Pakistan's Hide and Seek With Democracy

7/31/2019 Pakistan's Hide and Seek With Democracy

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Pakistans Hide-and-Seek with Democracy,1947-2011: The Bridge-to-Nowhere or Creeping

Consolidation?Unlike India, Pakistan has struggled to institute democracy over the last sixty four years after gaining

independence. Using the concepts of democratic transition, consolidation, stability and quality, this article

investigates the impact of four sets of factors on Pakistans progress with democracy: structural, institutional,

strategic choice and political economy. These factors emerge in Pakistans case as inter-connected levels of a

comprehensive framework to evaluate democratization. Structural factors provide the foundation for the

emergence of institutional factors, which in turn provide the grounds for strategic choice and transient political

economy factors to affect the democratization in a country.

Since independence, Pakistan has experienced four periods of military rule which have consumed 35 out of its 64

years of independent existence. It has spent another seven years under unelected civilian rule while the army

wielded disproportionate powers even during quasi-democratic regimes. Compared with the firm commitment to

democracy of India, its twin at birth and putative arch enemy since then, Pakistan held its first national elections

with near universal suffrage only 23 years after independence. Since then, it has held eight more elections of

varying fairness and is currently ruled by an elected government, though it is not certain whether this government

will complete its term and whether the next government will be ushered in democratically. However, its dictators

have not ruled Pakistan with the same longevity and brutality as in Africa and have all been forced soon to

attempt to legitimize themselves by introducing the trappings of democracy. In fact, they have usually seized

power with the promise to introduce real democracy soon. Thus, democracy has remained the only game in

town in theory. These contradictions make Pakistan an interesting case for analyzing the factors which impede

the establishment of democracy in poor, ethnically diverse and traditional societies.

Scholars have ascribed various reasons for Pakistans erratic democratic progress, including the supposed

contradiction between Islam and democracy, the incoherence of Pakistani nationalism, the strength of its army,

the weaknesses of its political class and American support for dictators. Many of these explanations carry weight.

However, they do not constitute a comprehensive framework for understanding Pakistans past zig -zag march

towards democracy, its current status and future prospects. This article utilizes the concepts of democratic

transition and consolidation to answer the following five questions: 1) What factors impeded a democratic

transition in Pakistan and eventually facilitated it?; 2) What factors have undermined democratic consolidation

since then?; 3) What is the quality of democracy presently?; 4) What are Pakistans future democratic

prospects?; 5) What conclusions does Pakistans case provide about democratic transition and consolidation in

developing countries? The next section develops an analytical framework for answering these questions. Section

three provides an overview of Pakistans democratic journey to the present while answering the first two

questions. Sections four focuses on the third question and the last section focuses on the fourth and fifth

questions.Analytical framework


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Democracy represents governance of the people, by the people, for the people. A minimalist approach,

championed by Huntington (1991) and Dahl (1971), views democracy as the holding of free, regular and

competitive elections, i.e., whether access to state power is gained democratically. However, elections only

represent governance by the people. Diamond (1999) and ODonnell (2010) champion a more maximalist

approach which also focuses on whether state power is exercised democratically, i.e., the two remaining aspects

above. The concepts of democratic transition and consolidation can act as a bridge between these two

approaches. Democratic transition is the first movement away from an authoritarian regime marked by the

holding of a countrys first fair election with near-universal franchise, competition and acceptance (Munck, 2003).

Thus, democratic transition represents the minimalist approach.

Democratic consolidation refers to the stage after democratic transition (Diamond, 1997; Schedler, 1998). It can

be divided into two sub-components: democratic stability and quality. Democratic stability refers to the durability

of the democratic transition and is marked by regular free, competitive and near-universal suffrage elections

(Munck, 2003). Democratic stability exists when all major societal groups accept democracy as the only game in

town (Linz and Stepan, 1997). Finally, democratic quality represents the maximalist vision and focuses on the

democratic exercise of power. Adapting from Diamond (1999) and ODonnell (2010), this article identifies seven

specific dimensions of democratic consolidation, the first of which represents democratic stability and the

remaining six represent democratic quality:

Regular, fair elections with near-universal suffrage, competition and acceptance

Empowered elected government unencumbered geographically or functionally by internal or external entities

