

to settle Afghan and Pakistan relations. As an advancement in this regard, Bhutto and

Sardar Daud made exchange visits to each other’s countries240. Sardar Daud also started

to discourage the communist elements within his own government, but he was too late

in his actions. USSR was thoroughly monitoring the developments and USSR head of

the state Leonid Brezhnev pointed towards everything before Sardar Daud during his

visit to Soviet Union from April 12-15, 1977. Brezhnev mentioned his reservations

238 Ibid., 98. 239 Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 209. 240 Rasul Bakhsh Raees, War Without Winners, (USA: Oxford University Press, 1994), 46.

62

about ignoring communist elements in the government and showed his annoyance

regarding Daud’s criticism about the communist countries Cuba and Ethiopia241.

Assassination of a communist leader Mir Khyber Ali on April 19, 1978 was the

main event which accelerated the government change in Afghanistan. During his

funeral more than 2000 people were gathered to participate in the ceremony and to listen

to the speeches of Hafeez Ullah Amin, Babrak Karmil and Nur Muhammad Tarakai.

Daud ordered arrest of those leaders but the speed of his action against the communist

leaders was quite slow which made it possible for pro-communist elements of

Afghanistan and USSR to play their part in over throwing Sardar Daud from the

government. Many communists marched out in the country to protest this assassination

and the arrest of communist leaders. Sardar Daud tried to disperse this protest with iron

hands, but the intensity of the protest was beyond his expectations.

Daud’s palace was surrounded on 27 April 1978, by communist backed troops.

The rebels also took complete control of Kabul Airport, and used MIG-21 aircraft to

destroy the palace242. Sardar Daud’s faithful forces were overpowered and most of the

members of his family were assassinated. This bloody rebellion was named the “Saur

Revolution” as April is also called “saur” in Persian language. After this revolution,

Noor Muhammad Tarakai took the control of the government. The chief of KGB’s First

Directorate, Vladimir Kryuchkov was the first high level USSR official who paid an

official visit to Kabul after the coup243. Tarakai was also pleased with USSR’s full

cooperation in fetching him to power. He regarded this Saur Revolution like Bolshevik

Revolution of 1917 vis-à-vis its significance244.

In Tarakai’s regime, a lot of Soviet advisors entered Afghanistan. According to

an estimate their number increased from 200 to 2500 in a few months. People used to

joke that even an Afghan cook had a Soviet advisor245. Although Tarakai was

continuously claiming that Afghanistan was non-aligned, but it had established close

ties with USSR. On December 5, 1978, an agreement was signed between Tarakai and

Brezhnev in Kremlin. According to one clause of this agreement it was agreed that

USSR and Afghanistan would consult each other to take appropriate measures to ensure

241 Tom Hutson (US Consulate, ret.), Interview by Qaiser Mehmood, Tape Recording, Lincoln (US),

February 04, 2017. 242 Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Talibans, (1st ed.), (Cambridge: De Capo Press, 2002), 230. 243 Peter Tomson, The Wars of Afghanistan, 121. 244 Hutson, Interview. 245 Peter Tomson, The Wars of Afghanistan, 121.

63

the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries. According to

Peter Tomson, this was the clause based on which USSR justified its invasion of

Afghanistan246.

Tarakai started to accomplish the communist agenda in the country but

confrontation to this agenda by non-communist fundamentals of the country started to

grow in different parts of the country. Some measures taken by the new government

directly contradicted the traditions and cultural norms of the tribal Afghan society.

Tarakai introduced land reforms, which included distribution of land and control of

irrigation channels by Ministry of Water and Energy. Seeds and fertilizers were

provided to the peasants on loan on difficult terms and the condition of poor peasants

went worse247. Government also made some laws about women which were either

contradictory to Islam or the traditions of the tribes. For example, it was proposed that

men and women would have equal rights in the field of civil laws which was not

matching to Pashtun tradition248. Moreover, according to this law, parents could not

arrange marriage of their girls without their mutual consent. As Afghanistan society

was a male dominated society so these laws were not accepted by them and they

regarded it as the intervention of their family affairs249. Being non-Islamic nature and

having full backing of the USSR, these laws were rejected by the people of Afghanistan250.

People not only rejected these reforms but also started a widespread protest them. Soon

these rebellions spread in the Kunar, Badakhsan and Central Hindukush regions.

Thousands of government soldiers were deserted by the rebels, taking their weapons

and equipment along with them251. The grip of government over the situation was

getting weakened day by day which finally resulted in Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

in December 1979.

Moreover, in February 1979, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolf Dubs

was kidnapped and was murdered in an unsuccessful rescue effort. CIA blamed

Hafizullah Amin’s hand in this whole incident252. Later on, forensic tests showed that

nine out of twenty bullets from his body were fired by a 0.22 caliber weapon but in the

room, it was shown by Afghan government that only a machine gun and a higher caliber

246 Ibid., 123. 247 Tom Hutson, Interview. 248 Ibid. 249 Raees, War Without Winners, 96. 250 Sherjan, Interview. 251 Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History, 232. 252 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, (New York, Penguin Press, 2004), 47.

64

gun were present in the room and it was announced that these weapons belong to the

kidnappers253. The strength of the rebellion movement in the country had increased to

a great extent that in March 1979, the Afghan army used massive fire power and air

support to suppress a rebellion in the city of Herat, which resulted in more than 5000

casualties254. It was not in favour of Afghan government that more than 100 Soviet

advisors were also killed in this attack and their bodies were hung on the poles which

was not tolerated by the USSR at any cost. Moscow decided to take stern action in this

regard and the replacement of Tarakai with Hafeez Ullah Amin was also included in

their agenda255. This wave of violence spread across the country rapidly and in August,

the same year, the Soviet backed forces suppressed a rebellion in Kunar with iron hands.

Tanks and gunship helicopters were used which resulted in indiscriminate killing of

innocent civilians. The whole development in Afghanistan made the Soviet government

to think about replacing Nur Muhammad Tarakai with Hafizullah Amin. On December

12, 1979, meeting of the selected group of Kremlin’s leaderships, took the fateful

decision of sending in the Red Army to accelerate the Communist Revolution256.

Just a few months earlier to this invasion of Afghanistan, the world witnessed a

great change when in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini ousted US most trusted ally, the Shah

of Iran. US had lost its most credible ally and intelligence bases in the region. Now US

needed regaining control over the region through other means and the most suited for

them at that time was Afghanistan. This change in Iran was also not in favour of USSR

so for them the survival of a pro-Moscow regime in the strategically vital Afghanistan

became a major priority257. Before the incident of the revolution in Iran the war in

Afghanistan was just a war between pro-Soviet forces and the Afghan tribes but then as

the US was also in search of a military base in the region so the limited war was going

to be transformed into a war between two super powers 258.

The revolution of Iran was having nationalistic roots and it was predicted that

Iran would renew its foreign policy and would construct it based on sole Iranian

interests. So, this revolution proved to be a source of new concepts in international

politics. US was affected as it had lost a most faithful friend in the region and USSR

although managed to establish a pro-communist government in Afghanistan, but it was

253 Peter Tomson, The Wars of Afghanistan, 126. 254 Coll, Ghost Wars, 41. 255 Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History, 264. 256 Hutson, Interview. 257 Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History, 234. 258 Sherjan, Interview.

65

expected that the wave of Islamic revolution in Iran might spread to Afghanistan as

well. Both US and USSR started to search for an ally or at least a land which could

serve in a better way to accomplish their motives.

For the USSR the situation was getting quite complex. USSR supported Noor

Muhammad Tarakai to get control of the country and then started to fulfill their

objectives through him. But when due to his anti-Islam and beyond the tradition policies

were disliked by the people and chaos had spread throughout the country USSR thought

of bringing the Communist revolution through its own army. The regional politics had

also been changed due to the Islamic revolution in Iran because then both the

superpowers were having interest in Afghanistan. Later, USSR supported Hafeez Ullah

Amin to hold power. He continued the non-Islamic traditions in Afghanistan just like

his predecessor. At that time mass armed movement of Mujahedeen’s had started in

Afghanistan. The government of Hafeez Ullah Amin did not have the capability to

handle the movement. He was killed and was replaced by another procommunist ruler

Babrak Karmal. He was just a puppet in the hands of the communists. But the activities

of mujahedeen were accelerated day by day which was not a good sign for the USSR.

So, they decided to get directly involved in the war and excused that the government of

Afghanistan invited Soviet army to come and help it against the activities of

mujahideen.

USSR did not quickly decide to attack Afghanistan, but it had been planning for

this invasion for years. USSR understood Afghanistan was an economically backward

country and in need of huge financial aid. Moreover, the government of Afghanistan

was also weak due to internal fights. USSR tempted the rulers and people of

Afghanistan about the benefits of communism. It managed to enter Afghanistan as their

well-wisher and found reliable friends among Afghan government. Moreover, it also

managed to win the hearts of the people who were always ready to pose any kind of

harm to the stability of the country for some money or other personal gains. USSR also

provided crucial economic and technical aid to Afghanistan and sent its high officials

in Afghanistan to fulfill Soviet’s motives in disguise of technical advisors. Afghan

rulers such as Zahir Shah and Sardar Daud did not have any political foresight and they

allowed USSR to enter Afghanistan in different forms. Gradually, USSR managed to

have full grip over the youth of the country. A time came when Zahir Shah and Sardar

Daud completely lost their control over the government. They thought it better to

continue with the USSR but when they realized that it was not better for their

66

governments as well as for the country then they tried to keep a distance with USSR.

But USSR did not let them do so and eliminated them from the scene.

There was a widespread perception that USSR wanted to reach the warm waters

of the Arabian Sea and Afghanistan was the logical first step which would automatically

be followed by invasion of Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. But this was only an

assumption that did not have any link to the truth, but it was a justification by Pakistan

to jump into the Afghan war259. USSR attacked Afghanistan for two reasons. The first

was to defend the identification of a communist regime in Afghanistan, and thereby

protect extensive and valuable investment of the USSR in the country, which had been

in progress as early as 1919. Secondly Hafizullah Amin, the current ruler, had proved

unproductive and so gone out of favor. His replacement by a fresh one was quite

necessary to wipe out all the threats to the communism in the region. Moreover, USSR

feared that Hafizullah Amin might set up closer links with the US260. Therefore, Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan was not just confined to the USSR and Afghanistan, but it was

the start of another cold war between the two mighty rivals i.e. USSR and the US.

Therefore, Afghanistan remained a focal point of the world politics for more than a

decade. Its aftershocks have still been felt by the world. This event also provided

opportunities for both Pakistan and the US to come close to each other as allies against

USSR for their own vital interests. From a US perspective, the physical move of Soviet

forces into Afghanistan presented a new point of danger, not seen since the Soviet attack

of Czechoslovakia. American status and authority were already shattered by the Iranian

revolution and might be further diminished by the accomplishment of this revolution.

For Pakistan it could give a chance to revive its relations with the US to tackle with the

Communist threat, which had then replaced nuclear proliferation in the hierarchy of

American priorities261 related to Pakistan. Zia-ul-Haq was quick to understand that by

allying himself with the West, he would protect his country on the East against India262.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan presented Pakistan with an opportunity to

break out of its isolation and more importantly reverse the order of the US government,

which had been greatly unfair towards Pakistan as compared to India in the last

decade263. War of Afghanistan was of great significance for Pakistan, US and USSR.

259 Hutson, Interview. 260 Raees, War Without Winners, 15. 261 Sherjan, Interview. 262 Fredric Grare, Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict 1979-85, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003),

27- 28. 263 Ibid., 29.

67

But for the USSR it was not less than a nightmare. For Pakistan this war proved to be a

source of winning US support and stabilize its relations with US which had been

crumbling for years. US also managed to weaken its rival on a battlefield that was

chosen by the USSR itself. This war also had a great political effect on Afghanistan’s

domestic politics as the political power was distributed among different fighting groups

which brought durable changes in the society264. A war is a source of making or

breaking nations which can be clearly observed in Afghanistan. Although Afghanistan

managed to build itself in a number of ways but the breaking factor for example

factional grouping was so great that it undermined positivity observed in

Afghanistan265. No one was thinking of USSR’s collapse when USSR entered

Afghanistan in December 1979. At that time USSR’s policy makers were thinking that

it would be a limited war and after capturing Afghanistan in few weeks the war would

be over. No one even thought about its widespread effects in near future266.

USSR’s defeat in the war unveiled the weakness of USSR army. It gave an

opportunity to the states which were not happy with Moscow’s policies to raise their

demand of political rights. It established a great political impact on domestic politics of

USSR. As a result, it became difficult for USSR to play a role of binding force among

the states. It was not possible for Soviet political leaders to remain stick to their

perception that military was the only option to keep the diverse states united. Andropov,

CPSU’s General Secretary, was one of the main supporters of USSR army’s role in

Afghanistan stated in 1983,

“it took almost the entire Red Army fifteen years to subdue

the rebellious khanates in the Soviet republics of Uzbekistan,

Tajikistan and Kirgizstan.”267

This war questioned the worth of USSR army. Gorbachev, in his address to the

CPSU’s Twenty-Seventh Congress, also regarded the Afghanistan war as a ‘bleeding

wound’ for the USSR268. In December 1989, the Congress of People’s Deputies

condemned both the intervention in Afghanistan and the leaders who made that

decision269. Many other officials also mentioned their point of views regarding Soviet’s

264 William R. Thompson, ‘The Consequences of War’, International Interactions, Vol. 19, (US: Gordon

and Breach Science Publishers, 1993), 125–47. 265 Rafael Reuveny & Aseem Prakash, The Afghanistan war and the Breakdown of the Soviet Union,

(Review of International Studies, British International Studies, 1999), 693–708. 266 Ibid. 267 Michael Dobbs, ‘The Afghan Archive: Dramatic Politburo Meeting Led to End of War’, The

Washington Post, November 16, 1992, 16. 268A. Trehub, ‘Soviet Press Coverage of the War in Afghanistan: From Cheerleading to Disenchantment’,

Report on the USSR, 1 (# 10, 1989), 2. 269 Rafael, The Afghanistan war and the breakdown of the Soviet Union, 693-708.

68

defeat in the war but the most interesting commentary on the incident was by

Bennigsen. In July 1988 he commented,

“It would be demonstrated that Soviet might was not invincible

and that resistance is possible. What are the Afghans for Central

Asia? It is a small, wild and poor country. So then, if the Afghans

could inflict a military and political defeat, hen that makes

anything possible. And everyone in Central Asia knows that. I

think that in Soviet Russia they know it too.”270

This was indeed a true commentary and just some weeks after the Soviet’s

withdrawal from Afghanistan a few incidents happened in Soviet states in which full

independence was demanded from Moscow. The first incident that took place was in

February 1989 when Sajudis, which was a democratic movement in Lithuania,

demanded full independence from Moscow271. This wave spread throughout Soviet

Union in next few years and many other states demanded full independence thus created

a miserable situation for Soviet Union. Moreover, many soldiers of Soviet army were

from the Central Asia. They reached Afghanistan as it was their duty as ordered by the

Soviet government. But there was a point of view in Soviet Union that these soldiers

did not fight in the true sense. It was expected that they did not take the Afghan militants

with iron hands and showed a soft corner for them. Their loyalty was questioned as

most of them were Muslims or belonged to a state which was having reservations

against Moscow. For this reason, they were removed from participating in direct fight

with Afghan mujahideen and after the war was over their presence was not acceptable

by the country272. This whole scenario aroused a sense of ethnic affiliation within the

Soviet army. In later years it was seen that it lost the ability to contain the ethnic

movements which resulted in ultimate dissolution of Soviet Union into independent

states. Soviet military was highly respected in the country and was considered as the

power source due to its unprecedented services for the country since the Second World

War. It was considered that the only reliable protection for the communism was the

army but after Afghan war Soviet army had lost this status. In 1988, Major General

Tsagolov admitted their defeat in these words;

“we became the victims of our own illusions.”273

It was rare to see any question raised about Soviet army before Afghan war

because it was considered as invincible but after the war civilians started questioning

270 Radio Liberty Research, ‘Pamiati A. Bennigsen (1913–1988)’, RS 58/88 (July 5, 1988), 6. 271 Rafael, Afghanistan war and the breakdown of the Soviet Union, 693-708. 272 Bohdan Nahaylo, ‘When Ivan Comes Marching Home: The Domestic Impact of the War in

Afghanistan’, The American Spectator, (1987), 15. 273 Rafael, The Afghanistan war and the breakdown of the Soviet Union, 693-708.

69

about the worth of the Soviet army. Many generals and other high ranked army

personnel were busy in justifying the capability of their army. The whole scenario

embarrassed the army and it lost its status prior to the war. General Gareyev, argued in

the defense of Soviet army that;

“I can say, judging by my own experience in Afghanistan

in 1989–90 (after the withdrawal of our forces), that the

chief military adviser’s reports practically never reached

the desk of the top political leaders who preferred to be

satisfied with the appropriately truncated information and

reports from other departments . . . The political leadership

must have the courage to hold themselves responsible for

their own actions, rather than pass them back to others.”274

But people were not ready to listen to such excuses and these kinds of

explanations from Soviet military high officials were based on their personal

experiences and without any solid evidences. Such useless efforts later further blurred

the image of the Soviet army among the masses. Soviet soldiers could not perform well

because they had been fighting a guerilla war in a region which was not geographically

known to them. Moreover, they did not have the support of Afghan people even though

they pretended to be their well-wishers. The reason was that some Soviet army

commanders looted and plundered the Afghan and some other were involved in drug

business in exchange of weapons received from the Soviet government. This individual

attitude of Soviet commanders forced the Afghan people to turn their sympathies to

Afghan mujahideen. In 1987, Helsinki Watch Reports reported that;

“Russians systematically entered all the houses, executing

the inhabitants including women and children often by

shooting them in the head.”275

This war also questioned the legitimacy of the Soviet government. Soviet Union

was a union of states which were diverse in their religion, ethnicity, beliefs and race.

Some of the states were once at daggers drawn to each other or with Moscow as well.

But as they were geographically neighbours and thought it better to remain under the

umbrella of Soviet Union, so they were a part of it. Soviet government was taking credit

of being respectful of every ethnicity and religion, but it was not actually the reality.

Many non-Russian states which were in minority were having reservations against

Moscow, but these reservations were buried in their hearts in long run national interests.

But after the defeat of Soviet Union in Afghan war these reservations were accelerated

274 Mahmut Gareyev, ‘The Afghan Problem: Three Years Without Soviet Troops’, (International Affairs,

March, 1992), 17. 275 Helsinki Watch, ‘To Die in Afghanistan’, Helsinki Watch Reports (New York, 1987).

70

and even transformed into demand for complete independence as well. In Afghanistan

along with Pashtuns the other major ethnic groups were Uzbeks and Tajiks. There were

also many people in Soviet Union who were either Uzbeks or Tajiks. They felt

somewhat ethnic brotherhood for Afghanistan. Moreover, they shared border with

Afghanistan so later freedom movements started in these regions and as Soviet Union

had lost its legitimacy, so they managed to become independent states in 1990s. Now

these are present as independent states including Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan etc. There was widespread perception throughout Central

Asian states that it was a war between Central Asians with other Central Asians, some

regarded this war as the war between the people of same ethnicity. Some others

commented that their boys were dying for an alien cause276.

Soviet media also played its role in presenting the biased picture of war before

the people. In the initial phase of the war, Soviet government persuaded that the Afghan

government was fighting against the Afghan militants and Soviet army was just

supporting Afghan government. For this purpose, the official media did not highlight

the causalities of Soviet soldiers, but the private media was constantly trying to present

the true picture before the general public. Private media told the people that Soviet army

was actively involved in the war and for this purpose it also presented the news of dead

bodies of Soviet soldiers who were brought in the country quietly. Later, official media

also started presenting the true picture of the war. Government could not check official

media in broadcasting the news against the government policy. Official media was

losing its worth before the private media because people used to refer private media for

unveiled truth.

The war of Afghanistan was the chief factor of Soviet disintegration. Although

Geneva Accord was signed in 1988 but the cold war between US and USSR came to

conclusion in 1989 when Soviet army totally evacuated the Afghanistan territory. Just

two years after in 1991 Soviet Union was disintegrated. Before the start of Afghan war

Soviet Union was in a better position and its invasion of Afghanistan was for its

expansion. But just after two years of Soviet attack on Afghanistan, the voices against

Moscow were raised but did not get much momentum. However, after the withdrawal

of Soviet army from Afghanistan the process of Soviet decline got acceleration and

completed in 1991. Most of the Soviet policy makers did not consider the war of

Afghanistan as the main cause of disintegration of Soviet Union. They thought that due

276 Rafael, The Afghanistan war and the breakdown of the Soviet Union, 693-708.

71

to the deficiency of genuine leadership and systematic failure of state, Soviet Union

was disintegrated. But the circumstances revealed that although these factors were

there, but the ultimate or major cause of Soviet disintegration was of course, Afghan

war.

On the other hand, Afghanistan also could not restore peace in the country after

the withdrawal of Soviet army. The reason was that there were nine fighting groups

involved in fighting against the Soviet army. Although, to defeat the Soviet army was

there common objective but each group was expecting a lion’s share in the government

after Soviet withdrawal. That was the reason, General Zia was of the view that before

leaving Afghanistan it was necessary to help in establishing a government set up to help

smooth running of the country. But it seemed that US did not have any interest in

Afghanistan after the defeat of Soviet army. Their foremost objective was to contain

communism in the region which was almost accomplished so US did not consider

General Zia’s suggestion and left the Afghan fighting group to decide their own fate.

2.2. Pakistan-US Interests in Afghan War and Their Convergence:

The era of Bhutto can be regarded as a nightmare for Pakistan-US relationship. The

main reason of conflict in these relations was no doubt, Pakistan’s nuclear program and

the Bhutto’s dream of establishing an Islamic bloc to protect the interests of the Muslim

states throughout the world. Although at that time the Muslim leadership was quite

interested in this idea and showed will with participation in the Second Islamic

Conference. This Conference was held from February 22-24, 1974 in Lahore. It was

hosted by Pakistan and was known as the Lahore Summit. This Conference was held

according to the proposal of OIC Secretary General, Tunku Abdul Rahman but Bhutto

also played a vital role to make it successful. He not only played his role by bringing

Muslim countries on one table as most of the Islamic countries were having serious

reservations vis-à-vis each other. The main agenda of this conference was to discuss the

Middle East situation after Arab Israel war in October 1973 and to discuss the impact

and consequences of the oil embargo imposed by Arabs. The most mentionable thing

about this conference was that most of the world-renowned Muslim leaders attended it

and sat on one platform to discuss and think about Muslim Ummah and challenges faced

by it. The most prominent leaders who attended the Conference were King Faisal of

Saudi Arabia, President Anwer Sadat of Egypt, Colonel Qaddafi of Libya, Shaikh Mujib

Ur Rehman of Bangladesh, Chairman Yasar Arafat of Palestine Liberation

72

Organization and almost every other monarch, president and prime minister of the

Islamic World277. People of Pakistan showed great love for the Muslim leaders and

Prime Minister of Pakistan also welcomed every leader personally. On this occasion,

Bhutto tried to mitigate the enmity with Mujeeb Ur Rehman and invited him as well.

On the same occasion Pakistan recognized Bangladesh as an independent country.

Bhutto’s picture with Mujeeb in which both were walking taking each other hands also

got popularity throughout Pakistan. Following decisions were made in the conference:

i. Support was assured to Jordon, Syria, Egypt and Palestinian people for their legitimate

struggle for recovering of their lands.

ii. Palestine issue needs to be resolved, all those states having relations with Israel were

condemned and it was suggested that steps should be taken to affirm Arab sovereignty

over Jerusalem.

iii. For the enhancement of Islamic culture, solidarity and education the Islamic Solidarity

Fund was established278.

This summit resulted in some immediate consequences for Pakistan and the

Muslim world. For Pakistan it proved to be a source of raising its stature among the

comity of nations. India also realized that Pakistan had full support of the developed

Islamic countries which were ready to assist Pakistan in any sort of aggression from

India. Egypt also got satisfied by having clear support from the Muslim world after

Arab-Israel war. This summit also admitted three important recognitions. First was the

recognition of Bangladesh as an independent country on the map of the world as some

Muslim countries had not accepted it in Pakistan’s love. Secondly, Yasser Arafat and

Palestinian Liberation Organization were recognized as the true representative of the

freedom movement which was in progress in Palestine. Thirdly Jerusalem was

recognized as a place of profound importance for Muslim Ummah279.

Although Pakistan managed to get full respect among Muslim Ummah, but the

role of Bhutto was not welcomed by the west especially by the US. A few months after

India shattered the balance of power by holding nuclear tests in Pokhran which was

named as “Smiling Buddha” by India.

277http://zulfikaralibhuttoshaheed.blogspot.com/2012/07/second-islamic-summit-conference-

lahore.html. Retrieved February 14, 2017. 278 http://historypak.com/lahore-summit-1974/. Retrieved February 14, 2017. 279 Ibid.

73

“India conducts an underground nuclear test at Pokharan in

the Rajasthen desert, code named the "Smiling Buddha."The

government claims it is a peaceful test, but it is actually part

of an accelerated weapons program. The Nuclear Suppliers

Group (NSG) is founded after India’s first “peaceful nuclear

explosion” conducted on May 18, 1974. NSG establishes

guidelines to regulate the transfer of sensitive nuclear material.”280

Pakistan was forced to think about establishing its own nuclear program.

According to Tom Gouttiere, Pakistan government made policy keeping in mind the

paranoia of India because India is an immediate neighbor of Pakistan and having great

economic and military resources, land and boosting economy. Moreover, Pakistan had

a bad experience of three wars with India in which Pakistan could not get the desired

results281. It is true and to some extent as for the reason Pakistan had to start its nuclear

program by inviting AQ Khan to Pakistan to start Uranium enrichment. Bhutto’s

statement of eating grass for the completion of Pakistan’s nuclear program was not

welcomed by the US. Sher Ahmadzai, Director Center for Afghanistan Studies at

University of Nebraska at Omaha (US) also made an interesting statement in this regard.

He said that he was not satisfied with Bhutto’s decision because as a prime minister of

Pakistan it was better to consider the future impacts of a decision on the people of

Pakistan. But Bhutto just followed the first ever thought which came in his mind and

that was to compete with India at any cost without analyzing the consequences for the

nation. He also added that if he were the prime minister of Pakistan at that time, he

would not let his people eat grass for establishing Pakistan’s nuclear program282.

Although all these logics are not deniable but the Indian factor in Pakistan’s foreign

policy making could not be neglected at all. There was no need for India to test the

weapons after achieving them. Indian government knew these tests would bring for it

anger from the US and the west. US was already unhappy with decision of India to

remain non-aligned and showing closeness with USSR. Moreover, it was not possible

for India to take this initiative on its own or just by the backing of USSR. However, the

ultimate objective which Indian government wanted to achieve was to tell Pakistan that

its rival managed to have the most destructive weapon on earth. It was a challenge for

Pakistani government which Bhutto accepted obviously knowing the consequences or

expected international reaction. Governments do think about national dignity on the

280 http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/timeline/timeline_page.php?year=1974, Retrieved February 14,

2017. 281 Thomas E Gouttiere (Dean Emeritus, International Studies & Programs, University of Nebraska,

Omaha), Interview by Qaiser Mehmood, Tape Recording, Omaha (US), February 13, 2017. 282 Sherjan, Interview.

74

expense of economy or foreign relations. Bhutto was also thinking in the same manner

at that time as he had no other option was left for him.

On the mid-night of 4th and 5th July 1977, Pakistan Army, under General Zia,

removed Bhutto from his office as a result of military operation named as “Operation

Fair-Play”. General Zia took over the control of country as Chief Martial Law

Administrator. He inherited a poor political condition in Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan-

US relations had reached to the lowest level during Bhutto’s era on the issue of

Pakistan’s nuclear program. When General Zia took over the control of the government,

the political and economic position was not up to the mark. General Zia was a military

man and it was not possible for the world to support him. Even the West was not ready

to support his military government although Bhutto was not acceptable for the West

either. On Bhutto’s removal US showed a silent and diplomatic response and regarded

it as an internal matter of Pakistan. In fact, US was pleased at General Zia’s military

action as she was angry at Bhutto for promoting Pakistan’s nuclear program but for the

sake of democratic image, it was not possible for US to encourage Martial Law in

Pakistan. US Ambassador in Pakistan, Arthur Hummel, in a meeting with General Zia,

proposed that Pakistan’s nuclear program must be downgraded283. But General Zia was

not ready to accept any kind of pressure on Pakistan’s nuclear program. He continued

this program with the same zeal as that of Bhutto as he was fully aware of the fact that

it would be the only way, which would assure Pakistan’s security.

US ceased Pakistan’s military and economic aid in September 1977, when US

persuaded Pakistan to terminate the agreement with France for purchase of reprocessing

plant and Pakistan refused to do so284. US President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) was

much annoyed at Pakistan’s cold response regarding abandonment of nuclear program.

In early 1978, he came on an official visit to India but totally ignored his old ally,

Pakistan and did not include visit to Islamabad in his agenda285. Carter’s this gesture

was totally annoying for Pakistan. It was a clear signal from Pakistan’s old ally, US,

that relations with India were of much significance as compared to that of Pakistan.

Interestingly, on April 27, 1978, Afghan President, Sardar Dawood was killed

and an anti-Pakistan and pro-communist, Noor Muhammad Tarkai replaced him286.

Pakistan was much concerned with this development. General Zia wrote a letter to US

283 Khalid Mehmood Arif, Zia ul Haq Ke Hamrah, (Islamabad: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1996), 163. 284 Ibid., 466-67. 285 Safdar Hussain, Pakistan: Political Root and Development (1947-99), 188. 286 Ibid.

75

President Carter and stressed on the need of a joint action against Soviet threat in the

west but US did not respond positively287. Perhaps, US did not realize the situation

correctly and considered this development just a tussle for power sharing among

internal political groups. Pakistan was much disappointed at such a cold response from

US. The time when communist threat was knocking at western boundaries of Pakistan,

US was busy in efforts to pressurize Pakistan to stop her nuclear program. For this

purpose, Pakistan’s request for US help in getting aid from IMF and the World Bank

was rejected in a meeting between US Foreign Minister, Mr. Syris Vans and Pakistan’s

Advisor of Political Affairs in Sep 1978288. On the other hand, US had been

continuously pressurizing France for abandonment of her agreement with Pakistan

regarding the purchase of reprocessing plant. In October 1978, France ceased her

agreement with Pakistan after accepting US pressure289. At such a crucial time, US was

indulged in a lesser-issue. US President Carter raised a fresh issue to pressurize General

Zia’s government. He was then sympathetic towards Bhutto, who was once most

disliked person for America. Carter was against punishing Bhutto and for this purpose;

a resolution was passed in the House of Representatives290. General Zia completely

ignored US request and with the help of the Supreme Court, Bhutto was sentenced to

death and he was hanged on April 4, 1979. During the same month, Carter

administration ceased all kind of economic, technical and military aid to Pakistan after

blaming it being indulged in the preparation of so called “Islamic Bomb”291.

Pakistan had signed certain anti-communist agreements in 1950 on the advice

of US to restrict possible advancement of the communists. But at the time, when

communist forces were becoming powerful, US totally turned her eyes and left Pakistan

on her own. These agreements did not mean for Pakistan anymore. Pakistan had already

left CEATO in 1971 and in 1979 it also left CENTO292. Moreover, as a reaction of US

sanctions on Pakistan, some mobs set US embassy in Pakistan on fire in November

1979293. As a result, Pakistan-US relations reached at the lowest level ever in the

history.

287 Arif, Zia ul Haq Ke Hamrah, 451. 288 Ibid., 467. 289 Ibid. 290 Ibid., 281. 291 Safdar, Pakistan: Political Root and Development (1947-99), 244. 292 Shahid M. Amin, Pakistan Foreign Policy; A Reappraisal, 123. 293 Safdar, Pakistan: Political Root and Development (1947-99), 245.

76

General Zia was lucky that due to crucial incidents of the Islamic Revolution in

Iran and Soviet-Afghan war, the significance of Pakistan’s geographical location has

increased. The Islamic revolution in Iran was a great blow to the US policies in the

region as Shah of Iran was a reliable guardian of US interests in the region. US were

totally dependent on Iran for its oil requirement because the Arab countries had imposed

an embargo on the export of oil to the west in the light of Arab-Israel war. So, US was

in search of another military base in South Asia which could be no other country than

Afghanistan because Afghanistan was the only country with political instability. US

were also well aware of the fact that in the presence of USSR in this region US could

never complete its objectives. So, US was in search of land base in the neighborhood

of Afghanistan which could be Pakistan only. So, the whole scenario benefitted General

Zia and Pakistan as well.

In December 1979, political situation in Afghanistan grew even worse, when

Soviet Army entered Afghanistan and killed Afghan President, Hafiz Ullah Amin and

replaced him by Babrak Karmal294. This incident was thought provoking for US Carter

responded effectively this time and said,

“An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf

region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the

United States and such an assault will be repelled by any means

necessary including military force.”295

But the problem for US was exceptionally long geographical distance from

which it was impossible for her to have a direct military venture against USSR.

certainly; US needed an ally in the neighborhood of USSR to help US in restricting

Soviet forces. The ultimate choice for US in this regard was Pakistan due to its

geographical location. US informed Pakistan that US regarded Durand Line as an

international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and agreed to lift economic

sanctions from Pakistan. US totally ignored Pakistan’s nuclear program at the moment

as according to her restriction of Soviet forces was of much worth than restriction of

Pakistan’s nuclear program296.

The situation was favorable for General Zia as he got opportunity to have his

military regime an international acceptance. It also helped him in getting huge economic

aid and he was in a good position to stabilize his government against democratic forces

294 Ibid., 238. 295 Diego Cordovez and Selig H. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, (New York: Oxford University Press,

1995), 55. 296 Arif, Zia ul Haq Ke Hamrah, 468.

77

within the country297. Pakistan appeared on the scene as US partner of the war against

USSR which was a breakthrough for General Zia298. Pakistan was going to enter in the

most significant phase of its relations with US which was important for its security as

well. Pakistan had been facing two opponents since independence. In the east India had

been a constant threat to Pakistan’s security. In the west of Pakistan was Afghanistan

sharing the longest border with Pakistan. Although Afghanistan had not passed through

any war like situation with Pakistan but the issue of Pashtunistan raised by Indian and

Soviet backed governments was a constant threat for Pakistan. So, Pakistan could not

afford a third enemy in the shape of USSR with full control over Afghanistan.

Therefore, Pakistan had no other option but to assist US in a comprehensive struggle to

stop Soviet advancement299.

Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan since 1947 also remained unpredictable.

On one occasion both were having close ties of Muslim brotherhood and on some other

occasion they were at daggers drawn. Pakistan had rejected the USSR support right in

the beginning and established good relations with US by joining in the SEATO and

CENTO alliances. On the other hand, the Afghan government tried to have close ties

with both US and USSR at the same time. But soon Afghan government diverted

towards USSR as it did not have much economic and military support from the US.

Although King Zahir Shah was a reliable ally of the US but the Afghan Prime Minister

Sardar Daud looked towards the Soviet Union for military and economic aid. The Soviet

Union provided Afghanistan, more than 1 billion dollars as military aid and 1.25 billion

dollars as economic aid over the next two decades300. In the process, the Soviets invited

a large number of Afghan students, technicians and other people to visit Moscow for

studies, thereby increasing their influence in country. Pakistan’s relations with

Afghanistan became bitter in 1961, during President Ayub’s time, when the border of

the two countries was closed, due to Sardar Daud’s support for Pashtunistan and then

during Bhutto’s time when Pakistan had been passing through a phase of instability

after losing East Pakistan, Afghanistan once again tried to harm Pakistan by launching

full support to some Baluch sardar to start rebellion in their region. The incident of

rebellion took place in 1973 and Sardar Daud welcomed some of the rebel leaders in

297 Goutiere, Interview. 298 Raees, War Without Winners, 239. 299 Sherjan, Interview. 300 Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History, 226.

78

Afghanistan and provided them shelter and other facilities within Afghanistan301. Bacha

Khan and Abdul Wali Khan along with their political party, National Awami Party, also

supported Sardar Daud. For this reason, case of treason was initiated against them and

their political party was banned afterwards. Bhutto and Sardar Daud, tried together for

reconciliation of mutual conflicts. Pakistan’s objectives of this reconciliation policy

were to guarantee the sanctity of Duran Line and initiating some strict action against

the chaotic elements on either side. This initiative was taken in 1976 but before its final

conclusion, both Sardar Daud and Bhutto lost their governments302. The new regimes

in Pakistan and Afghanistan could not maintain the little momentum that had been

created during the Bhutto and Sardar Daud’s governments. Bhutto was later on hanged

and it was due to his strong desire for making Pakistan a nuclear power and creating an

Islamic bloc. The west was not much concerned with the creation of Islamic bloc but

when most of the Muslim countries imposed an embargo over export of oil to the West

then it was regarded as unacceptable in any case. The two main architects of this bloc

i.e. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and Bhutto lost their lives within five years after Second

Islamic Summit. Sardar Daud got this treatment for establishing good relations with a

pro-west country and neglecting the Soviet elements within Afghan government. He

did not only lose his life but most of his family members were killed in the coup as well.

The efforts of reconciliation of Pakistan and Afghanistan relations also came to an

end with the removal of Bhutto and Daud. However, Pakistan recognized the newly

formed communist government of Amin in Afghanistan. Soviet advisors suggested to

Amin that it would be better to have good relations with Pakistan because without

Pakistan’s assistance it would not be possible for Afghanistan to have full control over

the tribal areas located adjacent to Pak-Afghan border303. General Zia wanted to visit

Afghanistan and sent request to Afghan government in this regard but Afghan

government constantly ignored his request for several months. Later on, General Zia

was invited to pay an official visit to Afghanistan but instead of making progress in the

already started policy of reconciliation, Amin preached General Zia about the benefits

associated with communism and also told about his reservations about Pakistan’s close

ties with the US. Amin also raised the issue of Pashtunistan with General Zia and told

301 Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan's Security under Zia, 1977-1988, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991),

31. 302Ibid., 32.

303 Tomson, The Wars of Afghanistan, 135.

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him that some parts of NWFP and Baluchistan were once the part of Afghanistan304.

Amin had full support from USSR because without such strong backing it was not

possible for him to raise his voice before Pakistani president in such a bold manner.

The Afghan War brought Pakistan and the US closer to each other due to

convergence of interests. Pakistan feared to have a communist force on its border and

to become a sandwich between two enemies on the east and the west. For the US the

main aim was to engage the USSR in the war in such a way that it might become

expensive for it. Moreover, to have a ground support in the region to protect US interests

after the elimination of Shah of Iran from the political scene305. US administration under

President Carter was serious in restricting USSR with a solid strategy which was not

possible at all without the support of Pakistan306. General Zia who had just visited

Afghanistan and had a meeting with Amin was more concerned about the security of

Pakistan’s western border. Pakistan did not take much time in launching its full support

to the US in restricting the USSR. After Pakistan’s alliance with the US, the security

situation of Pakistan improved307. Although US had just one-point agenda to restrict

communism but Pakistan got a lot of benefits which strengthened it308. Firstly, Pakistan

managed to save itself from expected threat of Soviet invasion in case of its permanent

presence in Afghanistan after capture. Secondly, the government of General Zia got

acceptance from the west especially from the US. Thirdly, Pakistan managed to

improve its economy and military by getting a huge economic support and military

equipment from the US. Last but not the least, US turned soft to Pakistan’s ongoing

nuclear program which provided Pakistan an opportunity to make advancement in its

nuclear technology. Pakistan was of the view that as soon as the crisis of Afghanistan

would settle then US would divert its attention towards Pakistan’s nuclear program.

Therefore, after USSR evacuated the region President Bush approved the Pressler

amendment according to which Pakistan’s economic aid was stopped till Pakistan’s U-

turn in its nuclear technology. Pakistan’s nuclear program was the main issue of conflict

before Afghan crisis. US needed Pakistan’s assistance in restricting USSR in

Afghanistan which was not possible by simultaneously pressurizing Pakistan for its

nuclear program. So, US shifted its policy and turned a deaf ear towards Pakistan’s

304 Ibid. 305 Hutson, Interview. 306 Ibid. 307 Sherjan, Interview. 308 Raees, War Without Winners,236.

80

nuclear program. But as soon as USSR was defeated and the threat of communism was

eliminated, Pakistan’s nuclear program and the issue of non-proliferation again became

dominant factor in Pakistan-US relations309. But at that time Pakistan had covered a long

distance in this regard and General Zia had given the indication that Pakistan managed

to make atomic bomb.

US left Pakistan isolated as it was before and left the region when USSR

troops vacated Afghanistan but for Pakistan just the removal of USSR troops was

not enough because at its western border Pakistan also needed peace and stability.

General Zia was of the view that US might leave after setting some set of rules for

the future of Afghan government and handing over it to the elected or selected

representatives. But Prime Minister of Pakistan Muhammad Khan Junejo by-passed

General Zia and signed Geneva Accord at its own will probably to show the strength

of his government. But this decision of Junejo’s government widened the gulf

between the Prime Minister and the President and few months later General Zia

dismissed Junejo’s government.

USSR withdrawal from Afghanistan was a source of satisfaction for

Pakistan’s peace and economy. On one hand the threat of communism was

eliminated and on the other it was possible for Pakistan to approach the Central Asia

states to enhance its trade. But that was only possible in case of stability within

Afghanistan. The militant groups, which were once united against USSR, started

fight with one another to get the ultimate rule over Afghanistan. That was due to the

miscalculation of the US vis-à-vis restoring political stability in Afghanistan.

General Zia was quite right that Geneva Accord must include a proper formula for

the future government in Afghanistan. But the militant groups were left behind to

decide about the government on their own. As these militants did not have the ability

to negotiate for a proper set up of a government. Whatever they knew was just

fighting so they struggled to resolve this issue with power. No militant group in

Afghanistan was capable enough to get the ultimate victory. At that time regional

powers jumped into the war and backed different militant groups to achieve their

own national interests. Burhan ud Din Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masood were not

happy with Pakistan’s backing of Gulbadeen Hikmatyar group and giving him a

lion’s share of the military aid and weapons received from the US. So, they were

included in anti-Pakistan alliance which was backed by India. Pakistan had no other

309 Raees, War Without Winners, 241.

81

choice but to empower its own militant group in Afghanistan. So, Pakistan backed

Talibans who soon managed to get control over 90% land of Afghanistan. US and

most of the world did not recognize Talibans as actual rulers of the country. Instead

they recognized Burhan ud Din Rabbani as the true ruler although he had a control

over just 10% of the land of Afghanistan. Due to long lasting chaotic situation within

Afghanistan, the thought of trade and economic benefits remained a dream for

Pakistan310.

Defeat of USSR in Afghanistan was made possible due to stern policy of US

President Reagan against the communist elements. His predecessor Carter was not as

strict as Reagan was. Reagan was committed not to concentrate on Soviet attack against

Afghanistan but also in rolling back communist impacts on every other country of the

third world311. Reagan was quite confident that the US might defeat in its agenda of

expansion that was why he regarded communism as a strange chapter in the history

whose last pages were going to be written in Afghanistan312.

