Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONA.C. No. 6155 March 14, 2006MA. GINA L. FRANCISCO, JOSEPHINE S. TAN and CARLOS M. JOAQUIN,Complainants,vs.ATTY. JAIME JUANITO P. PORTUGAL,Respondent.D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:Complainants filed before this Court an affidavit-complaint1on 15 August 2003 against Atty. Jaime Juanito P. Portugal (respondent) for violation of the Lawyers Oath, gross misconduct, and gross negligence. Complainants are related to petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23 entitled SPO1 Ernest C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin v. People of the Philippines, in whose behalf respondent filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) in the case.The complaint against respondent originated from his alleged mishandling of the above-mentioned petition which eventually led to its denial with finality by this Court to the prejudice of petitioners therein.The facts are as follows:On 21 March 1994, SPO1 Ernesto C. Francisco, SPO1 Donato F. Tan and PO3 Rolando M. Joaquin (eventually petitioners in G.R. No. 152621-23, collectively referred to herein as the accused) were involved in a shooting incident which resulted in the death of two individuals and the serious injury of another. As a result, Informations were filed against them before the Sandiganbayan for murder and frustrated murder. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. After due trial, the Sandiganbayan2found the accused guilty of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide.At that juncture, complainants engaged the services of herein respondent for the accused. Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Sandiganbayan but it was denied in a Resolution dated 21 August 2001. Unfazed by the denial, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration, with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration.3Pending resolution by the Sandiganbayan, respondent also filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Ad Cautelam) on 3 May 2002.Thereafter, complainants never heard from respondent again despite the frequent telephone calls they made to his office. When respondent did not return their phone inquiries, complainants went to respondents last known address only to find out that he had moved out without any forwarding address.More than a year after the petition was filed, complainants were constrained to personally verify the status of thead cautelampetition as they had neither news from respondent about the case nor knowledge of his whereabouts. They were shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a Resolution4dated 3 July 2002, denying the petition for late filing and non-payment of docket fees.Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest5had already been issued against the accused because respondent, whose whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking reconsideration from lapsing.In his Comment,6respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes that he was not the original counsel of the accused. He only met the accused during the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide. He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be present at the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision.Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But only because of his sincere effort and in true spirit of the Lawyers Oath did he file the Motion for Reconsideration. Though admitting its highly irregular character, respondent also made informal but urgent and personal representation with the members of the Division of the Sandiganbayan who promulgated the decision of conviction. He asserts that because of all the efforts he put into the case of the accused, his other professional obligations were neglected and that all these were done without proper and adequate remuneration.As to thead cautelampetition, respondent maintains that it was filed on time. He stresses that the last day of filing of the petition was on 3 April 2002 and on that very day, he filed with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review,7seeking an additional thirty (30) days to file the petition. Subsequently, on 3 May 2002, he filed the petition by registered mail and paid the corresponding docket fees. Hence, so he concludes, it was filed within the reglementary period.Soon thereafter, respondent recounted all the "herculean" efforts he made in assisting the accused for almost a year after the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision. He considered the fact that it was a case he had just inherited from the original counsel; the effect of his handling the case on his other equally important professional obligations; the lack of adequate financial consideration for handling the case; and his plans to travel to the United States to explore further professional opportunities. He then decided to formally withdraw as counsel for the accused. He wrote a letter to PO3 Rolando Joaquin (PO3 Joaquin), who served as the contact person between respondent and complainants, explaining his decision to withdraw as their counsel, and attaching the Notice to Withdraw which respondent instructed the accused to sign and file with the Court. He sent the letter through registered mail but unfortunately, he could not locate the registry receipt issued for the letter.Respondent states that he has asked the accused that he be discharged from the case and endorsed the Notice of Withdrawal to PO3 Joaquin for the latter to file with the Court. Unfortunately, PO3 Joaquin did not do so, as he was keenly aware that it would be difficult to find a new counsel who would be as equally accommodating as respondent. Respondent suggests this might have been the reason for the several calls complainants made to his office.On 9 February 2004, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.1awph!l.netThe case was assigned to Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) who sent notices of hearing to the parties but of the three complainants, only complainant Carlos Joaquin appeared. Thus, in the mandatory conference held, the other two complainants were declared as having waived their rights to further participate in the IBP proceedings.8The parties were directed to file their respective position papers and on 27 May 2005, Commissioner Villadolid submitted his Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility9and recommended the imposition of penalty ranging from reprimand to suspension of six (6) months.1awph!l.net10On 12 November 2005, the Board of Directors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve Commissioner Villadolids recommendation to find respondent guilty and specifically to recommend his suspension for six (6) months as penalty.The only issue to be resolved in the case at bar is, considering all the facts presented, whether respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling G.R. No. 152621-23, which eventually led to thead cautelampetitions dismissal with finality.After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds the suspension recommended by the IBP proper.In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, respondent has a higher duty to be circumspect in defending the accused for it is not only the property of the accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life and liberty. As held in Regala v. Sandiganbayan:11Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and public interest x x x .It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other profession in society. x x x12At the onset, the Court takes notice that thead cautelampetition was actually filed out of time. Though respondent filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration with the attached Second Motion for Reconsideration, he should have known that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading13and it rests on the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan to admit it or not. Thus, in effect, the motion did not toll the reglementary period to appeal. Having failed to do so, the accused had already lost their right to appeal long before respondent filed his motion for extension. Therefore, respondent cannot now say he filed thead cautelampetition on time. Also important to note is the allegation of complainants that the Sandiganbayan denied the second motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated 7 February 2002. This respondent does not dispute.As to respondents conduct in dealing with the accused and complainants, he definitely fell short of the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights of his clients. As aptly observed by Commissioner Villadolid, respondent had not been quite candid in his dealings with the accused or complainants. The Court notes that though respondent represented to the accused that he had changed his office address, still, from the examination of the pleadings14he filed, it can be gleaned that all of the pleadings have the same mailing