Distribution of authority horizontally (across the executive, parliament, political parties, bureaucracy, judiciary and

opposition) and vertically (devolution to smaller ethnic or administrative units)

Feedback loops (e.g., recall elections and active civil society)

Guarantee of civil and political liberties and equality, especially for minorities

Economic equity, i.e., equality of opportunities for all and safety nets for the vulnerable

The rule of law, with clear and nondiscriminatory laws and an efficient and effective justice system that covers

both the general public and public officials

Since few developing countries score highly on these criteria, they are called electoral or illiberal democracies at

best. Developed countries, termed liberal democracies, generally score highly on most of these criteria though

those following neoliberal economic policies do not score highly on the economic equity criterion. Thus, neoliberal

democracies may be a more suitable classification for them.

Scholars have identified four sets of factors which affect democratic transition and consolidation (Guo, 1999;

Haynes, 2001):

1. structural factors focus on the impact of macro-level societal structures,

2. strategic choice factors, which focus on the micro-level choices of powerful elites based on their self-interests,

3. institutional factors which focus on the interactions among societal institutions, and

4. transient political economy factors.

Pakistans democratic trajectory, 1947-2011

Pakistan came into existence under an elected government in 1947. The British had organized nation-wide

elections in undivided India in 1946 and the elected legislatures were subsequently divided up between India and


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Pakistan (Jalal, 1990). Assuming five-year validity for these legislatures, Pakistan should have called fresh

elections by 1951-52, as done by India. Unfortunately, this did not happen in Pakistan for a variety of reasons.

At birth, Pakistan was divided into East and West Pakistan which were separated by a 1000 miles of Indian

territory. This geographical division was overlaid by enormous ethnic diversity. Pakistans main ethnic group then

was the Bengalis (over 50% of the population) who inhabited East Pakistan. The Punjabis, Pakhtuns, Sindhis and

the Baloch inhabited West Pakistan and werejoined at independence by migrants (Mohajirs) from Indias Muslim

minority areas (Lieven, 2011). While numerically dominant, the Bengalis were thinly represented among

Pakistans powerful social groups, i.e., the military, landlords, bureaucracy, businesspersons and middle class

professionals. These groups were dominated by the West Pakistan-based Mohajirs and Punjabis, who thus had

an incentive to thwart democracy and nullify the Bengali numerical advantage in order to keep power in their own

hands (Jalal, 1990; Cohen, 2004).

The peculiar distribution of power among socio-economic groups also thwarted democracy. While middle-class

professionals dominated the political leadership at independence, most of them were migrants from India who

lacked strong political roots locally (Jaffrelot, 2002). While this middle-class should have been the natural

champion of democracy, the Bengali majority and their own lack of roots discouraged them from playing this role

and strengthened the military and bureaucracy. These unelected institutions were indigenous to West Pakistan

and were inherently prejudiced against democracy (Jaffrelot, 2002). The conflict with India on Kashmir further

strengthened the militarys hand as security issues became paramount. Consequently, electi ons kept getting

postponed. The bureaucracy and the military orchestrated the removal of a number of governments and the state

structure became centralized. This made the Bengalis feel marginalized within Pakistan (Jalal, 1990).

Pakistan soon developed close relationships with the US in order to counter India. The US had also identified

Pakistani generals as reliable clients in the Cold War. Fearing that a democratic government may adopt anti-

military policies after elections, Ayub Khan, the military leader, staged a coup in 1958 with tacit American support

(Ali, 2008). American advisors subsequently played an active role in Pakistan and favored elitist economic

policies. American aid supported capital-intensive industrialization and green revolution in western Pakistan at

the expense of the east and neglected the social sectors (Ali, 2008; Gardezi and Rashid, 1983). This increased

ethnic grievances among the Bengalis, Sindhis and the Baloch. While Ayub organized elections during this

period, they did not meet the criteria of fair elections with universal suffrage but only acted to rubberstamp his

transformation from a military to a civilian ruler.