2.3. Pakistan as Front-Line State in Afghan War:

The geographical location of Afghanistan incited the USSR effort to take the

region under its control remained a far cry. US, under President Reagan could serve as

the architect of countering communism in Afghanistan. Pakistan was also capable

enough to launch full land and air support to the US in this regard. Last but not the least,

the military history of Afghanistan was also a main factor of USSR’s failure in the war.

Since centuries, no foreign invader could ever have control over Afghanistan even the

powerful British failed in taking Afghanistan under its control. This was exactly the fate

of USSR in Afghanistan313. General Zia was considering the whole incident from

Pakistan’s angle and he desired to keep Soviet Union out of Afghanistan to protect the

security and safety of the country314.

General Zia was well aware of the fact that Afghan governments had been

supporting the political elements behind the issue of “Pashtunistan” which was one of

the factors of the start of anti-government movements in some areas of NWFP and

Baluchistan but fortunately the political and economic conditions of Baluchistan and

NWFP were far better than that of Afghanistan so these movements did not get public

310 Hutson, Interview. 311 Ibid. 312 Ibid. 313 Sherjan, Interview. 314 Dawn News, The Daily, Islamabad, March 23, 1983.

82

support on mass level315. For the success of a political movement it is necessary to

convince the people that their benefits are associated with the success of the movement.

Majority of the population of Baluchistan and NWFP was well aware of the fact that

their economic condition would become even worse on being a part of Afghanistan.

The other major issue which Pakistan had been facing with Afghanistan was the Durand

Line. To a great extent this issue also had some association with the issue of

Pashtunistan as well. Afghan government was well aware of the fact that after the

recognition of this line, the issue of Pashtunistan would die down. But for Pakistan this

issue was of less significance as compared to that of Pashtunistan. If there was a

Pakistan friendly government in Afghanistan, then there was no need to be worried

about the Durand Line issue. But after the establishment of an anti-Pakistan government

in Afghanistan, it was important for Pakistan to protect this border. Border protection

at Durand Line was also a tough task for Pakistan because Pakistan had to protect its

eastern border with India as well. But then Pakistan government started thinking that in

case of the presence of Soviet Union in Afghanistan, this border would become as

important for Pakistan as its eastern border was316.

After having a close look of the political condition at the time of Soviet attack

on Afghanistan it becomes clear that Pakistan was to do what it had done. Although,

Pakistan was having full support from the US in case of direct confrontation with the

USSR but Pakistani government was not able to take that risk due to its limited

economic resources and weaker military as compared to the USSR in terms of

technology. Before reaching to a final decision General Zia held a high-profile meeting.

Three main proposals were discussed in the meeting. The first proposal was that

Pakistan should keep itself neutral by avoiding any kind of military or moral support to

the Afghan fighting groups. This proposal was quite easy to follow but its consequences

were thought to be horrible. Pakistan could not afford Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

The second proposal which was discussed in detail was that Pakistan should stand with

Afghan militants and assist them economically and militarily. This option was also not

applicable because Pakistan was not in a position to afford the wrath of Soviet Union.

Moreover, Pakistan was not able to launch any kind of military or economic support to

Afghanistan as Pakistan was having a weak economy to get involved in any kind of

major war against the communists. The third proposal was that Pakistan should not

315 Sherjan, Interview. 316 Hutson, Interview.

83

come in front and support Afghan militants by keeping itself at the back. This was a

good proposal but it was possible only with some foreign aid. So, it was decided that

Pakistan should convince the world to support the Afghan militants against USSR to

restrict the expansion of communism317. Dr Wirsing explains it in crisply that Pakistan

was ready to transform itself from international rogue to good Samaritan rogue to good

Samaritan318.

Pakistan remained on the scene from the time of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

up to the withdrawal of Soviet army. Pakistan had foresighted the future events to be

happened in this part of South Asia and to cope with the situation in a better way.

Pakistan had started the diplomatic efforts by inviting a conference of foreign ministers

of the Muslim countries. Eleventh Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers was held in

Islamabad from May 17-21, 1980. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was one of the four

major points of agenda of the conference319. Afghan people migrated to Pakistan to

survive their lives. Pakistan was well aware of its economic condition but it did not stop

them. Within a few months about one million Afghan refugees came to Pakistan and

increased a huge economic burden on the crumbling economy of Pakistan. Soviet army

entered Afghanistan to help the government but in couple of months they had become

able to make advancement on their own without waiting for the order of Afghan army

chief or the government officials. Although, Soviet army was having full support from

Babrak Karmal, the ruler of Afghanistan, but people did not like Soviet invasion and

enhanced their activities against the army. Afghan army was becoming weaker and

weaker day by day because a large number of Afghan soldiers joined the militants and

started fighting against Soviet army. These Afghan well trained soldiers started to train

Afghan militants who were having strong will to fight but did not know modern tactics

of war. This improved the fighting abilities and tactics of the militants. The situation

was becoming worse for USSR and after a few months only 40% of Afghan military

remained. On looking the situation closely USSR not only stopped trusting Afghan

military but it also restricted the Muslim soldiers of Soviet army to actively participate

in the war. Afghan military officials were not invited to the meetings held for military

planning. US also condemned Soviet attack and threatened to stop 17 million ton of

food which US was to send to USSR. Meanwhile, Olympic Games were scheduled to

317 Shahi, Soviet-American Relations With Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, 50. 318 Wirsing, Pakistan’s Security Under Zia, 265-290. 319 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700168009421590?journalCode=rsan20, Retrieved

October 12, 2018.

84

be held in 1980 in Moscow. On January 20, 1980, US President, Jimmy Carter issued

an ultimatum for Soviet government that US would boycott the Olympic Games if

USSR did not withdraw its army from Afghanistan320. A few days later more than 100

countries passed a resolution in the UN to condemn the action of USSR but USSR

ignored the significance of such resolutions. In February 1980, US Foreign Minister,

Warren Christopher visited Pakistan and discussed the situation with Pakistani Foreign

Minister and President Zia. US offered 400 million dollars as economic aid to Pakistan

which was not according to Pakistan’s need at that moment. Pakistan was not only going

to start a fight with USSR but it had to settle large number of Afghan refugees as well.

That was the reason, General Zia regarded this aid as “peanuts”.

In May 1980, OIC held a meeting of 35 Islamic countries and decided not to

recognize the government of Babrak Karmal in Afghanistan and also suspended the

membership of Afghanistan321. Babrak Karmal ordered his officials not to take part in

any of the meeting regarding the discussion about the solution of Afghan crisis. In

November 1980, while addressing UN General Assembly, Afghan Foreign Minister,

Dost Muhammad said that the world should not worry about Afghanistan because

whatever had been going on in Afghanistan was its internal matter. Moreover, he also

blamed Pakistan, US and China for training the militants fighting against Soviet army

and Afghan government. He also stated that the presence of Soviet army in Afghanistan

was according to Soviet Afghan Friendship Agreement322. In the same session Pakistani

Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi rejected the blames imposed by Afghan Foreign Minister

and regarded them as baseless. He added that USSR had entered Afghanistan as an

aggressor. Many countries admitted Pakistan’s stance but the world did not do anything

except passing the resolutions against the Soviet aggression. The whole scenario did

not stop USSR from the accomplishment of its task in Afghanistan. General Zia held a

meeting with Pakistani ISI Chief Lieutenant General Akhtar Abdul Rehman and invited

some suggestions from him. General Akhtar who was a well devoted soldier and had a

close look over the situation. He proposed that Pakistan should restrict USSR by

launching full support to the Mujahideen. General Zia was reluctant because his

government was not having worldwide recognition especially within the US so he was

willing to start the strategy after having recognition. But the time was so crucial and

320 "The Olympic Boycott, 1980". state.gov. US Department of State. Archived from the original on

February 4, 2010. Retrieved December 7, 2015. 321 Mustafa Kamal Pasha, Fath-e-Afghanistan, (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992), 173. 322 Ibid., 174.

85

General Akhtar persuaded him giving logics in favour of his plan. The main objective

before Pakistan was to get rid of Soviet army without letting them know about

Pakistan’s direct involvement in the war. USSR was having a strong intelligence

network and got the knowledge about Pakistan’s policy. Although, Soviet army

occasionally launched air attacks on some border areas of Pakistan but could not dare

to cross the border from land. Pakistan’s policy regarding Afghanistan was having two

objectives. First of all, Pakistan was trying to pressurize USSR with the support of the

world to withdraw its army from Afghanistan and secondly Pakistan was willing to

establish a stable government in Afghanistan.

The plan of General Akhtar was not welcomed by Pakistan’s foreign ministry

including Agha Shahi as well. Some high ranked army officers and the opposition

leaders were also thinking that Pakistan was going to start a “mission impossible”.

Some people also commented that Soviet Union was so powerful than Pakistan and it

could easily move to Karachi as well without reasonable resistance. These people were

explaining their statement on the fact that during the past few centuries, no country

could dare to stop USSR. But General Akhtar was having full confidence over the

fighting capabilities of Afghan militants. They were trained in the border areas and were

sent back to Afghanistan. General Akhtar was the chief architect of the whole plan.

Afghan militants were given weapons and ammunition to fight against Soviet army. ISI

had been doing all this with full secrecy because it knew that in case of any kind of

leakage of information, Pakistan would be in a complex situation. ISI top level

management was involved in the whole plan. This plan was also kept secret from the

lower management of the ISI. The ISI officers had to deliver the arms and ammunition

to the militants by carrying huge burden on their shoulders like porters. War strategy

was also not known to different fighting militant groups as well. The main objective of

Pakistan was to spread this movement to different parts of Afghanistan. Pakistan

managed to fulfill its objective in few weeks when this military movement spread to

other parts of Afghanistan and Soviet army got huge loss. Soviet army was not ready

for such a strong military resistance by the militants. The main reason was that Soviet

army was not well aware of the geography of the territory and it also hesitated to believe

in local Afghan military. Consequently, the intensity of the resistance forced Soviet

army to think about some other options. Soviet army destroyed many Afghan populated

areas considering them providing support to the militants. A large number of women

and children were also killed by Soviet military which produced hatred among the

86

people of Afghanistan against Soviet military.

Pakistan was also feeling much difficulty after starting military resistance

against USSR with the help of Afghan militants and country’s own limited resources.

US and western media were considering that it would take a few weeks for Soviet army

to crush the militants. Moreover, Afghan militants were presented as “rebels” in the

western media. Based on such reports, US parliament also restricted its government to

support Afghan fighters against USSR. When Afghan mujahideen managed to survive

till some weeks and the military resistance against Soviet army got strengthened and

spread to a vast area, US sent its senators, Congress members and CIA officials to

monitor the situation closely323. General Akhtar briefed them in detail about the political

situation in Afghanistan and the achievements made by the militants. He also told them

how mujahideen would proceed further to restrict the Soviet army. US delegation was

convinced by the briefing of General Akhtar and agreed to support Pakistan in this

regard. Pakistan foreign office had still been persuading General Zia to find a solution

of the crisis through dialogue instead of military resistance. But General Zia was also

convinced by the idea of General Akhtar by knowing about successful advancement of

the plan. Therefore, when he was addressing a press conference and a journalist raised

a question that USSR was like a huge elephant and Pakistan was like a tiny ant, then

how could Pakistan confront USSR. At this General Zia replied to the journalist that

what he thought if the tiny ant would enter into the nose of the elephant. This showed

that General Zia was at that time confident about what role Pakistan had decided to play

in Afghan crisis. The other good thing for General Zia was the US agreement to support

Pakistan. US was having bad experience in the past with USSR because the US could

not restrict it wherever USSR initiated a military adventure. In Afghanistan, US was

thinking in the same way that the USSR was un-resistible but when General Akhtar

disclosed his strategy before them and informed about the successful resistance of

Afghan militants then they were convinced that the communist might be restricted. On

getting support from the US, General Zia was quite contented.

US provided Pakistan full moral, economic and military support. Although

Pakistan and US were having points of difference regarding some issues but the one

point on which both the countries were agreed was the unconditional withdrawal of

Soviet army from Afghanistan. But US was still having doubts about Soviet defeat in

the region so they tried USSR to get indulged in this region. The land of Afghanistan

323 Ibid., 184.

87

was quite suitable for the guerilla warfare and that was the basic policy on which

General Akhtar and his team were working. It seemed that initially US was interested

to have full command over the warfare to deal with the USSR according to own will

but General Akhtar was not ready to accept it. He was committed to the task and was

rigid about leading the Afghan militants by himself. General Zia was not so rigid in the

policy about Afghan crisis because he was the President and he used to be diplomatic

on some occasions. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar also pointed out about lack of rigidity of

General Zia about Afghan crisis. He related that US President was to meet with

Gorbachev and he was willing to take the credit of the successes of Afghan war so he

wished to meet Afghan militant leadership before his meeting. General Zia also

suggested them to meet President Reagan but Afghan leadership refused to do so324.

US was interested to play direct and leading role in Afghan crisis. For this

reason, CIA Director, William Kasey visited Pakistan and held a meeting with General

Akhtar and congratulated him on starting an impressive effort against the communist

army with the help of Afghan militants. Moreover, he desired that Pakistan would have

full support from the US in this regard and hoped that Pakistan would also consider US

to play its role in leading the war325. General Akhtar took him to visit ISI headquarter

and briefed him about Pakistan’s strategy to handle the situation effectively. He also

presented the problems faced by Pakistan in this regard. It was due to General Akhtar’s

briefing that made CIA Chief to persuade his government to launch more assistance to

Pakistan. In the same year, Pakistan’s economic aid was almost doubled. Pakistan

needed more assistance because Pakistan was not only supporting the Afghan militants

but on the other hand Pakistan was hosting Afghan refugees which could only be

possible with full support from the US.

The whole world was surprised about the successful resistance of Afghan

militants but in Pakistan there were a lot of discussion against Pakistan’s role. At that

time in 1981 in the cities a terrorist group called Hathora (Hammer) Group appeared

on the scene which used to kill people with hammers326. This produced a sense of fear

among the people of Pakistan. The people who were against Pakistan’s policy of

confrontation with the USSR argued about the involvement of Afghan refugees in these

incidents. They regarded it as a consequence of Pakistan role in Afghan war and its

decision to shelter the refugees. General Zia started its policy despite the criticism on

324 Ibid., 188-89. 325 Ibid., 190. 326 Ibid., 181.

88

his government’s policy. Due to Pakistan’s firm policy USSR was forced to decide

some dignified way to get out of Afghanistan and agreed to sign Geneva Accord.

To give refuge to the displaced Afghan people was also a big step of Pakistan.

Although, at that time Pakistan was not doing well economically due to some

embargoes imposed by the US. It was very difficult for Pakistan to host refugees from

Pakistan but it welcomed Afghan refugees openly and invited them to come and stay in

Pakistan. This was a great challenge accepted by Pakistan. Sherjan Ahmadzai is of the

view that Pakistan had not done it for free and got a lot of money, weapons and other

financial aid in this regard327. But whatever Pakistan got in return, it was a great decision

by Pakistan’s government. This decision also increased the respect for Pakistan in the

hearts of Afghan people. For this reason, photographs of General Zia can still be seen

hanging on the walls in their drawing rooms. When General Zia died in 1988, majority

of the people participated in his funeral ceremony were Afghans.

By accommodating Afghan refugees in own territory and giving full support to

Afghan mujahideen, Pakistan had to face severe anger from USSR. Soviet fighting air

planes crossed Pakistan’s border for a number of times inviting Pakistan to attack them.

In fact, USSR wanted to have an excuse to attack Pakistan as well and to take revenge

of Badaber issue of 1960s. But Pakistan continued its role in Afghan war with patience

and tolerance. Afghan emigrants were settled in different areas of Pakistan. Most of

them were settled in NWFP due to similarity in dress, language, customs and traditions.

Most of them also moved to Rawalpindi and Islamabad in search of better employment.

Some also settled in Baluchistan and even in Sindh. According to some resources there

were more than 4 million refugees which migrated to Pakistan328. According to UNHCR

there were about 1.5 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan which were registered by the

government of Pakistan329.

Pakistan managed to play its role as a front-line ally with the support of the US.

Without the support of the US Pakistan could not ever think of direct confrontation with

the USSR. Pakistan’s military was a good fighter and had capability to train Afghan

militants. But in this era of technology it was not possible for both Pakistan and

Afghanistan to handle the USSR army without having technical support and weapons

from the US. America supported Pakistan to improve its defense capabilities because

of the increased Soviet threat in the region by the presence of Soviet military. The threat

327 Sherjan, Interview. 328 Babrak Lodhi, Behtay Lahoo Ki Kahani, (Peshawar: Institute of Regional Studies, 1982), 126. 329UNHCR country operations profile - Pakistan, Retrieved February 15, 2017.

89

was genuine because Soviet Naval deployments, their Army and Air Force personnel

in Afghanistan had increased to a great extent along the northern part of Afghanistan.

It was also seemed that USSR was not to restrict itself in Afghanistan but its aim was

to move further. Its expansion might be up to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and

to the oil resources of the Gulf region. There was a great convergence of Pakistan and

US interests at that time which made Pakistan able to play its role as front line ally.

Both the countries were having a lot of mutual agreements regarding security, trade,

economy etc. Although, both Pakistan and the US also had some point of divergence in

their relations. The major conflict was Pakistan’s nuclear program. In his farewell

address President Carter mentioned that the race of nuclear weapon between Pakistan

and India might raise the threat of a nuclear war which might result in complete disaster

and nothing else. He also supported the idea of gaining nuclear energy for useful

purposes including the production of electricity that was the basic need of the

developing countries. But he was fore sighting that the nuclear race that had started

between Pakistan and India might result in some kind of nuclear disaster in the region.

Except the issue of Pakistan’s nuclear program, US were satisfied with Pakistan.

Pakistan remained a US partner in CEATO, CENTO and other agreements. Moreover,

the generosity of Pakistan in accommodating Afghan refugees in such a large number

despite being not economically stable also impressed the US government.

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Chapter No. 3

The Geneva Accords When USSR entered Afghanistan, it was expected that Soviet forces would

dominate the region by dent of strong military power. But Afghan militants by

continuous military resistance against the giant military of USSR proved it wrong. US

did not involve directly in the war but when it saw that militants managed to resist the

Soviet army then it provided militants full economic and military aid through Pakistan.

The whole scenario forced USSR to rethink about changing dynamics of the war.

Besides Soviet army witnessed a lot of opposition from inside USSR as well. A time

came when Soviet government started thinking of making withdrawal but in a dignified

manner. This chapter discusses the factors and events which led USSR to contemplate

about the withdrawal. Although UN was at forefront of the whole scenario which made

Geneva Accords330 possible but we cannot underestimate the role performed by

Pakistan and the US to give this accord a final shape. This chapter also discusses the

role performed by both of these countries and the impact of Geneva Accords on the

entire region.

3.1. Developments Leading to the Accords:

After Soviet invasion of Afghanistan neither Moscow nor the West was

expecting such a ferocious resistance from ill-equipped and unorganized Afghan

militants. Everyone was thinking that it was a game of weeks for USSR to capture

Kabul. Moscow’s decision to intervene was based on miscalculations about the Afghan

situation. There was no fighting between the Afghan militants and communist backed

Afghan government just for some political gains but it was an ideological conflict

between the Afghan socialist government whose main objective was its political

survival and the Afghan militants who thought it their moral and religious responsibility

to make their country free from the communist backed government and the effects of

socialism from the country331. USSR persuaded the world that its army had entered

Afghanistan on the request of Afghan government to rescue it from the rebel elements

who did not want to see a stable government in the country. The Soviet army captured

Kabul and tried to strengthen the socialist-Afghan government. It killed local people

330 Appendix-V 331 Rais, War Without Winner, 108.

91

randomly which produced a sense of hatred among the Afghan locals. A situation of

chaos was created in the country and large number of people deserted Afghan army also

joined the militants which increased their strength. Several countries of the world

condemned this act of Soviet regime and demanded quick withdrawal of Soviet army

from Afghanistan332. The government of Pakistan also issued a statement just two days

after Soviet intervention. According to this statement this intervention was regarded as

a matter of great concern for Pakistan and regarded it as a serious violation of the norms

of political co-existence333. Pakistan not only condemned USSR but also decided to

launch full underground support to Afghan militants fighting against communist forces.

On the same day Afghan President Babrak Karmal stated in a broadcast on Radio Kabul

that his government was quite sincere to discuss every kind of differences and

misunderstandings with Pakistan334. Moscow was also trying to justify its position and

issued a message to the world through its ambassadors. Soviet ambassador in Pakistan

also called on General Zia and handed over to him the Soviet version of Soviet

intervention of Afghanistan. He regarded it according to a mutual agreement of

friendship between Kabul and Moscow. General Zia frankly told the Soviet ambassador

that the whole action was staged by USSR government and it could not be regarded as

internal matter of Afghanistan. He also regarded it as a naked aggression and considered

it as threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty as well335. The other country for which this incident

was quite alarming was, of course, Iran. Some defense analysts of the world and think

tank of Iran were fore seeing Iran as the next target of USSR due to its closeness to the

Persian Gulf and vast oil reserves. Khomeini declared the attack of USSR on

Afghanistan as unjustified and termed Soviets as looters and exploiters. He also

regarded it as a serious threat to Iran336. He also invited the Islamic world to formulate

a joint action plan through some defense pact to get rid of this threat and to push back

Soviet forces from Afghanistan337. Moscow and Kabul also blamed Iran for extending

full support to the Afghan militants against Kabul to destabilize the government. Iran

government mentioned in a statement that Iran only provided shelter to Afghan refugees

on purely humanitarian grounds and further added that the whole scenario was quite

alarming for not only the neighboring Muslim countries but for the whole Islamic

332 Ibid., 109. 333 The Pakistan Time, The Daily, Islamabad, December 30, 1979. 334 Ibid. 335 Riaz Ahmed Syed, Almiyya-e-Afghanistan, (Islamabad: Institute of Historical Research, 1981), 167. 336 Ibid., 168. 337 Tahir Amin, Afghanistan Crisis, (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1982), 128.

92

world338. Saudi Arabia also condemned Soviet aggression and regarded it as an effort

by USSR to destroy the unarmed Afghans with the help of their tanks. Moreover, Saudi

government requested UN to play its role in restricting USSR from playing with the

independence of Afghanistan. Saudi newspapers were also full of articles in favor of

Afghanistan and condemning the Soviet intervention339. Saudi Foreign Minister

stressed on the Islamic world to condemn the bare aggression of the Soviet army

because it was not only a danger for Afghanistan alone but was a political threat to the

entire Muslim world. Saudi Arabia was the first Muslim country to boycott the Moscow

Olympics. He also issued the similar statement on the event of summit of foreign

ministers of member countries of OIC and invited the Muslim world to be united against

Soviet aggression340. Egypt also condemned Soviet aggression and forced USSR

Embassy in Egypt to reduce the size of their officials. Egyptian President also regarded

this aggression as a threat to the Arab world especially the countries located near

Persian Gulf341. On January 3, 1980, about five thousand students in Khartoum marched

out to condemn the Soviet intervention. They also demanded quick withdrawal of

Soviet military from Afghanistan342.

Turkey also showed displeasure on Soviet aggression and Turkish cabinet

unanimously condemned it on the next day of the incident. In Turkey, there were

reported some serious protests against USSR. In January 1980, some young Turks

attacked USSR Embassy in Turkey but the plan was defeated by the security forces by

killing one of the protestants. Turkish Foreign Minister also stressed on the need of the

unity of the Islamic world against Soviet aggression during his speech in OIC Foreign

Minister’s Conference343. The protests were also observed in Indonesia, Bangladesh,

Oman and other African countries. In the conference, Indonesian Foreign Minister

demanded the USSR government to leave Afghanistan to restore the rights of Afghan

people344. On December 31, 1979, in Dhaka, Bangladeshi Foreign Office also issued a

statement of condemnation of the Soviet aggression and regarded it against the

fundamental rights of the freedom of nations. Moreover, on January 2, 1980, many

Bangladeshi students came out in the streets and protested against Soviet

338 Riaz, Almiyya-e-Afghanistan, 168. 339 Jang, The Daily, Rawalpindi, December 30, 1979. 340 Nawa-i-Waqt, The Daily, Islamabad, February 7, 1980. 341 Riaz, Almiyya-e-Afghanistan, 171. 342 Ibid., 172. 343 Ibid., 173. 344 Ibid.

93

intervention345. Oman’s Foreign Minister also regarded this incident against the

manifesto of the UN and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet army as soon as

possible346. Malaysian Foreign Minster not only condemned the Soviet aggression but

also announced an assistance package of one and half million dollars for Afghan

refugees347. Iraq which was a close friend of the USSR since decades also condemned

Soviet aggression. On January 6, 1980, during his speech regarding the celebration of

59th independence of Iraq, the President of Iraq protested against the Soviet aggression

and demanded withdrawal of Soviet army at the earliest348. On December 20, 1979,

British Foreign Minister also condemned this action of Soviet Union and demanded

immediate withdrawal of Soviet army from the region349. The government of West

Germany also condemned Soviet action in his policy statement and demanded a

political solution of the issue through dialogue350. On December 30, 1979, Australian

Prime Minister met USSR Ambassador in Australia and presented the reservations of

his government about Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. USSR Foreign Minister

presented the same argument before the Prime Minister that it was not against

international law as whatever USSR had done was according to the mutual agreement

of friendship between USSR and Afghanistan and on the request of Afghan government

as well. But Australian Prime Minister denied this argument and regarded it against

international law and moral values351. More countries from the Eastern Europe which

condemned this action of USSR include Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania352.

Chinese government also showed their response about Soviet intervention and

declared it totally against international norms. According to a statement issued by the

government spokesman it was stated that the more pinching thing in the whole matter

was that USSR had done all this against a Muslim state which had kept itself non-

aligned in the world’s politics353. China regarded this act of USSR as naked aggression

and considered it as a step to fulfill its appetite of expansion and to have a control on

Persian Gulf and other nearby sea routes. He also added that USSR wanted to capture

the oil reserves of Iran and neighboring countries after capturing Afghanistan. In reply

345 Ibid. 346 Ibid., 174. 347 Jang, The Daily, Rawalpindi, January 4, 1980. 348 Riaz Ahmad, Almiyya-e-Afghanistan, 175. 349 Ibid., 23. 350 Ibid., 181. 351 Ibid., 182. 352 Ibid., 189. 353 Strategic Survey, (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 1981-82), 67.

94

to the USSR stance of invading Afghanistan to help it in getting rid of the fighting

militants, China stated that it was like a thief himself calling to stop the thief354. But

for Pakistan the response from Indian government was of much significance because

although India had declared itself a non-aligned but its past track showed some intimate

connections with USSR. The initial response of the Indian government was against the

Soviet intervention because every country of the world had been condemning USSR

and it was not possible for Indian government to go against the current. Indian Prime

Minister issued a statement and condemned this action of USSR and demanded

withdrawal of Soviet army from the region as soon as possible. He also regarded this

action of USSR as a threat to the security of the region355. The main political figure at

the scene of Indian politics at that time was of course Indra Gandhi, the main political

leader of Congress. At the time of Soviet intervention, she was the opposition leader

and issued a statement against Soviet aggression in a mild tune. On January 14, 1980

she became the Prime Minister of India and changed her prior stance about Afghan

crisis. She declared that the growing relationships between US and China were

responsible for Soviet invasions of Afghanistan. She was of the view that USSR was

having security concerns with such development. She also supported Soviet official

statement in defense of this attack. She added that whatever, USSR did in Afghanistan

was on the invitation of the Afghan government and according to Soviet-Afghan mutual

friendship agreement so the world should not worry about it356. Some other countries

which supported the Soviet invasion included Bulgaria, East Germany and

Czechoslovakia. These countries also declared to launch full moral support to USSR as

they were socialist. On the other hand, Hungry and Poland also favored Soviet invasion

but did not disclose it publicly357.

A wave of protest had started throughout the world especially among the

Muslim countries. It was good sign for Afghan militants as well as for Pakistan who

were actively involved in the war against Soviet army. US President Jimmy Carter was

also closely watching the emerging scenario. On December 29, 1979, Carter wrote a

letter to the Soviet President in which he told him that Soviet intervention was a source

of threat to the peace and security of the world. In a statement he said that Soviet attack

354 Abbas Rashid, Afghan Crisis: An Assessment Scrutiny, 1980, 49. 355 Syed Shabbir Hussain; Abdul Hamid Alvi; Absar Hussain Rizvi, Afghanistan Under Soviet

Occupation, (Islamabad: World Affair Publication, 1981), 13. 356 Kuldip Nayar, Report on Afghanistan, (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Limited, 1981), 57. 357 Riaz, Almiyya-e-Afghanistan, 189.

95

on Afghanistan was the continuity of the efforts which USSR had been making after

the Second World War and it was for the first time that it chose a Muslim country to

spread its communist agenda. He condemned this step of the USSR and regarded it

against the international law. He also added that USSR’s intervention of Afghanistan

raised a lot of questions about the peace and security of the world358. In response to the

letter of the US President, Soviet government persuaded that they had not done anything

against the international law because they had to take this step on the request of Afghan

government which was under serious threat due to resistance of Afghan militants. He

also added that USSR had done all this according to a mutual agreement of friendship

with Afghan government. US President rejected the reply of USSR and stated that US

did not only protest Soviet action but would assist any coalition formed against Soviet

aggression359. While addressing to Congress US President stated that USSR wanted to

reach the warm water harbors to enhance its trade. He also announced to stop any kind

of negotiation with USSR regarding agreement on nuclear disarmament. He also told

the US Senate that US would not sign any kind of agreement with USSR till withdrawal

of Soviet army from the region360. US decided to boycott Moscow Olympics and

stopped any kind of foreign trade with the US and started supply of arms and

ammunition for Afghan militants through Pakistan. Moreover, US also ordered the

Soviet Consulate in America to send seventeen unwanted Soviet delegates back to

USSR361.

Islamic countries continued their efforts to pressurize USSR to come to some

agreement on the issue of Afghanistan which was proved to be helpful for the

advancement towards Geneva Accord. On January 21-22, 1981, the regular session of

OIC was held in Taif, Saudi Arabia. Head of states of 44 Islamic countries participated

in the session. The issue of Afghanistan was the most significant that was discussed in

the conference. Due to presence of some pro-Soviet member states, USSR was not

directly condemned but the need of solution for this crisis was highlighted in the final

declaration. In Mecca Declaration that was issued at the end of the conference, the quick

withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan was demanded. It was also agreed upon

358 Jang, The Daily, Rawalpindi, January 3, 1980. 359 Nawa-i-Waqt, The Daily, Islamabad, January 2, 1980. 360 Ibid. 361 Jang, The Daily, Rawalpindi, January 10, 1980.

96

that it was the moral right of the people of Afghanistan to have an opportunity to elect

a government of their own through elections362.

All these factors were responsible to pressurize USSR to think about the solution

of the Afghan crisis. Besides, on January 5, 1980, a meeting of UN Security Council

was held on the request of ten-member countries of the council. Security Council

continued debate on the issue for two days. On January 7, 1980, Bangladesh,

Philippines, Zambia, Tunisia and Jamaica presented a joint resolution in the meeting

about the Afghanistan crisis and its possible effects on the region and the politics of the

world as well. It was also mentioned that in case of some delay in the solution of this

crisis the peace and security of the South Asia and of the world at large would be under

threat. It was also demanded that the USSR should act upon the international law

formulated by the UN according to which the freedom and independence of every

nation is sacred for the other. No country had the right to attack any other sovereign

country to humiliate the basic right of the people there. In this resolution the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan was regarded as against the manifesto of the UN363. Pakistani

representative, Niaz A. Naik also addressed the meeting of the Security Council and

presented Pakistan’s stance regarding Afghanistan crisis. He stated that Pakistan totally

condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and regarded it against the fundamental

rights of the people of Afghanistan. He also requested the UN to play its role and force

USSR to withdraw its army from Afghanistan. He regarded it as the basic responsibility

of the UN Security Council to resolve the issue according to the wish of the people of

Afghanistan so that peace be prevailed in Afghanistan and the return of Afghan refugees

from Pakistan be made possible364. The representatives of China, Britain, Bangladesh,

Yugoslavia, Turkey, Zambia, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia also addressed the meeting.

They also condemned Soviet aggression and regarded it as an aggression of a world

super power against a small country. They also told the meeting that USSR wanted to

get control over the oil resources of the Middle East and to reach the warm waters of

Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. They argued that in case of any kind of delay in the

solution of the crisis a cold war might start throughout the world bringing some severe

problems to the entire world365. Every member country of the UN Security Council

362 S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan Foreign Policy, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990),

448. 363 Riaz, Almiyya-e-Afghanistan, 219. 364 M. Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1993), 192. 365 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 194.

97

favored the resolution except USSR. On January 15, 1980, in a meeting of the UN

Security council, Afghan Foreign Minister resigned from his position as a protest

against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He requested all the Muslim countries to

come forward and help their Muslim brothers. He also requested all the countries of the

world to assist Afghanistan on this occasion to make quick withdrawal of Soviet army

from Afghanistan possible. He also demanded the whole world to regard this action of

USSR against international laws and pressure must be built on it to withdraw its forces

from Afghanistan. Obviously, USSR vetoed the resolution366.

After the use of veto power by the USSR, the member countries decided to bring

the issue before UN General Assembly. So, a special meeting of UN General Assembly

was requested to discuss the issue of Afghanistan and its implications on the world

politics in detail. 12 member countries of the Security Council favored it and an

emergency meeting of the General assembly was called. On November 20, 1980, after

the detailed discussion about Afghanistan crisis a resolution was passed in favor of the

solution of the problem at the earliest. This resolution was approved by a large majority

of the member countries. Just 22 countries opposed the resolution and 12 remained

absent on the day of voting367. In this resolution, along with some peaceful solution of

Afghanistan crisis it was agreed that the Afghan refugees would be assisted in such a

way that they might live in a dignified manner. Moreover, it was demanded that UN

General Assembly should ensure the security and action regarding the resolution368.

European Economic Community (EEC) also played its role in realizing the

world to solve the problem on immediate basis. On June 30, 1980, Lord Carrington, the

British Foreign Minister and the Chairman of EEC put forward the proposal for the

peaceful settlement of Afghan crisis. The proposal was consisted of two prongs strategy

of solving the crisis. Firstly, it was demanded that efforts would be made for the

resolution of existing Afghanistan crisis by the withdrawal of Soviet army from the

region and secondly it was demanded that steps must be taken to ensure that in future

such actions would not be taken by any country against any nation. In EEC conference

five permanent members of UN Security Council were invited along with Pakistan and

366 Nawa-i-Waqt, The Daily, Islamabad, January 16, 1980. 367 Nawa-i-Waqt, The Daily, Islamabad, November 21, 1980. 368 Kamal Mattinuddin, Power Struggle in the Hindu Kush Afghanistan, (Lahore: Wajid Ali (Pvt) Ltd,

1991), 186.

98

India369. It was quite interesting that in such an important conference no representative

from Afghanistan and Iran was invited although Afghanistan was the major affected

country and Iran’s security was also threatened by the crisis370.

In the second stage of the conference it was agreed that representation from

Afghanistan was also significant to discuss about the possible solution of the crisis.

Representatives of both the militants and of People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan

(PDPA) were expected to join the conference. USSR regarded the conference as good

British initiative but it refused to accept the suggestions and proposals framed in the

conference. Moreover, the representatives of PDPA regarded the issue as the regional

issue and demanded a trilateral dialogue among the most affected countries i.e;

Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. As Iran did not have good relations with US and the

Britain and to an extent with Pakistan as well so this suggestion was rejected by Pakistan

and Iran as well371. Pakistan did not want to involve itself in any kind of dialogue

without the umbrella of UN so afterwards Pakistan officially requested the UN

Secretary General to appoint someone to supervise the dialogue between Pakistan, Iran

and Afghanistan. This demand of Pakistan was accepted by the UN Secretary General.

On February 11, 1981, while addressing NAM Conference of Foreign Ministers in New

Delhi, he appointed Mr. Perez De Cuellar as his special representative and extended

him full authority to hold trilateral dialogue between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran372.

It was quite a complicated task but Perez De Cuellar was a man of strong will. He visited

Islamabad and Kabul in April 1981 and then in July the same year and held meetings

with Pakistan and Afghan officials and presented the proposals to be discussed in the

dialogue. The proposals framed by him were almost the same as approved in the UN

resolution about Afghanistan but it had just a few modifications. Both the countries

agreed on negotiations373. Perez De Cuellar presented his three-point agenda for

negotiations including withdrawal of the Soviet army from the region, settlement of

Afghan refugees and international guarantee to avoid any kind of similar incident in

future. Pakistan insisted for the addition of another point regarding the right of self-

determination of the Afghan people. Perez De Cuellar also included this point in his

369 Riaz Ahmed, Almiyya-e-Afghanistan, 199. 370 Ibid. 371 Matiuddin, Power Struggle in Afghanistan, 199. 372 Ibid. 373 Amin Saihal and William Malley, The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, (New York: Cambridge

University Press, 1989), 14.

99

agenda as well. Afghanistan government also had no objection about the inclusion of

this point in the agenda but it requested to have direct talks with Pakistan on this issue.

Pakistan put forward a condition that it would not get involved in direct talks with

Afghan government without the participation of Iranian government. Later on, Pakistan

agreed to have direct talks with Afghanistan on some intermediate issues but in the

presence of UN representative374.

The process of proper dialogue could not be continued due to some reservations

of Pakistan and Afghanistan. But in September 1980, in 36th session of UN General

Assembly, Afghanistan presented the new version of points to initiate proper dialogue

process. It was encouraging as Afghanistan not only agreed to trilateral dialogue

between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan but also admitted to empty chair idea that

means if a country could not participate in the dialogue process in the beginning for

some reasons or the other, it might participate on later stage375. Kabul also agreed upon

the presence of UN Secretary General or his representative in the dialogue as

international guarantor. It was also mentioned by Afghanistan that the return policy for

Afghan refugees in Afghanistan would also be formulated in detail376. USSR was

closely monitoring the ongoing situation. Afghan government under Babrak Karmal

was pro-Soviet and USSR launched full support to it. For USSR it was a serious issue

that Pakistan and US were not ready to recognize this government so USSR suggested

Karmal’s government to initiate direct talks with Pakistan. But for Pakistan, it meant

indirectly recognizing Afghan government so Pakistan did not respond to this

suggestion of USSR. Pakistan was not willing to give even any kind of impression that

Pakistan was going to recognize Karmal’s government. The reason was that OIC with

the efforts of Pakistan had refused to recognize Karmal’s government and it was not

possible for Pakistan to go against the policy of OIC. To persuade Pakistan, USSR sent

its Deputy Foreign Minister to Pakistan. He also presented similar suggestion before

Pakistani government that Pakistan should start direct negotiation with Afghan

government. But Pakistan rejected this proposal and continued its stance that Pakistan

374 Jagmohan Meher, America’s Afghanistan War: The Success that Failed, (New Delhi: Indian Kalpaz

Publications, 2004), 158. 375 Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, (New York: Oxford University Press,

1995), 77. 376 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 45.

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could only negotiate with Karmal’s administration in trilateral dialogue under the

supervision of UN377.

UN Secretary General’s special representative, Perez De Cuellar continued his

efforts to bring the parties to a table for dialogue process. Meanwhile, in February 1982,

he became the Secretary General of the UN. So, he appointed Mr. Diego Cordovez as

his special representative to continue the peace process in Afghanistan. Before this,

Cordovez had been working as UN under Secretary General for Political Affairs. Soon

after assuming this position he visited Tehran, Kabul and Islamabad to get himself

acquainted with the issue in detail, the position on the ground and opinion of the affected

countries. After his visit he announced that soon a solution of the issue would be

resulted with the agreement of all the parties. He also assured that the solution would

be acceptable for every country378. The directions, on which Cordovez was working on,

were the immediate withdrawal of Soviet army from the region, non-interference and

non-intervention in Afghanistan by any foreign country, accommodation and return of

refugees in dignified manner and international guarantee to the Afghanistan for all the

above-mentioned issues. Later on, the proposal given by Pakistan was also included in

the agenda for negotiations according to which the steps would be taken to give Afghan

people the right of self-determination to choose their own government through ballot.

This point was also of much significance because the people of Afghanistan had not

been given this right since 1969 when they participated in elections for the last time.

Cordovez was of the view that the newly elected government should be free in

formulating internal economic policy and any other issues related to it must also be

dealt with by the government in an independent way considering them as their internal

matter379. At last with the efforts of Cordovez the negotiations to resolve the issues were

started. UN Secretary General announced that indirect negotiations between Pakistan

and Afghanistan at Foreign Minister level would start in Geneva on June 16-24, 1982380.

As per schedule the negotiation started in Geneva from June 16-25, 1982. First of all,

UN Secretary General met with Afghan Foreign Minister, Dost Muhammad Khan to

know the point of view of Afghan government. Then Pakistan’s Foreign Minister,

Sahibzada Yaqub Khan met UN Secretary General and presented before him the

377 Ibid., 46. 378 Hurriyat, The Daily, Karachi, April 17, 1981. 379 Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 86. 380 Mashraq, The Daily, Lahore, May 18, 1982.

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opinion of Pakistan about the issue381. UN Secretary General announced that his

meetings with the foreign ministers of both countries were very useful and it gave him

an opportunity to understand the point of views of both sides in a precise manner. At

the occasion he also announced that UN would analyze the point of views of both sides

and the next phase of negotiation would be announced soon382. UN Secretary General

presented a report to the Security Council regarding the first phase of indirect

negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan Foreign Ministers. He regarded these

negotiations as fruitful. He mentioned the purpose of these negotiations and called them

as the foundation for the peace and security of South Asia. He also mentioned the region

of South Asia as one the most important geostrategic location of the world and the peace

in this region would ultimately bring peace and security in the world as well. He also

mentioned the need of direct talks between the affected countries. He stated that the

process which had started with this initiative would soon bring peace and stability in

Afghanistan383. The main points on the agenda of negotiations were those on which

Pakistan and Afghanistan had already shown agreement. Although, the foreign

ministers of both the countries, admitted each and every point of the agenda but these

negotiations failed to draw some text about the agreement. Cordovez was sure that after

the agreement of both the countries on these points it would be easy for them to proceed

further384.

Chairman of Communist Party of USSR, Brezhnev died on November 10, 1982

after months of declined health. It was a great blow for the USSR as he was quite

committed to the Afghan war. He was immediately replaced by Yuri Andropov who

was working as Secretary General of the party. Similarly, the death of Andropov was

very significant for the world politics. Andropov was against Soviet intervention at the

time when USSR was framing its plan. On December 24, 1979, just a few days before

the intervention he opposed it and argued that this incident would invite intense world

pressure which would not be in Soviet’s interest385. In February 1983, Cordovez visited

Afghanistan and Pakistan to discuss about the next round of the peace negotiations.

After the end of his visit he announced that the next round would be held in April 1983.