address as that known to complainants. Presumably, at some point, respondents office would have received the Courts Resolution dismissing the petition. Of course, the prudent step to take in that situation was to at least inform the client of the adverse resolution since they had constantly called respondents office to check the status of the case. Even when he knew that complainants had been calling his office, he opted not to return their calls.Respondent professed an inkling that the several phone calls of complainants may have been about the letter he sent PO3 Joaquin regarding his desire to be discharged as counsel of the case. However, though aware of such likelihood, respondent still did not return their calls. Had he done so, he and complainants could have threshed out all unresolved matters between them.Had respondent truly intended to withdraw his appearance for the accused, he as a lawyer who is presumably steeped in court procedures and practices, should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself instead of the accused. At the very least, he should have informed this Court through the appropriate manifestation that he had already given instructions to his clients on the proper way to go about the filing of the Notice of Withdrawal, as suggested by Commissioner Villadolid. In not so doing, he was negligent in handling the case of the accused.Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. His tale that he sent a registered letter to the accused and gave them instructions on how to go about respondents withdrawal from the case defies credulity. It should have been respondent who undertook the appropriate measures for the proper withdrawal of his representation. He should not have relied on his client to do it for him if such was truly the case. Without the presentation of the alleged registry receipt (or the return card, which confirms the receipt of the mail by the recipient) of the letter he allegedly sent to PO3 Joaquin, the Court cannot lend credence to respondents naked claim, especially so that complainants have been resolute in their stand that they did not hear from respondent after the latter had filed thead cautelampetition. He could relieve himself of his responsibility as counsel only first by securing the written conformity of the accused and filing it with the court pursuant to Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court.15The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the clients written consent or from a good cause.16We agree with Commissioner Villadolid that the dismissal of thead cautelampetition was primarily due to the gross negligence of respondent. The Court has stressed in Aromin v. Boncavil17that:Once he agrees to take up the cause of the client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of the his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.18Respondent has time and again stated that he did all the endeavors he enumerated without adequate or proper remuneration. However, complainants have sufficiently disputed such claim when they attached in their position paper filed before the IBP a machine validated deposit slip in the amount ofP15,500.00 for the Metro Bank savings account of one Jaime Portugal with account number 7186509273.19Respondent has neither admitted nor denied having claimed the deposited amount.The Court also rejects respondents claim that there was no formal engagement between the parties and that he made all his efforts for the case without adequate and proper consideration. In the words of then Justice Panganiban (presently Chief Justice) in Burbe v. Atty. Magulta:20After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not money, is the primary consideration.21Also to the point is another case where this Court ruled, thus:A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. x x x22Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration.Lastly, the Court does not appreciate the offensive appellation respondent called the shooting incident that the accused was engaged in. He described the incident, thus: "the accused police officers who had been convicted of [h]omicide for the salvage of Froilan G. Cabiling and Jose M. Chua and [a]ttempted [h]omicide of Mario C. Macato."23Rule 14.0124of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly directs lawyers not to discriminate clients as to their belief of the guilt of the latter. It is ironic that it is the defense counsel that actually branded his own clients as being the culprits that "salvaged" the victims. Though he might think of his clients as that, still it is unprofessional to be labeling an event as such when even the Sandiganbayan had not done so.The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of respondent for six (6) months, the most severe penalty recommended by Commissioner Villadolid, but did not explain why such penalty was justified. In a fairly recent case where the lawyer failed to file an appeal brief which resulted to the dismissal of the appeal of his client in the Court of Appeals, the Court imposed upon the erring lawyer the penalty of three (3) months suspension.25The Court finds it fit to impose the same in the case at bar.WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. Let a copy of the Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of respondent.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-3455 July 31, 1951THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.SOTERO ULIP and ANDRES ULIP,defendants-appellants.Augusto L. Valencia for appellants.First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon, Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Rafael P. Caniza for appellee.BENGZON,J.:Early in the night of May 24, 1949 Paulino Ulip, 72, was comfortably seated on a bed near the kitchen of his house in Tibanglin, Naujan, Mindoro. Suddenly and without warning he was shot several times with a carbine by a person who had stealthily approached the dwelling under cover of darkness. Paulino died on the spot.After a few days, for some reason that does not appear Andres Ulip was arrested and after being questioned by Sgt. Martinez of the Constabulary, he admitted having conspired with Sotero Ulip and Alfonso Bergonio to kill the deceased. The latter (Bergonio) soon confessed, saying that, induced by Andres Ulip and Sotero Ulip, sons of Paulino, he committed the assassination, as he was disgusted, like them, with his stinginess and unbearable disposition. The two brothers admitted their guilt in affidavits subscribed before the justice of the peace of the capital, Calapan.Two informations were filed: one against Alfonso Bergonio for murder; another against Andres Ulip and Sotero Ulip for parricide. On a plea of guilty, Alfonso Bergonio was sentenced tocadena perpetuaand is now serving sentence. The two brothers pleaded not guilty, were tried and were convicted. Hence this appeal.There is presently no question about the violent death of Paulino Ulip at the hands of Alfonso Bergonio. The carbine is marked Exh. A and Sgt. Exequiel Martinez, who investigated the case found in the scene of the crime one magazine with three rounds of ammunition and three empty shells. The only question is whether the two brothers did actually conspire with and induce Alfonso Bergonio to assassinate their aged father.Presented as witness for the prosecution after he had been convicted of the murder, Alfonso Bergonio substantially repeated before the court the contents of his confession. He swore that he shot Paulino Ulip with the carbine given to him that night by Sotero Ulip, who had purchased it with money contributed by Andres Ulip; that upon delivering the gun to him, Sotero told him to shoot his father (Sotero's); that he complied with the suggestion of Sotero because he was slightly drunk; that after Paulino had died Sotero came and told him to report the death to Andres which he did. it seems, however, that afraid of Andres Ulip whom he described as a fighting character Alfonso Bergonio did not dare repeat some things be related about Andres in his confession Exh. F, to wit, that Andres had been chased, The month before, by Paulino Ulip armed with a bolo, and that Andres accompanied Sotero when the latter proceeded to buy the carbine.Exequiel Martinez, Sergeant of the Philippine Constabulary, declared that he conducted the investigation of the bloody affair; that Andres and Sotero Ulip admitted their guilt as inducers of the crime, the latter saying "that he was the one who ordered Alfonso Bergonio to kill Paulino Ulip," because the old man was "very strict" and refused to give them (Andres and Sotero) their share of the lands; that Sotero also recounted the incident when his father Paulino had angrily chased Andres with a bolo in his hand. This officer further declared that he found the carbine in the possession of Sotero, who declared he had bought it for the purpose with money furnished by Andres. He also stated that according to Bergonio, the two brothers promised not to collect his indebtedness if he