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Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of Central AsiaRafis AbazovISBN: 9780230610903DOI: 10.1057/9780230610903Palgrave Macmillan

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The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of Central Asia

10.1057/9780230610903 - Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of Central Asia, Rafis Abazov

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To my wife, Alfia Abazova


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The Palgrave Concise Historical

Atlas of Central Asia

Rafis Abazov


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THE PALGRAVE CONCISE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF CENTRAL ASIA

Copyright © Rafis Abazov, 2008.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews.

First published in 2008 byPALGRAVE MACMILLAN™175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XSCompanies and representatives throughout the world.

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the PalgraveMacmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries.

ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7541–6 clothISBN-10: 1–4039–7541–8 clothISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7542–3 paperbackISBN-10: 1–4039–7542–6 paperback

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Abazov, Rafis.The Palgrave concise historical atlas of central Asia / Rafis Abazov.

p. cm.Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 1–4039–7542–61. Asia, Central––Historical geography––Maps. 2. Asia, Central––

History––Maps. 3. Asia, Central––Antiquities––Maps. I. Title.

G2202.21.S1A2 2008911�.58––dc22 2007048032

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.

First edition: February 2008

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America.


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Contents

Preface vii

General Key to the Maps xi

Acronyms and Abbreviations xiii

Changes in Geographical Names xv

I. INTRODUCTORY MAPS

1. Physical Characteristics2. Political Characteristics3. Natural Resources4. Demography5. Central Asian Cultures

II. EARLY HISTORY, SIXTH CENTURY B.C. TO SIXTH CENTURY A.D.

6. Political Map of the Ancient World7. Bactria, Sogdiana, Margiana and Khwarezm, Sixth to Third

Centuries B.C.8. Alexander the Great and the Greek Influence in Central Asia9. Parthian Empire and the Kushans

10. Sassanid Empire, Third to Seventh Centuries11. Early Turkic Empires12. Religions in Central Asia: Zoroastrianism,

Buddhism and Christianity13. International Trade and the Beginning of the Great Silk Road

III. ISLAMIC GOLDEN AGE, SEVENTH TO TWELFTH CENTURIES A.D.

14. The Political Map of Central Asia in the Middle Ages15. The Arab Conquest of Central Asia16. Consolidation of the Caliphate’s Political Influence17. The Samanids (875–999)18. The Karakhanid State (999–1140)19. The Seljuks (ca. 1038–1194)20. The Rise and Collapse of Khwarezm21. International and Major Trade Routes in Central Asia


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IV. THE MONGOLS AND THE DECLINE OF CENTRAL ASIA

22. The Mongol Invasion of Central Asia23. Central Asia under the Mongols24. Disintegration of the Mongol Empire25. Timur (Tamerlane) and the Timurid Empire in Central Asia26. Disintegration of the Timurid Empire27. The Rise of the Uzbek Khanate28. Bukhara and the Khwarezm Khanates. The Kazakhs and

Turkomans

V. THE ERA OF COLONIALISM AND NATION-STATE BUILDING

29. Central Asia and the Major Colonial Powersin the Eighteenth Century

30. Russian Colonization of the Kazakh Steppe31. Russian Colonization of Central Asia32. Early Administrative Division of Central Asia33. Administrative and Political Changes in the Early

Twentieth Century34. The Bolshevik Revolution35. Creation of the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic36. Civil War in Central Asia37. Nation-State Delimitation in Central Asia, 1924–192638. Administrative and Political Changes in Central Asia, 1926–193639. Economic Changes in Central Asia

VI. POST-COMMUNISM AND INDEPENDENCE

40. Interethnic Conflicts and the Collapse of the USSR41. Independent Kazakhstan42. Independent Kyrgyzstan43. Independent Tajikistan44. Independent Turkmenistan45. Independent Uzbekistan46. Ethnic Composition and Major Territorial Disputes47. Central Asia and the War on International Terrorism48. Border Disputes in the Farghona Valley49. Major Oil and Gas Pipeline Proposals50. Transportation Routes

Selected Bibliography 113

Index 121

About the Author 125

vi Contents


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Preface

The Central Asian republics have been commanding attention in newsrooms around the world since gaining independence in 1991.

Importantly, foreign-policy makers and many international relationsexperts in Moscow, Beijing, Delhi, Istanbul and recently, Washington,D.C., have been claiming that this region, its resources, and its trans-portation infrastructure are of vital and strategic importance for theglobe. The great paradox is that the major world powers, divided bythousands of miles and located in completely different geopolitical envi-ronments, have such high stakes in this remote part of the world. Thesituation is especially puzzling as the United Nations DevelopmentProgram (UNDP) in its regional report on Central Asia in 2005 put manyparts of the region on a par with the poorest countries in the world.

To explain this paradox, we have to open the history textbooks. In thepast the region played an important role in the political, military and eco-nomic development of Eastern Europe, the Middle East, South and EastAsia. For example, one of the most defining military campaigns in worldhistory, which changed the fates of so many countries on the Eurasiancontinent and led to the establishment of the world’s largest empire—theMongol Empire—was launched from Central Asia. In the nineteenth cen-tury the two greatest superpowers of that era—Britain and Russia—viedwith each other to establish control over this area of the Eurasian landmass in a competition dubbed the Great Game. The stakes were veryhigh, and poor knowledge of the Central Asian geopolitical terrain andits history cost the players dearly: The Russian Empire lost nearly half ofits expeditionary army in its campaign in Khiva in 1840, while the entireBritish expedition corps was slaughtered on the outskirts of Kabul in1842. In the early twenty-first century U.S. military strategists misinter-preted terrorist threats from the Al-Qaida base in Afghanistan, and thatmiscalculation led to the largest terrorist act on U.S. soil in the history ofthe United States, thus forcing the American government to revise its pol-icy toward Central Asia by establishing the first U.S. military bases in theregion. In addition, in the present day, the Central Asian republics controlthe second largest oil, gas and uranium ore resources on the territory ofthe former Soviet Union.

Historical and geographical maps can help us understand many ofthese paradoxes, events and geopolitical considerations. For example,most of the Central Asian capitals are situated just three or four hours’flight time from Beijing, Moscow, Delhi or Tehran. Because of their strate-gic location and numerous historical, cultural, political and economic


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relations, and their relatively large diasporas spread across neighboringcountries, developments in Central Asia also greatly affect the Russiancentral provinces, the Xingjiang province of China, Afghanistan, Iran andeven such distant regions as Iraq and Turkey.

Many questions are currently arising: What role did Central Asia playin world history and what role does it play now? How have Central Asianstates interacted with world powers in the past? What can we learn fromthe geopolitical and historical development in the region? How does thegeographic location affect the economic development of the region? Thisset of easy-to-read historical maps was developed with such questions inmind, in order to depict the geopolitical and geoeconomic dynamics of dif-ferent eras and the rich and intricate history of the Central Asian region.

The primary purpose of this atlas is to provide students and the gen-eral public with an effective tool that will help them visualize historicalchanges in the Central Asian region. It is also intended to supplementvarious research and textbooks in Central Asian, Middle Eastern,Eurasian and Russian history. In order to keep the book accessible to awide audience, however, most of the maps have been developed in abasic format. For specialized maps, tables, and information on economicand political development, climatic changes, transportation infrastruc-ture and other topics, I refer readers to specialized publications––a conciselist of which can be found in the selected bibliography section at the endof this book. The atlas is designed to cover a general historical frame-work, major periods and events in the history of the region, and territo-rial changes over time; again, for in-depth analysis and research, readersshould turn to the specialized literature.

I have followed the same format as other works in the Palgrave ConciseHistorical Atlas series. The maps in this atlas are produced in two colorsand only major geographical features are included, such as major ter-rains, rivers, mountains and cities. Two factors affected this decision—the cost effectiveness and accessibility of the information to the generalpublic.

One-page texts accompany each map, covering certain historical peri-ods and major developments in the relevant geographical area. Thesespecific texts have been written to help readers develop an understand-ing of the major features of the various historical periods and to stimulateinterest in looking for detailed studies in research publications. Due tospace limitations, the texts cover only major events and changes and donot go into detailed discussions.

The preparation of this atlas posed three major challenges: differ-ences in interpretation of the historical development in the region;inconsistency in the spelling of various geographic locations; and fre-quent changes of the names of various geographic locations. The firstchallenge arises from the fact that interpretations of Central Asianhistory has often been ideologically and politically motivated both inthe West and in the East. The other challenges arise from the fact that

viii Preface


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the Central Asian alphabets were changed several times during thetwentieth century. Until the 1920s, most Central Asians wrote in theArabic script and used the Persian and Turkic languages in literature,media, local administration and education.

The Soviet government initiated a switch from the Arabic script to theLatin alphabet in the 1920s. In the late 1930s, however, all Central Asianlanguages switched again, abandoning the Latin for the Cyrillic alphabet.The literary languages were codified and mass education in national lan-guages was introduced. Between the 1940s and mid-1980s the centralSoviet government heavily promoted the Russian language as the linguafranca in all the Central Asian republics, and most of the geographic andhistorical maps were produced in Russian. In the late 1980s and early1990s the Central Asian governments demanded greater use of theirnative languages. All republics in the region passed new language lawsthat made their local languages the only state languages in their respec-tive countries and initiated a gradual switch from the Russian to the locallanguage in all areas of life, including state administration and education.Some countries, such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, went evenfurther by abandoning the Cyrillic alphabet and reembracing the Latin.

In addition, the region’s urbanization and nation-state building hap-pened largely in the twentieth century and largely during the Russianimperial and Soviet dominations. Therefore, the names of many places,including cities, towns, provinces, and even mountains and canals havebeen changed frequently due to the political considerations of those eras.Since 1991 a new trend has emerged as the Central Asian governmentstried to de-Russify their geographic landscape and to change placenames back to the pre-Russian, pre-Soviet eras’ designations or to thenative spelling. I have tried to address this problem in a separate table onpages xv–xvii.

I would like to acknowledge support from the Harriman Institute atColumbia University, as well as my colleagues and Vladimir Bessarabovof the Cartographic Section, Department of Field Support, United Nations,who generously shared their knowledge and expertise. I would also like tothank Anthony Wahl, Senior Editor, Alan Bradshaw, Production Director,and Kate Ankofski, Editorial Assistant, at Palgrave Macmillan. However,any errors are the author’s sole responsibility.

RAFIS ABAZOV

Harriman Institute, Columbia University,

New York

ixPreface


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General Key to the Maps

All of the maps were initially prepared in black and white and reflectonly those features that are most important for the specific historical

periods. The shaded areas and colored lines were added in order to high-light important historical and geopolitical changes. Due to the nature ofthe work, none of the maps are intended to endorse any geopolitical orborder claims and were designed only to illustrate the most importanthistorical developments. The maps use the following key unless other-wise indicated:

International boundaries

Provincial boundaries

Names of states KYRGYZSTAN

Names of regions MAVERANAHR

Names of ethnic groups Kazakhs

Names of rivers Syr Darya

Names of lakes Lake Balqash

Names of national capitals Dushanbe

Names of cities Mary

Conflict areas


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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADB Asian Development BankBPSR Bukhara People’s Soviet RepublicCIA Central Intelligence AgencyCIS Commonwealth of Independent StatesCP Communist PartyCPC Caspian Pipeline ConsortiumCPSU Communist Party of the Soviet UnionECO Economic Cooperation OrganizationEEC Eurasian Economic CommunityEIU Economist Intelligence UnitFDI foreign direct investmentsFTZ free trade zoneGDP gross domestic productHDI Human Development IndexIMF International Monetary FundIMU Islamic Movement of UzbekistanKazakh SSR Kazakh Soviet Socialist RepublicKGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti (Committee

on State Security)Kolkhoz kollektivnoye khozyaistvo (collective farm)KPSR Khorezm People’s Soviet RepublicKyrgyz SSR Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist RepublicNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNGO non-governmental organizationOIC Organization of the Islamic ConferenceOSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in EuropePRC People’s Republic of ChinaRSFSR Russian Soviet Federated Socialist RepublicSCO Shanghai Cooperation OrganizationSovkhoz sovetskoye khozyaistvo (Soviet farm)Tajik SSR Tajik Soviet Socialist RepublicTASSR Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist RepublicTCP Turkistan Communist PartyTurkmen SSR Turkmen Soviet Socialist RepublicUN United NationsUNDP United Nations Development ProgramUNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural

OrganizationUSSR Union of Soviet Socialist RepublicsUzbek SSR Uzbek Soviet Socialist RepublicWTO World Trade Organization


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Changes in Geographical Names

During the twentieth century, a significant number of geographicnames were modified several times, including the names of coun-

tries, capitals, provinces and major cities due to various political changes.This process accelerated in the 1990s, as the Central Asian republicsgained their independence. One of the most important issues in thepreparation of this work was that of consistency, as many of CentralAsia’s geographic names can be found in various spellings. The names ofmany cities and provinces can be found in different spellings on differenthistorical maps: The name of the capital of Turkmenistan can be found infour different forms––Askhabad, Ashkhabad, Ash’habat and Ashgabat;the name of the province center in Kyrgyzstan can be found in fourdifferent forms––Dzhalal-Abad, Zhalal-Abad, Jalal-Abad and Jalalabad;the name of a province in Uzbekistan can also be found in four differentforms––Fergana, Ferghana, Farhona and Farghona. There are many fac-tors that affected these transformations. Several major changes in theusage of the script in the Central Asian republics generated issues oftransliteration of various words and terms within the Central Asian lan-guages and from Central Asian to foreign languages as well. The CentralAsian languages were largely standardized only in the twentieth century,with considerable influences of Russian and European linguists andscholars. Finally, since the 1990s the Central Asian republics have beenundergoing a process of de-Russification of geographic terms, personalnames and academic and technical terminology. This process has not yetbeen completed, and therefore different spellings are found in differentreference sources and on different maps.

This reference table provides examples of major changes in thegeographic names of countries, capital cities and provinces. All newgeographic names are written according to the contemporary localspelling.*

* In order to keep consistency, the author used a single reference source:https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/


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https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

xvi Changes in Geographical Names

Kyrgyzstan

Before 1991 After 1991

Kirgiz SSR The Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan)Frunze (capital) Bishkek (capital)Batken District (raion) Batken ProvinceChui Province (oblast) Chui ProvinceDzhalal-Abad Province Jalal Abad ProvinceIssyk-Kul Province** Ysyk Kol ProvinceNaryn Province Naryn ProvinceTalas Province Talas Province

Tajikistan


Tajik SSR The Republic of Tajikistan (Tajikistan,also Tojikiston)

Dushanbe (capital) Dushanbe (capital)Kurgan Teppe Khatlon ProvinceLeninabad Province Sughd ProvinceGorno-Badakhshan Kuhistoni Badakhshon Province

Autonomous Province

Kazakhstan


Kazakh SSR The Republic of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan)

Alma-Ata (capital) AlmatyTselinograd Astana (new capital)Alma-Ata Province (oblast) Almaty ProvinceAktubinsk Aqtöbe ProvinceAtyrau Atyrau ProvinceMangyshlak Province Mangghystau ProvincePavlodar Province Pavlodar ProvinceUzhno-Kazakhstan Province Ongtüstik Qazaqstan ProvinceKaraganda Province Qaraghandy ProvinceKustanai Qostanay ProvinceKyzyl-Orda Province Qyzylorda ProvinceSevero-Kazakhstan Province Soltustik Qazaqstan ProvinceTselinograd Province Aqmola ProvinceVostochano-Kazakhstan Province Shyghys Qazaqstan ProvinceZhambul Province Zhambyl ProvinceZapadno-Kazakhstanskaya Batys Qazaqstan Province

Province

** Corrected by author to reflect pronunciation in English.


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xviiChanges in Geographical Names

Uzbekistan


Uzbek SSR The Republic of Uzbekistan(Uzbekistan, Also Ozbekiston)

Tashkent (capital) Tashkent (capital) (also Toshkent)Andizhan Province (oblast) Andijon Province (viloyat)Bukhara Province Bukhoro Province**Ferghana Province Farghona Province**Dzhizak Province Jizzax ProvinceNamangan Province Namangan ProvinceNavoi Province Navoiy ProvinceKashkadar’ya Province Qashqadaryo ProvinceKarakalpak ASSR Qoraqalpog’iston RepublicSamarkand Province Samarqand ProvinceSurkhandar’ya Province Surkhondaryo Province**Tashkent Province Toshkent ProvinceKhorezm Province Xorazm Province

Turkmenistan


Turkmen SSR The Republic of Turkmenistan (Turkmenistan)

Ashkhabad (capital) Ashgabat (capital)Ashkhabad Province (oblast) Ahal Province (welayat)Charjou Province Lebap ProvinceKrasnovodsk Province Balkan ProvinceMary Province Mary ProvinceTashauz Province Dashoguz Province


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I

Introductory Maps


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The five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and

Uzbekistan—form the Central Asian region. This regionrepresents a distinctive geopolitical and geoeconomicentity with its own shared cultural and historical legacy,political and economic boundaries, and demographicdynamics. The region, geographically an uneven penta-gon shape, is about the size of half of the continentalUnited States (without Alaska). The coastline of theCaspian Sea forms most of the region’s natural westernboundary. The mountain ranges of Kopetdag andPamirs form the southern border of the region, separat-ing Central Asia from Afghanistan and Iran. Themountain ranges of Tian Shan and Alatau form theeastern borders of the region. Vast prairies and forest-steppe form the northern border of the region withRussia. This landlocked region has a land area ofapproximately 1,542,200 square miles (around 3,994,000square kilometers).

A region of extremes and contrasts, Central Asiacan be subdivided into five major geographical andclimatic zones that do not necessarily coincide withnational boundaries: the northern steppe and forest-steppe zone; the western dry desert zone; the southernand southeastern high mountain zone; the fertile valleysand oases between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers;and the series of moderately elevated valleys on theborder between the high mountains and central plain.

The large flat steppe and forest-steppe of thenorthern zone cover nearly half of Central Asia and cor-respond with the territory of Kazakhstan. This zone is apart of the Eurasian steppe that stretches from theDnepr River in Eastern Europe to the Altai Mountains,and it is characterized by a continental climate withextremely cold winters and warm summers. Thetemperatures might range from �38�C (�36.4�F)to �14�(7�F) in January, though occasionally it falls to �48�C (–54.4�F), and from �5�C (41�F) to �28�C (82�F)in July.

The dry and water-scarce desert zone of the south-western areas of Central Asia extends into Turkmenistanand western Uzbekistan. There is little precipitation inboth summer and winter, and the extremes of the conti-nental climate—very cold and windy winters andunbearably hot summers with temperatures up to�40�C and �50�C (104�F and 122�F)—render the desertquite inhospitable.

The major highland mountain ranges of the thirdzone stretch from southeastern Kazakhstan andKyrgyzstan to Tajikistan and southern Uzbekistan. Thehighest peaks are situated above 5,000 meters (16,400feet) and form an uninhabitable chain of mountainsoften covered with ice, glaciers and permafrost. Theclimate is more severe at high altitudes (3,000 meters[9,840 feet] and higher), ranging from �40�C (�40�F) to�14�C (7�F) in January and from �5�C (41�F) to �18�C(65�F) in July.

In the fourth zone, the fertile and densely populatedvalleys and oases between the Amu Darya and SyrDarya rivers encompass Uzbekistan, northern Tajikistanand southwestern Kyrgyzstan. The climate here is rela-tively mild and dry, with temperatures ranging from�14�C (7�F) to �7�C (45�F) in January and between�22�C (71.6�F) and �29�C (84�F) in July.

In the fifth zone, the series of moderately elevatedvalleys that begin in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, andUzbekistan, and continue into southern Turkmenistanmake this the most livable area in the region. Theweather is also affected by the continental climate, but itis relatively mild and dry, comparable to the climate inthe midwestern United States. The temperatures rangefrom –14�C (7�F) to �7�C (45�F) in January and between�26�C (78�F) and �29�C (84�F) in July.

The cultural landscape and population distributions inCentral Asia have varied during different historical erasdue to several reasons, including climatic change andhuman activities. In this regard, an imaginary line acrossthe Aral Sea from east to west can divide Central Asia intotwo parts. To the north of this line is the huge, never-ending Eurasian steppe where people have been mainlyengaged in animal husbandry. This steppe has anextremely fragile and volatile ecosystem that is suitable forraising the sheep, horses and camels of nomads and pas-toral nomads. To the south of this line, people have beenmainly involved in intensive agriculture, growing grains,cotton, fruits and vegetables, rendering animal husbandryof secondary importance. Many scholars argue that largeportions of what are now the Karakum and Kyzylkumdeserts also were prosperous cultivated lands thatbecame desert due to a combination of climatic changesand environmental mismanagement.

The geopolitical importance of Central Asia arisesfrom the fact that it is a meeting point for three majorworld religions and civilizations—Buddhism, Islam andChristianity. Military historians cite plenty of exampleswhen major campaigns against the Indian subcontinent,China and Russia were undertaken through the territoryof Central Asia. The strategic importance of CentralAsia was elegantly highlighted in the early twentiethcentury by Sir Halford John Mackinder, the British polit-ical geographer, who produced a simple geopoliticalformula: “Who rules the Heartland [which includedCentral Asia] commands the World-Island [Eurasiancontinent]. Who rules the World-Island commands theWorld.”

For nearly two thousand years, Central Asia was animportant crossroads for international trade along theSilk Road that connected East Asia with the Middle Eastand Europe. The region was also important for lucrativetrade between the Indian subcontinent and EasternEurope, including the Bulgar and Kazan khanates,Kievan Rus and Muscovite Russia.

Map 1: Physical Characteristics


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Shan Mountain

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Dashhowuz

Tyumen

Astrakhan

Barnaul

Bukhoro

Chirchiq

Zhambyl

Farghona

Herat

Izhevsk

Qaraghandy

Kokshetu

Kurgan

Qostanay

Qyzylorda

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Mary

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Kazan

Samara

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Perm

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Land from 200 m (656 ft) to 500 m (1,640 ft)

Land from 2,000 m (6,560 ft) to 3,000 m (9,840 ft)

Land from 3,001 m (9,843 ft) to 5,000 m (16,400 ft)

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The modern external borders of the Central Asianregion were established in the late nineteenth cen-

tury as the result of a formal arrangement between theBritish and Russian empires. This arrangement endedthe bitter competition for political and military controlin the region. The British expanded their influence overthe territory of Afghanistan and Iran, and the RussianEmpire established its influence over the land to thenorth of these two states, in the process extending itscontrol to the Kokand and Khiva khanates and theBukhara emirate.

The present administrative shape of Central Asia wasestablished in the mid-1920s during the region’snational delimitation. The Kremlin introduced adminis-trative delimitation in the Central Asian region andembraced the ideas of those Central Asian leaders whosuggested dividing the region along vague ethnic lines.On 27 October 1924 the Central Executive Committee (abranch of the Soviet government) issued a decree on thedelimitation of the Central Asian region and establish-ment of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

KazakhstanCapital: AstanaArea in sq. mi. (sq. km): 1,049,175 (2,717,400)Population: 15,285,000—July 2007, CIA est.Ethnicity (%): Kazakh (64.4), Russian (20), Ukrainian

(3.7), Uzbek (2.5), German (2.4), Tatar (1.7), Uigur(1.4), other (3.9)—2007 est.

Languages: Kazakh, Russian, UzbekReligions (%): Muslim (70), Russian Orthodox (24),

Protestant (2), other (4)Type of Government: Emerging presidential democracyGross Domestic Product (GDP): $53.6 billion—2006,

CIA est.GDP by Sector (%): agriculture (6.8), industry (39.5), serv-

ices (53.7)—2007, CIA est.Main Exports: oil and oil products, ferrous metals, gas,

chemicals, machinery, grain, wool, meat, coal

KyrgyzstanCapital: BishkekArea in sq. mi. (sq. km): 76,640 (198,500)Population: 5,284,149—July 2007, CIA est.Ethnicity (%): Kyrgyz (68), Uzbek (13.8), Russian (9.5),

Dungan (1.1), Ukrainian (1.0), Uygur (1.0), other(5.7)—2007 est.

Languages: Kyrgyz (official), Russian (official), Uzbek,Kazakh

Religions (%): Muslim (84), Christian (11), other (5)Type of Government: Emerging presidential democracyGross Domestic Product (GDP): $2.255 billion—2006,

CIA est.GDP by Sector (%): agriculture (34.5), industry (19.5),

services (46)—2006, CIA est.

Main Exports: cotton, wool, meat, tobacco, gold, mercury,uranium, hydropower, machinery, leather

TajikistanCapital: DushanbeArea in sq. mi. (sq. km): 55,252 (143,100)Population: 7,076,598—July 2007, CIA est.Ethnicity (%): Tajik (79.9), Uzbek (15.3), Russian (1.1),

Kyrgyz (1.1), other (2.6)—2000 censusLanguages: Tajik, Uzbek, RussianReligions (%): Sunni Muslim (90), Shi’a Muslim (5),

other (5)Type of Government: Emerging presidential democracyGross Domestic Product (GDP): $2.066 billion—2006,


services (48.0)—2005 est.Main Exports: aluminum, electricity, cotton, fruits,

vegetable oil, textiles

TurkmenistanCapital: AshgabatArea in sq. mi. (sq. km): 188,445 (488,100)Population: 5,097,028—July 2007, CIA est.Ethnicity (%): Turkmen (85), Uzbek (5), Russian (4),

other (6)Languages: Turkmen, Uzbek, RussianReligions (%): Muslim (92), Christian (6), other (2)Type of Government: Emerging presidential democracyGross Domestic Product (GDP): $15.18 billion—2006,


services (43.2)—2006, CIA est.Main Exports: gas, crude oil, petrochemicals, cotton fiber,

textiles

UzbekistanCapital: TashkentArea in sq. mi. (sq. km): 172,745 (447,400)Population: 27,780,059—July 2007, CIA est.Ethnicity (%): Uzbek (80), Russian (5.5), Tajik (5.0),

Kazakh (3.0), Karakalpak (2.5), Tatar (1.5), other(2.5)—2007 est.

Languages: Uzbek, Tajik, Russian, KarakalpakReligions (%): Muslim (88, mostly Sunni), Christian (9),

other (3)Type of Government: Emerging presidential democracyGross Domestic Product (GDP): $10.83 billion—2006,


services (43.2)—2006, CIA est.Main Exports: cotton, gold, energy products, mineral

fertilizers, ferrous metals, textiles, food products,automobiles

Map 2: Political Characteristics


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Tyumen

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Barnaul

Bukhoro

Charjew

Chirchiq

Zhambyl

Farghona

Herat

Izhevsk

Qaraghandy

Kokshetau

Turkmenbashi

Kurgan

Qostanay

Qyzylorda

Magnitogorsk

Mary

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Namangan

Nukus

Orenburg

Orsk

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Pavlodar

Penza Petropavl

RubtsovskRudnyy

Saratov

Semey

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AstanaOral

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Qukon

Atyrau

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Kazan

Samara

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Omsk

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Yekaterinburg

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d

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Many areas in Central Asia have difficult terrains,tough climates and fragile environments. Together

these factors expose the population to natural disasters,climate fluctuations and other upheavals beyondhuman control. Mother Nature seems to have compen-sated by endowing Central Asia with various naturalresources.

The most indispensable resource has been an abun-dance of both arable land and pastures. The fertile soil innumerous oases has helped to sustain the commercial-scale growth of various crops, including silk, cotton,fruits, vegetables and berries. Vast pasturelands haveprovided an excellent ground for raising horses, whichwere vital for warfare before the industrial revolutionand a highly prized export object. Some chroniclesreport that at the peak of trade, between 50,000 and100,000 horses a year were exported from the Eurasiansteppe to China, India and Persia.

Central Asia is also endowed with mineral resources,including gold, silver, copper, iron ore and various jadestones that have been mined and processed since the firstmillennium B.C. The local craftsmen acquired consider-able skills and achieved technological advancements,though the industrial revolution and major technologi-cal changes arrived in the region only in the nineteenthand twentieth centuries. In the early and mid-twentiethcentury local companies discovered huge reserves of oiland gas. All those resources, however, are distributedunevenly throughout the region.

Kazakhstan possesses the richest and most diversemineral resources among the Central Asian republics.The region’s largest oil and gas deposits lie in thewestern and southern provinces of the country.Kazakhstan’s potential oil reserves range between 100and 150 billion barrels. In 2005 Kazakhstan was in thir-teenth place in the world in proven oil reserves, aheadof the United Kingdom, the United States and Mexico.Gas reserves range between 1.8 and 2.5 trillion cubicmeters. Kazakhstan also has large commercialdeposits of coal, iron ore, chrome ore, cobalt, copper,molybdenum, gold, uranium and other metals that aresituated largely in the eastern and northeasternprovinces of the country. Kazakhstani farmers culti-vate various cereals on the vast prairies of the countryand herd sheep, horses, camels, goats and cows. In thesouthern provinces the farmers cultivate such valuableexport crops as cotton, tobacco, various fruits andvegetables.

Kyrgyzstan is a mountainous country that consists ofthree distinct parts: northern, southern and highlands.In the valleys in northern Kyrgyzstan the farmers culti-vate cereals, vegetables and tobacco. In the valleys ofsouthern Kyrgyzstan the climate is excellent for growingcotton, tobacco, various fruits and berries. In the high-lands the herders raise sheep, horses, goats and yaks.

The country has very small deposits of oil and gas thatrange between 10 and 50 million barrels of oil and5.6 and 10 billon cubic meters of gas. Kyrgyzstan alsopossesses significant deposits of antimony, gold, mer-cury, coal, uranium and other minerals. The country’shydroelectric power resources are considerable, as largereserves of fresh water can be found in the glaciersand mountain lakes. In fact, Kyrgyzstan is in third placein the CIS (after Russia and Tajikistan) for potentialhydroelectric power resources.

Tajikistan’s mountains cover nearly 90 percent of theland, making many areas in the country unsuitable forcommercial agriculture. In the valleys in the northernand southern provinces the farmers cultivate highlyvalued export quality cotton, fruits, tobacco, vegetablesand berries. Tajikistan is the second largest producer ofsilk among CIS members after Uzbekistan. The countryhas very small deposits of oil and gas that rangebetween 12 and 50 million barrels of oil and 5.6 and10 billon cubic meters of gas (2006, official est.). In addi-tion, Tajikistan has significant deposits of antimony,gold, mercury, coal, silver, uranium and other minerals.The total silver deposits range between 40,000 and60,000 tons.

Turkmenistan’s vast plains are largely unsuitable forcommercial agriculture due to lack of water. Yet, theherders raise camels, high quality horses, and sheep thatare famous for their wool and fur (karakul). In the south-ern, southeastern and eastern provinces of the country,farmers are engaged in intensive agriculture, raisingcotton, cereals, fruits and vegetables. Turkmenistanpossesses huge reserves of oil and gas. Its oil reserves arethe fourth largest among CIS members and rangebetween 1.0 and 2.0 billion barrels (2005, CIA est.), withpotential oil reserves reaching between 10 and 25 billionbarrels. Its proven gas reserves range between 3.0 and5.0 trillion cubic meters, with potential gas reservesreaching between 20 and 30 trillion cubic meters. In fact,the country was the world’s ninth-largest gas exporter in2005 (2005, CIA est.).

Uzbekistan’s agriculture benefits from its warmclimate, abundance of sunshine and the availability ofirrigation water in major valleys across the country. Thecountry is among the world’s largest producers ofcotton and silk. The farmers also cultivate fruits, veg-etables, cereals and berries for domestic consumptionand for exports to the regional markets. The herdersraise livestock including sheep, cows, bulls, goats andcamels. Uzbekistan’s proven oil reserves are between0.6 and 2.0 billion barrels, with potential oil reservesranging between 2.0 and 3.0 billion barrels; its gasreserves range between 2.2 and 3.5 trillion cubic meters.Uzbekistan also has large commercial deposits of gold,coal, copper, molybdenum, silver, uranium and othermetals.

Map 3: Natural Resources


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Natural Resources

Oil

Gas

Gold NickelCopper

Iron

Energy resources:

Metals:

Black coal

Brown coal

Bauxite

Radioactiveminerals

Manganese Chrome

Mercury Aluminum

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In the past, the population size, structure andcomposition of Central Asia were probably very dif-

ferent from what they are today. For centuries CentralAsia was a region where people of Turkic-Mongol, Indo-Arian and Middle Eastern origin mixed in a giant melt-ing pot. Probably, the size of the population peakedbetween the fourth and second centuries B.C., the fifthand seventh centuries A.D., the eleventh and thirteenthcenturies and the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.This fluctuation can be seen in the fate of the city ofSamarqand (now in Uzbekistan). According to variouschronicles, Samarqand’s population reached about20,000 in the second century B.C., 50,000 in the fifth tosixth century A.D., 100,000 to 200,000 in the eleventh cen-tury, declined to about 50,000 in first half of thirteenthcentury, climbed to about 300,000 in the early fifteenthcentury, and dwindled to just 1,000 families in the earlyeighteenth century; the city grew to 50,000 in the nine-teenth century. In 2007 its population reached 412,000according to an official estimate.

The Central Asian republics, like many countries inthe Third World, experienced rapid population growthin the twentieth century. The population of Central Asiawas estimated to be 57 million in 2007, up from between7 and 10 million in 1905. Today it is comparable in size tothat of France, Britain or Turkey. It is expected that thispopulation figure will double by 2050. If that happens, itwould be roughly the projected population of Japan (100million) or Russia (105 million).

The Kazakhs belong to an ethnic group of about 11million people. They make up the majority of the popu-lation of Kazakhstan (about 63 percent) according to anofficial estimate in 2007. Kazakhs also reside in China,Mongolia, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Most ofthe Kazakhs are Sunni Muslims. The Kazakhs in ruralareas have preserved a strong tribal identity, which ismuch weaker among the urban populations.

The Kyrgyzs (also Kirgizs, Kara-Kyrgyzs) make upthe majority of the population of Kyrgyzstan (about68 percent); they also live in Afghanistan, China,Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Their total num-ber in the region is between 4.5 and 5.0 million people.Until 1926 they were also known as the Kara-Kyrgyzs.Most of the Kyrgyzs are Sunni Muslims. The Kyrgyztribal identity is deeply embedded in the psychology ofthe people.

The Tajiks (also Tojiki) belong to an ethnic group ofabout 7 million people who live mainly in Tajikistan andhave large diasporas in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan,Kazakhstan and Russia. The Tajiks are the only non-Turkic speaking people in Central Asia, as their lan-guage, Tajiki, is close to Iranian. Many Tajik families arebilingual and speak various Turkic languages. The over-whelming majority of the Tajiks are Sunni Muslims,

though there is an influential community of Ismailis,linked to the Shi’a teaching of Islam.

The Turkmens (also Turkomans) belong to an ethnicgroup of about 5 million people that make up the major-ity of the population of Turkmenistan; they also live inAfghanistan, Iraq and Iran. Traditionally, Turkmen soci-ety is divided into several tribes and tribal groups. Mostof the Turkmens are Sunni Muslims. The tribal identityis still essential for the Turkmens and it plays a signifi-cant role in national politics. The Turkmens speak theTurkmen language, one of the languages of the Oguzlinguistic group of the Turkic language family.

The Uzbeks are the largest ethnic group in the region,comprising approximately 25 million people. Most Uzbeks(over 20 million) live within the territory of Uzbekistan,though large Uzbek communities—each exceeding a mil-lion—live in neighboring Central Asian countries and inAfghanistan. The overwhelming majority of the Uzbeksare Sunni Muslims. Historically, the territory of what isnow Uzbekistan was one of the most urbanized areas in theregion, the “land of a thousand cities.” The Uzbek nationwas formed by two quite different groups of people:the settled, Persian-speaking population of Bukhara,Samarqand and other cities and towns, and the Turkic-speaking pastoral-nomadic population.

The Karakalpaks (or Qaraqalpaqs) are an ethnic groupof about 650,000 people according to a 2006 official esti-mate. They mainly live in the Karakalpakistan Republic(an autonomous entity within Uzbekistan), which occu-pies the northwestern part of Uzbekistan. The over-whelming majority are Sunni Muslims.

The Russians constitute the largest ethnic minoritygroup in the Central Asian region, though their numbershave been steadily declining since 1991. According tovarious estimates, there will be between 4.5 and 6 mil-lion Russians total in 2008 in the five Central Asianrepublics, down from about 9.5 million in 1989. In2007 there were about 4 million in Kazakhstan, 700,000in Uzbekistan, 330,000 in Kyrgyzstan, 120,000 inTurkmenistan and 50,000 in Tajikistan. An overwhelm-ing majority of the Russians are Orthodox Christians.Central Asian Russians live mainly in the major metro-politan areas where they arrived in large waves of immi-gration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

There are many other large and small ethnic groupsin Central Asia. Some of the groups, such as the Iranians,Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Tatars, Uigurs, and others arrivedin the region many centuries ago, settling in large andsmall towns and cities and becoming inseparable partsof the Central Asian nations. Others, such as theGermans, Ukrainians, Koreans and Poles, moved inmainly during the twentieth century; they still maintaintheir distinctive cultures and speak their own languagesat home.

Map 4: Demography


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ISLAMIC REPUBLICOF

I R A N

U Z B E K I S T A N

K A Z A K H S T A N

C H I N A

K Y R G Y Z S T A N

T A J I K I S T A N

P A K I S T A N

I N D I A


Aktau

Major Ethnic Groups

CH Chinese/Dungans RU Russians

KG Kyrgyzs TJ Tajiks

KK Karakalpaks TU Turkmens

KO Koreans UZ Uzbeks

KZ Kazakhs UG Uigurs

UZ/RU/KOUZ

KG/UZ/TJ

Namangan

KG/RU/CH/UG


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The cultures of the Central Asian people have beenformed through centuries of interactions among sev-

eral traditions. The region has been a meeting point fordifferent civilizations—Zoroastrian, Buddhist, Islamicand Christian. It has also been an area of active contactbetween nomads and sedentary people, and it has beenan intersection of Turkic and Persian cultures. In thepast, with the exception of the loose Mongol Empire,there was never a single political entity that controlledthe entire region in its present boundaries. Various partsof the Central Asian region were affiliated with differentstates, empires or civilizations.

For many centuries religious discourse and inter-change were of great importance for the spiritual devel-opment of Central Asian societies. These factors shapedmultifaceted cultures and traditions. Many religiousthinkers of the ancient and medieval worlds found inCentral Asia both a refuge and an inspirational environ-ment for developing and refining their thinking. CentralAsians played an important part in the development ofZoroastrian, Buddhist, Manichean, Eastern Christianand Islamic theological and legal thought, philosophyand culture. Such philosophers and theologians as Al-Bukhari, Al-Farabi, Al-Khoresmi, Al-Beruni, Al-Ghazali,Nakhshbandi and Akhmed Yasavi have been widely rec-ognized in the Muslim world.

The millennium-long division of the Central Asian pop-ulation into nomads and settlers has had a major role indefining political and cultural identities. Notably, thenomads shared and preserved many ancient Turkic andMongol traditions. Throughout the centuries some of theseTurkic mores made a significant impact on some aspects ofcultural development in the Persian-speaking world. TheIslamic and Persian cultural traditions in turn immenselyinfluenced the Turkic-speaking communities in the region.Indeed, the Turkic and Persian elements are intermingledto such a degree that some scholars are inclined to usethe term “Turkic-Persian” instead of “Central Asian” inreference to the region’s cultural heritage.

The Central Asian region has been traditionally sub-divided into three cultural cores.