381 Jasarat, The Daily, Karachi, May 19, 1982. 382Jang, The Daily, Rawalpindi, June 26, 1982. 383 Amman, The Daily, Karachi, June 29, 1982. 384 Ibid. 385 Protocol of the meeting of Politburo of Communist Party from 17 March 1979,

http://psi.ece.jhu.edu/%7Ekaplan/IRUSS/BUK/GBARC/pdfs/afgh/afg79pb.pdf, Retrieved March 5,

2017.

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UN Secretary General was willing to know the opinion of the newly formed government

of USSR under Andropov. In this regard he along with Cordovez visited Moscow and

met with Andropov. He held meetings with Andropov and other government officials

and requested the Soviet leadership to abandon their role in Afghanistan. He also told

Andropov that this step of USSR was not taken as a good step as it was against the

international law. While leaving Moscow, Perez De Cuellar was quite satisfied with his

meeting with Andropov. He declared that Andropov also showed his satisfaction on UN

role regarding the solution of the Afghan issue386. After his visit to Moscow and getting

the point of view of the Soviet government, Cordovez was sure that Moscow would

decide to leave Afghanistan after the threat of rebellion in Afghanistan would minimize.

At the end of March 1983, Cordovez drafted the text of the possible points of the agenda

of the second round of talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan387. The draft prepared

by Cordovez was consisted of five parts. The very first part was the key part of the draft

which was about complete settlement of the issue and about the fixation of dates of the

withdrawal of the Soviet army from the region and the time-frame for the return of

Afghan refugees. The second part was consisted of non-intervention and non-

interference according to the UN General Assembly Declaration of 1981. The third part

was about the nature of international guarantee and the last part was about voluntary

return of refugees to Afghanistan388.

Pakistan had some reservations about the draft. The opinion of Pakistan in this

regard was that the international guarantee must be about all the phases of settlement

and not to non-intervention or non-interference only389. In the light of Pakistan’s

reservations, Cordovez modified the draft and again visited Moscow, Kabul and

Islamabad. Soviet leadership under Andropov showed good response on the draft and

assured full support in this regard. The discussion with Andropov was a good source of

encouragement for Cordovez. USSR leadership suggested Cordovez to start the next

phase of peace dialogues in Geneva. Kabul was not agreed to some of the points of the

draft but after long discussions with government officials, Cordovez convinced them.

At the end he visited Islamabad and discussed the draft with General Zia and other

government and military officials. Although Pakistan was still having some

reservations about the draft but the government showed satisfaction on the efforts done

386 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 107. 387 Ibid., 108. 388 Ibid. 389 Ibid., 109.

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by Cordovoz regarding the solution of the crisis. It was very fruitful visit which raised

Cordovez’s level of contentment. At the end of his visit Cordovez made a statement in

a decisive way that about 95% of the agreement was in his hands at that time390.

Geneva negotiations started in April 1983. The representatives of Pakistan,

Afghanistan and USSR reached there. Pakistan and Afghanistan requested some more

time to study the draft in detail but Cordovez declined this request. Moreover, USSR

also wanted to have a slight change in the draft. It wanted to lay stress on non-

interference instead of non-intervention. Cordovez also told Ganvrilov, the Soviet

representative that Pakistan wanted for immediate withdrawal of Soviet army from the

region. On this Ganvrilov replied that first of all Pakistan should stop the policy of

interference in internal matters of Afghan government. He also assured that USSR

would withdraw its army from Afghanistan and change the Karmal’s government which

had been the main demand of Pakistan for starting direct talks on the issue391. On

objections from all the three parties, Cordovez revised the draft. During the discussions

some changes were made in the draft. Pakistan raised the demand that Afghanistan

should recognize the Durand Line which had been demarcated in 1883 by Sir

Mortimand Durand as the border between Afghanistan and the British India392.

Cordovez also admitted that Pakistan’s demand was right because Durand Line was

known as international boundary and according to UN Declaration of 1981 it was

obligated for every country to respect the international border. Afghanistan agreed to

recognize Durand Line on the condition of Pakistan’s non-interference in Afghanistan’s

internal affairs. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan replied that Pakistan was

willing to admit all the agreements reached during the negotiations. Cordovez finalized

the draft and finally it was consisted of seventeen pages393. Pakistan and Afghanistan

both agreed on this new version of the draft. Soviet representative Ganvrilov was also

satisfied and said that Geneva negotiations would accelerate with the finalization of the

draft. Cordovez sent special representative of UN General Secretary to meet Afghan

390 Jagmohan Meher, America’s Afghanistan War: The Success that Failed, (New Delhi: Indian Kalpaz

Publications, 2004), 161. 391 Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 124. 392 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 109. 393 Jagmohan, America’s Afghanistan War, 163-164.

104

refugees in Pakistan to plan of their return to their homeland. This step of Cordovez

was welcomed by Pakistan as it was also one of the points of the draft of negotiations394.

Cordovez decided to establish United Nation’s High Commission for Refugees

(UNHCR) to accelerate the return of refugees. Pakistan and other prominent countries

of the world appreciated this step and also assured their full support and assistance. But

Pakistan was of the view that before this step Karmal’s government should be removed.

There was again a difference of opinions on this demand because USSR and

Afghanistan did not favor it. Cordovez was again uncertain about the future of

negotiations after this difference395. To advance further, Cordovez visited Iran and met

with Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Vilayti and invited Iran to talks. He also

showed the draft to the Vilayti and told him that UN was willing to restore the seat of

Afghanistan in UN General Assembly. Vilayti presented the Iran’s point of view before

Cordovez that Iran did not recognize Karmal’s government and would not support

restoration of Afghanistan’s seat in UN under him. He also stressed on the immediate

return of Afghan refugees to their homeland. Vilayti also told Cordovez that Iran was

concerned about Afghan mujahideen and refugees more than that of Pakistan396.

At the end of January, USSR head of state, Andropov became seriously ill of

renal disorder due to increase of toxicity in the blood397. On February 9, 1984, he died

and was replaced by Konstantin Chernenko who was already ill398. On August 22, 1984,

Cordovez invited Pakistan and Afghanistan for the next round of Geneva negotiations.

This round of talks lasted for six days. On first four days talks about the legal status of

the documents of the draft and the remaining two days were spent on the issue of Afghan

refugees. Afghanistan once again proposed direct talks between Pakistan and

Afghanistan which was again rejected by Yaqub Khan399. Cordovez also requested

Afghanistan and USSR to give a time-frame of the withdrawal of the Soviet army from

Afghanistan. Yaqub Khan told Cordovez that Pakistan wanted that the time frame given

by USSR should be within six months but Soviet government did not respond in a

394 Bashir Ahmed Tahir and Shabbir Ahmed Khalid, A Chronology of Pakistan’s Relation With

Afghanistan, (Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies, 1989), 188. 395 Verinder Grover, Afghanistan Government and Politics, (India: Deep and Deep Publications, 2000),

182. 396 Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 168. 397 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuri_Andropov, Retrieved March 7, 2017. 398 Ibid. 399 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 132.

105

positive way. The situation was once again very complex and Cordovez had to adjourn

the talks till some future date400.

Later on, Cordovez announced that the next round of Geneva negotiations

would start in February 1985. In Pakistan, General Zia had already announced that

general elections would be held in the last week of February 1985. So, Yaqub Khan

requested Cordovez to postpone Geneva negotiations up till April 1985. Cordovez

discussed the matter with the representatives of Afghanistan and USSR but they did not

agree. Afghanistan was of the view that the country would celebrate anniversary of

Revolution in April and USSR also refused to accept Pakistan’s demand. Cordovez

visited Kabul and convinced Afghan government about the genuine problem of

Pakistan. Therefore, it was announced that the next phase of negotiations would be held

in May 1985. The history of Soviet leadership got another serious blow when

Chernenko died on March 10, 1985. Since the time he became the head of state, he had

been suffering from emphysema and other lung disorders as he was a heavy smoker.

After his death, Mikhail Gorbachev became the new Chairman of Communist Party and

head of state and was also the last person to assume this charge because of collapse of

Soviet Union a few years after401.

Cordovez again visited Pakistan, Afghanistan and USSR in May 1985, to have

firsthand knowledge of the commitments of the parties about the negotiations but he

found that every party was still standing on their already disclosed stance. Afghanistan

and USSR had still been insisting on Pakistan to start direct talks with the Afghan

government and leave interference in the internal affairs of Afghan government with

the support of Afghan mujahideen and the US. Pakistan had also been insisting on the

settlement of the issue of Afghan refugees and withdrawal of Soviet army from the

region. This situation again forced Cordovez to start the next round of negotiations with

a little delay402.

Consequently, the next round of Geneva negotiations held on June 10, 1985.

This round was quite successful because Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to resolve

many mutual issues including the issue of Durand Line, return of Afghan refugees and

non-interference in internal affairs of other countries. The issue of withdrawal of Soviet

400 Ibid., 133. 401 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Konstantin_Chernenko, Retrieved March 7, 2017. 402 Barnet R. Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, (London: Vale University, 1995), 71.

106

army was not included in the agenda and it was put aside to be discussed in later phase.

After his return to Pakistan, Yaqub Khan regarded the Geneva negotiations quite result

oriented due to agreements of Pakistan and Afghan government on certain issues. He

also stated that the Soviet representative also disclosed that Gorbachev was willing to

withdraw Soviet army from the region403. He also added that if all the four sections of

the negotiations would reach to some final conclusion then there would be no hesitation

to start direct talks with other parties. The BBC highlighted it in its news that for the

first time during the entire period of negotiation Pakistan agreed to start direct

negotiations. But Pakistani government officially denied it404. Later on, when Cordovez

contacted Yaqub Khan about direct talks with Afghan government, he replied that

Pakistan would agree to start direct talks only after reasonable progress on all the issues

contained in the agenda for negotiations405. On August 27, 1985, Cordovez started the

fifth round of Geneva negotiations but this time he had to face a lot of opposition from

each party. First two days passed in convincing Pakistan and Afghanistan to show some

kind of flexibility regarding direct talks but both the parties did not leave their stance.

Afghanistan Foreign Minister, Dost Muhammad, told Cordovez that Afghanistan would

not continue indirect talks with Pakistan any more. Later on he agreed to negotiate only

on the role of US as international guarantor in the issue406. Dost Muhammad requested

Cordovez to hold a secret meeting with Yaqub Khan but he did not agree. Moreover,

the response of USSR was also strange for Cordovez as USSR did not agree to give a

time specification for withdrawal of its army. These circumstances brought a kind of

deadlock in the process of negotiations407. Although, Cordovez was not happy with the

situation but he continued his struggle. He met USSR officials and tried to persuade

them to remove Karmal so that Pakistan might start direct talks with Afghan

government which was badly needed to accelerate the negotiation process. He told them

that Karmal’s government was supported by the USSR as he was the person who invited

Soviet army for intervention. USSR denied its influence on Karmal’s administration

and regarded both General Zia and Karmal as dictators. Moreover, Soviet leaders

claimed that Afghan issue was a mutual issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan and

they were to solve the issue by bilateral dialogue. They added that USSR would not

403 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 143. 404 Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 214. 405 Jagmohan, America’s Afghanistan War, 165. 406 Matinuddin, Power Struggle in Hindukush, 198. 407 Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 217.

107

participate in the talks at this point but would join it when negotiation about withdrawal

of Soviet army would be discussed408.

Afghanistan crisis had become the most significant issue of the world up to the

end of 1985. The effective military opposition of Afghan mujahideen managed to

continue for six long years which was made possible only by the assistance of Pakistan

and the US. Soviet army had not only become tired of this long war but also lost its

worth within USSR as well. It was the binding force that had been holding different

states under Soviet Union but when it failed to destroy the military resistance of Afghan

mujahideen then people within USSR started questioning about the worth of Soviet

military. For this reason, Soviet government under Gorbachev had started to think of

some dignified way of Soviet withdrawal from the region. USSR started thinking that

Babrak Karmal was a source of hurdle in their way as he was willing to remain the

political head of Afghanistan. For this reason, he was continuously trying to delay the

Geneva dialogue process for some reasons. Gorbachev made a statement that Karmal

was the main factor responsible for the cause of delay in the resolution of Afghan crisis

as he wanted to remain in power with the help of USSR409. The Soviet leadership had

started thinking that without leaving current approach in Afghanistan; USSR would

have to fight another 20 to 30 years which would bring a huge internal damage to

USSR410. Karmal also realized that he was no more acceptable for Soviet administration

so he started cementing his support within his country especially in PDPA. He also

approached some USSR officials and assured them his unconditional support. But

despite Karmal’s efforts, USSR had started thinking about the way to remove Karmal.

It was also better known to USSR that Karmal had support within his country and any

miscalculated effort by the USSR would result in a serious blow to the Soviet policy.

There were two main suggestions which were being discussed within USSR in this

regard. The first suggestion was that USSR had brought Karmal to power so Gorbachev

should use his influence and replace Karmal with Najibullah. Najib had been considered

as more pro-communist than Karmal. But the problem was that the Soviet

administration was not quite sure about the intensity of reaction that might come from

within Afghanistan. The second suggestion was that USSR should only use its influence

by keeping itself behind the curtain and Karmal should be forced to resign himself for

408 B.R. Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, (London: Vale University Press, 1995), 42. 409 Hassan Kakar, Mohammad Kakar, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–

1982, (California: University of California Press, 1997), 74. 410 Ibid., 75.

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some kind of personal reasons. Finally, it was decided that USSR would extend full

support to Najib in removing Karmal from the government. In May 1986, Najib

removed Karmal and send him to exile to Moscow. But Najib could not win the

sympathies of the Karmal’s supporters within Afghan government so he was called

back to Afghanistan by Najib. This step of Najib was to win the support of the people

but Karmal started some anti-Najib action with the help of his supporters. Abdul

Rasheed Dostam was also a supporter of Karmal during his rule. Later on, Karmal

joined Dostum in anti-Najib activities. Removal of Karmal had opened new ways for

Geneva negotiations. Cordovez was contented with the changed scenario within

Afghanistan. He resumed the process of negotiations with full zeal and zest and got full

support from Pakistan, Afghanistan, USSR and the US.

As the USSR had decided to attack Afghanistan to achieve some political and

economic motives but the developments made later on forced USSR to withdraw its

army from the region. The policies made by the USSR to create its influence were quite

fruitful before 1979 but his action of invading Afghanistan was not welcomed by

Afghan people and the world as well. The effective military resistance of Afghan

militants was also one of the major factors that pushed USSR to the wall. Moreover,

the role played by the UN was also of great significance. Perez De Cuellar started peace

process effectively and later on his successor Cordovez did a marvelous job in

convincing Pakistan, Afghanistan and the USSR to find some solution of the crisis. At

some points it was thought that Cordovez would lose hope and would decide to stop his

efforts but he made the Geneva Accords possible through his untiring efforts. It was

due to his efforts that the parties which were having a lot of differences among each

other were brought to an agreement.

3.2. Pakistan & US Role in Geneva Accords:

Pakistan and US also played a significant role to make the Geneva Accords

possible. Pakistan was directly affected by the Afghan crisis as it was not in Pakistan’s

favor to have a communist country sitting right at the western border. That was the

reason, Pakistan had to play role not only to settle the issue but also to protect its

boundary. Pakistan’s role had two dimensions i.e. to pressurize USSR by offering its

army full resistance through Afghan militant groups and to engage the Soviet and

Afghan procommunist leadership on table talks. In both dimensions Pakistan played a

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vital role. The position of the US was rather different from Pakistan because US did not

have any kind of security threat in case of the victory of USSR but the main concern

for the US was to protect its anti-communist allies which was not possible without the

defeat of USSR. To launch any kind of opposition to Soviet army US had to depend on

Pakistan so it extended full moral, economic and military support to the Afghan

mujahideen through Pakistan. On the other hand, US did not participate in any kind of

negotiation directly but it continued its backdoor diplomacy and joined negotiation in

the last phase as international guarantor. Besides UN, the role of Pakistan and the US

also made Geneva Accords possible.

Brezhnev was the chief architect of the Soviet plan in Afghanistan but he could

not get success in weeks as he had been expected before intervention. The main reason

was strong military resistance by the Afghan militants supported by Pakistan. After the

death of Brezhnev, Andropov became the new head of USSR. He was a former KGB

Chief and was not in favor of Soviet intervention of Afghanistan. General Zia visited

Moscow in November 1981 to attend the funeral of Brezhnev. During his visit he met

with Andropov. After his meeting with Andropov, General Zia was satisfied because of

the flexibility shown by Andropov on the issue and his intention to find a solution of

the crisis. He also stated that USSR wanted to improve its relations with Pakistan411.

Later on, in December 1982, General Zia visited US to take them in confidence about

his meeting with Andropov. On December 31, 1982, a leading Soviet newspaper Tass

claimed that USSR was willing to resolve Afghanistan crisis and for this reason they

were in search of some responsible leadership in Afghanistan. Moreover, USSR

government had no hesitation in having direct negotiations with Pakistan to resolve the

issue412. This was a source of satisfaction for US and Pakistan. Pakistani Foreign

Minister, Yaqub Khan paid a special visit to US to discuss US policy regarding the role

of international guarantor to solve Afghan crisis. US government replied Yaqub Khan

that of their willingness to play the said role but only after having complete draft of the

negotiation process. US Secretary of State also visited Pakistan in 1983 and stressed the

need for immediate resolution of the crisis through dialogue. He also visited Afghan

refugee camps in Pakistan and assured them of US support. He also declared that US

Congress had approved a new aid package for the refugees413. To put a pressure on the

411 Afghanistan: Pakistan, Present and Future, (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 1987), 499. 412 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 109. 413 Bashir Ahmed Tahir, A Chronology of Pakistan Relations With Afghanistan Relations, (Islamabad:

National Institute of Pakistan Studies, 1989), 178-179.

110

USSR, Pakistan also moved a resolution in UN General Assembly with the help of US

in November 1983. The delegations of about seventy countries participated actively in

the session. Pakistan’s delegation was led by Sardar Shahnawaz who remained

Pakistan’s Chief delegate in the UN from 1982 to 1989. Voting was held for the

resolution and there were 116 votes in favor of the resolution, 20 were against and 17

countries remained absent. This was a great recognition of Pakistan’s policy vis-à-vis

Afghanistan issue. During the same session, US Under Secretary of State, Lawrence

Eagleburger also met with Cordovez and told him that there would be a great

breakthrough vis-à-vis regarding Afghan crisis in near future because he had been

noticing some flexibility in the policy of USSR, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US

government414. Although at that time Cordovez was not willing to believe in his

statement but by looking at the later developments it seemed that Eagleburger’s analysis

was true. On April 8, 1984, Cordovez visited Pakistan and met with General Zia to

request him for adopting a new approach for the resolution of the crisis. General Zia

was a little bit aggressive at that time and replied Cordovez that Pakistan had already

been trying to resolve the issue but the motives of USSR were not clear in this regard.

He told him that USSR was trying to make the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan

afraid of communism and ultimately it was Soviet agenda to capture whole of South

Asia. General Zia also called USSR a bully who wanted to push Pakistan to a position

where it would be in a state of conflict with every other nation in the region and as a

result to make Pakistan would be totally isolated415. Cordovez also requested General

Zia to recognize Karmal’s government so that direct talks would start between Pakistan

and Afghanistan. He also quoted the example that Pakistan had already recognized

procommunist governments of Daud and Tarakai. General Zia replied that Pakistan

recognized their governments because they had not entered Afghanistan sitting on

Soviet tanks. General Zia suggested Cordovez that he wanted to get Karmal’s

government replaced by former King Zahir Shah. He supported his idea with argument

that Pashtuns, Tajiks and other communities within Afghanistan regard him and in this

way Pakistan and Iran would also have no hesitation in direct talks with his

government416.

414 Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 142. 415 Ibid., 168. 416 Bashir, A Chronology of Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan, 204.

111

In the middle of the 1984, the situation in Afghanistan became worse when

USSR started rapid army operation in Afghanistan. Soviet leaders were of the view that

instead of showing a new strategy on negotiation table it was better to display it on

ground. It was a great blow to the efforts made by the UN to resolve the issue. Both

Cordovez and Perez de Culler arrived Moscow on July 11, 1984. They realized that

Chernenko was an old and tired man, so they did not meet him. Instead they met with

the Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko, the Foreign Minister of Soviet Union, who had been

serving in the same capacity since 1957. He was an influential personality in Soviet

politics. Gromyko blamed US government for creating all the problems that the world

had been facing since decades. He also blamed Pakistan that it did not act upon the non-

interference. He proposed that the withdrawal of Soviet army from Afghanistan was

linked with end of interference from Pakistan’s side417.

Pakistan and the US proposed to bring another resolution in UN General

Assembly in its annual session of November 1984. This time there were 119 votes in

favor of the resolution, 20 were against and 14 countries remained absent. Pakistan and

the US blamed USSR for violating human rights in Afghanistan by torturing the Afghan

in an inhuman manner. UN took notice of it and established a commission to observe

human rights violation in Afghanistan418. In March 1983, General Zia went to Moscow

to attend the funeral of Chernenko and after the funeral ceremony he had long meeting

of about fifty minutes with Soviet leaders about the UN efforts for the resolution of

Afghan crisis. On his return to Islamabad, General Zia told the press that Soviet

leadership assured him of their cooperation with regard to UN efforts for the resolution

of the issue. He also told them that Soviet officials were also in favor of indirect talks

between Pakistan and Afghanistan419.

Cordovez continued his efforts to hold the next round of the negotiations. In this

regard he met with officials of Pakistan, Afghanistan, US and USSR. During his

meeting with USSR representative, Safronchuck, he told him that Pakistan and US were

ready to show flexibility in their already described stance but only after some assurances

from USSR and Afghan government regarding the withdrawal of Soviet army from

Afghanistan. US also demanded to invite Afghan mujahideen to the negotiations

because they were the main affected party of the whole incident. In a statement, US

Congress declared that without the participation of Afghan mujahideen, US would not

417 Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, 63. 418 Ibid. 419 Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 182.

112

support the process of negotiations420. In September 1985, US President Reagan

delivered a speech on the occasion of fortieth anniversary celebrations of UN General

Assembly. In his speech he suggested a three-prong peace process in the world. Firstly,

he suggested proposals for the resolution of regional conflicts, secondly, he insisted that

talks must be held between the US and USSR to make a joint strategy for bringing peace

throughout the world and thirdly he invited all the countries of the world to make efforts

to enhance the economy of every member of the comity of nations by respecting human

rights. At the end Reagan declared that US would extend full moral and material support

to Afghan people in their historic struggle for liberty and they were not alone in

freedom-fighting. He also mentioned that US also extended its moral support to the

people who had been losing their lives for freedom in other regions of the world

including Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua421.

In the light of his speech in General Assembly Reagan met with Gorbachev on

November 19 and 20, 1985 in Geneva in the first East-West Summit. The meetings

between them lasted for more than fifteen hours. These meetings were sometimes

friendly and sometimes unfriendly. But, this summit helped both the super powers to

agree on establishing better relationships. The newspapers all over the world

highlighted those meetings with different points of view. Reagan convinced Gorbachev

to look for a diplomatic solution of the Afghan crisis. But Gorbachev blamed that US,

Pakistan and China were the countries responsible for bringing the Afghan issue to this

point where its solution was not an easy task422. US was not willing to play the role as

an international guarantor for Afghanistan crisis and had been denying the request of

Cordovez. But when Cordovez again contacted US administration a few weeks after the

Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, US agreed to play its role423.

Cordovez visited US on January 14, 1986 and met with Michael H. Armacost,

US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, in his office to negotiate about further

proceedings of Geneva negotiations. Cordovez discussed with Armacost the

development made in correct direction and the problems which he had been facing in

this regard. Armacost assured him that US would extend its full support in reaching to

a solution agreeable to all the related countries. After having a fruitful meeting with

420 Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History, (London: Routledge Curzon Press, 2001), 169. 421 Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 220. 422 Ibid. 423 M.S. Deora and R. Grover, Documents on Pakistan and International Conflicts, Vol, 19, Part-I,

(India: Anmol Publications, 19913), 284.

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Armacost, Cordovez went to Moscow on February 9, 1986. He met with Georgy

Markovich Kornienko, the Deputy Foreign Minister of USSR and discussed the

instrument on guarantees and told him about US willingness to act as international

guarantor424.

He also persuaded Kornienko to accept the instrument of international guarantor

but in reply he told him that it was not a major issue. He showed his concerns about

non-participation of Iran in the negotiations. Cordovez told him that Iran gave him a

written agreement during his recent visit to Tehran that as soon as USSR would

announce the date of the withdrawal of its army, Iran would participate in the

negotiations. Later on, Cordovez also met with Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard

Ambrosiyevich Shevardnadze who also showed Soviet intention to solve the issue as

soon as possible. He also told Cordovez that Afghan crisis had two aspects one was

internal and the other was external and the world might help Afghanistan to resolve

external issues but Soviet government would be pleased if Afghanistan would resolve

its internal crisis. After his meetings with high officials of the two super powers

Cordovez declared that both USSR and US were willing to resolve the crisis on

immediate basis425.

Gorbachev while addressing to Communist Party’s Congress on February 25,

1986, made a speech which was welcomed by the world. In his speech he announced

that USSR wanted to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan in the nearest future. He

also said that the schedule of the withdrawal would be prepared with the Afghan

government as soon as Geneva negotiations would reach to some political settlement.

This speech was published in most of the newspapers around the world. The writer and

thinkers were pleased with this speech and regarded it a good step on behalf of USSR

regarding the resolution of Afghan crisis. This speech was a great breakthrough for

Cordovez so he immediately visited Islamabad and Kabul to discuss the matter with the

respective governments. At the end of his fruitful visit Cordovez announced that there

would be only one more round of negotiation which would start in near future426.

Cordovez prepared the final draft of Geneva negotiations after the discussion

from the government officials of Pakistan, USSR and Afghanistan. His new draft was

prepared on the basis of his newly framed principles which were according to the UN

charter. But the problem occurred on the schedule of the withdrawal of Soviet army.

424 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2009), 139. 425 Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, 77. 426 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot,(Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1993), 147.

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Soviet and Afghan government agreed on the proposal that the withdrawal of Soviet

army from the region would be on gradual basis and first of all one-third of the Soviet

army would be withdrawn. Pakistan did not agree this proposal because Pakistan

wanted the withdrawal in just one phase and within the period of thirty days. But

Cordovez rejected this proposal as well and replied Yaqub Khan that it was not possible

for the USSR to withdraw army on immediate basis as it would take some time. Still

the part seven of the final draft was not completed which was regarding the monitoring

of the withdrawal of Soviet army. Armacost told Cordovez that US was of the view that

the settlement should include necessary arrangement for this purpose427. Yaqub Khan

wanted that monitoring must be done by the UN or a third party instead of a commission

comprising of US, USSR, Afghan and Pakistani representatives428. Pakistan and

Afghanistan governments were also having difference of opinion about the withdrawal

of troops and monitoring issue. Afghanistan was not in favor of complete monitoring

by the UN or a third country but wanted to have representations of Pakistan and

Afghanistan in the monitoring team as well. Moreover, Afghan Foreign Minister

proposed a two-phase withdrawal of Soviet army to be completed in four years which

was not acceptable to Pakistan at any cost429. Yaqub Khan told Cordovez that

Afghanistan wanted to crush the negotiations by making such demands which were not

acceptable to Pakistan. Cordovez met with Dost to convince him that Pakistan wanted

the Soviet withdrawal within one-month time and his four-year scheme would not be

acceptable to Pakistan. Dost agreed to reduce the time frame by six months and

Cordovez conveyed it to Yaqub Khan430. Cordovez had very confusing signals from all

sides when the next round of Geneva negotiation was to start in August. Cordovez was

informed a depressing news from Moscow that the Soviet government had been facing

some tough situation by the increasing difficulties in Kabul as well as increasing tension

with Soviet army on the issue of withdrawal. US had been closely watching the situation

and came to know that Soviet government had been feeling desperation in Afghanistan

and wanted to leave Afghanistan. The time was crucial. British Prime Minister, Margret

Thatcher also talked to Gorbachev and advised him to settle the crisis as soon as

possible and to give the time-frame of the withdrawal of Soviet army from Afghan

territory. Cordovez received same kind of reports from Pakistan where internal political

427 Ibid., 148. 428 Ibid., 156. 429 Jagmohan, America’s Afghanistan War, 166. 430 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 151.

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scenario had changed to a great extent by the return of Benazir Bhutto from exile who

was the daughter of late Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was hanged by Zia’s government. She

received a very warm welcome by the people of Pakistan which was alarming for the

government of General Zia. It was reported to Cordovez that General Zia would

concentrate on internal politics and would try to linger on Afghan crisis because early

solution to Afghan crisis would not be in General Zia’s favor at that time. Just before a

few days of the next round of negotiations, on July 31, 1986, Gorbachev announced in

a policy statement that six regiments of Soviet army would be withdrawn from

Afghanistan on immediate basis431.

Next round of negotiations started in Geneva in August 1986 but there was still

confusion about the time-frame for withdrawal. Afghan Foreign Minister, Dost

Muhammad proposed that one-third of Soviet army would leave the region within one

year and remaining two-third would be withdrawn in next two years’ time. But

Cordovez told him that this time-frame was not suitable and was not acceptable to

Pakistan and US as well432.

Later on, Cordovez persuaded Soviet government to give one-year time-frame

for complete withdrawal. US regarded this time-frame as acceptable for the US but

Yaqub Khan insisted on four months’ time. Cordovez worked for several days to

prepare a detailed proposal on the issue of monitoring. In his proposal he suggested that

a representative of the UN Secretary General would act as a political advisor throughout

the process of settlement. A senior military officer of NATO would head two small

units, one would be located in Afghanistan and the other in Pakistan. The Security

Council would also assist in settlement of the problem. But USSR rejected the

appointment of a NATO officer. Cordovez accepted this demand and told the US to

appoint the head from some other country acceptable for all such as an Austrian, a Swiss

or from Finland. US told Cordovez to appoint the said military head from Finland. On

October 11, 1986, Reagan and Gorbachev had a meeting in Reykjavik, the capital of

Iceland to discuss the issue of arms control but no positive outcome was seen and the

meeting ended in a complete failure433.

Cordovez met with the representative of the European Community in New York

and discussed with him the settlement then Cordovez visited Islamabad and discussed

431 Matinuddin, Power Struggle in Hindukush, 198. 432 Riaz, Untying the Afghan Knot, 150. 433 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, (New York:

Harpercollin Publishers, 1987), 237.

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the settlement of the issue. Zia accepted the Cordovez formula of settlement of

withdrawal. Later on, Cordovez met with Yaqub Khan and Dost Muhammad and

presented his detailed scheme of settlement. Both the foreign ministers approved his

scheme and also gave their formal consent to a comprehensive memorandum of

understanding on the issue of monitoring434.

Meanwhile, Gorbachev visited India and gave a statement that the day was not

far off when the issue of Afghanistan would resolve and USSR would withdraw its

troops from Afghanistan. Cordovez was much pleased with his statement and he

accelerated his efforts for the resolution of the crisis. In this connection, he also visited

Tehran to meet Foreign Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister and talked about the

Afghan settlement. Both of them supported Cordovez but they had some reservations

about binging former king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, back to rule. He also visited

Islamabad and New York and during this trip Cordovez got the news of the replacement

of Dost, the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan by Abdul Wakil. Cordovez did not think

it a good move and stated that this incident might damage Geneva negotiations435. On

January 1, 1987, Najibullah announced ceasefire on behalf of Afghan and Soviet troops

but that was not accepted by mujahideen and they continued fighting436. Najibullah

announced that if mujahideen would not accept ceasefire then Afghan government

would not start direct negotiation with them. Mujahideen replied that Najibullah was a

puppet in the hands of USSR and they did not want to negotiate with his government.

They also added that they would rather prefer to have direct talks with Soviet

government. Armacost also visited Islamabad and met with government officials and at

the end of his visit he announced that Pakistan had shown flexibility on the time

duration of withdrawal of Soviet troops and agreed to complete withdrawal in one and

half year instead of four months. He also stated that ceasefire was not included in

Geneva agreement and Afghan should not impose the condition of acceptance of

ceasefire for direct negotiation437.

Pakistan was under internal political pressure because riots had been started in

Karachi protesting against the involvement of Afghan refugees in bringing heroine and

weapons to Karachi through smuggling. At the same time some bad news came from

434 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 157. 435 Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 541. 436 William Zartman, Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, (Washington: Brooking

Institution Press, 1997), 244. 437 Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, 80.

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Pakistan’s border with India where India deployed huge army on Pakistan’s borders

followed by aggressive statements. War hysteria had been created by India and it

seemed that India wanted to get advantage of Pakistan’s situation. Pakistan’s cricket

team was playing in India and Zia went to India to watch the cricket match. In his visit

he met with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The war like situation had been

dissolved after this visit. This clever step of General Zia was famously known as

“cricket diplomacy”438. On January 17, 1987 the seven main resistance groups of

mujahideen rejected the formal terms of the ceasefire and pledged to fight until a

complete withdrawal of Soviet troops. Pakistan and US also demanded the immediate

announcement from Soviet government about the withdrawal of troops from

Afghanistan and regarded it a basic requirement for the resolution of the crisis439. USSR

informed Cordovez that Pakistan’s growing relations with China were not welcomed

by USSR and Pakistan should immediately cease these relations. He also told him that

USSR wanted Pakistan’s assistance in withdrawing its army and to resolve the issue but

Pakistan had been speaking in US tone of humiliating Soviet Union. He was pointing

towards Yaqub Khan’s statement in which he said that Pakistan wanted to hit the Soviet

Union head on. Cordovez had the chance to meet Yaqub Khan and representatives of

Afghan militants in the fifth meeting of OIC in January 1987 and put before Yaqub

Khan the demands of USSR but he refused to cease Pakistan’s relations with China440.

The next round of negotiation started on February 25, 1987. Cordovez met with

new Afghan Foreign Minister, Wakil for the first time. Wakil raised a number of points

including the boarder issue and the participation of Iran in the negotiation. Yaqub Khan

also reached Geneva to join talks. On his way, he had made a stopover in Moscow. He

met with Soviet leaders. After reaching Geneva he came to know about Wakil’s opinion

of giving twenty-two months-time for the withdrawal of Soviet army. Yaqub Khan told

Cordovez that neither Afghanistan nor USSR were willing to resolve the issue so he

decided to leave Geneva without talks. Cordovez convinced Wakil to reduce the time-

frame and it was reduced to eighteen months. Yaqub Khan showed reservations on this

time-frame as well and told Cordovez that Pakistan had been facing severe internal

political and security issues due to a large number of Afghan refugees and for this

reason Pakistan had been insisting on immediate withdrawal441.

438 https://www.dawn.com/news/1219397, Retrieved March 13, 2017. 439 Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan’s Security Under Zia, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1991), 66. 440 Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 278. 441 Rais, War Without Winners, 125.

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Cordovez was dissatisfied with this round of negotiations as this was without

any reasonable progress probably due to new Foreign Minister of Afghanistan.

Cordovez visited Islamabad and Kabul and told them that next round of negotiations

would start in May 1987 but both the countries rejected his proposal. Later on, Perez

De Cuellar visited Moscow and had a fruitful meeting with Gorbachev. At the end of

meeting Gorbachev declared that USSR would not mind if a non-pro-Soviet

government would be established in Kabul with mutual agreement to resolve the issue.

He also proposed Cordovez to start the next round of negotiations in September 1987442.

Meanwhile, Yaqub Khan resigned from his office and was replaced by Zain Noorani.

When Noorani went to New York in August 1987, he met with Cordovez. In a very

long meeting, Cordovez told him about his negotiations with Afghan mujahideen. He

also discussed with Noorani all the details about all aspects of the issue. Cordovez

drafted a new proposal for a UN sponsored meeting with representatives of all the

political entities of Afghanistan443.

Wakil informed Cordovez that Afghan government wanted to participate in next

round of Geneva negotiations in late August or in early September. Cordovez informed

Noorani about Afghan proposal. Noorani, after the approval from the government of

Pakistan told Cordovez to hold talks between 7 to 9 September, 1987. After the

acceptance of these dates, Cordovez announced that the next round of negotiations

would be held on 7 to 9 September 1987. But the problem of time-frame for the

withdrawal of Soviet troops was still a major issue on which Pakistan and Afghan

governments were not agreed. Afghanistan had been continuously insisting on sixteen

months’ time but Noorani told Cordovez that Afghanistan was not serious in reaching

to some conclusion. He also told him to consider that Pakistan had been facing much

internal problem due to Afghan issue so Soviet army must withdraw not later than seven

months’ time444. Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Eduard Ambrosiyevich

Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State, George P. Shultz had a meeting in Washington

soon after the end of this round of Geneva negotiations. Both the leaders decided to

settle the Afghan conflict till the end of 1987. Later on, Shevardnadze also met with

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister at the occasion of UN General Assembly annual session.

He also assured that USSR wanted to settle the issue immediately. Pakistan brought the

resolution regarding Afghanistan crisis. The resolution was approved by taking 123

442 Wirsing, Pakistan’s Security Under Zia, 66. 443 Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, 81. 444 Ibid., 82.

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votes in favor and just 19 against. 11 countries absented themselves. Meanwhile, a large

number of protestants marched out near UN building. These people were consisted of

Afghans and the Americans. They were holding the banners which read as “Cordovez

should not ignore the right of self-determination of Afghan people445.

Gorbachev decided to attend the Washington Summit where there was a

widespread agenda including old cold war, the reunification of Germany, the

dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the collapse of the communist system. But there

was no visible success regarding already prescribed agenda but just the Intermediate-

Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) was signed on December 8, 1987, between

US and USSR. This treaty was on the elimination of their intermediate-range and

shorter-range missiles. There was no progress made on the resolution of regional

conflicts including Afghanistan crisis. But a source of satisfaction was the statement of

Gorbachev in which he assured that Soviet government was willing to pursue the

resolution process of Afghanistan issue in accordance with the Cordovez scheme. He

also gave the assurance that Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the region within

twelve months’ time or less than that446. Cordovez visited Moscow and met with the

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Yuli Mikhailovich Vorontsov. Cordovez was told by

Vorontsov that USSR was firm in its stance to solve Afghan crisis immediately. He also

told that Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan met with Pakistan’s Prime Minister,

Muhammad Khan Junejo and both of them agreed to solve the issue as soon as possible.

Soviet leaders told Cordovez that they wanted two stage procedures for the settlement.

First, they wanted the reconciliation between all the parties including Afghan

mujahideen and the second was to move forward in the light of reconciliation. They

also demanded that after the withdrawal special efforts must be made for peace keeping

in Afghanistan and Iran should also participate in the negotiations as these negotiations

were approaching its final phase. Cordovez satisfied them about Iran’s participation in

the negotiations at any time before the start of last phase of negotiations. For peace

keeping, Cordovez assured that UN peace keeping would look over the peace and

security of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Cordovez also went to

Pakistan and had a meeting with General Zia. He was told by General Zia that Pakistan

did not only want the withdrawal of Soviet troops but also wished to establish a political

set up in Afghanistan to avoid chances of chaos after the withdrawal of Soviet troops447.

445 Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan, (London: I.B Tauris, 2004), 202. 446 Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, 84. 447 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 255.

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In the beginning of 1988 both US and USSR accelerated their efforts to reach

the solution of Afghanistan crisis. In this regard Armacost visited Islamabad and met

with the leadership of Pakistan and the mujahideen. At the end of his visit, Armacost

declared it a useful visit. He stated that this visit would help in strengthening the ties

between Pakistan and the US and hoped that Pakistan-US relations would reach to its

peak after the final settlement of the issue448. USSR sent Shevardnadze to Kabul to

discuss about the emerging situation in Afghanistan. He met with Najibullah and told

him that USSR would continue assisting his government and soon Soviet troops would

leave Afghanistan. He also told Najibullah to propose a shorter time frame for

withdrawal in the next round of Geneva negotiations. Cordovez also visited Kabul and

met with Wakil to know his intentions about the next phase of the negotiations. Wakil

regarded it as the last phase of negotiation as there was nothing to be discussed in this

round. Cordovez told him that the time-frame for the withdrawal of Soviet troops was

still not fixed. Later on, he met with Wakil and Najibullah to convince them to give a

shorter time-frame as demanded by Pakistan but after a long discussion they did not

give a reasonable response. General Zia was also conscious about the attitude of Afghan

government as it was not giving a proper time frame for the withdrawal. In this regard

he gave an anti-Afghan statement in newspaper in which he stated that Afghan militants

should be given a role in the formation of new government after Soviet Union449.

Cordovez immediately visited Pakistan to discuss with the new situation which

was quite threatening for Geneva negotiations after this statement. General Zia told him

that in the interview given to Washington Post, he just discussed the future plan of the

government formation after Soviet withdrawal in which he thought that Afghan

militants must also play their role. This statement of General Zia persuaded Cordovez

to include the representatives of mujahideen and Afghan refugees in the future interim

government of Afghanistan so he also decided to meet mujahideen leaders. Cordovez

also met with General Zia and he told him that he wanted to plan a common strategy

for the conclusion of the settlement450.

General Zia assured Cordovez that the resistance leaders would be ready for a

meeting very soon and emphasized him not to push them too hard to get the immediate

outcome of the discussion. The only importance must be given to their participation in

the negotiation and not to the result. Cordovez went to Kabul where he found that

448 Ibid., 246. 449 Wirsing, Pakistan’s Security Under Zia, 67. 450 Ibid.

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Afghan government was not happy at General Zia’s interview to the Washington Post.

They also suggested that the next round of negotiations should be held in February

1988. When Cordovez requested Afghan leadership to give a ten-month time-frame for

withdrawal of Soviet troops they did not reply properly and told him that to know about

Afghan opinion in this regard he must wait till the next round of Geneva negotiation.

But Cordovez insisted that it was the principal agenda of Geneva negotiations and

Afghanistan must consider it. Later on, after discussion with Soviet leadership

Afghanistan accepted a shorter time-frame for withdrawal of Soviet troops451.

On February, 5, 1988, Cordovez visited Peshawar to meet the representative of

mujahideen. He met with Younas Khalis, who was the Head of Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis

Group). Khalis told him that the draft of Geneva negotiations was discussed within the

meeting of mujahideen leaders and it was jointly decided that some of its points must

be amended which were considered offensive for the resistance movement. Cordovez

told him that he had no authority to amend the draft without discussing with other

parties. He promised that he would first discuss it with representatives of Pakistan,

Afghanistan and USSR452.

Khalis also stated that he was doubtful about the commitment of the USSR

because on one hand it had talks for reconciliation and on the other it was consolidating

its military position in the region. Moreover, he told Cordovez that the new government

which would be formed after the withdrawal of Soviet troops must be worthy to reach

a compromise between mujahideen and the Muslims of other communities and must

work in rebuilding the country again as it had been ravaged by the Soviet. Cordovez

assured him that they had been working in the same direction453.