would kill their father.The confessions of Sotero Ulip and Andres Ulip are in the record as Exhibits D and E. The first states in substance that one day Andres Ulip and Alfonso Bergonio were chased out of their farm by Paulino Ulip armed with a bolo; that resenting the old man's bad temper, on May 22, 1949 Alfonso gave Sotero went to Andres and the three of them conspired to do away with Paulino; that Andres gave Sotero one hundred pesos with which to buy a rifle; that the next day Andres together with Sotero went to the barrio of Baruyan, Calapan but failed to purchase the gun; that afterwards Sotero returned to the same barrio and finally acquired a carbine, which he handed to Alfonso Bergonio a few minutes before the murderous assault; that the brothers were resentful of their father because he was stingy and was so hot-tempered that when provoked, he would pursue them with a bolo in his hand.From the affidavit of Andres Ulip Exh. E it appears that Alfonso Bergonio was his second cousin. He admits in that statement that on May 22, 1949 Sotero and Alfonso went to see him to get money for a carbine with which to kill Paulino Ulip; that he gave the money one hundred pesos saying "sila ang bahala" (meaning either "they could do it on their own responsibility" or "go ahead.") That statement, in our opinion, could mean nothing but approval, coming as it does from a son who is apprised of their intention to put his father to death. This admission coupled with the fact that he took no steps to prevent the deed or to dissuade the two conspirators (Sotero and Alfonso) and his silence in not immediately denouncing them to the authorities is proof confirmatory of his oral admission to Sgt. Martinez that he conspired to liquidate his unfortunate parent. The circumstance that immediately after the shooting Alfonso Bergonio reported the victim's death to Andres, is additional indication of the latter's participation in the conspiracy to kill. Anyway, he knowingly contributed the money to buy the fatal weapon; and that is sufficient to make him responsible as principal for having cooperated with an act without which the crime could not have been accomplished.1Alfonso Bergonio has no reason falsely to implicate his two cousins, the accused herein. And their version about the confessions Exhibits D and E having been obtained thru violence and threats has been rightly rejected by the trial judge, because they refused to identify the officers who had allegedly tortured or threatened them, never mentioned the maltreatment to any of their relatives who visited them in jail, and the justice of the peace of Calapan before whom they executed the affidavits, positively asserted that they told him, when subscribing the documents, they were acting voluntarily and freely, without any duress.In this connection we may advert to the point raised by appellant's attorney that, according to our decisions, to consider as principal by induction one who advises or incites another to perpetrate the offense it is essential to show that the advisor had a great ascendancy or great influence and that his words were so efficacious and powerful as to amount to moral coercion. Undoubtedly proof of such extremes is usually required to justify the conclusion that his words or advice actually moved the hands of the principal actor. But such proof would seem to be unnecessary where as in this case such principal actor admits having been so impelled, and says that he acted pursuant to a previous plan or conspiracy to kill, and a promise to condone his indebtedness.In conclusion, these two prisoners are, without reasonable doubt, guilty as charged. The Solicitor-General suggests premeditation as aggravating circumstance. But that would be compensated by their lack of instruction.Consequently, the penalty of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court is affirmed. But the sum of P1,500 fixed as indemnity should be raised to P6,000.2With this modification the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.Paras, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Jugo, JJ.,concur.

[A.C. No. 5235. March 22, 2000]FERNANDO C. CRUZ AND AMELIA CRUZ,complainants, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO C. JACINTO,respondents.JurisR E S O L U T I O NMELO,J.:In their sworn complaint, spouses Fernando C. Cruz and Amelia Manimbo Cruz seek the disbarment of Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, through Commissioner Jesulito A. Manalo of the Commissioner on Bar discipline, conducted an investigation. Thereafter, he submitted his Findings and Recommendation, thusly:This is a disbarment case filed by the spouses Fernando and Amelia Cruz against Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto. This case was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline last 30 January 1991.The evidence of the complainants show that sometime in June 1990, Atty. Ernesto Jacinto, lawyer of the couple in an unrelated case, requested the Cruz spouses for a loan in behalf of a certain Concepcion G. Padilla, who he claimed to be an old friend as she was allegedly in need of money. The loan requested was for PhP 285,000.00 payable after 100 days for PhP 360,000 to be secured by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land located at Quezon City.Sc jurisThe spouses, believing and trusting the representations of their lawyer that Padilla was a good risk, authorized him to start preparing all the necessary documents relative to the registration of the Real Estate Mortgage to secure the payment of the loan in favor of the Cruz spouses.On 4 July 1990, the complainants agreed to the request of Atty. Jacinto and were presented by the latter with a Real Estate Mortgage Contract and a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 127275 in the name of Concepcion G. Padilla. The amount of PhP 285,000.00 was given by the spouses to the respondent in cash (PhP 270,000.00) and a PBCom check no. 713929 for PhP 15,000.00.Upon maturity of the loan on 15 October 1990, the spouses demanded payment from Concepcion G. Padilla by going to the address given by the respondent but there proved to be no person by that name living therein. When the complainants verified the genuineness of TCT No. 127275 with Register of Deeds of Quezon City, it was certified by the said office to be a fake and spurious title. Further efforts to locate the debtor-mortgagor likewise proved futile.Juris scIn their sworn affidavits given before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the spouses claim that they relied much on the reassurances made by Atty. Jacinto as to Concepcion G. Padillas credit, considering that he was their lawyer. It was also their trust and confidence in Atty. Jacinto that made them decide to forego meeting the debtor-mortgagor.The complainants evidence also included the sworn statements of Estrella Ermino-Palipada, the secretary of the respondent at the Neri Law Office, and Avegail Payos, a housemaid of Atty. Jacinto. Ms. Palipada stated that:1. she was the one who prepared the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the Receipt of the loan upon the instruction of the respondents;2. she was a witness to the transaction and never once saw the person of Concepcion G. Padilla, the alleged mortgagor; and that3.she was instructed by Atty. Jacinto to notarize the said contract by signing the name of one Atty. Ricardo Neri.Avegail Payos, the housemaid of the respondent, in turn stated that she was the one who simulated the signature of one Emmanuel Gimarino, the Deputy Register of Deeds of Quezon City upon the instruction of Atty. Jacinto. This was done to make it appear that the real estate mortgage was registered and the annotation to appear at the back of the TCT as an encumbrance.On 14 November 1997, a case for Estafa thru Falsification of Public documents under Art. 315 was filed against Atty. Jacinto. He was arrested and detained by the NBI.The defense of the respondent, on the other hand, was embodied in his Answer with Motion to Dismiss filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline. Therein, he alleged that the criminal information for estafa thru falsification filed against him had already been dismissed because of the voluntary desistance of the complainants.Misj urisIn his version of the facts, Atty. Jacinto averred that while he indeed facilitated the loan agreement between the Cruz spouses and Concepcion G. Padilla, he had no idea that the latter would give a falsified Certificate of Title and use it to obtain a loan. He claimed that he himself was a victim under the circumstances.Respondent further alleged that he had not been remiss nor negligent in collecting the proceeds of the loan; that in fact, he had even advanced the full payment of the loan due to the complainants from his own savings, even if Concepcion G. Padilla had not yet paid, much less found.RECOMMENDATIONSIt is every lawyers sworn duty to obey the laws of the land to promote respect for law and legal processes. The Code of