The first historical core of Central Asia is situated inthe river basins of and the oases between the two greatestwaterways of the region. One river is the Amu Darya(Oxus in Latin and Jayhun in Arabic sources), whichbegins in the Pamirs Mountains in the far southeast cor-ner of Central Asia and takes its precious water to thewest for 500–600 miles (804–965 kilometers), beforeturning to the north and ending in the Aral Sea. The areaon the right bank of the river was traditionally calledMaveranahr (“the area beyond the river” in Arabic). Theother river is Syr Darya (Iaxartes in Greek and Sayhun in

Arabic sources), which begins in the Tian Shan Mountainsand flows to the northwest for about 500 miles (750 kilo-meters), then turns to the west and heads to the Aral Sea.Eventually the name Maveranahr began to be used torefer to the area between these two rivers.

The second historical core of Central Asian pastoralcivilization was situated to the northeast of the SyrDarya River. It was called in Turkic Jetysuu (“the area ofseven rivers”). During the early medieval era manycities flourished in this area flanked by the Tian ShanMountains in the south and Lake Balqash in the north,including Otrar, Balasagun and Taraz. This area wascompletely devastated during the Mongol invasion.

The third area that played a significant role in CentralAsian history is the Eurasian steppe. This land roughly cor-responds with the vast territory from the Russian AltaiMountains in the east all the way to the Volga River in thewest. For many centuries numerous pastoral and pastoral-nomadic tribes raised horses, sheep, goats and camels here,utilizing the steppe’s practically endless supply of grass.

Three other areas that played no less a role in ancientCentral Asian history have been cut off from the regionin the modern era by political events. One is Khorasan(“the land of rising sun” in Persian). In the past it was alarge area to the south and southwest of the Amu DaryaRiver in the eastern part of the Iranian plateau andincluded the cities of Herat, Nishapur and Merv.Khorasan was one of the centers of cultural and politicaldevelopment of the sedentary people in Central Asiaand of the interaction between Persian and indigenousCentral Asian cultures. The second area is the area of theTarim River basin (also sometimes called EasternTurkestan). It is situated to the east of the Tian ShanMountains and its oases are watered by the Tarim,Kashgar and many other rivers. The Eastern Turkistanarea played a prominent role in the political and culturaldevelopment of Central Asia, especially during the firstmillennium A.D., as a center of Buddhist and Manicheancivilizations. The third area is the steppe zone thatstretches from the Jetysuu area to southern Siberia andMongolia. This was the realm of many Turkic andMongol tribal leaders for centuries and was often usedas a base for military campaigns in Central Asia and inthe Eurasian steppe.

Then, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, anentirely different cultural universe—Russian, Soviet andWestern—swooped through the region. Central Asiansocieties, which have unique historical, cosmologicaland metaphysical roots in preindustrial society, cameunder the influence of the value systems of the industrialand postindustrial world.

Map 5: Central Asian Cultures


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SSyySS rr DDaarryyrrrr aa

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MMuu

MMMMrrggrr

aabb

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I S L A M I C R E P U B L I C O F

I R A N

UZBEKISTAN

K A Z A K H S T A N

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T A J I K I S T A N

P A K I S T A N

I N D I A

Great Eurasian Steppe


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Mts

C H I N A

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KHORASAN

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Great Eurasian Steppe

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II

Early History, Sixth Century B.C.to Sixth Century A.D.


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With the rise of the ancient civilizations that organizedpeople into complex societies with distinct cultures,

social and political institutions, religious traditions andgoverning systems, humans began interacting with eachother in more systematic ways. Trade, technological andcultural exchanges, wars and international alliancesaffected communities far away from the major centers ofthe ancient era. It may be said that world history wasborn during this epoch.

The place of Central Asia in ancient world history isvery difficult to define (Adshead 1993). However, exist-ing evidence suggests that during the eleventh to sev-enth centuries B.C. the population of Central Asia wasalready engaged in various forms of crop cultivation andanimal husbandry. Moreover, there was a division oflabor into two large groups. One was represented by set-tlers who cultivated fertile soil in numerous oases on andaround the Zeravshan, Murgab and Amu Darya (Oxus inancient Greek chronicles) rivers and their tributaries. Asearly as this period, Central Asians introduced irrigationtechniques that helped to establish and maintain relativeprosperity in their lands. The other group was repre-sented by the nomadic and seminomadic population ofthe vast steppe to the north of the Syr Darya River.During these centuries these peoples domesticated andactively traded their animals (horses, camels, sheep,goats and bulls) with settled populations in exchange forgrain, weapons, metal work and manufactured goods.

Between the eighth and sixth centuries B.C. the earlyancient states and protostates had emerged in theTransoxiana (the area between the Amu Darya and SyrDarya rivers), the earliest appearing at the Farghona,Murgab, Bukhara, Khwarezm and other oases. From thesixth to the third centuries B.C. Central Asian peoples hadestablished several principle urban centers on sites closeto present-day Samarqand (in Uzbekistan), Balkh (inAfghanistan), Merv (in Turkmenistan), Khojand (inTajikistan) and many other cities. Some of the cities werequite large, at times supporting populations in the tens ofthousands. Other cities and towns were relatively small,as their citizens were exclusively engaged in subsistenceand small-scale commercial agriculture and barter trade.

These urban centers were in one way or anotherlinked to the major world powers of the ancient era, asgold and jade originating from Central Asia were foundin China and Persia. In the ancient era the Central Asiansdealt with four great neighboring powers—Persia, China,Mediterranean states and Scythia—who would eventu-ally play important roles in the history of Central Asia.

The early Persian states were situated in the neigh-borhood immediately to the south of the major CentralAsian cities. From early times they were linked to some

of the original Central Asian city-states through inten-sive trade and cultural exchange. The Persian rulers reg-ularly launched relatively minor and at timesconsiderably larger wars and campaigns to the north inorder to expand their direct and indirect control overthis area. For example, in 530 B.C. the Persian King Cyrus IIthe Great (ca. 590–530 B.C.) campaigned in Central Asiabut was defeated by an army led by Queen Tomiris.However, Darius II returned a decade later with a largerarmy and conquered Central Asia, turning Bactria,Parthia, Khwarezm, Ariana and Sogdiana into Persiansatrapies and recruiting Central Asian cavalry into theRoyal Persian army.

The Mediterranean or western powers were situatedfar to the west. About 2,000 miles (3,300 kilometers) sep-arated the major Central Asian cities from the earlyGreek city-states in the Mediterranean. Yet the Greeksexpanded their numerous trade outposts and colonies inall directions, and evidence suggest that they reached asfar east as present-day Iran, Afghanistan andUzbekistan. Herodotus (ca.484–425 B.C., the “father ofhistory”), indicates that the Greeks knew about thedevelopment of the Persian and Scythian worlds (mod-ern Central Asia) and their traders, spies, missionaries,scholars and adventurers regularly reached some partsof Central Asia (Herodotus 1963).

Major ancient Chinese cultural and political centerswere between 2,000 and 2,400 miles (3,300 and 3,900kilometers) east of Central Asia. They were separatednot only by great distances, but also by wild andimpenetrable deserts, steppe and mountains populatedby powerful nomadic and seminomadic tribes. Manyadventurers, traders and scholars traveled to and frononetheless, and by the sixth century B.C. the Chinesealready had a relatively clear cultural and political por-trait of the Central Asian lands. The ancient Chinesehistorian Sima Qian (ca.145–85 B.C.) was able todescribe land to the west of China with considerableaccuracy using earlier chronicles and reports.

The powerful though unstable Scythian tribal con-federations of the vast Eurasian steppe formed an inde-pendent political force that played an important role inthe history of the Central Asian city-states. Scythianpolitical and military activities were especially visiblewhen capable and ambitious leaders emerged, bring-ing formidable forces under their control. At the sametime they contributed immensely to the economicdevelopment of Central Asia as they supplied valuablegoods for the region and for international trade. Ancienthistorical chronicles suggest that the Scythians wereengaged with the Persians and Greeks both militarilyand commercially.

Map 6: Political Map of the Ancient World


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KHWAREZM

SOGDIANA

MARGIANABACTRIA

Antiochia inScythiaUzboy

Political Map of the Ancient World, Sixth Century B.C.–Sixth Century A.D.

Intercontinental trade routesRegional trade routes

Directions of trade routesAreas populated by pastoral nomadsMajor settlements

Oases

Antiochia inMargiana

Amu

Darya

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During the sixth century B.C., the early ancient statesbegan consolidating in the territory of Central Asia.

Geoclimatic and geopolitical factors played importantroles in this process. The ancient states solidified aroundthe urban centers that were established and developedin the fertile oases and on the banks of the major rivers:Amu Darya (Oxus in ancient Greek chronicles), theupper basin of Syr Darya (Iaxartes), Zeravshan(Polytimetus), Murgab (Marg) and others. In the drycontinental climate those rivers provided access to cleanirrigation and drinking water. At the same time, themountains, hills and deserts provided important defen-sive positions against sudden attacks from the nomads.

The political and cultural life of the region during thisera was concentrated mainly in the southern areas. Inthis regard, the Amu Darya River, which rises in thePamirs mountains, played a similar role in the rise ofCentral Asia’s civilizations as did the Nile River in NorthAfrica or the Euphrates and Tigris in Mesopotamia.

Bactria (also Bakhtar in Persian, Bhalika in Arabic andTa-Hsia in Chinese) emerged on the upper streams of theAmu Darya and the Balkh River. Its capital, Bactra, wasprobably situated in a valley where the city of Balkh (alsoVazirabad) now lies in the Balkh province in northernAfghanistan. The high mountains around the Bactriancenter provided excellent defense against surpriseattacks from troublesome neighbors and good stagingposts for territorial expansions. At its peak, Bactria con-trolled significant areas of what are now southernTajikistan and Uzbekistan, and northern Afghanistan.The ancient state was consolidated during the sixth tofourth centuries B.C., though the Persian Empire underthe Achaemenid dynasty brought Bactria under its con-trol. Its prosperity was built on intensive agriculture inthe oases and banks of the rivers, the mining of jade andmetals in the mountains, and profitable barter trade withits neighbors. Some scholars believe that Zoroastrianismwas founded there in the sixth century B.C., as its founder,Zarathushtra, lived in Bactria.

Sogdiana (Sughuda in Persian and Sute in Chinese)emerged in the territory that corresponds with the mid-dle reaches of the Amu Darya and Zeravshan rivers.Sogdiana was situated to the north of Bactria and wasprobably a loose alliance of city-states with centers inancient Samarqand (Smarakanda), Bukhara, Khojandand others. At its zenith, Sogdiana expanded its controlto include the area that is now southern Uzbekistan,Tajikistan, western Kyrgyzstan and northern Afghanistan,though it is not clear if these territories were ever unitedinto a single political entity during that period. Theprosperity of the Sogdian cities was built on intensive

agriculture, animal husbandry, mining and the skills ofits craftsmen and merchants. They also profited from theexport of jade and jade jewelry and the re-export of silkin later eras. Between the sixth and fourth centuries B.C.the Sogdian city-states struggled against the PersianAchaemenian empire but were eventually defeated.

Margiana emerged at the oases of the lower reachesof the Murgab River. Situated to the west of Bactria andSogdiana, it was a strategically important entrepôt forregional and transcontinental caravans traveling fromPersia to Central Asia and further to China. The pros-perity of Margiana was built on extensive agricultureand the financial and trading services provided by thenumerous caravans. Although Margiana lost its politicalindependence to the Persian Empire probably in themid-sixth century B.C., it continued to enjoy a significantlevel of political and economic autonomy. Alexander theGreat founded a city in Margiana named after himself—Alexandria in Margiana (later Antiochia in Margiana)—which became one of the largest and most prosperouscities in the area.

Khwarezm (Khwarazm in Persian and Hualazimo inChinese) emerged about the lower waters of the AmuDarya River. Khwarezm, likely one of the oldest politicalentities in the territories of Central Asia, was situatedbetween Sogdiana and the Aral Sea. It was probably aloose confederation of settled and seminomadic groups.In the mid-sixth century B.C. the Persian King Cyrus II(ca. 590–530 B.C.) brought the area into his empire as aprotectorate, although the extent of Persian control is notvery clear. The prosperity of Khwarezm was built onintensive agriculture, animal husbandry and regionaltrade with the nomads.

The Eurasian steppe was not united into a single politi-cal entity, and during this period early nomadic protostatesbegan emerging in this territory. The area was populatedby Sarmatian and Scythian tribes (these names are at timesused interchangeably), who controlled land from southernSiberia to the Black Sea. These nomadic and seminomadictribes built their prosperity on animal husbandry andactive exchanges, both through trade and military cam-paigns alongside their neighbors. Some scholars believethat on many occasions ancient Scythians were militarilyallied with the Persian and Greek empires. In fact, it wasSarmatian female warriors who inspired the Greek tales ofthe Amazons. Recent archeological discoveries indicatethat these Scythians built quite sophisticated and prosper-ous societies, and the many gold artifacts found in theirburial grounds indicate that they had developed a uniqueculture and art while being aware of Persian, Chinese andMediterranean artistic achievements.

Map 7: Bactria, Sogdiana, Margiana and Khwarezm, Sixth to Third Centuries B.C.


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Intercontinental trade routes

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Areas populated by pastoral nomads

Bactria, Sogdiana, Margiana and Khwarezm, Sixth to Third Centuries B.C.

Directions of local/regional trade routes

Uzboy

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Bukhara



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Events in the mid-fourth century B.C. seriously dis-rupted the political development of Central Asia and

changed the course of history for several centuries. Inthe eyes of Central Asians, the Greek-Macedonian armyled by Alexander the Great (356–323 B.C.) probably cameout of nowhere. He appeared from the west to move tri-umphantly through Mesopotamia and Persia, defeatingthe Persian army, one of the world’s most powerful mil-itary forces until that time. Alexander successfullyfought against the Persian garrisons, campaigningbetween 330 and 327 B.C., and then suddenly left theregion and never returned.

The political situation in Central Asia, along with itseconomic development, on the eve of Alexander’s inva-sion contributed significantly to his success. The PersianAchaemenian empire had controlled the Central Asianstates in one way or another for about 200 years. By themid-fourth century this control was already signifi-cantly weakened. The centralized Persian Empire hadbeen considerably undermined by internal strife, exces-sive expenditures on the royal family’s lavish court life,public constructions and numerous military campaignsthat siphoned revenues from a shrinking state budget.On top of that, there was growing strife between the cen-ter and the Central Asian periphery over taxes and therecruitment of conscripts and mercenaries into thePersian army.

Alexander the Great probably entered Central Asia in330 B.C., after campaigning in Persia for about four yearsin pursuit of the Persian King Darius III (380–330 B.C.).Darius III gathered large armies several times but lost allthe decisive battles. Step by step he retreated further tothe east, probably hoping that the remoteness of hisCentral Asian satrapies would give him shelter againstthe advancing Greek troops. However, entrepreneurialGreek merchants, craftsmen and colonists had probablysettled in or visited Central Asia and were able to providehelp to Alexander. Darius’s military mismanagementand mediocrity angered many of his followers and sup-porters. In 330 B.C. he was murdered by his own gover-nor Bessus, the satrap of Bactria. Bessus declared himselfDarius’s successor and adopted the name Artaxerxes V.

With the rise of Bessus-Artaxerxes V as a self-nominated ruler of the Persian Empire, the war entereda new stage. Alexander and his army faced the threat ofa protracted guerrilla war in the difficult mountainousterrain of Bactria and later Sogdiana, where Bessus-Artaxerxes V sought refuge. Bessus’s lack of legitimacyundermined his standing with the army and he toowas murdered, in 329 B.C., by his own followers. Thewar did not quite end there, for Spitemenes, a satrap of

Sogdiana, rose to lead the local resistance. He in turnwas killed by his own followers in 328 B.C.

Alexander decided that his positions were strongenough and he turned to conquer India. Before leavingfor India, however, he decided to cement his stand in theregion by making some strategic arrangements, one ofwhich was a dynastic marriage. In 327 B.C., by accidentor by an accord, he met and married Princess Roxana(Roshanak—“little star” in Persian), the daughter of aninfluential local leader and one of the most beautifulwomen in Asia. Other arrangements included the estab-lishment of several cities as Greek-Macedonian strong-holds and colonies. Ancient sources traditionally reportthat Alexander established six such centers in CentralAsia: Alexandria of Margiana (near present-day Merv inTurkmenistan); Alexandria of Ariana (near present-dayHerat in northern Afghanistan); Alexandria of Bactria(near present-day Balkh in northern Afghanistan);Alexandria on the Oxus (on the upper reaches of AmuDarya, which the Greeks called Oxus); Alexandria ofCaucasum (close to present-day Bagram in northernAfghanistan); and Alexandria Eschatae (near present-day Khojand in northern Tajikistan).

Bactria and Sogdiana were included in Alexander’sworld empire, though very soon after his death in323 B.C. these provinces began experiencing politicalturmoil. The empire was shattered by internal instabil-ity and infighting and rivalries among his generals.Between 301 and 300 B.C. Seleucus, one of Alexander’sgenerals, consolidated his control over the Persian pos-sessions and founded the Seleucid Empire. In 250 B.C.Diodotus, governor of Bactria, broke away from theSeleucids and established an independent Greco-Bactriankingdom. This kingdom flourished for 125 years,between 250 and 125 B.C., as an island of Hellenism inCentral Asia. The Greco-Bactrian state prospered andbecame known as the land of a thousand cities, leavingsignificant cultural marks among both the settled andnomadic populations of Central Asia. At its zenith itextended its control well into Sogdian territory in thenorth and to areas of northern India, although it strug-gled against militant nomadic tribes that regularlyattacked the kingdom from the north.

The final blow to the Greco-Bactrian kingdom camefrom the Eurasian steppe, where powerful nomadictribal confederations of the Huns and Yueh-Chih foughtfiercely for influence in the second century B.C. TheYueh-Chih lost to the Huns and were forced to move tothe territory between the Syr Darya and Amu Daryarivers, eventually regaining strength and destroying theGreco-Bactrian state, probably between 126 and 120 B.C.

Map 8: Alexander the Great and the Greek Influence in Central Asia


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Directions of invasions by nomadictribal confederations in second century B.C.

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The Parthian state emerged around 250 B.C. and lastedfor nearly 500 years, becoming one of the longest

empires in ancient history. At its height, the kingdom ofParthia controlled territory from the Caspian Sea andsouthern Caucasus in the north, Bactria in the east, thePersian Gulf in the south and Mesopotamia in the west.Its rulers actively exchanged diplomatic and trade mis-sions with the Chinese, Roman Empire and Central Asianstates, and during the age of the Parthian Empire theancient Great Silk Road reached its peak. The Parthiansentered the annals of western history for some of the mostremarkable military battles in history: They defeated therenowned legions of the Roman general Crassus in 53 B.C.and inflicted heavy losses upon Mark Antony (83–30 B.C.)in 36 B.C., ultimately leading to his downfall and deathalong with his lover, the legendary Cleopatra.

The early Parthian State was founded by a small con-federation of Iranian-speaking tribes, who probablylived to the north and around the Kopetdag Mountainsin what is now southern Turkmenistan. In about 250 B.C.a tribal king, Arsuces, established a small semi-inde-pendent principality. Step by step he spread his controlover cities and towns to the south. However, it was notuntil Mithridates the Great (ruled ca. 171–138 B.C.) andPhraates II (ca. 138–127 B.C.) that the Parthian state trulybecame a world empire. The Parthians benefited fromthe demise of the Greco-Bactrian state and the SeleucidEmpire in the second century B.C. The Parthians movedthe center of political gravity further to the west, defeat-ing Seleucid armies and gradually reaching the PersianGulf and Mesopotamia. Their ambitious military cam-paigns and territorial expansions alarmed the RomanEmpire. In 53 B.C. the Roman general Crassus invadedParthia from the west but lost his entire army at the Battleof Carrhae. Allegedly, most of the captured Roman sol-diers were sent to settle in various places in Central Asia.Roman forces managed to defeat the Parthians and evento kill their king in 39 B.C., but Mark Antony experiencedheavy losses during a campaign three years later.Frequent wars between the Parthians and Rome ultimatelycontributed to the decline of both empires.

Neither the Parthian Empire’s longevity nor all itsmilitary successes would have been possible without itsexcellent administrative organization of the state. Theempire’s decentralized nature was one of its majorstrong points (Colledge 1967), and this derived from thetribal background of the dynasty, its adaptation toHellenic traditions, and the incorporation of peoplesfrom various ethnic backgrounds, including Assyrians,Greeks, Persians, Jews and Sarmatians, into one political

entity. The ruler of the empire was often called the Kingof Kings (in Persian Shah-n-Shah)—he was consideredfirst among equals, with numerous members of the royalfamily scattered around the Empire and enjoying signif-icant autonomy. On the economic front, the Parthianrulers always patronized international and regionaltrade providing transportation infrastructure, militarysecurity and stable taxes and tariffs. Even in times ofmilitary conflict and wars, the Parthian rulers did notinterfere with the caravan trade, letting goods flowwithout restrictions between the East and the West.

Skill in the diplomatic arts also contributed to the riseand strengthening of the empire. Its rulers maintainedstable and friendly relations with China and regularlyexchanged diplomatic missions, sometimes of severalhundred people, with the Chinese emperor. The Parthianswere also actively engaged with the Scythians of theEurasian steppe to the north of the Aral Sea. It is likely thatthe two parties competed on some issues, especially overcontrol of their bordering territories, but both benefitedfrom the regional trade and exchanges.

The rise of the Kushan kingdom, which emergedfrom the remnants of the Greco-Bactrian state in the firsthalf of the first century A.D., complicated the geopoliti-cal situation in Central Asia. The Kushans probablybelonged to one of the Yueh-Chih tribal confederations,and their political power was based on their control ofareas of present-day Afghanistan. The Kushan dynastywas founded between 1 and 30 A.D. and strengthenedunder King Kajula Kadphises (30–80 A.D.). The statereached its height under King Kanishka I (ruled127–147 A.D.), and extended its control from the AmuDarya River basin in the north to the Indus River basinin the south. Unfortunately the historical chroniclersdid not leave us a detailed account of interactionsbetween the Parthians and Kushans, the two naturalrivals for influence in Central Asia. It is probable thatthe Kushans fought the Parthians over influence inTransoxiana.

By the third century A.D. it was becoming clear thatParthia was exhausted by its never-ending wars withthe Romans, and that its human and financial resourceswere overstretched. Various Parthian provinces gradu-ally began demanding more autonomy while contribut-ing fewer taxes and fewer military units to the imperialcause. The final blow came between 198 and 224 A.D.,when a combination of military misfortune in the latestwar with the Romans and revolts by the vassals in vari-ous parts of the empire, including Central Asia, led tothe ultimate fall of the Parthian dynasty.

Map 9: Parthian Empire and the Kushans


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Migration routes during great population movement in the Eurasian steppe


Chinese military expeditions

Parthian Empire and Kushan Kingdom, Third Century B.C. to Second Century A.D.

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The political situation surrounding Central Asiachanged considerably during the third century A.D.,

affecting both political and economic relations with theregion’s neighbors. In the south the fall of the ParthianEmpire and, shortly after, that of the Kushan Empirewas followed by several decades of intense wars. Inthe East, the Chinese Empire of the Han Dynasty(206 B.C.–220 A.D.) disintegrated and was replaced byseveral kingdoms that were engaged in unceasing mili-tary strife. The Chinese not only withdrew from CentralAsia and Turfan (present-day China), but also reducedtrade with all their trading partners. In the north, on thegreat grasslands of the Eurasian steppe, the new tribalconfederations of the Turkic-speaking peoples gainedstrength in and around Greater Mongolia and southernSiberia. They began slowly moving westward, pushingvarious groups of Iranian-speaking tribes to move to theTransoxiana, Caucasus and Eastern Europe.

In 224–226 Ardashir I (?–241), ruler of one of theParthian provinces, defeated the last emperor of theParthian Empire. He established a new Sassaniddynasty and accepted the title of Shah-n-Shah (King ofKings). This dynasty would rule for the next 425 years,until 651. Ardashir I and his son Shapur I (ruled241–272) paid considerable attention to Central Asia andareas surrounding it. They campaigned in Khorasan,Margiana, Khwarezm, Bactria and probably in Sogdianaagainst the last Kushans (see maps 8 and 9).

The region prospered under the Sassanids, expandingits irrigated fields and profiting from regional trade withits nomadic neighbors. Due to the instability of China,however, the transcontinental trade along the Great SilkRoad shrank significantly. Yet there were importantchanges afoot that would contribute immensely to theeconomic well-being of Central Asia for many centuries.In about the second century (although some sources indi-cate it was the third century), silk cocoons were secretlybrought from China to Central Asia, probably to theFarghona Valley. Entrepreneurial Central Asian farmersmastered production of the cocoons, and craftsmenlearned to produce silk materials. It is not clear how longit took to perfect the new technologies, but this develop-ment revolutionized trade in the region. The CentralAsians became producers and exporters of a highly valu-able commercial product. New cities appeared on the mapand old Central Asian urban centers grew significantly.

After successful wars in Central Asia, the Sassanidsturned most of their attention to the West. King Shapur Isuffered a setback at the Battle of Resaena in 244 butrecovered. His army captured the city of Antiochia inSyria in 253 and defeated the Roman army led by theEmperor Valerian (253–260) in the Battle of Edessa in259. The Sassanids’ fortunes turned a few decades laterin the 270s and 280s, when under the rule of Bahram II

(276–293) they experienced a series of defeats at thehands of Rome’s Emperor Carus (282–283), followed bythe further loss of several western provinces to theRoman emperor Diocletian (284–305). The wars on thewestern front ultimately exhausted the military powerand economic resources of the Sassanids.

The Eurasian steppe from the fourth to seventh cen-turies A.D. also experienced significant changes. A com-bination of demographic, climatic and political factorsforced numerous nomadic groups to move from south-ern Siberia and Altai to the Central Asian steppe and tocross the Syr Darya River into Transoxiana. The firstlarge wave of ferocious nomadic armies confronted theSassanids in Central Asia in the mid-fourth century.Shah-n-Shah Shapur II (ca. 309–379) mobilized his disci-plined heavy and light cavalry squadrons and crushedthe intruders, apparently extending Sassanid control tothe east, all the way to the Jetysuu region. This decisivevictory helped to pacify the Transoxiana for severaldecades. However, the Sassanids were not so successfulin dealing with the second large wave of intrusions acentury later. In the mid-fifth century new nomadicgroups, the Hephthalites, moved into the Transoxiana.This time the war inflicted heavy casualties on theSassanid army and was prolonged for several decadesas the tides of fortune changed several times. In 484,during one of these campaigns, Shah-n-Shah Peroz I(?–484) was defeated and killed in battle along with hisentire army.

There were victories. Under Kavadh (488–531), andespecially under his son Khosrau I (531–579), theSassanids again faced their most powerful enemy, theRoman Empire. They managed to successfully fight boththe Eastern Roman Empire (which had split from theRoman Empire in 395 A.D.) and the Hephthalites.

However, in the early seventh century the SassanidEmpire again experienced a series of internal troublesand suffered defeats by the Romans. The state and itsarmy were significantly weakened, and almost allSassanid provinces were by this time impoverished byhigh taxes, neglect and mismanagement. In addition, theShah-n-Shahs of these final days largely misread thechanging geopolitical situation on their southwesternborders, where the Arab tribes, mobilized by the powerof their new Islamic creed, were gaining strength (seemap 15). The Sassanids were so much preoccupied bytheir internal affairs that they paid little attention to theMuslim Arabs who defeated all their rivals and gradu-ally built a large and powerful state. In 637 the Muslimsprepared to launch a series of military campaigns againstthe large Persian army, culminating with the Battle ofal-Qadisiyyh. The Sassanid Empire never recovered fromthis defeat and began falling apart. It ended in 651 withthe death of the last Shah-n-Shah, Yazdegerd III (?–651).

Map 10: Sassanid Empire, Third to Seventh Centuries


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Directions of major nomadic expansion in the third through sixth centuries A.D.

Sassanid Empire, Third to Seventh Centuries

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Area of eastward expansion of the Sassanid Empire

Principalities that acknowledged the Sassanid suzeraintyAreas populated by pastoral nomads

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In the early sixth century A.D. a new and formidablepower entered the political scenery of Central Asia—the

Turks. A combination of various factors whose relativeforce and significance historians still vigorously debate—environmental changes, rapid population growth, pres-sure from neighboring tribes and the political intrigues ofthe Chinese Empire—forced the Turks to move around.Between the third and eighth centuries A.D. they formed anumber of consecutive large migration waves reachingfrom their heartland in Southern Siberia all the way toChina, Central Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe(Findley 2005).

Between the mid-fifth and mid-sixth centuries theTurks had engaged in a series of military conflicts withthe competing tribal confederations of Jou-Jan (Rouran)and the Uigurs, who came from the area east of Jetysuu.These conflicts and external threats brought the Turkicpeoples together and honed their military and strategicskills. In addition, they effectively strengthened theirposition by allowing various clans and tribes to jointheir confederation and enjoy equal rights. By the 520sthe Turks had assembled a large army led by Bumin(also Tumin) Khaghan (?–ca.552), who began advancingto the east, the south and the west.

The political situations in both the south and in thewest were favorable for Turkic expansion. In the south,the Chinese Empire and its rivals had been weakened bynumerous long-lasting military conflicts and internalstrife. To the west, the Hephthalites of Central Asia wereexhausted after a series of wars with the Sassanids; theSassanids in turn were weakened by their unceasingwar with the eastern Roman Empire. In this environ-ment Bumin defeated the Jou-Jan, the Uigurs andOghuzs, and in 552 declared himself Il-Khaghan (King ofKings), but unexpectedly died.

Remarkably, his successors—his son MughanKhaghan (ruled 553–572) and his brother Istemi (ruled552–575)—swiftly consolidated joint power in theirhands. Mughan Khaghan became supreme khaghan,controlling the territory of the Turkic heartland in theeast, while Istemi became ruler of the western parts ofthe empire roughly congruent with the territory ofCentral Asia. This division would survive for the nextmillennium, with Central Asia often referred to asWestern Turkistan and the eastward territory dubbedEastern Turkistan. In the 550s the Turks shifted to theeast and the south, establishing control over northernChina. In the 560s they turned their attention to CentralAsia. Around 563 the Turks defeated the Hephthalitesand established control over the Tarim River Basin,Jetysuu, probably some parts of the Maveranahr andvast areas of the Central Asian steppe.

To what degree the Turks controlled the Central Asianurban centers and the exact nature of their relations with

the settlers are not clear. Some sources indicate that thesecities paid tributes and reparations to the Turkickhaghans, accepted Turkic garrisons and Turkic settlersand provided administrative and financial expertise tothe Turks. In exchange, the Turks did not intervene intheir internal affairs and provided protection to thecaravan trade on the regional and international routes.

After the deaths of Mughan Khaghan (572) andIstemi (575), however, the situation changed dramatically.The Turkic Empire experienced its first major crisis.Differences and rivalries between the east and west wingsof the empire became irreconcilable. By the 580s theTurkic Empire had split into an Eastern and WesternKhanate. This development significantly weakened thepowers of both. The strength of the Eastern Khanate wasfurther undermined by its wars against numerousrebelling tribes and missteps in its intervention into a civilwar in China. In 630 the Khaghan of the Eastern Khanatewas defeated in battle and captured by the Chinese.Without its leader the Eastern Turkic tribal confederationdisintegrated into small competing groups. Fortuneschanged for a time in the late seventh century, when theEastern Turks united once more under the leadership firstof Kapagan Khaghan (ruled ca. 691–716) and then BilgeKhaghan (ruled ca. 716–734). With the death of BilgeKhaghan in 734 the khanate began a series of disastrousintertribal wars and ultimately ceased to exist in 745.

The Western Turkic Khanate experienced a broadlysimilar fate. In the 580s its leaders switched internationalalliances, joining the Byzantines against the Sassanids.The Turks gathered their army and crossed the AmuDarya River. However, they lost a decisive battle atHerat in 588. Under Tan Khaghan (ruled ca. 618–630) theTurks ventured from their bases in Jetysuu and easternMaveranahr, all the way to the Caspian Sea and theCaucasus. This series of wars was costly. They were amajor drain on resources and troops, yet they broughtalmost no rewards to the tribal leaders. The Sassanidsskillfully exploited rising dissatisfaction in the Turkicarmy, and through various intrigues stirred mutiny,which led in 630 to Tan Khaghan’s murder. His deathwas followed by nearly half a century of devastatingintertribal wars. The Chinese seized the moment andmoved against the Western Turkic tribes, who weredefeated and ultimately vanquished from the politicalscene in the 740s.

Turkic domination of the Jetysuu, the Maveranahr,and the vast Eurasian steppe had far-reaching conse-quences for the whole region. It changed the ethniccomposition and marked the beginning of a long era ofinteraction between Turks and Iranians that enrichedboth cultures. Turks’ expansion had also pushed numer-ous smaller tribes across the Eurasian steppe all the wayto Eastern Europe, Asia Minor and the Balkans.

Map 11: Early Turkic Empires


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Religious beliefs were highly significant, and in somecases crucial, in the development of ancient civiliza-

tions everywhere, as well as in the ways that differentempires, states and peoples interacted. Central Asiawas no exception. Religious development between thesixth century B.C. and sixth century A.D. played animportant role in the cultural and political changes.What made this region different from other places in theworld, however, was the intensity of interfaith interac-tions (Foltz 1999). Several factors worked in uniquecombination: large-scale migration; active trade; multi-ethnic composition of major urban and rural areas; andfierce competition between various missionary groupsfor proselytizing advantage. The geographical positionof Central Asia at the crossroads of major cultural high-ways also contributed to this intensity.

Although it is very difficult to reconstruct the earliestreligious traditions of Central Asia, a significant body ofarcheological artifacts and some written and oralsources lead us to believe that the early Central Asianspracticed various forms of polytheism. In settled areasthe religious traditions were served by influentialgroups of professional priests. In the tribal nomadic andseminomadic areas, religious needs were probablyserved by shamans and wandering missionaries.

The popular beliefs of the Eurasian Steppe. The pop-ular beliefs that dominated the Central Eurasian steppe forthousands of years probably survived in the pre-Islamicreligious practices of the Turkic-speaking nomadic people.Their pantheon included a main god who controlled theheavenly universe and his rival who controlled the under-world. Both were served by numerous lesser gods. At thecenter of this belief system was the god of blue sky, Tengri(Tenri), the most powerful and mighty master of the forcesof nature. Next to him was the goddess Umai (Umay),symbol of the earth, motherhood and fertility. There wasalso the god of the underworld, Erglig, who guarded theworld of the dead and hunted for people’s souls. Manynomads also believed in totems, sacred animals thatplayed a role in the tribe’s earliest beginnings. The wolf,for example, was regarded by many as a totem-protectorof all Turkic tribes. In addition, people worshiped numer-ous local spirits, saints and patrons.

Zoroastrianism. Zoroastrianism was founded byZoroaster who began preaching the revelation heclaimed to have received from the “Wise Lord” (AhuraMazda) probably in the sixth century B.C. His teachingcame to be systematically presented as the sacred scriptureknown as the Avesta. Zoroaster preached the oneness ofGod, who is served by a retinue of assistants distantlyresembling, in form and role, the Judeo-Christian

archangels, and who is challenged by Evil (Ahriman inPersian). Humans have freedom to choose betweenright (Truth) and wrong (Lies). Upon death, Zoroastertaught, each person’s soul is taken to the Bridge ofDiscrimination and judged as to their fitness to enterparadise or to fall into hell. In Zoroastrianism, fire sym-bolized Ahura Mazda’s power, presence and purity, andtherefore sacred fires had to be maintained in everyZoroastrian temple. Some scholars believe thatZoroaster began preaching in Khwarezm (nowUzbekistan) and his teaching gradually spread toBactria, Sogdiana, Khorasan and many other areas inCentral Asia and along the Great Silk Road. Over time itexpanded all over the Persian world, where it was thedominant religion for several centuries.

Buddhism. Buddhism arrived in Central Asia in thefifth century B.C. A popular legend claims that theBuddha—Siddhartha Gautama (ca. 563–483 B.C.)—wholived and taught in the region of modern northern India,Pakistan and Afghanistan, met merchants from CentralAsia and conveyed to them his teachings. Gautama’stitle, “Buddha,” is translated as “awakened” or “enlight-ened.” His followers systematized his teachings insacred writings called the Three Baskets (Tipitaka),covering the three main dimensions of his teaching: thepractice of Buddhism at its highest level; the lessons andsayings of the Buddha; and cosmology and theology.These teachings place human nature within never-ending cycles of birth, life and death, in which anindividual’s actions affect his next rebirth. Populationsof Central Asia’s settled areas and the nomads of thesteppe both experienced the influence of Buddhism to asignificant degree. Moreover, Buddhism dominated inthe oases of Afghanistan and western China (easternTurkistan) before the arrival of Islam.

Christianity. The followers of the so-calledNestorian school of Christianity began arriving in largenumbers in Central Asia in the fifth and sixth centuriesA.D. Nestorius (ca. 386–451 A.D.), the patriarch ofConstantinople (now Istanbul), came into conflict withthe Catholic Church in the mid-fifth century over doctri-nal differences on a number of key theological issues.The Council of Ephesus condemned Nestorius andhis supporters and exiled them from Constantinople.To escape persecution the Nestorians fled to Persia,India, Central Asia and as far as Mongolia and China.They established large churches and monasteries inSamarqand, Kashgar and Chang’an (modern Xi’an), andexercised significant influence in the courts of Chineseemperors and some nomadic empires (for example,Uigurs and Mongols).

Map 12: Religions in Central Asia: Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and Christianity


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Spread of Christianity

Spread of Zoroastrianism

Spread of Buddhism


Religions in Central Asia, Sixth Century B.C. to Sixth Century A.D.

Eurasian Steppe

Hephthalites

Western

Turkic

Khanate


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From the earliest ancient times the states in andaround Central Asia increasingly engaged in trade

and in technological, cultural, political and dynasticexchanges. Very often these contacts started with giftexchanges or interdynastic marriages between rulers ofneighboring states; they later extended to politicalalliances and commercial operations. Increasing special-ization among the animal herders, settled farmers andcraftsmen boosted productivity and stimulated barterexchange and trade at various levels. These develop-ments led, as early as the sixth century B.C. to the consol-idation of local and regional markets, and to theextension of neighborhood bazaars where local peoplefreely bartered and traded various goods and products.

The growth in trade was stimulated by innovativedevelopments in transportation and finance. By thesixth century B.C. the local people had greatly improvedtheir transportation capacity as caravans increased insize. The selective breeding process helped to adaptdomestic animals—Bactrian camels, horses and bulls—for carrying goods longer distances, and improvementsin transportation technology helped to establish andexpand the trade routes. At the same time, local rulersestablished more or less clear norms for issuing theircurrencies, while local dealers developed a rudimen-tary international currency market.

These changes in turn facilitated the establishmentof a commercial-scale transportation and trade infra-structure for the era’s local, regional and internationaltrade. Of course, the economic, political and legalchanges and technological advances also contributedto the rise of this trade. Tradable items included highlyprized nephrite jade and race and cavalry horsesthat were exported to China, and silk, porcelain andmany other exotic goods sent from China to CentralAsia, Persia, the Roman Empire and the rest of theMediterranean and Egypt. High-quality weapons weretraded in all directions.