Cordovez informed General Zia about his discussion with Khalis and reached

Kabul on February 7, 1988. He met with Najibullah and told him that next round of

negotiations would be held in February but if USSR and Afghanistan were not ready to

give time-frame of less than a year then there would not be any negotiation. Najibullah

handed over a document to Cordovez containing the text of an announcement of

Gorbachev made in Moscow. According to the text USSR announced that their

government along with the government of Afghanistan had agreed to set a specific date

for the start of withdrawal of Soviet army on May, 15, 1988 and the whole process

451 Riaz Khan, Untying Afghan Knot, 249. 452 Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, 87. 453 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 253.

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would be completed within ten months454. Cordovez thanked Najibullah and said that a

round of negotiation to start immediately. Cordovez told Pakistan government about

the announcement of Gorbachev and later on announced that the next round of Geneva

negotiations would start on March 2, 1988. Cordovez and his team remained busy

throughout February in making all the necessary preparations for the next round of

negotiations. They worked out all the minute details about the foreseen circumstances

to be created after the completion of negotiation process. The most significant job done

by them was about the proposed monitoring arrangement. Senior military officials from

Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Fiji, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal, Poland, and Sweden

were selected for the operation. General Rauli Helminen of Finland was designated as

head of the monitoring team. Along with this military arrangement there was also a

small team of civilian staff for their assistance. It was also included that USSR would

be bound to withdraw from Afghanistan within the specified time and UN monitoring

was given the authority to make it possible455.

The eleventh round of negotiations started in Geneva on March 2, 1988.

Pakistan was having some pressure from mujahideen side for the establishment of a

government in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Soviet and that government must

constitute of all the stake holders of Afghanistan including refugees and the mujahideen.

Soviet representative argued that USSR would not tolerate any effort to delay in the

negotiations. He requested Cordovez to take necessary measures to finalize the

agreement because the formation of a government was not on the agenda of Geneva

negotiations. He regarded it just an effort to delay the diplomatic process. Cordovez

told him that he himself had also visited Islamabad and met with mujahideen leaders

and they also showed their concern regarding the formation of government in

Afghanistan. He added that Pakistan had been facing some pressure from mujahideen

leaders456.

Noorani returned to Pakistan on March 4, 1988 for attending a meeting between

the government and opposition parties. Taking the opportunity, Wakil held a press

conference in Geneva in which he told the media that Pakistan had been insisting on

the formation of a government in Afghanistan after withdrawal but it was not on the

agenda of the negotiations and it was another issue and must be treated separately.

Cordovez was in favor of putting this question to Afghanistan to settle as it was its

454 Saikal, The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 16. 455 Institute of Regional Studies, Afghanistan: Past, Present and Future, 474. 456 Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, 88.

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internal matter. He also told the parties that the agenda of negotiation was consisted of

five main items including the time-frame for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, return of

refugees to Afghanistan and some instruments suggested by resistance leaders, the

issues regarding border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, technical arrangement for

implementation and the monitoring scheme and the arrangement for the signing of the

settlement instruments457.

Meanwhile, Junejo presented a loaded formula regarding withdrawal of Soviet

troops in a meeting with Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan. According to it 50% of Soviet

troops would have to leave in first three months. This formula surprised everyone at

Geneva. Wakil told Cordovez that new ideas and issues should not be launched at this

stage of negotiations as Afghanistan had already agreed on a single digit time-frame for

withdrawal as per Pakistan’s request. He was of the view that the negotiations went

quite long and efforts must be made to resolve the issue as soon as possible without any

delay458.

Noorani came from Pakistan and joined the negotiations. He raised a lot of

questions about conditions and number of troops to be withdrawn each month. He also

asked about complete removal of mines and about the policy regarding the return of

Afghan refugees. Cordovez satisfied them by saying that everything asked in the

questions had been included in the agenda of negotiations. The significant development

in this round of negotiations was the interest of the US. For the first time since the start

of negotiations US sent its high officials to follow the process of negotiations closely.

Those officials included Robert Pech, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary accompanied

by John Arbogast, the Lawyer of US State Department. Cordovez told him that Soviet

representative had taken the position that Soviet military was bound to provide details

of proceeding related to matters discussed on the agenda of negotiations to the UN

military officials but all other matters which were not included in the instrument of

settlement would be decided by them independently. But Pech did not respond and

replied that US would be in a position to issue some policy statement after having

complete review of the process of negotiations459.

When Cordovez met US and Pakistan’s representatives the US had given an

indication to promote national consensus before signing the agreement. US

representative replied that when Pakistan would decide not to delay the signing of the

457 Dawn, The Daily Islamabad, March 5, 1988. 458 Ibid. 459 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 273.

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agreement USSR would be willing to participate in the efforts to promote an intra

Afghan dialogue. Noorani was of the view that Pakistan did not oppose former King

Zahir Shah but the resistance groups were having some reservations about him. He also

added that Pakistan had decided to sign the agreement after March 15, 1988, when there

would be a reasonable advancement in the formation of broad-based government in

Afghanistan. But Pech was of the view that regardless of Islamabad’s position, the US

would not be ready to sign before a scheduled meeting between Shultz and

Shevardnadze in Washington on March 22, 1988 at which an agreement on symmetry

was expected to be concluded. In this discussion, the first week of negotiation ended460.

Noorani assured Cordovez that Pakistan would not take any unexpected

decision and the date of May 15, 1988 for the start of the withdrawal would be regarded.

Cordovez was trying to finalize the draft and get it signed by the member countries and

guarantors till the end of March 1988. Cordovez was working on the following aspects

of the draft:

i. A formal understanding that all concerned would support the establishment

of a broad-based government in Afghanistan to be set up by Afghanistan

itself.

ii. A formal undertaking not to change the definitive text of the settlement

instrument.

iii. An understanding that signature of the settlement instrument would not be

considered to be a formal recognition of any government.

Cordovez efforts to finalize the documents during that week were futile as Noorani

and Wakil did not show any good impression during the negotiation461.

The second week of the negotiation ended in an atmosphere of frustration due to the

attitude of the representatives of Pakistan and Afghanistan. On March 13, 1988, US

representative, Kozirev informed Cordovez that if settlement instrument would not be

signed before March 15, 1988, then it would not be possible for the USSR to start the

withdrawal of its troops by May 15, 1988. Noorani informed Cordovez that Pakistan

had decided to sign the instrument in March 1988 and if the date would be after March

15, 1988, even then the USSR would be bound to start the withdrawal of its troops by

May 15, 1988. Peck also rejected the new argumentation of the USSR and told

Cordovez that US would not accept the start of withdrawal of Soviet troops after May

460 Henry S. Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, (Karachi: Oxford University Press,

2001), 291. 461 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 271.

125

15, 1988 in any case. The meeting of Shevardnadze and Shultz for about which Pech

had already pointed out had ended in Washington on March 24, 1988462.

During the second session of talks, Wakil and Noorani continued discussing the

local matters between the two countries including the status of Durand Line and its

violation on either side. Their discussion greatly affected the process of negotiation and

no fruitful outcome was seen. By the end of third week of negotiations, Cordovez was

again worried about the future of the negotiations by witnessing the attitude of Wakil

and Noorani. So, he realized the need of narrowing down the points of discussion to

avoid the deviation from the main theme of the negotiation. He announced that the

further negotiations would concentrate on just three points; the symmetry, the border

issue and establishment of a new Afghan government. As we entered the fourth week

of the negotiation on March 21, 1988, there was a growing feeling of suspense.

Cordeovez told the press that they were busy to complete the settlement instrument for

signature. On March 24, 1988 the Voice of America reported that no agreement had

been reached in Washington on the question of symmetry. After this news Cordovez

decided to resume the discussions the next morning. Cordovez was determined to

prevent the collapse of the negotiation. He requested the US and USSR governments to

send high level officials to Geneva for discussion. He recommended the names of

Armacost and Voronstove to join the discussion because they were fully aware of the

all the preceding and the progress of negotiations. He also stated that if US and USSR

would refuse to move further by sending these high officials then he would adjourn the

negotiations463.

On March 25, 1988, Peck met with Cordovez and told him that in Washington

meeting, Shultz had proposed a three-year moratorium on military assistance after the

completion of withdrawal which had subsequently been reduced to one year and then

to three months. Shevardnadze rejected Shultz suggestion and gave his own opinion

which had been rejected by Shultz. Afterwards, a working group chaired by Armacost

had spent many hours trying to work out a mutually acceptable formula. Shevardnadze

was of the view that having failed to reach an agreement on symmetry the USSR might

withdraw its force from Afghanistan on the basis of a tri-party agreement with

Afghanistan and Pakistan. But the US insisted on an agreement on symmetry464.

462 Ibid., 268. 463 Dawn, The Daily, Islamabad, March 24, 1988. 464 Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, 88.

126

On March 28, 1988 the beginning of the fifth week of negotiations there was no

progress in the symmetry. Cordovez settled the draft of the negotiations but the

symmetry system failed the negotiations round. Cordovez sent the draft of instrument

to the President Reagan in Washington for approval. Peck told Cordovez that US

government accepted his proposal as it was but Soviet representative was not satisfied.

The negotiation had been failed due to the agreement of symmetry. Cordovez decided

that the dialogue should take place during a walk in Geneva because he knew that Peck

and Kozirev met for several times and no progress was made465.

Cordovez informed the interlocutors that there would be no meeting regarding

the negotiation process until April 4, 1988 as Shultz and Shevardnadze both wanted to

get themselves agreed on a certain formula of the crisis. After a long discussion with

US officials, Shevardnadze visited Kabul and met Najibullah and told him that the

symmetry issue had been resolved and was ready for signatures if the Afghanistan

would settle the border issues with Pakistan466. US and USSR were also willing to assist

Pakistan and Afghanistan in resolving the border issue. Noorani stated that Pakistan

intended to propose negotiations on the border issue to the new Kabul government.

Meanwhile, Shevardnadze reported from Moscow that Najibullah had accepted the text

of the statement on the formation of new government. Soviet Foreign Minister,

Vorontsove had called the Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow and had formally made

two suggestions to solve the border issue. First was to delete the whole paragraph or

secondly, to amend the text by writing that both Pakistan and Afghanistan would not

violate each other’s border. General Zia contacted Cordovez and told him that Pakistan

did not wish the boarder question to become a hurdle in the settlement process and

informed him that he was inclined to accept the second Soviet suggestion provided that

the word international would be added before the word borders. Cordovez was

convinced that the settlement was about to be concluded. Symmetry issue had suddenly

disappeared from the scene and the border issue got significance467. In a joint statement

issued, Gorbachev and Najibullah asserted that the last obstacles in concluding the

agreement had then been removed and advocated their immediate signing. Cordovez

also announced in the press center that the entire settlement instrument was ready and

open for signature. The Geneva Accord was signed on Thursday, April 14, 1988 by

Noorani and Wakil and on behalf of the guarantor governments by Shultz and

465 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 274. 466 Dawn, The Daily, Karachi, April 4, 1988. 467 Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, 294.

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Shevardnadze. The proceedings which were presided over by Perez de Culler had been

carefully organized and rehearsed with representative of the four countries468.

It was a great achievement regarding Afghan crisis and full credit accorded to

the efforts made by Perez De Cuellar and later on by Cordovez on behalf of the UN. At

some stages it seemed that the negotiation process would collapse and on some other

stages he had to start the process from zero. The achievements of mujahideen were also

helpful in forcing USSR to think about the resolution of the issue. The flexibility shown

on behalf of Pakistan, Afghanistan and USSR on some issues was also one of the main

causes of the success of Geneva negotiations. Although US did not join the negotiation

process in the beginning but in the last phase of the Geneva negotiations the role of US

government was also worth mentioning.

3.3. Impact of Geneva Accords on Pakistan-US Relations:

Before going to describe the impact of Geneva Accord on Pak-US relations it is

necessary to mention the detail of important events that happened after the Accord

including the withdrawal of Soviet troops and formation of interim government in

Afghanistan. Geneva Accord was not a single document but it was a set of four

documents signed between four countries. The first was between Pakistan and

Afghanistan and contained detailed provisions barring all kinds of interference in each

other’s affair. The second was a declaration on international guarantees and signed by

US and USSR assuring that both of them would make the implementation of the

agreement possible. The third was also signed by Pakistan and Afghanistan and was

about the voluntary return of five million refugees from Pakistan and Iran back to their

homeland. The last agreement was signed by all the four countries which was about the

withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan whose scheme of action was that the

withdrawal would start on May 15 with half of the Soviet troops gone by Aug 15 and

complete withdrawal would complete within nine months. This agreement also

contained a 50-person UN observer team being set up to monitor the Soviet withdrawal

and non-interference provisions.

The signing of Geneva Accord was a great achievement but there were

something that was also needed to be done in this regard. First of all although Cordovez

repeatedly assured Afghanistan and USSR that Iran would also join the negotiations

before the process of signing but UN could not persuade Iran to join the negotiations.

468 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, 176.

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Secondly, it was strange that US and Pakistan were ready to accept the Afghan

government as a signatory of the agreement but they were not ready to accept its

legitimacy. The third was that almost every country had been imposing certain

conditions on fully abiding by the agreement in true letter and spirit.

US Secretary of State said in a statement made in a news conference in the old

League of Nation council chamber;

“History has been made today. For over eight years, the Afghan

people have suffered a brutal war that has brought unmeasurable

death, dislocation and destruction. The world community has

long sought to remove the cause of this agony -- the Soviet

military occupation of Afghanistan.”469

Perez de Cuellar regarded the accord as a major stride towards peace in

Afghanistan and he was confident that the signatories of these agreements would abide

fully by the letter and spirit of the texts and that they would implement them in good

faith470. Pakistan and US made it clear that they would only abide the accords by letter

and spirit if USSR would withdraw its troops exactly as promised and would cut off all

its military aid to the Kabul regime. Moreover, they also declared that the signing of

the accords did not mean that they had recognized the Soviet back Afghan regime as it

still regarded it illegitimate.

Shevardnadze also held a press conference separately from Shultz's and said that

they represented it a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. He also

stressed that Pakistan and Afghanistan must abide by treaty obligations and end all the

interference in each other's affairs in any form whatsoever. He also warned Pakistani

leadership to stop the flow of American arms to Afghan resistance groups through their

territory. He directly talked to Shultz in his press conference that US did not have right

to deliver arms to the resistance groups and if US would continue the same, the political

settlement would become complicated. On the question of stopping Soviet military

support to the Afghan government he replied that it was not illegitimate as it was

according to the mutual agreements signed between USSR and Afghan government471.

UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) was

established to monitor the process of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

General Rauli Helminen was appointed its head. He was instructed to proceed to

469 https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/04/15/agreement-on-afghanistan-signed-in-

geneva/c7288c64-6764-4e73-9bc5-7eeb48f7827d/?utm_term=.56ed0650e017, Retrieved March 19,

2017. 470 Ibid. 471 Ibid.

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Islamabad and Kabul with a small advance party of military and civilian officials to

organize the two headquarters’ units. He was given the authority on behalf of UN

Secretary General to make the whole process completed with the help of his officers

belonging to different countries and through the practical means available to him for

the purpose472. A few days later the Secretary General also announced the appointment

of the Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan as Coordinator for UN Humanitarian and Economic

Assistance Programs related to Afghanistan473. General Helminen appointed Austrian

officer, Edonel to head the Islamabad Headquarter and a Swedish Colonel to head the

Kabul Headquarter and there were a lot of mobile officers who were assigned the

responsibility to report any violation of Accord on either side. On May 15, 1988, ten

UN military officers were present at the early morning ceremony in Jalalabad when first

group of Soviet troops started the withdrawal process by evacuating a camp that was

handed over to Afghan authorities474. The major task of the Geneva accord along with

the withdrawal of the troops was the formation of broad-based government in

Afghanistan475. Cordovez wanted to start intra Afghan dialogue and was of the view

that people of Afghanistan should be given an opportunity to elect their own

government. He was doubtful that Najibullah’s government was not recognized by the

mujahideen leaders and field commanders and in case of any delay in this regard the

military struggle might start in the areas under Najibullah’s control. People should be

taken out themselves. But Najibullah thought that his government was legal and he was

not ready to accept anything in this regard. Therefore, Cordovez requested the Soviet

government to assist in this regard so that a legal government assisted by all entities

within Afghanistan could be established476. Former King Zahir Shah, who was in Rome

in exile, welcomed Geneva Accords and stated that Loya Jirga (a traditional assembly

of tribal chiefs) and other leaders should be convened without delay to discuss the

formation of a new government in Afghanistan acceptable to all the stake holders477.

On April 10, 1988, a tragic incident occurred in Ojhri Camp, a huge ammunition depot

at Rawalpindi. It was blown up with a series of explosions causing a great panic in the

city and loss of more than 100 lives. The ammunition was estimated between 100 to

472 Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, 294. 473 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Publishers, 2009), 144. 474 Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History, (London: Curzon Press, 2002), 170. 475 S. Fida Yunas, Afghanistan: A Political History, (Peshawar: 2002), 163. 476 Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, Afghanistan: Past, Present and Future, 475. 477 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 311.

130

130 million dollars’ worth478. This incident started a kind of tussle between the

government and the army. Junejo was angry at the careless attitude of ISI leadership on

storing huge dump of ammunition in a residential area. He wanted General Akhtar

Abdul Rehman, the previous ISI chief and present Joint Chiefs of Staff and Lieutenant

General Hamid Gul to be sacked. But instead Junejo himself lost his premiership.

Within weeks the political scenario changed in Pakistan and Afghanistan when on May

29, 1988, General Zia dismissed Prime Minister Junejo’s government and accused his

government’s failure to maintain law and order in the country and did not advance for

the creation of an Islamic society in Pakistan. On June 6, 1988, Najibullah dismissed

Afghan Prime Minister, Sultan Ali Keshtmand and appointed mainly non-party cabinet

headed by Muhammad Hassan Sharq, an old-time associate of Sardar Dawood and a

former Afghan Ambassador to India479.

Cordovez visited Pakistan to take a look on the progress of UN monitoring

headquarter at Islamabad. In his tour he met with Yaqub Khan who had once again been

appointed Foreign Minister shortly after Junejo was sacked. Cordovez discussed with

him his proposal regarding the formation of a new government in Afghanistan. He also

met with General Zia who assured him that Pakistan had been facing severe economic

burden of Afghan refugees after the ban on US economic aid and he would support any

reliable solution of Afghanistan internal conflict. Cordovez also met with Arnold Lewis

Raphael, US Ambassador in Pakistan, who blamed Soviet government of continued

support to Kabul. Cordovez assured him that additional supply to Kabul would cease

around May 15, 1988480. Cordovez met with Soviet General Varenikov, who was the

in-charge of withdrawal process on behalf of USSR. He briefed Cordovez about the

actual position of Soviet army in Afghanistan. He told that at the time when the Geneva

Accord was signed there were 1,00,300 Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 18 garrisons.

Out of them 35,000 had already returned to the USSR while 13,310 soldiers lost their

lives during the war, 35,478 were wounded and 311 were missing in action as of May

15, 1988481. Cordovez also met with Soviet ambassador in Kabul and later on with

Najibullah to discuss the possibility of new government in Afghanistan. Soviet

Ambassador told him that it would be insulting to request a head of the state to step

478 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allied, (Baltimore: John

Hopkins University Press, 2001), 289. 479 Ibid. 480 Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, 87. 481 Ludwig W. Adamec, Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, (London: Scarecrow Press, 1991), 303.

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down. Najibullah was of the view that as soon as he would step down, Pakistan and the

US would assist in launching a government fully consisted of Afghan mujahideen. He

accepted to step down on the assurance from Pakistan and the US to comply with

Cordovez’s proposal in true letter and spirit. Cordovez informed him about General

Zia’s support to his proposal482. The resistance groups also nominated Ahmad Shah

Masood as their interim Prime Minister. Cordovez wanted to have a meeting with

resistance leaders but they told him to meet Ahmad Shah Masood but Cordovez refused

to meet him. On July 9, 1988, Cordovez stated in a press conference that the withdrawal

process had been in progress in a smooth manner and presented the detail of his proposal

regarding interim government in Afghanistan. He said that this proposal would help in

bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan. General Zia told Cordovez that his

government would force the mujahideen to cooperate him in finding a solution

acceptable to all the groups483. After a few days later, Syed Ahmad Gilani held a press

conference and told Cordovez that he was ready to accept Cordovez’s proposal. He

clarified that he was accepting the proposal as the head of the National Islamic Front of

Afghanistan and not as the head of the resistance groups. He also mentioned that the

best way to resolve the issue was to hold a Jirga under the supervision of General Zia.

But by the death of General Zia in a plane crash on August 17, 1988, the efforts in this

regard slowed down484.

USSR appointed Voronstov as Soviet Ambassador in Afghanistan in October

1988. He started his efforts to set up new government in Afghanistan. USSR agreed to

hold direct talks with resistance leaders but some fundamentalists did not want the

interference of other in internal matters of Afghanistan. After much struggle Cordovez

managed to get approval of a call for a shoora of 519 members to form an interim

government. This proposal was acceptable for Pakistan, USSR and Afghan government

and all the major resistance groups485. A meeting was held between Vorontsov and the

resistance leaders in Taif, Saudi Arabia. This was the start of a proper struggle for

government formation in Afghanistan. The importance of this meeting was that Burhan-

ud-din Rabbani and Gulbadin Hikmatyar also attended the meeting. Finally, on

February 10, 1989, in a huge Muslim Pilgrim Transit Center built, by the Government

482 Ejaz S. Gillani, The Future of Afghanistan, (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1989), 32. 483 Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 376. 484 Dawn, The Daily, Islamabad, August 18, 1988. 485 Hafeez Malik, Soviet Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics, (London: McMillan Press Ltd,

1994), 287.

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of Pakistan, between Islamabad and Rawalpindi, a meeting was held. All the resistance

leaders attended the meeting except rightist leaders from Tehran. After a long

discussion an interim government supported by ISI was formed but it did not get wide

support as it did not have representation from Iran backed Shia groups and

procommunist elements. On February 15, 1989, the government was made effective.

After that Soviet General Baris V. Gromov walked across the steel friendship bridge to

the border city of Termez in Uzbekistan and said’

“Our nine-year stay ends with this.”486

The mutual relations between Pakistan and US were not good just before the

incident of Soviet intervention of Afghanistan but we saw a kind of hand and glove kind

of relationship between the two countries throughout the period till Geneva Accords

were signed for the settlement of the crisis. Although a few months after the

enforcement of Geneva Accords the two countries remained close allies but then the

warmth of Pakistan-US relations continued to decline. When Pakistan decided to assist

mujahideen against USSR, the main objective behind this decision was to improve

strategic relations with the US487. Pakistan also played a vital role in mobilizing

international support including the US support. Looking at the complexity of Pakistan’s

economic, political and security situation at that time, it can be argued how difficult it

was for Pakistan to decide for not only giving a helping hand to resistance groups but

also open borders for Afghan refugees. That was the reason, Pakistan’s role was not an

ordinary foreign policy response to a crisis in the region488. Moreover, Pakistan was the

only country in the region to serve the US in a better way to get its objectives of

defeating the USSR. In March 1980, General Zia made it clear to Americans in these

words;

“If you take Pakistan out of this region and you will find

that you have not one inch of soil where American can

have influence.”489

In 1982, Reagan accepted that Carter was wrong in not giving full support to

Pakistan and gave 3.2 billion dollars as aid to Pakistan for five years. Pakistan also got

F-16 from the US which were badly needed to strengthen Pakistan air force490. US tried

to have full control in strategic planning and decision making through CIA but ISI

486 Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 384. 487 Hafeez Malik, Soviet American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, (London: McMillan

Press Ltd, 1987), 129. 488 Rais, War Without Winners, 236. 489 Matinuddin, Power Struggle in Hindukush, 120. 490 Ibid., 217.

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continued its leading role with CIA as its junior partner491. This situation continued

throughout the crisis and some months after Geneva Accords as well. But after

achieving its chief objective of defeating USSR, US started to reduce its assistance vis-

à-vis Pakistan. The differences between Pakistan and US had started before the signing

of Geneva Accords but those were having slight intensity. First difference which was

between the two countries was on the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Basically, Pakistan was of the view that before the withdrawal of Soviet troops effort

should be made to establish an interim government to run the state affairs in an effective

way. But US was anxious to get Geneva Accords signed and to make the withdrawal of

Soviet troops possible without establishing a smooth government in Afghanistan. In

March 1988, Armacost visited Islamabad and told General Zia about the need to sign

an accord irrespective of the formation of any government set up in Afghanistan492.

Arnold Raphael, the US Ambassador to Pakistan also showed his reservations by

commenting that Zia and ISI had been wishing to run their own show in Afghanistan

because they considered them entitled to do so after eight years of war493. General Zia

was of the view that if a broad-based government could not be established with the help

of UN and international guarantors then afterwards mujahideen would not be able to

achieve the said objectives. Unfortunately, he could not get support in this regard not

only from the US but from his own government led by Junejo. Later on, Junejo held All

Parties Conference in March 1988 and it was agreed upon in the conference that Soviet

withdrawal at the earliest would be better for the region. The situation went worse when

mujahideen groups also rejected Geneva negotiations in a statement given in

Peshawar494.

General Zia was thinking in a positive way but he did not have support in this

regard. Although in the beginning, his point of view was fully supported by the US but

as the time passed by every country started thinking to first make the withdrawal of

Soviet troops possible. Few years after, the emergence of Taliban on the political scene

was also a consequence of not supporting General Zia’s opinion. In the presence of a

smoothly running interim government in Afghanistan as per General Zia’s opinion,

Taliban could not have gotten the opportunity to emerge on the political scenario as the

491 Fazl-e-Raheem Marwat, Pakistan’s Strategic Role in Afghanistan Crisis, Journal Pakistan Studies

Center, (University of Peshawar, Spring-Autumn, 1993), 192. 492 Hilali, Pakistan-US Relationships, 287. 493 Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, 259. 494 Wirsing, Pakistan’s Security Under Zia, 66-71.

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most powerful Afghan fraction with fundamentalist ideology. General Zia tried his best

to Islamize the state of Pakistan by introducing some Islamic measures so everyone was

thinking that he had been trying to establish some kind of Islamic renaissance in

Afghanistan in the shape of his proposed government.

After the death of General Zia, Pakistan’s new Army Chief General Aslam Beg

decided to stay away from the politics and assisted acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan

in holding General Elections. Consequently, PPP under the leadership of young Benazir

Bhutto emerged as the main political party. She was elected as the first woman Prime

Minister of Pakistan. US appointed Robert Oklay as Ambassador who also showed

interest in making democracy strengthen in Pakistan. The time was very crucial for

Pakistan as it lost a very experienced head of state and was replaced by a young 36

years old lady who was an inexperienced politician that time. Moreover, after playing

an effective role in Afghan war, Pakistan’s ISI had also become very powerful and had

a great influence in country’s politics.

The main issue which remained a reason of confrontation between Pakistan and

the US was the nuclear proliferation. US Congress under Carter had banned any kind

of aid to Pakistan. But after the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan, US needed an ally

during Soviet intervention and Pakistan was their ultimate choice but Pakistan could

not support the US without getting economic and military aid. So, it was decided by the

US Congress that Pakistan could get aid from the US only if US President would submit

a certificate that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapon. For six years, Reagan

submitted the certificate about non-possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan despite

having knowledge that Pakistan did not only have nuclear weapon but was also making

progress in this regard. Soviet intervention was a kind of good luck in this regard which

got an opportunity for Pakistan to enhance its nuclear program. But when George Bush

Senior became the President of the US, he refused to submit the certificate. In 1989,

during the visit of Pakistan’s Army Chief General Aslam Beg, he was told by Brent

Snowcraft, the US National Security Advisor that President Bush was ready to certify

as long as he could but he would not lie495. US Ambassador in Pakistan, Robert Oklay

also informed Pakistan’s government that if Pakistan would continue its nuclear

program then Bush would invoke Pressler Amendment496. The events concealed the

fact that US wanted if Pakistan would wish to get US aid then it had to roll back or

495 Kux, The United Sates and Pakistan, 300. 496 Ibid.

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freeze its nuclear program and further enrichment of Uranium. But Benazir had a lot of

internal pressure from ISI, army, opposition parties and people of Pakistan so she could

not dare to do so. Consequently, Pakistan’s aid was suspended when in October 1990,

Bush refused to certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons497. When Pakistan

told that US was demanding more than what had already been compromised between

the two countries on the nuclear issue, the US replied clearly that they could not change

their policy and it was Pakistan who would change its nuclear policy498.

General Zia was right in thinking to sign the Geneva Accord after the settlement

of the issues of refugees and the formation of interim government in Afghanistan.

Probably he was aware of the fact that these issues could be resolved only with the

involvement of the US. He knew that US would lose interest after the withdrawal of

Soviet troops and would leave Pakistan alone to deal with the aftershocks of Afghan

war. Within two years after the Geneva Accords, US not only left Pakistan alone but

also banned its economic aid. War struggle started in Afghanistan between the

resistance groups and the communist elements of the government. Pakistan had to

involve in the war because Pakistan could not afford the unprotected western border.

Pakistan’s this effort resulted in the emergence of Taliban. Moreover, the issue of

Afghan refugees was a major issue which had to be resolved by Pakistan only.

Pakistan’s internal situation was not capable to deal with the situation. On one hand,

Pakistan had to face a huge economic burden and on the other many social and security

related issues emerged in the country including the spread of drugs and weapons

throughout the country which resulted in bloody ethnic and sectarian fights between

Shias and Sunnis etc. These ethnic and religious quarrels were responsible for

worsening Pakistan’s relations with Iran. Overall, US and Afghanistan appeared as

victorious after the withdrawal of Soviet troops but Pakistan transcended from bad to

even worst situation.

497 Hilali, Pakistan-US Relationship, 204. 498 Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 315.

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Chapter No.4:

Impacts of Pakistan-US Alliance

There is a chequered wonderful history of Pakistan-US alliance during the past

70 years. Although the US always had a dominant position in the alliance but Pakistan

remained an active junior partner as well. When Pakistan and India appeared on the

map of the world, the USSR and the US were in search of faithful allies to contain each

other. There were five main countries which could serve as an ally for both the great

powers including China, India, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Having great manpower

and natural resources India and China were their best choices. But when China turned

communist after independence and India opted to be non-aligned then both the super

powers opted for Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. US managed to hold its impact in Iran

in the person of Raza Shah Pahlvi, the King of Iran. Afghanistan fell in the lap of the

USSR as King Zahir Shah and more significantly Sardar Daud had great attraction

towards communism. Pakistan was the only country remained to become US’s ultimate

choice. Stalin, the Head of State of the USSR invited Liaqat Ali Khan to visit Moscow

and he accepted that invitation. But when he got invitation from Truman, the President

of the US, he quickly visited there ignoring the already accepted invitation. That was

the first step regarding the establishment of Pakistan and US relations. Later on, strong

ties between Pakistan and the US were witnessed on three occasions. First of all, in

1950s and 1960s Pakistan entered in CEATO and CENTO on the wish of the US and

afterwards played a significant role in bringing China and the US closer to each other.

Secondly, after some bitter experience of Pakistan and US relations during Bhutto’s era,

the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan again brought the two countries closer to each

other. Then after 12 years of cold relations between the two countries the world

witnessed them again in hand and glove after terrorist attacks on World Trade Centre.

In 1980s, Pakistan was with the US in support of Afghanistan mujahideen, fighting

against the Soviet troops and in the first decade of 21st century, Pakistan was with the

US but this time against the same mujahideen led by Taliban. This scenario showed that

US always had dominant position in mutual relations with Pakistan. This chapter

describes about the impact of Pakistan-US alliance in South Asia, in terms of military

and economic agreements. This chapter also focuses on the effects of India factor on

this mutual alliance. In the last section of this chapter, the background and detail of

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those militant groups has been mentioned who were declared the right groups to get the

US military and economic assistance to fight against the Soviet army.

4.1. US Military & Economic Aid to Pakistan:

Pakistan-US diplomatic relations were adversely affected during the Carter

Presidency from 1977 to 1980. The main reason was the nuclear program of Pakistan.

It was a reality that Pakistan did not even think to start its nuclear program before 1974

when India tested its nuclear weapon for the first time. But Carter had started a policy

of reconciliation with India and he had been just pressurizing Pakistan to sign the Non-

proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to cancel its nuclear reprocessing plant’s deal with

France499. Carter used different tactics to impose pressure on Pakistan to reverse its

nuclear program and the major step which he took in this regard was to cease US

economic and military aid to Pakistan in April 1977500.

US was much concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons after the

nuclear test of India so strict actions were taken to stop it. When Bhutto called Dr. AQ

Khan to Pakistan to start its nuclear program, he brought plans from Netherland. But to

accomplish the task of converting the plans to reality, Pakistan needed hardware in the

form of technological components. It was not possible for Pakistan to purchase entire

units openly from the world market so Pakistan decided to purchase these hardware as

individual components to assemble them in Pakistan. For this purpose, Pakistan

approached the suppliers in Germany, Switzerland, Britain, France and Belgium501.

France was the main country with whom Pakistan had made a deal to purchase

components needed for running nuclear plant. When Jimmy Carter became the

President of the US, Pakistan was involved in a package deal with France for the

purchase of nuclear equipment. US pressurized France to stop the deal to eliminate any

kind of probability of nuclear proliferation. First of all, France agreed to admit that only

fuel to be used for running the nuclear processing plant for useful purposes would be

given to Pakistan which could not be used for making bombs but when US insisted to

stop the deal at all, French government ended the contract with Pakistan502.

499 Zulfiqar, A Retrospective Perspective on Pakistan-United States Relations: 1947-1977, 21-41. 500 Ibid. 501 Richard N. Haass, ed., Sanctions and American Diplomacy, (New York: The Council of Foreign

Relations, 1998), 159. 502 Ibid.

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After the end of agreement with France, US was quite satisfied and Carter

Administration decided to resume Pakistan’s economic assistance but at that time it was

learnt by the British government that Pakistan had still been making efforts for parallel

uranium enrichment and for this purpose, Pakistan had been trying to purchase

inverters, a key apparatus used in making bombs. That was the reason, on April 6, 1979,

Carter once again stopped Pakistan’s economic aid by using Symington Amendment.

According to this agreement, US Congress was given power to stop any kind of military

or economic aid to the countries being involved in unsafeguarded nuclear technology503.

But Pakistan was constantly denying the fact that it was making any kind of bomb.

When US Congressman Lester Wolff asked Agha Shahi about Pakistan’s nuclear

program during his visit to Pakistan, Agha Shahi replied that Pakistan had no hidden

motives to make a bomb and just wanted to progress in nuclear technology to use it for

power generation504. Afterwards, due to a firing incident by a gunman on Grand Mosque

in Mecca, it was alleged that US and Israel were involved in the issue. As a reaction, on

November 21, 1979, there was unrest in Islamabad when a mob set US Embassy in

Islamabad on fire causing the death of two Americans and injuries of some employees.

Then police reached the occasion and dispersed the mob and the situation came under

control505. Carter administration responded in a serious manner and regarded Pakistan’s

government responsible for the incident as it failed to provide protection to the embassy

situated in the capital. This incident brought Pakistan and US relations to the lowest

level ever in the history.

Pakistan also had some reservations from the US when Pakistan’s assistance

was stopped due to involvement in the purchase of components of the nuclear reactor

but on the other hand despite having nuclear tests some year ago, Carter allowed India

to purchase uranium from the US for its nuclear reactor at Trombay506. Agha Shahi

commented on the attitude of the Carter Administration towards Pakistan that Carter

had visibly downgraded Islamabad’s position in the region and, instead, patronized

other countries like Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran and India507. US Deputy Secretary of

State, Warren Christopher, even went one step ahead and said that US was not

503 Ibid., 160. 504 Ibid. 505 Herbert Hagerty, Attack on the US Embassy in Pakistan, Joseph P. Sullivan (ed.), Embassies Under

Siege, (Washington: Bressey’s, 1995), 71-88. 506 Zulfiqar, A Retrospective Perspective on Pakistan-United States Relation, 21-41. 507 Ibid.

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concerned about the past ties between the two states508. On this occasion, wrote Shahi

that the prospects of stable relationship between Pakistan and the US hinged on

Pakistan's willingness to cap its nuclear program509. However, it was not possible for

Pakistan to leave nuclear program because Pakistan’s immediate rival India had been

constantly progressing in preparing nuclear weapons. This was the one of the prime

reasons Bhutto decided to launch Pakistan’s nuclear program. Moreover, the political

developments in Afghanistan was also not in favor of Pakistan and having both the

longest borders on the eastern and western side insecure, it was the only way for

Pakistan to protect itself.

The relations between Pakistan and the US took another turn when USSR

invaded Afghanistan. Pakistan again got the opportunity to get closer to the US and

establish good relations. Due to its geographical location, Pakistan was assigned the

role of “front line ally” against the USSR. At the time when in December 1979, Soviet

troops entered Afghanistan, the political scenario had changed to a great extent due to

Islamic revolution of Iran where the King was ousted by the Islamic groups under the

leadership of Ayat Ullah Khomeini. The main accusation on the former King was its

undoubted tilt towards the US so it was not possible to regain support from the newly

formed government in Iran. The situation forced the US to search for an ally in the

region. Meanwhile, USSR entered in Afghanistan which was an alarming situation for

the US. Initially, US government was reluctant to involve in the war but when the

mujahideen offered strong resistance against the Soviet troops with the assistance of

Pakistan then US decided to stand with Pakistan in fighting against communists. US

Congress had already imposed sanctions on providing any kind of military or economic

aid to Pakistan. In 1980s, Pakistan agreed to pay $ 658 million to the US to buy 28 F-

16 fighter planes, US Congress froze the deal and not only refused to hand over F-16 to

Pakistan but also withheld the money510.

To cope with the situation in Afghanistan, Carter offered Pakistan $325 million

in aid over three years. But the intensity of the incident was very high and this amount

was not enough to meet the expenses so General Zia rejected this by regarding this

amount as "peanuts." Carter was quite reluctant in extending full support to Pakistan.

508 Hutson, Interview. 509 Shahi, Pakistan’s Relations with US, 166-167. 510 Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, (New York: Random House Trade,

2002), 117.

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General Zia was a clever man and he played his cards well. He was well aware of the

situation that Carter was an outgoing President. He was expecting more assistance from

the coming President Reagan. When Reagan became the President, he set his own

priorities regarding Pakistan. Congressman Charles Wilson played a key role in

persuading Reagan to extend full support to Pakistan. Afghan Desk Chief of CIA, Gust

Avrakotos also assisted him511. They told the President about the need to increase

funding for Operation Cyclone against the USSR. As a result, the assistance to Pakistan

and the militant groups of Afghanistan reached to one billion US dollars512. The Reagan

administration supported Pakistan's military regime and a lot of US officials frequently

visited Pakistan in coming years. Agha Shahi was quite pleased on the new situation in

the region and especially about a positive change in Pakistan and US relations and said

that both the countries had taken positive steps in building Pakistan and US relationship

on durable basis513. Agha Shahi and K.M Arif, Zia’s Chief of Staff met with US

Secretary of State, Alexander Haig and told him that Pakistan nuclear program would

not again become a hurdle in the way of Pakistan-US relations. At that point Haig

warned that although Reagan administration was willing to extend full support to

Pakistan at crucial stage but if Pakistan would explode any nuclear device then US

Congress would not allow Reagan to move further in this regard and Pakistan might be

in a critical situation514.

Pakistan had been constantly giving assurances to the US that its nuclear

program was just for power purposes and it would never intend to make a bomb. But

the ground situation was quite different. The reports of CIA were quite different from

the assurances of Pakistan which had been given to the US from the top-level officials.

Some of these reports were leaked and in the light of these reports, in June 1984, US

Senator Alan Cranston alleged that Pakistan had developed its nuclear program to such

extent that it had the achieved the capability to make several atomic bombs515.

The turning point in the relations between Pakistan and the US was a five-year

economic aid and military sales package worth $3 billion concluded by Pakistan and

511 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan%E2%80%93United_States_relations#cite_note-27,

Retrieved April 2, 2017. 512 Ibid. 513 “Pakistan Reports US has offered Five Year Aid Deal” New York Times, April 22, 1981, A-1. 514 Haass, Sanctions and American Diplomacy, 161. 515 Washington Post, The Daily, June 21, 1984.

141

the United States in June 1981516. The agreement which was to come into effect from

October 1982 provided for an American credit of $2 billion at an interest rate of 14 per

cent spread over five years for the purchase of military hardware by Pakistan including

the F-16 fighter-bomber. The US was to extend another $1 billion as economic

assistance on softer terms for projects of military utility such as the construction of

roads, railways and airfields in the areas bordering Afghanistan. But the condition was

that it needed the approval of the US Congress on annual basis. Pakistan had to pay the

money from its own resources or from the credit provided by some friendly Arab

states517. Before, Pakistan’s military aid had been cut off by Carter regime due to the

Symington Amendment. According to this amendment, US would not extend economic

and military aid under the US Military Sales Act, to a country that had been involved

in receiving nuclear technology without appropriate international safeguards518. The

situation had become critical in South Asia due to the presence of Soviet troops so after

five months of negotiations at the highest level, it was declared that the presence of

foreign troops in neighboring Afghanistan, posed a serious threat to the region. The two

governments agreed that a strong and independent Pakistan was in the mutual interest

of the US and Pakistan as well as of the entire world. Hence the US would assist

Pakistan and safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity519.

The problem at that was that US President was bound not to extend any kind of

military or economic aid to a country involved in developing its nuclear program. First

of all Senator John Glenn initiated a proposal in the US Congress. He demanded that

there should be an amendment to the Foreign Relation Act of 1961, through which it

was proposed that if US President wanted to extend military or economic aid to

Pakistan, then he would certify that Pakistan neither possessed nuclear weapons nor

was trying to develop it520. This amendment was approved by the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee but when it was presented before the government, it objected on

the wording of the amendment. US President wanted to extend full support to Pakistan

because it was the need of the time but he wanted to do it in a dignified manner. Later

on, Senator Larry Pressler proposed an amendment in the draft of the proposal initiated

516 Zubeida Mustafa, Pakistan-US Relations: The Last Phase, The World Today, Vol. 37, No. 12 (Dec.,

1981), pp. 469-475, (Royal Institute of International Affairs), http://www.jstor.org/stable/40395255,

Retrieved January 18, 2017. 517 Ibid. 518 Ibid. 519 Hutson, Interview.. 520 Ibid.

142

by Senator John Glenn. According to this proposed amendment, US President would

give an annual waiver to Pakistan that it did not possess a nuclear device and US

assistance package would be for advancing non-proliferation objectives. This

amendment was approved and later on known as Pressler Amendment. Although,

Pakistan was in good position at that time to object the amendment but the time was

crucial not only for the US but also for Pakistan because of the threat of Soviet troops.

No reasonable opposition was seen in Pakistan because Pakistan started to get aid from

the US after the approval of this amendment so the government regarded the

amendment as the internal political affair of the US.

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan proved to be a blessing in disguise for Pakistan.

First benefit of the war was that Pakistan managed to assist the resistance groups to

bring pro-Pakistan elements in power to make its long border with Afghanistan secure.