Professional Responsibility command that he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility)Jj lexIn the instant case, there was a clear yet unrebutted allegation in the complaint that the Respondent had ordered his secretary and housemaid to falsify the signatures of the notary public and the Deputy Register of Deeds respectively to make it appear that the real estate mortgage contract was duly registered and thus binding.While it may be true that the complaint for Estafa thru Falsification filed against the Respondent had been dismissed, the dismissal was because of the complainants voluntary desistance and not a finding of innocence. It neither confirms nor denies Respondents non-culpability. Furthermore, it is well-settled that disciplinary proceedings are "sui generis", the primary object of which is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the professions persons whose disregard of their oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. Thus, disciplinary cases may still proceed despite the dismissal of civil and/or criminal cases against a lawyer.A lawyer who does any unlawful fraudulent or dishonest act may and should be held administratively liable therefor. In the case at bar, the Respondent should not be made an exception. While it may be shown that he indeed advanced the payment due to his erstwhile clients, such will not exempt him from administrative liability. At best it can only mitigate. Respondent is recommended to be suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law.(Findings and Recommendation, pp. 1-4)New misoOn February 28, 1998, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution XIII-97-199 adopting and approving the Findings and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, which reads:RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, respondent Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months for his unlawful, fraudulent or dishonest act.(Notice of resolution [dated Feb. 28, 1998]).In his Comment and Answer with Motion to Dismiss, respondent averred that complainants have no cause of action against him as the same has been waived, settled, and extinguished on account of the affidavits of voluntary desistance and quitclaim executed by them in the criminal case filed against him.NcmmisThe assertion must necessarily fail. The practice of law is so intimately affected with public interest that it is both a right and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare. The Constitution vests this power of control and regulation in this Court. Since the practice of law is inseparably connected with the exercise of its judicial power in administration of justice, the Court cannot be divested of its constitutionally ordained prerogative which includes the authority to discipline, suspend or disbar any unfit and unworthy member of the Bar by a mere execution of affidavits of voluntary desistance and quitclaim (par. [5], Sec. 5, 1987 Constitution).A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court (Maligsa vs. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 408 [1997]), and the complainants who called the attention of the Court to the attorneys alleged misconduct are in no sense a party, and have generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice (Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, 285 SCRA 93 [1998]).Undeniably, respondent represented complainants in the loan transaction. By his own admission, he was the one who negotiated with the borrower, his long-time friend and a former client. He acted not merely as an agent but as a lawyer of complaints, thus, the execution of the real estate mortgage contract, as well as its registration and annotation on the title were entrusted to him. In fact, respondent even received his share in the interest earnings which complainants realized from the transaction. His refusal to recognize any wrongdoing or carelessness by claiming that he is likewise a victim when it was shown that the title to the property, the registration of the real estate mortgage contract, and the annotation thereon were all feigned, will not at all exonerate him.ScncmAs a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. However, the measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with this client is a much higher standard than is required in business dealings where the parties trade at arms length. Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to be sure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor (Nakpit vs. Valdes, 286 SCRA 758 [1998]). Further, his fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be evermindful of the responsibilities that should be expected of him.Verily, a lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his former client. The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence at the highest degree (Maturan vs. Gonzales, 287 SCRA 943 [1998]).SdaamisoRespondent utterly failed to perform his duties and responsibilities faithfully and well as to protect the rights and interests of his clients and by his deceitful actuations constituting violations of the Code of Professional Responsibilities must be subjected to disciplinary measures for his own good, as well as for the good of the entire membership of the Bar as a whole.WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and orders respondent Atty. Ernesto C. Jacinto suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.SdaadSO ORDERED.Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima,andGonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,concur.

HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR.,A.C. No. 5303in behalf of PENTA RESORTSCORPORATION/Attorney-in-Fact of LUMOT A. JALANDONI,Complainant,Present:PUNO,J.,Chairperson,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,-v e r s u s-CORONA,AZCUNA andGARCIA,JJ.ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA,Respondent.Promulgated:June 15, 2006x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xR E S O L U T I O NCORONA,J.Humberto C. Lim Jr.[1]filed a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa on July 7, 2000.[2]On February 19, 2002, respondent moved for the consolidation of the said complaint with the following substantially interrelated cases earlier filed with the First Division of this Court:1.Administrative Case No. 5463: Sandra F. Vaflor v. Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona and Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa;2.Administrative Case No. 5502: Daniel A. Jalandoni v. Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa.In a resolution dated February 24, 2003, this Court considered Administrative Case No. 5463 closed and terminated.[3]On February 4, 2004, considering the pleadings filed in Administrative Case No. 5502, the Court resolved:(a)to NOTE the notice of the resolution dated September 27, 2003 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the case against respondent for lack of merit; and(b)to DENY, for lack of merit, the petition filed by complainant praying that the resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the instant case be reviewed and that proper sanctions be imposed upon respondent.[4]No motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial in Administrative Case No. 5502 appears in the records.The Court is now called upon to determine the merits of this remaining case (A.C. No. 5303) against respondent.The complaint read:AS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTIONxxxxxxxxx- II -That respondent is a practicing lawyer and a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental Chapter. That sometime on September 19, 1997, Lumot A. Jalandoni, Chairman/President of PRC was sued before RTC, Branch 52 in Civil Case No. 97-9865, RE: Cabiles et al. vs. Lumot Jalandoni, et al.The latter engaged the legal services of herein respondent who formally entered his appearance on October 2, 1997 as counsel for the defendants Lumot A. Jalandoni/Totti Anlap Gargoles. Respondent as a consequence of said Attorney-Client relationship represented Lumot A. Jalandoni et al in the entire proceedings of said case.Utmost trust and confidence was reposed on said counsel, hence delicate and confidential matters involving all the personal circumstances of his client were entrusted to the respondent.The latter was provided with all the necessary information relative to the property in question and likewise on legal matters affecting the corporation (PRC) particularly [involving] problems [which affect] Hotel Alhambra.Said counsel was privy to all transactions and affairs of the corporation/hotel.- III -That it was respondent who exclusively handled the entire proceedings of afore-cited Civil Case No. 97-9865 [and] presented Lumot A. Jalandoni as his witness prior to formally resting his case.However, on April 27, 1999respondent, without due notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly filed a Motion to withdraw as counsel, one day before its scheduled hearing on April 28, 1999. A careful perusal of said Motion to Withdraw as Counsel will conclusively show that no copy thereof was furnished to Lumot A. Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformity.No doubt, such notorious act of respondent resulted to (sic) irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al since the decision of the court RTC, Branch 52 proved adverse to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. The far reaching effects of the untimely and unauthorized withdrawal by respondent caused irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al; a highly meritorious case in favor of his client suddenly [suffered] unexpected defeat.- IV -That the grounds alleged by respondent for his withdrawal as counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was that he is [a] retained counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena and the Fernando F. Gonzaga, Inc. It was Dennis G. Jalbuena who recommended him to be the counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al.It is worthy to note that from the outset, respondent already knew that Dennis G. Jalbuena is the son-in-law of Lumot A. Jalandoni being married to her eldest daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena.The other directors/officers of PRC were comprised of the eldest sibling of the remaining children of Lumot A. Jalandoni made in accordance with her wishes, with the exception of Carmen J. Jalbuena, the only daughter registered as one of the incorporators of PRC, obviously, being the author of the registration itself [sic]. Respondent further stated that he cannot refuse to represent Dennis G. Jalbuena in the case filed against the latter before the City Prosecutors Office by PRC/Lumot A. Jalandoni due to an alleged retainership agreement with said Dennis G. Jalbuena. [He] likewise represented Carmen J. Jalbuena and one Vicente Delfin when PRC filed the criminal complaint against them. On April 06, 1999, twenty-one (21) days prior to respondents filing of his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al., respondent entered his appearance with Bacolod City Prosecutor OIC-Vicente C. Acupan, through a letterexpressly statingthat effective said date he was appearing as counsel for both Dennis G. Jalbuena and Carmen J. Jalbuena and Vicente Delfin in the Estafa case filed by the corporation (PRC) against them. Simply stated, as early as April 6, 1999respondent already appeared for and in behalf of the Sps. Carmen and Dennis Jalbuena/Vicente Delfin while concurrently representing Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. in Civil Case No. 97-9865. However, despite being fully aware that the interest of his client Lumot A. Jalandoni [holding an equivalent of Eighty-two (82%) percent of PRCs shares of stocks] and the interest of PRC are one and the same, notwithstanding the fact that Lumot A. Jalandoni was still his client in Civil Case No. 97-9862, respondent opted to represent opposing clients at the same time.The corporations complaint for estafa (P3,183,5525.00) was filed against the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena together with UCPB bank manager Vicente Delfin.Succeeding events will show that respondent instead of desisting from further violation of his [lawyers] oath regarding fidelity to his client, with extreme arrogance, blatantly ignored our laws on Legal Ethics, by palpably and despicably defending the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in all the cases filed against them by PRC through its duly authorized representatives, before the Public Prosecutors Office, Bacolod City (PP vs. Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena for False Testimony/Perjury, viol. of Art. 183 RPC under BC I.S. No. 2000-2304; viol. of Art. 363, 364, 181 and 183 RPC under BC I.S. 2000-2343, PP vs. Carmen J. Jalbuena for viol. of Art. 315 under BC I.S. 2000-2125 and various other related criminal cases against the Sps. Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena).AS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTIONxxxxxxxxx- I -xxxxxxxxxThere is no dispute that respondent was able to acquire vast resources of confidential and delicate information on the facts and circumstances of [Civil Case No. 97-9865] when Lumot A. Jalandoni was his client which knowledge and information was acquired by virtue of lawyer-client relationship between respondent and his clients.Using the said classified information which should have been closely guarded respondent did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously conspired and confabulated with the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in concocting the despicable and fabricated charges against his former clients denominated as PP vs. Lumot A. Jalandoni, Pamela J. Yulo, Cristina J. Lim and Leica J. Lim for viol. of Art. 172 of Revised Penal Code due to a board resolution executed by the corporation which the Sps. Jalbuena, with the assistance of herein respondent, claimed to have been made without an actual board meeting due to an alleged lack of quorum, [among other things].Were it not for said fiduciary relation between client and lawyer, respondent will not be in a position to furnish his conspirator spouses with confidential information on Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, operator of Alhambra Hotel.- II -Adding insult to injury, respondent opted to deliberately withhold the entire case file including the marked exhibits of the Cabiles case for more than three (3) months after his untimely unilateral withdrawal therefrom, despite repeated demands from [his] client.On July 26, 1999, capitalizing on his knowledge of the indispensability of said documents particularly the marked exhibits, which deadline to file the formal offer of exhibits was continually impressed upon the new counsel by the court, respondent suddenly interposed an amount of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos as consideration prior to or simultaneous to the turnover of said documents. [On] July 29, 1999, left with no other alternative owing to the urgency of the situation, PRC issued Check No. 2077686 for P5,000.00 in payment thereof.This was duly received by respondents office on the same date. Such dilatory tactics employed by respondent immensely weakened the case of Lumot A. Jalandoni eventually resulting to (sic) an adverse decision against [her].Further demonstrating before this Honorable Court the notoriety of respondent in representing conflicting interest which extended even beyond the family controversy was his improper appearance in court in Civil Case No. 99-10660, RE: Amy Albert Que vs. Penta Resorts Corp., this time favoring the party opponent of defendant who is even outside the family circle.During the pre-trial hearing conducted on May 5, 1999, while still [holding] exclusive possession of the entire case file of his client in Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent brazenly positioned himself beside Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona, counsel of plaintiff [in] a suit against his client Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, coaching said counsel on matters [he was privy to] as counsel of said client.Facts mentioned by said counsel of the plaintiff starting from the last par. of page 25 until and including the entire first par. of page 26 were the exact words dictated by respondent. The entire incident was personally witnessed by herein complainant [who was] only an arms length away from them during the hearing. However, the particular portion showing the said irregular acts of respondent was deliberately excluded by the court stenographer from the transcript, despite her detailed recollection and affirmation thereof to herein complainant. This prompted the new counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC to complain to the court why Atty. Nicanor Villarosa was coaching Atty. Pamplona in such proceedings. Said corrections were only effected after repeated demands to reflect the actual events which [transpired] on said pre-trial.[5](emphasis ours)In an addendum to the July 4, 2000 complaint, Lim also pointed to certain acts of respondent which allegedly violated the Rules of Court perpetration of falsehood and abuse of his influence as former public prosecutor. These supposedly affected the status of the cases that Lim filed against the clients of respondent.[6]In a motion to dismiss dated October 30, 2000, respondent claimed that the complainant violated Circular No. 48-2000 because, in his verification, Lim stated:3. That [he] prepared this instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa, read its contents, the same are alltrue and correct to [his] own personal knowledge and belief.[7](emphasis ours)Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that:SEC. 4.Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. (5a)A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.A pleading required to be verified which contains verification based on information and belief or upon knowledge, information and belief, or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (As amended, A.M. 00-2-10, May 1, 2000.) (emphasis ours)While the Rules provide that an unsigned pleading produces no legal effect,[8]the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it appears that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay.[9]We find that Lim was not shown to have deliberately filed the pleading in violation of the Rules.In his comment dated December 1, 2000, respondent, reiterating his ground for the dismissal of the complaint, added:[that] complainant Humberto C. Lim, Jr. has not only violated the Rule on Civil Procedure but he was/isNOTduly authorize[d] by the Penta Resorts Corp. (PRC) nor [by] Lumot A. Jalandoni to file this complaint against [him].Neither [was Lim] a proper party to file this complaint.This fact is an additional ground to have his case dismissed because Humberto C. Lim Jr. exceeded whatever authority was granted to him as embodied in a resolution and the Special Power of Attorney allegedly granted to him by the complainants.[10]To bolster his assertion that the complaint against him was unfounded, respondent presented the following version in his defense:FACTS OF THE CASExxxxxxxxxThat Mrs. Jalandoni has two sons-in-law, namely Dennis G. Jalbuena married to her daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena, and Humberto C. Lim Jr., the herein complainant married to her daughter, Cristina J. Lim.That Mrs. Lumot Jalandoni organized a corporation namely the Penta Resorts Corporation (PRC) where she owned almost ninety seven percent (97%). In other words, in reality, Penta Resorts Corporation is a single proprietorship belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni.That the only property of the corporation is as above-stated, the Alhambra Hotel, constructed solely through the effort of the spouses Jalbuena on that parcel of land now claimed by the Cabiles family.That sometime on the year 1997 the case above-cited (Civil Case No. 97-9865) was filed before the court against the sisters.That [he], beingRETAINEDcounsel of the spouses Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena wasRECOMMENDEDby the spouses to the sisters to answer the complaint filed against them.II.That as counsel to the sisters, [he] filed a Motion for Extension Of Time To File Answer and ultimately, [he] filed an Answer With Counter-Claim And Prayer For Issuance Of Writ Of Preliminary Injunction.That reading the Answer it is clear that the defense of the sisters totally rest onpublicdocuments (the various titles issued to the land in question because of the series [of changes] in ownership) and the sisters and their parents actual occupation and possession thereof.xxx xxx xxxMr. Lim[s] accusation against [him] in the light of the above-facts is the best evidence of Humberto C. Lim, Jr.s penchant for exaggeration and distortion of the truth.Since the defense of the sisters to retain ownership of the land in question is based onPUBLICdocuments,what delicate and confidential matters involving personal circumstances of the sisters allegedly entrusted to [him], is Mr. Humberto C. Lim, Jr. talking about in paragraphs I and II of his Complaint? What [privity] to all transactions and affairs of the corporation/hotel is he referring to?Whatever transactions the corporation may have been involved in or [may be getting involved into], is totally immaterial and irrelevant to the defense of the sisters.There was nothing personal [about the] circumstances of the sisters nor transactions of the corporation [which were] discussed. The documents being offered as evidence, [he] reiterate[s] for emphasis, arepublic; the presumption is that the whole world knows about them.That [he] [also] vehemently den[ies] another distorted allegation of Mr. Lim that [he] represented Mrs. Jalandoni [in] theentireproceedings of [the] case.[Lim] himself attested that [he] [filed] [his] Motion to Withdraw As Counsel, datedApril 26, 1999 , before the trial court, sometime on April 27, 1999.How then could [he] have represented Mrs. Jalandoni for [the]entireproceedings of the case?Further, Mr. Limintentionallyhid from this Honorable Court the important fact that [his] Motion to Withdraw wasAPPROVEDby the trial court because of thepossibilityof a conflict of interest.xxx xxx xxx.[11]Respondent discredited Lims claim that he deliberately withheld the records of the cited civil case.He insisted that it took him just a few days, not three months, to turn over the records of the case to Lim.[12]While he admitted an oversight in addressing the notice of the motion to withdraw as counsel to Mrs. Totti Anlap Gargoles instead of Mrs. Jalandoni at Hotel Alhambra, he maintained that it was the height of hypocrisy to allege that Mrs. Jalandoni was not aware of his motion to withdraw[13]since Mrs. Gargoles is Mrs. Jalandonis sister and Hotel Alhambra is owned by PRC which, in turn, actually belongs to Mrs. Jalandoni. Respondent also argued that no prejudice was suffered by Mrs. Jalandoni because she was already represented by Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza from the first hearing date.[14]In fact, respondent contended, it was he who was not notified of the substitution of counsels.[15]As to the bill ofP5,000, respondent stated:That Mr. Lim begrudge[s] [him] for billing Mrs. Jalandoni Five Thousand (Php5,000.00) Pesos. Mr. Humberto C. Lim Jr. convenientlyforgetsthat the net worth of the property together with its improvements, under litigation in that Cabiles, et al. vs. Gargoles et al. case, is a minimum ofTHIRTY MILLION (Php30,000,000.00) PESOSthen, and more so now.[He] cannot find any law which prohibits a counsel from billing a client for services in proportion to the services he rendered.[16]In view of these developments, respondent was adamant that:the only real question to be answered in this complaint iswhy Mr. Lim so consistently [determined] to immerse the Jalandoni family [in] a series of criminal and civil suits and to block all attempts to reconcile the family by prolonging litigations, complaints and filing of new ones in spite of the RESOLUTION of the corporation and the UNDERTAKING of the members.[17]On June 18, 2001, the Court resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro made the following report and recommendation:xxxxxxxxxAfter going over the [pieces of evidence] submitted by the parties[,] the undersigned noted that from the onset, PRC had a case wherein respondent was its counsel.Later on, complainant had a case against spouses Jalbuena where the parties were related to each other and the latter spouses were represented by the respondent as their retained counsel; after respondent had allegedly withdrawn as counsel for the complainant in Civil Case No. 97-9865.Being the husband of one of the complainants which respondent himself averred in his answer, it is incumbent upon Humberto Lim Jr. to represent his wife as one of the representatives of PRC and Alhambra Hotel in the administrative complaint to protect not only her interest but that of the [familys].From the facts obtaining, it is evident that complainant had a lawyer-client relationship with the respondent before the latter [was] retained as counsel by the Spouses Jalbuena when the latter were sued by complainants representative.We cannot disregard the fact that on this situation for some reason or another there existed some confidentiality and trust between complainants and respondent to ensure the successful defense of their cases.Respondent for having appeared as counsel for the Spouses Jalbuena when charged by respondents former client Jalandoni of PRC and Alhambra Hotel, represented conflicting interests in violation of the Canon of Professional Responsibility.As such therefore, the Undersigned has no alternative but to respectfully recommend the suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months from receipt hereof.RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.Pasig City, June 20, 2002.[18]The IBP Board of Governors (Board), however, reversed the recommendation of the investigating commissioner and resolved to dismiss the case on August 3, 2002.[19]Lumot A. Jalandoni filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) on October 18, 2002 but the Board denied the MR since it no longer had jurisdiction to considerand resolve a matter already endorsedto this Court.[20]Before delving into the core issues of this case, we need to address some preliminary matters.Respondent argues that the alleged resolution of PRC and the special power of attorney given by Lumot A. Jalandoni to Humberto did not contemplate the filing of an administrative complaint.[21]Citing the Rules of Court, respondent said that:[s]uch complaints are personal in nature and therefore, the filing of the same, cannot bedelegatedby the alleged aggrieved party to any third person unless expressly authorized by law.We must note, however, the following:SECTION 1.How instituted. Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Courtmotu propio,or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint ofany person.The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits or persons havingpersonal knowledgeof the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents a may substantiate said facts.The IBP Board of Governors may,motu propioor upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, orat the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against any erring attorneys.[22](emphasis ours)Complaints against members of the Bar are pursued to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, not for private vendetta.Thus, whoever has such personal knowledge of facts constituting a cause of action against erring lawyers may file a verified complaint with the Court or the IBP.[23]Corollary to the public interest in these proceedings is the following rule:SEC. 11.Defects. No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigators Report shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record,finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which event the Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of the entire proceedings.[24](emphasis ours)Respondent failed to substantiate his allegation that Lims complaint was defective in form and substance, and that entertaining it would result in a miscarriage of justice.For the same reason, we will no longer put in issue the filing at the onset of a motion to dismiss by respondent instead of an answer or comment.[25]The core issues before us now are:1.whether there existed a conflict of interest in the cases represented and handled by respondent, and2.whether respondent properly withdrew his services as counsel of record in Civil Case No. 97-9865.CONFLICT OF INTERESTPetitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing conflicting interests, breach of attorney-client confidentiality and deliberate withholding of records were committed by respondent. To effectively unravel the alleged conflict of interest, we must look into the cases involved.InCivil Case No. 97-9865, respondent represented Lumot A. Jalandoni and Totti Anlap Gargoles.This was a case for the recovery of possession of property involving Hotel Alhambra, a hotel owned by PRC.InBC I.S. No. 99-2192,Lim v. Vicente Delfin, Spouses Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena, respondent was counsel for Delfin and the spouses Jalbuena. In this case, plaintiff Cristina Lim sued the spouses Jalbuena and Delfin on the basis of two checks issued by PRC for the construction of Hotel Alhambra.[26]The corporate records allegedly reflected that the contractor, AAQ Sales and Construction (AAQSC), was already paid in full yet Amy Albert Que of AAQSC still filed a collection case against PRC for an unpaid balance.[27]In her complaint-affidavit, Cristina averred:11. That it was respondent Carmen J. Jalbuena, who took advantage of [her] signatures in blank in DBP Check Nos. 0865590 and 0865591, and who filled up the spaces of the payee, date and amount without the knowledge and consent of any officer of the corporation and [herself], after which she caused the delivery of the same checks to her husband Dennis Jalbuena, who encashed without [their] knowledge and consent, and received the proceeds of the same checks (as evidenced by his signature in receipt of payment on the dorsal side of the said checks) with the indispensable participation and cooperation of respondent Vicente B. Delfin, the Asst. Vice President and Branch Head of UCPB.[28]Notably, in his comment, respondent stated:There was a possibility of conflict of interest because by this time, or one monthbefore[he] filed [his] Motion to Withdraw, Mrs. Jalandoni /Penta Resorts Corporation, Mr. Lim, through hiswife,Cristina J. Lim, byanother counsel, Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza, filed a criminal complaint against the spouses Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena on March 26, 1999 under BC-I.S. Case No. 99-2192.[29]Similarly, inBC I.S. Nos. 00-1370, 2000-2304, 2000-2343, 00-2125, 00-2230, 00-880, respondent positioned himself against PRCs interests.And, inCivil Case No. 99-10660, a collection case against PRC, Atty. Alminaza of PRC was alarmed by the appearance of respondent at the table in court for AAQSCs counsel.[30]Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) highlights the need forcandor, fairness and loyalty in all the dealings of lawyers with their clients. Rule 15.03 of the CPR aptly provides:Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer may appear against his client; otherwise, his representation of conflicting interests is reprehensible.[31]Conflict of interest may be determined in this manner:There is representation of conflicting interestsif the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matterin which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.[32](emphasis ours)The rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided but alsothose in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.[33]Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof, and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquire in the previous employment.The first part of the rule refers to cases in which the opposing parties are present clients eitherin the same action or in a totally unrelated case; the second part pertains to those in which the adverse party against whom the attorney appears is his former clientin a matter which is related, directly or indirectly,to the present controversy.[34](emphasis ours)The rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or in totally unrelated cases.The cases here directly or indirectly involved the parties connection to PRC, even if neither PRC nor Lumot A. Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant in some of the cases mentioned.An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance.After being retained and receiving the confidences of the client, he cannot, without the free and intelligent consent of his client, act both for his client and for one whose interest is adverse to, or conflicting with that of his client in the same general matter.The prohibition stands even if the adverse interest is very slight; neither is it material that the intention and motive of the attorney may have been honest.[35](emphasis ours)The representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the written consent of all parties concerned after a full disclosure of the facts, constitutes professional misconduct which subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action.[36]Even respondents alleged effort to settle the existing controversy among the family members[37]was improper because the written consent of all concerned was still required.[38]A lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to it.[39]WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97-9865The next bone of contention was the propriety of respondents withdrawal as counsel for Lumot A. Jalandoni in Civil Case No. 97-9865 to fulfill an alleged retainership agreement with the spouses Jalbuena in a suit by PRC, through Cristina Lim, against the Jalbuenas and Delfin (BC I.S. No. 99-2192).In his December 1, 2000 comment, respondent stated that it was he who was not notified of the hiring of Atty. Alminaza as the new counsel in that case and that he withdrew from the case with the knowledge of Lumot A. Jalandoni and with leave of court.The rule on termination of attorney-client relations may be summarized as follows:The relation of attorney and client may be terminated by the client, by the lawyer or by the court, or by reason of circumstances beyond the control of the client or the lawyer.The termination of the attorney-client relationship entails certain duties on the part of the client and his lawyer.[40]Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted.Canon 22 of the CPR reads:Canon 22 A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case.[41]A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court.[42]He must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three days before the date set for hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a mere scrap of paper.[43]Respondent made no such move. He admitted that he withdrew as counsel on April 26, 1999, which withdrawal was supposedly approved by the court on April 28, 1999. The conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty. Villarosa because of the appearance of Atty. Alminaza in court, supposedly in his place.[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance.Thus, it has been held that a client is free to change his counsel in a pending case and thereafter retain another lawyer to represent him.That manner of changing a lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it require approval of the court.[44]The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent but to act as additional counsel.