Regional and international trade became increas-ingly profitable, supported by the growth of wholesalestores at the bazaars. With the rise of the trade capitals,and consequently the rise of the trading missions (cara-vans), there was serious demand for caravanserais,inns, that provided safe accommodation for travelers.From the early days merchants also nurtured positiverelations with and patronage from local rulers by fre-quently supplying exotic and luxury gifts. This gift-giv-ing tradition gradually evolved into regular andmore-or-less clearly defined taxes. In the end, the localrulers found they had substantial motive to providelegal, military and financial guaranties to the merchants.

Some ancient rulers went even further byestablishing, protecting and operating strategically

important highways. One such road was knownas the Persian Royal Road. It was probably estab-lished in the fifth century B.C., and it stretched2,000 miles (about 3,200 kilometers), connectingPersian-controlled seaports on the eastern Mediterraneanwith trading and political centers on the Tigris River.This road was serviced by caravanserais, postal sta-tions and small military garrisons. Similar but proba-bly less sophisticated roads connected Persia with theancient cities of Merv, Bukhara, Samarqand, Heratand other centers.

Eventually the many fragmented trade routesexpanded far enough to connect the major trading centersin China, Central Asia, Persia, Mesopotamia and theMediterranean. Many scholars date the beginning of theGreat Silk Road to the second century B.C. During thisperiod the rulers of the Han Dynasty (ca. 206 B.C.–220 A.D.)discovered commercially viable routes to Central Asia,Persia and Europe.

Geographical and climatic considerations imposedsignificant limitations on the direction of the traderoutes. The high and inhospitable mountains of theTian Shan, Pamirs and Himalayas created seriousobstacles for trade between the richest and mostadvanced ancient civilizations of China, Persia and theMediterranean.

Ancient travelers had two choices. One was to gothrough the passes in the Tian-Shan and the PamirsMountains: Anxi, Khotan, Yarkend, Kashgar, Balkh andMerv, and then to Persia and the Mediterranean. The otherwas to travel through the broad stretches of grassland tothe north of the mountain slopes: Anxi, Turfan, Urumchi,Balasagun, Chach (Tashkent), Samarqand, Bukhara, Mervand on, once again, to Persia and the Mediterranean. Ofcourse, at different times varying circumstances couldcause the routes to deviate significantly.

The Silk Road developed its own business cycles, asit was greatly affected by the political, military and eco-nomic development in all regions along its length: inChina, in the principalities of Central Asia, thenomadic states and empires of the Eurasian Steppe, inPersia and the Mediterranean world. Large-scale tradeflourished along the transcontinental Silk Road forabout 400 years until its collapse in the early secondcentury A.D. due to the disintegration of both the HanEmpire in China and the Parthian Empire in CentralAsia, and the beginning of the “great population move-ment” in the steppe zone between Mongolia and theBlack Sea. The Silk Road was reinvented between theseventh and tenth centuries A.D. under the TangDynasty (618–907 A.D.) and again between the thir-teenth and fifteenth centuries (under the protection ofthe Mongol Empire).

Map 13: International Trade and the Beginning of the Great Silk Road


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Merv

Isfijab

Yarkend

Khotan

Tian Shan Mountains

Pamirs

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Kopetdag M

ts Serakh

Uzboy

Eurasian Steppe

To Turfan, Urumchi, Anxi

Aqsu

To Turfan, Anxi

To B

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ian

To Europe

To Anxi

To Mediterranean

Transcontinental trade routes



Great Silk Road

Talas


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III

Islamic Golden Age, Seventh to Twelfth Centuries A.D.


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The beginning of the Middle Ages in Central Asia insome degree resembled the development of Western

Europe. In Europe, the arrival of the medieval era fol-lowed several dramatic events and changes: the pillageof Rome in 410 A.D. and the subsequent collapse oftrade, manufacturing and Roman central administration;dramatic cultural and population changes (including thearrival of tribes from Central Asia); and changes inthe religious landscape. In Central Asia the beginning ofthe new era was similarly marked by the collapse of themajor power, the Sassanid Empire, in 651 (see map 10);dramatic population change; changes in the religiouslandscape—in this case the rapid spread of Islam in theregion in the eighth century; and a temporary collapse oftrade. There was one very important difference: inEurope the beginning of the Middle Ages also signaledthe arrival of feudalism, a system based centrally onownership of the land (the feud, or fief) as the currency ofpower, and on the social, economic and political relation-ship between the various ranks of landowners (thenobles), their tenants (knights or vassals) and the unfree,landless peasant or serf class. In Central Asia in the MiddleAges, however, feudalism and clear-cut changes in eitherpolitical or economic relations are not so evident.

The Central Asian region entered the Middle Ages inthe seventh century (some scholars date its beginningas the sixth), with political fragmentation and instabil-ity. In the seventh century the great powers—theSassanids, Chinese and Turks—were strong enough toraid the cities and oases of Central Asia to demandreparations and tributes, but they were too weak tomaintain full political control of the region, establisheffective administration or revive trade. For about acentury between the mid-sixth and mid-seventh cen-turies, regional and international trade stagnated. Theeconomy of Central Asia, especially its manufacturingsector and commercial services, declined, leading to asignificant drop in living standards in the region. Thegeopolitical situation in Central Asia changed signifi-cantly during the Middle Ages and ultimately affecteddevelopment in the region. Four international forceswere significant in this process.

One of the most important changes was the gradualweakening and eventual collapse of the Sassanid Empire.Between 500 and 651 the Sassanids overstretched their eco-nomic and military resources by fighting wars on threefronts simultaneously: in the west against their archenemy,the Byzantine Empire; in the east to check the rising powerof various mini-kingdoms in the region that became knownas Tokharistan and in Central Asia; and in the northeast inbloody conflicts with the Western Turkic Khanate.

During this era the Chinese Empire quickly rose ininternational prominence after the establishment of theTang Dynasty (618–907 A.D.). The Tang emperors con-ducted administrative and military reforms, put an endto destructive civil wars and revived military might. In630 they defeated the Western Turkic Khanate and cap-tured Ton Ynghu Khaghan. By the mid-seventh centurythe Chinese had established control in the Tarim Riverbasin. By the late seventh century they had expandedtheir influence over a number of oases in the Jetysuu andMaveranahr.

Between the fifth and seventh centuries the RomanEmpire—another long-time partner and an importantplayer in Central Asian political and economic develop-ment—fragmented and significantly declined in impor-tance, and along with it the Mediterranean economicsystem. The almost constant warfare between the east-ern Roman Empire and the Sassanids had sapped theirwealth and prosperity. There was little to no demandfor luxury goods and trade from China and CentralAsia, though the eastern Roman Empire and Turkickhanates continued to exchange regular diplomaticmissions.

Between 550 and 651 the Turks were consumed byperpetual internecine wars. Their populations wereburdened by the constant recruitment of ordinaryherders for the numerous military campaigns thatyielded few economic gains for ordinary tribesmen.That many tribes regularly revolted against their ambi-tious leaders or joined groups who challenged the pow-ers of the Turkic dynasties is not surprising. Inretribution, the Turkic armies often massacred membersof unruly or opposing tribes, or pushed them into theWest or East, further undermining their own powerbase.

During this era the Central Asian principalitiesremained on the periphery of the great powers, yet theregion was still viewed as an important geopoliticalasset by many. Control over and alliances with theCentral Asian states could help to gain comparativeadvantage over opponents. Reparations and tributesfrom the area could finance costly military campaigns,and trade with the region could help to gain new mar-kets for goods, including goods of military importancesuch as horses for the cavalry.

In this environment of instability and politicalchaos a new power emerged on the outskirts of theSassanid Empire. The Arabs and their Muslim allieswould come to play a decisive role in the developmentof the Middle East, Persia and Central Asia for manycenturies.

Map 14: The Political Map of Central Asia in the Middle Ages


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Major trade routes

Travel routes of Roman Empire diplomatic missions to Turkic Khanates


Medieval Central Asia

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Numerous competing Arab and non-Arab tribeswere brought together by the skillful politics and

universal appeal of Muhammad (ca. 570–632). In 610 hedeclared that he had experienced a series of revelationsand gradually began gathering followers (Muslims).Despite an early setback in 622, when he and his follow-ers were forced to escape from Mecca to Medina, he tri-umphantly returned to Mecca in 630, establishing thecity as the center of the Islamic state. Islam soon becamethe dominant religion among most Arabs.

After Muhammad’s death in 632, the leadership of theIslamic world was transferred to caliphs who assumedsupreme spiritual and political authority in the Muslimstate. The earliest Muslim state under the first fourcaliphs (632–661) was formed under a single, straightfor-ward mandate: the spread of Islam to all corners of theworld. Several factors contributed to its strength: its callfor social justice, regardless of race, color, social back-ground, tribal origin or language; its enforcement of lawand order; and its support for trade. In the militarysphere, the Muslims introduced an effective combinationof compact professional units and massive volunteerarmies, and efficiently used cavalry and infantry.

Under the leadership of the first four caliphs, theMuslim armies achieved significant success in crushingthe Sassanid forces. They captured Damascus in 635,Ctesiphon in 636, Jerusalem in 638, and Nehavend in 642.They finally defeated the last Shah-n-Shah of the SassanidEmpire in series of battles. The last Shah-n-Shah was killedin 651 before the Central Asian city of Merv (Gibb 1923,rep. 1970). The Arab commanders made Merv their baseof further operations in the region, raiding Herat in 651and Balkh (Bactra) in 652, though the first raids inKhwarezm did not bring any decisive success. In 675–676the Arabs battled the rulers of Bukhara, Samarqand andTermez (Tarmita). In 680–681 they campaigned inMaveranahr, again asserting their control over Bukharaand Samarqand, and attempting to capture the city ofKhojand farther east in the Farghona Valley. Internalinstability in the late seventh century forced them to halttheir activities in Central Asia, though a small Arab garri-son was established at a base in Termez and maintainedsemi-independent status between 690 and 704.

In the early eighth century the Muslim armies contin-ued their campaigns in the region, but the nature of thosecampaigns changed significantly. In the first place,around this time the composition of the armies wastransformed from a predominantly Arab into a trulymultiethnic force, as the Arab commanders welcomed

Muslim converts into their ranks. Many of the convertswere Persians or belonged to various tribes and groupswith kinship or cultural links to the Central Asian com-munities. Secondly, the Muslims attempted to establish apermanent presence in the region, rather than simply tak-ing tributes and leaving. In 706 a Muslim army under theleadership of the highly capable commander Qutayba binMuslim (?–715) crossed the Amu Darya River. One by onehis army captured such important Central Asian urbancenters as Paykend in 706, Bukhara in 709, Nakhsheb andKesh in 710, and Samarqand in 712. He then turned east-ward, capturing several important centers such as Chach(Tashkent) in 713 and Khojand in 715. Political develop-ments in the caliphate soon intruded into the militaryaffairs of the region. Qutayba refused to pledge an oath offidelity to the new caliph, Sulayman ibn Abd al-Malik(ruled 715–717) and was killed. His troops immediatelywithdrew from the region.

The resulting power vacuum plunged the CentralAsian cities into a succession of rebellions againstMuslim governors for nearly three decades. Numerousincursions by Turkic armies and groups added to themisery and chaos in the region. By the 740s theinternecine wars had taken their toll and the Turkickhanates were in a state of collapse. In this environmentthe Chinese armies saw an opportunity, and marchedfrom Kashgar to Chach to capture the city. Their movetoward Central Asia brought them into conflict with thegrowing Muslim interests in the region.

The decisive battle between the Chinese army, led byGeneral Gao Xianzhi, and General Ziyad ibn Salih’s Arab-Persian army took place in 751 on the Talas River, in theJetysuu area. This was in fact one of the most importantbattles in the history of Central Asia (Bartold 1995), as itsoutcome would determine which power controlled theregion. Each side brought an army approximately 100,000strong, and the fighting was fierce. Both the Chinese andMuslims claimed victory, though for either it would prob-ably have been Pyrrhic. The Chinese had to retreat to theirmilitary base in the Tarim River basin and Kashgar. TheMuslims were unable to move beyond the Jetysuu area,though they remained in Central Asia.

One hundred years of Muslim presence in CentralAsia, from the battle against the Sassanid Shah-n-Shahbefore the walls of Merv in 651 to the Battle of Talas in751, significantly changed the geopolitical and culturallandscapes in the region. Central Asian economies werefirmly linked to the economy of the Muslim caliphate ascommercial relations and trade grew extensively.

Map 15: The Arab Conquest of Central Asia


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Western TurkicKhanate

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TOKHARISTANHerat

Eurasian Steppe

Major trade routes

Early Arab military campaigns

Movement of Chinese expedition army


Arab Conquest, Seventh to Eighth Centuries

Major battles751


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The period from 751 onward became an era of furtherstrengthening of the Islamic caliphate’s position and

Islamic influence in Central Asia. This era coincidedwith the demise of the Omayyad Caliphate (661–750)and the end of the civil war. The new Abbasid Dynasty(750–1258) quickly consolidated its political power bydecisively moving against the various competing politi-cal groups and reforming the political and administra-tive systems of the Islamic Empire. Caliph Abu Jabaral-Mansur (ruled 754–775) paid significant attention todevelopment in the eastern provinces. In a symbolic ges-ture he moved his capital from Damascus to Baghdad in762. In an earlier move al-Mansur invited Abu Muslim,then the governor of Khorasan and Maveranahr, to hispalace and ordered his execution in 755.

The power struggle in the caliphate and especiallythe death of Abu Muslim created a power vacuum inCentral Asia. In addition, representatives of variousrevisionist and heretical groups in Islam, after losingbattles, began moving into the empire’s periphery,further disturbing the situation in Maveranahr and theeastern parts of Khorasan. Various political, social andnon-Islamic religious groups also attempted to seize themoment and recapture political power in parts of theregion. They became increasingly active in the face ofthe mass destruction of the Zoroastrian temples andsacred places.

One of the first uprisings occurred in 755, when sup-porters and loyalists of Abu Muslim rebelled. They werejoined by those who strongly opposed Abbasid rule andtheir interpretation of Islam, as well as by some groupsof Zoroastrians and representatives of the communalis-tic movement, the Hurramits. The rebels, under SumbadMag (some sources indicate that he was a Zoroastrian),managed to establish control over some rural areas ofKhorasan. However, regular troops sent by the newKhorasan governor crushed the rebel militia andreestablished central authority in the region.

An uprising by another leader, Hashim al-Muqunna(ca. 775–780) represented a more serious threat to thepolitical power of the caliphate in Maveranahr. Somesources claim that he was influenced by the teachings ofMazdakism (a communalist, populist ideology estab-lished in Persia in the sixth century). Al-Muqunnareceived considerable support from the rural populationin Maveranahr and by 776 had established a power baseon the outskirts of Bukhara. The al-Muqunna movementspread over large areas in Maveranahr, from Bukhara toSamarqand and Kesh. In late 776, however, the rebel

army was defeated by regular troops sent by Bukhara’sruler. Al-Muqunna managed to escape and capturedSamarqand, which he maintained control over for abouta year, successfully fighting off regular armies sent fromBukhara and Merv. The rebel army then lost a series ofbattles in 778 and disintegrated into a guerrilla move-ment that retreated south from Samarqand, establishingbases in the mountains around the city of Kesh. It tookthe Khorasan ruler about two years to conquer all thestrongholds, killing the rebels including al-Muqunna.

Another significant uprising took place in Samarqandbetween 806 and 810. Rebels led by Rafi ibn Leisa killedthe provincial governor and attempted to extend theirinfluence to the cities of Bukhara, Khojand and others.When disagreements within the ranks of the rebelsweakened their position, the uprising was subdued bytroops from Khorasan.

The series of large and small uprisings that inflamedthe region between the 750s and early 800s had seriousconsequences for politics and religion in Central Asiansociety. As the governing troops crushed rebellion afterrebellion, they eliminated the indigenous Central Asianelite, destroyed temples and shrines of various non-Islamic religious groups and forced a large number ofBuddhist, Manichean and Zoroastrian clergy to movefarther into the lands of the East, where they attemptedto establish roots and influence, and achieved notableresults. For example, the Uigur Khaghan Bogu (ruledca. 759–779) was converted to Manichaeism and declaredit the official religion of the khanate in 762. At thesame time, the Buddhist communities were expandingtheir influence both in eastern Turkistan and in Tibet,where they achieved the status of official religion inabout 787.

In Maveranahr, in contrast, a large number of CentralAsians, especially among the urban elite, began accept-ing Islam and benefited from the strong and comprehen-sive Islamic educational system in the region.Administrative and educational reforms brought theArab language and script into the region and graduallyit became the language of government, law, science andart. Importantly, a growing number of Central Asianeducated elite began traveling across the caliphate toenter into public administration, senior army ranks,clergy, the educational establishment and artistic com-munities. Central Asia increasingly became part of theIslamic world. The caliphate came to rely heavily on thelocal elite to maintain its political influence and controlover the region.

Map 16: Consolidation of the Caliphate’s Political Influence


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Expansion of Islamic Caliphate’s influence by mid-eighth centuryExpansion of Islamic Caliphate’sinfluence by end of eighth century

Major uprising against the Arabs



Caliphate’s Influence, Eighth Century


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During the ninth century although Central Asiaremained part of the caliphate with the Arabs play-

ing an important role, the rulers of the Islamic Empireincreasingly relied on local elites for governing andadministration. In this environment several local fami-lies and clans rose to prominence. Gradually theyacquired a significant degree of autonomy from thecaliph and began building their own political bases inthe region. From those clans rose the dynasties of theTahirids, Saffarids, Samanids and various others(Gafurov 2005). In the end, the Samanids emergedascendant, founding of one of the first Iranian Islamicdynasties.

The dynasty’s founder, Saman Khuda, came from aprominent family of landlords, probably from the areabetween Samarqand and Termez. He sent his grandsonsto serve at the court of the Khorasan governor and even-tually they were appointed to administer Farghona,Chach and Herat. They demonstrated potent adminis-trative and diplomatic skills. In 875 the caliph appointedone of the members of the clan, Nasr Saman (ruled875–892), governor of Samarqand. From there NasrSaman also administered the whole of Maveranahr. Thisdate is traditionally perceived as the beginning of theSamanid dynasty and state.

Nasr Saman faced considerable challenges during hisreign. His numerous brothers, uncles and nephews,while nominally accepting him as senior among equals,in fact ignored him. It took prodigious diplomaticmaneuvering over a long period for Nasr to avoid waragainst all those family members. After Nasr’s death in892, his brother Ismail (ruled 892–907) declared himselfruler of Maveranahr and moved the capital to Bukhara.Ismail proved to be a skillful commander and diplomat,fighting off all other contenders, including thosesupported by the caliph. He consolidated his politicalcontrol all over the region and built up an effectiveadministration and army. In order to strengthen theirlegitimacy and appeal to local elites, the Samanidsdeclared that their clan descended from the Sassanidemperor Bahram Chobin.

Ismail paid particular attention to reforming andbuilding redoubtable armed forces. One of his innova-tions was the mass recruitment of Turkic warriors intohis cavalry units. In 893 his army captured the cities ofTaraz and Otrar in the far northeastern corner of thestate, making them key military outposts in the fightagainst the Turkic nomadic confederations and impor-tant centers of Islamic learning in the Turkic lands. In900 he successfully fought off an invasion by theSaffarids from their base in northern Khorasan, defeat-ing them in a decisive battle before the city of Balkh.

Then in 900 and 901 he annexed two remote southernprovinces east of the Caspian Sea. He also managed toextend his control to the Sogdiana and Herat.

Under Nasr II Samanid (ruled 914–943), the SamanidEmpire reached its peak. The dynasty reigned over allthe lands from the Caspian Sea in the west to theFarghona and Jetysuu valleys in the east, and their influ-ence reached to Khwarezm in the north and Herat in thesouth, with the rulers of those centers becoming vassals.The Samanids spent lavishly on the building of militaryfortresses, mosques, palaces, caravanserais and variouspublic buildings. They also supported the arts andsciences, and sponsored numerous scholars whoworked at the Samanid court. The political stabilizationof extensive territory in Maveranahr and easternKhorasan brought significant economic growth andprosperity, stimulating the expansion of local, regionaland international trade as well as mining—especially ofsilver, gold, jade—in the Farghona valley, ZeravshanRiver and other areas. However, the Samanids’ mostimportant impact was in the religious area, by spreadingIslam through intensive missionary work among thevarious Turkic tribes within the empire. Many scholarstrace the Turkic tribes’ enduring mass acceptance ofIslam to the Samanid era.

Nevertheless, in the tenth century the Samanidsbegan facing serious challenges and rivalries. In midcen-tury the political stability and cohesiveness of theregime was undermined by the deep rivalry betweentwo theological schools in Islam, the Sunnis (the tradi-tional Islamic school) and the Ismailis (a group close tothe Shi’a interpretation of Islam). The Sunni school wonout and inspired purges of Ismaili followers throughoutthe state, including from the ranks of the army. TheIsmaili were driven underground but continued theirwork in all major cities and towns across the region.From 947 to 954 serious internal strife within theSamanid family provoked a series of military conflicts.This was followed by revolts of local rulers and armygenerals. In addition, from 990 to 992 the Turkic armiesentered the Jetysuu area and marched to its capital,Bukhara. Only the sudden death of their khan obligedthem to withdraw. The Samanid Empire never recov-ered from these cataclysms and began to crumble.

The last Samanid rulers inherited a very weak king-dom under constant attack from their powerful neigh-bors to the south and north. In 999 the Karakhanid Turksgathered a large army in Jetysuu and invaded Maveranahr.They captured Bukhara and imprisoned the entireruling family. The Samanid kingdom disappeared fromthe political map and a new dynasty established itspower in the region—the Karakhanids.

Map 17: The Samanids (875–999)


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Territorial expansions of Samanids at the peak of their power


Samanid Dynasty, 875–999

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In the ninth and tenth centuries the descendants of theearly Turkic empires began gathering strength again in

the areas between Mongolia and Jetysuu. By the lateninth century they felt themselves strong enough toenter the political scene and to challenge the power ofthe Samanids at the prosperous Maveranahr oases. Thistime, however, the Turks entered Central Asia undervery different circumstances and in a very different envi-ronment. By the tenth century, they had firmly estab-lished themselves on the eastern and northern bordersof the Samanid Empire, including the areas around theSyr Darya river basin and the Aral Sea.

The Karakhanid tribal confederation emerged in themid-tenth century with its center in eastern Turkistan.In 992 the supreme ruler (bogra khan) led his troops in awar against the Samanids and captured their capital,Bukhara. However, his sudden death forced the armyto retreat to the Jetysuu area. A new bogra khan, AhmadArslan Qara Khan (ruled ca. 998–1017) invaded theSamanid state again. This time he defeated theSamanid army, capturing Bukhara in 999. Most schol-ars consider that year the beginning of the KarakhanidEmpire. This empire at its zenith controlled the terri-tory of Maveranahr, Jetysuu and parts of easternTurkistan.

The Karakhanid rulers maintained their strongholdin the eastern parts of Central Asia, in the cities ofBalasagun and Kashgar. Within a few decades thesecities grew into bustling urban centers of about 100,000inhabitants, hosting numerous mosques, Christianchurches and probably monasteries and Islamicmadrasas. The supreme ruler of the empire possessed sig-nificant power and military potential. He was able tomobilize an army of between 100,000 and 150,000 men atthe first call, and he probably had a steady inflow of rev-enues from taxing trade, industry and farming. Thisincome funded numerous public construction works inthe capital and in major cities across the state. Politically,however, the state remained a loose confederation oftribal rulers. The Karakhanid era signifies importantchanges in Turkic culture, including the formation ofMuslim Turkic identity and the codification of the Turkiccultural legacy in the 1070s (Kashgari 1982).

From its beginning, the Karakhanid state was politi-cally quite unstable, as various individuals and clansvigorously fought for power and influence. At the sametime, the Karakhanids faced formidable threats from thesouth, where the Ghaznavid dynasty rose to promi-nence, establishing its center in the city of Ghazna (inpresent-day Afghanistan). In 1008 the Karakhanids lostan important battle before the city of Balkh that haltedtheir expansion south of the Amu Darya River. Inanother setback, they lost influence over the Khwarezm,as the Ghazna ruler captured the capital of Khwarezm

(Gurganj) in 1017 and installed a governor hostile to theKarakhanids. During the reign of Usuf Kadyr-Khan(ruled ca. 1026–1032) and his son Suleiman (1032–?), theKarakhanids attempted to expand their empire andcampaigned against the rulers of Khwarezm.

In 1040 Ibrahim bin Nasr (ruled 1040–1068), a mem-ber of the royal family, initiated a revolt and declaredhimself supreme ruler. He moved his royal family intothe city of Samarqand, his capital. This action split theempire into two parts, the Eastern and WesternKarakhanid empires. Ibrahim bin Nasr attempted toestablish full control over the entire Karakhanid empireand launched a series of campaigns in the east. In the1060s he conquered the Farghona valley, then Chach andTaraz, but Balasagun proved a more difficult target. Hecaptured and lost the city several times. After his death,the Western Karakhanid khanate fell apart and as a con-sequence, was subdued by the rival Turkic tribal group,the Seljuks (see map 19).

In the 1060s and 1070s the Eastern Karakhanidkhanate strengthened its position and recapturedChach, Taraz, Uzgend and a number of other cities.However, the Eastern Karakhanids failed to bringunder control the renegade Western Karakhanidkhanate, as the Seljuks provided massive militarysupport to the Western Karakhanid. Muhammad IIArslan Khan (ca. 1102–1132), probably the last greatKarakhanid, turned his attention to domestic issues,conducting military and administrative reforms, sup-porting trade and the arts and funding many publicconstruction works. By 1132 Muhammad Arslan Khanfelt he was powerful enough to yet again challenge theSeljuks, but was defeated and killed in a decisive battleat Samarqand.

As with many other nomadic empires, theKarakhanids’ end overtook them due to a protractedsuccession struggle. The weakened Eastern Karakhanidsfaced a new and powerful rival, the Karakitais (alsoKara Kitans), a tribal confederation probably of Mongolorigin (Biran 2005), that conquered the territories ofKashgar and Jetysuu in the 1130s. The EasternKarakhanids were defeated first, below the city ofBalasagun in 1134. The Western Karakhanids thenattempted to stop the Karakitais, but lost a major battlebefore the city of Khojand in 1137. The final, decisivebattle took place in an area close to Samarqand in 1141.The Karakhanids lost despite help from the Seljuks andwere reduced to vassalage in the Karakitai khanate.Members of the Karakhanid family continued to governsmall and medium-sized principalities in the territoryof Maveranahr and Jetysuu for another 70 years, but in1211 both the Karakitais and Karakhanids weredefeated by the rulers of Khwarezm, and the dynastycame to an end.

Map 18: The Karakhanid State (999–1140)


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Political instability within the Samanid, Karakhanidand Khwarezm states, and perpetual military conflicts

and internecine skirmishes between generals, tribal chiefsand rebellious members of the royal families, significantlyweakened all major players in the region. These develop-ments provided opportunities for many ambitious tribalchiefs to wrest power from other traditional players.Several groups attempted to make use of such moments,but the most successful among them were the Seljuks.

In the ninth and tenth centuries the Seljuk dynastyemerged as a new and powerful actor in Central Asianpolitics. Seljuk, a local chieftain, broke from the Oghuztribal confederation and brought his followers to the lowerbasin of the Syr Darya River. The Seljuks came into contactwith the Samanids and soon accepted Islam. Graduallythey established control over a vast territory around theAral Sea. In the mid-tenth century, they moved first to thelower delta of the Amu Darya River and in the earlyeleventh century to the southwest. Soon after, Toghril Beg(ca. 990–1063) took over the city of Merv, then a strategi-cally important trading center, making it his capital.

Initially Toghril Beg (ruled 1016–1063) experiencedmixed fortunes. As an ally of the Western Karakhanidshe fought against Mahmud Ghaznavi, the ruler of theGhaznavid Empire, but he was defeated in 1025. Toghrildid not give up but moved to the Khwarezm oases,preparing for a new war. In 1028–1029 his army returnedto Khorasan, successfully recaptured Merv and annexedNishapur. From this base Toghril raided Bukhara andBalkh, and in 1037 he stormed the city of Ghazna, theGhaznavid capital. In 1037 Toghril Beg was crownedwith the title of sultan. This date is traditionally consid-ered the beginning of the Seljuk Empire. From here theSeljuks moved on to establish one of the largest empiresof their time, extending their power as far as CentralAsia, the Middle East, North Africa and eastern Europe.

In 1040 Sultan Toghril Beg defeated Mas’udGhaznavi in the decisive Battle of Dandanqan, forcingMas’ud to flee to Lahore. In the 1040s Toghril cam-paigned in various areas of Maveranahr and Khorasan,strengthening his position and securing new vassals andallies. In 1050 he captured the city of Isfahan, where-upon he moved his capital there. From this new base helaunched further campaigns to the west, and in 1055 hisforces captured Baghdad, the capital of the Islamiccaliphate. This action had many important conse-quences for the Islamic world. It ended the power of theShi’a Buyids, a strong clan that had exercised significantpower in Baghdad and throughout the caliphate. This

step decisively strengthened the power of the Sunnischool of Islam at the expense of the Shi’a; from this timeon the Sunni doctrine became the dominant teaching inthe Islamic world. The Seljuks temporarily halted thedecline of the caliphate, invigorating it with new energyand leading territorial expansions into western Byzantiumand the Mediterranean. They institutionalized Sunniinfluence by establishing and promoting a large net-work of Islamic colleges (madrasas) that provided sys-tematic training to Islamic scholars, lawyers andadministrators. Significant as these developments were,it was the Seljuks’ role in capturing the Holy Land, andtheir consequent role in the wars with the Crusaders thatgave them a prominent position in the annals of history.

The Seljuk sultans Alp Arslan (ruled 1064–1072) andMalik Shah I (1072–1092) took their campaigns ever far-ther west. The Seljuks conquered Armenia and Georgiain 1064 and crushed the Byzantine army at the Battle ofManzikert in 1071, capturing the Roman EmperorRomanus IV. This battle ultimately weakened theByzantine Empire and signaled the beginning of itsirreversible decline (Gibbon 1788, rep. 2001).

In 1092 Malik Shah I died. The empire was splitbetween his brother and sons, and entered a series ofdestructive conflicts. In the meantime, Byzantiumattempted to utilize the moment and called on PopeUrban II to send a military expedition to reclaimJerusalem. In 1095 the army of the First Crusade arrivedin Asia Minor, defeated the weak defenses they encoun-tered, captured the Holy Land and established the cru-sader states. Ahmed Sanjar (ruled 1118–1157) attemptedto reunite the Seljuks. He moved the capital to Merv andreasserted his authority in Maveranahr in a series ofcampaigns in the 1130s. Fortune turned its back onSultan Sanjar in 1141, when he lost his army in a battlewith the Karakitais.

This setback notwithstanding, the Seljuks triumphedover the Second Crusade armies in 1148. It was one oftheir last successes. In 1153 Sultan Sanjar sufferedanother defeat, this one by a rival clan that capturedSanjar himself and then sacked and looted the majortrading centers of Khorasan. Sanjar escaped from captiv-ity in 1156 and returned to his capital, Merv, but he diedthe following year and the empire began disintegrating.Some Seljuk princes attempted to revive it but met withlittle success, and in 1194 the great Seljuk Empire finallycollapsed. Representatives of the clan survived in AsiaMinor and would soon give birth to the OttomanEmpire.

Map 19: The Seljuks (ca. 1038–1194)


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Directions of expansion of Seljuk tribal confederation

Major military campaigns of Seljuks

Seljuk Empire, ca. 1038–1194

Early Seljuk tribal confederation in 9th c.

Seljuk Empire in 11th c.

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KHWAREZM MAVERANAHR

Kushaniya

Isfijab

Kesh

Bukhara

Serakh

Taraz

Samarqand

Termez

Khojand

Balkh

Herat

Paykend

Merv

Lake Saryqamysh

Uzboy

Nishapur


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In the mid-twelfth century the geopolitical situation inCentral Asia changed yet again with the deterioration

of the Seljuk Empire. In this environment, the rulers ofKhwarezm filled the vacuum. Step by step they begangathering together pieces of the fallen empires andbuilding a new empire of their own. As very few playerscould mount any meaningful resistance, the Khwarezmexperienced a spectacular rise, establishing control overa vast territory from the Jetysuu Valley in the east toMerv and Nishapur in the west.

Khwarezm was a small and prosperous principality tothe south of the Aral Sea that flourished on the delta of theAmu Darya River. The rulers of Khwarezm customarilyacknowledged the suzerainty of their powerful neighborsbut retained independence in domestic affairs. The situa-tion changed when Ala Ad-din Atsyz (ruled 1127–1156)attempted to wrest greater independence from theSeljuks. Atsyz rebelled against Sultan Sanjar several times(1138, 1141–1142 and 1147–1148), but achieved only tem-porary successes and retreated to Khwarezm. However,Atsyz captured the vast area on the lower banks of theAmu Darya River and Saryqamysh Lake. Between 1153and 1156 Atsyz finally achieved his objectives and movedhis armies to Khorasan, but he suddenly died in 1156while campaigning.

The next ruler of Khwarezm, Il-Arslan (ruled1156–1172) significantly expanded the state’s borders,granting himself the title Khwarezmshah. In his cam-paigns Il-Arslan showed impressive diplomatic skills,establishing and abandoning many alliances. In 1158,with help from the Turkic tribes of Karluks, he contendedsuccessfully for control over Bukhara and Samarqand. In1167 Khwarezmshah Il-Arslan captured Nishapur andseveral other cities in Khorasan. These campaigns gavethe Khwarezm effective control over both Maveranahrand Khorasan. In 1171 his troops suffered losses in battlewith the Karakitais. With the death of Il-Arslan the fol-lowing year, political power was relatively quickly con-solidated in the hands of Ala Ad-din Tekesh (ruled1172–1200). In 1194 Tekesh defeated Toghril II, one of thelast descendants of the Seljuk dynasty, finally ending theSeljuks’ attempts to restore their empire.

Tekesh’s son Ala Ad-din Muhammad II (ruled1200–1220) conquered almost all of Khorasan. In 1201 hesacked Herat and Nishapur, and in 1203, Merv. In 1207 hesuppressed a rebellion in Bukhara. In 1210, in an impor-tant step, his army defeated powerful Karakitais, extend-ing his control to eastern Turkistan and then to theFarghona Valley. In 1215 and 1216, Muhammad II con-quered the city of Jend and invaded the territory of thesteppe tribes to the north of the Syr Darya River. Thesedecisive victories had a significant psychological effect.

Many small principalities both in Maveranahr andKhorasan and beyond declared themselves vassals of theKhwarezmshah. At the zenith of his power, Muhammaddeclared himself the second Alexander the Great andmoved his capital to Samarqand, then the largest city inthe region. He even demanded that the caliph endorsehis political supremacy in the Muslim world.

During this period, Khwarezmshah Muhammad IIbegan inflicting increased atrocities on his own people.This alienated many former allies and loyalists. Forexample, he ordered the destruction of a flourishingoasis around the city of Chach, in order to create a no-gozone for Turkic tribes from the north. His troopsbehaved so brutally in Samarqand that in 1212 the localpopulation rebelled, killing all Khwarezmians in thecity—some 8,000 to 10,000 people. In retaliation,Muhammad II sacked the city and ordered the slaughterof about 10,000 citizens.

Yet, despite these displays of strength, the KhwarezmEmpire was beginning to show the first signs of decay.Its downfall was accelerated by a religious rift betweenthe Khwarezmshah and the caliph. In 1217 Muhammadopenly proclaimed a move against the existing caliph,and sent his army to capture Baghdad, but Muhammad’stroops suffered severe casualties due to unusually coldweather and guerrilla attacks by the local population.Nearly half the army was lost without a single majorbattle. At around this time, Muhammad made a numberof diplomatic blunders in dealing with his neighbors. In1218 he approved the massacre of an entire Mongoltrade caravan and the murder of a Mongol ambassador.The Mongols perceived this as an act of war and moveddecisively into Central Asia.

In 1220 Khwarezmshah Muhammad witnessed thearrival of the main Mongol army, numbering between250,000 and 300,000 (exact numbers are still debated).He decided not to gather his troops into a single army,but rather to spread them among the major urban areasin his kingdom. He judged that the Mongols would havelittle expertise in storming fortified cities. This proved tobe another critical mistake. His troops, scattered amonghostile and dissatisfied populations, had little morale fora fight against the Mongols. Meanwhile, the Mongolsshowed great skill in city sieges: they employed Chineseengineers to plan operations and assemble the necessaryequipment for storming city walls, and they used localcivilians as human shields for their warriors. Legendstates that Muhammad II did not fight even a singlebattle against the Mongols, escaping instead with adiminished entourage across his empire. He met hisdeath in 1220 on a small island in the Caspian Sea. In1221 the Khwarezm Empire was destroyed utterly.

Map 20: The Rise and Collapse of Khwarezm


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LakeSaryqamysh

Uzboy

Khiva

Uzgend

Kashgar

Gurganj

Yarkend

Early Khwarezm state

Aqsu

Nesa

Initial territorial expansions of Khwarezm

Chach

KHORASAN

BalasagunOtrar

Jend

Major military campaigns of Khwarezm shahs

Territories under control of Khwarezm during peak of its power

Khwarezm Empire from Mid-Twelfth to Early Thirteenth Centuries

TalasKHWAREZM

Farghona Valley

Mongols

KARAKITAIS

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80 0 100

0 200

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500 mi400

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Aral

Sea

Casp ianSea

KaraBogazGol

Lake Ysyk Kol

Tura

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Tobo

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Chu

Ili

Tarim

Ufa

Volga

Zhay

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Oka

Irgiz

Turg

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Atrak

Syr Darya

Khoper

Sura

Volga

Vyatka

Yar

kant

Toxkan

Hotan

Er

Terek

EsilErtis

Zera

vshan

Ural

Amu

Darya

Sarysu

Nura

Murgab

MAVERANAHR

Merv

Kushaniya

Isfijab

Nishapur

Kesh

Bukhara

Serakh

Taraz

Astarabad

Samarqand

Termez

Khojand

Paykend

Balkh

Herat

KIPCHAKS


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The establishment of the Turkic empires and later ofthe Islamic caliphate rejuvenated the Great Silk Road.

The Turkic empires controlled the territory between Chinaand Maveranahr and Khorasan from the sixth to mid-seventh centuries, and the Islamic caliphate dominatedthe land between Maveranahr and the Mediterraneanfrom the mid-seventh to early ninth centuries. Risingliving standards among the ruling elite and urban popu-lations generated a growing demand for imported goodsand thus boosted both regional and international trade.Craftsmen, farmers and herders became increasinglyinvolved in the commercial production of goods to besold in the large bazaars in Balasagun, Samarqand, Merv,Herat and Baghdad.

The trade growth was greatly stimulated by theestablishment of a stable currency exchange system, andof rudimentary banking and insurance systems. Duringthis era unified legal and taxation systems were alsodeveloped. Merchants were obliged to pay a fixed per-centage of the total value of their goods and had rightsto file complaints (and they did) in the courts or go allthe way to the royal dignitaries if they faced unfair treat-ment. Although there was no change in the transporta-tion modes, and caravans still relied on camels, bullsand horses, the transportation and communicationinfrastructure was further improved. A far-reaching sys-tem of caravanserais was built along the Great SilkRoad. As regional and international trade becameincreasingly profitable, various royal families showedinterest in being involved in the business. Historic evi-dence suggests that royal courts, tribal leaders and themilitary often had direct or indirect stakes in the inter-national trade. In exchange for various privileges andtax breaks, the merchants and merchant bankersfinanced the lavish royal lifestyle and funded construc-tion of royal and public sites and even some militarycampaigns. Many well-established merchant familiesalso carried various diplomatic duties, delivering diplo-matic letters, documents and gifts to foreign rulers andconducting surveys of political, economic and militarydevelopments in foreign countries.