In summary, the period from 1947-1965 was one of increasing authoritarianism because of all four sets of causal

factors mentioned earlier. Structural factors were the most salient and manifested themselves in the shape of the

ethnic diversity and its peculiar geographical dispersion across the two wings of the country. This set up an East

vs. West political dynamic which was detrimental to the cause of democracy. Institutional factors were the next

most important set of factors, in the shape of the mismatch between the strength of political parties and unelected

institutions. External political economy factors, particularly the animosity with India and American support for the

military, further undermined democracy. Finally, the strategic choices made by Ayub and other military officers in

the pursuit of their own self-interest also undermined democracy. However, such strategic choices were


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subservient in importance to structural and institutional causes as without them, individuals would not have had

the freedom to choose the options they did.

Pakistan fought a stalemated war with India in 1965, which undermined Ayubs domestic political standing as he

had promised a victory. Subsequently, the USA suspended its aid as a punishment, thus undermining his

international standing. This caused an economic downturn within Pakistan given its heavy dependence on foreign

loans, which constituted 8.7% of the GDP by 1964-65 (Ahmed and Amjad, 1984). Ethnic grievances crystallized

institutionally in the shape of several popular political parties, the most prominent being the Awami League (AL)

in East Pakistan and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in West Pakistan (Jalal, 1990). Civil society groups

institutionalized into strong labor and student unions. Finally, Ayubs health deteriorated by 1968. The

combination of these institutional, political economy and strategic choice factors, in this order of importance,

caused the eruption of intense pro-democracy movements. These pressures culminated in March 1969 in a

Pakistani Spring leading to Ayubs downfall after 10 years in power (Jalal, 1990).

Ayub transferred power to the military, which held Pakistans first free and universal elections in 1970. The

elections resulted in an almost complete polarization, with the AL winning in East Pakistan and the PPP in West

Pakistan (Jalal, 1990). Structural factors, which were unimportant in the transition to democracy to-date, became

salient again as west-based military and the PPP refused to transfer power to the AL. This led to widespread

insurgency in the east, brutal army action by Pakistan and finally war with India which ended with the division of

Pakistan (Jalal, 1990). Power was then transferred in the new Pakistan to the PPP, leading to an imperfect

democratic transition 25 years after independence.

Pakistans first elected government was led by Zulfiqar Bhutto, a Sindhi landlord with socialist ideology who

increased spending on anti-poverty programs, undertook mild land reforms, nationalized private industry and

established state-owned heavy industry (Gardezi and Rashid, 1983). Bhuttos rule coincided with the Middle East

oil boom, which produced job opportunities for hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis but also exposed Pakistan to

the conservative Wahabi brand of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia. Bhutto organized rigged elections in 1977,

which led to massive political demonstrations, partly funded by the money flowing in from the Middle East. The

army, already uncomfortable under a strong-minded politician, imposed martial law in 1977 under General Zia,

just when Bhutto was about to remove him. This ended Pakistans first brief democratic experiment (Ali, 2008).

Bhuttos nuclear ambitions and socialist tendencies had chilled relations with the US. However, once the USSR

invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the USA decided to support counter-insurgency activities there with the help of

Pakistan in return for major US aid. Zias 11-years long dictatorship, made possible partly by American support,

enhanced ethnic and sectarian tensions and fueled the spread of arms, drugs and fundamentalism as Zia

sponsored numerous militant sectarian and ethnic groups in order to check-mate Bhuttos party (Ali, 2008). Zia

arranged rigged and party-less elections to earn a thin veneer of democratic legitimacy (Jalal, 1990). The Soviet

Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988, and Zia soon thereafter perished in a mysterious air crash. This started

a decade of quasi-democratic rule where the army maintained strategic control and twice instigated the

dismissals of both Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Zulfiqar Bhutto, and Sharif, a traditional industrial baron from

Punjab. Benazir and Sharif were perceived as corrupt and inefficient leaders and their removal did not result in

any major mass-based resistance (Ali, 2008). In the meantime, with the Soviet Union defeated, the USA re-dug


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the other hand, Pakistans political parties emerge from within its largely patronage -based economy where

personal and family connections hold the key to economic advancement (Ahmed, 2001; Lieven, 2011).