Secondly, the military and economic aid which was cut off by the US due to Pakistan’s

nuclear program was resumed. The third and the most significant benefit which Pakistan

achieved, was the accomplishment of its nuclear program. Pakistan got full advantage

of the situation and obtained a lot of technological equipment which was necessary for

nuclear program. US was also conscious about Pakistan’s advancement in the field of

nuclear technology but Pakistan was badly needed by the US in fighting the war against

USSR. However, another amendment was initiated in US Congress by Senator Stephan

Solarz in August 1985, about the nuclear issue. US was well aware of the fact that

Pakistan had purchased a lot of components from open markets to advance its nuclear

program. The “Solarz Amendment” to the Foreign Assistance Act was passed by the

US Congress and became a law. According to this amendment, US would cut off all

military and economic aid to purportedly non-nuclear nations that illegally export or

attempt to export nuclear-related materials from the US521. Although, there were

subsequently several examples of Pakistan exporting nuclear weapons technology from

the US, but they were not punished until the end of the Soviet-Afghan War522. This

amendment had the provision of Presidential waver if he was sure that Pakistan had not

been doing anything to progress its nuclear program without the knowledge of the US.

At that time US was extending every kind of assistance to Pakistan but those two

amendments showed that US was also having deep concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear

521 http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a0885solarzamendment, Retrieved April 2, 2017. 522 Ibid.

143

program and they were trying in the direction to stop Pakistan from proceeding its

nuclear program unchecked.

US provided Pakistan with the arms and ammunition to support mujahideen in

fighting against the Soviet army. There were many flaws in the whole process of

delivery of the ammunition. The main problem was that both Pakistan and the US did

not have much time to enlist the weapons and ammunition. Consequently, there was a

main problem in the ratio between weapons and ammunition including bullets and

rockets. Brigadier (Retd) Muhammad Yousaf mentions it as;

“At times even basic common sense seemed lacking. Invariably

we wasted days, if not weeks, going through their lists pointing

out errors and inconsistencies. They seldom related our ammunition

needs to the weapons. For example, it was agreed that as a rule

twenty rockets would be provided for every RPG-7 launcher

purchased. In 1985 we were to receive 10,000 RPGs along with

200,000 rockets, but our CIA friends in Washington failed to take

into account all the RPGs we had already received since 1980 (less

an annual wastage rate of 15 per cent). It had not occurred to them

that we needed ammunition for them as well. Similarly with anti-

aircraft ammunition, the CIA lists were often woefully inadequate as

no account was taken of the very high rate of fire of these weapons.”523

Pakistan’s duty was to prepare a list and hand it over to CIA and it was the

responsibility of the CIA to purchase it from any country of the world including China

and Egypt and to ship it to Karachi for delivery to Mujahideen. Later on, it was also

revealed that CIA also purchased some weapons from Israel. This fact was not declared

at that time because it was expected that some opposition might rise against it from the

Arab world and within Pakistan which might be unsuitable for war during that time.

Because the Muslims had great sympathy for Palestine and it was not acceptable for

them at any cast to fight Jihad with the weapons purchased from Israel 524. During 1983

approximately 10,000 tons of weapons were received which raised to 65,000 tons in

1987. The type of weapons purchased ranged from small arms to anti-tank and anti-

aircraft (AA) rocket launchers and guns. Silk Route was used to get weapons from

China525.

523 Muhammad Yousaf & Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap (Afghanistan’s Untold Story),

http://www.afghanasamai.com/Dscutions-poleticalcullture/Afghanasamai-

2012/BATTLESafghanistanTheBearTrapDefeatofaSuperpowerMohammedYousaf.pdf, Retrieved March

27, 2017. 524 Ibid. 525 Ibid.

144

US was also having a close eye on Pakistan’s nuclear program. When General

Zia visited US to take part in UN General Assembly in November 1985, he was told by

US National Security Advisor, Robert Mc Farlane that US had a deep concern over

Pakistan’s nuclear program and US government wanted that Pakistan should not test its

nuclear device526. In reply, General Zia assured him that Pakistan needed the US

assistance against Soviet troops so Pakistan could not think to take such step which

could be embarrassing for the US. But it was just a government declared policy

statement which was not coincided with the reality. Similarly, Pakistan’s Prime

Minister, Junejo visited US in July 1986 and assured the US that Pakistan’s nuclear

program was just for peace and Pakistan would not exceed the level of Uranium

enrichment as prescribed for the peaceful purposes. The positive outcome of his visit

was that US administration assured Pakistan of 4 billion dollars aid for another six

years527.

When the Soviet Union left Afghanistan in 1988, the US interest in South Asia

began to decrease. The political situation of Afghanistan was worst and most of the

infrastructure had been damaged as a result of the war that lasted for a decade. Pakistan

wanted to persuade the US to formulate an interim government in Afghanistan

representing all the stakeholders of the country including the pro-communist elements

but US left Afghanistan at its own. Actually, US had lost interest in the war because its

most significant objective which was to defeat the USSR had been accomplished. Now

US did not want to let its economy to suffer a huge economic burden by keeping itself

remain involved with the Afghan war. US did not only left Afghanistan to its fate but

also cut down its economic ties with Pakistan. The amount of $4.2 billion which US

had promised to give to Pakistan was withdrawn528. Moreover, the President of the US

refused to certify that Pakistan had not been involved in developing nuclear program.

This certificate was necessary to give any assistance package to Pakistan. Consequently,

not only the aid to Pakistan was withdrawn but also US started pressurizing Pakistan to

roll back its nuclear program529.

526 Kux, The United States and Pakistan: Disenchanted Allies, 278. 527 Ibid., 283. 528 Tariq Gillani, US-Pakistan Relations: The Way Forward, (Strategy Research Project, US Army War

College, 2006), 84-102. 529 Ibid.

145

Until 1981, with the start of the new phase of Pakistan-US relations, Pakistan

was the sixth largest recipient of the US economic aid. More than $ 2 billion which was

about 40% of the total assistance package was for food aid. About one-third of the

assistance package was for commodity assistance, and some one-fifth was for project

assistance primarily for agriculture and infrastructure530. Especially in the 1960s, this

assistance enabled Pakistan to tide over difficulties of food shortages, provided needed

raw materials, and supported major investments in infrastructure531. But after the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan, most of the aid provided by the US was for military purpose.

Due to this war, Zia’s government attracted the attentions of the world especially of the

US and got much military and economic assistance. By 1985, Pakistan had become the

fourth largest country getting aid from the US after Israel, Egypt and Turkey532. With

the approval of more $7.4 billion aid for the years 1982-90, Pakistan became the second

country taking the highest amount of aid after Israel533. This aid package was used to

boost the capabilities of Pakistan military in fighting against the Soviet troops as well

as to meet the economy’s deficits. Pakistan also had been taking aid from other

resources at that time as well. The major sources from which Pakistan had been getting

economic aid were Japan, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. But United

States Agency for International Development (USAID) emerged as the single largest

donor to Pakistan. During 1980-88, USAID provided $954.2 to Pakistan in

development sector and $205 million for irrigation system534.

The tension between Pakistan and the US had already been started with the

incident of Ojhri Camp and on some issues regarding the Geneva Accords. Later on,

when on August 17, 1988, General Zia along with the US Ambassador in Pakistan,

Arnold Rafael, some other high-profile military officers died in C-130 plane crash on

their way back from Bahawalpur, many conspiracy theories appeared on the scene.

Most of the people were of view that KGB or RAW might be involved in the incident

and some others pointed out towards Al-Zulfiqar, an organization led by Mir Murtaza

Bhutto, son of late Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. The involvement of CIA was also one of the

conspiracy theories. According to Tom Gouttiere US government could not do that on

530 Arshad Zaman, Economic Relations Between Pakistan and the United States, Journal of Institute of

South Asia, (University of California, 1985), 56-69. 531 Ibid. 532 A.Z. Hilali, Cost & Benefits of Afghan War for Pakistan,

http://www.khyber.org/publications/pdf/afghanwarcosts.pdf, Retrieved April 5, 2017. 533 Ibid. 534 Ibid.

146

the expense of the death of its own Ambassador and the role of ISI or Pakistan army

could be possible behind the incident. But ISI was having good relations with General

Zia because a few months ago when Junejo’s government had demanded the court

martial of ISI chief after the issue of Ojhri Camp, General Zia removed Junejo instead

of taking any action against ISI chief535.

Army’s role under General Mirza Aslam Beg, the successor of General Zia had

also been discussed on some forums because Aslam Beg was also scheduled to travel

with General Zia but he refused to go with him at the eleventh hour. This clue led the

people’s opinion against him but nothing could be said in this regard with full precision.

All of these theories were regarded as conspiracy theories as nothing conclusive had

come out of them.

Benazir Bhutto took the government after elections and she was not interested

in the case as her own father had lost his life due to General Zia’s political implication

of Bhutto in a murder case. ISI skillfully used by General Zia to manipulate political

parties in opposition. In 1985, the major opposition party, PPP was handled by

announcing general elections on non-party basis but after the arrival of Benazir Bhutto,

such strategy could not be more effective. Therefore, ISI was used to play its role to

keep it in control. ISI did this by the creation of Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) in

Sindh and later on IJI was launched at the central level536.

When Zia assumed power in mid-1977, Pakistan was out of the limelight and

was considered as politically unstable country. By the time of Zia's death in 1988, it

had, because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, become an important actor

occupying a central position in the world arena. General Zia inherited a pledge that for

any kind of domestic or international political reasons Pakistan must continue its

progress in the field of nuclear program to compete with India. General Zia skillfully

handled the diplomacy during the period of tension. The United States under the

administration of Jimmy Carter did not welcome the displacement of Bhutto by Zia.

Moreover, human rights, and nuclear nonproliferation were also of concern to Carter

administration. The execution of Bhutto only added to the United States displeasure

with Zia and Pakistan. A number of United States laws, amendments to the Foreign

Assistance Act of 1961, applied to Pakistan especially vis-à-vis its program of nuclear

535 Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy, (London: Pluto Press, 2017), 102. 536 Ibid.

147

weapons development. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979,

causing a sudden reversal of United States policy. Carter, who had described Pakistan

as a frontline state in the Cold War, offered military and economic aid to Pakistan.

When the Ronald Reagan administration took office in January 1981, the level of

assistance increased substantially. In April 1988, a series of agreements were signed

among the United States, the Soviet Union, Pakistan, and Afghanistan that called for

the withdrawal of Soviet forces by mid-February 1989.

The withdrawal was completed on time. Throughout the years of Soviet

occupation of Afghanistan, relations between the United States and Pakistan were best

characterized by close cooperation. US policy makers became increasingly concerned

that General Zia and his associates were giving priority to the Islamic fundamentalists,

especially mujahidin leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. After the implementation of Geneva

Accord and General Zia's death Pakistan’s aid given by the US was ceased. The events

of the Zia period brought Pakistan to a leading position in world affairs. However,

Pakistan's new visibility was closely connected to the supportive role it played for the

anti-Soviet mujahidin in Afghanistan. However, its importance decreased when Soviet

Union withdrew from Afghanistan.

4.2. Indian Factor:

Pakistan’s foreign policy regarding India reflects conflicts. Most of the time

these two countries were found in a situation of conflict and on a few occasions, these

were seen having mutual interaction. The conflict situation remained so high between

the two countries that the small duration of time when the two nations tried to have

mutual cooperation was mostly undermined. The main reason was that, India was a

large country with a lot of resources and so had an upper hand against Pakistan. A

situation of mistrust was produced which created a sense of insecurity in the minds of

the people of Pakistan. This situation of insecurity created a threatening atmosphere for

Pakistan which in turn tried to seek protection in making different economic and

military agreements with the US. The dilemma of Pakistan was politics instability not

due to irresponsible attitude of the politicians after the death of Jinnah. As a result,

military grew power in Pakistan which either managed to run the state affairs directly

or sometimes influenced it while keeping itself behind the curtain. This political

instability also created a sense of insecurity among the people of Pakistan. Moreover,

the unstable democratic values, weak political and state institutions, military

interference and India phobia, affected Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India to a great

148

extent. Since the time of creation of Pakistan, military took control over the core issues

of the country including the issue of Kashmir and tried its best to establish good military

and economic relations with the US instead of seeking help for the resolution of

Kashmir issue. This gave the military of Pakistan a great significance over the civilian

government and the military took control over Pakistan’s foreign policy with India and

Afghanistan especially. This issue also increased the need of military’s involvement in

national policy making. During the military rule of military adventures were tried to

achieve two objectives. Firstly, to make people of Pakistan realize the significance of

military and secondly, to have close ties with the US to get economic and military

support. On the other hand, Indian politicians showed great sense of responsibility after

the death of Gandhi and under the leadership of Nehru. It was a positive point for the

India that its democratic values were better than that of Pakistan. That made India a

better country to have good relations with as compared to Pakistan. The foreign policy

of Pakistan always remained India centric as it was declared the biggest threat to

Pakistan’s sovereignty since creation of Pakistan. Under the British rule, India was the

most suitable place for the US to handle the USSR. The US was having reservations

about the partition of India because according to the US, a united India could be more

effective ally against the USSR. But after partition the US wanted to make India as its

ally instead of Pakistan because of being stronger than Pakistan economically and

militarily but India opted to be non-aligned so Pakistan became its ultimate choice537.

India remained all the time choice of the US for being the most influential developing

country in contemporary world politics. But US also wanted to retain its good

relationship with China and Pakistan. China was the strongest communist power and

did not have the motives of expansion like the USSR. Pakistan, being the most

significant country of the comity of the Muslim states, was also in the good books of

the US. Moreover, all these three countries (China, India and Pakistan) were declared

nuclear powers of the world. All these countries also share borders with each and hence

this area is regarded as the nuclear flashpoint of the world with three neck to neck

nuclear states. So, the US did not want to leave this important region on its own. It is

the main policy of the US to maintain good relationships with all the three countries.

So, whenever, in the past, there was a conflicting situation in this area US came forward

to resolve the issue. The most recent example was during the Kargil War between India

and Pakistan in which the US President Bill Clinton played a key role to resolve the

537 Gouttiere, Interview.

149

crisis. But on some occasions in the past, the tilt of the US towards one specific country

was regarded as a threat for the other country. Most often it was seen that the tilt of the

US was towards India which was never welcomed by Pakistan. Having a look on the

history of this region it appears that the relationship between Pakistan and China

remained mostly cordial.

On the other hand, India had to fight wars with Pakistan in 1948, 1965, 1971

and 1999 and at Siachen during mid-1980s and with China in 1962. The worst

experience of India with its two neighbors proved to be the main source of bringing

Pakistan and China so closer to each other538. The Sino-Pak strategic collaboration was

regarded as “all weather friendship” and it included Chinese arms transfers to Pakistan,

China’s port modernization and road construction activities in Pakistan539. Despite

having so close economic ties, China never supported Pakistan so openly against India

in wars. It was due to geographical significance of India and the depth of its economy.

US also did not disengage with India just for Pakistan’s interest. First interest of the US

in India was no doubt its large economy. Secondly, due to second most populated

country of the world, US regarded it as a significant international market. Thirdly, India

being a larger military it could serve a better US ally than Pakistan.

In the era 1977-88 the response of the Indian government towards the political

situation of the region was quite confusing. In India there were two main regimes in

this era i.e; one was led by Bhartia Janta Party (BJP) and the other was led by the

Congress. The government of BJP showed a soft corner for Pakistan but Congress under

Indra Gandhi and later on under Rajev Gandhi always tried to create political problems

for Pakistan. Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai was from BJP and he gave a foreign

policy statement soon after taking oath that India wanted to have good relations with all

of its neighbors and if the Charter of Friendship with USSR would be taken as the

Charter of Friendship with other countries then his government would have no

objection540. Moreover, the leaders of BJP did not make any comments about Pakistan’s

internal political issues regarding the military coup of General Zia, the trial of Bhutto

and other related issues but Congress leaders were constantly making anti-Pakistan

538 Chintamani Mahapatra, India-China-Pakistan Triangle: The US Factor, Indian Foreign Affairs

Journal Vol. 6, No. 4, October-December 2011, 407-421. 539 Ibid. 540 Ehsan Chaudhry, Pakistan and the Troubled World, (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1993), 213.

150

language to win the support of the people in the forthcoming elections541. BJP

leadership was focused on the regional politics instead of getting involved in the world

issues. It did not use its political, economic and military worth to undermine its

neighbors. It was also a good decision of BJP leadership to condemn the USSR attack

against Afghanistan. Although, India had a good chance to weaken Pakistan in the wake

of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but, the situation shifted to a great extent after

Congress formed its government under the leadership of Indra Gandhi by winning

General Elections.

First of all, Indra Gandhi supported Soviet attack against Afghanistan and

regarded it according to the mutual agreement of friendship between Afghanistan and

the USSR. Moreover, she condemned Pakistan’s role in the Afghan war and its close

ties with the US to defeat the communists. The political stance of India was quite

confusing for the world. One government openly condemned the Soviet invasion and

the other not only argued in favor of Soviet presence in Afghanistan but also gave

assurances to the world on behalf of the USSR that the Soviet army would leave the

territory after the accomplishment of its task542. India argued that the USSR entered

Afghanistan on the request of Afghan government and would leave the region after

defeating the foreign involvement in the internal affairs of the country. The foreign

involvement was taken as the interference of Pakistan in the internal affairs of

Afghanistan. If one thinks about the Afghan government then one comes to know that

Indian statement was close to the reality however, if one thinks of Afghanistan then it

did not have any link with the actual situation because the government of Afghanistan

did not have much acceptance among the people of Afghanistan and they came out

against the government because it took steps to please its Soviet supporters that entailed

displeasure of common people. On January 12, 1980, Brajesh Mishra, the Indian

permanent representative in the UN, stated that India hoped that the people of

Afghanistan and the government would soon manage to handle the internal situation of

Afghanistan against the foreign interference and Soviet troops would not stay in

Afghanistan a day longer than necessary543. He also added that India did not condemn

the Soviet action as the same kinds of actions were taken by the other countries of the

world during different times of the history which were not condemned as well544. The

541 Ibid. 542 Abdul Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 1947-2005, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 155. 543 Ehsan, Pakistan and the Troubled World, 277. 544 Ibid.

151

policy of India regarding Afghanistan crisis was ambiguous which was also quite

alarming for Pakistan. It was a matter of great concern that in case of consolidation of

the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, India would manage to bring harm to Pakistan and

this Soviet-India relationship would become a hard nut to crack for Pakistan545.

Meanwhile, the closer ties of India and the USSR in the shape of a military agreement

was also alarming for Pakistan. According to this agreement a deal was signed between

USSR and India through which the USSR provided MIG aircraft, T-72 tanks and war-

ships on just a throw away price of $1.6 billion although the actual market cost of the

equipment was roughly about $6 billion546.

Pakistan’s policy towards India was rather soft because Pakistan was not

capable to open two fronts at the same time. At the time of Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan, Pakistan hardly forgot the incident of dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971

in which India played a key role. The Indian nuclear tests in 1974 further brought

Pakistan in quite a defensive position. Pakistan’s government was of the view that India

would always be ready to get full advantage to further weaken Pakistan. India was also

alleged by Pakistan for being involved in the issue of Pashtunistan and it was expected

that India would use the land of Afghanistan through Soviet troops to harm Pakistan.

That was the reason, Pakistan instantly decided to resist the USSR through mujahideen.

The other reason for this decision was that Pakistan had been passing through a difficult

stage due to less acceptance of military government throughout the world. Moreover,

the death sentence of the Supreme Court against Bhutto and later on the incident of

hanging him to death had also brought bad name for Pakistan. The world thought it as

a political murder. Bhutto was quite popular among the world despite some reservation

of the US and the West547. Pakistan was also isolated diplomatically because its

relations with the US were at the lowest level ever at that junction of history of Pakistan.

It also had bitter experience with India on the issue of Kashmir. So, it was not possible

for Pakistan to start any kind of confrontation with India or the US. So, Pakistan had

been trying to keep India neutral during Afghan crisis and to get full support of the US

in the war against the USSR. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan helped Pakistan in

this regard.

545 Sattar, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 156. 546 Ibid., 160. 547 Sadia Mushtaq, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Towards India: An Analysis of Civilian Governments and

Military Regimes 1972-2008, PhD Thesis, (Lahore: Government College University, 2005), 141.

152

The growing economy of India and its agreements to get military equipment

from the USSR and the US was another matter of concern for Pakistan. When in 1980,

India made a deal of 1.8 billion dollars with the USSR for the purchase of military

equipment, Pakistan’s government regarded it alarming for the security of the country.

The other factor that played in the minds of Pakistan’s decision makers was the fact that

after a short interval of time, the forceful and strong Indra Gandhi was once again back

in power in 1979. She launched aggression against Pakistan. She was also much

powerful to maintain good relationships between military and the politicians of India.

Everyone in Pakistan was of the view that in her presence it was impossible to expect

from India other than aggression. Moreover, India was a declared nuclear power and

Pakistan did not have sufficient arms supply to keep its deterrence with a nuclear India.

Due to vast market and better economy, India sought attractions of the USSR, the US

and China.

Pakistan was in much need of obtaining weapons and to upgrade its missile

system. Despite having purchase of the required weapons, even Pakistan’s economic

assistance was stopped by the US. General Zia was a military man and he knew well

what Pakistan’s military needs were at that time. The presence of the Soviet troops in

Afghanistan was another critical condition for General Zia. Pakistan successfully

diverted the situation in its favor by offering strong resistance to the Soviet army with

the help of Afghan mujahideen. General Zia was well aware of the tactics to take the

benefit of the situation. He was having a close eye on the US politics and refused

initially to take economic aid from the US as “peanuts” and waited for Reagan to come

into power and to make a good deal with him. Pakistan’s main objective was on one

hand to stop the USSR and on the other hand to get military aid to strengthen its army

sufficiently to reduce Indian threat. As evident from President Zia’s first demand to the

US i.e. request for the latest hi-tech F-16 Fighter Aircraft, it could be easily argued that

the Indian threat was the foremost with Pakistani strategic planners, even as Soviet

troops were consolidating their positions in Kabul and other Afghan cities. Pakistan was

well aware of the political harms which it got since its creation by the troika consisting

of India, USSR and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s government and the foreign policy makers

were taking the situation in two ways. First and the foremost was the threat of the USSR

that wanted to reach the warm waters of Gwadar in Baluchistan. The second major

threat to the government was the internal political threat due to the socially and

economically deprived situation of the two provinces of Pakistan sharing a border with

153

Afghanistan. It was possible for the Afghanistan and the USSR to get support from the

political elements of the provinces having differences with the government548. Generals

Zia’s policy was accepted in Pakistan as most people did not support the communist

ideology as well as the Soviet–Indian partnership549.

General Zia had to make major policy shifts by not to totally concentrate on the

internal political situation of Pakistan. He chose the option of resisting the USSR,

Pakistan was going to handle the regional politics or to a great extent the world’s politics

by starting confrontation with the USSR. General Zia accused the USSR of violating

the charter of the UN which restricted the attack on a sovereign country550. Pakistan’s

decision of opposing the expansion of the communism and of engaging the Soviet army

with the help of Afghan mujahideen was welcomed by the world and the US

particularly. The new era of Pakistan’s relations with the US was going to start551.

Pakistan was at the front-line in the war against the USSR and its front-line status was

in favor of the US. Pakistan and the US made an alliance to defeat the grand design of

the USSR which was to reach the warm waters of Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea552.

US provided a lot of military equipment to Pakistan to distribute among the Afghan

resistance groups fighting against the USSR. The Afghan refugees were also another

significant issue and US provided $400 to Pakistan to play its role for the settlement of

the refugees. According to an estimate, up to mid December 1979, there were about

3,00,000 refugees in KP, 51,269 in Baluchistan, 1,141 in the northern areas553.

Unfortunately, Pakistan’s role as a frontline state was not welcomed by India.

The active involvement of the US in the politics of South Asia and Pakistan’s

development in the nuclear field under the umbrella of the political situation of the

region was a source of disappointment for India. Therefore, India openly condemned

Pakistan’s role and blamed that Pakistan had totally ignored the Kashmir issue due to

its Afghan policy554. India regarded the growing military cooperation between Pakistan

and the US as a serious security threat to itself. Moreover, although India took full

support from the USSR during 1971 and also established friendly ties with the US but

548 Francis Fuhuyama, The Security of Pakistan: A trip Report Santa Monica. Rand Corporation. p. 30-31, September 1980 549 Shahi, Pakistan Security and Foreign Policy, 8-9. 550 Sadia, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Towards India, 142. 551 Ibid. 552 Ibid, 143. 553 Ehsan, Pakistan and the Troubled World, 217. 554 Sadia, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Towards India, 144.

154

it kept itself always non-aligned to discourage the role of the super powers in South

Asia. Indian Foreign Minister Shyam Nandan Mishra while addressing the Havana

Conference said that Indian policy of non-alignment was the dream of Gandhi and

Nehru. He also added that the non-aligned policy made India possible to move in the

right direction and to opt freely its political stance on major issues of the world and kept

it apart from the influence of the super powers555. India was also having reservation

against a huge supply of weapons to Pakistan by US. According to the Indian

leadership, this frequent supply of weapons to Pakistan would disturb the geostrategic

position of Pakistan and India in the region and in future, after the conclusion of war,

Pakistan might use the same weapons against India. The same reservations were put by

the Indian before the US as President. P.V. Narsimha Rao, the Foreign Minister of India,

stated that,

“It is our apprehension that the induction of arms into

Pakistan would convert South Asia into a theatre of

Great Power confrontation and conflict and would

threaten the security of India.”556

Indra Gandhi also showed reservations against Pakistan and the US military

deal. She described her doubt that the weapons given by the US to Pakistan might be

used against Afghanistan government through the fighting resistance groups, or against

India through Pakistan army and even against Pakistani people in the form of sectarian

conflicts557. Indra Gandhi’s last prediction proved true as after acquiring weapons the

sectarian conflicts increased to a great extent causing a lot of deaths in Pakistan. The

main cause of such kind of Indian feeling was because of the deal of Pakistan with the

US for latest F-16 fighter planes. Indian government was of the view that that Pakistan

had been demanding from the US, a huge quantity of weapons which was beyond their

needs to accomplish the task of fighting the Soviet troops. It was a matter of great

concern for them that Pakistan would accommodate arms beyond the needs of defense

purposes558. India was much concerned about the growing relationship between

Pakistan and the US and suspected that Pakistan would either continue its nuclear

program under the umbrella of the war against the communism or it would manage to

achieve concession from the US about Pakistan’s nuclear program as US was much

obliged to Pakistan at that time. Later on, having the status of the front-line ally,

555 Ibid., 145. 556 Ibid., 146. 557 Ajay Saksenha, India and Pakistan: Their Foreign Policies, (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1987),

284. 558 Ehsan, Pakistan and the Troubled World, 272.

155

Pakistan also got the favor of the NATO559. Although, India had been developing its

nuclear program, which was already much upgraded than that of Pakistan yet it was

having concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear progress. India was in other words ignored

by the US and the West due to its less geographical role in the Afghan War. On the

other hand, Pakistan was at the limelight and having the status of front-line state. India

could not absorb growing good will between the US and Pakistan and started the

propaganda campaign against Pakistan’s nuclear program and its harmful effects for the

efforts done by the US and the world regarding non-proliferation of the nuclear

technology. Furthermore, India alleged Pakistan for providing an opportunity for the

direct confrontation between the two superpowers of the world which might result in

damaging the peace and security of South Asia560.

While, the reality was different, because since the time of Bhutto, Pakistan had

been trying to come out of the external influence regarding its foreign policy. Its tilt

was shifted from the world politics to the Islamic world. Therefore, Pakistan organized

the Second Islamic Summit at Lahore. For the same reason, Pakistan joined NAM (Non-

Aligned Movement) in 1979561, which showed that Pakistan was no more willing to be

dictated by the US. But it was quite difficult for Pakistan to achieve its objectives

because Pakistan was not doing well economically so it could not reduce the US

influence. Pakistan’s focus was at that time just India and its nuclear program and for

the same reason Pakistan initiated its own nuclear program. After the Soviet invasion

of Afghanistan, Pakistan totally ignored India and focused its intentions towards

Afghan War. But to fight the war against the USSR was not possible for Pakistan

without getting support from the US. So once again Pakistan had to keep close ties with

the US. Pakistani leadership was of the view that Pakistan never objected India-USSR

partnership or the military and economic support given by the US so India also had no

right to object Pakistan’s cordial ties with the US. Having look at the political scenario

of the time, it can be argued that India forced Pakistan to seek military aid from the US

particularly after the incident of East Pakistan and the nuclear tests of India, the sense

of insecurity of Pakistan had raised to a great extent. Pakistan was already like a

sandwich between two hostile countries i.e. Afghanistan and India. Especially, after the

threat of USSR, Pakistan was in a critical situation. At that Pakistan was left with no

other option except to improve its ties with the US. The main blame on Pakistan was

559 Sadia, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Towards India, 146. 560 Ibid. 561 Ibid.

156

that it had been inviting the super powers to use South Asia as their battle field to

achieve their strategic goals. But Pakistan had not invited the Soviet troops to invade

Afghanistan and Pakistan was just trying to restrict USSR to establish its position in

South Asia. Pakistan had done all that at the cost of its internal peace and security and

to a great extent its economy. It was a false propaganda of the India that Pakistan was

inviting the US to affirm its position in South Asia because US did not have any other

motive except to defeat the USSR. That was obvious from the fact, the US quit from

the region when USSR decided to leave Afghanistan after being failed in facing the

resistance of the mujahideen backed by Pakistan and the US caused humiliation of its

army, economic burden and due to changing political leadership of the USSR562. The

other propaganda, which the Indian government initiated against Pakistan that it might

use the weapons obtained by the US against India, was also baseless. At that time, it

was not possible for Pakistan to initiate any kind of confrontations on its eastern border

as well.

Pakistan was in a very difficult situation after the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan. This situation could go even worse if General Zia had not moved in the

right direction. out of the two longest borders, Pakistan had been fighting against the

Soviet troops with the help of Afghan mujahideen. General Zia was well aware of the

fact that it would be a foolish act on behalf of his government if he would start any kind

of confrontation with India. Pakistan’s policy towards India was rather of reconciliation.

To get rid of Indian reservations of getting huge stock of weapons from the US, Pakistan

government proposed a No War Pact with India on November 22, 1981563. India was

reluctant to admit that this proposal was fully supported by Pakistan army. To give

assurance, General Zia himself issued a statement that,

“If India is inclined to banish its unfounded fears and

is ready to grasp the hand of friendship which we

extend, it shall not find us wanting in establishing

good neighborly relations on our part, we are prepared

to enter into immediate consultation with India for the

purpose of enhancing mutual guarantee of non-

aggression and no use of force in the spirit of the Simla

Agreement.”564

He further proposed that a mutual committee consisting of military officials

from both Pakistan and India must be constituted to examine in detail the military

562 Ibid. 563 Ibid, 148. 564 Hassan Askari Rizvi, Pakistan and Geo-Strategic Environment, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993),

40.

157

strengths of both armies and if they would deem necessary then the reduction would be

incorporated on terms acceptable for both the countries565.

India refused to accept No War Pact and argued that first of all both the countries

should take steps for confidence building between each other and after that they should

sign No War Pact. India brought its own Agreement of Friendship which was like No

War Pact initiated by Pakistan with a few new clauses. India proposed that both the

government should sign an agreement about no-use of weapons and should not support

any foreign country by giving airports and military bases for the use of any war like

activity against a country of South Asia. The more significant clause of the proposal

was that both Pakistan and India should handle mutual issues on bilateral level and no

assistance would be sought from any other country of the world. Pakistan also refused

to accept Indian proposal because Pakistan was busy in the war against the USSR with

close assistance of the US and it was not possible for Pakistan at that time to get out of

the war and leave the Afghan mujahideen alone. Although, the US had the capability to

tackle the Soviet troops alone but without the help of Pakistan it was not possible to win

the war. Pakistan was the only way through which the US could provide weapons to the

Afghan mujahideen. Moreover, Pakistan was not in favor of keeping the third party’s

role out of the Kashmir issue because India had not negotiated properly with Pakistan

to resolve the Kashmir issue. Because, at that time it was not possible for Pakistan to

start any serious confrontation with India so it politely refused Indian proposal. As there

was no acceptance of each other’s proposals, so no advancement could be made in this

regard.

Although, no proper agreement could be signed between the two countries due

to difference of opinions on both sides, yet it opened a window of negotiations with

India. To take full advantage of the pleasant atmosphere, Pakistani Foreign Minister,

Agha Shahi visited India on March 10, 1982. He met with Indra Gandhi who proposed

that a joint commission of Pakistan and India should be constituted to enhance mutual

cooperation in different fields. Although, she did not mention the strategic issues

between the two countries such as Kashmir but it was a positive development between

the two countries in other fields like, economy, culture, education, science etc.566.

During 80s, Pakistan was involved in close security relationship with the US

therefore, its security situation with India could not improve. On the other hand, it went

565 Ibid., 39. 566 Sadia, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Towards India, 150.

158

on complex day by day. In fact, the insecurity grew even further, as the conflict in

Kashmir moved to new heights when both India and Pakistan got involved in a warlike

situation at Siachen Glacier situated at the Northern part of the Line of Control (LoC)

in Kashmir. Siachen Glacier constituted of high mountain terrain right up to the Chinese

border which remained covered with snow throughout the year. Indian Army managed

to capture two important strategic passes which made them secured the entire length of

the Glacier. But Pakistan army responded in the same way and successfully occupied

the remaining height just in front of Indian posts. This event decided that the glacier

warfare was to begin between the two countries on the issue of Kashmir. With

permanent positions at heights ranging between 10,000 to 22,000 feet, this was the

highest and one of the costliest battle-grounds in the world. Pakistan had to spend

enormous amounts of money, to support its troops on such heights. The real cost of the

conflict was not so much in terms of money, as the aggravation of the perception that

India was an untrustworthy neighbour, who would use all available resources, and any

opportunities offered to undermine Pakistan567.

Pakistan highlighted the issue of Siachen and blamed India for initiating an

unnecessary confrontation with Pakistan at that moment when Pakistan was completely

focused on its western border. India claimed Siachen Glaciers for the first time in 1984.

However, since the division of the sub-continent this region belonged to Pakistan. A lot

of atlases and maps provided by the US, Britain and Encyclopedia Britannica showed

that Siachen Glacier was a part of Pakistan at the time of Independence568. In reply to

that India blamed Pakistan for developing “Islamic Bomb” without bringing it to the

notice of the US. The main purpose of initiating this confrontation was to divert

Pakistan’s attention from Afghan War but this confrontation could not let Pakistan

down in the war against the USSR because the war was not fought on the official level

and it was totally supervised by the ISI and CIA.

India was much concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear program and highlighted

that Pakistan had been preparing a bomb for the protection of Muslim countries. The

world was also impressed by the propaganda launched by India and hence this nuclear

bomb of Pakistan was labeled as the “Islamic Bomb” throughout the world569. US did

not notice Indian propaganda because of its strategic interests, although CIA was well

567 Wirsing, Pakistan's Security Under Zia, 28,99. 568 Sadia, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Towards India, 150. 569 Ehsan, Pakistan and the Troubled World, 276.

159

aware of the fact that Pakistan had been developing its nuclear program under the

umbrella of the joint war against the USSR. Indian propaganda just spoiled its relations

with Pakistan. Nuclear issue was of much concern for the Indian government that it

blamed Pakistan of starting nuclear race in the region. Everyone was well aware of the

fact that it was India that tested its nuclear device for the first time and Pakistan’s

nuclear program was just as a counter action for its protection. Just before taking oath

Indra Gandhi described Indian concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in these

words;

“India and rest of the world knew that Pakistan was always

developing the capacity to build nuclear weapons and would

soon explode a nuclear device. This might prompt India to

explode another nuclear device of its own.”570

In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi indicated that Pakistan was very close to develop a

nuclear bomb and later on Indian Defence Minister C. Subramanian stated that India

would find grave problem if Pakistan developed a nuclear bomb571.

On some occasions Pakistan also felt some reservations vis-à-vis growing

relations between India and the US. When Carter Administration imposed sanctions on

Pakistan then US did not expect any kind of strategic support from Pakistan. So, to

replace Pakistan, the US turned towards India. In 1980s during the cold war period this

cooperation became visible. Although, after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US

again had to rely on Pakistan due to its geographical location, yet it provided a lot of

military equipment to India. US offered to sell American military hardware to India as

well. In 1980, an Indian team visited the US to explore the possibility of buying TOW

anti-tank missiles and long-range howitzers572. Carter Administration had approved a

policy about disapproving the use of an advanced American electronic guidance system

in India’s Jaguar Aircraft19 and in the nuclear field. But it reversed its policy and

permitted two more enriched uranium fuel shipments to Tarapur573. The Reagan

Administration also provided limited assistance to India. India sounded out Washington

on the purchase of a range of US defence technology, including F-5 aircraft, super

computers, night vision goggles and radars. In 1984 Washington approved the supply

of selected technology to India including gas turbines for naval frigates and engines for

570 Sadia, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Towards India, 152. 571 Ibid. 572 Ashok Sharma, Indo-US Strategic Convergence: An Overview of Defense and Military Cooperation,

(New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2008), 9. 573 Ibid.

160

prototypes of India’s light combat aircraft. There were also unpublicized transfers of

technology, including the engagement of a US company, Continental Electronics, to

design and build a new VLF communications station at Tirunelveli in Tamil Nadu,

which was commissioned in the late 1980s574.US was almost holding a better position

with China and working alliance with Pakistan. So, India and Afghanistan were the two

countries which were under the influence of USSR. Although India was not so much

dependent on the USSR but a lot of arms held by the Indian army was USSR made. US

could bring India out of the influence of USSR only by extending it full military

support. So, in the wake of Afghanistan crisis Carter provided incentive to India in the

form of economic assistance and military aid. India was a growing economy at that time

and was in search of the ways to acquire variety of military resources and investment

in the field of scientific, technical and trade field. Therefore, it was important for it to

look towards the US in this regard. Moreover, USSR was also not in a position to extend

full support to India due to Afghan war. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was

signed between the US and India in 1984 on transfer of technology. In exchange for

alterations to India’s own export-control regulations, the United States would begin

allowing access to civilian and dual-use technologies as well as some military

assistance, subject to previous restrictions imposed by US law. Under this agreement,

sensitive technology transfers took place. India received super computers, General

Electric (GE) F-404 engines for the light combat aircraft (LCA) programme, LM-2500

gas turbine engines for upgrading Indian naval vessels, night vision devices for tanks

as well as permission to co-produce the devices, co-production of the Northrop

Corporation TF-5 aircraft in India and F-5 tooling facility, at 5 per cent of the original

cost575. In terms of export licenses issued by the US in 1987, India ranked number seven.

In the period 1984-88, there was a five-fold increase in US government approvals of

civilian technology exports to India576. The MoU did lead to a surge of technology

licenses to Indian companies and government institutions, but mainly for the items that

were below the level of state-of-the-art technology. Since 1985, policy-makers in the

Reagan Administration began to use the term “opening to India.” The US defence

secretary visited India in 1986 and 1987, and his successor Frank Carlucci, in 1988,

paved the way for improving ties between the US and India577. The US also indicated

574 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%E2%80%93United_States_relations, Retrieved April 15, 2017. 575 Ibid. 576 Ibid. 577 Ibid.

161

the desire to forge closer relations with India and vice versa. There was a new beginning

in Indo-US defence cooperation in 1989 when apart from the official dialogue, Track II

diplomacy entered the scene. The defence minister of India, on his visit to the US, was

accompanied by high level civilian and armed Services officials to the United States.

This served as a major step to remove mutual misperceptions and enhance

understanding among the strategic communities of both countries. Since then, there

have been frequent high-level exchanges of visits between the armed forces personnel

as well as civilian officials dealing with security issues between the two countries.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War came to an end, paving the

way for a new international matrix in which India had to place itself. India, in a

significant departure from the Cold War paradigm, allowed US military planes to refuel

at Bombay’s Sahar Airport during the Gulf War for the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi

military occupation578. It was due to the US support extended to India that despite good

relations with Iraq, it condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and adhered to all 12

mandatory United Nations Security Council Resolutions on sanctions against Iraq.

India had been enjoying all the benefits of nuclear technology, military

advancement and growing economy but it could not absorb Pakistan’s progress whether

it was in nuclear field or in the relationship with the US. Indra Gandhi threatened

Pakistan that if it did not stop its nuclear program for developing an atomic bomb, it

would be expelled out of the NAM. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan did not want to enter

in any kind of confrontation with India so Pakistan adopted a linear opinion. Pakistan

issued a policy statement that Pakistan’s nuclear program was not against any country

but it was for the peaceful purpose only. Although, India was well aware of the fact that

Pakistan thought of developing its own nuclear program only after the nuclear tests of

India and the main objective of its program was deterrence yet it had started propaganda

against it. At that time, it appeared that due to having a good military alliance with

Pakistan, the US was showing some kind of favor to India especially regarding nuclear

policy. US thought that India had made better nuclear advancement than Pakistan. A

US scientist perceived Indian worth over Pakistan in the words that if India could defeat

Pakistan and dismember East Pakistan in just fourteen days then why could not it take

out Pakistan’s nuclear program in fourteen minutes579.

578 Ibid. 579 Sadia, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Towards India, 153.

162

India had been constantly highlighting Pakistan’s advancement in the field of

nuclear technology and it was blamed that Pakistan would multiply in this technology

to a limitless extent580. But on the other hand, Pakistan had been constantly showing its

willingness to sign NPT and declared that Pakistan’s nuclear program was for peace

and power purposes and it did not have other objectives. General Zia had been

constantly willing to ignore India to divert its full attention towards Afghan border. But

when he saw that India had been constantly pressurizing Pakistan to weaken its position,

he increased Pakistan’s defense budget to 43% to be used for the purchase of weapons

and other military equipment581. General Zia was facing serious domestic political

problems because very strong voices were raised in favor of democracy and he had to

hold elections on 1985 as a result of which government was handed over to Muhammad

Khan Junejo but General Zia was still having the strongest position in the government

as the President with the power of 58-2 (b) that authorized the President to dismiss the

government. Later on, the arrival of Benazir Bhutto also disturbed General Zia

politically so he had to deal with three challenges i.e.; Afghanistan, India and internal

instability. India took full advantage of the situation and criticized Pakistan’s elections

which were held on non-party basis. Pakistani officials totally turned down Indian

allegations and regarded it as interference in Pakistan’s internal matters. India also

blamed Pakistan of extending full assistance to the insurgent in India which made

Pakistan and India relations worse582.

Two major South Asian countries were having worse relations and there was no

South Asian organization present at that time to diffuse the situation. Although, this

idea was discussed at least three conferences: the Asian Relations Conference held in

New Delhi in April 1947; the Baguio Conference in the Philippines on May 1950; and

the Colombo Powers Conference held in Sri Lanka in April 1954583. In late 1970s and

in early 1980s efforts in this regard were accelerated and at last on December 8, 1985,

South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established584. The

first ever session of SAARC was held in Dhaka on December 7-8, 1985, in which all

the heads of South Asian States participated including the President of Bangladesh

580 Ibid. 581 Ibid. 582 Ibid., 155. 583 http://jang.com.pk/important_events/saarc_2004/history.html, Retrieved April 14, 2017. 584 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Asian_Association_for_Regional_Cooperation, Retrieved April

14, 2017.