The variety of the commodities traded also increasedsignificantly. During this era it included traditionalitems (such as high-quality nephrite jade, preciousstones and jewelry, race and cavalry horses), and alsosilk, textile, porcelain, salt and weapons. Probably, asizeable volume of slave trade existed due to highdemand for experienced domestic workers, concubinesand craftsmen in the markets of China, Central Asia andthe Middle East. By the eleventh and twelfth centurieseastern European countries, such as the BulgarKingdom, Kievan and Novgorod Russia and variousBaltic states also joined the international trade, as theVolga River and its tributaries were open for navigation

all the way from the Caspian Sea to Bulgar, Tver andother cities. They added new goods to the trade flow,such as fur, leather, fresh-water pearls and honey.

During this era it became possible and still profitableto sell such items as silk and jade to neighboring coun-tries, from which local merchants would carry goodsfurther. This way the merchants avoided the need totravel all the way from China to the Mediterranean andthe Middle East. The Great Silk Road was transformedfrom a transportation highway into a sophisticated net-work of markets. However, geographical and climaticconsiderations still imposed significant limitations onthe directions of the trade routes.

The traders and explorers used two main options fortheir travels. One was to go through the passes in theTian Shan and the Pamirs mountains: Anxi, Khotan,Yarkend, Kashgar, Balkh and Merv, and then to Persiaand the Mediterranean. The other was to travel throughthe broad stretches of grassland to the north of themountain slopes: Anxi, Turfan, Urumchi, Balasagun,Chach (Tashkent), Samarqand, Bukhara, Merv, and on,once again, to Persia and the Mediterranean. During thisera there probably was a rise of the south-north trade, asmerchants from Samarqand, Bukhara, Merv, Khiva andGurganj became increasingly involved in the trade witheastern Europe along the Volga River route in the northand with various states and principalities of the Indianpeninsula in the south.

Numerous archeological evidence and chroniclesfrom that era suggest that the trade was quite substan-tial and the monetarization of the economies of theCentral Asian states and empires was quite impressive.The intensive trade went hand-in-hand with major cul-tural, intellectual and technological exchanges.Numerous educators and scholars traveled along theGreat Silk Road opening schools, colleges and educa-tional centers. These centers of learning produced anew class of well-educated local professionals andscholars in Central Asia. Not only did they play keyroles in the cultural and intellectual development oftheir own region, but also of many parts of the MiddleEast and South Asia. Talented scholars from CentralAsia traveled to Herat, Nishapur, Baghdad, Damascusand elsewhere and made considerable contributions inclassic literature, mathematics, algebra, astronomy andmedicine, among other fields.

Undoubtedly, over the period of about 400 years theSilk Road had its own business cycles, as the trade andcultural exchanges were greatly affected by wars, con-flicts, economic mismanagement, currency collapsesand other factors. The large-scale trade that had flour-ished along the Silk Road between the seventh and tenthcenturies probably declined in the eleventh and twelfthcenturies.

Map 21: International and Major Trade Routes in Central Asia


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To Europe

To Turfan, Anxi

To Turfan, Urumchi, Anxi

To Europe

Khiva

Bukhara

Kasan

Kashgar

Gurganj

Taraz

Kesh

Herat

Samarqand

Balkh

Nesa

Nishapur

Khojand

Serakh

Chach

AqsuLake

Saryqamysh

Uzboy

To Mediterranean

To Anxi

To B

am

ian

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80 50

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0 200

300200

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500 mi400

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Sea

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KaraBogazGol

Lake Ysyk Kol

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Tarim

Ufa

Volga

Zha

yya

Oka

Irgiz

Turg

ay

Atrak

Syr Darya

Syr Darya

Khoper

Sura

Volga

Vyatka

Yark

ant

Toxkan

Hotan

Terek

MuMMrgr ab

EsilErtis

Ural

Amu Darya

Sarysu

Nura

Zeravshan

Talas

Merv

Isfijab

KHWAREZM

KHORASAN

Balasagun

Uzgend

Otrar

Jend

Bulgar

Yangikent

Osh

Yarkend

Almalyk

Barskhan

Syghnaq

MAVERANAHR

Pamirs

Mts

Tian ShanMountainsMadminiya

TermezAstarabad

Dihistan

Kerminiya

Kath

Mizdahqan

Eurasian Steppe

Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century Trade Routes




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IV

The Mongols and the Decline of Central Asia


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In the late twelfth century Central Asia entered an eraof general political anarchy. Several Turkic dynasties

and clans battled each other to establish control over thevarious parts of Jetysuu, Maveranahr and Khorasan.Almost every leader was forced to fight off claims andcounterclaims to the supreme throne from numerousmembers of his own clan. The general population wasdeeply frustrated by rulers and governors who wastedresources on never-ending wars, neglecting public proj-ects such as irrigation, policing and infrastructure. Thewars became more frequent and more rancorous, assome commanders began randomly executing not onlythe commanders of competing armies but also entireclans and families. These actions ignited the flames ofblood feuds and internecine wars in the region.

In the meantime, in the east a new power began toemerge. The Mongols, a large tribal confederationinhabiting much of Mongolia and southern Siberia,gradually consolidated into a formidable military andpolitical force. Genghis Khan (?–1227), the leader of aminor tribal group, played a significant role in this con-solidation. Through a maze of internal wars he rosefrom the ranks of outlaw and leader of a renegade bandto become one of the most powerful leaders among thetribes. In 1206 many of the Mongols were broughttogether into a nomadic protostate, and an assembly ofthe tribal leaders (kurultai) proclaimed Genghis Khanthe supreme khan (ruler).

What distinguished the Mongols under GenghisKhan’s leadership from their Turkic predecessors wasthe use of total war against all opponents. They raisedthe experience of tribal blood vengeance to an unprece-dented mass level. During their numerous campaigns,they did not balk at slaughtering the entire civil popula-tions of rival tribes, cities and towns. Unlike the Turkictribes, the Mongols were not interested in settling incities and did not perceive urban centers as potentialplaces to settle or as sources of long-term revenue. In thecase of Central Asia, therefore, they stripped cities oftheir most valuable assets and then often burned thosecities to the ground. The Mongols accepted the total sub-mission of other tribal groups and recruited highly qual-ified local experts, integrating them without hesitationinto their multinational armies. For example, they incor-porated the most capable Chinese military engineersand weaponry experts into special units commanded byMongol generals.

Between 1211 and 1219 the Mongols establishedcontrol over eastern Turkistan. In 1219 Genghis Khaninvaded Central Asia and captured all the most

important cities in the Jetysuu, including such largeurban centers as Otrar, Taraz and Balasagun. In 1220 theinvaders moved on the major cities in Maveranahr. TheMongols destroyed Khwarezmshah’s army that hadbeen divided into city-garrisons, simply had no fightingmorale, and on many occasions had come into conflictwith the local populations.

In winter 1220 the Mongols encircled the city ofBukhara, which had some of the most advanced fortifica-tions in the region; the local garrison abandoned the city.The Mongols successfully stormed the defenses, slaugh-tering nearly half the civilian population and taking theother half as slaves, and then burned the city to theground. In March, Genghis Khan’s army sacked anddestroyed Samarqand. Over the summer of that year theMongols captured most of the cities in the Farghona andZeravshan valleys, often burning them down. In 1221they stormed Gurganj, one of Khwarezm’s largest andimportant urban centers. After a prolonged resistance, thecity was taken and completely destroyed. The Mongolsnot only massacred its entire population, they alsodestroyed a sophisticated network of irrigation dams, cre-ating an environmental catastrophe for the whole area.

In the same year, Genghis Khan crossed the AmuDarya River and within a year or two had captured allthe major urban centers of Khorasan. The cities of Merv,Nishapur, Herat, Balkh, Ghazna and Bamian weredestroyed with such ferocity that some never recovered.The Mongols marauded at will all the way to the IndusRiver in the south and to the Euphrates in the southwest.

By 1222 most areas of Jetysuu, Maveranahr andKhorasan had been captured and brought under Mongolcontrol, though the invading troops spent another twoyears subduing small garrisons in the remote areas of theregion, including the Eurasian steppe north of the AralSea. Once this subjugation of an entire region had beenaccomplished, Genghis Khan decided to return toMongolia, refusing to establish his capital in any of thecaptured urban centers in Central Asia.

The three years of the main Mongol campaigns inCentral Asia brought massive consequences. The regionlost a significant proportion of its population, especiallyeducated and skilled professionals. Estimates of humanlosses vary between two and four million people out ofa total population of between 10 and 16 million. Theentire economy of the region was destroyed, as well aslocal, regional and international trade with prosperousneighbors in the south and west. Many cities andareas took from 30 to 50 years to recover; some neverrecovered at all.

Map 22: The Mongol Invasion of Central Asia


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Khiva Uzgend

Kashgar

Gurganj

Yarkend

Aqsu

Nesa

Chach

KHORASAN

BalasagunOtrar

Jend

Talas

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TaTTrim

Ufa

Volga

Zhay

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AAttrraakk

Syr Darya

Syr Darya

Khoper

Sura

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Vyatka

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eeZZZZrraa

vvsshhaann

Ural

AmuD

arya

Sarysu

Nura

Murgab

Murgab

Uzboy

LakeSaryqamysh

MAVERANAHR

Merv

Kushaniya

Isfijab

Nishapur

Kesh

Bukhara

Serakh

Taraz

Astarabad

Samarqand

Termez

Khojand

Paykend

Balkh

Herat

JETYSUU

Thirteenth-Century Mongol InvasionsTerritories under control of Khwarezm shahs

Mongol invasions, 1219–1221 Farghona Valley


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After the death of Genghis Khan in 1227 the MongolEmpire quickly disintegrated. In accordance with

nomadic tribal traditions, the empire was dividedamong members of Genghis Khan’s family. In theory,the descendants of Genghis Khan were subordinate tothe supreme ruler (Great Khan), who could endorse ortake away those principalities (uluses) with the approvalof the tribal congress (kurultai). In reality, however, thisarrangement was open to dispute by numerous con-tenders. Such internal disagreements notwithstanding,in the 1240s and 1260s the Mongols were still able topreserve their unity for major military campaigns in thesouth, east and west.

The Mongol Empire was initially divided betweenfour Hordes (Uluses), each ruled by a khan: the Ulusof Tolui Khan, the Ulus of Odygei Khan, the Ulus ofChagatai Khan and the Ulus of Jochi Khan (after hisdeath, Batu Khan).

The Ulus of Tolui. Tolui Khan (ruled 1227–1232)inherited the territory of Mongolia proper and presidedover the election of the Great Khan, as a regent from1227–1229. He supported his brother Odygei. After thedeath of Tolui Khan, the ulus was absorbed into theGreat Ulus of Odygei.

The Ulus of Odygei. Odygei Khan (ruled 1229–1241)received the crown of the Great Khan and was recog-nized as supreme ruler by all Mongol princes. He led theprolonged conquest of China. After his death, his suc-cessors struggled to establish their authority and recog-nition among all members of the royal family andeventually slipped into a long series of internecine con-flicts. The situation stabilized, however, under KublaiKhan (ruled 1260–1294). Kublai Khan had successfullyfought off all contenders and proceeded with theconquest of China, crushing the Song dynasty. Kublairecognized the importance of China for the future of theMongol Empire and in 1264 moved his capital toKhanbaliq (present-day Beijing). In 1271 (other sourcesgive 1279) he formally declared the establishment of theYuan dynasty, which existed for nearly 200 years.

The Ulus of Chagatai. Chagatai Khan (1227–1241)received under his rule parts of eastern Turkistan andMaveranahr, and established his capital in the city ofAlmalyq in eastern Turkistan (formerly Eastern TurkicKhanate). The descendants of Chagatai strengthenedtheir control over Altai, Jetysuu and Maveranahr, andwrested some territories from the other Mongol khans.This dynasty would maintain its control in Transoxianafor nearly 120 years and its princes would play animportant role in both eastern and western Turkistan forseveral centuries.

The Ulus of Jochi. Jochi died before Genghis Khanand this ulus was given to his son Batu (ruled1227–1255). The territory of this khanate (symbolicallydivided into the Blue Horde [eastern part] and White

Horde [western part] and later united into the GoldenHorde) included all the land west of the Balqash Lakeand the Ural Mountains. Under the leadership of BatuKhan the Mongols conquered the Volga Bulgars, theCaucasus and a number of Russian principalities, andraided Poland and Hungary. Batu founded his capital,Sarai, on the lower reaches of the Volga River. The Hordewould exist for about 300 years, benefiting from the trib-utes of vassal principalities and from trade with theMediterranean, eastern Europe and Central Asia,although periodically it endured protracted successionwars and conflicts.

The Ulus of Hulegu. Hulegu Khan (ruled 1255–1265)was sent to conquer territories to the west of the AmuDarya River that were largely controlled by variousMuslim dynasties. He led a large army that marched tothe city of Baghdad in the fall of 1257. Hulegudemanded that the Baghdad garrison and the caliph sur-render; when they refused, he ordered a siege of the city.Baghdad was razed to the ground, bringing to an endthe Abbasid caliphate. Hulegu established his controlover the territories ruled by the Abbasids and estab-lished a new Ulus, often called the Il Khanate.

In the 1240s and 1270s Central Asia found itself inthe geopolitical center of the powerful MongolEmpire, which at that time spread from Korea andChina in the east to Russia and Mesopotamia in thewest. However, the political center of gravity movedfrom the oases of Maveranahr to the Jetysuu area andthe vast Eurasian steppe. In 1237 the Mongols left theirbase on the Eurasian steppe, crossed the Volga Riverand began their four-year conquest of eastern Europe.About the same time they conquered most of theIranian plateau. In the 1250s and 1260s the Mongolsconquered China and Mesopotamia. Hard on the heelsof these triumphs, however, the Mongol princesbecame engaged in internal quarrels and bloodyinternecine wars, and the Mongol Empire entered aperiod of rapid fragmentation.

In the 1260s and 1270s a series of conflicts amongvarious clans of the Mongol elite again redrew thepolitical map of Central Asia. During this period, threeimportant processes began affecting the political situationin the empire. The first was a rapid Turkization ofMongol society. By the end of the thirteenth century theTurks, who had joined the Mongol armies as juniorpartners under Mongol commanders, began assertingthemselves and gained more prominent positions inboth the military and government administration. Inaddition, many members of the ruling elite and withthem many ordinary tribesmen began converting toIslam. Finally, a process of economic recovery thatstarted in many parts of the empire in the mid-1200sled to rapid growth in regional, international andtranscontinental trade.

Map 23: Central Asia under the Mongols


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Kublai Khan (ruled 1260–1294) was probably the last,true supreme khan of the Mongol domain. A suc-

cessful warrior and administrator, he led the Mongols inthe conquest of China and effectively administered theempire’s military, political and diplomatic affairs. Evenwith a large pool of local and international advisers at hisdisposal, however, he could not prevent the process ofdisintegration of the state. With the conquest of sophisti-cated settled areas of China, Central Asia and the MiddleEast came increased involvement in everyday adminis-tration and the running of the numerous provinces of theempire. The centralized nature of the state led to lengthydelays in major decision making because transportationand communication technologies were still quite primi-tive and undeveloped. For example, it could take fromsix to fifteen weeks for a messenger to carry a letter fromSamarqand to Karakorum. Hence many governors andlocal khans exercised increasing autonomy over variousissues, independent of the center.

At the same time, another important factor con-tributed to the disintegration processes in the Empire—proselytism. The Mongols were noted for their religioustolerance and interest in spirituality. In the case of CentralAsia, it is probable that Berke (ruled 1257–1267), grand-son of Genghis Khan, had already converted to Islam, andlikewise Baraq (ruled 1266–1271), Ghazan Khan (ruled1295–1305), Uzbek (ruled 1313–1341) and others adoptedthe Muslim faith. Though Islamization took another 100to 150 years, the process had a huge impact on relationsbetween the center and periphery, as it created a deepdivide between the shamanistic and later BuddhistMongols and their Muslim kinfolk. Through conversion,the Mongols were transformed from political and culturaloutsiders to political and cultural insiders. Increasinglyzealous Muslim khans of the Chagatai khanate, theGolden Horde and Il Khanate began distancing them-selves from traditional shamanistic practices, thus foster-ing the political isolation of the center in Karakorum.

In addition, several other factors contributed to thedecline of the Mongols’ military power, with threeprobably playing key roles in the process: climatechange; disease, especially in the form of outbreaks of apandemic; and social-demographic factors (a decreasingbirth rate and high levels of alcoholism among theMongol elite). Recent studies indicate that betweenthe late thirteenth and mid-fourteenth centuries, theEurasian continent experienced a “Little Ice Age.”Animal herders were particularly vulnerable to theextreme winters as their animals relied on natural pas-ture. In such winters the Mongols’ horses—a majorsource of food, their chief form of transportation and thebasis for their cavalry—would die en masse, leading tomalnutrition, starvation, even famine among the general

population. Against this background, the Black Death,the pandemic that killed nearly half of Europe’s popula-tion in the first half of the fifteenth century, could havesimilarly affected the Eurasian steppe. Some scholarsbelieve that the Black Death had in fact originated inChina and Central Asia and was brought to the MiddleEast and Europe by the Mongols and their merchants.

Many families in this time were experiencing achronic social malaise, as never-ending military cam-paigns took young people away from their families foryears, thus contributing to a falling birthrate and erosionof family cohesion. It is not surprising, therefore, that insuch a time of social degradation and death many mem-bers of the Mongol aristocracy turned to alcohol, liter-ally drinking themselves to death. This might wellexplain why many Mongol princes died relativelyyoung.

In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuriesthe Mongol rulers were also engaged in a deadly cycle ofinternecine wars. Even Kublai Khan struggled for recog-nition among some Mongol tribes; several members ofthe Genghis family did not acknowledge his authority,including his own younger brother Arikbukha (?–1266).Another significant rival was Kaidu Khan (1230–1301),great-grandson of Genghis Khan. Kaidu Khan, togetherwith Duwa Khan (ruled 1282–1307), a ruler of the Ulusof Chagatai, spent almost his entire reign fighting othercompetitor-princes for superiority in the empire. In1285, Duwa Khan’s troops even took on and defeatedthe army loyal to Kublai Khan, and began a campaign ineastern Turkistan for three years. In the 1290s DuwaKhan constantly campaigned against his neighbors andrivals in Khorasan, Maveranahr and eastern Turkistan.He also participated in internecine wars among GenghisKhan’s descendants from 1300 to 1304 and 1305 to 1306in Mongolia. He effectively exhausted the Mongolarmies in these numerous campaigns, which he pursuedalmost until his death in 1307 (Biran 1997).

In the early fourteenth century, the conflicts amongmembers of the royal family further sped up the processof disintegration. Kebek Khan (ruled ca. 1318–1326)moved his administrative center from Jetysuu toMaveranahr. After his death the khanate slid into twodecades of political chaos and was ruled by variouskhans whose reigns generally lasted between two andfive years. During this era many princes neglected theiradministrative, diplomatic and political duties andlargely returned to a traditional nomadic life, indulgingthemselves in hunting, small military campaigns andfamily wars. The political chaos undermined economicdevelopment and further weakened the numerousmembers of the Genghis clan in Central Asia. In thisenvironment, a new regional leader emerged.

Map 24: Disintegration of the Mongol Empire


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The political vacuum created in Central Asia in the earlyfourteenth century wreaked political chaos through-

out the region. Numerous Turkic and Mongol clans werepowerful enough to raid each other’s territory, to wagecampaigns and sometimes even to storm large cities, butthey were too disunited and too disorganized to establishstable states or to lay the foundations of economic recov-ery and growth. In this environment, the major urban cen-ters were interested in investing in and supporting acapable leader who could bring stability into Transoxiana.

Timur bin Taraghay Barlas (ca. 1336–1405), who wasbetter known by his nickname “Tamerlane” (Timur theLame), was from a small but prominent clan. At the ageof 25 Tamerlane formed an armed squadron and joinedthe military service of Tughluk Timur Khan. Tamerlaneparticipated in various campaigns and gradually rose tohigh-level officer rank in the khan’s army. He acquiredso much influence that in 1369 he became the ruler ofSamarqand. He found support among individuals fromnumerous Turkic and Mongol tribes as well as fromwealthy merchants and landlords of Samarqand, whounderwrote his first military campaigns.

Timur proved to be a capable military leader whoenforced iron discipline and instilled excellent militaryskills in his army (Manz 2002). He employed strategiesborrowed from the Mongols, such as totally destroyingcities and towns and slaughtering their populations inorder to destroy the morale of opponents. He set up spe-cial engineering units in his army to assist in the siege ofcities. He also regularly captured all the artisans, schol-ars and craftsmen from occupied cities and sent themback to Samarqand as slaves. In addition, Timurattracted considerable support from numerous triballeaders by declaring that his ultimate goal was to restorethe great Mongol Empire.

During the 1370s and 1380s Timur campaigned in aneffort to strengthen the position of his state. Between1372 and 1379 he invaded Khwarezm, pillaging citiesand enslaving most of the craftsmen and artisans.Between 1381 and 1383, he captured Herat. From 1386 to1387 he conquered northern Persia. In 1386 his armyclashed with Tokhtamysh Khan (?–1406), a powerfulruler of the Golden Horde, at the Battle of Derbend. In1388 he recaptured the city of Gurganj in Khwarezm anddestroyed most of it. In 1389 and 1390 he annexed theFarghona Valley and moved into the Jetysuu Valley, col-liding with the Chagatai Horde. By the early 1390sTimur, who had assumed the title of Amir (from theArabic for leader), had gathered considerable strength,establishing a large disciplined army in preparation forcampaigning in distant lands.

From 1391 to 1395 Amir Timur’s army invaded the ter-ritory of the Golden Horde and ultimately defeatedTokhtamysh in a large battle in 1395, paving the way forthe rise of Muscovite Russia. The Central Asiansdestroyed several of the Horde’s foremost trading andpolitical centers, including Sarai and Haji-Tarkhan. In1398 and 1399 Timur invaded northern India, plunderingmany large urban centers. In this campaign, once againhis army used Mongol-style tactics; the onslaught againstDelhi was typical in that the city was destroyed, its treas-ures looted and almost all its inhabitants slaughtered.

Between 1399 and 1404 Amir Timur moved to thewest, capturing Baghdad, Damascus and Aleppo. In thedecisive battle of Ankara in 1402, he defeated SultanBayazid I of the Ottoman Empire. The battle was so fiercethat of a 100,000-strong Turkish army just a few thousandsurvived. Timir reached the Mediterranean coast, but ashe had no naval forces and no maritime expertise, heturned back. The Ottoman Turks fled to the Balkans. Thismilitary campaign and defeat temporarily weakened theOttomans and delayed their invasion of Constantinopleand southern Europe for several decades. Despite thedecisive victory, Amir Timur decided not to invadeEurope or Egypt, but to return to his capital, Samarqand.

In 1404 Timur prepared his troops for the last and ulti-mate challenge in the restoration of the Mongol Empire—the invasion of China. He gathered a great armyestimated at 200,000 or 300,000 strong, and at the end of1404 he moved toward the city of Otrar in the Jetysuuarea, as a preparation for war. The winter of 1404–1405proved to be one of the coldest in the history of the region.Timur, who was accustomed to living year-round in asimple tent, refused to slow down and ordered his troopsto move ahead despite terrible blizzards. During this win-ter he became sick, allegedly catching pneumonia orplague, and died in February 1405.

Timur left behind a large, prosperous, but very unsta-ble empire and a highly controversial legacy. During hisreign, he patronized trades and crafts that helped toreintroduce profitable regional, international andtranscontinental trade networks along the Great SilkRoad. His capital, Samarqand, with its population of300,000 to 400,000 became one of the largest cities in theworld at that time. However, the prosperity of the impe-rial center was achieved by plundering and destroyinghundreds of cities and towns in the conquered territo-ries. His troops enslaved tens of thousands of the mostskilled craftsmen, engineers, scholars and artisans, cre-ating a very substantial brain-drain and decades of steepcultural and economic decline on the outskirts of theempire.

Map 25: Timur (Tamerlane) and the Timurid Empire in Central Asia


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The sudden death of Timur in 1405 was a serious blowto the unity of the empire. In the east, the rulers of

the Moghulistan (which roughly corresponded withJetysuu and surrounding areas in eastern Turkistan) laidclaims on the Kashgar and Farghona valleys andMaveranahr. On the great Eurasian steppe the rulers ofthe Golden Horde recovered from the defeat inflicted byTimur’s armies and began regular raids on the prosper-ous areas in Khwarezm. In the west, Turkomans regu-larly raided the western provinces and cities. Thegreatest challenge, however, was coming from withinthe empire.

Timur designated his grandson, Pir MuhammadJahangir, as his successor, a decision challenged bynumerous contenders in a devastating series of warsover five years. Only in 1409 did Shah Rukh (1377–1447),the son of Timur, manage to defeat competitors. Hereconquered most of the provinces of Timur’s empire,establishing the city of Herat as its capital. Sultan ShahRukh divided his empire into two parts, eastern andwestern, by establishing dual regency. His son, UlughBek (1394–1449), became governor of Maveranahr, con-trolling all the land east of the Amu Darya River from hiscapital in Samarqand.

During the first half of his regency, Ulugh Bek cam-paigned in the east and north, but he proved notablyunsuccessful as both diplomat and military strategist.From 1420 to 1421 he helped Prince Shir MuhammadChagatayid become ruler of Moghulistan in hopes ofgaining a loyal ally and vassal. Shir Muhammadaccepted the help and won the throne; but not only didhe then refuse to be Ulugh Bek’s vassal, he also tookover Kashgar and laid claim to the prosperous FarghonaValley. Ulugh Bek organized a military expeditionagainst Shir Muhammad in 1425, but he was forced toturn back without a decisive victory. Ulugh Bek also pro-vided assistance to Prince Baraq to establish control overthe Eurasian steppe in 1422 and 1423. Baraq (ruled1422–1427) won the throne, defeating powerful competi-tors, but he, too, then refused to be Ulugh Bek’s vassal.Baraq Khan severely defeated Ulugh Bek’s army in 1427;only the sudden death of Baraq Khan saved theTimurids from a disaster.

These and other missteps in regional affairs forcedthe Timurids to abandon their ambitions for great terri-torial gains and to focus on defending the empire’s bor-ders and strengthening its economy. During the 1430sand 1440s Shah Rukh and Ulugh Bek systematizedadministration, patronized the development of tradeand industries and supported the arts and sciences.Political and economic stability stimulated the rapidgrowth of both capitals of the empire—Herat andSamarqand—as well as the other small and medium-sized trade centers on the Great Silk Road.

The death of Shah Rukh in 1447 radically changedthe political situation within the empire. Devastatingintradynastic wars severely damaged major urbancenters of the state. From 1447 to 1448 Ulugh Bekfought a powerful contender, Ala ad-Dawla, who wasShah Rukh’s grandson. Ulugh Bek defeated Ala ad-Dawla in the Battle of Herat in 1448. Although UlughBek’s troops allegedly pillaged the city, killing thou-sands of civilians, he was unable to establish full controlover the provinces in Khorasan due to the hostility of thelocal population. In 1449 Ulugh Bek himself was chal-lenged by his son Abd al-Latif (ruled 1449–1450), andlost a battle at Samarqand. Although he agreed to handover the throne to Abd al-Latif, Ulugh Bek was mur-dered in October 1449, allegedly at his son’s order.Meanwhile, Turkic-Mongol groups of the Eurasiansteppe, led by Abu Khayr, had raided the Syr DaryaRiver basin in 1446, and Khwarezm and Maveranahr in1448. In 1451 an alliance with Abu Khayr at its head evencaptured Samarqand.

Between 1451 and 1469 Abu Said (1424–1469), oneof the Timur’s descendants, temporarily restored theTimurid Empire, uniting Maveranahr and thenKhorasan. In 1459 he won the Battle of Serakh, defeatinga group of Timurid princes and gaining dominance overthe principalities in Badakhshan and Bamian (present-day Afghanistan). He campaigned constantly in differ-ent parts of the empire, putting down one rebellion afteranother and fighting various Turkic-Mongol tribalgroups. However, in 1469 he was killed by hostile troopswhile campaigning in the mountains of Azerbaijan.After a short period of further conflict, a kind of statusquo was established within the empire as it was dividedbetween descendants of Timur into four autonomousprincipalities. In the mid-1490s history took anotherturn when the rulers of Maveranahr and Farghona died,and the region slid into yet another round of internecineconflicts.

The new rulers of the major Central Asian principali-ties were unable to reverse the trend toward disintegra-tion. Maveranahr and Khorasan ultimately moved apart,their political divide reinforced by a strong religiousdivide. Shi’a Persians gradually strengthened their influ-ence in Khorasan, weakening and undermining theirSunni competitors. This process gained momentum in thelate fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries when a Shi’adynasty, founded by Ismail Safavi, seized power inPersia. His followers captured most of the areas inKhorasan previously controlled by the Timurids and thenzealously enforced Shi’a teachings among the localpopulations. The emergence of a strong Persian state hos-tile to the Timurids significantly undermined the CentralAsians’ position, isolating them from important economiccenters in the southwest and from the Mediterranean.

Map 26: Disintegration of the Timurid Empire


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In the sixteenth century the remnants of the TimuridEmpire continued to experience a perpetual series of

internecine wars. Unlike western Europe where thelarge cities were effective power bases from which rulerscould establish strong absolute monarchies, the CentralAsian cities were too weak economically and politicallyto provide the foundations for centralized states. Newkhanates did emerge, but they had very short life spans,often disappearing within a decade or two. In this envi-ronment it was inevitable that a new tribal leader wouldgather a large enough army to launch an offensive inCentral Asia. Such a move came this time from theEurasian steppe, under the leadership of the Uzbektribal elite led by Muhammad Sheybani (ca. 1451–1510).

The Uzbeks had emerged as a large tribal confedera-tion that controlled territory to the east and north of theAral Sea and had already begun to distinguish themselvesas a separate tribal entity in the fourteenth and fifteenthcenturies (Allworth 1994). Their leaders traced their ances-tors from the clan of Genghis Khan and retained strongerattachments to their Turkic-Mongol roots than did theTimurids. In the late fifteenth century the Uzbeks organ-ized regular incursions into the Timurids’ domains. Onlyin 1499 or 1500 did Sheybani Khan decide it was time totake over the crumbling Timurid Empire.

Sheybani Khan took full advantage of the hostilitiesamong the Timurids and gradually expanded his controlfrom his base in the Syr Darya river basin south into theoases of Maveranahr. Not only did he mobilize a largearmy between 100,000 and 150,000 strong, but alsoordered all Uzbek tribes to move and settle in the newlyconquered lands. In 1500 Sheybani Khan captured thecities of Bukhara and Samarqand and established theSheybani dynasty. He spent about ten years fighting offvarious challengers, including Babur, a great-grandson ofTimur. Sheybani’s war against the Timurids proved diffi-cult, as he lost and recaptured Samarqand and Bukharaseveral times. He captured Balkh in 1506, and Herat in1507. Though the new empire was established and itsrulers liked to compare themselves to the TimuridEmpire, its military and political might was not even closeto that of Tamerlane, as the state was weakened by eco-nomic decline and the hostility of the local populations.

The collapse of the Sheybani dynasty came fasterthen expected. In 1509 and 1510 Sheybani Khan clashedwith an emerging tribal confederation called theKazakhs (Qazaqs), led by Qasym Khan, and lost amajor campaign. He retreated to Samarqand, where helearned of a new threat, this time from powerful IsmailSafavi, Shi’a shah of Persia. Sheybani Khan had littletime to recover from his defeat by the Kazakhs and wasforced to start a new campaign with significantly

weakened forces. In November 1510 the Uzbek armywas defeated at the Battle of Merv. Sheybani Khan waskilled in the battle, along with his entire entourage.This opened the door for the Persian conquest of majorurban centers and oases in Maveranahr, includingBukhara, Samarqand, Qarshi and others. It also lookedat that moment as if the Timurids could reestablishtheir authority in Transoxiana, as Babur allied himselfwith the Shi’a Persians and returned to Samarqand.

The Uzbeks retreated to their bases in the Syr Daryariver basin, but they did not give up. They won time toregroup and defeated the Persians in 1511. A tribal gather-ing (kurultai) elected a new khan—Ubaidullah—in 1512and the Uzbeks raised a large new army. This reinvigoratedUzbek force marched to Bukhara, where they met the alliedforces of Babur and the Persians. At the battle of nearbyGhijduvan the Uzbeks soundly defeated their opponents.The army of Ismail Safavi was forced to retreat beyond theAmu Darya River, while Babur’s only choice was to leaveCentral Asia forever. He moved to India, where he foundeda new dynasty known as the Great Moguls.

The victorious Uzbeks divided Transoxiana betweenthe members of the Sheybani Khan family, acknowledg-ing Ubaidullah Khan as first among equals. Militarily,however, they were not so successful in their numerouscampaigns in Khorasan in the 1520s and 1530s. But theUzbek conquest of Maveranahr did lead to a veryimportant change in the region. Most of the Uzbek tribesmoved to the area and through interaction with local set-tled populations began forming a new national identity.

As the Uzbeks were engaged in Khorasan, theKazakhs, their neighbors in the north, were alsoengaged in a protracted series of conflicts againstanother tribal confederation—the Mangits—experienc-ing mixed fortunes.

In the end, the series of wars in the early sixteenthcentury, as well as demographic, economic and culturalchanges in the region, transformed the geopolitical mapof Central Asia. Khorasan eventually came underPersian control, becoming increasingly distinct from therest of Central Asia in religious, cultural and linguisticterms. At the same time, the Central Asian principalitiesgravitated toward a common religious background (theSunni school of Islam), and common legitimacy of theirrulers, who customarily traced their roots to the house ofGenghis Khan. Poets in the settled areas and bards in thetribal zones began systematizing the traditional epics,folklore and other forms of literature in dialects intelligi-ble to large groups of people. This process in turn facili-tated the process of the consolidation of languagesidentified with specific groups, leading to the formationof new ethnic identities.

Map 27: The Rise of the Uzbek Khanate


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TIMURIDS

Otrar

UZBEKS

KAZAKHS

KAZAKHS

OshUzgend

Yarkend

Talas

Uzboy

Ghijduvan

Lake Ysyk Kol

Khiva

Bukhara

Kashgar

Shahrisabz

Herat

Samarqand

Balkh

Nesa

Nishapur

Khojand

Serakh

Tashkent

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Military campaigns of Safavids

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Military campaigns of Uzbeks

CHAGATAYIDS

PERSIANS

1510

Astarabad

KHORASAN

MAVERANAHR

LakeSaryqamysh

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In the early seventeenth century, Central Asia remainedpolitically fragmented while its economy and trade

stagnated. This stagnation contributed to Central Asia’sgrowing isolation from the international economy, aslucrative transit trade from China and India to westernEurope was increasingly channeled toward safer mar-itime routes. Central Asia’s situation contrasted sharplywith the state of development in Europe, where coun-tries were entering an era of rapid economic growth,trade expansion and industrialization. In the area ofwarfare, European advancements in military technologycanceled out the relative advantage traditionally held byCentral Asia’s mobile light and heavy cavalry.

In the early seventeenth century, four major powersplayed important roles in the region: the Bukhara Emirate,the Khwarezm (Khiva) Khanates, Turkoman tribes to the eastof the Caspian Sea, and the Kazakh tribal confederation onthe Eurasian steppe. Gradually these powers developedareas of influence. Though there were still numeroussmall conflicts and wars, none of the main players wasable to establish exclusive dominance in the region. TheCentral Asian states became more focused on domesticand regional affairs; after the 1600s they never againorganized any large campaigns.

By 1610 the rulers of the Bukhara Emirate had estab-lished control of the Maveranahr, Farghona and Balkhareas. They also opted in favor of dual monarchy. ImamQuly Khan (?–1641) ruled the state as supreme khan fromthe capital, Bukhara, while his brother NadhrMohammad Khan (?–1651) ruled from his own capital inBalkh. As in previous eras, the khanate was subdividedinto smaller appendages governed by numerous mem-bers of the ruling royal family. Throughout the 1620s and1630s the Bukharians invaded Khorasan on many occa-sions, but they had little success as the Safavid dynasty ofPersia continued to gain considerable strength. Abd al-Aziz Khan, the ruler of Bukhara between 1651 and 1681,and his successor Subhan Quli Khan, who ruled between1681 and 1702, gave up any ideas of territorial expansion.

In the meantime, the rulers of the Khwarezm (Khiva)Khanate were busy stabilizing their own state. For almosta half century, two members of the ruling Arabshahiddynasty—Isfandiyar (ruled ca. 1623–1643) and Abu’lGhazi Bahadur (ruled 1643–1663)—fought fiercely forthe throne. Beginning in 1645 Abu’l Ghazi, and after himhis son Anush Khan (ruled 1663–1687), attempted toexpand the territories of the khanate to the southwest,colliding with the Turkoman tribes, and to the south,where they encountered the Bukhara khanate. Thesecampaigns did not, however, bring significant gains,merely exhausted the state’s financial and militaryresources, and damaged trade and the economy sobadly that Khwarezm army officers rebelled and killedAnush Khan.

Throughout the seventeenth century, the Kazakhswere also engaged in a series of destructive wars, fight-ing for control of the Central Asian steppe. In the south,the Bukharians contended with the Kazakhs for controlof Tashkent and the surrounding areas. In the east theKazakh position was threatened by the Junghars(Oyrats), who established control over parts of theJetysuu area. In the west, the Kalmyks, a tribal confeder-ation of Mongol origin, consolidated their control overthe middle and lower basin of the Yayik (Zhayya) riverand campaigned ferociously against both the Kazakhsand Khwarezm. In the north, a new player entered thepolitical scene: Muscovite Russia. The Russian rulershad already captured the Siberian Khanate in the latesixteenth century, and in the seventeenth century theyestablished the first peasant and Cossack colonies andfortresses that would form the border between theKazakhs and Russia.

During this period the Turkomans became increas-ingly independent players in the politics of Central Asia(Abazov 2005). Numerous Turkoman tribes werespread between Mangyshlak and the Aral Sea in thenorth and the Kopetdag Mountains in the south, andbetween the Caspian Sea in the west and the AmuDarya River in the east. They formed an amorphoustribal confederation that was never able to consolidateinto a centralized state. Thus different tribes entered theservices of various rulers in Khwarezm, or in Persia, orformed alliances with generals from the settled areas intheir campaigns against competitors. At various timesthe Turkomans even captured some districts and citiesin Khorasan and Khwarezm, but they usually retreatedto their bases.

By and large the situation in the Central Asianregion remained fairly chaotic. The khans wasted sig-nificant resources in numerous wars in their attempts tograb territory from their rivals. They relied more andmore on tribal warlords who were becoming increas-ingly independent and thereby eroding central author-ity. As the rulers neglected the economy, agriculture,industries and trade went into decline. In this environ-ment of economic recession, the warring parties werecompeting for shares of rapidly decreasing economicresources.