Traditional Pakistani families are inter-locked networks of political and economic patronage, starting from the

local level and extending all the way to the national level. It is this pyramid of family-based patronage networks

which produces the phenomena of dynastic politics in Pakistan. The dynastic leaders of major political parties sit

at the top of large patronage networks and face strong pressures to reward supporters when they come to power.

Consequently, they adopt state policies to reward supporters rather than rational policies which facilitate broad-

based development. Corruption is endemic in such a scenario as part of the black money goes towards

distributing largesse among supporters (Fair, et al., 2010). Gunther and Diamond (2001) define such parties as

elite parties. These patterns of politics undermine their credibility among important domestic and international

stakeholders, and make it easier for the army to informally wield significant powers even when elected

governments are in place and to frequently take over formally when its core interests are under serious threat.

Thus, structural societal factors provide the underlying basis for institutional factors and have played a key role in

undermining democratic quality in Pakistan. The low democratic quality in turn further undermines democratic

stability.

Democratic quality: present situation, future prospects

I now analyze the current status of democratic quality in Pakistan in the next section using the six dimensions

identified earlier.

Unencumbered elected government: First, high democratic quality means that the powers of the elected

government must not be unconstitutionally fettered, functionally or geographically. Functionally, a major fetter on

Pakistani elected governments is the fact that Pakistans security and foreign policy largely resides with the

military even during elected rule (Oldenburg, 2010). Elected governments have to keep in mind the militarys

preferences in order to reduce the chances of another martial law. During formal military rule, the military also

often institutes changes in the structures of the civilian government to enhance its own powers immediately and

subsequently (PILDAT, 2008a&b). Geographically, parts of Pakistan often become no-go areas where

government writ does not prevail. While the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan

has always been largely beyond government writ, parts of Balochist an and even Karachi (Pakistans largest city)

are managed by militants. Tribal leaders and landlords maintain their own mini-fiefdoms. Since 2006, the Taliban

have posed a big challenge to government writ as they captured some areas beyond FATA, reaching within 60kilometers of Islamabad, Pakistans capital, by 2008. Since then their military might and political popularity has

plummeted and they seem unlikely to capture power militarily or politically (Oldenburg, 2010).

Horizontal and vertical distribution of power: The flip side of power not being fettered unconstitutionally is that

it should be fettered constitutionally by being distributed among different constitutional institutions. Horizontally, it

must be distributed across the executive, legislature, judiciary and political parties. Vertically, it should be

devolved provincially and locally. Shorn of considerable power unconstitutionally, Pakistani central executives

become reluctant to share further power constitutionally. While the judiciary has succeeded in wresting some

constitutional power, other horizontal institutions remain powerless (Ghias, 2010). In 2010, the parliament did


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pass a significant piece of legislation to enhance provincial autonomy. However local governments, toothless

even earlier, are in limbo presently for the last one year (Burki, 2010).

Feedback loops: Third, high democratic quality requires vigorous feedback loops from the electorate to the

elected in-between elections, including electoral mechanisms (e.g., recall elections) and civil society activities.

While electoral mechanisms provide little space for the electorate to influence the behavior of the elected, civil

society activity has certainly picked up in recent years. In particular, Pakistani media has become very vigorous

and together with the legal fraternity played a major role in Musharrafs downfall (Ghias, 2010; Zaidi, 2008).

However, many feel that it is not responsible in its reporting, being overly driven by rating concerns, and needs a

code of conduct. At the same time, threats to journalists safety in Pakistan remain among the highest globally

(BBC, 2011). Consequently, Pakistan ranks 151 out of 178 countries on the Press Freedom index of the

Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF, 2010). Pakistans growing Diaspora in Europe and North America also offers

high potential in strengthening the role of civil society in Pakistan (Abbasi, 2010). On the other hand, the role of

labor unions in politics has reduced significantly since the 1960s due to the policies of subsequent governments

which aimed to weaken them institutionally (Candland, 2007).