163

Hussain Ershad, the King of Bhutan Jigme Singye Wangchuk, the President of Pakistan

Zia-ul-Haq, the Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi, the King of Nepal Birendra Shah,

the President of Sri Lanka JR Jayewardene, and the President of Maldives Maumoon

Gayoom585. The creation of SAARC was a positive advancement as it brought the South

Asian states together and became a source of reducing tension between Pakistan and

India, the two most powerful member countries. India was the major country of this

forum and in the beginning, Pakistan suspected that India might try to materialize its

dream of leading the South Asian states through this forum but when the main functions

of this organization were approved then Pakistan’s reservations were eliminated to a

great extent. The major aim of this organization was to take steps to improve the cultural

relations among the member countries and to reduce the tension or conflicts the member

states had with each other. It totally rejected any kind of super power status in SAARC.

This organization brought the leadership of Pakistan and India closer to each other to

discuss the mutual issues through dialogue.

But this pleasant atmosphere could not last for a year and India again started

blaming Pakistan for its dual diplomacy. It blamed that on one hand Pakistan had been

in close association with the US to fulfill US aims by disturbing the peace of South Asia

and on the other it had been working at the platform of SAARC to bring peace in the

region586. Meanwhile, Indian internal political situation also became worse when a Sikh

movement started and demanded from Indian government to give Sikhs their due status

by giving Chandigarh proper significance in the province of the Punjab but Indian

government did not listen to them. On this the Sikh Movement was converted into a

militant movement and they made Golden Temple as their base. Although, Indian

government managed to stop this movement by force but this movement further spoiled

Pakistan-India mutual relations. India blamed Pakistan for launching the support to this

movement just to weaken India. They also alleged that Pakistan provided weapons to

the Sikhs to start the armed agitation587. But at that Pakistan was already in a difficult

situation due to Afghan crisis and internal politics due to which Pakistan was not able

to open a new front. On the basis of these allegations, India refused to negotiate with

Pakistan on any forum. Later on, Pakistan also alleged India for being involved in

disturbing the peace of Sindh.

585 Ibid. 586 Sadia, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Towards India, 157. 587 Ibid.

164

The situation went worse and India deployed its army on Pakistan’s border.

India justified its step by alleging Pakistan’s involvement in Indian internal affairs.

India was much aggressive and started its military exercises called “Brasstacks” along

with India-Pakistan border in Rajhistan and Punjab588. It was an alarming situation for

Pakistan as it had to concentrate on two long borders at a time. To cope with the Indian

threat, Pakistan also deployed its army on border with India. The two armies were

facing each other at the border and a small mistake could change into major war. The

war between Pakistan and India could be beneficial for India but it meant total

destruction for Pakistan because Pakistan did not have the ability to fight two wars at

the same time. It was a crucial time for General Zia. At that time Pakistan Cricket team

was on a scheduled tour to India. On February 22, 1987, General Zia went to India to

watch the cricket match. His motive was to have a dialogue with Rajiv Gandhi to

convince him to avoid any kind of war at this crucial time. He was successful in

dissolving the war-like situation and both the armies returned to their normal positions.

US was also worried about the situation as it would force Pakistan to divert its attentions

from the western border. This situation was not suitable for the US. After the dissolution

of the situation, US observers were happy and they appreciated the efforts of General

Zia in this regard589.

Pakistan’s relations with India throughout the period of Afghan War remained

at the lowest ever level. India tried its best to engage Pakistan on eastern border but full

credit had begiven to Pakistan and General Zia who dealt with Indian aggression

carefully time and remained focused on the western border. But throughout this period

there was hardly any role of the US to normalize relations between the two countries.

The reason was that the US wanted to have good relations with both the countries. For

the same reason, the US on one hand extended a lot of support to Pakistan in fighting

against the USSR and on the other it also gave military and economic aid to India to

maintain its good relations. But Pakistan always showed its reservations when the US

launched military support for India as India remained conscious about Pakistan’s status

as front-line state in Afghan War. US did not openly favor either Pakistan or India

because it did not want to lose any of these countries. US also did not play its role

588 Shahid Javed Burki, Craig Baxter, Pakistan Under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia Rule, (New York:

Westview Press, 1991), 141. 589 Sadia, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Towards India, 159.

165

openly to reduce the tension between the two nations. So, it could be argued that Indian

factor remained active throughout the period of Afghan War.

4.3. Pakistan-US Joint Assistance to Major Resistance Groups in

Afghan War:

A few years before the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan, the agitation against

the Soviet backed Afghan governments had started. During the regime of Sardar Daud,

strict actions were taken against the leaders of Islamic parties including Abdul Rasool

Sayyaf, Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar etc. Most of these leaders

were ill-treated and sent to jails, therefore some of them managed to migrate to Pakistan

such as Rabbani and Hekmatyar. Later on, Tarakai, Amin and Karmal also continued

the communist policies to please USSR. Especially during the regime of Karmal,

several anti-Islamic steps were taken which ignited hatred in the hearts of people.

Several agricultural reforms were introduced by the pro-communist regimes which

badly affected the poor farmers. People were fed up with the reforms introduced by the

government and a large number of them migrated to Pakistan and Iran before the Soviet

intervention. A large number of people, who could not leave Afghanistan, left cities and

went to mountains. Besides, armed groups started resistance against the government

according to their capacity but they could not offer valuable resistance. After the Soviet

intervention, a number of Afghan soldiers joined these resistance groups which

accelerated the movement. These trained soldiers brought with them arms and

ammunition and they also taught other people useful fighting strategies. Although, on

some occasions, they offered significant resistance to the Soviet troops but they did not

have sufficient arms. At the same time, Pakistan regarded the Soviet presence in

Afghanistan as a great threat to its internal security. It was not in favor of Pakistan to

have direct military encounter with the USSR army so Pakistan government decided to

assist these resistance groups through ISI. Some of Afghan leaders were already in

Pakistan, so they were contacted by the Pakistani officials. US also decided to extend

full assistance to these militants and in this way a much-organized military resistance

was started. Main Afghan leaders who were contacted by ISI were Burhan-ud-Din

Rabbani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Molvi Younis Khalis, Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, Syed

Ahmed Gilani, Sibghat Ullah Mujadadi, Molvi Nabi Muhammadi etc. These Afghan

leaders were having significant following in Afghanistan and among the Afghan

migrated people. Although there were other people as well, who were fighting against

166

the Soviet troops but ISI decided to support these seven leaders and their parties to

accelerate the resistance movement against the Soviet army. It is a matter of quite

interest that none of the people from Shia community of Afghanistan participated in the

war under Pakistan’s leadership. They were aligned with Iran and got support from

Iranian government. So, they were much influenced by Iran and they were taking part

in the war to fulfill Iranian interests. Therefore, they were fully supported and funded

by Iran590.

Prof. Sibghat Ullah Mujaddadi was born in 1926 in Afghanistan591. He was one

of the prominent leaders of Afghan movement. His main achievement was to unite the

ulemas on one platform. During Sardar Daud’s government he migrated to Denmark592.

He laid the foundation of a mosque in Denmark and started preaching Islam. After the

Soviet intervention of Afghanistan, he laid the foundation of his party “Jabh-e-Nijat

Milli” to make his homeland free from Soviet occupation. Mujaddadi belonged to the

famous Mujaddadi family of Afghanistan whose millions of followers were spread

throughout Afghanistan and the Muslim states of the Middle East. This family is the

descendant of Naqshbandia chain of Sufism. “Qilla Jawad” is a well-known shrine of

this chain which is located in the surroundings of Kabul593. He was imprisoned in 1959

and remained in prison for five years594. This family showed a great resistance against

Afghan governments on the introduction of western traditions. With the passage of

time, this family westernized itself as well. At present this family is better recognized

as the moderated Muslim family instead of conservatives. Mujaddadi received

education from Kabul University and then went to Jamia Alazhar of Egypt595. In 1971,

during the reign of Sardar Daud, he formed “Jamiat Ulemae Muhammadi” and gathered

a large number of ulema at the platform of this party and started a strong resistance

against the Atheism in Afghanistan. But due to the strict action taken by the

government, he migrated to Denmark. He also lived in Libya for some time. In February

1989, after the departure of Soviet troops, a meeting was held for the formation of joint

government in Afghanistan. Almost all the mujahideen leaders participated in the

meeting. Mujaddadi was chosen as the President of Afghanistan596. He also served as

590 Rais, War Without Winner, 195. 591 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sibghatullah_Mojaddedi, Retrieved April 19, 2017. 592 Pasha, Fath-e-Afghanistan, 272. 593 Ibid. 594 Afghan Bios, "Who is Who in Afghanistan: Mojadedi, Sibghatullah Hazrat Sahib Mujadidi Mojadidi".

Retrieved April 19, 2017. 595 Pasha, Fath-e-Afghanistan, 272. 596 Ibid.

167

the head of the transitional council which was formed in April 1992 to supervise the

transfer of power from the falling Soviet regime. He had been affiliated with Rabata-e-

Alam-e-Islami (World Muslim League) which addressed the basic question of Islamic

solidarity and cooperation among the Muslim states. His part had the fighting strength

of 2,000 men and had 1,50,000 followers.

Professor Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani was another main leader of the Afghan

militants. He was considered as one of the founders of the resistance movement against

the pro-communist elements of Afghanistan. He migrated to Pakistan during early

1970s597. He was working with Hekmatyar but in 1975 they split up over a variety of

factors including ethnicity, social background and ambitions for the leadership. He had

close affiliation with Syed Moududi and his party Jamat-e-Islami. Late Qazi Hussain

Ahmed, ex-Ameer of Jamat-e-Islami was one of his close friends. He was born in 1942

in Badkhashan province of Northern Afghanistan. He could speak Arabic and Persian

along with Pashtu. He completed his education from the faculty of Shariah of Kabul

University598. He also taught Islamic Law in Kabul University in early 1960s. Later on,

he went to Jamia Alazhar of Egypt. In 1968, he received a PhD degree in Islamic

philosophy from Jamia Alazhar. After the completion of his education, he started

teaching in Egypt. He affiliated himself with Ikhwan-ul-Muslameen (Muslim

Brotherhood)599. Later on, he returned to Afghanistan and affiliated himself again with

Kabul University. He became the Dean of the faculty of Islamic Law at Kabul

University. He was much impressed by the teachings of Moududi so he returned to

Afghanistan and started working for the Islamic Movement. With the help of Moududi,

he formed and strengthened Jamat-e-Islami in Afghanistan. During the period of Soviet

occupation, he led the militants and fought bravely in Panj Sher. He provided effective

resistance to the Soviet army in Panj Sher causing great damage to its military strategy.

Famous Afghan Commanders, Ahmad Shah Masood, Zabiullah and Ismael Khan were

also affiliated to his party600. His party and affiliates fought a very successful and potent

guerrilla campaign in the province of Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Baghlan and

Mazar-i-Sharif601. He belonged to Tajik ethnic group and his party had great influence

on the Northern Afghanistan. He wrote more than two dozen books on different topics

597 Ibid., 273. 598 Ibid. 599 Ibid. 600 Rais, War Without Winners, 183. 601 Ibid., 182.

168

and had mastery over eight languages. He was given the ministry of reconstruction in

the coalition government formed after the withdrawal of Soviet troops602. He

represented the Afghan mujahideen in several conferences held on international level.

His party had 3,000 fighting strength and about 1,00,000 followers. It did not enjoy

support from the rural masses. Their main areas of operation were Kunar and

Badakhshan Provinces. Its power bases were located in Uzbek and Tajik regions of

North and North-East Afghanistan.

Engineer Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was the head of Hizb-e-Islami. He was born at

Imam Sahib, a place in Kunduz Province of Afghanistan in 1947603. While he was

studying in Engineering Faculty of the Kabul University, he joined Anjuman Nojwanan-

e-Islam and started resistance against the government of Daud against his pro-

communist steps. Daud Khan took strict actions against this movement and killed its

leadership including Abdul Raheem Niazi. After him, Hekmatyar himself led the

movement and was ill-treated by Sardar Daud. He was sentenced to death by the Afghan

government for killing a communist student. He migrated to Pakistan in early 1970s

and continued his resistance from Pakistan604. He was one of the early militants who

started armed movement against pro-communist government of Afghanistan. It is also

believed that he started the movement against Tarakai and later on in 1990 he supported

the rebellion of General Tanai against Najeeb605. He was the Vice President of the

seven-party alliance of mujahideen against the USSR. He was most wanted by the

USSR as he provided great damage to the communists. Government of the USSR had

announced a huge sum of money for killing him. He was the most favored by Pakistani

establishment amongst all the seven leaders of the parties included in the alliance

against the USSR. In an interview, Pakistani ISI Chief, General Hamid Gul replied on

the question of favoring Hekmatyar that Pakistan supported the Afghan resistance

leaders on the basis of some qualities including party’s organization, discipline and

effectiveness of combat606. He was appointed as the Foreign Minister in the coalition

Afghan government after the withdrawal of the Soviet army607. His party was one of

the largest and oldest resistance groups in Afghanistan. It had about 7,000 fighting men

and 2,50,000 followers. Its main areas of activity were Paktia, Kabul, Kandahar, Herat

602 Pasha, Fath-e-Afghanistan, 273.. 603 Ibid., 274. 604 Ibid. 605 Ibid. 606 Grare, Pakistan and Afghan Conflict, 93. 607 Pasha, Fath-e-Afghanistan, 274.

169

and Kunduz Province. He has vowed to establish an Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

more or less along the ideological foundations of Khomeini’s Iran. Khomeini’s radical

Islamic Revolution in Iran helped Hekmatyar to cultivate for a minute relations with the

Islamic Republican Party of Iran. He also earned enough goodwill to operate for some

time a radio station in Iranian Baluchistan and promoted some understanding with the

Tehran-backed Shiite regional groups in Hazarajat. But his relations with Iran soured

after Khomeini’s death608.

Professor Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf was the head of Ithad-e-Islami Barai Azadi-

e-Afghanistan (Muslim Unity for Freedom of Afghanistan). His real name was Abdul

Rasool Sayyaf but during the Afghan War he had close affiliation with an Arab

Professor Abdullah Azzam who changed his name to Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf609. He

got a university degree from the faculty of Shariah from Kabul University and went to

Jamia Al-Azhar of Egypt. During his stay at Egypt, he forged relations with some Arab

friends who supported his party against the non-Islamic traditions610. They provided a

lot of funds to run the party affairs. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, his party

actively participated in the resistance movement against the USSR. During his stay in

Pakistan, he met with Abdullah Azzam, an exiled Palestine leader. Azzam provided him

full moral support and invited a lot of young people from Arab countries to take part in

the war against the Soviet army. Sayyaf was a good speaker and he represented the

Afghan mujahideen in many international conferences. He was elected as the President

of the seven-party alliance of mujahideen against the USSR611. He was appointed the

Prime Minister of the joint government of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet

troops612.

Molvi Muhammad Younas Khalis was born in 1919 in Gandmak, a village of

Tehsil Khugiani of Nangahar Province of Afghanistan. He was born in a religious

family so in 1939, he was admitted to “Dar-ul-Aloom Haqqania” a famous religious

school at Akora Khattak in KP, Pakistan to achieve religious education613. He got an

opportunity to get educations from Maulana Abdul Haq, a famous religious scholar of

Pakistan. After completing his education, he went to Afghanistan and started his career

as a teacher. He started writing about different Islamic topics. In 1961, he became the

608 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, (Cambridge: University Press, 1990), 128. 609 Pasha, Fath-e-Afghanistan, 275. 610 Ibid. 611 Ibid. 612 Ibid 613 Ibid., 276.

170

Editor of “Paiman-e-Haq” a journal614. It was the time when the government of Zahir

Shah started humiliating Islamic traditions. He formed a party to offer resistance against

the anti-Islamic steps taken by the government of Zahir Shah. In 1968, he started weekly

magazine “Ghair”615. Later on, he joined “Anjuman Nojwanan-e-Islam” and took active

part in organizing the party. During this period, he had an opportunity to work with

Abdul Raheem Niazi, Rabbani, Sayyaf and Hekmatyar. After the formation of Hizb-e-

Islami, he was elected as its Vice President616. In 1978, he actively participated in the

armed movement against Tarkai and formed Harkat-e-Inqalab-e-Islami (Movement for

Islamic Revolution). Although this party offered valuable resistance to Tarakai

government but soon this party was dispersed. Then he formed his own separate party

Hizb-e-Islami and continued his struggle. He was elected as its Ameer and he took part

in the war against the Soviet army617. His party soon got significance due to brave

commanders including Maulana Jalal-ud-Din Haqqani, Haji Din Muhammad, Abdul

Haq and Malalang etc618. He also won the hearts of many soldiers of Afghan National

Army who also joined his party619. He was chosen as the Interior Minister in the Afghan

government after the USSR left Afghanistan620. His party was strongly supported in

Paktya and Nangarhar Province. It had a fighting strength of 5,000 and had about 75,000

followers.

Molvi Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi was another prominent leader of

mujahideen. He was born in 1921 in Qalla Abbas Shah, a region of town Barki Bark of

Logar Province621. He started his education at the age of five and completed it through

different madrassahs of Logar, Maidan and Paghman. After completing his education

in 1953, he started his career as teacher. In 1969, he was elected the member of Loya

Jirga622. He laid the foundation of his own madrassah in Helmand province623. When

the communists started anti-Islamic steps in Afghanistan, during the government of

Zahir Shah, he offered resistance through his writings and statements. He also gathered

people against the pro-communist government of Afghanistan. When the government

started strict action against him and his followers, he migrated to Pakistan. In May 1978,

614 Ibid. 615 Ibid. 616 Ibid. 617 Ibid. 618 Ibid. 619 Rais, War Without Winners, 186. 620 Pasha, Fath-e-Afghanistan, 276. 621 Ibid., 277. 622 Ibid. 623 Ibid.

171

he launched his party “Harkat-e-Inqalab-e-Islami” in Quetta and became its Ameer624.

When a seven-party alliance was to be created to fight against the Soviet army, he

refused to join it and decided to launch resistance independently. His decision created

mess within his party and a large group led by Molvi Nasrullah Mansoor left him and

joined the alliance. The time was crucial and the unity among the mujahideen was badly

needed. Therefore, with the efforts of ISI, Nabi agreed to join the alliance. But, at the

time when Nabi joined the alliance, Molvi Nasrullah Mansoor separated from the

alliance625. He passed major part of his life in Logar. He was considered as the strongest

person among the moderate Muslim community of Afghanistan. After the withdrawal

of the Soviet troops, he was appointed as the Defense Minister in joint Afghan

government626. His party conducted military operations in Kandahar and Ghazni areas.

Pir Syed Ahmad Gillani Afandi was born in Kabul in 1933627. He got education

from Shariah faculty. His family was moved from Iraq to Afghanistan. Shah Abdul

Qadir Gillani was among the forefathers of his family. His father was a Pir. So, after

his death, he himself was appointed as Pir of Qadria chain of Sufism628. His family had

a large area of land throughout Afghanistan including the areas of Surkrod, Nangahar,

East and North Afghanistan629. He formed a party Mahaz Milli Islami when he migrated

to Pakistan in 1978, to fight against the communist elements. He was a liberal Muslim

and was in favor of a joint government in Afghanistan having representation of every

ethnic group. He was appointed as the Chief Justice in the joint Afghan government

formed after the withdrawal of Soviet troops630. He had about 8,000 fighting men and

about 1,00,000 followers.

All the above described groups of Mujahideen were united and formed a solid

bloc known as the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan631. This alliance was also called seven-

party Mujahideen Alliance or Peshawar Seven. These seven parties were divided into

two main categories. First category of Mujahideen was radical group including Hizb-e-

Islami led by Hekmatyar, Khalis Faction led by Younas Khalis, Islamic Union for

624 Ibid. 625 Ibid. 626 Ibid. 627 Ibid., 278. 628 Ibid. 629 Ibid. 630 Ibid. 631 Shaida Muhammad Abdali, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India: A Paradigm Shift, (New Delhi: Pentagon

Press, 2016), 7.

172

Liberation of Afghanistan led by Sayyaf and Jamat-e-Islami led by Rabbani. The second

group was composed of traditionalists including National Islamic Front for Afghanistan

led by Gilani, Revolutionary Islamic Movement led by Muhammadi and Afghanistan

National Liberation Front led by Mujaddadi632. All these factions of Mujahideen

belonged to diverse ethnic groups such as Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras and others.

Along with them some mujahideen were from the Arab countries and from

Chechnya633. Although, these mujahideen were prepared to die and were well trained

to fight guerilla war but the main reason which enabled them to defeat the super power

of the world was that they were well aware of the mountainous areas of Afghanistan.

This knowledge of the land, valleys and passages through mountains gave them an edge

over Soviet troops.

The major dilemma for Afghanistan, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops was

that these allied mujahideen groups started fighting against each other and created chaos

in the country. Pakistan tried and brought all the mujahideen leaders to table and

Peshawar Accord was signed by all the fractions according to which different ministries

were distributed among all the leaders. All the mujahideen leaders accepted this accord

except Hekmatyar as he wanted to become the sole ruler of Afghanistan for being so

close to Pakistan and ISI but it was not acceptable for all other factions634. In early

1990s, Pakistan attempted to induct Hekmatyar in power despite the opposition by all

the other factions. ISI fully supported him and extended full support to him to attack

Kabul which was still under the control of pro-communist government led by

Najibullah. This plan of ISI and Pakistan was not acceptable to all other mujahideen

factions and they strictly refused to accept it. Pakistan was again in a difficult position

because its efforts to make its western border secured were almost ending in no positive

outcome. But Pakistan did not lose hope and carried on its efforts. At the end, these

efforts were resulted in the formation of Taliban, who were the group of students and

teachers of madrassahs of Afghanistan and Pakistan and this group was led by Mullah

Omar. Pakistan immediately accepted their rule but due to their rigid policies, Taliban

could not get world-wide acceptance.

Although, Pakistan and the US started their efforts in a better way to restrict

Soviet troops and bring peace in Afghanistan. But due to difference in Pakistan and the

US interests in the war and some policy shift of Pakistan did not wind up the crisis in a

632 Ibid. 633 Ibid. 634 Ibid., 8.

173

better way. In the beginning, Pakistan and the US wanted to stop the USSR to reach the

warm waters and this was the only point at which the two countries were agreed. Other

than that, there was hardly any convergence of interest. Besides, Pakistan was planning

that in case of anti-Pakistan government in Afghanistan, India might harm Pakistan. So,

Pakistan started its two-pronged policy i.e.; to restrict Soviet troops and to install a pro-

Pakistan government in Afghanistan. On the basis of same strategy, Pakistan wanted

some delay in signing Geneva Accord. This caused a point of difference between

Pakistan and the US. According to the US policy, removal of Soviet troops from

Afghanistan was the chief objective. Therefore, soon after the withdrawal of Soviet

troops from the region, US immediately left Afghanistan and stopped the assistance to

Pakistan. US and Pakistan took advantage from Afghan crisis but it proved to be total

destruction of Afghanistan. From 1979 to 1989, Afghanistan faced a war like situation

between pro-communist government of Afghanistan assisted by Soviet troops and the

mujahideen and then from 1989 to 1994 it faced a chaos during the fight among

mujahideen groups. Lack of interest of the US and the world in Afghanistan made it a

safe shelter for the terrorist elements of Al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations. Later

on, the whole situation led to the attacks of 9-11 which made the US government furious

and Afghanistan was literally destroyed by the US during the War against Terror.

174

Chapter No. 5:

US Concerns Regarding Pakistan’s Nuclear

Program

The history of Pakistan-US relations is a mix bag. Both the countries had pleasant

relationship for most of the time up to the early 1970s. Pakistan got a huge sum of

economic and military aid from the US. Pakistan remained a close US ally in SEATO and

CENTO. The most significant contribution which Pakistan made for the US was to act as

a bridge to establish its relations with China. Although, Pakistan government expected a

positive role by the US to resolve Kashmir dispute and on the occasions of wars between

Pakistan and India in 1965 and 1971 but the US remained neutral on both the occasions.

During the regime of Bhutto, Pakistan started its nuclear program as a response to India’s

nuclear test. Since then the relations between Pakistan and the US lowered and in the late

1970s these relations were at the ever-lowest ebb. This chapter focuses the impact of

Pakistan’s nuclear program on mutual relationship between Pakistan and the US. To

describe the detail of the developments made in this regard, this chapter has been divided

into three sections. In the very first section, the impact of Pakistan’s nuclear program soon

after the start till the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been discussed. In the second

section, Pakistan’s development of nuclear program under the umbrella of Afghan War

and US concerns have been described in detail. The last section of this chapter focuses

on the period after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

5.1. Pre- Afghan War Period:

In 1971, East Pakistan separated from the West Pakistan and India played a

significant role in that. The whole nation was low on morale after the dismemberment of

Pakistan. At this crucial period of Pakistan’s history, Bhutto came to power. He was the

first ever elected Prime Minister of Pakistan. He took the much-needed steps to boost the

morale of the nation by making it strong economically. It was expected that India might

launch another adventure to harm the West Pakistan as well. Meanwhile, in 1974, India

tested its nuclear weapon. That was a kind of strong warning from the Indian side to a

demoralized nation. The economy of Pakistan was also at its bottom. It was not an easy

task to reply India in the same tune. At that time, there was no other option left for Bhutto

to declare that the nation would eat grass for the accomplishment of nuclear program.

175

Although, Pakistan started its nuclear program in 1950s but that was totally for

the power purposes. On December 8, 1953, US President Eisenhower presented a

proposal to the UN which was “Atom for Peace”. He was of the view that sharing of

nuclear energy and technology for power generation must be appreciated635. Pakistan

welcomed this statement of the US President. Pakistani Foreign Minister, Zafar Ullah

Khan stated that Pakistan was also of the view that nuclear program for power generation

must be encouraged. He also assured that it was not included in Pakistan’s policy to

progress for the preparation of nuclear bomb636. In the following year, Pakistan

announced a plan for the establishment of a nuclear research body for scientific and

industrial research in the country637. The very first step taken by the Pakistan’s

government was the establishment of the High Tension & Nuclear Research Laboratory

at Government College, Lahore, to provide research facilities in nuclear physics for

graduate and post-graduate students638. In January 1955, the government formed the

Atomic Energy Committee. This committee was chaired by Dr. Nazir Ahmed and it had

twelve members. The committee was assigned the task of formulating an atomic energy

program; identifying personnel requirements; and planning a survey of radioactive

materials relevant to atomic energy research in Pakistan; and advising the government on

any other matter pertaining to the peaceful uses of atomic energy639. That was the first

ever major move by the Pakistani government to achieve the nuclear technology. Pakistan

was not able to accomplish this task alone so it needed support from the world. The best

country to provide the support was the US as Pakistan had entered in SEATO with the

US. To assist Pakistan in this regard US signed an agreement with Pakistan on

cooperation concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. US also assured Pakistan to

extend economic support in this regard. US offered Pakistan $350,000 in aid to start its

nuclear program640.

Pakistan established Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in March 1956 which

was divided into two parts. First part was the Atomic Energy Council comprising of two

ministers and two secretaries from the federal government and the chairman of the PAEC.

The second part was the commission itself comprising of the chairman of the PAEC and

635 “Atom for Peace”, Eisenhower speech in the UN, The Eisenhower Institute, December 8, 1953. 636 Ashok Kapur, "1953-59: The Origins and Early History of Pakistani Nuclear Activities," Pakistan's

Nuclear Development, (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), 34. 637 Ibid., 35. 638 Ibid., 36. 639 Ibid. 640 Shahid-ur-Rehman, Long Road to Chagai, (Islamabad: 1999, Print Wise Publication), 22.

176

six other scientists641. Everything was going well but the main problem was the political

instability in Pakistan. Therefore, the proposals of PAEC could not be accomplished up

to 1958. The main problem for PAEC was that it had no administrative and financial

power sufficient to advance the accomplishment of objectives. It had to depend upon

certain other institutions such as Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC)

and Finance Ministry. Efforts of PAEC became fruitful when on January 5, 1964,

Pakistan's Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) approved

a project to build a 137MW nuclear power plant at Karachi with Canadian assistance642.

The negotiations over the purchase of the nuclear power plant from Canada were started

but there was a deadlock over the issue of inspection. Canada insisted that the 137MW

power plant was not a small plant according to its capacity and it must be subject to

inspections. However, the Pakistani foreign office was not accepting it and argued that

Canada had already supplied such power plant to India without the condition of

inspection. After long discussion, Canada put another option before Pakistan. According

to this option, Canadian government agreed to withdraw the proposal of inspection on the

condition that Pakistan would pay Canada through its own sources and without having

economic aid from some other country. The Pakistani foreign office ultimately accepted

the Canadian condition. In May 1965, the Canadian General Electric Company (CGE)

signed a contract with the Pakistani government to build a 137MW heavy water nuclear

power reactor at Karachi. The Canadian government offered Pakistan a soft loan of $33

million and a supplier credit of $24 million to finance the project643. The main problem

faced by Pakistan was that it did not have enough nuclear scientists to run the program

effectively. To cope with the situation, Pakistani government sent 600 scientists and

engineers abroad for getting higher education in the field of nuclear technology. Out of

600, just 106 returned with doctorate degree644. That was the first big step by the

government of Pakistan to accelerate its nuclear program.

Pakistan had a bad experience of war with India in 1965. Although, Pakistan

managed to show reasonable war capabilities according to its worth but overall India had

an upper hand in the war and during the negotiation process after the war till Tashkent

Declaration. Soon after the declaration, the Pakistan foreign office and Foreign Minister

641 Kapur, Pakistan’s Nuclear Development, 35. 642 Rehman, Long Road to Chagai, 24.

643 Ibid, 24. 644 Ibid, 19.

177

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto lobbied for a nuclear weapons option. However, Bhutto and the

foreign office were opposed by PAEC, the Ministry of Finance, and President Ayub

Khan. PAEC was of the view that it did not make any attempt since its establishment to

acquire facilities for a nuclear fuel cycle that could provide the technical basis for a

nuclear weapons program645. On having close look at the political situation of South Asia,

the super powers of the world were expecting nuclear race in the region. Therefore, the

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) came into effect as the US, USSR, and the Great

Britain deposited the instruments of ratification. Both Pakistan and India did not sign the

treaty which made the US and other powers more anxious about the region.

In 1971, when Bhutto came into power after the fall of East Pakistan, he got an

opportunity to fulfil his agenda of starting Pakistan’s own nuclear weapon program. Dr.

Munir Ahmed Khan was related to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Bhutto

gave him the task to prepare a report on Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure646. He wanted

to know the worth of PAEC whether it was capable to launch nuclear weapon program

or not. On January 20, 1972, Bhutto held a meeting with senior Pakistani nuclear

scientists to discuss the possibility of initiating Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.

During the meeting, majority of the scientists supported the idea of starting nuclear

weapons program. Bhutto endorsed the idea and promised that his government would

extend every possible facility to the nuclear scientists to accomplish the task of making

nuclear weapons. He also demanded that the scientists must produce a fission device

within three years. Bhutto was much impressed by the efforts made by Munir Ahmed

Khan in this regard. Therefore, at the end of the meeting, Bhutto announced that Munir

Ahmad Khan would replace Dr. Usmani as Chairman of the PAEC647.

At that time Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan (AQ Khan) was not related to PAEC and he

did not attend the meeting. He was a Pakistani metallurgist, who took up a job with the

specialized Dutch engineering company, Physical Dynamics Laboratory (FDO) at its

metallurgical section in the Dutch town of Almelo. The Dutch secret service, BVD, ran a

brief background check on Khan and granted him a security clearance. So, A.Q started

working there648.

645 Kapur, Pakistan’s Nuclear Development, 77-87. 646 Ibid, 16-17. 647 Ibid, 17-18. 648 Steve Weissman & Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb, (New York, Time Books, 1981) 176-177.

178

Munir Ahmad shared good news with the nation on December 27, 1973, by

making the announcement that large uranium deposits had been discovered in Southern

Punjab province. It was a great advancement in the field of nuclear technology but the

problem was still there to enrich it. Pakistan neither had technology nor scientists to

accomplish the enrichment of uranium within Pakistan. Munir Ahmed also announced a

plan to construct 15 new nuclear reactors in the next 25 years to meet two-thirds of

Pakistan's power requirements649. PAEC was making progress with great speed because

Bhutto was extending full support to it. Bhutto knew India might start another adventure

to weaken Pakistan as it already managed to separate eastern wing from Pakistan.

Pakistan signed a contract with France in April 1974 for the supply of a nuclear

fuel reprocessing plant. The plant was to be constructed at Chashma on the banks of Indus

River650. On May 18, 1974, the time had reached for which Bhutto was worried about

India tested a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE). Following India's test, Bhutto met with

senior Pakistani officials to discuss the implications of India's nuclear tests. A statement

by the Pakistani foreign ministry was released after the meeting according to which

India's pronouncements of peaceful intentions did not satisfy Pakistan's security concerns

and that the nuclear programs often incorporated both peaceful and military ends651. On

May 19, 1974, in a news conference, Bhutto indicated that Pakistan would not be

threatened by India's nuclear blackmail. He also indicated that Pakistan would not alter

its current policies at any cost652.

Bhutto was much concerned with the advancement of India in nuclear field. On

June 7, 1974, he said that India's nuclear program was designed to intimidate Pakistan

and establish "hegemony in the subcontinent" and Pakistan would develop a nuclear

program in response to India's nuclear testing of an atomic device. However, Bhutto

insisted that Pakistan's program would be limited to peaceful purposes653. US was much

concerned about the expected nuclear race in the region. On July 5, 1974, US Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) officials predicted that about two dozen

649 The New York Times, December 27, 1973. 650 World Politics and Current Affairs, International, 56; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 14 April

1974, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. 651 The New York Times, May 19, 1974. 652 The New York Times, May 20, 1974. 653 Ibid, June 8, 1974.

179

nations could acquire nuclear weapons over the next decade including Pakistan, Japan,

West Germany, Argentina, Brazil, and South Korea654.

Pakistan’s nuclear program was progressing but at a very slow pace as Pakistan

did not have the services of any competent metallurgist at that time. On September 17,

1974, AQ Khan wrote a letter to Bhutto through the Pakistani ambassador in Belgium. In

this letter, he explained his expertise in centrifuge-based uranium enrichment

technologies at URENCO in Belgium. He offered help and urged Bhutto to take the

uranium route to a nuclear weapons program. Bhutto was quite pleased with his offer and

directed Munir Ahmed to meet AQ Khan to discuss with him655.

Pakistan’s economy was not much better to start its nuclear program in impressive

manner so Pakistan constantly showed its interest to make the region a nuclear free zone.

Pakistan was also much concerned about the role of the US in this regard. On October 14,

1974, Bhutto said that Pakistan would not need to move further in the field of nuclear

technology if US would restart arms shipments to Pakistan. He also stated that Pakistan’s

crumbling economy could not afford the development of nuclear weapons656.

Pakistan’s proposal to declare a nuclear free zone in South Asia was approved by

the UN General Assembly on November 21, 1974. Out of 84 countries, only two

countries, India and Bhutan voted against it but the proposal was passed by a vote of 82

against 2657. In this way, Pakistan managed to expose India. It appeared before the world

that it was India that was willing to continue nuclear arm race in South Asia. The year

1974 was a turning point for Pakistan’s nuclear program when Dr. AQ Khan started

working with the Pakistani government. His main responsibility was to develop plans for

setting up an ultracentrifuge uranium enrichment plant.

Pakistan’s move in the UN for creating a nuclear free zone in South Asia was

appreciated by the world and the US. On February 6, 1975, US President Ford indicated

to Bhutto that his administration would consider the lifting of the 10-year arms embargo

against Pakistan. Bhutto replied that he would place Pakistan’s nuclear reactors under

international safeguards if the US would provide sufficient conventional arms to meet

Pakistan’s requirements658. But US was much concerned about the nuclear race in the

654 Ibid, July 5, 1974. 655 Rehman, Long Road to Chagai, 47. 656 Ibid, October 14, 1974. 657 New York Times, November 21, 1974. 658 New York Times, February 6, 1975.

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region on the basis of some confidential reports. On April 9, 1975, the Director of the US

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Fred C. Ikle, warned that several

countries had been pursuing efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. He also warned that such

countries had been acquiring the means to produce nuclear weapons under the guise of

obtaining nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Although he did not reveal the names

of countries but the New York Times claimed that the list included Pakistan, Argentina,

Brazil, Libya, Israel, Taiwan, and South Korea659.

In October 1975, AQ Khan was willing to play the main role in bringing the blue

print of the project of nuclear bomb making with the help of one of his colleagues at FDO.

He asked him to take photograph of drawings of ultracentrifuges. But he declined to help

AQ Khan and reported the incident to the authorities of FDO. In response, the Dutch

Ministry of Economic Affairs asked FDO to shift AQ Khan to a less sensitive position to

keep him away from accessing documents related to the ultracentrifuge project660. AQ

Khan got a chance to accomplish this task when in 1975, he was asked to translate

sensitive documents concerning a German technical breakthrough in the ultracentrifuge

uranium enrichment process from German into Dutch. For this purpose, he spent sixteen

days at URENCO’s facility in the town of Almelo. Due to shortcomings of security

arrangements, he managed to get some useful detail about the project. Someone reported

that he saw AQ Khan making notes at his desk in a foreign script661. AQ Khan sent

centrifuge-related technical literature, blueprints, plans for plant design, and lists of

equipment and material suppliers to the PAEC through an employee at Pakistan’s

embassy in Netherland662. On December 15, 1975, AQ Khan returned to Pakistan with

his wife Henny and two daughters and informed FDO that he would stay in Pakistan and

resigned from his position at FDO on March 1, 1976663. In 1975, Pakistan secretly

launched project to produce enriched uranium using the centrifuge enrichment process.

The project involved the construction of a pilot facility at Sihala, to be followed by the

construction of an industrial-scale plant housing 10,000 centrifuges at the village of

Kahuta. AQ Khan took charge of the new Engineering Research Laboratory (ERL),

whose main task was to design the centrifuges for the proposed facilities. PAEC was

given overall charge of the project, while the military’s Special Works Commission was

659 World News Digest, April 12, 1975. 660 Ibid, 180. 661 Ibid, 179-80. 662 Rehman, Long Road to Chagai, 51. 663 Weissman, The Islamic Bomb, 180.

181

asked to help with purchases from abroad and construction of the top-secret facilities664.

On February 23, 1976, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Ikle revealed

before the Senate Foreign Relations that the US and six other countries had agreed to

develop new safeguards and placed restrictions on the export of nuclear facilities. But he

did not provide the names of the countries that had agreed to such controls; but it was

believed that these included the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Canada, West

Germany and Japan. He also mentioned that the US was making efforts to persuade

Pakistan to abandon its efforts to purchase a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant from France

and blamed that Pakistan wanted to produce nuclear weapons665. The situation was

turning complex for Pakistan. Bhutto declared that Pakistan was not interested in

acquiring nuclear explosives and the deal with France to buy a reprocessing plant had

been approved by the IAEA666.

Pakistan’s nuclear program was going at quite slow pace. It was not acceptable

for AQ Khan as he had come to Pakistan to do something in this regard but due to some

hurdles, the nuclear program of Pakistan was not making progress at a reasonable pace.

On April 19, 1976, AQ Khan wrote a letter to the Chairman PAEC, expressing his

impatience with the slow pace of the centrifuge-based uranium enrichment project. He

also wrote a similar letter Bhutto and threatened that he would resign if nuclear program

would progress on the same pace667. In this regard, he met with Bhutto and repeated the

same intention before him if he would not be given formal charge of the uranium

enrichment project. Bhutto could not afford to lose AQ Khan so he formulated a

committee to resolve the matter. The committee was consisted of Deputy Chairman

Planning Commission, AGN Kazi, Defence Secretary, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Foreign

Secretary Agha Shahi. The committee proposed to hand over the formal charge of the

uranium enrichment project to AQ Khan. However, the PAEC could continue with the

plutonium fuel project independently668. Therefore, on July 17, 1976, AQ Khan took

formal charge of ERL whose main task was to develop centrifuge technology for

enriching uranium. ERL was declared as an independent organization with a three-

member board comprising of AGN. Kazi, Ghulam Ishaq, and Agha Shahi669.

664 Rehman, Long Road to Chagai, 56. 665 New York Times, February 24, 1976. 666 New York Times, February 26, 1976. 667 Rehman, Long Road to Chagai, 51-52. 668 Ibid, 52. 669 Rehman, Long Road to Chagai, 53.

182

Due to some concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear program Canada suspended talks

with Pakistan on March 2, 1976 which were started during Bhutto’s visit to Canada670.

This was a great setback for Pakistan. During the same month, Pakistan signed a contract

with France for the purchase of a nuclear fuel-reprocessing plant671. US was much

concerned about Pakistan’s new agreement with France for the purchase of nuclear

reactor. In August 1976, the US offered to sell 110 Vought A-7 attack aircraft to Pakistan

on the condition of abandonment of its efforts to purchase a nuclear reactor from

France672. This step taken by the US was not liked by France so on August 9, 1976, the

French Foreign Minister informed Sam Gammon, the US foreign representative in

France, about the displeasure of France over US efforts to resist the sale of a fuel

reprocessing plant to Pakistan. He also indicated that France would proceed with the sale

of the reprocessing plant and revealed that the sale of the reprocessing plant was approved

on March 18, 1976, under an agreement reached between France, Pakistan, and the IAEA.

France indicated that it followed all international agreements regarding the sale, including

an agreement with the IAEA to ensure that the plant would only be used for peaceful

activities673.

While addressing a news conference in Lahore on August 9, 1976, US Secretary

of State Henry Kissinger announced a compromised formula to avoid confrontation

between the US and Pakistan over Pakistan’s attempts to obtain a nuclear fuel

reprocessing plant from France. According to this formula, Pakistan would not be able to

divert nuclear material for building nuclear weapons. He also announced that the US

would block the sale of 100 A-7 Corsair jet-fighter bombers until Pakistan would reach

an agreement with France over the fuel reprocessing plant674. On August 11, 1976, Sam

Gammon met with Kissinger and after the meeting he told the French government that

the US wished to work out a safeguard agreement for the reprocessing plant that France

was planning to supply to Pakistan675.

Bhutto showed the commitment of Pakistan to proceed with the purchase of the

French nuclear equipment despite objections from the US676. The government of the US

670 World News Digest, March 6, 1976. 671 Washington Post, August 27, 1979. 672 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 4, 2017. 673 New York Times, August 10, 1976. 674 Ibid. 675 Ibid., August 11, 1976. 676 Ibid.

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initiated a proposal that US should also be invited in agreement for the sale of a French

fuel reprocessing plant to be signed between Pakistan and France. But, French Prime

Minister Jacques Chirac rejected this proposal. He was of the view that as it was an

agreement between Pakistan and France so it must be done between the representatives

of the two countries only. Kissinger stated that the US was only interested in preventing

the proliferation of nuclear weapons677. On August 26, 1976, the French cabinet indicated

its intention to proceed with the sale of the nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan despite

objections raised by the US678. US was not happy with this deal so it started pressurizing

the governments of Canada and France to stop the deals with Pakistan.