Against this background, three great powersemerged on the borders of the Central Asian region andaccelerated their colonial expansions in the eighteenthand nineteenth centuries. In the north, Russia was rap-idly growing into a major international player. In thesouth, the British Empire defeated the Mogul Empire ina series of offensive operations and began its coloniza-tion of the Hindustan peninsula. In the east, the ChineseEmpire wished to secure its western border and to estab-lish control over eastern Turkistan.

Map 28: Bukhara and the Khwarezm Khanates. The Kazakhs and Turkomans


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Mangysh la

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Pen in

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Ka lmyks

Kazakhs

Khiva

Bukhara

Kashgar

Shahrisabz

Herat

Pers ians

Turkomans

KHWAREZM

Samarqand

Balkh

Nesa

Nishapur

Khojand

Serakh

Tashkent

Aqsu

Qarshi

Bukhara Emi ra te

Talas

Uzboy

Lake Ysyk Kol

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Zeravshan

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AmuD

aryaSar

ysu

Nura

Junghars

(Oyra ts )

Kyrgyzs

Merv

Osh

Khiva

Khanate

Astarabad

KHORASAN

MAVERANAHR

Uzgend

Yarkend

Urgench

Termez

LakeSaryqamysh

Kopetdag M

ts

Early Seventeenth Century

Territory controlled by Uzbeks (Bukhara Emirate)

Khiva Khanate


Otrar


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V

The Era of Colonialism and Nation-State Building


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The eighteenth-century world underwent vastchanges due to the impact of industrialization, a rise

in trade and rivalry among the major powers. Largefactories and plants in the industrial countries beganproducing a wide range of products at increasinglycompetitive prices. Many goods that had traditionallybeen imported to Europe, such as textiles, began to bemachine-produced in Europe, thus undermining small-scale manufacturing in Asia and the Middle East. Manyformerly prosperous manufacturing centers across theChinese, Mogul, Persian and Ottoman empires experi-enced a deep economic recession. This in turn led toincreasing poverty in many of those places.

Although lucrative international trade had long con-nected many parts of the globe, developed nations’ gov-ernments now became actively involved in promotingtrade, via both peaceful means and force. The BritishEmpire had great financial success trading with Chinaand India, flooding the local markets with cheap indus-trial products. The development of marine routessteadily reduced the cost of moving goods long dis-tances, making many old land-based trade routes on theEurasian continent obsolete. Even the largest caravan,fully laden, could not compete in speed, volume or cost-efficiency with a single cargo ship. As a result of thesechanges, international trade shifted from land routes tomarine routes.

The rise of international trade led to rising competi-tion among the major world powers for the new markets.

By the eighteenth century Great Britain had becomethe leading naval power in the world, capable of send-ing powerful fleets to major seaports anywhere onEarth. Attracted by the riches of the Hindustan penin-sula, the size of the market and the weakness of the localrulers, the British began penetrating India in the earlyseventeenth century and by 1650 had established aboutthirty trading posts there. Between 1775 and 1849 Britishforces essentially completed the colonization of theIndian subcontinent, extending their influence to thenorth, closer to Central Asia.

Early in the eighteenth century Muscovite Russiaemerged from the political chaos and feudal wars of thesixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a powerful cen-tralized state. The Russians cemented their position tothe north and west of Central Asia by conquering theKazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556) khanates on theVolga River. Some decades later they established a newline of city-fortresses: Uralsk (1620) and Guriev (1645),effectively controlling the Ural (Zhayya) River. Peter theGreat (ruled 1682–1725) vigorously promoted interna-tional trade and industrialization. Tsar Peter and his suc-cessors significantly expanded the Russian Empire tothe east and south, driven by the desire to secure thestate’s southern and southeastern borders, to gain new

land for distribution among the nobility and to accessnew markets. In this environment the Russians madesteady progress toward Central Asia from the north.

The Chinese Empire under the Qing Dynasty(1644–1912) also emerged as a formidable power in itsown right. The Chinese “march to the west,” as somescholars put it (Perdue 2005), was primarily driven bytheir need to secure both their northern and westernborders from destructive nomadic raids. By the mid-eighteenth century China had established controlover vast areas of eastern Turkistan. This actionbrought the Chinese close to the Central Asian fron-tiers in the east.

Central Asian relations with the Persian (Iranian)Empire were also uneasy. As the Persian rulers, whoactively promoted the Shi’a school of Islam at theexpense of the Sunni school, consolidated significantpower in their hands and overcame their domestic polit-ical crises, they began projects of territorial expansioninto areas in Khorasan and present-day Afghanistan,traditionally contested by their Central Asian competi-tors. The Persian rulers, especially Nadir Shah Afshar(ruled 1732–1747), sponsored an aggressive expansionistpolicy in the southern parts of Central Asia.

Against this background, the Central Asian statesexperienced economic and political turmoil, and at cer-tain stages in the eighteenth century they were veryclose to total political collapse. Numerous tribal leaders,generals and royal clans engaged in endless conflictswith each other. The situation was further complicatedby conflicts among five large tribal groups—theKazakhs, the Kyrgyzs, Uzbeks, Turkomans andJunghars. Political stagnation led to economic collapseon an almost unprecedented scale, probably comparableonly with the era of Mongol invasion. For example,some historical chronicles report that the largest city ofthe region, Samarqand, was partially abandoned by itsinhabitants in the eighteenth century.

This desperate situation led to significant changes inCentral Asian international relations and diplomacy.Some of the region’s rulers and tribal leaders began con-sidering a measure unthinkable in previous eras: turn-ing to the external non-Muslim great powers forprotection. By the end of the eighteenth century therewere numerous recorded diplomatic missions to theRussian and Chinese empires, in which the CentralAsian rulers asked for help with promises of politicalsubmission and dependency status. In the eyes ofthose rulers, most of these acts of supplication carriedlittle weight; they in fact sought no more than militarysupport against competing groups or dynasties andplanned to throw away the treaties on their day of vic-tory. But those treaties were emblematic of a new era inCentral Asian history—the era of colonization.

Map 29: Central Asia and the Major Colonial Powers in the Eighteenth Century


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Kazakhs

Uzbeks

EMIRATE

TalasKHIVA

KHANATE

Khiva

BukharaKashgar

Shahrisabz

HeratPERSIA

Turkomans

KHWAREZM

Merv

Samarqand

BalkhNishapur

Khojand

Serakh

Tashkent

Aqsu

Qarshi

BUKHARA

RUSSIA

Area o f Br i t i sh s t ra teg ic

in te res ts

SaratovSamara

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CHINA

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Eighteenth-Century Central Asia


Russian Empire

Bukhara Emirate

Khiva Khanate

China

Turkomans

Persia

Kalmyks


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By the eighteenth century the Central Asian Steppewas mostly controlled by Kazakh tribes. The

Kazakhs were divided into three competing hordes(confederations). The Great Horde (Ulu Zhuz in Kazakh)controlled most of the Jetysuu Valley and fiercely com-peted for control of such cities as Tashkent, Chimkentand Turkistan (Olcott 1995). The Middle Horde (OrtoZhuz in Kazakh) controlled the area to the west of theGreat Horde from the lower basin of the Syr Darya Riverand the northern shores of the Aral Sea to the upperbasins of the Tobol, Ishym and Irtysh rivers. The LittleHorde (Kichi Zhuz in Kazakh) controlled the area westfrom the Aral Sea, all the way to the middle and lowerbasin of the Ural River.

Though the Kazakhs were a formidable militarypower, their dominance was undermined by several fac-tors. The settled centers in the north and south acquirednew military technology in the form of muskets and can-nons, thus canceling out the natural advantage of thepastoral nomads’ mobile cavalry forces. The nomadsoccasionally acquired muskets too; but having no largesettled urban centers or technology, they were unable toreproduce either firearms or gunpowder.

This developmental imbalance had very importantconsequences. The nomadic khanates lost their militarysuperiority over the armies of the settled centers.Hence they lost an important source of revenue andmaterial supplies in the form of the tributes, reparationsand military resupply that they had extracted fromtheir settled neighbors for centuries. The neighboringstates also began to acquire territories controlled by thenomadic khanates and to redistribute them amongtheir growing peasant populations. With the loss oftheir military might, the nomadic khanates graduallyfound themselves saddled with unequal trading termswith their major trading partners—who required themto pay ever-higher prices for various manufacturedgoods, food and military supplies—while faced withdeclining demand for their single major export item,horses. Some pastoral nomads began facing environ-mental problems, too, including pasture overgrazingand desertification and decline in the available pasturedue to increasing acquisition of the land by settlers.Studies further suggest that the pastoral nomads alsofaced serious health problems in the form of epidemics.The diseases in question may have included the BlackDeath, which supposedly came from Central Asia,India or China, and reached Italy between 1629 and1631 (the Italian Plague) and Vienna in 1679 (the GreatPlague of Vienna). In addition, numerous travelersfrom the east and the west brought with them new dis-eases that had in the past been little known among theregion’s native populations.

Against this backdrop of turmoil, the JungharKhanate (a tribal confederation of Mongolian origin)

launched a series of raids against the Kazakh tribes ofthe Great Horde. The Junghars had emerged on thenortheastern outskirts of Turkistan and had begunmoving into Central Asia in the late seventeenth cen-tury. They defeated the Kazakhs in a series of bloodybattles in 1724 and 1725. In keeping with the era’s tradi-tions of tribal war, thousands of men were killed, andthe children and women were taken as hostages orenslaved. It was claimed that between 60,000 and200,000 Kazakhs perished in these conflicts. In 1728 and1729 all the Kazakh Hordes united and crushed theJunghar army; yet the war dragged on for three moredecades. Junghar expansion was stopped only in themid-eighteenth century, with their loss to the Chinesearmy between 1756 and 1758. This defeat cost theJunghars dearly. Between 50 and 70 percent of theirpopulation perished during the war and the postwarfamine, and the Chinese gained control over easternTurkistan.

Though the Kazakhs proved victorious in the end,they entered the second half of the eighteenth centurysignificantly weakened both militarily and politically,unable to unite their military forces or coordinate theirdomestic and foreign policies.

In this environment, imperial Russia emerged asone of the most prominent players in the region. Afterpacifying rebellions in 1676 and 1707 by the Bashkirs(a pastoral nomadic tribal group of the Ural regionthat had “voluntarily” joined Russia in 1557), theRussians strengthened their position between theupper basins of the Ural and Kama rivers and begansystematically populating that area with Russian peas-ants and Cossacks. The Russian government used thesame formula in the areas populated by the Kazakhs:they accepted “voluntary” submission of varioustribes into Russian protection, established new mili-tary strongholds and began distributing land amongpeasant families and Cossacks. Very soon Russiaestablished a new line of fortified cities: Omsk (1716),Semipalatinsk (1718), Ust-Kamenogorsk (1720),Koriakovski (later Pavlodar) (1720), Orenburg (1743)and Petropavlovsk (1752).

Noting the moves by the Junghars and the Russians,Ablai Khan (1711–1781), a talented Kazakh leader,attempted to bring together all the Kazakh clans. Afterhis death, however, Kazakh unity quickly deterioratedand a series of conflicts followed. Observing the politicalturmoil in the region, Russia decided to assert its controldirectly over the Kazakh tribal confederation. TheRussian administration abolished the office of khan inthe Middle Horde in 1822 and in the Little Horde in1824. A small group of the Kazakh tribes were allowed toretain semi-independent and self-governing statusunder the name of Bukei Horde in 1801, but it too wasabolished in 1845.

Map 30: Russian Colonization of the Kazakh Steppe


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BukharaKashgar

Shahrisabz

Herat

PERSIA

Turkomans

KHWAREZM

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BalkhNishapur

Khojand

Serakh

Tashkent

Aqsu

Qarshi

BUKHARA

RUSSIA

Area of British strategic

interests

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Kyrgyzs

CHINA

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Ertis (Irtysh)

Esi

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)

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Lake Ysyk Kol

Talas

Astarabad

KHORASAN

MAVERANAHRYarkend

OshUzgendUrgench

Guriev

Orenburg

Orsk

Omsk

Semipalatinsk

Petropavlovsk

Koriakovski(Pavlodar)

Eighteenth-Century Colonization of Kazakh Steppe

Military expeditions of Junghars

KHIVAKHANATE

Turkistan


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Numerous internecine conflicts devastated theeconomies of the Central Asian tribal confederation

and of the Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand khanates. In thisenvironment many tribal leaders turned to outsidepowers for support. In the eighteenth century severalKazakh and Turkoman clans negotiated trade and polit-ical treaties with the Russian Empire. In the meantime,some Kyrgyz tribes sent a number of delegations to theBritish, Chinese and Russian emperors asking for theirhelp or protection. Yet, the Russian and British wereinitially slow to move into the region.

The situation changed, however, by the mid-nineteenth century. St. Petersburg became increasinglyinterested in reaching the Central Asian market withtheir goods, securing land trade routes to Persia andIndia and halting the British advance toward CentralAsia. This British-Russian race for influence in CentralAsia became known as the Great Game (Hopkirk 1992).British strategists argued that the Russians mightadvance to Afghanistan and Persia, thereby threateningBritish trade and economic interests in the Middle Eastand in the Indian colonies. Russian strategists in turnsaw great economic and military benefits in advancinginto Central Asia and protecting Russia’s southernflanks from hostile British moves in case Russian-British relations turned sour. The first actions in theCentral Asian region were, however, unsuccessful forboth Russia and Britain. In 1840 the Russians tried tomarch from Orenburg to Khiva and lost nearly half theirexpeditionary army to severe blizzards and abnormallycold winter weather. In 1842 the British lost their entireKabul garrison who were slaughtered on the outskirtsof the city.

Yet, the Russians decided to continue their push intothe region. In preparation for this further expansion, theybuilt a new line of fortresses, establishing Akmolinsk,Kokchetav and Karkaralinsk in 1824, and Aralsk,Kazalinsk and Vernyi between 1847 and 1854.

After Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War (1853–1856),Tsar Alexander II (ruled 1855–1881) decided to boostmorale among the general population by waging a “just”war in Central Asia. To do this, the Russian ministersstarted a propaganda campaign, emphasizing the needto save Russian subjects from the horrible fate of beingsold in large numbers as slaves in the bazaars of CentralAsia. In the early nineteenth century, a rumor was spreadthat between 8,000 and 60,000 slaves of Russian originwere to be found in Central Asia. Relying on massivepublic support, the Russian Empire made a series ofdecisive moves into Transoxiana between the mid-1850sand mid-1870s.

Kyrgyz tribes. Between 1855 and 1864 the Kyrgyztribes in the Lake Ysyk Kol valley, Chatkal River basinand some other areas negotiated a special treaty with the

Russian authorities to bring them under Russian protec-tion, a step directly counter to the interests of theKokand Khanate. This action helped Russia establishcontrol over significant parts of the eastern areas ofCentral Asia and check any further Chinese move intothe region.

Kokand Khanate. Kokand collided with the impe-rial Russian authorities in the early 1860s. The khan ofKokand was angered by the fact that the Kyrgyzs tribesof the Chui and Ysyk Kol valleys, whom Kokand hadsubjugated decades earlier, had become subjects of theRussian Empire. Kokand’s ruler, Khudoyar Khan,overestimated his military potential and waged a futilewar against Russian troops. A small expeditionaryRussian army led by Generals Cherniaev, Konstantinvon Kaufman and Mikhail Skobelev conquered thecities of Ak-Masjid, Turkistan and Chimkent in 1864,Tashkent in 1865, and Khojand in 1866. The khan ofKokand, having experienced defeat after defeat andmass desertions by his troops, signed a peace treatyin 1869.

Bukhara Emirate. The Emir of Bukhara, MuzzafarKhan, was alarmed by the Russian actions against theKokand Khanate. He demanded the return of the city ofTashkent to Bukharan authorities and mobilized histroops. In response, the Russian expeditionary armyattacked the Bukharan cities of Jizak and Ura Tube in1866 and of Samarqand in 1868. The Bukharan army,untrained and equipped with outdated cannons andmuskets, was defeated. Another Bukharan army, led byMuzzafar Khan himself, lost another battle before thecity of Katta Qurgan. Muzzafar Khan signed a peacetreaty with the Russian authorities that legitimized theRussian annexation of the territories of the Kokand andbrought the Bukhara Khanate under the indirect controlof the Russian Empire.

Khiva Khanate. The Khiva Khanate witnessed thefate of the other khanates and did not present any signif-icant resistance. In 1869 Russian troops landed on theeastern shore of the Caspian Sea and organized severalexpeditions deep into the Karakum Desert, threateningthe westem frontier of the khanate. In 1873 they marchedsimultaneously from Orenburg and Tashkent and aftershort skirmishes captured the city of Khiva. In 1873Khiva’s ruler, Muhammad Rahim Khan, signed a capitu-lation and peace treaty.

Turkoman tribes. The independent-minded Turkomantribes resisted and even had some success against Russianregiments below the Geok Tepe fortress in 1879, but theRussian expeditionary army defeated the Turkoman armyat the Geok Tepe fortress in 1881. Peaceful treaties betweenthe Russians and Turkomans followed, and the territorycontrolled by the various Turkoman tribes came underRussian control.

Map 31: Russian Colonization of Central Asia


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-Kazakhs

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Karakum Desert

Chatkal

KattaQurgan

Khanate

BukharaEmi ra te

Khiva

BukharaKashgar

Krasnovodsk

Herat

PERSIA

Turkomans

Merv

Samarqand

Geok Tepe

Nishapur

Khojand

Serakh

Tashkent

Aqsu

Qarshi

RUSSIA

Area of Br i t ish strategic

interests

Kokand

Kokchetav

Akmolinsk

Vernyi

Karkaralinsk

Aralsk

Kazalinsk

Ufa

Astrakhan Guriev

SemipalatinskUst-Kamenogorsk

Namangan

Kokand FarghonaOsh

Andijan Uzgend

Yarkend

Tobolsk

Perovsk

Turkistan

Chimkent

Pishpek

Shahrisabz

Uralsk

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Ufa

Volga

Zhay

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Toxkan

Hotan

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Zeravshan

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Sarysu

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CH

INA

Bashk i rs

Orenburg

Orsk

Tsaritsyn

Termez

Khiva Khanate

Astarabad

Kazan

Samara

Urgench

Russian Colonization

in the Nineteenth Century

Russian Empire

Kokand Khanate

Bukhara Emirate

Khiva Khanate

Turkomans

Territory controlled by Kazakhs

Russian military expeditions

Area of British strategic interests


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The Russian government faced numerous challengesin Central Asia. In the first place, there was no effec-

tive administrative or taxation system in the region. TheCentral Asian rulers did not consider the Russian moveinto the region an ultimate defeat, and they exploredvarious opportunities for gaining greater autonomy,including support from the British, Chinese, Turkish andPersian empires. Second, the local population waslargely hostile to the newcomers, and tribal and reli-gious leaders constantly stirred anti-Russian attitudesamong the ordinary people. Third, the absence of lawand order in the region for nearly a century underminedeconomic and trade opportunities. Fourth, St. Petersburghad a very small army spread over a vast area and wasunable to provide security.

The main task of the Russian colonial authorities,therefore, was the establishment of an effective admin-istrative system. Itself a very poor country, Russiaoperated its empire under serious budgetary con-straints. Hence the imperial cabinet opted to establish aflexible administrative system, leaving local gover-nance in the hands of the local authorities and retainingcontrol over major political and economic issues only.Local judges continued practicing Shariah (Islamiclaw), though slavery was abolished. The ranks of theCentral Asian administration were often filled byRussian officers. Traditionally, the highest positions inthe region were given to military officials, oftenRussian generals in the imperial service. All adminis-trative positions at the provincial and district levels tra-ditionally went to civil servants of Russian, German orPolish origin. The whole region was initially dividedinto several sections, and the city of Tashkent wasselected as the regional administrative seat.

Turkistan Governor-Generalship. The TurkistanGovernor-Generalship was established in 1867. Itincluded most of the territory that is now Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (excluding the territories ofthe Bukhara Emirate and Khiva Khanate). The firstgovernor-general, General Konstantin von Kaufman,supervised the acquisition of new lands, the abolish-ment of the Kokand Khanate and the administrativedelimitation of Turkistan into oblasts (provinces).

Kokand Khanate. According to the peace treaty theKokand Khanate retained its semi-independent statusand control over areas of the fertile Farghona Valley.However, numerous riots that were often of an anti-Russian character, and the inability of the last khan ofKokand to stabilize the khanate and establish aneffective administration, led to the abolishment of thekhanate on 19 February 1876. Its territory was dividedbetween several oblasts of the Turkistan Governor-Generalship.

Bukhara Emirate. The emirate signed a special peacetreaty in 1868, maintaining autonomy in internal affairs

but surrendering its foreign policy. The Russian Empireprovided a special stipend to the emir of Bukhara, andstationed special political advisers to the ruler and hiscabinet. The emir granted special privileges to Russianmerchants, and Russian officers traveling throughBukhara enjoyed a certain level of immunity; however,the general population was subject to Bukharan, notRussian, law.

Khiva Khanate. The khanate became a protectorateof the Russian Empire in 1873, and like Bukhara, and itpreserved internal affairs autonomy while giving upcontrol of its foreign policy. Its khan also received a spe-cial stipend from the Russian government and main-tained relations with the Russian authorities throughspecially assigned military officers in Tashkent. The gen-eral population was subject to Khivan law, and Russiadid not intervene in internal power struggles.

One of the most important achievements of theRussian administration was the construction of amodern communication system in the region. In theearly 1800s trading caravans could travel for weeksfighting off marauders and warlords just to reach thebazaars in neighboring cities. This situation radicallychanged with the completion of the Trans-Caspianrailway in 1888 and the Orenburg-Tashkent line in1905 (see map 33). The railways made trade betweenRussia and Central Asia easier and faster. Steel, glass-ware and other industrial goods, as well as grain,were brought to the local markets in exchange forprimary products such as cotton, wool, leather andsilk. Hundreds of small workshops and plants toprocess various products for export to Russia wereopened in major towns and cities all over the region.New technologies in land cultivation and a betterstandard of agricultural equipment led to significantincreases in productivity. New commercial crops wereintroduced to local farmers, and many people gradu-ally began to cultivate tobacco and cotton. By 1917 anumber of small mines (lead, copper, coal principally)would open.

Such economic and social transformations con-tributed to changes in relations between the Russiancolonial administration and local authorities. As morelocals acquired a Russian education and languageskills, they were recruited into the administrativestructure and army. The new economic realities alsobegan to erode tribal and regional isolation, and toaffect the nucleus of traditional Central Asian society—the extended family—as people began to engagein various economic and political activities outsidetheir families and tribes. New types of relations alsoundermined traditional values and identities amongnative people, who began exploring their place in thechanging world, their relationship with the RussianEmpire and the outside world.

Map 32: Early Administrative Division of Central Asia


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Kazakhs

Uralsk

Khiva

KashgarKKK

Herat

PERSIA

Turkomans

Khiva

Geok-Tepe

aSamarqandam da rq d

NishapurSerakh

Tashkent

AqsuAqA

QarshiBukhara

Emi ra te

RUSSIA

Area of Br i t ish inf luence

Kokand

Khanate (abo l ished

in 1876)

a lsh ipaa lsh ipa h ia lsh ipl inor -Genor -GGenr e aaneraaneraaeTurk isTurk isT k s tan Govestann Govea G vernoernoor

GurievAstrakhan

Tsaritsyn

Samara

Kazan

Ufa

Tobolsk

Orenburg

Orsk

Aralsk

Kazalinsk

Perovskk

Chimkent

Kokand

Pishpek

Vernyi

Semipalatinsk Ust-KamenogorskAkmolinsk

Kokchetav

Omsk

Karkaralinsk

hUrgenchUrgenchhh

Lake Ysyk Kol

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yr Darya

SSSyr Darya

Khoper

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Yark

ant

ToTTxxxkkak

n

Hotan

E

Terek

Murgab

EsilErtis

Zera

vshan

Ural

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DDaarryyrrrr aaaa

Sarysu

Nura

Kyrgyzs

CHINA

Bashk i rs

CCCChhhhCCCCCC aattkktttt aakkkk ll

TalasTalaasTalaslaaTalaTala

Astarabad

Merv

Krasnovodsk

Turkestan Governor-Generalship

Kokand Khanate

Bukhara Emirate

Khiva Khanate

Mid-Nineteenth-Century Russian

Administrative Division

Territory controlled by Kazakhs

Area of British influence

Turkomans

ndarqanddrq dmarqandmarqandKaKaKK

Uooxxxkk

AqAqA

Aral

Sea


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The Russian government used economic, social, politicaland even demographic tools to integrate Central

Asia into the empire, treating the region as an integralpart of the empire. This approach contrasted sharplywith that of the British Empire, for instance, whichassumed and imposed a separation between the imperialcenter and its overseas dominions and territories.

Between the 1890s and 1910s, St. Petersburglaunched a second round of administrative reforms. Thegovernment came up with two special regulations—theStatute for the Administration of the Turkistan Region(1886) and the Statute for the Administration ofAkmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Semirechye, Ural and Turgaioblasts (1891). The administrative structure in CentralAsia replicated those in other parts of the empire andwas organized at four levels: region (gubernya), province(oblast), district (uezd) and subdistrict (volost). Theterritory of Central Asia was divided between twogubernyas (as of 1914): Turkistan and Steppe (Stepnoi).The Turkistan gubernya was in turn divided into fiveoblasts with provincial capitals: Ferghana (capital,Skobelev), Samarqand (Samarqand), Semirechye (Vernyi),Syr Darya (Tashkent) and Zakaspian (Askhabad). TheSteppe gubernya was divided into two oblasts:Akmolinsk (Omsk) and Semipalatinsk (Semipalatinsk).The Ural (Uralsk) and Turgai (Kustanai) oblasts becameseparate administrative entities. This administrativedivision reinforced the division of Central Asia into twoparts—Central Asia proper and the Kazakh steppe(Demko 1969).

To support the regular army and police, the Russiangovernment also established paramilitary Cossackadministrative entities called Cossack regiments (Kazachievoisko). There were four such entities in Central Asia:Orenburg (established in 1748 with its center in the city ofOrenburg), Uralsk (1775, center in Uralsk), Sibir (1808,center in Omsk) and Semirechye (1867, center in Vernyi).

Local administration at volost, town and village levelswas traditionally in the hands of local native leaders.Initially they received their appointments more or lessautomatically and their tenure was almost indefinite. Inthe early twentieth century the Russian authoritiesimposed a requirement that local salaried leaders shouldreceive some level of training and education, and shouldbe elected on a competitive basis.

With the growth of the administrative apparatus,several provincial capitals became dominant in theregion. The largest was the city of Tashkent, whichbecame the most important financial, political and mili-tary center in Central Asia. The position of the city wasstrengthened after the completion of the railroad systemconnecting Tashkent with European Russia (Tashkent-Turkistan-Perovsk [Kyzyl Orda]-Kazalinsk-Aktubinsk-Orenburg-Samara) and with other parts of Central Asia(Tashkent-Samarqand-Qarshi-Merv-Askhabad-Kyzyl

Arvat-Krasnovodsk). Various other administrativecenters such as Vernyi, Skobelev, Samarqand, andSemipalatinsk also grew rapidly throughout the colonialera, doubling their populations every 15 to 20 years.Tashkent undeniably thrived, its population growingfrom about 120,000 in 1877 to 156,000 in 1897 and to271,000 in 1914; Vernyi (Almaty) leapt from 12,000 in1877 to 23,000 in 1897 and to 43,000 in 1914; likewise,Samarqand went from 30,000 in 1877 to 55,000 in 1897and to 98,000 in 1914. These administrative centersbecame magnets for large-scale immigration by bothSlavic and non-Slavic peoples.

The rapid development of trade, industries and themonetization of economic dealings brought significantchanges to the Central Asian societies. The new eco-nomic realities began to erode tribal and regional isola-tion and traditional values among the people. Familiesin increasing numbers abandoned subsistence agricul-ture and husbandry and switched to commercial cropcultivation. Local landlords—manaps, beks and biis—grew wealthier, while many other social categories losttheir traditional tribal and communal support. Some ofthe poorest members of society left agriculture alto-gether in search of new sources of income in large urbancenters.

Despite all the social and economic changes, however,Turkistan remained one of the most underdeveloped andeconomically backward parts of the Russian Empire, pre-serving many of its most anachronistic features andproving unable to adapt itself fully to the changes in theenvironment. The imperial background to Turkistan’sdevelopment was hardly inspiring: the early twentieth-century Russian Empire itself remained one of the mostunderdeveloped empires in the world. The inflexibility,corruption and incompetence of the Russian governmentand administration in the provinces stirred grievancesamong social classes across the empire. The first alarmssounded between 1905 and 1907, when various politicalgroups and parties, including the Bolsheviks, organizedmass riots.

The Russian tsar responded to these signs of rebel-lion by introducing the first Russian constitution (the“Fundamental Laws”) in April 1906, and the firstRussian parliament (the Duma). The Russian constitu-tion stipulated that all citizens of the empire were eli-gible for representation in the Duma—a contrast withthe practice of the British Empire, whose colonial citi-zens had no capacity to elect representatives in theBritish parliament. Yet, the Russian legal system intro-duced a very complex arrangement of representationand elections, dividing the Russian electorate into anumber of categories. The Central Asian population(excluding the Khiva and Bukhara khanates) receivedthe right to elect their own representatives to theDuma.

Map 33: Administrative and Political Changes in the Early Twentieth Century


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Bukhara

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Namangan

IRAN

Zakasp ian ob las t

Kh iva

Khanate

Merv

Kokand

AFGHANISTAN

SamarqandKhojand

Aqsu

QarshiBukhara Emi ra te

RUSSIA

Syr Darya ob las t

Omsk

Tobolsk

Ufa

Kazan

Samara

Orsk

Orenburg

Tsaritsyn

Astrakhan Guriev

Kazalinsk

Perovsk(Ky(Kyzyl Orda)z dOO )yl

Krasnovodsk

Chimkent

Tashkent

Pishpek

Vernyi

Skobelev(Farghona)

Turkistan

Aktubinsk

Askhabad

Kyzyl Arvat

Uralsk

Kustanai

Ferg

hana

obla

st

Turga i ob las t

Ura l ob las t

Akmol insk ob las t

Semipa la t insk

ob las t

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SSSSSSyyySrrr DDDaaaaaarrrrrryyyrrr aaa

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AAAmmmuuu DDDaaaryyyrrr aaaa

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Kokchetav

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Ust-Kamenogorsk

Karkaralinsk

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Early Twentieth-CenturyAdministrative Changes, 1900–1917

Railways


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Relations between the newcomers and the nativeCentral Asian populations were not always smooth,

as the economic changes disrupted traditional ways oflife and led to increasing social polarization. Local com-munities blamed the Russians for their growing poverty,loss of land, various social ills and the exploitationof native workers. Anger mounted about the rampantcorruption among local administrators. The economicrecession of 1900–1903 and Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese war in 1904 led to economic difficultiesthroughout the empire. Many social groups, especiallythe workers, were dissatisfied with deteriorating livingstandards and corruption and mistreatment in theirworkplaces. Various revolutionary groups attempted tochannel sporadic strikes and uprisings into an organizedrevolutionary movement. Between 1905 and 1907 theworkers, led by those political groups, organized a num-ber of mass strikes in major cities in Central Asia.Importantly, the newly born Turkistan intelligentsiagradually joined this revolutionary movement. Thetsarist administration managed to suppress the firstwave of revolutionary uprisings of 1905 through 1907but was unable to eliminate the revolutionary groups.

A new wave of social disturbances occurred between1914 and 1916, as Russia’s involvement in World War Ibrought in a new economic depression, high inflationand the burden of new war taxes. This growing dissatis-faction finally gave way to open rebellion in mid-1916,triggered by the tsar’s decree to mobilize about 250,000Turkistanis to carry out war-related duties. Russia’s waragainst Germany was unpopular with the Turkistanis,particularly because it was also a war against Germany’sally Turkey. The Central Asians had a long tradition ofclose relations with Ottoman Turkey, which was histori-cally and linguistically linked to the Turkic people andhad enormous influence as the guardian of holy Islamicplaces. The 1916 uprising became the most extensiveanticolonial unrest in Central Asia, affecting the Turgai,Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Semirechye, Samarqand,Ferghana and the Zakaspian oblasts. The rebelsdestroyed administrative centers and police barracks,and killed representatives of the local administrationand police. It took nearly six months, until late in 1916,for the imperial administration to crush the uprising.The suppression was brutal, involving police, regulararmy troops and Cossack regiments. Thousands ofpeople were arrested, beaten up or forced from theirland and homes. Despite this, some communities andorganized revolutionary groups continued their activi-ties well into 1917.

The February Revolution of 1917, resulting in theabdication of Tsar Nicolas II and the establishment of theRussian Republic, did not bring stability, order or anyimprovement in people’s everyday life. The newlyestablished Provisional Republican Government was

busy preparing for legitimate elections; it did not endRussia’s involvement in the war against Germany, and itconducted only very limited political reforms.

Against this background the Bolsheviks rose toprominence on a promise to end the war and bring radi-cal political and economic changes and justice, includingreforms of the Russian colonial administration. InOctober of 1917 they seized power in the Russian capi-tal, St. Petersburg, abolished the provisional govern-ment and declared themselves the only legitimatepower in the country.

The Bolsheviks faced opposition from manypolitical groups, the Russian colonial administrationand supporters of the provisional government. Inaddition, the monarchists, who supported the returnof Nicolas II to power and the restoration of themonarchy, were prepared to fight the supporters ofboth the Provisional Republican Government and theBolsheviks.

In Central Asia the city of Tashkent became a majorbattleground for various political forces. After the tsar’sabdication, the Provisional Republican Governmentestablished its authority in the region in April 1917through a Turkistan Executive Committee. In the sum-mer and fall the Bolsheviks and their supporters swiftlymoved to organize elections for the workers’ and sol-diers’ councils (soviets) in all major urban centers of theregion, with the Tashkent Council acting as CentralCouncil, thereby creating a central Bolshevik authorityin the region. However, in most of the small towns andcities on the Kazakh steppe, especially in the areasdominated by the Cossacks, the pro-monarchist forcesremained the major power.

Most of the Central Asian elite developed stronghostility toward the “godless” Bolsheviks, but somegroups of native intellectuals supported them. Therevolutionary groups in the major urban areas organ-ized their followers with great energy, taking over theold administrative structures. Ordinary people, bothlocals and new settlers, initially remained politicallyinert, although they were inclined to support theirtribal and community leaders. Yet, the revolutiondeeply polarized the Turkistani population andquickly escalated into civil war and political anarchy.A rifle and revolver became the frequently usedmethod of resolving disagreements, and variouspolitical groups began fighting each other and brutal-izing civilians in a merciless war.

The revolution also gave great impetus to rising anti-colonial, pro-independence sentiment and nationalismin the region. Local intellectuals became heavilyinvolved in region-wide debates about the future ofTurkistan and Turkistan society, learning about variousideas, from the nationalism in the Kazakh land to pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism.

Map 34: The Bolshevik Revolution


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PERSIA

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Merv

Kokand

AFGHANISTAN

Khanate

Samarqand Khojand

Aqsu

Qarshi Bukhara Emi ra te

RUSSIA

Syr Darya ob las t

Tobolsk

Ufa

Kazan

Samara

OrskOrenburg

Tsaritsyn

Guriev

Kazalinsk

Perovsk(Kyzyl Orda)

Krasnovodsk

Chimkent

Tashkent

Pishpek

VernyiTurkistan

Aktubinsk

AskhabadKyzyl Arvat

Uralsk

Kustanai

Turga i ob las t

Ura l ob las t

Akmol insk ob las t

Semipa la t insk

ob las t

Semi rechyeob las t

Astrakhan

50 60 70

80 60 50

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300200

400 600 800 km

500 mi400

Lake Balqash

Aral

Sea

Casp ianSea

KaraBogazGol

Lake Ysyk Kol

Tura

Esi

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Tobo

l

Chu

Ili

Tarim

Ufa

Volga

Zhay

ya

Oka

Irgiz

Turg

ay

Atrak

Khoper

Sura

Volga

Vyatka

Yark

ant

Toxkan

Hotan

E

Terek

Murgab

EsilErtis

Zera

vshan

Ural

AmuD

arya

Sarysu

Nura

CHINA

Syr DaryaSyr Darya

Astarabad

Kokchetav

Akmolinsk SemipalatinskUst-Kamenogorsk

Karkaralinsk

Herat

Urgench

Tehran

Major uprising against tsarist government (1905–1907)

Areas of uprising against tsarist government (1916)

Areas of major uprisings (1916)

Political Development and Bolshevik RevolutionBorder of Central Asian regionRailways

Samarqand ob las t

Ferghana ob las t

Provincial borders


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The political chaos of the two revolutions of 1917 hadespecially negative effects on the administrative sys-

tems in Central Asia. Widely disparate political groupsacross the whole region, including the emerging nation-alist intelligentsia in Central Asia, competed for powerin the postimperial era. In this environment of uncer-tainty, multiple centers of power emerged that oftenrelied on local warlords. The warlords often exploitedintertribal grievances, espoused populist policies andwere responsible for atrocities against ethnic and reli-gious minorities that ignited the first flames of the dis-astrous civil war. Many peripheral districts and townsbecame semi-independent quasi fiefdoms for localrulers, adventurers and even criminals.

The political forces were many and diverse, includ-ing supporters of the provisional government, monar-chists and local Islamic, nationalist and tribal leaders. Asnone of the rival groups or parties had the sufficientstrength or influence to gain the upper hand over thevast Central Asian region, a number of groups tried toestablish their own governance systems. By late 1917and early 1918, multiple centers of political power hademerged in Central Asia, and several different govern-ments were operating simultaneously. However, they allstopped short of declaring their independence fromRussia, unlike Finland, the Baltic states and Azerbaijan.Four of these governments became particularly promi-nent and left a significant mark on the political develop-ment of the region: the nationalist Alash Orda in Kazakhareas; the “autonomous” government in Kokand; theTrans-Caspian government in Askhabad; and the Sovietgovernment in Tashkent.

The Alash Orda government emerged in December1917 on the Central Asian steppe and established its“autonomy,” with its center at the city of Orenburg.This organization was led by a group of nationalisti-cally inspired Kazakh intelligentsia who won fairlywide support among Kazakhs for their attempts to cre-ate a fair and comprehensive system of native represen-tation and establish law and order. It is not clear, and isto this day the subject of academic debate, whether theAlash Orda effectively administered the Kazakh areasand whether it enjoyed the support of the Kazakh pop-ulation overall, but its autonomy survived for nearlytwo years until it was crushed in November 1919.

The Kokand Autonomous Government emerged inNovember 1917 as representatives of the native populationand Islamic groups gathered in Kokand to establishautonomy. Numerous negotiations on power sharingwith the Bolsheviks, monarchists and other groups tookplace in late 1917 and early 1918, but all failed. This gov-ernment also failed to establish effective administrativeinstitutions or an army. Despite this ineffectuality, the

Soviet authorities in Tashkent perceived the Kokandregime as a threat. The Red Army moved to Kokandand, after a short siege, forced the Kokand AutonomousGovernment to flee. After its fall, however, the govern-ment’s many supporters and followers, who were dis-persed around the Farghona Valley and surroundingareas, joined a resistance movement called the basmachimovement. They waged a guerrilla war against the RedArmy and maintained control of a number of cities andtowns in the area until 1920.

A group of local activists established a semi-independent Trans-Caspian Province Government,with its center in Askhabad. They repelled theBolsheviks with the support of the British mission inIran and regular British Army units. Here again, anative-led administration formed an autonomous gov-ernment and attempted to negotiate power sharingwith the Bolsheviks, but failed. Though the govern-ment did not put forward any demands for full inde-pendence, the Russian authorities saw their stance inextreme terms, and accused the British of harboringplans to split the resources-rich area off from BolshevikRussia. The Trans-Caspian Government survived untillate 1919 and early 1920.