[45]Mrs. Jalandonis conformity to having an additional lawyer did not necessarily mean conformity to respondents desire to withdraw as counsel. Respondents speculations on the professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support in the records of this case.Respondent should not have presumed that his motion to withdraw as counsel[46]would be granted by the court. Yet, he stopped appearing as Mrs. Jalandonis counsel beginning April 28, 1999, the first hearing date.No order from the court was shown to have actually granted his motion for withdrawal. Only an order dated June 4, 1999 had a semblance of granting his motion:When this case was called for hearing Atty. Lorenzo Alminaza appeared for the defendantsconsidering that Atty. Nicanor Villarosa has already withdrawn his appearance in this case which the Court considered it to be approvedas it bears the conformity of the defendants.[47](emphasis ours)That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty. Alminazas professional engagement on her behalf despite respondents withdrawal did not absolve the latter of the consequences of his unprofessional conduct, specially in view of the conflicting interests already discussed. Respondent himself stated that his withdrawal from Civil Case No. 97-9865 was due to the possibility of a conflict of interest.[48]Be that as it may, the records do not support the claim that respondent improperly collectedP5,000 from petitioner.Undoubtedly, respondent provided professional services to Lumot A. Jalandoni.Furthermore, there is no evidence that the documents belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni were deliberately withheld. The right of an attorney to retain possession of a clients documents, money or other property which may have lawfully come into his possession in his professional capacity, until his lawful fees and disbursements have been fully paid, is well-established.[49]Finally, we express our utter dismay with Lims apparent use of his wifes community tax certificate number in his complaint for disbarment against respondent.[50]This is not, however, the forum to discuss this lapse.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby foundGUILTYof violating Canon 15 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and isSUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for one (1) year, effective upon receipt of this decision, with aSTERN WARNINGthat a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.Let a copy of this resolution be entered into the records of respondent and furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG),petitioner, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA,respondents.D E C I S I O NPUNO,J.:This case isprima impressionesand it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.In1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank.[1]It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totalingP172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful andP0.505 million as uncollectible.[2]As a bailout,the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total ofP310 million.[3]Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, theCentral Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANKinsolventand unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, andordering its liquidation.[4]Apublic bidding of GENBANKs assetswas held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.[5]Subsequently,former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petitionwith the then Court of First Instancepraying for the assistanceand supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with theSandiganbayana complaint forreversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan,et al.), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros.The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005of the Second Division of theSandiganbayan.[6]In connection therewith, the PCGG issued severalwrits of sequestrationon properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.Respondents Tan,et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions forcertiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.[7]After the filing of the parties comments, this Court referred the cases to theSandiganbayanfor proper disposition. These cases were docketed asCivil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan,et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filedmotions to disqualifyrespondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan,et al. with theSecondDivision of theSandiganbayanin Civil Case Nos. 0005[8]and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General[10]and counsel to Central Bank,actively intervenedin the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan,et al.and became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan,et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, headvisedthe Central Banks officials on theprocedureto bring about GENBANKs liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invokedRule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.Rule 6.03prohibits former government lawyersfrom accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.OnApril 22, 1991the Second Division of theSandiganbayanissued a resolutiondenyingPCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005.[11]It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendozas former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General.[12]It further ruled that respondent Mendozas appearance as counsel for respondents Tan,et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office.[13]The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling.[14]It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 weretransferredfrom theSandiganbayansSecond Division to the Fifth Division.[15]In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of theSandiganbayandenied the other PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza.[16]Itadoptedthe resolution of itsSecond Divisiondated April 22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.[17]Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of theFifth Divisionof theSandiganbayanvia a petition forcertiorariand prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[18]The PCGG alleged that theFifth Divisionacted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not waive the objection to respondent Mendozas appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thusres judicatadoes not apply.[19]The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.ISubstantive IssueThekey issueis whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with anymatterin which he hadintervenedwhile in the said service.I.A. The history of Rule 6.03A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace thehistorical lineageof Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.In theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive inEnglandand other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.The forms of lawyer regulation incolonial and early post-revolutionary Americadid not differ markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees.[20]Thenineteenth centuryhas been termed thedark ages of legal ethicsin the United States. By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations e.g., the do no falsehood oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered a new era in American legal ethics.[21]Toward theend of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members.[22]In 1887, Alabamabecame the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.[23]In 1917, the Philippine Barfound that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[24]As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns was therevolving dooror the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service.[25]These concerns were classified asadverse-interest conflictsandcongruent-interest conflicts.Adverse-interest conflictsexist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse.[26]On the other hand,congruent-interest representation conflictsare unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers.[27]For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new canons.[28]To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers,Canon 36was minted which disqualified them both for adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest representation conflicts.[29]The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyers largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients.[30]Canon 36provides,viz.:36. Retirement from judicial position or public employmentA lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.[31]In 1946, the Philippine Bar Associationagain adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.[32]By themiddle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between the inspirational and the proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed thatCanon 36of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the government.The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility.[33]The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum ru