In November 1976, France refused to proceed with the supply of the nuclear

reprocessing plant to Pakistan. There were two reasons behind this decision of France.

First was the US opposition to the deal and second was the announcement by the Canadian

Secretary Donald C. Jamieson that Canada would not supply Pakistan with fuel for its

power reactor if France supplied Pakistan with the reprocessing plant. It was a difficult

situation for Pakistan so Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed and the French Foreign

Minister Louis de Guiringauld met in Paris to discuss the issue. France also sent an envoy

to Pakistan to discuss the sale of the reprocessing plant679. Although, France was the

major defense contractor of Pakistan and Bhutto also threatened France that future

defense agreements with France would not be finalized if France would cancel this

written agreement. But, France government was under pressure especially from the US

so it cancelled the agreement680.

US wanted to provide Pakistan with some other options to improve its deterrence.

For this purpose, on November 17, 1976, the US Defense Department agreed to the sale

of 110 A7 attack planes to Pakistan. The deal was worth $700 million and included

training for Pakistani pilots and supply of spare parts. The deal needed to be approved by

Congress and the State Department. But the condition imposed by the State Department

was that Pakistan would abandon its plan to acquire a nuclear-fuel reprocessing plant

from France681. Meanwhile, US convinced French government to stop any kind of supply

677 Ibid., August 12, 1976. 678 Ibid., August 26, 1976. 679 Ibid., November 12, 1976. 680 Tahrir-Khalil, Shirine R. (1997). "Preventing Proliferation". India, Pakistan and the United

States (google book). New York: Council on Foreign Relations. 72–76. ISBN 0-87609-199-0.

Retrieved September 17, 2012. 681 New York Times, November 17, 1976.

184

which would assist proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, on December 16, 1976,

the French Nuclear Export Council, chaired by President Giscard d’Estaing, stated that

France would not supply any fuel reprocessing plants in the future. The decision was

taken to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Although, French officials,

indicated their willingness to cancel the deal, but could not do so due to domestic political

pressure. However, France was expecting that Pakistan should cancel the deal. Therefore,

the French officials indicated that France would be happy if Pakistan would decide to

cancel the contract. The French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing was hopeful that

Pakistan would cancel the agreement682.

The difficulties for Pakistan to accomplish the task of nuclear program were

increasing. Therefore, after the refusal from Canada, Pakistan began a major purchasing

effort in Western Europe for its uranium enrichment project. The government agents

placed orders with Swiss and Dutch firms for the purchase of highly specialized valves

for centrifuges, a gasification and solidification unit to feed uranium hexafluoride gas into

centrifuges and hardened steel tubes. The Swiss and Dutch governments knew that

Pakistan was willing to purchase these items to enhance centrifuge facility. So, they stuck

with a narrow interpretation of nuclear export control regulations and did little to interfere

the sales683. In 1976, Pakistan attempted to purchase 10-15 tons of uranium hexafluoride

gas from the West German company Rohstoff Einfuhr; but Pakistan could not manage to

do that684.

Due to such hindrances, Pakistan’s nuclear program started in 1976 and to let AQ

Khan work independently without any pressure, Bhutto gave him full control of the

project on July 31, 1976 and placed it directly under Prime Minister685. Pakistan was

going to do, what the US did not like. At that time, all the nuclear states were non-

Muslims and the world, especially the US could not bear a Muslim nuclear power. So,

when US got knowledge of advancement of Pakistan in her nuclear program, US wanted

to get it terminated just in the start. For this purpose, in August 1976, Kissinger,

pressurized Bhutto by threatening that US would make a horrible example of him if

Pakistan went ahead in her nuclear program686. US threats could not influence Bhutto and

682 Ibid., December 17, 1976. 683 Weismann, The Islamic Bomb, 182-84. 684 Ibid., 218. 685 Malik, Dr. AQ Khan and the Islamic Bomb, 63. 686 Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal, 80.

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he carried on the nuclear program with more zeal. AQ Khan selected a loyal team for this

great project to reach the destination of making nuclear bomb under Bhutto. But, one after

the other, a lot of fronts were opened for Bhutto. His concentration was diverted from

nuclear program to some other challenges faced by his government internally and

externally. Law and order situation was created in Pakistan by internal political elements.

The situation became severe during mid-1977 and Bhutto’s government was ended after

a military coup of Pakistan Army under Chief of Army Staff, General Muhammad Zia-

ul-Haq on July 5, 1977. Bhutto was accused of a political murder and was hanged

according to the decision of Supreme Court in April 1979.

The removal of Bhutto and afterwards was apparently a consequence of

Henry Kissinger’s threat given to Bhutto in August 1976. Within one year of the threat,

Bhutto despite winning the elections could not manage to save his rule as well as his

life. The last phase of Bhutto’s era was the worst period for Pakistan-US relations. Some

high officials of both the countries had openly exchanged harsh language for each other.

Later, the government of General Zia also continued Pakistan’s nuclear program with

the same zeal and zest. The first ever problem faced by General Zia in this regard was

on January 5, 1978, when a French newspaper Le Monde published a report stating that

France was renegotiating a nuclear contract with Pakistan to decrease the danger of

plutonium production687. The French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing refused to

comment on the report that appeared in the French newspaper688. On January 7, 1978,

Pakistan declared that it was unwilling to accept modifications to the existing contract

to build a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility689. A couple of days after, the French

government announced that it was attempting to alter the contract to sell a nuclear fuel

reprocessing plant to Pakistan. General Zia was not willing to accept the new terms of

the contract690.

Pakistan's government, on January 11, 1978, demanded that France must deliver

the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant according to the original contract without any

modifications. A spokesman of Pakistan's Foreign Ministry said that all international

safeguards to prevent the misuse of plutonium as prescribed by the IAEA had been written

into the existing agreement691. The US State Department announced that a group of 15

687 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 5, 2017. 688 Ibid. 689 New York Times, January 10, 1978. 690 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 6, 2017. 691 Washington Post, January 12, 1978.

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nations had agreed on a 16-provision code to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The

agreement required the participating nations to abide by the specified requirements for

selling nuclear technology. The 16-provision code was being submitted to the IAEA.

According to US State Department officials, one of the provisions banned the sale of

reprocessing equipment. The provisions were not backdated and hence did not apply to

the French contract to supply Pakistan with a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility692. On

May 20, 1978, the US. State Department withheld nuclear licenses for 12 countries

including Pakistan because of their attempts to acquire nuclear fuel reprocessing capacity.

The amount of plutonium withheld was less than one pound. The plutonium was intended

for a research reactor in which the plutonium was irradiated with alpha particles693.

Speaking at a banquet in honor of the visiting Chinese Vice-Premier Keng Piao,

on June 16, 1978, General Zia mentioned Pakistan's efforts at the UN to create a nuclear

weapons free zone in South Asia and thanked China for its support for extending support

on this issue. Keng Piao indicated that the Chinese government would support Pakistan's

efforts to create a nuclear-free zone in South Asia694.

General Zia received a letter from the French president on August 9, 1978,

requesting modification in the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. The modification would

produce a mix of uranium and plutonium that could not be used to make nuclear weapons.

Pakistan objected to the proposed modification indicating that any such attempt would

contain fundamental changes in the facility's design. Pakistan also indicated that a

significant portion of the partially constructed plant would have to be brought down to

incorporate the proposed modification. Pakistan further pointed out that the technique

was relatively new and indicated that experiments in the US revealed that the technique

could not be used on a commercial basis695.

French President Valery d'Estaing informed Pakistan on August 23, 1978, of his

decision to cancel the contract for supply of a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility. In a letter

written to the Pakistani President, the French president indicated that the cancellation was

based on doubts that Pakistan might use the plutonium from the reprocessing facility to

shape nuclear weapons. In the letter, the French president offered to provide a nuclear co-

processing plant that could produce a mix of uranium and plutonium that could not be

692 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 6, 2017. 693 Washington Post, May 20, 1978. 694 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 6, 2017. 695 Washington Post, November 4, 1978.

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used to make nuclear weapons. President d'Estaing's decision represented a significant

change from the policy of former Prime Minister Jacques Chirac who was a strong

supporter for proceeding with the nuclear deal. Following Chirac's departure, French

officials indicated that France had become more concerned with stopping the spread of

nuclear technology and President d'Estaing, for the same reason, had been attempting to

dismiss the Pakistani contract. The US and Canada also pressurized Pakistan to cancel

the reprocessing plant deal. Because of Canada's decision to withhold the supply of

uranium, Pakistan's KANUPP reactor had been operating at less than 70% of its

capacity696. On August 23, 1978, General Zia announced that the decision of France was

to back out of the contract to supply a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. He also stated that

Pakistan was not interested in nuclear proliferation but could not lag behind other nations

in technology. He also suggested that Pakistan would acquire such technology from other

means if conventional methods were not available. General Zia also denied that China

had agreed to provide Pakistan with the reprocessing facility697.

US State Department announced on August 24, 1978, that the US might sign a

new aid agreement with Pakistan following France's decision to cancel the contract to

supply a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant to Islamabad. US had earlier cut-off food aid in

the fall of 1977 as a measure to pressurize Pakistan to cancel the deal. The US State

Department spokesperson Ken Brown stated that the US did certainly hope that it could

sign a new aid program with Pakistan soon. The Carter administration had already asked

the US Congress to approve $69 million in development aid for the 1979 fiscal year. The

development aid request was distinguished from the $53.4 million request for food aid698.

French spokespersons confirmed President Giscard d'Estaing's offer to reopen talks with

Pakistan on supplying a modified nuclear reprocessing plant699.

In October 1978, Bhutto who was in prison, claimed that Pakistan was near to

attaining full nuclear capability prior to his overthrow in 1977. He also took credit for

developing Pakistan's nuclear energy program and indicated that Pakistan only needed a

reprocessing facility to attain nuclear capability700. In October 1978, the British

government imposed tighter export control laws after a Labor Party member of parliament

696 New York Times, August 24, 1978. 697 Washington Post, August 24, 1978. 698 Ibid., August 25, 1978. 699 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 6, 2017. 700 Ibid.

188

Frank Allaun revealed that Pakistan had placed orders with a British company for

inverters that could be used in a uranium fuel enrichment plant. The British company,

Emerson Electric Industrial Controls, was working on 100 more inverters to be supplied

to Pakistan when the government imposed further restrictions to stop the export of such

components701.

US announced the renewal of economic assistance to Pakistan on October 24,

1978. The resumption of aid would provide Pakistan with $122.4 million during the fiscal

year 1979. The amount allotted for food aid was $53 million702. In November 1978, US

offered to supply Pakistan with F5 fighter planes. The offer was formally made by the

US. Undersecretary of State Lucy W. Benson703. On November 3, 1978, Pakistan and

France agreed to resume negotiations over the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant under

construction in Pakistan. A representative of General Zia met the French President Valery

d'Estaing and handed over a letter from General Zia regarding the reopening of talks704.

On December 8, 1978, top US officials in the Carter administration considered Pakistan

to be the biggest proliferation threat. US officials pointed to the document written by

Bhutto as indication of Pakistan's aims to develop a nuclear weapons program. US

officials thought that despite France's withdrawal from the nuclear fuel-reprocessing

contract, Pakistan possessed the complete blueprints for the reprocessing facility since

France provided Pakistan with those blueprints in 1976. A top US official said that the

France had nipped in the bud the short route to proliferation, but Pakistan would probably

explore a variety of other paths705. Till late December 1978, despite the decision by

France to dismiss the contract for the supply of the reprocessing plant, French technicians

continued to work at the plant's construction site in Chashma706.

In early 1979, US officials considered the possibility of damaging the uranium

enrichment facility existing in Pakistan. The option was rejected due to its dangerous

nature and political infeasibility707. In January 1979, US initiated a diplomatic dialog with

the Pakistani government after the US government attained concrete indication of

Pakistan's uranium enrichment program708. In February 1979, India's Prime Minister

701 Washington Post, August 27, 1979. 702 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 7, 2017. 703 Washington Post, August 6, 1979. 704 Ibid., November 4, 1978. 705 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 7, 2017. 706 Ibid. 707 New York Times, August 17, 1979. 708 Washington Post, August 27, 1979.

189

Morarji Desai wrote a letter to General Zia expressing concern over Pakistan's nuclear

weapons program. Indian scientists were reported to have learned from European

commercial sources about Pakistan's fresh purchase of huge quantities of 'maraging steel,'

an extremely hard variety of steel used to make critical components of a gas centrifuge

uranium enrichment system. General Zia denied any nuclear weapons program and

proposed a joint Indo-Pakistan declaration rejecting nuclear weapons and placing all

nuclear facilities in both countries under international inspections709.

In February 1979, the French government retained an unclear attitude towards

French companies that had contracts for the transfer of mechanical and nuclear-sensitive

parts for the plutonium reprocessing plant that was to be built with French support in

Pakistan. At the influence of Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poncet, Industry Minister

Andre Giraud issued an official notice to French companies not to supply any further

equipment for the Chashma nuclear reprocessing plant710. On March 1, 1979, US Deputy

Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Pakistan. Among the list of high

importance items for debate was Pakistan's construction of a uranium enrichment facility.

During the talks, Christopher failed to persuade General Zia to abandon the construction

of the uranium enrichment plant711.

US government, on March 23, 1979, made its export control laws strict to include

inverters and other components that could be used to build a uranium enrichment plant712.

US also asked Pakistan to allow international inspections of its nuclear research facilities.

Pakistan did not accept this request and regarded it discriminatory as other nations

possessing nuclear research programs had not been asked to open their facilities for

inspections713. Therefore, on April 6, 1979, US informed Pakistan of its decision to cut

off economic and military aid. US Ambassador to Pakistan was recalled for consultations.

Pakistan regarded this step of the US as unfair and discriminatory and assured that

Pakistan was not developing nuclear weapons as no aid cutoff was imposed on India even

after its nuclear tests. The cancelled amount involved $40 million that was approved for

fiscal year 1979 and the entire $45 million that was approved for the fiscal year 1980. An

amount of $40 million for food aid was not cancelled. A small military training program

709 Ibid., April 7, 1979. 710 Weissman, The Islamic Bomb, 200. 711 Washington Post, April 7, 1979. 712 Ibid., August 27, 1979. 713 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 7, 2017.

190

grant of $600,000 was also cancelled under the cutoff aid policy. However, Pakistan was

permitted to purchase equipment from the US. US State department officials insisted that

the construction of the facility had been continuing for quite some time and revealed that

high-level talks had been held between the US and Pakistan on the issue714.

A spokesperson of Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on

April 8, 1979, denying that Pakistan intended to develop nuclear weapons under the guise

of a peaceful nuclear program and termed the aid cutoff as an act of discrimination against

Pakistan. The spokesperson stated that Pakistan would not unilaterally allow inspections

on its nuclear facilities unless countries with more advanced nuclear programs would

allow such inspections. The spokesperson also indicated that Pakistan had proposed a

reciprocal inspection process between India and Pakistan of their nuclear facilities. The

proposal, according to the spokesperson, was rejected by India715.

US planned to sell up to 50 Northrop F-5E Tiger fighter planes to Pakistan on

April 17, 1979 and aided on its nuclear power, provided Pakistan agreed to restrict the

production of nuclear weapons. Several US officials, however, insisted that the US lost

its influence on Pakistan's nuclear program when it imposed a cutoff in military and

economic aid on Pakistan. US administration officials also indicated that efforts to

persuade Pakistan to abandon its uranium enrichment plant had met with limited or no

success716. On May 1, 1979, in an evidence to the Senate Governmental Affairs

Subcommittee on Nuclear Proliferation, US Assistant Secretary of State Thomas R.

Pickering testified that the US had acted too late to keep Pakistan from acquiring the

capacity to make nuclear weapons. He declared that Pakistan had succeeded in obtaining

sufficient special equipment for producing weapons grade uranium before its efforts were

discovered. Pickering also informed that India's nuclear explosion in 1974 brought the

general instability in the region contributed to Pakistan's decision to acquire nuclear

weapons717.

US officials confirmed on May 2, 1979, that Pakistan had started to build a

plutonium plant that would provide an alternative to use weapons grade uranium for its

nuclear weapons718. But Pakistan's Ambassador to the UN Niaz A. Naik rejected it and

714 Washington Post, April 7, 1979. 715 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 8, 2017. 716 New York Times, April 17, 1979. 717 Washington Post, May 2, 1979. 718 New York Times, May 2, 1979.

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stated that non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy were not helpful for Pakistan's objectives.

He pointed out that the US was accusing Pakistan of making a nuclear bomb even if

Pakistan was buying a simple steel pipe for its textile industry719.

Carter administration on May 27, 1979, proposed the creation of a nuclear

weapons-free zone in South Asia to prevent an arms race between India and Pakistan.

According to US officials, the proposal would be backed with security guarantees by the

US, USSR and China720. In June 1979, the US government formed an interagency

taskforce comprising of officials from the State Department, Energy Department,

Intelligence agencies, and military officials and headed by Gerald C. Smith. The study

group was expected to produce a report in September721.

Pakistan allocated $48,000,000 for its nuclear program for the year 1979-80 in its

annual budget. The funds would be utilized for various activities like buying equipment

for laboratories and a nuclear research center, uranium exploration, building a fuel

reprocessing plant, and other administrative activities722. In June 1979, US President

Jimmy Carter and the Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev discussed Pakistan's nuclear

weapons program during their summit meeting. Carter also corresponded secretly with

leaders in France, West Germany, Japan, Britain, and other nations. The US was also

engaging China in its efforts to deal with Pakistan723.

General Zia addressed to the nation on July 28, 1979, and declared that he would

not compromise on Pakistan's sovereignty regarding its peaceful nuclear program. He

also said that Pakistan required nuclear energy to meet its growing energy requirements

but the economic aid to Pakistan had been cut off despite the peaceful nature of the

nuclear program724.

The Carter administration was considering several initiatives to stop Pakistan

from obtaining nuclear weapons. The efforts include imposing strict economic sanctions

to supplying advanced conventional arms. Undertaking secret operations using

paramilitary forces to sabotage Pakistan's uranium enrichment plant was also one of the

options. The other two options were imposing harsh economic sanctions or providing

719 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 8, 2017. 720 New York Times, May 27, 1979. 721 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 8, 2017. 722 Ibid. 723 Washington Post, August 27, 1979. 724 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 8, 2017.

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Pakistan with advanced conventional weapons like the F-16 fighter planes725. On August

14, 1979, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry summoned the US Ambassador to Pakistan Arthur

Hummel and expressed serious concern over the efforts by the US government to threaten

and intimidate Pakistan's government over its peaceful nuclear program. He was further

informed that such actions by the US would harm peace and stability in the region. The

Foreign Ministry also informed the ambassador that Pakistan might lodge a protest in an

international forum if the US continued in its efforts to threaten Pakistan's nuclear

program726.

A senior State Department official, on August 14, 1979, stated that a covert

operation to sabotage Pakistan's uranium enrichment plant was not an option and the US

wanted to pursue good relations with Pakistan despite its objections to Pakistan's plans to

develop nuclear weapons. Pakistani officials were not contented with the assurances

provided by the State department727. Meanwhile, US officials managed to get some

photographs of the heavily guarded and elaborate Kahuta plant being constructed.

According to US officials, Pakistan's civilian nuclear program did not need such large

quantities of enriched uranium and estimated that Pakistan would be able to produce

weapons grade uranium after three to five years of construction and operation of the

enrichment plant. According to informed estimates, Pakistan was expected to produce

weapons grade plutonium in six to 10 years. Pakistan also possessed a pilot "hot cell"

reprocessing capability at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology

(PINSTECH). The pilot reprocessing facility could quickly produce small amount of

bomb material if the right elements were present728.

In an interview, on September 23, 1979, General Zia rejected the claim that

Pakistan was making a nuclear bomb and requested US President Jimmy Carter to

reconsider the decision to cut off military and economic aid to Pakistan. General Zia

acknowledged that Pakistan was building a facility for enriching uranium but indicated

that it would only be used to produce energy. He reiterated that no Pakistani government

could compromise on the nuclear issue under US pressure and denied reports that

725 New York Times, August 12, 1979. 726 Washington Post, August 15, 1979. 727 Ibid. 728 Ibid., August 27, 1979.

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Pakistan was collaborating with Libya to develop nuclear weapons for the Palestine

Liberation Organization (PLO)729.

US and Pakistan began two days of talks over Pakistan's efforts to produce

weapons-grade highly enriched uranium on October 16, 1979. The talks were held

between US Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance and Pakistan's Foreign Affairs Adviser

Agha Shahi and several other high-level officials730. On October 17, 1979, the US and

Pakistan held a final round of talks in the afternoon and the US indicated that no decision

had been taken. Agha Shahi stated that differences continued to exist between Pakistan

and the US over the nuclear issue. Both sides agreed to continue high-level discussions

in the future. The economic and military cut-off, imposed by President Carter in April

under US law, could be lifted only after President Carter would certify that Pakistan

would not develop or acquire nuclear weapons or assist other nations in acquiring such

weapons. Despite the assurances provided by Agha Shahi, the US was not willing to

accept such promises. Agha Shahi also refused to confirm or deny the recent news report

that Pakistan had halted work on the construction of its uranium enrichment plant owing

to a shortage of parts from Europe with advanced conventional arms in return for

Pakistan's commitment to abandon its nuclear program. It was not sure if the US had

made such a proposal during the talks731.

After the conclusion of two days of talks between US and Pakistan, the US

officials were not much confident about persuading Pakistan to abandon its nuclear

weapons program. The talks also reduced the certainty of US estimates that Pakistan was

at least two years behind from conducting a nuclear test. Agha Shahi informed members

of the US Congress that Pakistan was willing to provide a "no explosion" pledge for the

duration of the current Pakistani government. Shahi indicated that General Zia could not

make promises that could extend beyond the current administration and bind subsequent

Pakistani administrations. He also suggested that Pakistan was willing to bring all nuclear

facilities under international safeguards and inspections provided India would also

implement such measures. US intelligence estimate quoted a Pakistani official

mentioning that Pakistan possessed the necessary material to build a bomb732. On

December 11, 1979, the UN General Assembly passed Pakistan’s proposal of nuclear free

729 New York Times, September 23, 1979. 730 Washington Post, October 18, 1979. 731 Ibid., October 18, 1979. 732 Ibid., October 20, 1979.

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zone in South Asia by 96 votes. Only India and Bhutan voted against the resolution.

During the UN General Assembly meeting, Pakistan's Ambassador Niaz A. Naik rejected

a claim by the Israeli Ambassador Yehuda Z. Blum that Pakistan, Iraq, and Libya were

seeking to create a nuclear axis733.

The relations between Pakistan and the US which were started in early 1950s and

lasted for two decades in a pleasant manner were then at the lowest ever level. The main

cause for the decline in Pakistan-US relations was the Pakistan’s nuclear program.

Although Pakistan was not the country to start the nuclear race in the region. Pakistan

was just trying to acquire nuclear technology as a mean of deterrence against India.

Pakistan’s main concern with the US was that it was not asking India to stop its nuclear

program and was only pressurizing Pakistan. Bhutto was the most disliked personality for

the US as he was the founder of this program and after him even the coldness between

Pakistan-US relations lasted during General Zia’s regime as well.

5.2. During Afghan War:

In December 1979, Soviet forces entered Afghanistan on the request of Afghan

government to crush the resistance offered by the militants. This event brought both

Pakistan and the US closer once again as both had mutual interest in fighting against the

Soviet forces. For Pakistan, the presence of Soviet forces was not a good sign as it made

insecure its western border and for the US it was a challenge to its authority as a super

power. The cold war between the US and USSR which was in progress since decades

entered in Afghanistan and Pakistan was there to assist US in restricting the USSR. So,

US thought it better to let the issue of non-proliferation aside and form a coalition against

the USSR with Pakistan.

US offered $400 million over the next two years in economic and military

assistance to Pakistan in response to the threat posed by Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

But a special Congressional act was required to proceed with the aid package since

existing nonproliferation laws did not allow such assistance to Pakistan. Although the

Pakistani delegation did not reveal any change in the policy over its uranium enrichment

plant during the dialogue process with the US and the intelligence reports indicated that

the pace of construction had slowed down due to technical difficulties734. On January 17,

733 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 9, 2017. 734 Washington Post, January 15, 1980.

195

1980, in an interview, General Zia asked the US to convert the 1959 defense agreement

between the US and Pakistan into a "friendship treaty" to protect Pakistan's freedom and

integrity. In requesting greater assistance from the US and the Western world, General

Zia indicated that Pakistan's nuclear program and the issue of holding elections soon

would not be discussed735. On February 1, 1980, the Carter administration informed

Congress leaders of its plan to enter a long-term military relationship with Pakistan and

to lift the aid embargo. US officials also wanted to prevent Pakistan from testing nuclear

weapon736. During talks with the Pakistani delegation in Islamabad, the two sides further

defined the 1959 defense agreement between the two countries. Under the newly agreed

rules, the US would provide aid to Pakistan in the event of a Soviet attack. US was still

concerned over Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, but the American delegation

believed that the new agreements would enable both sides to address the issues in a better

manner737. US government warned that aid to Pakistan would be ceased in case of

advancement in the field of nuclear technology. General Zia stated that Pakistan did not

wish to develop nuclear weapons. But the US intelligence estimated that Pakistan would

not be able to produce sufficient quantities of enriched uranium for a bomb at least until

late 1981738.

In March 1980, due to some differences over the issue, the aid package to Pakistan

was stopped. US State Department spokesperson Hodding Carter said that Pakistan

attitude showed that it did not need any kind of assistance from the US but according to

Pakistan, the amount of aid was too little739.

Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Munir Ahmad

Khan announced on August 31, 1980, that Pakistan achieved self-reliance in the

manufacture of nuclear fuel from uranium740. In September 1980, US State Department

informed the Swiss government that five Swiss firms were still providing equipment and

technical assistance to Pakistan's uranium enrichment process. The formal complaint was

conveyed to the outgoing Swiss Ambassador Raymond Probst by the Assistant Secretary

of State Thomas Pickering. Swiss officials replied to the US that the items exported to

Pakistan were not banned under existing export control regulations owing to their use in

735 Ibid., January 18, 1980. 736 New York Times, February 1, 1980. 737 Washington Post, February 4, 1980. 738 New York Times, February 28, 1980. 739 Washington Post, March 8, 1980. 740 New York Times, September 1, 1980.

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multiple purposes741. On September 22, 1980, Carter administration interrupted nuclear

cooperation with Switzerland in retaliation of the Swiss export of nuclear technology to

Pakistan. US delayed the grant of license needed by the Swiss government to reprocess

its spent fuel in France. US officials warned the Swiss government that the US Congress

might be forced to cut off nuclear cooperation under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act742.

The Swiss government rejected the blames and argued that none of the exported

items were prohibited under international export guidelines and the Swiss government

monitored all the exports to Pakistan to ensure their compliance with existing

international exports guidelines743. On December 30, 1980, the Swiss government

promised to closely review and possibly ban future exports of nuclear technology to

Pakistan that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. In return, the US agreed to

resume nuclear cooperation with Switzerland744. In 1980, the US informed Turkey about

Turkish firms assisting Pakistan's nuclear explosives program by supplying inverters and

requested the Turkish government to halt the transfer of such electric equipment. But the

Turkish government did not act on US requests and insisted that the inverters were not

covered under existing export control regulations745.

US Congress suggested on February 2, 1981 to amend the US nonproliferation

laws so that assistance might be provided to Pakistan to save it from coming under Soviet

influence. But the resumption of aid to Pakistan required a modification of the Symington

Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act and the Glenn Amendment to the Foreign

Assistance Act. The Symington amendment prohibited assistance to countries receiving

or sending enrichment equipment, material or technology not covered under international

safeguards. The Glenn amendment prohibited assistance to countries involved in

unsafeguarded reprocessing deals746. On February 11, 1981, Netherlands' Justice Minister

Job De Ruiter said that AQ Khan would be investigated under the terms of a law on the

unlawful acquisition of state secrets. He also indicated that he might be trialed in his

absence as he failed to present himself before the commission747.

741 Washington Post, September 21, 1980. 742 Ibid., September 22, 1980. 743 New York Times, September 23, 1980. 744 Washington Post, December 31, 1980. 745 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 10, 2017. 746 Ibid. 747 Ibid.

197

IAEA Director's report announced on February 27, 1981 that the outcome of its

October 1980 inspections of the KANUPP reactor as satisfactory. IAEA officials

indicated that the inventory guaranteed that Pakistan was not diverting materials from the

nuclear facility for military purposes748. But the US was not satisfied and on March 17,

1981, US Senator Alan Cranston alleged that Pakistan was continuing to purchase dual-

use nuclear technology from Europe and Pakistan would most likely have the capacity

and the materials for fabricating several nuclear weapons by the end of 1982. He also

urged the Reagan administration to threaten to cut-off the supply of nuclear fuel to France,

Italy, and other countries if they continued their nuclear cooperation with Pakistan749. But

the need of Pakistan against the USSR was also processing. On March 19, 1981, US

Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr. urged Congress before the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee to modify existing law to re-establish a dialogue of trust and confidence with

Pakistan. He also hoped to bring several countries into a strategic consensus to counter

Soviet Union's expansion in the region750. Later US Under-Secretary of State James L.

Buckley urged the repeal of the Symington amendment that prohibited aid to countries

that had detonated or were seeking to acquire nuclear weapons751.

US administration officials indicated that the Reagan administration had

tentatively decided to offer Pakistan $400 million in military credits, $100 million in

economic support, and $600,000 in military training. Also, Reagan administration

officials urged Congress to amend the existing laws reasoning that Pakistan might be

deterred from producing nuclear weapons if its security needs were addressed. On the

other hand, some US officials expressed concern that Pakistan would persist in its

attempts to produce nuclear weapons irrespective of the amount of aid given by the United

States752.

US Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig and the Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha

Shahi, on April 21, 1981, concluded one and half days of talks over the proposed US aid

package to Pakistan. Shahi announced that the US had presented a five-year aid proposal.

748 New York Times, February 28, 1981. 749 Washington Post, March 18, 1981. 750 New York Times, March 20, 1981. 751 Ibid., March 20, 1981. 752 Ibid., March 24, 1981.

198

US sources indicated that the Reagan administration had not sought any new assurances

from Pakistan over its nuclear weapons program753.

US Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to lift aid restrictions on Pakistan

and authorized $100.6 million in economic and military assistance. The measure was

passed by the Foreign Relations Committee and exempted Pakistan from the Symington

amendment. Out of the $100.6 million, $100 million was to be used for security-related

economic aid and $600,000 for military training assistance754. On June 12, 1981, US

decided to offer F-16 fighter planes to Pakistan as a part of the planned five-year

economic and military aid package. US State department approved the sale as a symbolic

gesture that would indicate the Administration's emphasis on building a strengthened

relationship with Pakistan755. On June 15, 1981, the US and Pakistan agreed on a $3

billion military and economic aid deal to strengthen Pakistan's military in the face of the

Soviet threat in Afghanistan. A US State Department spokesperson, David Passage,

announced that US administration believed that by addressing those security concerns

which had motivated Pakistan's nuclear program and reestablishing a relationship of

confidence with it offered the best opportunity in the long run for effectively dealing with

its nuclear program. The five-year aid program involved $400 million in loans every year

for military purchases as well as $100 million economic assistance annually756. On June

17, 1981, in response to a question over the proposed aid to Pakistan and whether Pakistan

had provided assurances not to develop nuclear weapons, US president Reagan refused

to answer and indicated that it was important for the US to assist Pakistan owing to

Pakistan's strategic location757.

US Under-Secretary of State James L. Buckley announced on June 14, 1981,

before the Senate Government Affairs Committee that Pakistan's President and Ministers

had provided absolute assurances that Pakistan did not intend to develop nuclear

weapons. Buckley also clarified that such a clause that aid to Pakistan would be cut-off if

it exploded any kind of nuclear device was not discussed with Pakistani officials but they

were familiar with US758. Pakistan’s nuclear program was under great threat from India

and Israel so General Zia ordered tight security measures to guard Pakistan's nuclear

753 Washington Post, April 22, 1981. 754 New York Times, May 15, 1981. 755 Ibid., June 13, 1981. 756 Ibid., June 16, 1981. 757 Ibid., June 17, 1981. 758 Ibid., June 25, 1981.

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installations following Israel's air-strikes against Iraq's nuclear reactor. Munir Ahmed,

Chairman of PAEC also stated that the steps were taken to guard against possible

rebellious activities and sabotage attempts on Pakistani nuclear projects759.

Government of Pakistan formally accepted a six-year $3.2 billion military and

economic assistance package in September 1981, offered by the US. Pakistan accepted

the offer after the US proposed a plan for the speedy delivery of the F-16 fighter aircraft.

The F-16 fighter aircraft offer was not part of the $3.2 billion economic and military

assistance package. Pakistan agreed to pay $1.1 billion in cash for the 40 F-16 fighter

aircraft. Saudi Arabia promised to assist Pakistan in paying for the planes760. US Under-

Secretary of State James Buckley urged the Congress to remove a ban on aid to Pakistan

to proceed with the six-year $3.2 billion aid package. He also told that General Zia had

categorically assured the US that Pakistan did not intend to acquire nuclear weapons. He

also refused to clearly state that the US would cut off aid if Pakistan exploded a nuclear

device. The Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency Erich F. von Marbod

said that the nuclear capabilities of the F-16s would be removed before their shipment to

Pakistan761.

In September 1981, General Zia reiterated that Pakistan would not produce or

acquire a nuclear bomb but Pakistan would not surrender its right to possess nuclear

technology762. US Senator John Glenn stated that he would introduce three amendments

to strengthen US nonproliferation laws. According to him, one of the amendments would

require a cut-off of aid, without a presidential waiver, to India and Pakistan in case either

of the countries would detonate a nuclear device763. On October 20, 1981, the Senate

adopted two amendments to the Foreign Aid Bill introduced by Senator John Glenn. The

first amendment required an annual report from the president on Pakistan's nuclear

activity as a condition for the renewal of the aid program. The second amendment placed

a limit on any waiver extended to Pakistan to a period of six years764. Next day, the Senate

approved another amendment introduced by Senator John Glenn by a vote of 51-45 that

required suspension of foreign aid to Pakistan or India if they would conduct a nuclear

test. Later, Senator Jesse Helms introduced another amendment that required the US

759 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 11, 2017. 760 New York Times, September 16, 1981. 761 Ibid., September 17, 1981. 762 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 12, 2017. 763 Washington Post, September 26, 1981. 764 New York Times, September 21, 1981.

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government to cut off aid to any non-nuclear country that would conduct a nuclear test

and this amendment was passed by a voice vote765.

In November, 1981, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 10-7 to

approve the sale of F-16 warplanes to Pakistan. Similarly, two House Foreign

Subcommittees voted 10-5 to approve the sale. Under-Secretary of State James L.

Buckley said that the US would continue its efforts to halt Pakistan's nuclear program by

stopping the sale of nuclear equipment and technology. He opposed the Senate

amendment that called for suspension of aid to Pakistan if it exploded a nuclear device.

He told the Senate that it was difficult to see how the US could go forward with an

assistance program for Pakistan under such circumstances766.

After a couple of days, the House Foreign Affairs Committee rejected a resolution

opposing the sale of 40 F-16 aircraft to Pakistan. The voting session resulted in a 13-13

tie, which was considered a defeat under Congressional rules767. A few days later General

Zia said that Pakistan got the ability to prepare a bomb but it was not in the agenda of

Pakistan’s nuclear program. He further stated that developing countries need to possess

nuclear technology and he said that Pakistan was determined to acquire nuclear

technology768. On December 8, 1981, the US House Foreign Affairs Committee voted to

provide Congress with greater powers to reject aid to countries believed to be developing

nuclear weapons. An amendment to the foreign aid authorization bill, sponsored by

Stephen J. Solarz would allow the Congress to override a Presidential waiver to the

Symington amendment by a concurrent resolution that only required simple majorities.

The proposed amendment could not be cancelled by a presidential veto769. On December

14, 1981, the House-Senate conference approved the $11.4 billion foreign aid bill. The

bill included $100 million in economic assistance to Pakistan. The aid was permissible

after a waiver of the required Presidential assurance that Pakistan was not participating

in the transfer or receipt of a nuclear device, or a detonation of a nuclear device. The

Presidential waiver expired after 30 days, after which the Congressional action was

needed to extend it further. A second waiver allowing the President to declare that

765 Washington Post, October 22, 1981. 766 Ibid., November 18, 1981. 767 New York Times, November 20, 1981. 768 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 12, 2017. 769 Washington Post, December 9, 1981.

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Pakistan was not involved in the receipt or transfer of equipment for uranium enrichment

was subject to Congressional veto by both Houses770.

In December 1981, CIA reported that Pakistan could possess the ability to test a

nuclear device within the next three years. According to the report, Pakistan was partly

deterred from conducting a nuclear test by President Reagan's military and economic

package which would be withdrawn once Pakistan would test a nuclear device771. On

January 14, 1982, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi said that Pakistan did not

provide any assurance to the US over its nuclear program in return for the $3.2 billion

military and economic aid. He also stated that Pakistan was aware of the US law that

would result in a cut-off of aid to any country that exploded a nuclear device. However,

he also stated that the Reagan administration might not adopt such a hardline even if

Pakistan conducted a nuclear explosion since Pakistan was crucial to US strategic plans

in the region772. On January 26, 1982, speaking at a news conference after his luncheon

meeting with the French President Francois Mitterrand, General Zia stated that Pakistan

did not possess the capacity or the intention to produce nuclear weapons. He also stated

that he did not attempt to renew the French contract for the supply of a nuclear fuel

reprocessing plant to Pakistan773.

In his address to the UN Disarmament Conference on June 10, 1982, Pakistan's

Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan stated that Pakistan would not develop or

acquire nuclear weapons and Pakistan was committed to the creation of a nuclear

weapons-free zone in South Asia774. Meanwhile, the nuclear accords between the US and

China were obstructed due to China's relationship with Pakistan regarding nuclear issues

because it was suspected by the US that China supplied Pakistan with material other than

fuel-related items775.

US placed a hold on bilateral nuclear cooperation with China on September 18,

1982, because of intelligence reports suggesting that China helped Pakistan in its efforts

to produce weapons-grade uranium and that it aided Pakistan in its efforts to enrich

uranium776. In September 1982, US Secretary of State George P. Shultz made a private

770 New York Times, December 15, 1981. 771 Ibid., January 24, 1982. 772 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 12, 2017. 773 New York Times, January 26, 1982. 774 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 12, 2017. 775 Ibid. 776 New York Times, September 19, 1982.

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request to Western European allies to deny permission for the sale of a new reactor to

Pakistan until Pakistan accepted international safeguards on all its nuclear facilities777.

General Zia assured the US that China was not involved in Pakistan's peaceful nuclear

energy program778. On November 16, 1982, Pakistan agreed to implement most of the

additional monitoring mechanisms requested by the IAEA779. General Zia stated that

Pakistan would be willing to accept tougher nuclear inspections if the US would request

such inspections on all countries and if the pressure was only on Pakistan, then we would

resist780.

In January 1983, US intelligence officials indicated that China had provided

sensitive nuclear weapons design information to Pakistan. The Chinese assistance

removed the need for Pakistan to conduct an early nuclear test. Unlike Israel, Pakistan

was not believed to possess the technical complexity to build a nuclear arsenal without

testing a nuclear device781. General Zia assured the nation that Pakistan had taken

necessary measures to protect its nuclear installations after receiving information of a

planned attack on the installations by India or Israel782. On January 16, 1984, Pakistan

renamed the Kahuta nuclear facility as AQ Khan Research Laboratory in recognition of

Dr. AQ Khan's contribution to Pakistan's nuclear program. Dr. Khan, in an interview with

the magazine stated that he had achieved for Pakistan within minimum expenditure what

countries like West Germany, Britain, and Holland took 20 years to complete at a cost of

almost $2 billion783. On another occasion, AQ Khan stated that Pakistan had broken the

Western countries' monopoly on the enrichment of uranium and Pakistan was then among

the few countries in the world that could efficiently enrich uranium. He also claimed that

Pakistan had gained a lead over India in uranium enrichment technology. He also thanked

General Zia and Ghulam Ishaq Khan for their support for the program784.

US Senate passed an amendment to the foreign aid bill on February 28, 1984, to

block the sale of nuclear components, materials or technology to countries that have not

implemented full-scope safeguards stipulated under the NPT. The amendment was

proposed by Senator Gordon J. Humphrey and Senator William V. Roth Jr. The countries

777 Ibid., December 3, 1982. 778 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 13, 2017. 779 Washington Post, November 17, 1982. 780 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 13, 2017. 781 Washington Post, January 28, 1983. 782 New York Times, July 4, 1983. 783 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 13, 2017. 784 New York Times, February 10, 1984.

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affected by the amendment were Pakistan, India, Israel, Argentina, Brazil, and South

Africa785. On March 28, 1984, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted an

amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill that required a halt to any assistance to Pakistan unless

the US President certified that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device, and

was not acquiring, overtly or covertly, technology, material, or equipment for

manufacturing or detonating a nuclear explosive device. The amendment was proposed

by Senator Alan Cranston and cosponsored by Senator John Glenn. The Under Secretary

of State for Security Assistance William Schneider said the amendment would undermine

US efforts to convince Pakistan to accept nuclear non-proliferation agreements786.

In April 1984, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee reversed an

amendment passed on 28 March that required a Presidential certification that Pakistan did

not possess a nuclear device as a precondition for aid to Pakistan. The reversal occurred

after the US administration convinced some senators that a cut-off of aid due to the

amendment might cause Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons for its security787. US

administration was still suspecting about China as assistance provider to Pakistan in

nuclear field but China informed the US that it would not provide additional assurances

apart from those already provided. Some sources indicated that in 1983 China transferred

design for the fourth device detonated by China and not the design of the fourth nuclear

device built by China788.

Reagan administration officials stated on July 17, 1984 that China's assistance to

Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was a major road block in consummating the nuclear

cooperation agreement signed between China and the US during President Reagan's

China trip in April. US officials expressed serious concern over the presence of Chinese

officials at the Kahuta enrichment facility and indicated that the situation was being

closely observed. US officials believed that China would assist Pakistan in overcoming

the technical hurdles for building uranium enrichment centrifuges and in return China

might get access to the advanced centrifuge designs obtained by Pakistan789. On

September 12, 1984, Reagan sent a personal letter to General Zia warning that Pakistan

might lose American military aid if it continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program.

785 Ibid., February 29, 1984. 786 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 13, 2017. 787 Ibid. 788 New York Times, June 23, 1984. 789 Financial Times, London, June 17, 1984.

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He also warned General Zia not to enrich uranium beyond 5% at the Kahuta enrichment

facility790.