The Soviet Government was established inTashkent in November 1917 by the Russian-dominatedCongress of Soviets. The Bolshevik Party in CentralAsia emerged as the only politically organized powerable to fill the vacuum in October 1917. The Bolsheviksdid not hesitate to use the Red Terror against the bour-geoisie, landlords and other exploiters. Initially theSoviet Government was significantly undermined byinternal rivalries and weak representation in manyareas of the Central Asian region, but it managed toattract growing support by inviting native intelligentsiainto the government, and by initiating administrative,political and economic reforms. In a step designed toestablish themselves firmly in Central Asia, the Sovietauthorities promised to support the nationalist driveand to break with the tsarist practice of suppressing cul-tural and political developments on the outskirts of theempire. On 30 April 1918, the All-Turkistan Congress ofSoviets declared the establishment of the TurkistanAutonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR), with itscenter in Tashkent.

During this period the Bukhara Emirate enjoyedalmost full independence, but its ruler, Sayyid AlimKhan, chose a cautious path, stopping short of a radicalbreaking of ties with the authorities in Russia. In theKhiva Khanate, local tribal leaders and generals decidedto utilize the momentum they had gained to strive formaximum autonomy, and they forced the Russiantroops to withdraw from the area.

Map 35: Creation of the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic


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Ob'

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(Kyzyl Orda)

Khiva

BukharaOsh

Kashgar

Namangan

PERSIA

Khiva

Khanate

Merv

AFGHANISTAN

Samarqand

Aqsu

QarshiBukhara Emi ra te

Tobolsk

Ufa

Kazan

Samara

Orsk

Tsaritsyn

Guriev

Kazalinsk

Perovsk

Chimkent

Tashkent

Pishpek

VernyiTurkistan

Aktubinsk

Askhabad

Kyzyl Arvat

Kustanai

Krasnovodsk

Uralsk

Astrakhan

Orenburg

50 60 70

80 60 50

0 100

0 200

300200

400 600 800 km

500 mi400

Lake Balqash

Aral

Sea

Casp ianSea

KaraBogazGol

Lake Ysyk Kol

Tura

Esi

l

Tobo

l

Chu

Ili

Tarim

Ufa

Volga

Zhay

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Oka

Irgiz

Turg

ay

Atrak

Syr Darya

Syr Darya

Khoper

Sura

Volga

Vyatka

Yark

ant

Toxkan

Hotan

Terek

Murgab

EsilErtis

Zeravshan

Ural

AmuD

aryaSar

ysu

Nura

CHINA

Astarabad

Kokchetav

AkmolinskSemipalatinsk Ust-Kamenogorsk

Karkaralinsk

Herat

Urgench

Tehran

Railways

Center of Kokand Autonomous Government

Center of Soviet Government (TASSR)

Center of Alash Orda Government

Center of Trans-Caspian Government

Turkistan ASSR

Postrevolution Power Centers, 1917–1918

RUSSIA

Kokand


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The Bolshevik Revolution unleashed a multitude ofgrievances and discords that had been gathering

momentum within the Russian Empire for decades:from social and class conflict to nationalism, frominterethnic and intertribal melees to deep-seated rural-urban divisions. In addition, the Bolsheviks, who haddisbanded the tsarist administration, faced economicand political anarchy and resistance across the country.To control the situation they attempted to use mass RedTerror, similar to the Terror of the French Revolution,against all their opponents, who in retaliation launchedanti-Bolshevik terror campaigns themselves.

Between fall 1917 and spring 1918, the Bolsheviksestablished strongholds in Tashkent and a few urban cen-ters with large army and Russian worker presence, suchas Aulie Ata, Pishpek and Samarqand. In many otherareas, they faced steep resistance from political groups.The monarchist, Cossack and some national liberationgroups challenged the Bolsheviks on the vast Kazakhsteppe. Local Islamic and national liberation groups andtribal leaders fought the Bolsheviks to the south ofTashkent. The national liberation groups with the help ofBritish forces repelled the Red Army from the Zakaspianoblast. The Khiva Khanate and Bukhara Emirate tight-ened political control in their constituencies and expelledall political groups sympathetic to the Bolsheviks.

By mid-1918 the forces hostile to the Bolsheviks con-trolled between 70 and 80 percent of the Central Asian ter-ritory. The escalation of the civil war and the intensity ofthe fighting meant that neither Bolshevik nor anti-Bolshevik groups showed any mercy to their adversaries,prisoners of war or those in the local population who pro-vided support to rival groups. The pro-tsarist White Armyregularly executed members of the Bolshevik Party whileRed Army soldiers systematically eliminated their adver-saries. As the atrocities of the civil war increased, mostpeople in the region had no choice but to take sides. Nativepopulations often set up their own militias, frequently ledby ambitious commanders, tribal leaders or sometimessimply adventurers. These militia groups were known asthe basmachi (from the Turkic word basma, assault). Thebasmachi fought against either the Bolsheviks or the repre-sentatives of the White Army or both.

Between mid-1918 and mid-1919 the Red Army inCentral Asia was on the defensive and was repelledfrom most of the disputed territories of the region.Gradually, however, the Bolsheviks and their armyreemerged from defeat. Their renewal of strength wasnot merely military, but grew from a strategy aimed atwinning minds and hearts. They promised to end thecivil war, to conduct economic and social reforms,including redistribution of land and water, and to

provide greater opportunities for the local population.The Bolsheviks did in fact begin to involve the nativepopulation in local legislatures (Sovety), local districtand provincial governments (Ispolkomy). They alsointroduced a nationality program promising greater cul-tural and political autonomy to the native population.Very small groups representing the native population,especially the intellectuals, lent their support to theBolsheviks. The ordinary Central Asians, especially thenatives, initially remained indecisive about the ideologyand motives of the various political forces, though theywere inclined to remain loyal to their tribal and commu-nity leaders.

In mid-1919 the situation began changing drastically.The Bolshevik government in Moscow defeated majorcounterrevolutionary forces on several fronts, restored therailroad to Tashkent and sent military reinforcements toCentral Asia. The massive influx of regular troops helpedthe Red Army to gradually regain its control over theregion’s most important strategic centers in the TASSR. Inlate 1919 and early 1920 the Bolsheviks also changed theregimes in Khiva and Bukhara. Small revolutionary pro-Bolshevik groups had challenged the rulers of thosekhanates and organized a series of uprisings. In early 1920the Red Army intervened in Bukhara against Sayyid AlimKhan, the last ruler of the Bukhara Emirate, and in Khivaagainst Sayyid Abdulla, the last ruler of the KhivaKhanate. With the direct assistance of Soviet authorities,People’s Republics were established in both places.

However, the popular resistance movements, undersuch leaders as Junaid Khan in the Zakaspian oblast,Madaminbek in the Farghona Valley and Enver Pasha insouthern Turkistan, continued their fight through 1921and 1922. These large forces were eventually defeated anddestroyed, though small groups in the remote areas of theregion and on the borders with Central Asia were stillfighting against the Bolsheviks well into 1924 and 1928.

The civil war in Russia proved to be one of the mostdevastating conflicts in its history. The country lostbetween one quarter and one third of its population tothe war, local conflicts, famine and starvation. The entireindustrial base was almost destroyed and the transporta-tion infrastructure was left in ruins. In the case of CentralAsia, the civil war continued for several years longerthan in the Russian Federation, and came close to totallydestroying the region’s economy. Like Russia, CentralAsia lost a significant portion of its industrial base, com-munication infrastructure and qualified labor force duedirectly to military operations. But in addition, duringthe turbulent years between 1916 and 1922, the regionlost up to one third of its population to famine and star-vation, extraneous civil war atrocities and emigration.

Map 36: Civil War in Central Asia


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Khiva

Bukhara Kashgar

PERSIA

Merv

Kokand

AFGHANISTAN

Lake Ysyk Kol

(Kyzyl Orda)

Samarqand

Aqsu

RUSSIA

Tobolsk

Ufa

Kazan

Samara

OrskOrenburg

Tsaritsyn

Guriev

Kazalinsk

Perovsk

Chimkent

Tashkent

PishpekVernyi

Aktubinsk

Kustanai

Aulie Ata

Turkistan

Astrakhan

Uralsk

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500 mi400

Lake Balqash

Aral

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KaraBogazGol

Tura

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Tobo

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Chu

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Tarim

Ufa

Volga

Zhay

ya

Oka

Irgiz

Turg

ay

Atrak

Syr Darya

Syr Darya

Yenis

ey

Khoper

Sura

Volga

Vyatka

Yark

ant

Toxkan

Hotan

Ertix

Terek

Murgab

Esil

ErtisUral

Amu

Darya

Sarysu

Nura

CHINA

Astarabad

Kokchetav

AkmolinskSemipalatinsk

Ust-Kamenogorsk

Karkaralinsk

Herat

Sergiopol

NarynUrgench

Tehran

Railways

Areas controlled by Anti-Bolshevik forces by mid-1918

Operations of Bolshevik forces in 1919–1922

Anti-Bolshevik resistance of 1921–1922

Postrevolution Civil War

Krasnovodsk

AskhabadKyzyl Arvat

Qarshi

OshNamangan

Dushanbe

KhivaKhanate

KuniaUrgench

Bukhara

Emi ra te


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Between 1920 and 1924 the Soviet governmentinstituted a series of political changes that culminated

in the creation of the Central Asian republics. This verycomplex process was affected by a number of factorsand considerations, and it created outcomes that con-tinue to influence relations between the republics wellinto the twenty-first century.

The nation-state delimitation started in Central Asiaagainst the background of the devastating civil war. TheSoviet concept of “national self-determination” wasanchored in the Bolshevik Party manifesto, which prom-ised to break with the tsarist policy of discriminationagainst ethnic minorities. The rise of national identitiesand national liberation movements in the RussianEmpire was one of the important driving forces stirringmass political participation.

Between 1916 and 1920 a growing number of nativeCentral Asians became involved in the political processand governance for the first time. The rapidly burgeon-ing native intelligentsia eagerly embraced new ideasranging from nationalism to liberalism and from pan-Turkism to communism. In response to the rising cul-tural and national identity, the Soviet authorities begandiscussing various models for implementing theirnationality policy. Three major scenarios were floated inthe early 1920s: (1) to keep Central Asia as parts of theSoviet state on the same principle that applied during theRussian imperial era; (2) to create a single autonomousadministrative entity—a superprovince or federal repub-lic; (3) to create politically and culturally autonomousentities—nation-states—as part of the Soviet state.

All these paradigms were vigorously debatedbetween 1920 and 1924 by the Kremlin leaders and theCentral Asian intelligentsia. In the end, Moscowembraced the ideas of those Central Asian leaders whosuggested dividing the region along vague ethnic lines.The Soviet government had already set a precedent withan experiment delimiting the borders of the KazakhAutonomous Republic within the Russian Federation in1920 (until 1926 Kazakhs were called “Kyrgyzs” or“Kaisak-Kyrgyzs” and Kyrgyzs were called “Kara-Kyrgyzs”), and the Turkmen Autonomous Oblast in1921. In 1924 the Kremlin finalized its new nationalityscheme and proceeded with the creation of nation-stateswithin the Soviet Union having three different levels ofpolitical and cultural autonomy: (1) the Soviet nation-state with its own government and in “voluntary” unionwith the other Soviet republics (this applied toUzbekistan); (2) autonomous republic status within theRussian Federation (the case with the Kyrgyz [Kazakh])Autonomous Republic); (3) autonomous oblast statuswithin the Russian Federation (the case with the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast).

On 27 October 1924 the Turkistan Soviet SocialistRepublic (TSSR) was abolished to give way to the newlydesignated nation-states. Two nation-states and fourautonomous entities were immediately established inCentral Asia.

The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic wasupgraded from the Turkmen Autonomous Oblastinto a union republic with the city of Askhabad as itscapital.

The Kara-Kyrgyz (later Kyrgyz) AutonomousOblast was established within the Russian Federationwith its capital in Pishpek. The oblast received under itsjurisdiction significant portions of the Semirechye, SyrDarya and Farghona districts and a small section of theSamarqand oblast.

The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic was estab-lished as a union republic with its capital in Samarqand,and also including the Tajik region as an autonomousrepublic. It acquired most of the former territory of theBukhara Emirate and Turkistan province.

The Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republicwas created in 1924 as an autonomous republic withinthe Uzbek SSR, with its capital in Dushanbe. Itincluded the eastern and southeastern parts of theBukhara People’s Republic (formerly the BukharaEmirate).

The Kirgiz (later Kazakh) Autonomous SovietSocialist Republic was already established within theRussian Federation, with its capital in Orenburg, but theyear 1924 brought several important changes, as the cap-ital was moved to the city of Kyzyl Orda. The republicreceived under its jurisdiction most of the Kazakhsteppe, which had been controlled by Kazakh Hordes inthe late eighteenth century.

The Karakalpak Autonomous Oblast was estab-lished within the Kazakh ASSR in February 1925, withits capital in Nukus.

Between 1924 and 1926 the Soviet authorities com-pleted this politically controversial border delimitationscheme, which at the time was hotly debated and con-tested. Recent studies suggest that the process resultedfrom vigorous debate both among and between thenative Central Asian leaders and the policy makers inMoscow. The territorial delimitation was very difficultin places with traditionally mixed populations, such asthe Farghona and Semirechye valleys; the Sovietauthorities employed a very complex formula inassessing tsarist-era censuses, population sizes andeven community and tribal structures. They managedto convince skeptics that the borders would playpurely symbolic roles due to the political and socialintegration and intraregional cooperation prevailingwithin the Soviet Union.

Map 37: Nation-State Delimitation in Central Asia, 1924–1926


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Kirgiz ASSR

KhivaOsh

KashgarTurkmen SSR Uzbek SSR

Karakalpak AO Kara-Kyrgyz AO

TajikASSR

Lake Ysyk Kol

PERSIA

Merv

Kokand

AFGHANISTAN

Dushanbe

NukusAqsu

Qarshi

RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

Ufa

Kazan

Samara

Orsk

Stalingrad

Astrakhan Guriev

Kazalinsk

Kyzyl Orda

Krasnovodsk

Chimkent

Pishpek

VernyiTurkistan

Aktubinsk

Ashkhabad

Kyzyl Arvat

Uralsk

Kustanai

Aulie Ata

Orenburg(capital 1920-24)

80 60 50

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500 mi400

Lake Balqash

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Toxkan

Hotan

Terek

MMuu

MMMMrrgg rr

aabb

EsilErtisUral

AAmmuu DDaarryyrr aa

Sarysu

Nura

CHINA

Syr DaryaSyr Darya

Bukhara

NamanganTashkent

Samarqand

Astarabad

Kokchetav


Ust-Kamenogorsk

Karkaralinsk

Herat

Sergiopol

Urgench

Tehran

Railways

Kunia

Borders of Soviet Republics

Borders of Autonomous Republics/Oblasts

Nation-States, 1924–1926

Urgench

Pavlodar


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Over the decade from 1926 to 1936 the Sovietgovernment introduced a new round of changes

to consolidate political power and newly born nationalidentities. First, all political parties other than theBolshevik Party—subsequently renamed the CommunistParty (CP)—were banned. From the late 1920s onwardthe Soviet authorities prohibited tribal leaders and for-mer tsarist officers from holding any position in thenational government or in the Communist Party,though the Kremlin incorporated many representativesof the native intelligentsia into the administration andgovernments within each newly created national repub-lic. Second, all political and intellectual debate wasbanned within the ruling party, especially on the issuesof nationality and nation-state delimitation. Third, theSoviet central government introduced completely newpolitical and administrative systems that revolvedaround the ruling party. Fourth, the Bolshevik(Communist) Party as the ruling party was put incontrol of all branches of power, administration andgovernance.

Between 1926 and 1936 the Soviet governmentrevised some aspects of the nation-state delimitation andintroduced changes into the administrative and politicalmap of the region. These changes effectively finalized allterritorial claims and disputes by adjusting borders andadministrative divisions within the region and withineach republic. These adjustments also paved the way forthe formation of federal relations with the Kremlin.

The Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republicunderwent significant changes, gaining the Syr Daryaand Jetysuu (formerly Semirechye) provinces in 1925.However, Orenburg and surrounding areas were trans-ferred to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. Thecapital of Kazakhstan, which had moved from Orenburgto the city of Kyzyl Orda in 1924 was again moved, toAlma-Ata (present-day Almaty), in 1929. In 1930, theKarakalpak Autonomous Oblast was transferred fromthe jurisdiction of Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation.In 1936 the Kazakh ASSR received the status of unionrepublic and was renamed Kazakh Soviet SocialistRepublic (Kazakh SSR), thus gaining the legal right toleave the USSR.

The Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast (renamed from the“Kara-Kyrgyz” to “Kyrgyz” in 1925) gained the status ofAutonomous Republic of the Russian Federation in1926. In 1936 the Kyrgyz ASSR received the status ofunion republic and was renamed Kyrgyz Soviet SocialistRepublic (Kyrgyz SSR).

The Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In1929 the Tajik ASSR gained the status of union republicwithin the USSR. At the same time, the territory of theKhojand region was transferred from the Uzbek SSR to

the Tajik SSR. The Soviet Constitution of 1936 recon-firmed the status of the Tajik SSR as a union republic.

The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic was estab-lished as a union republic in 1924. The republic did notexperience significant territorial changes and its statuswas reconfirmed by the Soviet Constitution of 1936.

The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, was estab-lished as a union republic in 1924, including Tajikistan asan autonomous republic. In 1929 Uzbek SSR lost TajikASSR, which gained the status of union republic, andtransferred the territory of the Khojand region to thenew Tajik SSR. However, in 1936 the Uzbek SSR addedthe Karakalpak ASSR to its jurisdiction.

The Karakalpak Autonomous Oblast was trans-ferred from the jurisdiction of the Kazakh ASSR to theRussian Federation in 1930, and in 1932 gained the statusof an autonomous republic. In 1936 the Karakalpak ASSRwas transferred to the jurisdiction of the Uzbek SSR.

The Soviet Constitution of 1936 endorsed all theadministrative and political changes of the previous twodecades. It also sanctioned the elevation of the politicalstatus of the three Central Asian autonomous republics tothat of union republic. The administrative structure in theCentral Asian republics replicated those in other parts ofthe Soviet Union and was organized at three levels:province (oblast), district (raion) and city (town or village).In addition, the Uzbek SSR had under its jurisdiction anautonomous republic (the Karakalpak ASSR), and TajikSSR had under its jurisdiction an autonomous oblast(Gorno Badakhshan Oblast). Although these divisionswere established primarily for administrative and plan-ning purposes, they reflected both the peculiarities of theregion’s economic geography and, in some degree, thetribal divisions of the Central Asian societies.

Every republic established its own constitution, andadministrative changes within the individual republics(such as abolishing and establishing oblasts or districts,or changing the status of individual towns and villages)were within the jurisdiction of the union republics.

One of the most important areas of change during theSoviet era was in the cultural landscape of the region.Many old cities were renamed according to the Sovietrulers’ tastes, and many newly founded cities and townswere named after various Soviet and Russian historicalleaders. The city of Pishpek (the capital of the KyrgyzSSR), for example, was renamed Frunze after the RedArmy general and civil war hero Michael Frunze; thecity of Khojand and the Khojand oblast were renamedthe city of Leninabad and Leninabad oblast; Dushanbe(the capital of Tajikistan) was renamed Stalinabad, andso on. The names of many small towns, villages andstreets were Russified and named after various Sovietheroes and leaders.

Map 38: Administrative and Political Changes in Central Asia, 1926–1936


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Ob'

-

Khiva

OshKashgarTurkmen SSR

Tajik SSR (from 1929)

ASSRKyrgyz ASSR

(Kyrgyz SSR from 1936)

Pavlodar

alal

Kazakh ASSR (Kazakh SSR from 1936)

IRAN

Merv

Khojand

AFGHANISTAN

Stalinabad

Nukus Aqsu

Qarshi

Ufa

Kazan

Samara

Orsk

Stalingrad

Astrakhan Guriev

Kazalinsk

Kyzyl Orda(capital 1924–29)

Chimkent

Tashkent

FrunzeAlma Ata

Aktubinsk

Ashkhabad

Kyzyl Arvat

Uralsk

Kustanai

Aulie Ata

(capital from 1930)

(capital to 1930)

(capital from 1929)


SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

(Kuibyshev1935–1991)

Samarqand

80 60 50

0 100

0 200

300200

400 600 800 km

500 mi400

Lake Balqash

Aral

Sea

Casp ianSea

KaraBogazGol

Lake Ysyk Kol

Tura

Esi

l

Tobo

l

Chu

Ili

Tarim

Ufa

Volga

Zhay

ya

Oka

Irgiz

Turg

ay

Atrak

Khoper

Sura

Volga

VyatkaY

ark

ant

Toxkan

Hotan

Terek

uuMMMM

rrggrraabb

EsilErtis

Ural

AAAmmuu DDaarryyrrrr aa

Sarysu

Nura

CHINA

Syr Darya

Syr Darya

Astarabad

Kokchetav


Ust-Kamenogorsk

Karkaralinsk

Herat

Sergiopol

Urgench

Tehran

Railways

KuniaUrgench

Political Map, 1926–1936

Borders of Karakalpak ASSR (within Uzbek SSR from 1936)

Bukhara

Petropavlovsk


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The Soviet leaders believed that only when nationswere united by common economic interests could

they overcome their “backwardness.” Thus, the Sovietgovernment channeled sizable investments into theregion in an attempt to build modern diversifiedeconomies. In order to accelerate their regional eco-nomic growth and make effective use of these invest-ments, the Soviet government introduced five-yearplanning. These plans emphasized high-priority invest-ments in building major industrial enterprises, espe-cially heavy, large machinery and light manufacturing,and large-scale state-controlled farming.

Kazakhstan. During the Soviet era the Kazakhstanigovernment, with help from the Soviet central budget,built a diversified economy with a strong industrial,agricultural and resources-extraction base. In the 1930sall private farmers, herders and peasants were broughtinto the Soviet-style cooperatives (kolkhozes). It was,however, only in the 1950s and 1960s that the large areasof so-called virgin land (tselina) were brought under cul-tivation with a huge inflow of investment and immi-grants from all over the Soviet Union. This madeKazakhstan the grain basket of the USSR, as it providedabout one quarter of the total cereal production in theSoviet Union. Between the 1950s and 1980s Kazakhstanalso came to specialize in nonferrous (lead, copper andnickel) and ferrous (iron ore) metal and coal production.With the discovery of large oil and gas reserves in thecountry’s western and southern provinces, from the1970s onward the republic became one of the fastest-growing oil and gas producers among the socialist coun-tries. Kazakhstan also built heavy machinery andaerospace service enterprises. In fact, nearly 80 percentof all Soviet space rockets were launched from therepublic’s territory.

Kyrgyzstan. Remoteness from major markets, amountainous landscape and a small population madeKyrgyzstan’s economic development especially diffi-cult. During the Soviet era the Kyrgyzstan governmentmade an effort to create its own industrial, agriculturaland resources-extraction base. In the 1930s herders andprivate farmers were brought into the kolkhozes and thecountry became an important producer of various agri-cultural products, such as tobacco, wool, leather, sugar,vegetables and cotton. Between the 1940s and 1990sabout 500 state-controlled enterprises were established,specializing in the production of nonferrous metals(antimony, uranium ore and mercury) and smallamounts of coal. The republic became the fifth largesthydroelectric power producer in the USSR.

Tajikistan. During the Soviet era the government ofTajikistan established a diversified industrial, agricul-tural and resources-extraction base. In the 1930s and1940s the kolkhozes became an important producer ofsuch agricultural products as cotton (third largest in

the USSR), silk, berries and grapes. State-controlledenterprises, established mainly between the 1940s and1990s, began producing nonferrous materials (alu-minum, bismuth ore, silver, gold and molybdenum)and small amounts of gas and coal. In the 1970s and1980s the republic was one of the largest producers ofhydroelectric power in Central Asia. In the 1970s and1980s Tajikistan also began to export silk, textiles andapparel.

Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan developed its ownindustrial, agricultural and resources-extraction base.In the 1930s the kolkhozes began large-scale productionof various agricultural products, such as cotton (thesecond-largest crop in the USSR), wool, sheepskin (thesecond largest producer of karakul, the famousAstrakhan fur) and small quantities of raw silk. Betweenthe 1940s and 1990s hundreds of state-controlled enter-prises were established that specialized in productionof the nonferrous materials (sodium sulfate, bromine,sulfur and small amounts of magnesium sulfate). In the1970s the republic became an important producer ofcarpets and carpet products (second largest in theUSSR), textiles, leather materials and apparel. In addi-tion, from the 1970s on the republic became the USSR’ssecond largest producer of gas and its fifth largestproducer of petroleum.

Uzbekistan. The country established a diversifiedindustrial, agricultural and resources-extraction base.In the 1930s the country became the largest producer ofcotton, raw silk, berries and vegetable oil in the USSR.State-controlled enterprises specialized in producingnonferrous metals (the second largest producer of goldin the USSR), gas and coal. In the 1970s the republicbecame one of the largest producers of cotton and silkfabric in Central Asia. In the 1970s and 1980s it beganlarge-scale exportation of textiles and apparel.

The Soviet development strategy stimulated a veryhigh level of economic growth during the early stagesof economic development (between 1928 and 1965),because it managed to mobilize all human and financialresources into achieving certain economic objectives.However, between 1965 and 1990 economic growthsignificantly slowed and even stagnated, as the Sovietpolicy makers increasingly emphasized large and presti-gious projects, ignoring cost effectiveness and overlook-ing rapid technological changes. In addition, for decadeseconomists and planners often ignored the negativeenvironmental impact of such large projects.

Between 1985 and 1990, the Gorbachev-Ryzhkovadministration attempted to repair the most severeeconomic problems and past mistakes. However, acombination of a cavalier approach to economic man-agement and the incompetence of the administration inimplementing reforms led to the malfunctioning of theSoviet economic system in 1990 and 1991.

Map 39: Economic Changes in Central Asia


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0 100

0 200

300200

400 600 800 km

500 mi400 80 90

Ust-KamenogorskSemipalatinsk

Tselinograd

Kokchetav

Petropavlovsk

Omsk

Kustanai

Orsk

Ufa

Kazan

Kuibyshev

Uralsk

Astrakhan

Aktubinsk

OrenburgSaratov

Guriev

Kazalinsk

Kyzyl Orda

Nukus

UrgenchDashhowuz

KhivaKrasnovodsk

Kyzyl Arvat

Merv

Charjew Karshi

BukharaSamarqand

Chimkent

KokandOsh

Kashgar

Alma Ata

Karaganda

Temirtau

Zhezkazghan

Pavlodar

Zhambyl

(Akmolinsk)

Lake Balqash

Casp ianSea

KaraBogazGol

Lake Isyk Kol

TuraIrtysh

Esi

l

Tobo

l

Chu

Ili

Tarim

Katun

Biya

Ob

Ufa

Volga

Zhay

ya

Oka

Irgiz

Turg

ay

Atrak

Syr Darya

Tom'

Chulym

Khoper

Sura

Volga

Vyatka

Yark

an

t

Toxkan

Hotan

E

Terek

Murg

ab

Karakumsk Canal

EsilErtis

Zeravshan

Ural

Am

uD

arya

Sarysu

Nura

Ashkhabad

Tashkent

Tehran

Kabul

Dushanbe

Baku

AFGHANISTAN

T U R K M E N S S R

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

OF

IRAN

U Z B E K S S R

K A Z A K H S S R

CHINA

K Y R G Y Z S S R

T A J I K S S R

PAKISTAN

INDIA


SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

(RSFSR)

Areas of industrial concentration

Electric energy production

Agricultural area

Animal herding (in the desert areas)

Aktau

Farghona

Central Asian Economy, 1928–1990

Aral

Sea

F r u n z e


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VI

Post-Communism and Independence


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Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroikaopened up discussions on many issues previously

banned by the Soviet authorities. At the same time,however, the democratization process led to politicalconfrontations between supporters and opponents ofthe reforms, and to the rise of nationalism. It also led toa rapid decline in the legitimacy of existing Soviet insti-tutions without opening opportunities for the creationof new ones. This was especially true in dealings withinterethnic and social tensions: The Soviet authoritiesabandoned the Soviet-era approach of responding to allkinds of tensions exclusively with repression and force,but they did not create new mechanisms for mediatingthose conflicts and tensions. Thus, the Central Asianrepublics, like many other parts of the Soviet Union,experienced rising interethnic tensions that sometimesexploded in violent clashes and uprisings. Between 1986and 1991, interethnic conflicts claimed hundreds, if notthousands, of lives.

Alma Ata (Kazakh SSR). In December 1986 unsanc-tioned demonstrations in Alma Ata led to clashesbetween demonstrators and security forces. The imme-diate cause of the political and ethnic unrest, which latergrew into an uprising, was Moscow’s order to replaceKazakhstan’s leader, Dinmuhammed Kunayev, a nativeKazakh, with Gorbachev’s protégé, the RussianGennady Kolbin. Thousands of people gathered in AlmaAta to express their disagreement with the Kremlin’sethnic policy in Kazakhstan in general and with thisappointment in particular. The demonstration was bru-tally put down, mass arrests took place, several peoplewere allegedly killed and several hundred injured. Thisevent led to a sharp ethnic polarization betweenKazakhs and Russians, and antagonized Kazakh society.

Ashkhabad and Nebitdag (Turkmen SSR). In May 1989sporadic riots took place in Turkmenistan’s capital city,Ashkhabad, and in the provincial town of Nebitdag.Cars, public buildings and shops (allegedly run by ethnicminorities) were vandalized. The immediate causes ofthis strife are unknown, though it was believed that theconflicts were products of rising social and interethnictensions. Although only a few casualties were officiallyreported, these riots, accompanied in some cases byextremist nationalistic slogans, had a very negativeimpact and created a nervous atmosphere especiallyamong ethnic minorities.

Novyi Uzen (Kazakh SSR). In 1989 sporadic clashesbegan between local people and representatives of ethnicminorities employed in the local oil refinery and pro-cessing factories. The immediate cause of this mainlycommunal unrest, localized in a small provincial town,is unknown. It is believed that the degradation of socialconditions, growing unemployment and the arrival of alarge number of immigrants had led to grievancesamong the local communities. As a result, the localyouth turned against newcomers from the ethnic

minorities, who were seen to have jobs, accommodationand social benefits “at the expense” of the localcommunities.

Farghona (Uzbek SSR). In June 1989 a communal con-flict between the Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks grewinto bloody clashes, which spread from the suburbs ofthe provincial towns of Farghona and Kokand to othercities and towns in the Farghona Valley. According to anofficial report, over 100 died and 1,000 were injured, anda number of properties, private and public, weredestroyed. Tensions were so high and the number killedwas so large that there was no option but to relocate theentire community of about 30,000 Meskhetian Turks toRussia.

Dushanbe (Tajik SSR). In February 1990 thousands ofpeople organized a spontaneous demonstration inDushanbe. The demonstration became violent, withcars, shops and public buildings burned to the ground,and clashes between Tajiks and ethnic minoritygroups. The immediate cause of this unrest was thenews that refugees from Armenia would be relocatedto the city. This relocation was allegedly to have beenfunded by money from the local community budgetand houses would supposedly be taken from locallow-income families. It is believed that dozens of peo-ple were killed during the riots and several hundredwere injured. Despite the imposition of a state of emer-gency and the mobilization of police and army units,sporadic clashes continued for several weeks. As aresult, ethnic minorities began leaving Tajikistan:roughly 385,000 people left the country between 1990and 1992.

Osh-Uzgen (Kyrgyz SSR). In May and June 1990 dis-cord between local communities of Kyrgyzs and Uzbeksturned into mayhem in Uzgen and Osh. The immediatecause of the violence was the news that, in response tothe demands of the Kyrgyz movement Osh Aimagy, thelocal administration was going to distribute plots ofland to the landless Kyrgyzs at the expense of the Uzbekcommunity. Protests followed that led to mass clashesbetween representatives of the two communities. It wasthe bloodiest event to occur at the time, with official cal-culations of 220 dead and 1,000 hospitalized (unofficialestimates give figures between 600 and 1,200 killed duringthe entire disorder).

Against this background of political turmoil and con-flicts, the Central Asian republics entered negotiationsover the new Soviet Union treaty. This treaty wouldkeep the Soviet Union alive by giving greater autonomyto the Union’s republics. However, it awoke seriousopposition among the hard-line leaders of the SovietUnion, who attempted a coup d’état in Moscow inAugust 1991. Although the coup was suppressed, theleaders of three USSR republics, Russia, the Ukraine andByelorussia, signed an agreement that unconditionallydissolved the USSR in December of 1991.

Map 40: Interethnic Conflicts and the Collapse of the USSR


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Almaty

Ob

ED NATIONS Department of PeacekCa

-

-

Zaysan

Alma Ata1986

1990

Uzgen

50 60 70 80 90

80 70 60 50

0 100

0 200

300200

400 600 800 km

500 mi400

Aktubinsk

Chimkent

Zhezkazghan

Qarshi

Kashgar

Dashhowuz

Astrakhan

Bukhara

Zhambyl

Farghona

Herat

Karaghanda

Kustanai

Kyzyl Orda

Merv

Novokuznets

Nukus

Orenburg

Orsk

Osh

Pavlodar

Petropavlovsk

Saratov

Semipalatinsk

Temirtau

Akmolinsk

Urask

Urgench

Kokand

Aqtau

Samarqand

Kokchetav

Ust-Kamenogorsk

Charjew

Krasnovodsk

Guriev

1989

Kyzyl Arvat

Kazalinsk

Lake Balqash

Aral

Sea

Casp ianSea

KaraBogazGol

Lake Ysyk KolFrunze

Tashkent

Tehran

Kabul

Baku

Dushanbe1990

Ashkhabad1989

1989

Nebitdag

AFGHANISTAN

TUR

KM

EN

SS

R

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

OF

IRAN

UZBEK SSR

KAZAKH SSR

CHINA

TAJIK SSR

PAKISTAN

INDIA


SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

(RSFSR)

KYRGYZ SSR

Novyi Uzen

(Zhanaozen)

1989

Osh1990

Areas of interethnic riots

Soviet Republics at the USSR’s Collapse


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On 16 December 1991 Kazakhstan declared itsindependence from the Soviet Union. Its regional

importance was enhanced by the fact that the country ofabout 15.3 million people—the second most populous inCentral Asia (2007 CIA est.)—has the largest territory inthe region and is the ninth largest in the world. It hashistorically been one of the most ethnically diversecountries in the region, including Kazakhs (64.4 percent),Russians (20.0 percent), Ukrainians (3.7), Uzbeks (2.5),Germans (2.4), Tatars (1.7) and others (5.3) (2007 officialest.). Since 1991 a significant number of Russians andGermans have left the country. During Kazakhstan’sfirst decade of independence there was a great deal ofconcern about secessionist movements in the northernprovinces of the country and about interethnic tensionsin the south (see map 40). These concerns were largelyput to rest in the early 2000s, due to the changing demo-graphic balance in Kazakhstan.

The Kazakhstan government responded to the social,economic and security challenges by adopting policiesthat combined political and economic liberalizationswith the retention of certain forms of direct and indirectstate control over aspects of people’s lives. Oppositionpolitical parties and independent media were permitted,as long as they did not directly challenge the govern-ment and its policies. President Nursultan Nazarbayev,who served as prime minister between 1984 and 1989and was first elected president in 1990, has ruled thecountry without interruption for nearly two decades. InDecember 2005 Nazarbayev was reelected to the presi-dency for a seven-year term.

In the early 1990s Kazakhstan’s leaders attempted topresent the country as an “economic tiger of CentralAsia,” believing that enormous reserves of naturalresources, especially oil, plus an advanced industrialsector and a well-educated population would createmomentum for fast and dynamic economic develop-ment. From the Soviet era Kazakhstan had inherited awell-diversified economy in which the oil-extractingsectors, with a highly developed transportation infra-structure of pipelines and railroads, played a key role.

Despite possessing huge natural resources and asmall population, Kazakhstan experienced a severe eco-nomic recession in the 1990s. The government selec-tively accepted an IMF-designed program of radicaleconomic changes and opened the country to the forcesof globalization. It approved mass privatization, priceliberalization and currency reforms, allowed privateentrepreneurship and free trade. At the same time itretained some degree of regulation and control over theso-called strategic sectors of the national economy. Anational currency—Kazakhstan’s tenge—was intro-duced in 1993 and was openly exchanged for all majorcurrencies, although it took a while to achieve full

convertibility. Annual inflation fluctuated between600 and 1,200 percent between 1993 and 1998, but thecountry achieved some degree of macroeconomic stabi-lization in the 2000s and the annual inflation ratedeclined to 8.6 percent (2007 CIA est.).

Economic changes and globalization brought win-ners and losers. Between 1990 and 1999 Kazakhstan’seconomy experienced a steep decline, especially in theagricultural and manufacturing sectors. However, thecountry attracted significant direct foreign investmentinto its oil, gas and nonferrous metal-extracting sectors,becoming one of the leading destinations for investors inthe region by the 2000s. The government invested alarge portion of its oil revenue in infrastructure, trans-portation and construction, and created special funds toaccumulate oil revenue windfalls for future generations.

Industry and services are the two main pillars ofKazakhstan’s post-Soviet national economy, contributing39.5 and 53.7 percent respectively to GDP in 2005 (2007World Bank est.); the agricultural sector remains impor-tant in terms of employment though it produces only6.8 percent of GDP. Exports are still narrowly based onsales of raw materials on international markets. The coun-try’s main exports are oil (in 2006 it produced 65 milliontons of oil or 1.3 million barrels a day), gas (25.6 billioncubic meters), textiles, grain, cotton and other agriculturalproducts (2007 Economist Intelligence Unit est.). Thegovernment’s target is to double the country’s GDP withinthe next ten to fifteen years, which would put Kazakhstanamong the world’s top 50 most developed nations.

In the 1990s Kazakhstan experienced a steady declinein living standards across all groups of the population,with the exception of a very small number of people whobenefited from market opportunities. The 2000s broughta rapid increase in living standards. As of 2007 Kazakhstanhas the highest per capita income in the region and thesecond highest among CIS members. In 2006 the UNDevelopment Program’s Human Development Index(HDI) ranked Kazakhstan in 79th place out of 177, on apar with Saudi Arabia, the Ukraine and Lebanon. Unlikeother Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan became a netreceiver of large-scale economic migration (the secondmost in the CIS, and the ninth most popular destinationfor immigrants in the world).

Between 2002 and 2008 Kazakhstan received hugeinflows of oil revenue due to rapidly rising oil prices onthe international market and completion of several oilprojects and pipelines. During this period it experiencedrobust economic growth, averaging between 7 and 11 per-cent annually, due to favorable conditions in the domesticand international markets. Kazakhstan became the onlycountry in the former USSR to move its capital to a newlocation: the government moved from Almaty to the cityof Astana in 1997.