The rule of law: The fourth component of high democratic quality is the rule of law, with clear, nondiscriminatory

laws and an efficient justice system to apply them to the public and public officials. The Rule of Law Index of the

World Justice Project, a Washington D.C.-based think tank, ranks Pakistan among the bottom 10 countries out of

the 66 countries ranked by it during 2011, and characterizes Pakistan as lagging behind even regionally on the

rule of law. Government accountability and the justice system efficiency are low while corruption is high (WJP,

2011). Pakistan still uses many anachronistic British-era laws and has added other laws which discriminate

against women and minorities. While the Supreme Court has breathed fire into the judicial system, lower courts

do not provide efficient justice and the police are notoriously corrupt (Ghias, 2010; ICG, 2010).

Civic and political rights and equality: Fifth, high democratic quality includes the guarantee of civic and

political rights and equality, including the freedom of speech, association, culture, religion, security, property etc.

Beyond discriminatory state laws, large sections of Pakistans population, especially women and minorities, have

lost these rights to non-state actors, e.g., militants and landlords, in the name of religion and tradition. Even

elected governments lack the willingness and capacity to redress these rights. Pakistan ranks in the middle

category of the Index of Freedom of the US-based Freedom House. However, a series of high-profile incidents in

recent years have come together to give Pakistan an image much worse than these rankings. These include the

murder of Salman Taseer and Shahbaz Bhatti, both government officials who spoke out against the oppression

of minorities, the routine murder and torture of women who marry of their own accord, and the frequent cases

instituted against minorities for supposedly insulting Islam (Constable, 2011).

Economic equity: Sixth, high democratic quality includes the existence of programs and policies which enhance

economic equity, i.e., equality of opportunities for all and safety nets for the vulnerable. Economic policies even

under elected Pakistani governments remain elitist, with little attempt to tax the rich adequately and implement

socio-economic programs. Pakistans tax-GDP ratio is among the lowest globally and socio-economic programs

generally depend on foreign aid. As a result, Pakistans social indicators in the areas of literacy, health and

gender equity are much below its recently acquired middle-income status. The total spent by the government on


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health, education and other social development programs is considerably less than the annual expenditure on

defense (Ali, 2008).

Conclusions

Pakistan experienced an imperfect and bloody democratic transition 25 long years after independence while

democratic stability and quality have eluded it in the 40 years since then. The most important factors that

undermined democratic transition were structural, i.e., the geographical division between an eastern and western

wings and the overlay of ethnic diversity. Another important structural factor was the patronage-based economy

which undermined the emergence of strong non-elitist political parties. These structural factors gave rise to

institutional mismatches, allowing the army to become stronger than political parties and civil society institutions.

These institutional mismatches allowed individual strategic choice factors to become salient as a series of army

generals exploited them to gain power. Finally, transient factors in the political economy played a facilitative role

in undermining democracy including the Cold War and rivalry with India. While the specific factors have changed,

the same four sets of factors have combined to undermine democratic stability and quality. The most important

structural factor is still the patronage-based economy which undermines the emergence of stronger political

parties who can provide high quality governance. This structural factor perpetuates the institutional mismatch and

provides fertile ground for strategic choice and political economy factors to contribute to democratic non-

consolidation.

However, certain encouraging signs can also be seen. As the economy has expanded and has become more

merit-oriented, helped by the large migration of Pakistanis abroad, strong civil society groups are emerging in the

shape of media groups, NGOs and professional groups who are exerting pressure for democratization and better

governance. Externally, the United States no longer sees the Pakistan army as its most reliable client within

Pakistan. The international environment is also becoming less tolerant of military coups. Finally, militants, who till

a few years back, were threatening to conquer Pakistan have lost much of their fighting capacity as well as

popularity among the general population. These changes provide some basis for greater optimism about the

prospects of democratic consolidation in Pakistan.

Thus, the four sets of factors can be seen as part of a comprehensive and inter-locking framework where

structural societal factors provide the chessboard on which different institutional constellations appear. These

institutional constellations provide the drop-back for individual strategic choices and transient political economy

factors. Thus, while the immediate triggers undermining democracy may appear to be strategic choice andtransient political economy ones, it is important to identify the institutional and structural characteristics which

shape the manifest factors.

Dr. Niaz Murtaza is a Visiting Scholar at the Center for South Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

His research interests include studying alternatives to neoliberal globalization and political economy issues in

South Asia, with a particular focus on Pakistan.

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Pakistan's Hide and Seek With Democracy