In March 1985, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Michael

Armacost, traveled to Islamabad to reaffirm Washington's determination to keep a lid on

the Pakistani nuclear weapons program791. On March 14, 1985, Pakistani nuclear

scientist AQ Khan stated in an interview that Pakistan's nuclear program was entirely for

peaceful purposes but it could carry out an atomic explosion in a very short time, if

required, without conducting any test792. In April 1985, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv

Gandhi communicated his concerns about Pakistan's nuclear program directly to Pakistan.

He opined that a nuclear arms race in the subcontinent would only subject both our

peoples to the worst possible fate on earth793.

US Ambassador to Pakistan, Deane R. Hinton said in a press conference on May

2, 1985, in Islamabad that the United States would be willing to cooperate with Pakistan

in the peaceful use of nuclear energy only if Pakistan would agree to the NPT or full-

scope safeguards794. In 1985, at the UN General Assembly meeting in New York, General

Zia, called for India and Pakistan simultaneously to sign the NPT, accept mutual full

scope safeguards and inspections, and renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This

proposal was duly endorsed by Reagan but not by Gandhi795. On September 13, 1985, the

Reagan Administration expressed its concern about the possible development of a nuclear

weapon by Pakistan and about overall tensions in the region. According to the US the

underlying concern in the region was the danger of Indian retaliation against any nuclear

developments in Pakistan796. On March 2, 1986, US Ambassador to Pakistan Deane

Hinton expressed doubts about Pakistan's nuclear program and asked the Pakistani

leadership to sign the NPT. The Ambassador said that if Pakistan wanted to pursue its

nuclear program for peaceful purposes, it could get more aid from the US and other

countries797.

790 Wall Street Journal, October 25, 1984. 791 George Perkovich, "Nuclear Capabilities Grow," India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global

Proliferation, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 264. 792 Ibid. 793 Ibid. 794 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 14, 2017. 795 Perkovich, Nuclear Capabilities Grow, 276. 796 New York Times, September 13, 1985. 797 NTI Nuclear and Missile Developments, March 26, 1986, www.nti.org.

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In April 1986, Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Khan Junejo asked the US

and China to help Pakistan's peaceful nuclear program to tide over power shortages in the

country. This was the first time that Pakistan publicly sought assistance from China on

nuclear development. US Ambassador Deane Hinton said the US was willing to help

Pakistan in nuclear technology, provided its peaceful uses were verified by international

inspections798. In July 1986, US Secretary of State George Shultz and Pakistan Foreign

Minister Yaqub Khan signed an agreement to transfer advanced US technology including

mainframe computers and communications equipment with the condition that Pakistan

could not transfer the equipment to a third country and might not use it in any nuclear

weapons program799. Junejo assured the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that

Pakistan had no plans to build a nuclear bomb and was abiding by President Reagan's

guidelines that the enrichment plant at Kahuta to be limited to no more than 5%, the

highest enrichment necessary for civilian reactor fuel800.

US once again warned Pakistan on November 7, 1986, that it would cut off aid if

Islamabad continued its efforts to make a nuclear bomb. Washington Post reported that

Pakistan had conducted heavy explosives tests in September, in order to develop an

implosion trigger device801. On March 6,1987, US Senator John Glenn asked President

Reagan to suspend military aid to Pakistan until it offered convincing proof that it was

not seeking to develop nuclear weapons802. Pakistan declared that it would continue its

peaceful development of nuclear energy and would not bow to pressure from foreigners

who feared that it might be building atomic bombs803. On September 22, 1987, Reagan

met with Junejo at the UN and pressurized him that US would suspend aid if Pakistan

would not open its nuclear installations to international inspection804. In his speech to the

UN, Junejo proposed a nuclear-free zone and regional test ban treaty in South Asia. He

said that his government would accept a bilateral test ban between India and Pakistan805.

On March 28, 1988, India and Israel reportedly discussed the possibility of attacking

Pakistan's nuclear facility at Kahuta. Both countries feared Pakistan's nuclear bomb

manufacturing know-how for different reasons: India feared that Pakistan would use the

798 Ibid., May 1, 1986. 799 Ibid., August 1, 1986. 800 Ibid. 801 The Times of India, November 7, 1986. 802 New York Times, March 6, 1987. 803 Ibid., March 9, 1987. 804 Ibid., September 22, 1987. 805 http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_nuclear.pdf?_=1316466791, Retrieved May 14, 2017.

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bomb in a regional conflict and Israel feared that Pakistan would share its know-how with

other Arab states. Israeli officials believed that financial barriers were the only thing

preventing Pakistan from making a bomb806.

The period of Afghan war was a golden period for Pakistan nuclear program. US

and Pakistan were on one page regarding the fight against the USSR and both needed

each other in the war. US officials knew it very well that in case of pressurizing Pakistan

on the issue of non-proliferation, the objectives of Afghan war could not be achieved so

US did not bloc the assistance given to Pakistan despite having reports of CIA mentioning

the progress of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Although, Pakistani government remained

firm on its stance that Pakistan’s nuclear program was for peace and there was no

intention to make a bomb. India and Israel were much concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear

program but they did not initiate any concrete effort to harm Pakistan’s nuclear program.

In short it is argued that if there had not been any Afghan war, Pakistan’s nuclear program

could hardly be accomplished.

5.3. Post Afghan War Period:

After Geneva Accords, on one hand US reduced Pakistan’s military and

economic aid and on the other hand they started pressurizing Pakistan to roll back its

nuclear program. It was interesting that US changed its stance vis-à-vis Pakistan’s

nuclear program. In the past US always demanded Pakistan to leave its nuclear program

and open it for international inspection. But after the conclusion of Afghan war, US was

well aware of the fact that Pakistan had made a lot of progress in the field of nuclear

technology and the demand of ceasing nuclear program was no more valid so it

demanded complete roll back of the program. To increase pressure on Pakistan US and

the West started a blame game against Pakistan’s nuclear program.

UK Observer confirmed on June 13, 1988 that Pakistan and Iran had signed a

secret nuclear cooperation agreement in 1987, which would allow Iranian engineers to

develop their skills in Pakistan. This agreement took place between Reza Amrollahi,

chairman of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization and his Pakistani counterpart,

Munir Ahmad Khan807. But on very next day, a Pakistani foreign office spokesman

denied the allegation. The spokesman claimed that no Pakistani scientist had visited

Iran's nuclear plant in recent years, nor had Iranian nuclear experts received additional

806 The Muslim, Islamabad, March 28, 1988. 807 NTI Nuclear and Missile Database, July 13, 1988, www.nti.org.

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training in Pakistan808.

A US Government report stated that Pakistan's Kahuta enrichment plant might

be able to produce enough weapons & grade uranium to produce one to three explosive

devices annually809. Later in January 1989, a visiting US delegation to Pakistan led by

Congressman Stephen Solarz was informed by Pakistani President Ghulam Ishaq Khan

that Pakistan would set up its own nuclear power plants within the next ten years. Ishaq

Khan also suggested that the US should not resort to a discriminatory policy regarding

nuclear proliferation in South Asia810. On January 29, 1989, Pakistan announced that it

was planning to hold consultations with the US in order to convince the American

government that Pakistan’s atomic program was only for peaceful purposes and its

objective was to increase the production of electricity811.

In February 1989, US Congressman, Stephen Solarz, mentioned a proposal

under which the US would sell an atomic reactor to Pakistan, if Pakistan would agree

to accept total safeguards for all its nuclear installations, including the existing ones.

Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman responded that Pakistan needed atomic reactors to

meet its energy requirements and that these reactors would come under IAEA

safeguards. Although, IAEA safeguards were being applied to the Karachi nuclear

power plant. However, Pakistan neither agreed to sign the NPT, nor accepted inspection

of its nuclear installations. Pakistan declared that the cause of nuclear nonproliferation

in the region could be eliminated only through non-discriminatory and equitable

measures812.

Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto spoke to a joint session of the US

Congress on June 7, 1989 and said that Pakistan was willing to open its nuclear

installations to inspection if other countries in the region would do the same. She also

said that there was a need for a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. Pakistan once again

made it clear that it had no intention of manufacturing nuclear weapons813. US President

George Bush informed Bhutto that US aid would be cut off if he would find that

Pakistan possessed a nuclear weapon814. On February 21, 1990, French President,

Francois Mitterrand visited Pakistan and during his visit he announced that he had

808 Ibid., June 21, 1988. 809 Ibid., November 1, 1988. 810 Jang, Lahore, January 17, 1989. 811 NTI Nuclear and Missile Database, February 6, 1989, www.nti.org. 812 Ibid., February 28, 1989. 813 The Dawn, Karachi, June 10, 1989. 814 NTI Nuclear and Missile Database, June 9, 1989, www.nti.org.

208

agreed to sell a nuclear reactor to Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto assured that complete

safeguards would be provided for the French plant. Later, both the heads of

governments discussed the issue of a reprocessing plant815.

In February 1990, the US Department of State expressed concern over the

proposed sale of a nuclear power plant by France to Pakistan but Pakistan regarded this

concern as baseless and stated that Pakistan was aware of the US concern about

nonproliferation and stressed that Pakistan's nuclear program was for peaceful purposes

only816. Bob Oakley, the US Ambassador to Pakistan also expressed US displeasure at

the then agreement made between France and Pakistan for the sale of a nuclear power

plant817. Meanwhile, the government of Benazir Bhutto was dismissed but France

confirmed that the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto would not affect discussions between

both countries for the export of a nuclear power plant to Pakistan818.

In October 1990, the US Congress cut off $500 million a year aid to Pakistan

because the Bush administration did not certify that Pakistan was not building a nuclear

weapon819. But Pakistan was firm that it would not sign the NPT unless India signed it

first820. A. Q Khan assured the government that the nuclear program of Pakistan could

be continued without aid from the US. Besides, newly elected Pakistani Prime Minister,

Nawaz Sharif stated that Pakistan did not have a nuclear bomb and would be happy to

sign the NPT provided India would do the same821. On November 21, 1990, Stephen

Solarz urged the US to cut off aid to Pakistan to pressurize Pakistan into giving new

guarantees that it would not build nuclear bombs822. Nawaz Sharif said that he was

ready to open talks with the US on Pakistan’s nuclear program823. US withheld the aid

to Pakistan. In February 1991, the US decided to return two-third of the aid that it was

providing to Pakistan824.

In June 1991, US proposed to supply Pakistan with conventional weapons in

exchange for a promise that the country would not attempt to buy or develop nuclear

weapons825. In the same month, a delegation of Pakistani Senators visited the US to end

815 Ibid., February 21, 990. 816 Ibid., March 2, 1990. 817 The Nation, Lahore, February 26, 1990. 818 NTI Nuclear and Missile Database, October 1, 1990, www.nti.org 819 New York Times, November 30, 1990. 820 NTI Nuclear and Missile Database, November 15, 1990, www.nti.org. 821 Ibid. 822 Ibid., November 21, 1990. 823 New York Times, November 30, 1990. 824 Nawa-i-Waqt, Lahore, February 1, 1991. 825 Washington Post, June 11, 1991.

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the US suspension on economic and military aid to Pakistan. US State and Defense

Department officials told the Pakistani Senators that the suspension would continue

until Pakistan would prove that it had no intention to build nuclear weapons826. Ghulam

Ishaq Khan, the President of Pakistan stated that Pakistan would not allow international

inspections to take place at the Kahuta uranium enrichment facility. He also assured

that Pakistan was pursuing a peaceful nuclear program and that countries did not reveal

their research to each other. Meanwhile, the press in Pakistan saw the Kahuta facility

as a possible target for Israeli armed forces as Israel believed that Kahuta was involved

in military activities and could supply Arab countries with nuclear weapons in the

future827.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif threatened to declare war against any country that

would let its soil be used in attacks on nuclear sites in Pakistan. Pakistani newspapers

suggested that the group of Israelis who were abducted from Indian ruled Kashmir in

June 1991, were plotting to attack a secret Pakistani nuclear plant at Kahuta828.

US Senator, Larry Pressler said that the US was convinced that Pakistan

possessed a nuclear device. He said that the US feared an Islamic bomb either in

Pakistan or in the Central Asian republics of the former USSR. But Pakistan told the

US that it was not aiding Iran in its attempts to build nuclear weapons. Although

Pakistan admitted that an Iranian request was made within the last few years to former

army chief of staff Mirza Aslam Beg for access to Pakistan's nuclear weapons

technology. In exchange for this access, Iran offered a pledge to write off Pakistan's

debts and meet its financial needs. But this request of Iran was turned down by Pakistan

829. On January 14, 1992, the Bush administration told Pakistan that it must destroy the

parts it was believed to have for at least two nuclear weapons before the US would

resume aid but Pakistan denied that it had the parts, and stated that complying with the

US demand would create a political problem since nuclear capability was an important

symbol of prestige for Pakistan. Meetings between the new army chief of Pakistan,

General Asif Nawaz and US officials were held but did not resolve the dispute. Pakistan

said it had stopped production of enriched uranium to meet US conditions for aid

renewal830.

826 NTI Nuclear and Missile Database, July 1, 1991, www.nti.org. 827 Ibid. 828 Washington Post, July 12, 1991. 829 Ibid., January 14, 1992. 830 Ibid.

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Pakistani Foreign Secretary Shahryar Kahn, on February 8, 1992, said that

Pakistan had the capability to build a nuclear weapon, but it had not and would not build

one, nor would it transfer nuclear technology to other countries. He stated that the

current government had frozen its nuclear weapons program and wanted to meet with

India to discuss regional nuclear disarmament as encouraged by the US, Russia, and

China. He also mentioned that Pakistan would only roll back its nuclear program if

India would do so831.

Regarding inspection of nuclear program, Nawaz Sharif said that Pakistan

would not allow inspections of the nuclear facilities at Kahuta. He also added that

Pakistan would sign any non-discriminatory agreement with India on the nuclear issue,

if it guaranteed that the two countries would be at par in letter and spirit. He also made

it clear that Pakistan had to confront over one hundred nuclear warheads of India that

threatened its security832.

Pakistani Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi also gave a statement that Pakistan had

suspended its nuclear program and was not proceeding any further beyond the given

point. He also stated that he believed that the US would reconsider the embargo because

of the growing military imbalance between Pakistan and India and the need for a

deterrent against Indian aggression833. On October 19, 1993, newly elected Pakistani

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, announced that she wished to resolve any

misunderstandings that existed between the US and Pakistan regarding Pakistan's

nuclear program. She also wished that she would like to renew the old relationship of

friendship which Pakistan had with the US834. She also suggested that the Pressler

Amendment should be reviewed which had banned US aid to Pakistan unless the

President would declare that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons835.

US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel met with Prime Minister Benazir

Bhutto and Army Chief General Abdul Waheed in Islamabad to discuss US-Pakistan

relations and differences regarding Pakistan nuclear program. However, little progress

was made on the nuclear issue between the two sides836. On March 29, 1994, US Deputy

Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Pakistan's Ambassador in Washington DC,

Maleeha Lodhi, discussed the possibility of convening an international conference on

831 New York Times, February 8, 1992. 832 The Pakistan Times, Islamabad, December 18, 1992. 833 Reuters, Islamabad, September 24, 1993. 834 NTI Nuclear and Missile Database, October 19, 1993, www.nti.org. 835 New York Times, October 21, 1993. 836 Reuters, Islamabad, November 8, 1993.

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nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia. The proposed conference would include all

permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as Japan and Canada. Pakistan

was also seeking a one-time waiver of the Pressler Amendment to permit the delivery

of 40 F-16 aircraft from the US. In exchange for the waiver, Pakistan would allow

international inspections of its nuclear facilities only if India would do the same837.

Strobe Talbott considered talks with Pakistani diplomats as good. He also hoped to

convince Pakistan to allow a verifiable cap of its nuclear program in exchange for a

one-time waiver of the Pressler Amendment, which would allow the US to deliver 38

F-16 aircraft. In response to his statement Benazir Bhutto announced that if Pakistan

would be unilaterally pressed for the capping, it would be discriminatory, and Pakistan

would not agree to it838. US Intelligence agencies discovered that Pakistan was going

forward on a deal to purchase M-11 missiles from China. Leader of Opposition, Nawaz

Sharif had stated that Pakistan possessed a nuclear bomb. This statement had increased

concern among proliferation experts that Pakistan would employ the Chinese missiles

(M-11) for the delivery of nuclear warheads839.

Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, on November 26, 1994, in an

interview, said that the refusal of the US to deliver F-16 jets, which Pakistan had paid

for, was strengthening the position of hardliners who wanted Pakistan to develop

nuclear weapons840. In April 1995, US President Bill Clinton called for modification of

the Pressler Amendment. He said that a revised law would make the US a stronger force

for peace and reconciliation in South Asia841.

US Senate's Foreign Relations Committee voted 15 to 1 to modify the Pressler

Amendment and ease restrictions on military aid to Pakistan842. Benazir Bhutto gave a

statement that if India would conduct a nuclear test, Pakistan could be forced to follow

suit. According to Bhutto, Pakistan hoped that the day would never arise when we had

to use our knowledge to make and detonate a nuclear device. However, she believed

that a nuclear test by India would trigger a proliferation race on the subcontinent.

Western diplomats said that an Indian nuclear test would threaten peace in the region

by ruining the delicate ambiguity that each country maintained about its nuclear

837 NTI Nuclear and Missile Database, March 31, 1994, www.nti.org. 838 Washington Times, April 10, 1994. 839 Ibid., September 7, 1994. 840 Reuters, Islamabad, November 26, 1994. 841 Wall Street Journal, April 5, 1995. 842 New York Times, May 24, 1995.

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programme843.

Pakistani foreign minister Gohar Ayub Khan said in an interview to the BBC

World Service that Pakistan was ready to sign a treaty with India on non-use of nuclear

weapons, even though it would put Pakistan at a disadvantage. He also stated that

Pakistan was against nuclear weapons844. In a statement, AQ Khan stated that the

nuclear program in Pakistan would continue despite criticism from the West. He said

that it was so central to Pakistan’s security that Pakistan would not stop it. He added

that efforts of scientists had placed Pakistan into the club of six or seven countries

capable of enriching uranium up to 95 percent for use in weapons of mass destruction845.

Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in a statement, acknowledged

Pakistan’s nuclear program. He stated that the issue of nuclear capability was an

established fact. Hence the debate on this issue should come to an end. He also made it

clarified that Pakistan had progressed significantly and it had left the developmental

stage far behind846. Meanwhile, on May 13, 1998, India tested its nuclear weapons and

threatened Pakistan. US and the world pressurized Pakistan not to test its nuclear device

in reply to India. But Nawaz Sharif was under great internal pressure and on May 28,

1998, Pakistan tested its nuclear device as well. Nawaz Sharif reported on May 28, 1998

that Pakistan conducted five nuclear tests and had settled the score with India. He also

reported that Pakistan would weaponize its intermediate-range ballistic missile Ghauri

with nuclear warheads. In addition, Sharif criticized the international community's

response to India's nuclear tests and said, that Pakistan was left with no choice but to

detonate its own nuclear devices. Pakistanis cheered in the streets of Islamabad, India's

parliament responded in aggressive way when Opposition Leader, Sharad Pawar

blamed Indian government for starting a nuclear arms race847.

Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was of the view that he would sign the

CTBT only if US would lift sanctions. The sanctions were imposed on Pakistan in May

1998 after it conducted its nuclear tests. However, Nawaz Sharif said that Pakistan's

adherence to the treaty would take place only in conditions free from pressure. He added

that Pakistan expected that the arbitrary restrictions imposed on Pakistan by multilateral

institutions would be speedily removed and that discriminatory sanctions against

843 The Daily Telegraph, January 6, 1996. 844 The Times of India, July 27, 1997. 845 Washington Times, August 13, 1997. 846 The Times of India, September 8, 1997. 847 New York Times, May 28, 1998.

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Pakistan would be lifted848.

Keeping an eye at the history of Pakistan-US relations in perspective of

Pakistan’s nuclear program we see a great shift from the US side. Whenever US needed

Pakistan’s assistance, it not only ignored Pakistan’s nuclear program but also extended

full economic, military and political assistance to Pakistan but when the US policy

objectives were achieved then it not only left Pakistan alone but also demanded to close

or roll back Pakistan’s nuclear program. The collapse of Soviet Union reduced the links

between Pakistan and the United States which unfolded many miseries for Pakistan. It

also changed the entire spectrum of the world politics. In the changing geostrategic

scenario, Pakistan was no longer considered by the US to be a strategic partner that

could be preferred over India. Pakistan was not even treated on equal footings with

India. The strategic worth of Pakistan was still acknowledged by the US Pentagon but

it was not taken as important for the US interests as India. To contain China, Clinton

administration chose India as a close strategic and economically partner. The

development of US-India close relationship not only alarmed Pakistan but also widened

the gulf created in the trust between the US and Pakistan. The nuclear Pakistan was

considered a threat to the US’s objective to make South Asia a nuclear free zone.

Without considering Pakistan’s strategic needs, the US administration was much

concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear program.

US did not bother to consider the defense needs of its ally even after invaluable

sacrifices in war against communist Soviet Union. Sanctions under Pressler amendment

caused political, economic and military setback to Pakistan. Basically, the Pressler

amendment was aimed at deterring Pakistan from becoming a nuclear state but the

sanctions imposed under this amendment pushed Pakistan to pursue the nuclear option

more vigorously. Looking at the Indian nuclear ambitions and her past and present

hostile attitude towards Pakistan, the acquisition of nuclear deterrence had become top

most priority of Pakistan. The nuclear program that was started after the US embargo

in 1965 was accelerated after Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 and further increased

after the US sanctions in 1990. It was precisely the US sanctions imposed on Pakistan

in 1965 that had encouraged Pakistan to acquire long-range missiles and nuclear

weapons. India’s supplies had continued to come in from Russia which had put Pakistan

in a position in which it was necessary for it to turn to missiles and nuclear weapons to

ensure national security.

848 Washington Times, September 24, 1998.

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Conclusion

Relations between the countries are established on the basis of mutual interests.

It is the basic principle of foreign policy that there is no permanent friend or foe.

Friendship and rivalry depend upon national interests. When there is conflict of interests

then even close friendship turns into enmity. Similarly, enemies become close friends

when there exists common national interest. Therefore, achievement of national interest

is the major objective of foreign policy. Moreover, geographical location also plays

significant role in the formulation of foreign policy. Pakistan’s confrontation with India

remained a significant factor in foreign policy making throughout our history.

Pakistan’s close relations with the US or sometimes working for the accomplishment

of the US interests was mainly due to Pakistan’s confrontation with India.

US was a super power at the time of Pakistan’s independence. Pakistan’s affinity

with the US was on one side due to the inclination of Liaqat Ali Khan towards US and

on the other US’s good strategy as compared to the USSR. Pakistan’s relations with the

US are rampant with ups and downs. These relations are based on the mutual

requirements of both the countries. On one hand, Pakistan, being a new country and in

search of economic and military support, needed strong collaboration with the US and

on the other, US was also in search of a reliable friend in South Asia to counter the

growing influence of the USSR in the region.

Pakistan’s geographical location is the main factor which makes it important for

the US. Pakistan was a close neighbor of two communist countries, China and Russia.

US was consistently trying to contain communism for decades during cold war.

Besides, for both super powers, Pakistan was the best choice to be used against each

other. During Afghan crisis, Pakistan was used by the US in restricting the USSR.

Although Pakistan managed to do that but at the cost of its internal security.

Economic and political outcomes in Pakistan over the last 70 years are a mixture

of inconsistencies. It is usually believed that economic growth can take place only in

the presence of political stability, but in Pakistan it has been observed that it is directly

related to Pak-US relationships so far. Therefore, Pakistan’s relations with the US

remained a significant factor affecting Pakistan’s foreign policy.

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Pakistan started depending on US aid from the beginning due to many reasons,

the primarily being its new economic structure and security concerns from its

neighbour, India. Right from the early days of the relationship with the US, Pakistan

has defined its foreign policy rules vis-à-vis US in favour of its own interests with

foreign assistance serving as temptation. It was Pakistan's geo-strategic significance

that attracted American policymakers' attention to Pakistan during the cold war; they

recognized that Pakistan could play an important role in the containment of

communism. In 1954, large-scale interaction between US and Pakistani military started,

and Pakistan joined memberships of SEATO and CENTO, which mired Pakistan's

diplomatic ties with other countries and did not serve the basic purpose of defence

against Indian aggression.

During Ayub Khan’s regime, Pakistan received huge amounts of economic aid

from the US besides sufficient military assistance. The 1960s era was perhaps the most

enjoyable for both the US and Pakistan. GDP growth in this decade jumped to an

average annual rate of 6.8% percent from 3% in the 1950s. Karachi was seen as an

economic hub around the world but this economically golden period was short lived

because afterwards US cut down aid to Pakistan. Ayub Khan could not suffer the

aftermath of 1965 war and fell from the presidency.

As a result of 1970s, election, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, became President and later

Prime minister in 1974. This period was seen as a "quiet cold war" between US and

Pakistan. Under Bhutto, Pakistan focused on Movement of Non-Aligned Countries,

building closer ties with Soviet Bloc. American aid to Pakistan already started declining

due to Bhutto's secret pursuit of nuclear technology during the concluding year of his

regime. The Carter administration imposed the Symington Amendment on Pakistan in

April 1979, thereby cutting off most economic and military aid. The economic growth

rate in the 1970s fell to 4.8% per annum from 6.8% percent recorded in the 1960s. When

Zia assumed power in mid-1977, Pakistan was out of the limelight but because of the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan became an important actor occupying

a central position in the world arena.

The nuclear issue was of critical importance to both Pakistan and India. In 1974

India successfully tested a nuclear device. Bhutto reacted strongly to this test and said

Pakistan must develop its own atomic bomb. Zia thus inherited a pledge that for

domestic reasons he could not discard, and he continued the development of nuclear

program. He asked India to agree to several steps to end this potential nuclear arms race

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in the subcontinent. One of these measures was the simultaneous signing of the Treaty

on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The second step was a joint agreement

for inspection of all nuclear sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Pakistan

also proposed a pact between the two countries to allow for mutual inspection of sites.

And, finally, Pakistan proposed a South Asian nuclear-free zone. It appeared that Zia

was looking for a way to terminate the costly Pakistani program. But in order to sell

this idea in Pakistan, he required some concessions from India. Termination would also

get him out of difficulties the program was causing with the United States, including

the reduction of aid in 1979. Active and potential conflict continued to be a constant

factor in Pakistan's relations with India. The dispute over the precise demarcation of the

Line of Control in Kashmir at the Siachen Glacier heated up periodically.

A number of United States laws, amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of

1961 were applied to Pakistan and its program of nuclear weapons development. The

1976 Symington Amendment stipulated that economic assistance be terminated to any

country that imported uranium enrichment technology. The Glenn Amendment of 1977

similarly called for an end to aid to countries that imported reprocessing technology-

Pakistan had from France. United States economic assistance, except for food aid, was

terminated under the Symington Amendment in April 1979. In 1985 the Solarz

Amendment was added to prohibit aid to countries that attempt to import nuclear

commodities from the United States. In the same year, the Pressler Amendment was

passed referring specifically to Pakistan, it said that if that nation possessed a nuclear

device, aid would be suspended. Many of these amendments could be waived if the

president declared that it was in the national interests of the US to continue assistance.

The turning point of Pakistan-US relations was the Afghan crisis when the

Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, causing a sudden reversal of

United States policy. Throughout the years of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan,

relations between the United States and Pakistan were best characterized by close

cooperation. US provided Pakistan economic and military aid and both the countries

extended every possible support to the Afghan militants fighting against Soviet army.

For Pakistan, Soviet-Afghan war left both positive and negative impacts. The

positive impact on Pakistan was the international recognition of Zia’s military regime.

His government was facing criticism both internally and externally. But when Pakistan

217

opted to support Afghan militants along with US, it became the political focus of South

Asia. US was imposing economic and military sanctions on Pakistan but after the start

of Soviet-Afghan war, US provided economic and military aid to Pakistan. Although,

US also promised to provide F-16 fighter planes but this deal could not accomplish.

Pakistan also got the opportunity to accelerate its nuclear program under the umbrella

of Afghan war. US was constantly demanding from Pakistan to reverse its nuclear

program and sign NPT and CTBT but afterwards this demand of the US disappeared

under the dust of Soviet-Afghan war.

Because of the war, Pakistan also got opportunity to influence internal political

matters of Afghanistan in its own favour. Pakistan achieved partial objectives in this

regard as the events after Geneva Accords were not according to Pakistan’s will.

Despite the formation of a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan, the Afghan militant

groups started fighting among themselves. Therefore, Pakistan failed to make its long

western border secure. Although, during mujahideen regime, Pakistan was not worried

about its western border but after that the condition became worse. Pakistan’s internal

security was badly deteriorated and Pakistan faced an unprecedented series of terrorist

attacks. The terrorists used to enter Pakistan and after achieving their motives they used

to return to Afghanistan without any obstruction. Therefore, Pakistan had to start the

installation of Pak-Afghan border with barbed wires.

Weapon and Kalashnikov culture started in Pakistan as a result of Soviet-

Afghan war. There was no proper check on the distribution process of the weapons

provided by the US. So, a large amount of ammunition and weapons went to wrong

hands. It was also sold in open markets in tribal areas and was available to common

people as well. Anti-state elements used these weapons in robbery, dacoity and in

sectarian killings. This increased the rate of incidents of theft, robbery and violence to

a great extent. Moreover, the society of Pakistan was hardly familiar with sectarianism

but after Soviet-Afghan war, these religious factions made their own military wings and

started killings of each other.

A large number of Afghan refugees entered Pakistan which was a great burden

on instable economy of Pakistan. Afghans were physically strong as compared to the

people of Pakistan, so they provided a good labour force on minimal wages. This

increased unemployment in Pakistan. Cultivation of opium and its products was a major

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source of the income for Afghans and they continued even in Pakistan. This increased

spread of drugs and the drug addiction in Pakistan.

For the USSR, Soviet-Afghan war was like a nightmare. Soviet policy makers

miscalculated the political situation of Afghanistan and ignored the possible

participation of US through Pakistan and Afghan mujahideen. The defeat in the Soviet-

Afghan war was itself not a great setback for USSR as compared to the aftershocks of

the failure. Soviet army was considered as the binding force of the states of Soviet

Union. But after this defeat these states started thinking of independence. In a couple of

years, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,

Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia

and Lithuania declared independence.

The consequences of Soviet-Afghan war are like a win-win situation for the US.

Its main rival lost its supremacy and the world transformed from bipolar to unipolar.

US achieved its objectives without using its land and military. To free Afghanistan from

Soviet army was but to bring political stability in Afghanistan, perhaps was not included

in the foreign policy objectives of the US. For this reason, soon after Geneva Accords,

US left Afghanistan at its own. Political instability in Afghanistan had a bad impact on

Pakistan’s internal security.

Future Prospects:

Pakistani rulers should re-visit their attitude towards foreign policy making

because foreign policy should be formulated according to the changing dynamics of the

current time. Pakistan should establish good relations with all of its neighbors including

India. The only bone of contention between Pakistan and India is the Kashmir issue. A

sincere effort may be made by both countries to resolve this issue politically by give

and take. Pakistan’s government should try to resolve core issues with Afghanistan as

well including cross border terrorism and border issue. Both the countries should start

a joint border security which may be good in eliminating mutual rifts. Pakistan should

invite Afghan students to study in Pakistani universities to minimize Afghanistan’s

dependence on India. Pakistan should invite its neighboring countries to participate in

China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to affiliate their economic interests with

Pakistan.

219

Weak economic conditions of Pakistan also force Pakistan to work for other’s

interest for some economic gains. Pakistan should make its economy strong so that no

one can dictate in making of its own foreign policy. The world has become a global

village due to advancement in media. Pakistani media is not much vigilant as compared

to US. Therefore, Pakistan’s role in the world’s politics is not highlighted in a true

sense. Pakistani media should play its role in presenting true picture of Pakistan among

the comity of nations.

US is probably fascinated by its growing relations with India. That is why it

provided a lot of technological and military support to India. It seems that US wants

Indian role in Afghanistan. But India is politically and economically stronger than

Pakistan and it is rather difficult to dictate India as compared to Pakistan regarding its

policy towards Afghanistan and China. India has nothing common with Afghanistan.

On the other hand, Pakistan and Afghanistan have common culture, religion and

traditions. Moreover, both have a long common border so geographically Pakistan is in

a better location to play its role in Afghanistan and China as compared to India.

Ultimately US will have to rely on Pakistan for whatever US policy makers want to do

in these countries.

Pakistan and US relations throughout the history remained short term and event

based. After the accomplishment of the objectives US turned a cold shoulder towards

Pakistan. For this reason, Pakistan-US short term strategic ties have never been

welcomed among the masses. This also makes it difficult for Pakistan’s government to

join alliance with the US. Therefore, it is necessary that US policy makers should revisit

their strategy and establish sound and long-lasting relations with Pakistan.

Pakistan-US strategic ties in South Asia are quite complex. India is the biggest

strategic threat to Pakistan but US declares it a major strategic partner. Pakistan has

classic relation with China and is trying to establish good relations with Russia but both

China and Russia are strategic rivals of the US. Moreover, US has bitter relations with

Iran and wants to contain it but Pakistan cannot offer any kind of assistance to the US

in this regard as Pakistan has a large Shia community and decision of joining US against

Iran may result in sectarian conflicts in the country. Therefore, it is required that both

countries should enhance cooperation in other fields such as education, technology,

economy and cultural exchange.

220

The relations between Pakistan and the US may become even stronger if both

the countries would assist each other regarding different foreign policy related issues.

Pakistan has security concerns from India and Kashmir is the bone of contention

between the two nations. US being closer to India can play an active role to resolve this

issue. US can play the role of mediator to find such a solution of Kashmir issue which

may be acceptable for India, Pakistan and Kashmiris. After the resolution of this core

issue, Pakistan’s eastern border would be secure. In this way, Pakistan would be in a

better position to assist US in attaining its policy objectives. Besides, Pakistan may play

the role of a bridge to bring US and China close to each other. China, although a

communist country, but does not have the policy of expansion like Russia. Therefore,

US may not have any concerns in establishing good relations with China. In this way,

both Pakistan and the US can come strategically closer to each other which would be

of great advantage for both the countries.

Relations between Pakistan and the US are significant for the politics of

South Asia to a great extent and for the world to some extent. Pakistan and US should

focus on areas of common interests including education, IT and cultural exchange to

make their relations long-lasting rather than coming close to each other on some issues

like Afghan crisis. CPEC could serve as a game changer for Pakistan so beneficiaries

of CPEC should be brought together to counter any threat to destabilize Pakistan and

Pakistan should also keep US on board to minimize US reservations. US and Pakistan

should work together for a permanent solution of Afghan issue acceptable to all

stakeholders to secure Pakistan’s western border and for bringing political stability in

Afghanistan. US should take Pakistan’s nuclear program only as a strategic deterrence

against India which is also an atomic country and should nor regard this issue as bone

of contention between each other.

221

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34. Peter Tomson, The Wars of Afghanistan, (New York: Public Affair Publishers,

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48. Babrak Lodhi, Behtay Lahoo Ki Kahani,(Peshawar: Institute of Regional

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50. Tahir Amin, Afghanistan Crisis,(Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1982).

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52. Syed Shabbir Hussain, Abdul Hamid Alvi and Absar Hussain Rizvi,

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55. Kamal Mattinuddin, Power Struggle in the Hindu Kush Afghanistan, (Lahore:

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56. Amin Saihal and William Malley, The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan,

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92. George Perkovich, "Nuclear Capabilities Grow," India's Nuclear Bomb: The

Impact on Global Proliferation, (Berkeley: University of California Press,

1999).

Interviews:

1. Name of Interviewee: Tom Hutson

Designation: US Consulate (Retd)

Interview by: Qaiser Mehmood

Venue: Lincoln NE (US)

Date: February 04, 2017

2. Name of Interviewee: Tom Gouttiere

Designation: Dean Emeritus UNO (United States)

Interview by: Qaiser Mehmood

Venue: Omaha NE (United States)

Date: February 04, 2017

3. Name of Interviewee: Sherjan Ahmedzai

Designation: Director Afghanistan Studies, UNO (US)

Interview by: Qaiser Mehmood

Venue: Omaha NE (US)

Date: February 13, 2017.

Websites:

http://www.history.com

http://history.state.gov

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu

227

http://en.wikipedia.org

http://www.en.banglapedia.org

http://www.historypak.com

http://www.nazriapak.info

http://www.historycommons.org

http://www.tandfonline.com

http://web.lexis-nexis.com

http://www.dawn.com

http://www.nti.org

http://www.washingtonpost.com

Newspapers:

Washington Post, The Daily, Washington D.C:

January 12, 1978

May 20, 1978

August 24, 1978

August 25, 1978

November 4, 1978

April 7, 1979

May 2, 1979

August 15, 1979

August 27, 1979

October 18, 1979

October 20, 1979

January 15, 1980

January 18, 1980

February 4, 1980

March 8, 1980

September 21, 1980

September 22, 1980

December 31, 1980

March 18, 1981

April 22, 1981

September 26, 1981

October 22, 1981

228

November 18, 1981

December 9, 1981

November 17, 1982

January 28, 1983

June 21, 1984

June 11, 1991

July 12, 1991

January 14, 1992

November 16, 1992

April 10, 1994

September 7, 1994

August 13, 1997

September 24, 1998

The New York Times, The Daily, New York:

December 27, 1973

May 19, 1974

May 20, 1974

June 8, 1974

July 5, 1974

October 14, 1974

November 21, 1974

February 6, 1975

February 24, 1976

February 26, 1976

August 10, 1976

August 11, 1976

August 12, 1976

August 26, 1976

November 12, 1976

November 17, 1976

December 17, 1976

January 10, 1978

August 24, 1978

April 17, 1979

229

May 2, 1979

May 27, 1979

August 12, 1979

August 17, 1979

September 23, 1979

February 1, 1980

February 28, 1980

September 1, 1980

September 23, 1980

February 28, 1981

March 20, 1981

March 24, 1981

May 15, 1981

June 13, 1981

June 16, 1981

June 17, 1981

June 25, 1981

September 16, 1981

September 17, 1981

September 21, 1981

November 20, 1981

December 15, 1981

January 24, 1982

January 26, 1982

September 19, 1982

December 3, 1982

July 4, 1983

February 10, 1984

February 29, 1984

June 23, 1984

September 13, 1985

March 6, 1987

March 9, 1987

September 22, 1987

230

November 30, 1990

February 8, 1992

October 21, 1993

May 24, 1995

May 28, 1998

Financial Times, The Daily, London:

June 17, 1984

Wall Street Journal, The Daily, New York:

October 25, 1984

April 5, 1995

Telegraph, The Daily, London:

January 6, 1996

The Times of India, The Daily, Mumbai:

November 7, 1986

July 27, 1997

September 8, 1997

Dawn, The Daily, Islamabad:

March 23, 1983

March 5, 1988

March 24, 1988

August 18, 1988

Dawn, The Daily, Karachi:

April 4, 1988

June 10, 1989

The Nation, The Daily, Lahore:

February 26, 1990

The Pakistan Times, The Daily, Islamabad:

December 30, 1979

December 18, 1992

Jang, The Daily, Rawalpindi:

December 30, 1979

January 3, 1980

January 4, 1980

January 10, 1980

231

June 26, 1982

Nawa-i-Waqt, The Daily, Islamabad:

January 2, 1980

January 16, 1980

February 7, 1980

November 21, 1980

February 1, 1991

Hurriyat, The Daily, Karachi:

April 17, 1981

Mashraq, The Daily, Lahore:

May 18, 1982

Jasarat, The daily, Karachi:

May 19, 1982

Amman, The Daily, Karachi:

June 29, 1982

The Muslim, The Daily, Islamabad:

March 28, 1988

Jang, The Daily, Lahore:

January 17, 1989

Reuters, Islamabad:

September 24, 1993

November 8, 1993

November 26, 1994

Interview Questionnaire

1. US were interested in establishing good relations with Pakistan soon after independence

of Pakistan. What factors were behind this interest?

2. What is the importance of Pakistan’s geographical location for US?

3. Pakistan and India got independence on the same day. Whom did US think most suitable

country for friendship?

4. What kind of reservations did US have from the spread of Communism in South East

Asia?

5. China also turned into a communist nation after independence, but we did not find US

severe stance against China as compared to Soviet Union. What was logic behind that?

6. How did US see Pakistan’s entry into defense agreements like SEATO and CENTO?

232

7. Pakistan was expecting assistance from the US during the wars of 1965 and 1971 with

India but US did not come to help Pakistan. According to your point of view what factors

make US policy makers to remain neutral in these wars?

8. How do you look Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s government from 1970 to 1977 in which the major

step he took was the start of Pakistan’s nuclear program?

9. What are the US reservations from Pakistan’s nuclear program?

10. On one side we see that US were constantly wishing for democratic governments in

Pakistan but on the other side we find that US always had hand and glove like

relationship with military rulers of Pakistan i.e; with Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and recently

with Pervaiz Musharraf. What is the reason behind this?

11. How do you see Pakistan’s role in Afghan War against the Soviet army?

12. According to your point of view what the Pakistani government did the best for the United

States from 1947-1988?

13. In the same way I want to ask what the Pakistani government did the worst thing for US

point of view from 1947-1988?

14. What is the importance of geographical location of Afghanistan for both United States

and the USSR?

15. What were the causes behind Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan?

16. US quickly decided to respond Soviet military intervention. What were the factors behind

this decision of the US?

17. Why did the US government select Pakistan as their ally in the war against Soviet army?

18. What factors led both US and USSR to come to the conclusion of war by signing Geneva

Accord?

19. General Zia was of the view that before signing the Geneva Accord it was important to

set up a government infra structure in Afghanistan. Do you think that he was thinking in

a better way?

20. Pakistani Premier Muhammad Khan Jonejo decided to sign Geneva Accord without the

will of President General Zia. Did Jonejo have full support of the US?

21. Do you think that Geneva Accord was signed at proper time and it was not good to linger

it on?

22. What were, according to your point of the view, the motives behind US full support to

religious Islamic groups in Pakistan fighting in Pakistan and why it did not rely only

Pakistan’s military to do so?

233

23. It is thought in Pakistan that US were only involved in the war to defeat USSR and they

were not interested in internal stability of Afghanistan. As USSR was defeated so on

accomplishment of this objective US instantly withdrew its support from Afghanistan.

What is your opinion in this regard?

24. US were having reservations about Pakistan’s nuclear program. That is why soon after

the defeat of USSR the economic aid given to Pakistan was ceased. Why did US not

question about Pakistan’s nuclear program throughout the period of war?

25. How do you look Pakistan-US mutual support in Afghanistan War? Was it possible for

Pakistan or US alone to defeat communism in the region?

26. There is still a conspiracy theory in Pakistan that US were having some reservations

from General Zia on the issue of Geneva Accord and US was behind death of General

Zia a few months after Geneva Accord? What is your point of view in this regard?

234

APPENDICES

235

Appendix-I

236

Appendix-II

237

Appendix-III

238

239

240

241

242

243

Appendix-IV

244

245

246

Appendix-V

247

248

249

250

251

252

253

254

255

256

257