Map 41: Independent Kazakhstan


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Yrghyz

Qarabutaq

Shalqar

Dzhambeyty

Oyyl

Aqtobe

Beyneu

Torghay

Zhailma

Embi

Oral

Furmanovo

Kalmykovo

Aksu

Ganyushkino

Zhetybay

Atyrau–

FortShevchenko

Qostanay

Arqalyk

Chelyabinsk Kurgan

Petropavl

KyzyltuRudnyy Pavlodar

Bestamak

Lebyazhye

Qaraghandy

Kachiry

Kurchatov

Omsk

Karasuk

-Kokshetau

Akbakay

DzhambulBalqash

Saryshagan

Furmanovka

Zhanatas

Shymkent

Qyzylorda

Zhezqazghan

Akshiy

Zhambyl

Samarqand

ZaysanAyaguz

Georgiyevka

Almaty

Say

ak

Beskol

Taldyqorghan

Urdzhar

SemeyOskemen

Khromtau

Aqtau

Astana

Bishkek

Tashkent

Baku(Baki)

ZHAMBYL

SOUTHKAZAKHSTAN

A Q T O B E

Q A R A G H A N D Y

PAVLODARQOSTANAY

AQMOLA

A L M A T Y

EAST KAZAKHSTAN

QYZYLORDA

WEST KAZAK HSTAN

NORTH KAZAKHSTAN

ATYRAU

MANGGHYSTAU

TURKMENISTAN

CHINA

TAJIKISTAN

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

KYRGYZSTAN

UZBEKISTAN

CA

SP

IA

NS

EA

Volga

Zha

yyq (Ural)

ARALSEA

Sary

su

Ishim

Ura

l

Syr Darya

Zhem

Shu

Tekes

TengizKöli Zaysan

KoliNura

Alakol

Toxkan

Tobo

l

Amu Darya(O

xus)

Turgay

Irtysh

KazakskiyZaliv

Ertis

Tarim

Ili

Aylagy

Garabogaz

BalqashKoli

Lake Ysyk Kol

OstrovaVozrozhdeniya

OstrovaTyuleni

U s t y u r tP l a t e a u

K A Z A K H

U P L A N D S

UR

AL

MO

UN

TA

IN

S

Tu

ra

n

Lo

wl

an

d

Casp ianDepression

PoluostrovBuzachi

BETPAQ DALABaikonurCosmodrome

55˚45˚ 50˚ 60˚ 65˚ 70˚ 75˚ 80˚ 85˚ 90˚

55˚

50˚

45˚

40˚

55

50

45

40˚

50˚ 55˚ 65˚ 75˚ 80˚

0 100 500 km200 300 400

0 100 300 mi200

National capitalProvincial capitalTown, villageAirportInternational boundaryProvincial boundaryMain roadSecondary roadRailroad

Independent Kazakhstan


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Kyrgyzstan declared its independence from the USSRon 31 August 1991. The country of about 4.5 million

people embarked on its independence against a back-ground of serious interethnic conflicts (see map 40). Atthe time of independence, ethnic Kyrgyzs accounted forless then 52 percent of the total population (1999 census).However, changes in the ethnic balance and numerouspolitical, cultural and social concessions saw tensionsease by the late 1990s. Yet, in the 1990s a significant num-ber of Russians and representatives of various minoritygroups left the country. By 2007 the country’s populationwas 5.3 million but it had become far less diverse and farmore stable, with Kyrgyzs accounting for 68 percent ofthe population, Uzbeks 13.8 percent, Russians 9.5percent, Dungans (Muslim Chinese) 1.1 percent and oth-ers 7.6 percent (2007 est.).

Kyrgyzstan established the most liberal regime in theregion under President Askar Akayev. Akayev won thepresidential elections in 1990, competing against a pow-erful Communist Party leader. He opened the doors foropposition political parties, independent media andNGOs, and cooperated with international organizationsby experimenting with political reforms. These measuresultimately won his country the title “Island ofDemocracy.” By the end of the 1990s, however, the situa-tion had radically changed. Akayev began increasinglyto rely on his family members, cronies and regional-based clans to run the country. The corrupt and intoler-ant regime persecuted its critics and jailed the mostradical opposition leaders and journalists. In 1995 andagain in 2000 Akayev won presidential elections by largemargins, but many independent observers leveled accu-sations that these elections were unfair and rigged. InMarch 2005 grievances and dissatisfaction caused by cor-ruption, mismanagement and cronyism led to massunrest and ultimately resulted in the “Tulip (Yellow)Revolution.” Akayev and his family fled the country. InJuly 2005 Kurmanbek Bakiyev was elected president fora five-year term. The new president promised to conducta series of political reforms including constitutionalchanges, and to fight corruption and cronyism. However,he too was accused of cronyism and corruption, and sev-eral opposition parties organized mass demonstrationsin 2006 and 2007 demanding his resignation.

Throughout the 1990s Kyrgyzstan was the only coun-try in Central Asia to fully embrace the so-called ShockTherapy approach in economic reform prescribed by theIMF and World Bank. It introduced radical market andtrade liberalization, mass privatization and structuralreforms. Despite all these reforms and considerableinternational assistance, Kyrgyzstan’s economy suffereda deep, decade-long recession. According to the WorldBank, the country’s economy declined at an average

annual rate of between 5 and 8 percent from 1990 to2000. It succeeded in attracting foreign direct invest-ments to its natural resources–extracting sector only,especially to its gold-mining sector. Foreign investorshave been reluctant to invest in other sectors because ofthe amount of red tape imposed by the national bureau-cracy and the small size of the local market.

Kyrgyzstan’s national currency—the som—wasintroduced in May 1993. Annual inflation fluctuatedbetween 300 and 1,200 percent between 1991 and 1995,and the national economy was negatively affected byAsian and Russian financial crises in 1997 and 1998.Macroeconomic stabilization was achieved in the early2000s and the annual inflation rate was brought undercontrol, settling at a relatively low level and fluctuatingbetween 2 and 6 percent (2007 CIA est.).

Agriculture, industry and services are the three mainpillars of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan’s economy, contribut-ing 34.5, 19.5 and 46 percent respectively to GDP in 2006(2006, CIA est.). Exports are narrowly based on sales ofraw materials on the international market. The country’smain exports are gold, textiles, tobacco, raw cotton andother agricultural products (2007 EIU est.). Kyrgyzstanhas accumulated the highest external debt per capita inthe Central Asian region.

The post-Soviet economic changes have led to asteady decline in living standards among all sections ofKyrgyzstan’s population, despite the recent macroeco-nomic stabilization. The country remains one of thepoorest of the former Soviet Union, with 40 percent ofits people living below the poverty line (2007 CIA est.)and an average life expectancy of 67.1 years (2006UNDP est.). In 2006 the UN Development Program’sHuman Development Index (HDI) put Kyrgyzstan in110th place out of 177, on a par with Syria, Egypt andVietnam. Due to mass poverty and the economic reces-sion, a large number of Kyrgyz citizens have emigratedfrom the country in the post-Soviet era. In the firstwave, about a half-million of the Russian-speaking pop-ulation left the country in the first half of the 1990s. Inaddition, between 300,000 and 700,000 ethnic Kyrgyzshave moved to Russia, Kazakhstan and other destina-tions in search of jobs and economic opportunities since1997–1998. It is estimated that these economic migrantssend to their home country the equivalent of 200 or 300million U.S. dollars annually in remittances.

Like the other Central Asian states, between 2002and 2007 Kyrgyzstan experienced economic growth,although at a very slow rate, between 0.5 and 3.5 percentannually on average. By 2006–2007, neighboringKazakhstan had become one of the largest investors inKyrgyzstan, focusing mainly on the construction andfinancial sectors and infrastructure projects.

Map 42: Independent Kyrgyzstan


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Tashkumyr

Shymkent

Sulyukta

Ravat

Kyzylkia

Sarytash

GulchaAlaykuu

Kokyangak

Uzgen

Daraut Korgan

Andijon

Namangan

Alabuka

Karakul

Toktogul

Tunuk

KaraBalta

Tokmak

Ugyut

Angren

Khaidarken

Quqon

Almaty

Cholponata Tyup

Enilchek

Shyirak

Ysykkol

Kekaigyp

Barskoon

Karasay

Osh

Jalalabad

TalasPrzhevalsk

NarynTashkent

Bishkek

C H U I O B L A S T

T A L A S O B L A S T

N A R Y N O B L A S T

I S Y K K O L O B L A S T

DZHALALABAD OBLAST

O S H O B L A S T CHINA

TAJIKISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

KAZAKHSTAN

UZBEKISTAN

TAJIKISTAN

L. Song-Kel

L. Chatyr-Kel

ToktogulReservoir

Chu

Chu

Talas

Naryn

Aksay

Toxk an

He

Kyzyl-Suu

Surkho b

Vakh

sh

Chatkal

Oy-TalKurshab

Naryn

Kek-Art

Ala-B

uk a

Lake Ysyk Kol

70˚ 72˚ 74˚ 76˚ 78˚ 80˚

74˚ 76˚ 78˚72˚70˚

44˚

42˚

40˚

38˚

44˚

42˚

38˚

0

0 25 50 75 100 mi

25 50 75 100 125 150 km

National capitalOblast (province) centerTown, kishlakMajor airportInternational boundaryOblast (province) boundaryMain roadSecondary roadRailroad

Independent Kyrgyzstan


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Tajikistan declared its independence from the SovietUnion on 9 September 1991. The country entered

independence as one of the poorest states in the region.Its population was growing at the fastest rate in the for-mer USSR—32.65 births per 1,000 people (2006 CIAest.)—doubling every 20 to 25 years and thus creatingenormous pressure on the fragile environment of themountains that occupy about 90 percent of its territory.The Tajiks account for 79.9 percent of the population,Uzbeks 15.3, Russians and others about 4.8 percent.Though Tajikistan had built a relatively well-diversifiedeconomy and experienced high economic growth fromthe 1930s through the 1970s, it experienced economicstagnation and slow growth throughout the 1980s. Onthe eve of independence Tajik society was in turmoil dueto widespread social unrest, interethnic tensions andpolitical confrontations.

In the early 1990s the political scene was dominatedby three groups. The Communist Party of Tajikistan(CPT) and its successors tried to retain tight control overthe political system and economy. The radical nationalistopposition demanded significant changes and reforms,including the removal of the CPT from power, while itsultranationalist wing demanded the revision of existingborders and claimed that important cities with signifi-cant Tajik-speaking populations such as Bukhara andSamarqand should be transferred from Uzbekistan toTajikistan. Small but very active groups of Islamicactivists also emerged, who worked under the umbrellaof, or in cooperation with, the Islamic Party ofRenaissance (Tajikistan) (IPRT).

The CPT won the parliamentary elections in 1990 andits representative, Rahmon Nabyev, won the presidentialelection, but the opposition refused to recognize theresults. In 1992 a civil war, fueled by regional rivalry andgrowing Islamic radicalism, broke out in Tajikistan, lead-ing to the ouster of President Nabyev. After numerousclashes in which both sides—the government and theopposition—destroyed infrastructure, property and irri-gation systems, a coalition of the regional elite installedImomali Rakhmonov as head of the parliament. In 1994he won the presidential election. The opposition, unitedunder the umbrella of the United Tajik Opposition(UTO), established control over most provinces butfailed to capture the capital. In 1997, with UN, Russianand Iranian assistance, Rakhmonov managed to negoti-ate and sign a peace accord with the UTO. The accordgranted the UTO a fixed share of positions in the govern-ment and free participation in parliamentary elections. Inbitterly contested presidential elections in 1999 and in2006, the UTO candidate lost to President Rakhmonov.

The civil war had a devastating effect on the nationaleconomy. According to the World Bank, Tajikistan’seconomy declined at an average annual rate of 6–7 percentbetween 1990 and 2000. Practically all manufacturing

plants were closed due to political and economic insta-bility, high inflation and lack of investment. However,the natural resources extracting sector survived, as itreceived considerable government support and invest-ment. With the end of the civil war in 1997, Tajikistan’sgovernment adopted a program of postwar economicreconstruction focusing on the restoration of major sec-tors of the economy and achieving self-efficiency in foodprovision. The government gradually liberalized itstrade, opened the national economy to internationalinvestment and introduced its own national currency, thesomoni, in October 2000.

Agriculture, industry and services are the three mainpillars of modern Tajikistan’s economy, contributing23.4, 28.6 and 48.0 percent respectively to GDP (2006World Bank est.). The country depends heavily onimports of machinery, oil, gas, industrial consumergoods and food products; it increasingly relies on theexport of raw materials to the international market,especially aluminum, silver, electricity, cotton and fruits.After 1991 Tajikistan became one of the major routesfor illicit drugs (especially opium) transiting fromAfghanistan to Russia and further to Eastern andWestern Europe. The advent of large-scale drug smug-gling has contributed to the rise of a shadow economythat accounts for nearly 40 percent of the country’s GDP.

Tajikistan’s total external debt reached 773.2 millionU.S. dollars in 2004 (2004 World Bank est.) and isexpected to grow further in the near future. The countryneeds considerable foreign direct investment and inter-national assistance to modernize existing technologiesand to implement major economic changes.

Due to the civil war and the difficulties of postwarreconciliation, there has been a steady decline in living stan-dards among the population, especially among women andchildren. In 2006 the UN Development Program’s HumanDevelopment Index (HDI) put Tajikistan in 122nd placeout of 177, down from 34th place in 1991. The countryremains the poorest in the former Soviet Union, withaverage monthly wages ranging from 18 to 30 U.S. dol-lars and with 64 percent of the population living belowthe poverty line (2007 EIU est.). It is estimated thatbetween 70,000 and 110,000 people left Tajikistan annu-ally in the 1990s for Russia, Kazakhstan and othercountries in search of jobs and better standards of living.

Between 2002 and 2008, however, Tajikistan experi-enced robust annual economic growth of 7 to 8 percent dueto favorable conditions in domestic and international mar-kets. Significant rises in commodity prices on the interna-tional market boosted the state’s revenue. Tajikistan alsoattracted significant foreign investment in the energy andconstruction sectors of its economy. In addition, large sumsin the form of remittances, estimated at between 200 and500 million U.S. dollars per annum, were sent to Tajikistanby Tajiks working in other countries.

Map 43: Independent Tajikistan


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DangaraKulob

(Kulyab)

Panj

Shuroabad

Moskovskiy

FeyzabadShir Khan

Khovaling

Kalininabad

Kolkhozabad

NizhniyPanj

TavildaraObigarm

Hisor(Gissar)

KofarnikhonNurek

Tursunzade

Jirgatal

Kalaikhum

Shaartuz

Komsomolabad

SicharogDashtishur

SayodLairon

Childara Wakhio

Vir

Rushan

Vrang

Vanj

Buved

Kalot

Ishkashim

Kazidi

Rangkul

Murgab

Kudara

Dzhartyrabot

Shaymak

KokandTaboshar

AyniPanjakent

Kanibadam

Shahriostan

Uroteppa Isfara

Bekabad

Garm

Andizhan

Navabad

Kargovad

Angren

Kholm(Tashkurghan)

KhanabadQonduz

Taloqan

Termez

Chkalovsk

Qurghonteppa(Kurgan-Tyube)

Khorugh

Khujand(Leninabad)

Dushanbe

Tashkent

L E N I N A B A D

K H A T L O N

KUHISTONI BADAKHSHON( G O R N I Y B A D A K S H A N )

AFGHANISTAN

UZBEKISTANKYRGYZSTAN

CHINA

PAKISTAN

KAZAKHSTAN

UZBEKISTAN

Ka

r at e

gi n

Panj

Panj

Kow

kche

h

Oqsu

MurgabBarta

ng

Vak

hsh

Kaf

irni

gan

Zeravshan

Syr Dary

aSur

khan

Dar

ya

Lake Karakul

LakeSarezskoye

NurekReservoir

Surkhob

KayrakkumReservoir

Ragnau

Obikhingou

Amu Darya

Obikhingou

Pamir

0 25 50 75 100 km

50 75 mi250

Independent TajikistanNational capitalViloyat (province) centerTown, kishlakMajor airportInternational boundaryViloyat (province) boundaryMain roadSecondary roadRailroad

TAJIKISTAN


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On 27 October 1991 Turkmenistan declared itsindependence from the USSR. The country of about

5.1 million people embarked on its independence undervery favorable conditions. It possesses enormousreserves of natural gas and significant reserves of oil,which stirred speculation that Turkmenistan would bethe Kuwait of Central Asia. From the Soviet eraTurkmenistan inherited a relatively diversified econ-omy, in which the gas- and oil-extracting sectors alongwith a well-developed transportation infrastructure(including export-oriented pipelines) played key roles.Its society is one the most homogeneous in the region, asTurkmens account for 85 percent of the population,Russians about 4 percent, Uzbeks about 5 percent, andothers about 6 percent (2007 est.). Since 1991 a significantnumber of Russians and Russian-speaking groups haveleft the country.

Post-independence reforms in Turkmenistan havebrought to life one of the most extreme political regimesin the former USSR. Saparmurat Niyazov was electedpresident in 1990 and requested that he be calledTurkmenbashy (father of all Turkmen). He introduced anational policy represented by the slogan “Khalq, Vatan,Turkmenbashy!” (People, Fatherland, Turkmenbashy).In 1999 the Mejlis (parliament) endorsed him as presi-dent for life. But in December 2006 he unexpectedlydied, allegedly of heart failure, and in February 2007 hissuccessor, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, was electedpresident for a five-year term. The political system inTurkmenistan combines extreme forms of statism, egali-tarianism, and authoritarianism with nationalism andemphasis on traditional values. The Communist Party ofTurkmenistan was renamed the Democratic Party ofTurkmenistan (DPT) in December 1991 and hasremained the sole ruling party (as of 2007). All majoropposition parties were banned and a significant num-ber of Turkmen political leaders went into exile, mainlyto Russia, Norway and Sweden. In addition, theTurkmen government established tight control over themedia, banning all independent media outlets and evenimposing state control over Internet access. In 2007Berdymukhammedov promised to conduct some politi-cal reforms, including political and economic liberaliza-tion.

Despite possessing vast natural resources andhaving only a small population, the economic achieve-ments of Turkmenistan in the post-Soviet era havebeen mixed. The Turkmenistan government rejected anIMF-designed program of radical economic changes,confident that the sale of the country’s gas reserves—which they believed to be among the largest in theworld—would allow Turkmenistan to become prosper-ous within 10 to 15 years. The government approvedsmall-scale privatization, limited price liberalizationand currency reforms, allowed private entrepreneur-ship and selectively liberalized trade. But at the same

time, it retained a form of centrally planned economyand control over most of the enterprises in the indus-trial and agricultural sectors. The national currency, themanta, was introduced in November 1993. After a tur-bulent period from 1992 to 1998 during which annualinflation fluctuated between 600 and 3,000 percent, thecountry managed to reduce the inflation rate to 11 percent(2007 CIA est.).

Despite its apparent advantages, Turkmenistan’seconomic miracle did not materialize. This was largelydue to three factors: nonpayments for gas by theCIS partners; the absence of a gas pipeline to the non-CIS market; and the weaknesses of the economicdevelopment model chosen by Turkmenistan’s leaders.According to the World Bank, Turkmenistan’s economydeclined at an average annual rate of 4.8 percentbetween 1990 and 2000. The country failed to attractsizable direct foreign investment to modernize its gasand oil extracting facilities or to build new pipelines (seemap 49).

Agriculture, industry and services are the three mainpillars of post-Soviet Turkmenistan’s economy, con-tributing 17.7, 39.2 and 43.2 percent respectively to GDPin 2006 (2006, CIA est.). Exports are narrowly based onsales of raw materials on the international markets. Thecountry’s main exports are gas (in 2007 the countryexported 58,000 million cubic meters of gas), oil (5.5 mil-lion tons exported), textiles, cotton (Turkmenistan is theworld’s tenth largest producer of cotton), silk and otheragricultural products (2007 EIU est.).

The economic changes introduced in the 1990s haveled to a decade of steady decline in living standardsamong all groups of the population, despite the fact thatthe state provides water, electricity and gas free to allcitizens, and despite, too, some recent macroeconomicstabilization. The country’s healthcare, education andsocial welfare systems deteriorated significantly and anaverage life expectancy dropped to 62.5 years (2006UNDP est.). In 2006 the UN Development Program’sHuman Development Index (HDI) put Turkmenistan in105th place out of 177, on a par with El Salvador,Algeria and Jamaica. Unlike other Central Asianrepublics, Turkmenistan has not experienced a large-scale economic migration of its population during thepost-Soviet era.

Between 2002 and 2008 Turkmenistan experiencedrobust economic growth of 7 to 12 percent annually dueto favorable conditions in domestic and internationalmarkets. A significant rise in the prices of commoditieson the international market boosted the state’s revenue.A renegotiation of terms for gas and oil deliveries toRussia and the Ukraine significantly increased state rev-enues between 2002 and 2007. And yet, Turkmenistan’sagricultural sector and transportation infrastructure,especially pipelines, are run-down and require substan-tial investment and improvements.

Map 44: Independent Turkmenistan


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OstrovOgurchinskiy

Bekdash

Kara BogazGol

Chagyl

Kizyl Kaya

Oglanly

Aladzha

Kum Dag

Gazanjyk

Hasan Kuli

Kizyl Atrek

Kara-Kala

Khodzha Kala Bakhardok

Bakharden

Bami

Yerbent

Cheleken

Okarem

Ufra

Koturdepe

Gyzylarbat

Turkmenbashi(Krasnovodsk)

Pravda

BayramalyArtyk

Kalai Mor

Sandykachi

Krasnoye Znamya

Repetek

Kalinin

Nukus

azavraD

Kaakhka

Babadayhan

Tedzhenstroy

Serakhs

Uch Adzhi

Neftezavodsk

Dargan Ata

Urgench

Ravnina

Iolotan

Gushgy

Buzmeyin

Tedzhen

Dushak

Kerki Gaurdak

Bukhara

Farab

agnahsrahC

Samarqand

Kirova

Takh

ta Bazar

Kunia Urgench

Amu Darya

Nebitdag

Charjew

Dashhowuz

MaryAshgabat

DASHHOWUZ

B A L K A N

A H A L

M A R Y

L E B A P

KAZAKHSTAN

UZBEKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

ISL

AM

IC

RE

PU

BLIC

OFIRAN

KA

Z

AK

HS

TA

N

Ka

r aK

um

De s e r t

Tu

ra

n

Lo

w

l

a

nd

Chink Kaplankyr

KopetMountains

KrasnovodskiyPoluostrov

Depression

CA

SP

IA

NS

EA

Türkmen Aylag

y

Türkmenbashy AylagyAmu

Darya

(Oxus)

Garagum Canal

SariqamishKuli

GarabogazAylagy

Murgab

Sumbar

Atrak

0 50 150 mi100

0 50 100 150 200 km

National capitalWelayat (province) centerTown, kishlakAirportInternational boundaryWelayat (province) boundaryMain roadSecondary roadRailroad

Independent Turkmenistan

55˚ 60˚ 65˚

60˚ 65˚55˚

40˚

35˚

40˚

35˚


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Uzbekistan officially declared its independence fromthe USSR on 1 September 1991. The country began

its independence against a background of rising socialtensions and a looming ecological crisis. The country hasabout 27.8 million people (2007 CIA est.), making it thelargest in the region in terms of population. The popula-tion is very young, with about 50 percent below the ageof 25. The population could double within the next 25 to30 years if the current birth rate remains unchanged. Therapidly growing population puts enormous pressure onthe country’s environment and natural resources, withabout half of its territory experiencing a severe shortageof drinking water. In addition, large land areas facesalinization and desertification.

Uzbekistan’s society has long been relatively homo-geneous, with ethnic Uzbeks accounting for 80 percent ofthe population, Tajiks about 5 percent, Russians about 5.5percent, Kazakhs about 3 percent, Karakalpaks 2.5 per-cent, Tatars 1.5 percent and others 2.5 percent (2007 est.).Since 1991 a significant number of Russians and Russian-speaking groups have left the country due to interethnictensions and uncertainty about their future.

Citing political instability, the rise of social unrest,Islamic radicalism and interethnic tensions, Uzbekistanhas been slow to conduct political reforms. The govern-ment developed policies emphasizing egalitarianism,traditional community values, nationalism and the cen-tral role of the state and state institutions in regulatingand controlling the country’s political processes. TheCommunist Party of Uzbekistan was renamed thePeople’s Democratic Party (PDP) in 1991 and continuedplaying an important role in Uzbekistan’s political life.All major opposition political parties were banned andtheir leaders were persecuted or went into exile. Thegovernment also established tight control over themedia, banning all independent media outlets. In 1990and again in 2000, Islam Karimov was elected president(he skipped elections in 1995, as his term in office wasextended by a popular referendum).

Uzbekistan inherited from the Soviet era a well-developed and well-diversified economy; however, itsrestructuring and reforming proved very difficult. Thegovernment initially turned to the internationalexpertise of the World Bank, IMF, European Bank ofReconstruction and Development, Asian DevelopmentBank and others, though it outright rejected the ShockTherapy approach. By the mid-1990s it had devisedthe so-called Uzbekistan Model of Development thatemphasized gradual reforms, gradual privatization andliberalization and the preservation of the state’s centralrole in controlling the national economy. Althoughthe government approved small-scale privatization,allowed private entrepreneurship and conducted cur-rency reforms, at the same time it retained a form ofcentrally planned economy, large-scale subsidies anddirect control over the industrial and agricultural sec-

tors. The national currency, the sum, was introduced in1993. A currency black market emerged due to thestate’s strict control over the convertibility of the sum.After a turbulent period from 1993 to 2001, duringwhich annual inflation fluctuated between 400 and3,000 percent, in the early 2000s the country achievedsome degree of macroeconomic stability, with anannual official inflation rate of 7.6 percent in 2006 (2007CIA est.).

During the 1990s Uzbekistan’s approach to eco-nomic reform helped it avoid a steep economic reces-sion, mass closure of factories and plants and the massunemployment seen in many neighboring CentralAsian states. Uzbekistan even attracted direct foreigninvestment in its resources-extracting sectors, especiallygold extraction and processing, nonferrous metals andtextiles, and in its manufacturing sector—it became thefirst country in the region to begin producing cars (at ajoint Uzbek-Korean plant). By the late 1990s, however,foreign investors were becoming reluctant to invest inthe economy due to the continued inconvertibility ofthe national currency and the state’s centralized eco-nomic controls.

Agriculture, industry and services are the three mainpillars of post-Soviet Uzbekistan’s economy, contribut-ing 31.1, 25.7 and 43.2 percent respectively to GDP in2005 (2006, CIA est.). The country’s exports to the inter-national market include cotton (it is the region’s largestproducer), gold (it is the third largest producer in theCIS), energy products, textiles and some machinery. Dueto macroeconomic difficulties and huge spending on thesocial welfare system and on various large projects,Uzbekistan has accumulated about 4.7 billion U.S.dollars in external debt, the largest in the region (2007CIA est.).

Uzbekistan experienced a steady decline in livingstandards among all groups of the population in the1990s. The country remains one of the poorest countriesof the former Soviet Union, with 33 percent of thepopulation living below the poverty line (2007 CIA est.).In 2006 the UN Development Program’s HumanDevelopment Index (HDI) put Uzbekistan in 113th placeout of 177, on a par with Egypt and Nicaragua. As insome other Central Asian republics, a large number ofeconomic migrants left Uzbekistan in the post-Soviet era.

Between 2002 and 2008 Uzbekistan experiencedannual economic growth between 4 and 7 percent, dueto favorable conditions on the domestic and interna-tional markets. A significant rise in the prices of interna-tional market commodities boosted the state’s revenuesand Uzbekistan managed to improve its trade withpartners in the region and in the CIS. Yet, the countryfailed to attract significant foreign investment in itseconomy; its transportation infrastructure, energy facil-ities and agriculture have become run-down andrequire substantial investment and improvements.

Map 45: Independent Uzbekistan


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OstrovaVozrozhdeniya

Dargan Ata

Takhtakupyr

Uchquduq

Zarafshon

Beruni

Chimbay

Gazli

Khiva

Altynkul

Zhaslyk

KulkudukMynbulak

Gizhduvan

Qunghirot

Turtkul

Komsomolsk

Denau

Charjew Kitab

Nurata

Kagan

KasanMubarek

Farish

Guzar

Qyzylorda

Amu Darya

Kattakurgan

Shymkent

Zhambyl

Angren

Almalyk

Chirchiq

Bekabad

Quqon

M

unok

Mary

JizzakhGuliston

Qarshi

Termez

Navai

Bukhara

Farghona

Nukus

Namangan

Andijon

Samarqand

Urgench

Dushanbe

Tashkent

KAZAKHSTAN

TU

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ME

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REPUBLIC OF

IRAN

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0 50 250 km100 150 200

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1

National capitalCentre of autonomous republic or wiloyatTown, villageAirportInternational boundaryAutonomous republicor wiloyat boundaryMain roadSecondary roadRailroad

1 Andijon 2 Bukhara 3 Farghona 4 Jizzakh 5 Karakalpakstan 6 Khorazm 7 Namangan

8 Nawoiy 9 Qashqadaryo10 Samarqand11 Sirdaryo12 Surkhondaryo13 Tashkent

8

Wiloyat (provinces) of Uzbekistan

11

Independent Uzbekistan55˚ 60˚ 65˚

40˚

45˚

40˚

60˚ 65˚ 70˚


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The post-Soviet era’s interethnic problems and majorterritorial disputes were very much a product of the

USSR’s so-called nationality policies. From 1924 to 1926the Soviet authorities conducted their nation-statedelimitation in the region (see map 37), and over thenext six decades they supported the development ofall the attributes of the modern nation—national ver-nacular language and mass literacy, national identityassociated with territory and various national symbols.Communist government officials believed that nationalidentity and nationalism would inevitably give way to“socialist internationalism.” In this political philosophy,the borders between the Central Asian Soviet republicsplayed merely symbolic administrative roles, though theexternal borders were sealed by the “iron curtain” andreinforced by the military might of the Soviet state.

The dissolution of the USSR brought significantchanges in relations both among the Central Asianrepublics and with the outside world. Suddenly theissue of ethnic minorities and the demarcation of bor-ders became very important. Four major problems con-nected to borders and ethnicity seriously underminedrelations between the countries, problems which, if noteffectively addressed, had the potential to provokemajor regional wars.

First, the Soviet-era borders often divided ethniccommunities, sometimes literally cutting through townsand villages, for those borders were in fact largely irrele-vant before 1991. In the case of the Farghona Valley, forexample, as of 1991 up to half a million Uzbeksremained in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while severalhundred thousand Tajiks and thousands of Kyrgyzslived in Uzbekistan.

Second, suzerainty and capitalist materialism broughtfierce competition for natural resources in many borderdistricts. In the past, the Soviet government had regu-lated distribution of water, roads and energy infrastruc-ture so as to be equally shared between the communitieson both sides of any given border. In the post-Soviet era,nothing could stop one community from monopolizingresources or infrastructure.

Third, some communities laid so-called historicalclaims on the territories of neighboring states, citinghistorical evidence and the precolonial distribution ofpolitical power, culture and ethnic groups. CertainTajik groups, for instance, claimed that Bukhara andSamarqand should belong to the Tajik state as they weretraditionally Tajik centers of culture and learning, whilesome Uzbek activists demanded that the Kyrgyz cities ofOsh and Uzgen should belong to Uzbekistan.

Fourth, the problem of ethnic separatism emerged inmany areas of the region. For example, several millionethnic Russians had been living in the northern districtsand provinces of Kazakhstan for many generations,while many ethnic Kazakhs lived in the border provincesin the Russian Federation. About one million Uzbeks

live in the border districts in each of the neighboringCentral Asian states, while a significant number of Tajikslive in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

In addition, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistaninherited from the Russian colonial and Soviet erasterritorial disputes with the People’s Republic ofChina (PRC). Territorial disputes with Afghanistanemerged as well, and the Amu Darya River, tradition-ally accepted in some areas as the border betweenAfghanistan and Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, was grad-ually changing its course due to natural causes andclimatic changes.

Overall, experts on the region identified between 30and 60 conflicting points and disputed areas in the bor-der territories of Central Asia. These border issues andclaims were often championed by radical nationalistgroups, thus seriously undermining relations betweenthe newly independent states.

While the Central Asian republics chose differentapproaches to deal with each individual case, some com-mon ground was agreed upon. The initial framework forsettling interethnic problems and border disputes withinthe region was set up by the Almaty Declaration inDecember 1991. The declaration guaranteed the politicaland cultural rights of the ethnic minorities in everyrepublic in the region, with each government pledgingnot to discriminate against any ethnic groups. It was alsoaffirmed that all signatories of the declaration wouldrecognize existing borders and abstain from territorialclaims upon each other.

The demarcation of borders started in 1992 and 1993,and major border revisions were completed between1997 and 2007 when appropriate bilateral treaties weresigned. All the Central Asian states except Uzbekistanopted to keep the borders demilitarized, and only in1993–1994 did they establish checkpoints on the mainroads. The government of Uzbekistan chose a differentapproach, and decided to introduce Soviet-style controlover its borders by not only establishing checkpointsand installing barbed wire but also creating minefieldsalong some stretches.

Border disputes between the PRC on the one hand andKazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia on theother were settled on a multilateral basis within theframework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO), established in April 1996. SCO’s main purposewas to resolve territorial disputes and to demilitarizeborders. All border disputes between China, Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were officially settled by 1998and 1999, with the parties signing agreements on bordersand demilitarization. Some nationalistic elements inKyrgyzstan used the secret nature of the negotiations andthe fact that Kyrgyzstan transferred several hundredhectares of land to Chinese jurisdiction as a pretext tocriticize President Askar Akayev for “selling out hisfatherland.”

Map 46: Ethnic Composition and Major Territorial Disputes


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80 90

OskemenSemei

Astana

Kokshetau

PetropavlOmsk

Qostanai

Orsk

Ufa

Kazan

Kuibyshev

Oral

Astrakhan

Aktube

OrenburgSaratov

Atyrau

Qazali

Qyzylorda

Nukus

UrgenchDashhowuz

KhivaTurkmenbashi

Gyzylarbat

Mary

CharjewQarshi

Bukhara

Samarqand

Shimkent

Osh

Kashgar

Almaty

Qaragandy

Temirtau

Zhezqazghan

Pavlodar

Zhambyl

Nebitdag

Uzgen

Aktau

Balqash

Taldyqorgan

Lake Balqash

Aral

Sea

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TuraIrtysh

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l

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l

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Ili

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Katun

Biya

Ob

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Volga

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Irgiz

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Syr Darya

Tom'

Chulym

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Yark

an

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Hotan

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ab

Karakumsk Canal

EsilErtis

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Ural

Am

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Bishkek

Ashgabat

Tashkent

Tehran

Kabul

Dushanbe

Baku

AFGHANISTAN

TURKMENISTAN

ISLAMIC REPUBLICOF

IRAN

UZBEKISTAN

KAZAKHSTAN

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KYRGYZSTAN

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RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Border disputes in Farghona Valley

Uzgen Cities claimed by neighboring countries

Areas of concentrated minority populations

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Territorial Disputes

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The Central Asian republics showed remarkablepolitical stability after the collapse of communism in

1991, in sharp contrast to Yugoslavia or Afghanistanafter the Soviet occupation. The only country in theregion to experience significant turmoil in the 1990s wasTajikistan, and even there the conflict was quickly con-tained. Beneath this perceived stability, however, a verycomplex situation has emerged wherein a number ofsmall and dynamic groups and networks are preparedto challenge the ruling regimes.

From the first years of independence all national gov-ernments faced small radical and terrorist groups.Uzbekistan and Tajikistan took very harsh measuresagainst some radical critics and opponents, denyingthem political participation. This harsh approach in turnprovoked a backlash, as young people with no opportu-nity for political participation were increasingly drawninto the ranks of extremist groups. Among the most vis-ible and potentially the strongest were the radicalIslamic organizations, some of which gradually rose insize and sophistication, becoming components of vari-ous international networks of terrorist groups.

In response to these challenges and rising tensions,all the Central Asian republics banned any politicalorganizations based on religious or ethnic ideologies orprograms. Among the outlawed organizations were sev-eral small groups that demanded enforcement of stricterIslamic moral norms and eventually the introduction ofShariah, the Islamic legal system. Some of these groupswere dismantled by law enforcement agencies, othersmoved underground or began working at communitylevels, and some migrated to other countries in search ofsupport.

The civil war in Tajikistan from 1992 to 1997 opened anew chapter in the development of radical politicalgroups that were increasingly attracted by extremeIslamic ideologies. Many individuals from differentparts of the region traveled to Tajikistan to participate inthe war as “warriors of faith” (mujahedin) supportingvarious Islamic groups. After a series of defeats, themujahedin and many members of the Tajik oppositionmoved into Afghanistan. According to a number of esti-mates, between 20,000 and 100,000 Central Asians foundrefuge in Afghanistan. It was during this period thatCentral Asian political activists first established contactwith the Taliban movement, and probably also with theAl-Qaida organization.

In the late 1990s some of these young activists beganreturning to their home countries in the region andorganizing themselves into more active politicalnetworks and groups. In those years two major radicalIslamic groups emerged in the region: the IslamicMovement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan established itspower base in the Tajikistan parts of the Farghona Valley,

but recruited its members from Kyrgyzstan andUzbekistan. The IMU’s ultimate goal has been to over-throw Islam Karimov’s political regime in Uzbekistanby force and to establish an Islamic state. Several timesin 1999, 2000 and 2001, the IMU launched high-profileattacks into Uzbekistan from their Tajikistan bases viaKyrgyzstan territory. On one occasion the group evencaptured and held a number of small towns inKyrgyzstan for several weeks but were repelled by theKyrgyz army with help from Uzbek, Russian andKazakh forces. A series of suicide bombings that shookthe capital of Uzbekistan in spring 2004 were allegedlymasterminded by the IMU.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir established its power base in theFarghona Valley, but it is claimed to have a strong pres-ence in all Central Asian republics. Its ultimate goal isalso to establish an Islamic state, but the activists of theorganization have often stated that they would like toachieve their goal by peaceful means.

Both groups have a history of prominent activism inthe region. They both appear to have close relations withthe Taliban and Al-Qaida, and they are believed to beinvolved in illicit drug trafficking. Neither allegation,however, has ever been documented.

The situation changed drastically after theSeptember 11, 2001, attack on the United States and theensuing war in Afghanistan. The Central Asian gov-ernments lost no time in condemning the terroristactions and joined the U.S.-led efforts to overthrow theTaliban regime in Afghanistan. All the Central Asianrepublics granted overflight rights in their airspace tothe U.S. and NATO aircraft involved in humanitarianand rescue operations and air-support for the groundtroops in Afghanistan. Three of the Central Asianrepublics—Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan—agreed to host U.S. and NATO military personnel ontheir territory. Subsequently, in early 2002 the U.S.-ledcoalition established two military airbases in theregion. One was at Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan (stilloperational as of 2007); the other was at HanabadAirport in Uzbekistan. Several military facilities inTajikistan have been used by U.S. and NATO troopsfor a variety of missions.

With the beginning of the war in Iraq, however, rela-tions between the Central Asian governments and theUnited States deteriorated. Although Kazakhstan sentmilitary engineers to Iraq and pledged to keep them inthe country “as long as there is a need,” other republicswere reluctant to lend their unconditional support forthe war. In addition, Russia and China put pressure onKyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan over the U.S. militarybases, demanding a clear deadline for their closure. Dueto a combination of factors, the government ofUzbekistan closed the military base in Hanabad in thefall of 2005.

Map 47: Central Asia and the War on International Terrorism


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Lake Balqash

Aral

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Casp ianSea

KaraBogazGol

Lake Ysyk Kol

TuraIrtysh

Esi

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Tarim

Katun

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Chulym

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Kabul

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War on International Terrorism

Bishkek

OskemenSemei

Astana

Kokshetau

Petropavl

Omsk

Qostanai

Orsk

Ufa

Kazan

Samara

Oral

Aktube

OrenburgSaratov

Atyrau

Qazali

Qyzylorda

Nukus

UrgenchDashhowuz

KhivaTurkmenbashi

Gyzylarbat

Mary

CharjewQarshi

BukharaSamarqand

Shimkent

OshFarghona

Kashgar

Almaty

Qaragandy

Temirtau

Zhezqazghan

Pavlodar

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Since the 1980s the Farghona Valley has been potentiallyone of the most explosive areas in Central Asia, and a

microcosm also of the social, political and economic trendstypical in the developing world. The Farghona area, whichoccupies less than four percent of the region’s territory, ishome to about 15 percent of the region’s population. It isshared between three republics—Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistanand Uzbekistan—and therefore destabilization in thevalley can immediately affect all three republics. This isparticularly true for Uzbekistan, whose capital, Tashkent,the largest urban center in the region, is situated roughly100 miles (160 kilometers) away. All the problems and con-flicts that have affected the region since independence areto be found in the valley (Rubin 1999).

In many ways the problems in the valley replicatepatterns of development in countless agriculture-basedthird world countries. Over the past 50 years the popula-tion in the area has nearly tripled, reaching between8 and 9 million. Due to this massive demographic expan-sion in the 1970s and 1980s, the valley’s population islargely youthful, with an estimated 45 to 50 percent28 years old or younger. This growth has severely aggra-vated competition for resources and jobs between indi-viduals and communities. Social problems have becomeparticularly acute, as local and national governments didnot direct adequate investment into job-creation in the1980s and the 1990s. According to various estimates,between 15 and 30 percent of the people in the area areunemployed or underemployed and about half the pop-ulation lives below the poverty line (International CrisisGroup 2000). Limited market-oriented reforms and theopening of private initiatives have been introduced onlyin the Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan parts of the FarghonaValley, not on the Uzbekistan side.

The area’s social and demographic problems havebeen worsened by an ecological crisis. The FarghonaValley is one of the most productive agricultural areas inthe region, but it has a very fragile ecosystem. As inmany developing countries, local peasants tend to useoutdated practices and technologies in order to squeezeout of their small plots of land as much produce as pos-sible, often ignoring long-term consequences. Thus, thevalley has lost nearly all of its alpine and subalpine for-est, and large areas of bush along the rivers and creekshave also been destroyed. This in turn has led to anincrease in the frequency of landslides and floods duringthe wet season, water shortages in the dry season andsevere salinization and desertification.

Competition between communities has been aggra-vated even further by the multiethnic composition ofthe area and by rising nationalism. It is not uncommonfor a small conflict or disagreement between communi-ties to explode into a full-scale confrontation between

representatives of different ethnic groups. This type ofescalation can immediately involve much largergroups, as neighboring villagers rush to help their kin.Such was the case in community conflicts that led tomass riots claiming many lives in 1988, 1989 and 1990,and in minor water and land disputes in the 1990s.

Economic management and proper governance of thearea have been undermined by the erection of borders, arise in border disputes and an absence of cross-bordercooperation. During the Soviet era, all communication,transportation, energy and water infrastructure was builtby the central government. After 1991, however, thenational governments asserted their sovereign rightsover land, property and infrastructure and began man-aging and using these resources according to their ownneeds, often ignoring the needs of the others. The case ofwater management illustrates the problem. The govern-ments of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan claim that their waterresources constitute proprietary commercial assets andtherefore that a downstream country—in this case,Uzbekistan—should pay for the water or let them use thewater according to their needs. Kyrgyzstan’s andTajikistan’s governments wish to develop hydroelectricpower stations and sell the resulting power to China andAfghanistan for hard currency. To accomplish this,Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have insisted on their right tomanage the water resources by themselves, accumulat-ing as much water as possible during the spring andsummer seasons when the demand for electricity is low,and discharging as much as possible in the winter whendemand is high. The government of Uzbekistan, on theother hand, has taken the view that water is not a com-mercial asset but a public good, and hence it has the rightto participate in managing the water resources and to usethem without having to pay for them. The issue is veryimportant for Uzbekistan, as its cotton farmers needwater in the spring and summer, while excessive waterduring the winters would flood their fields.

In the meantime, as local and national governmentshave been locked in unending disputes and inefficientpractices, various radical Islamist groups have steppedin. These groups claim that the only solution lies in theirvision of radical change, which includes buildingTaliban-style governments and legal systems. Thesegroups are believed to have established close ties withthe Taliban and to have undergone training in theircamps. Upon returning from Afghanistan, they went sofar as to attempt the seizure of villages and towns inremote areas of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan inorder to establish their presence and power bases there.All together this development added a whole new layerof tension to the existing situation, further destabilizingthe area.

Map 48: Border Disputes in the Farghona Valley


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UzgenJalalabad

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KAZAKHSTAN

CHINA

KYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

PAKISTAN

INDIA

ISLAMIC

REPUBLIC OF

IRAN

Densely populated Farghona Valley

Hot conflict spots

Shared Territory: The Farghona Valley


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Throughout the 1990s, multibillion-dollar oil and gasdeals and pipeline contracts completed in Central

Asia made headlines in major newspapers. Some com-mentators hastened to compare the Central Asianenergy reserves favorably with those in the Middle East.Yet other experts claim that the region’s oil reserves arein fact modest and no match for those in the MiddleEast. Whoever is right, the region’s estimated potential,ranging from a conservative 80 billion barrels of oil to anoptimistic 200 billion barrels, is valued at 5 to 7 trillionU.S. dollars at 2003 prices.

Although early small-scale extraction of oil reservesin Central Asia began long before the mid-twentieth cen-tury, it took nearly a hundred years for large-scaleexploitation to become a reality. Similarly, the region’slarge gas reserves were discovered after World War Two,but extraction didn’t begin until the 1970s. Several factorscontributed to these delays: difficult geographic terrain,extremes of continental climate, high seismic activityand remoteness from major consumers in Eastern andWestern Europe.

Throughout the Soviet era no foreign companies wereallowed to operate in the region. The Kremlin invested ahuge amount of money in large-scale commercial explo-ration of the reserves during and after World War II.The most extensive oil reserves were found on the north-ern and eastern shores of the Caspian Sea and in centraland western Kazakhstan. The largest gas reserves werefound in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.During the Soviet-era the oil was delivered via the pipelinesof Shevchenko-Guriev (both Kazakhstan)-Orsk-Ufa (bothRussia), Shevchenko-Guriev-Kuibushev, and Shimkent-Pavlodar-Omsk. The gas was delivered via the pipelinesof Mary (Turkmenistan)-Khiva (Uzbekistan)-Saratov, Mary-Khiva-Chelyabinsk, and Mary-Khiva-Gazli-Almaty (CIA1985).

The first negotiations with Western oil and gas com-panies on possible technology transfers and prospectivejoint-venture development of some oil fields began inthe 1980s. As the First Gulf War was being fought, manyinternational experts and some policy makers begantalking about a need to diversify oil supply sources incase of a major crisis in the Middle East. This stimulatedinterest in, discussion on and speculation about theplace of Central Asia and its energy reserves in theinternational energy market, and potential transporta-tion routes for large-scale exports of those reserves.Dozens of oil and gas pipeline projects were discussedand feasibility studies were conducted in the 1990s.Within this framework, transnational corporations(TNC) developed feasibility studies on several pro-grams: east-west, east-southwest, east-south and east-southeast. These programs projected the development

of oil and gas delivery to Western Europe via Russia, theCaucasus and Turkey; to India and Pakistan viaAfghanistan and probably via Iran; and to China andpotentially Korea and Japan via China or RussianSiberia. As of 2007 a number of these projects hadmaterialized.

The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) is intendedto bring oil from Kazakhstan’s largest oil field at Tenghizto Novorossiisk, a Russian seaport on the Black Sea. Itwas established by Chevron, Agip, Mobil and compa-nies representing Kazakhstan, Oman and Russia (theownership structure has changed over time) in order toconstruct a 1,500-kilometer-long export-oil pipeline. Thefirst stage was completed in 2001 and it is expected thatthe second stage, which will triple the pipeline’s capac-ity, will be completed in 2010.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline was pro-posed to bring oil to Turkey’s Mediterranean port ofCeyhan and then to the European market, bypassingRussia. It became operational in 2005. The interna-tional partners that worked on the BTC also built theSouth Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), which brought naturalgas from the Caspian Sea along the same route viaBaku and Tbilisi to the Turkish city of Erzurum andthen to the European market. It became operational in2006.

The Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline (KCOP) isintended to bring oil from oil-rich Kazakhstan to theChinese market. The line’s total length will be about3,000 kilometers, at an estimated cost of 3.5 to 4.9 billionU.S. dollars. This pipeline has been divided into severalsections, the last of which will be completed in 2011.The first section, Aktube-Atyrau, was completed in 2003and the section from Atasu (central Kazakhstan) toAlashankou (western China) was completed in 2005. By2011 this pipeline is expected to be connected to theChinese pipeline system running from Xingjian to east-ern and south-eastern provinces of the PRC.

The Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey Gas Pipeline (TITGP)is intended to bring Turkmenistan’s gas to western mar-kets through Iran and Turkey. Turkmenistan has alreadycompleted a pipeline for exporting small amounts ofgas to Iran, but the TITGP project has been delayed byU.S. economic sanctions against Iran and is still in theplanning stage. There was an additional project thatproposed to deliver Turkmenistan’s gas via the trans-Iranian gas pipeline to the Persian Gulf.

The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India GasPipeline (TAPIGP) is intended to bring gas fromTurkmenistan to Pakistan and India. However, this proj-ect was undermined by the political instability and warin Afghanistan and therefore had not gone beyond thefeasibility stage as of 2007.

Map 49: Major Oil and Gas Pipeline Proposals


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CPC pipeline

Possible TITGPpipelines

KCOP pipeline

OskemenSemei

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Kokshetau

PetropavlOmsk

Qostanai

Orsk

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Kazan

Samara (Kuibyshev)

Oral

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OrenburgSaratov

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Qazali

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Gyzylarbat

Mary

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Bukhara

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OshFarghona

Kashgar

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Temirtau

Zhezqazghan

Pavlodar

Zhambyl

Nebitdag

Uzgen

Aktau

Balqash

TaldyqorganShevchenko

Chelyabinsk

Tenghiz

BTC, SCP

Atasu

Aral

pipelines

oil field

Turkmenbashi

Dashhowuz

GazliSamarqand

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Aral

Sea

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Lake Ysyk Kol

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Ashgabat

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Tbilisi

Tehran

Kabul

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Baku

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IRAN

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Selected existing oil pipelines

Selected existing gas pipelines

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Proposed pipelines toAfghanistan, Pakistan and India

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Proposed oil pipelines

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Gas and Oil Pipelines

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Independence opened up new opportunities for theCentral Asian states to join in globalization trends. The

Central Asian leaders believed that international tradewould help lift them out of the Soviet-era’s economicand political isolation.

From the early 1990s the Central Asian governmentsbegan talking about a resurrection of the trade throughthe Great Silk Road (see maps 13 and 21). In the newgeopolitical environment, Central Asia could provideseveral significant advantages if new transportation net-works were built. Central Asian infrastructure could pro-vide the shortest overland connection between thegrowing Chinese and European markets, and it couldalso connect India and Pakistan with Central Asia, Russiaand Eastern Europe. The Central Asian states wouldboost their lost economic growth as well through accessto international transportation networks, reductions intheir export costs and the benefits arising from trade.

The development of international trade and trans-portation infrastructure in the new millennium wouldrequire not only the building of new roads but also areconceptualization of the whole model of regional andsubregional trade. This included diversification of trans-portation networks, reducing dependency on Russia.

To address their existing problems systematically,the Central Asian republics initiated or joined severalinternational programs, consortiums and organizations,including the large transnational concepts of theEurasian Infrastructure Corridor (EIC), Eurasian Land-Bridge (ELB), Eurasian Railroad TransportationCorridor (ERTC) and Trans-Asiatic Pipeline Network(TAPN). All of these programs were designed to pro-mote the building of comprehensive railroad andpipeline systems. Central Asian leaders, together withleaders of nine states in Eastern Europe and theCaucasus, established a new international organizationin 1998 (officially inaugurated in 2001): the TransportCorridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia (TRACECA),with a specific mandate to facilitate the development ofinfrastructure projects within the territories of the mem-ber states. Various transportation projects were dis-cussed, studied and developed by the Commonwealthof Independent States (CIS), Economic CooperationOrganization (ECO) and the Shanghai CooperationOrganization (SCO).

The Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-CentralAsia (TRACECA) is designed to optimize the manage-ment, usage and development of existing rail andhighway systems among the member states. This projectis intended to restore and extend the transportationinfrastructure that existed during the Soviet era butbegan falling apart, largely due to the nationalization ofvarious sections of the system by the newly independentstates and to the collapse of interstate trade among for-mer Soviet republics. The member states also hope to

address the need for development of commerce andtrade among members and intraregional trade.

The Eurasian Railroad Transportation Corridor(ERTC) is intended to connect the port of Rotterdam inthe Netherlands with the Chinese port of Lianyungandon the Yellow Sea, through a Central Asian railroad net-work that links to the Chinese rail system and theRussian trans-Siberian railroad system. Another phaseof the project calls for building a Paris-Shanghai link,using existing railroad infrastructure. This projectwould mobilize both private and public investment tobuild the links missing between various sections of thesystem or reconstruct and update run-down sections.A long-term proposal that would technically make itpossible to travel by rail from Western Europe to China,it will probably take decades before commercialexploitation is possible.

The North-South Transportation Corridor (NSTC) isintended to connect Central Asia with South Asia via theKarakorum Mountain Road and/or via Afghanistan,thus boosting trade between various remote areas inKyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan.Although the Osh-Karakorum road was completed, itsusage has been undermined by the political instability inAfghanistan. There is also a proposal to build a railroadconnecting Osh with Bishkek, thus extending the NSTCto northern Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

The North-South Rail-Ship Container Corridor(NSRSC) is planned to connect northern Europe andindustrial centers in northwestern Russia with seaportsin the Persian Gulf and potentially with South Asia viathe Central Asian republics or the Caspian Sea. Thisproject envisions a combination of river and sea trans-portation, with overland rail connections on some sec-tions. One variation of the project includes aRussia-Iran-India transportation corridor.

The Central Asia–Persian Gulf Railway Project(CAPGRP) is proposed to connect the Central Asian andIranian railway systems from Mary to Bandar-Abbas sea-port in the Persian Gulf. This project was supported bythe ECO, and in the late 1990s the connection between thetwo systems was inaugurated. However, the commercialusage of the project was delayed by a combination of eco-nomic recession in Central Asia, Turkmenistan’s isolationfrom the economic integration processes in Central Asiaand U.S.-imposed sanctions against Iran.

The Central Asia-East Asia Highway (CAEAHW)would link several countries on the Tashkent-Andijon(Uzbekistan)-Osh (Kyrgyzstan)-Kashgar (China) route,boosting intraregional trade. A large section of the road(Tashkent-Andijon-Osh) already exists, and it has beenreported that feasibility studies were completed for build-ing the most technologically challenging stretch, betweenOsh and Kashgar through the Tian Shan Mountains. Thisproject is supported and backed by the SCO.

Map 50: Transportation Routes


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Lake Balqash

Aral

Sea

Casp ianSea

KaraBogazGol

Lake Ysyk Kol

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l

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l

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RUSSIA

TAJIKISTAN

KAZAKHSTAN

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Major auto and truck routes

Transportation Infrastructure

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IRAN

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Astrakhan

Aktube

OrenburgSaratov

Atyrau

Qazali

Qyzylorda

Nukus

UrgenchDashhowuz

KhivaTurkmenbashi

Gyzylarbat

Mary

Charjew QarshiBukhara Samarqand

Shimkent

OshFarghona

Kashgar

Almaty

Qaragandy

Temirtau

Zhezqazghan

Pavlodar

Zhambyl

Nebitdag

Andijon

Aktau

Balqash

TaldyqorganShevchenko

Chelyabinsk

Gazli

Atasu

Aral

Kushka

Zhanaozen

Volgograd

EkaterinburgTumen'

Magnitogorsk

Novosibirsk

Barnaul

Namangan Jalalabad

Kyzylkia

Shahrisabz

Termez

Kulab

Kurgan

Kerki

Navai

Uchkuduk

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Selected Bibliography

This bibliography of selected publications on Central Asia will helpscholars, students and the general public in their further studies of

the region, its people and political and economic development. Most ofthe works cover Central Asian history in general while others look at itsimportant features or particular periods. Most of them include varioushistorical maps. Currently, several books are available that comprehen-sively cover the history of Central Asia from the early days to the present,including the most authoritative five-volume work, published under theauspices of UNESCO: The History of Civilizations of Central Asia (pub-lished between 1996 and 2006). Those who would like to find additionalreading might consider turning to the most comprehensive bibliographi-cal work, Yuri Bregel’s three-volume Bibliography of Islamic Central Asiapublished in 1995. It contains bibliographical references to thousands ofbooks in English, Russian, French, German, Central Asian and other lan-guages. Considering space limitations, and the scope of the PalgraveConcise Historical Atlas of Central Asia, the author chose the most promi-nent modern works, which can lead readers to other publications, givingpriority to the most recent atlases and publications that include usefulmaps. Moreover, in the age of information technology many websitesprovide useful Internet links, bibliographies, and access to historical doc-uments, memoirs and travel reports, as well as links to historical andpolitical maps and statistical data for further studies of Central Asia. Inthis section readers will also find a concise list of Internet resources. Theauthor is fully aware that there are hundreds and hundreds of volumespublished on the topic in the Central Asian and Russian languages;however, the author included only a few of them, hoping that readerswill find appropriate publications in specialized libraries, archives andcollections.

Abazov, Rafis. Historical Dictionary of Kyrgyzstan. Lanham, Md.:Scarecrow Press, 2004.

———, Historical Dictionary of Turkmenistan. Lanham, Md.: ScarecrowPress, 2005.

Adle, Chahryar, Mahdavan K. Palat, and Anara Tabyshalieva. History ofCivilizations of Central Asia. Paris: UNESCO, 2005.

Adle, Chahryar, Irfan Habib, and Karl M. Baipakov. History ofCivilizations of Central Asia. Development in Contrast: from the Sixteenthto the Mid-Nineteenth Century. Paris: UNESCO, 2004.


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Adshead, Samuel. Central Asia in World History. London: Macmillan,1993.

Akiner, Shirin. Islamic People of the Soviet Union. London: Kegan PaulInternational, 1983.

Akiner, Shirin, ed. The Caspian: Politics, Energy and Security. London andNew York: Routledge Curzon, 2004.

Allworth, Edward, ed. Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance. AHistorical Overview. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994.

“Almaty Declaration.” In: “Report of the International MinisterialConference of Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries and DonorCountries and International Financial and Development Institutions OnTransit Cooperation, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 28 and 29 August 2003.”New York: UN, 2003, pp. 24–26 (UN document A/CONF.202/3).

Alram, Michael, and Deborah E. Klimburg-Salter, eds. Coins, Art, andChronology: Essays on pre-Islamic History of the Indo-Iranian Borderlands.Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999.

Bartold, Vasilii V. Cultural History of the Muslims. (Translated from theRussian by Shahid Suhrawardy.) New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1995.

———, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion. London: Luzac, 1928.Benningsen, Alexandre, and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay. Islam in the

Soviet Union. New York: Praeger, 1967.Biran, Michal. Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central

Asia. London: Routledge, 1997.———. The Empire of the Qara Khitai in Eurasian History. Between China and

the Islamic World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.Bosworth, Clifford Edmund, and M. S. Asimov. History of Civilizations of

Central Asia. The Age of Achievement: A.D. 750 to the End of the FifteenthCentury. Paris: UNESCO, 2004.

Boyle, J. A., ed. Cambridge History of Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1968.

Bregel, Yuri. An Historical Atlas of Central Asia (Handbook of OrientalStudies/Handbuch Der Orientalistik – Part 8: Uralic & Central AsianStudies, 9). Brill Academic Publishers, 2003.

Bregel, Yuri, ed. Historical Maps of Central Asia: 9th–19th Centuries.Bloomington, Ind.: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 2000.

Breton, Roland J.-L. Atlas of the Languages and Ethnic Communities of SouthAsia. Thousand Oaks, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1997.

Brice, William C., and Hugh Kennedy. An Historical Atlas of Islam(Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition). Leiden: Brill, 1981.

Central Intelligence Agency. USSR Energy Atlas. Washington, D.C.:Central Intelligence Agency, 1985.

Channon, John, and Robert Hudson. The Penguin Historical Atlas of Russia.London; New York: Viking, 1995.

Clubb, O. E. China and Russia: The “Great Game.” New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1971.

114 Selected Bibliography


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Colledge, Malcolm. The Parthians. New York: Praeger, 1967.Crandall, Maureen. Energy, Economics and Politics in the Caspian Region:

Dream and Reality. Westport, Conn.; London: Praeger SecurityInternational, 2006.

Crews, Robert. For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and CentralAsia. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006.

Cummings, Sally N., ed. Oil, Transition and Security in Central Asia. NewYork: Routledge, 2003.

Curtis, Glen, ed. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, andUzbekistan: Country Studies (Area Handbook Series). Washington, D.C.:Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1997.

Curzon, George Nathaniel. The Pamirs and the Source of the Oxus. London:Royal Geographic Society, 1896.

———. Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question.London: Cass, repr. 1967.

Danmore, the Earl. The Pamirs. Being A Narrative of a Year’s Expedition onHorseback and on Foot Through Kashmir, Western Tibet, Chinese Tartary,and Russian Central Asia. 2 vols. London: John Murray, 1893.

Demko, George J. The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896–1916.Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969.

Feshbach, Murray, and Alfred Friendly. Ecocide in the USSR: Health andNature under Siege. New York: Basic Books, 1992.

Findley, Carter Vaughn. The Turks in World History. New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2005.

Firdowsi, Abolqasem. Shahnameh: The Persian Book of Kings. Trans. DickDavis. New York: Viking Adult, 2006.

Foltz, Richard C. Religions of the Silk Road: Overland Trade and CulturalExchange from Antiquity to the Fifteenth Century. New York: St. Martin’sPress, 1999.

Gafurov, Bobozhan. Central Asia: Pre-Historic to Modern Time. (EnglishTranslation) Introduction by Devendra Kaushik. Delhi, India: ShirpaPublications, 2005.

Geiss, Paul Georg. Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia: CommunalCommitment and Political Order in Change. London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

Gibb, H. A. R. The Travels of Ibn Battuta. London: 1929; repr. 2000.———. The Arab Conquest of Central Asia. London: 1923; repr. 1970.Gibbon, Edward. The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.

New York: Blue Unicorn Editions, 2001.Gilbert, Martin. The Routledge Atlas of Russian History. Third Edition.

London; New York; Routledge, 2002.Golden, Peter. An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples.

Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassassowitz, 1992.Haidar, Mansura. Indo-Central Asian Relations: From Early Times to

Medieval Period. New Delhi; Manohar, 2004.

115Selected Bibliography


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Haidar, Mirza Muhammad. The Tarikh-i-Rashidi [A History of theMoghuls of Central Asia]. English trans. E. Denison Ross. (1895).Patna: Academica Asiatica, repr. 1973.

Hauner, Milan. What is Asia for Us? Russia’s Asian Heartland Yesterday andToday. Boston; London: Unwin Hyman, 1990.

Haywood, John, and Simon Hall. The Penguin Historical Atlas of AncientCivilizations (Penguin Historical Atlas). New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 2005.

Hedin, Sven. Central Asia Atlas, Memoir on Maps. Stockholm: the SvenHedin Foundation, Statens etnografiska museum, 1967.

Hemming, John. The Oxford Atlas of Exploration. Oxford; New York:Oxford University Press, 1997.

Herodotus. The Histories. Trans. A. D. Godley. Cambridge, Ma.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1963–1969.

Hoff, Brent, and Carter Smith. Mapping Epidemics: A Historical Atlas ofDisease. Franklin Watts, 2000.

Hopkirk, Peter. The Great Game: the Struggle for Empire in Central Asia.New York: Kodansha International, 1992.

Iacomelli, Aldo. Renewable Energies for Central Asia Countries: Economic,Environmental and Social Impacts (NATO Science Series: IV: Earth andEnvironmental Sciences). Springer, 2006.

International Crisis Group. Central Asia: Crisis Conditions in Three States.Brussels and Osh: International Crisis Group, 2000.

Johnson, Gordon. Cultural Atlas of India: India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan,Bangladesh & Sri Lanka. New York: Facts on File, 1996.

Kaiser, R. J. The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR.Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Kashgari, Mahmud. In: Dankoff, R., and J. Kelly. Compendium of the TurkicDialects, vol. 1. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982.

Khan, Aisha. A Historical Atlas of Kyrgyzstan (Historical Atlases of SouthAsia, Central Asia and the Middle East). New York: Rosen PublishingGroup, 2004.

———. A Historical Atlas of Uzbekistan (Historical Atlases of South Asia,Central Asia and the Middle East). New York: Rosen PublishingGroup, 2003.

———. A Historical Atlas of India (Historical Atlases of South Asia, CentralAsia and the Middle East). New York: Rosen Publishing Group, 2003.

Khazanov, Anatoly. Nomads and the Outside World. Trans. JuliaCrookenden. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994.

Knobloch, Edgar. Beyond the Oxus. Archaeology, Art and Architecture ofCentral Asia. London: Ernest, 1972.

Komroff, Manuel. Contemporaries of Marco Polo. London: 1928; repr. 1989.Kwanten, Luc. Imperial Nomads. A History of Central Asia, 500–1500.

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979.Lattimore, Owen, and Eleanor Lattimore. Silk, Spices and Empire: Asia Seen

through the Eyes of Its Discoverers. New York: Dell, 1968.



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Lewis, Bernard. Islam in History: Ideas, People, and Events in the Middle East.Second Edition. Chicago: Open Court, 2001.

Lewis, Robert A., Robert R. Churchill, and Amanda Tate. GeographicPerspectives on Soviet Central Asia. New York: Routledge, 1992.

Manz, Beatrice F., ed. Central Asia in Historical Perspective. Boulder, Colo.:Westview Press, 1993.

Manz, Beatrice F. Rise and Rule of Tamerlane. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, repr. 2002.

McGovern, W. M. The Early History of Central Asia. A Study of the Scythiansand the Huns and the Part They Played in World History. Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 1939.

Milner-Gulland, Robin, and Nikolai Dejevsky. Cultural Atlas of Russia andthe Former Soviet Union. New York: Checkmark Books, 1998.

Neilson, Keith. Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894–1917.New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Nicolle, David. Historical Atlas of the Islamic World. New York: CheckmarkBooks, 2003.

Olcott, Brill Martha. The Kazakhs. 2nd ed. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford UniversityPress, 1995.

Onians, John. Atlas of World Art. London: Laurence King, 2004.Pahlen, K. K. Mission to Turkestan. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.Parks, George B., ed. The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the Venetian. New York:

Macmillan, 1927.Perdue, Peter. China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia.

Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.Pierce, Richard. Russian Central Asia, 1867–1917: A Study of Colonial Rule.

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960.Rashid al-Din Tabib. The Successors of Genghis Khan. Trans. John Andrew

Boyle. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.Rawlington, (Sir) Henry. England and Russia in the East. London, 1875;

repr. New York: Praeger, 1970.Rayfield, Donald. The Dream of Lhasa: The Life of Nikolay Przhevalsky

(1839–88): Explorer of Central Asia. London: Elek, 1976.Rockhill, W. The Journey of William Rubruck to the Eastern Parts of the World,

1253–1255. London: 1900; repr. 1998.Romano, Amy. A Historical Atlas of Afghanistan (Historical Atlases of South

Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East). New York: Rosen PublishingGroup, 2003.

Rossabi, Morris. China and Inner Asia: From 1368 to the Present Day (ChineseHistory and Society). New York: Pica Press, 1975.

Ruthven, Malise, and Azim Nanji. Historical Atlas of Islam. Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Rubin, Barnett, and Nancy Lubin. Calming the Ferghana Valley: Developmentand Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia. New York: Century FoundationPress, 1999.

Rywkin, Michael. Moscow’s Muslim Challenge. London: C. Hurst, 1982.



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Index

Abbasids, 16Ablai Khan, ruler (Kazakhs), 30Abu Jabar al-Mansur, Caliph, 16Abu Muslim, governor (Khwarezm and Maveranahr),

16Abu Said, ruler (Timurids), 26Achaemenid Empire, 7, 8Administrative divisions. See BoundariesAfghanistan, 47, 48Ahmad Arslan Qara Khan, ruler (Karakhanids), 18Ahmed Sanjar, ruler (Seljuks), 19Airbases, military, 47Akayev, Askar, president (Kyrgyzstan), 42, 46Ala Ad-din Atsyz, ruler (Khwarezm), 20Ala Ad-din Muhammad II, ruler (Khwarezm), 20Ala Ad-din Tekesh, ruler (Khwarezm), 20Alash Orda government, 35Alexander II, tsar (Russia), 31Alexander the Great, 7, 8Alexandria in Margiana, 7Alma Ata. See AlmatyAlmaty (Kazakhstan), 33, 37, 40Almaty Declaration (1991), 46Amu Darya River, 5Anti-Bolshevik movements, 35, 36Arabs, 10, 14, 15Arabshahid Dynasty, 28Ardashir I, ruler (Sassanids), 10Ashgabad (Turkmenistan), 35, 37, 40Ashkabat. See AshgabadAshkhabat. See Ashgabad

Babur, 27Bactra (Bactria), 7Bactria, 7, 8. See also StatesBahram II, ruler (Sassanids), 10Bakiyev, Kurmanbek, president (Kyrgyzstan), 42Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, 49Basmachi, 35, 36Battles: al-Qadisiyyh (637 A.D., Arabs vs. Sassanids), 10;

Ankara (1402 A.D., Timurids vs. Ottoman Turks),25; Balkh (1008 A.D., Karakhanids vs. Ghaznavids),18; Carrhae (53 B.C., Parthians vs. Romans), 9;Dandanqan City (1040 A.D., Seljuks vs.Ghaznavids), 19; Derbend (1386 A.D., Timurids vs.

Golden Horde), 25; Edessa (259 A.D., Sassanids vs.Romans), 10; Herat (588 A.D., Turks vs. Sassanids),11; Khojand (1137 A.D., Karakhanids vs.Karakitais), 18; Manzikert (1071 A.D., Seljuks vs.Byzantines), 19; Merv (651 A.D., Muslims vs.Sassanids), 15; Resaena (244 A.D., Sassanids vs.Romans), 10; Samarqand (1141 A.D., Karakhanidsvs. Karakitais), 18; Talas river (751 A.D., Chinese vs.Arabs), 15

Batu Khan, ruler (Mongols), 23Berdymukhammedov, Gurbanguly, president

(Turkmenistan), 44Bessus-Artaxerxes V, ruler (Persia), 8Bilge Khaghan, ruler (Turks), 11Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), 37Black Death. See PlagueBlue Horde (Mongols), 23Bolshevik revolution (1917), 34Bolsheviks, 34, 35, 36Boundaries: modern, 2; 19th century, 32; early 20th

century, 33; Soviet, 37, 38; post-Soviet, 46, 48British Empire. See Great BritainBuddhism, 12, 16. See also ReligionsBukhara Emirate, 28, 31, 32, 35, 36Bumin (also Tumin) Khaghan, ruler (Turks), 11

Caliphate, Islamic, 16, 20Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), 49Central Asia-East Asia Highway (CAEAHW), 50Central Asia-Persian Gulf Railway Project (CAPGRP), 50Chagatai Khan, ruler (Mongols), 23China, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 29, 30Christianity, 12. See also ReligionsCities, 6, 7, 8, 33, 38Civil war (1918–1922), 34, 35, 36Civil war (1992–1997, Tajikistan), 43, 47Climate, 1Colonization of Central Asia, 29, 30, 31Commodities, 13, 21, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45Communication systems, 13, 21; 19th century, 32, 33;

post-Soviet, 50Communist Party, 38Communist Party of Tajikistan, 43Communist Party of Turkmenistan, 44Communist Party of Uzbekistan, 45

Numerals refer to map numbers (and facing text)


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Constitution, (1906), 33; Soviet (1936), 38Cossack regiments, 33Coup d’etat (Moscow, 1991), 40Crusades, 19Cultures, 1, 5Currency, 13, 21; of Kazakhstan, 41; of Kyrgyzstan, 42;

of Tajikistan, 43; of Turkmenistan, 44; ofUzbekistan, 45

Darius III, ruler (Persia), 8Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, 44Demography. See PopulationDeserts, 1Diplomatic relations. See International relations of

Central AsiaDrugs, illicit, 43Duma (Russian Parliament), 33Dushanbe (Tajikistan), 37, 40Duwa Khan, ruler (Mongols), 24

Eastern Karakhanids, 18Eastern Khanate, Turkic, 11Eastern Turkestan, 5Ecology: of Farghona Valley, 48; of Uzbekistan, 45Economy: early, 6; medieval, 14; post-Soviet, 41, 42, 43,

44, 45; Russian, 33; Soviet, 39Elections (19th century), system of, 33Ethnic groups, 4, 46Eurasian Railroad Transportation Corridor (ERTC), 50Eurasian steppe, 1, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 30Europe, 21, 28

Farghona (Uzbekistan), 40Farghona Valley, 46, 47, 48February revolution 1917, 34Frunze. See Bishkek

Gas and oil, 3, 41, 44, 49Gaznavids, 18, 19GDP: Kazakhstan, 41; Kyrgyzstan, 42; Tajikistan, 43;

Turkmenistan, 44; Uzbekistan, 45Genghiz Khan, ruler (Mongols), 22Geography, 1Golden Horde (Mongols), 23, 25, 26Gorbachev’s reforms, 39, 40Great Britain, 28, 29, 31Great Game, the, 31Great Silk Road, the, 9, 10, 13, 21, 25, 50Greco-Bactrian kingdom, 8

Hashim al-Muqunna, rebel leader (Maveranahr), 16Hephthalites, 10Hizb-ut-Tahrir, 47Hordes (Uluses), 23. See also MongolsHordes (Zhuzes), 30. See also KazakhsHulegu Khan, ruler (Mongols), 23Huns, 8

Ibrahim bin Nasr, ruler (Karakhanids), 18Il-Arslan, ruler (Khwarezm), 20Interethnic conflicts, Soviet, 40International relations of Central Asia, 9, 29Interrelations with: China, 6, 9, 10, 11, 46, 49, 50; Greece,

6, 8; nomads, 6, 9, 10; Persia, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 27, 29;Rome, 9, 10, 14; Russia, 29, 30, 31, 49; Scythia, 6, 7, 9

Islam, 15, 16, 17, 24, 47, 48. See also ReligionsIslamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 47Ismail, ruler (Samanids), 17Ismailis, 17. See also Islam

Jetysuu, 5, 11, 18Jochi Khan, ruler (Mongols), 23Junghars, 28, 30

Kapagan Khaghan, ruler (Turks), 11Karakalpakistan, Soviet administration, 37, 38Karakalpaks, 4Karakhanids, 17, 18Karakitais, 18, 19, 20Karimov, Islam, president (Uzbekistan), 45Kazakhs, 4, 27, 28, 30, 31, 35Kazakhstan, 2; independence, 41, 46, 47, 49, 50; natural

resources, 3, 39, 49; population, 2, 4, 41; Russianadministration, 32, 33; Soviet administration, 37,38; Soviet economy, 39

Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline (KCOP), 49Khiva Khanate, 31, 32, 35, 36Khorasan, 5, 16, 19, 20, 26, 28Khudoyar Khan, ruler (Kokand Khanate), 31Khwarezm, 7. See also StatesKhwarezm Empire, 20Khwarezm Khanate, 28King of Kings, 9, 10Kokand Autonomous Government, 35Kokand Khanate, 31, 32Kolkhozes, 39Kublai Khan, ruler (Mongols), 23, 24Kushan kingdom, 9Kyrgyzs, 4, 31Kyrgyzstan, 2; independence, 42, 46, 47, 48, 50; natural

resources, 3, 39; population, 2, 4, 42; Russianadministration, 32, 33; Soviet administration, 37,38; Soviet economy, 39

Kyzyl Orda (Kazakhstan), 37

Living standards: Kazakhstan, 41; Kyrgyzstan, 42; Tajikistan, 43; Turkmenistan, 44; Uzbekistan, 45

Manichaeism, 16. See also ReligionsManta (Turkmenistani currency), 44Margiana, 7. See also StatesMaveranahr, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, 28Merv (Turkmenistan), 19

122 Index


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Migration: 19th century, 33; post-Soviet, 41, 42Mithridates the Great, ruler (Parthians), 9Mongols, 20, 25; rise, 22, 23; disentegration, 24Mountains, 1Muhammad, the Prophet, 15. See also

IslamMuhammad II Arslan Khan, ruler (Karakhanids), 18Muzzafar Khan (Bukhara Emirate), 31

Nabyev, Rahmon, president (Tajikistan), 43Nasr II, ruler (Samanids), 17Nasr Saman, ruler (Samanids), 17Nationalism, 40, 48Natural resources, 3, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49Nazarbayev, Nursultan, president (Kazakhstan), 41Nebitdag (Turkmenistan), 40Nestorians, 12. See also ReligionsNiyazov, Saparmurat, president (Turkmenistan), 44Nomads, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 30North-South Rail-Ship Container Corridor

(NSRSC), 50North-South Transportation Corridor (NSTC), 50Novyi Uzen (Kazakhstan), 40Nukus (Karakapakistan), 37

Oases, 1, 6, 7October Revolution (1917), 34Odygei Khan, ruler (Mongols), 23Oil and gas, 3, 41, 44, 49Orenburg (Kazakhstan), 37Osh (Kyrgyzstan), 40Ottoman Empire, 25

Parthian Empire, 9Persia, 8, 27, 28, 29Peter the Great, tsar (Russia), 29Pipelines, 49, 50Pishpek. See BishkekPlague, 24, 30Polytheism, 12. See also ReligionsPopulation, 2, 4, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48Proselytism, 24Proto-states, 6, 7Provisional Republican Government (Russia), 34

Rafi ibn Leisa, rebel leader (Samarqand), 16Railways: 19th century, 32; 20th century, 33; post-Soviet,

50Rakhmonov, Imomali, president (Tajikistan), 43Rebellions. See UprisingsRed Army, 36Religions, 4, 5, 12, 16; Islam, 15, 16, 17, 24, 47, 48Revolutions, 20th century, 34Riots. See UprisingsRoman Empire, 9, 10, 14Roxana (princess), 8Russian Empire, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33

Russians, 4Russification, 32, 38

Saman Khuda, ruler (Samanids), 17Samanid Empire, 17, 18, 19Samarqand (Uzbekistan), 18, 25, 33, 37Sassanid Empire, 10, 11, 14Scyths, 6, 7, 9Seleucid Empire, 8Seljuks, 18, 19, 20Separatism, 46Settlers, 5, 6, 7, 11Shah Rukh, ruler (Timurids), 26Shah-n-Shah, 9, 10Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 46Shapur II, ruler (Sassanids), 10Sheibani Khan, ruler (Uzbeks), 27Shi’a, 19, 26. See also IslamSilk cocoons, 10Sogdiana, 7. See also StatesSom (Kyrgyzstani currency), 42Somoni (Tajikistani currency), 43Soviet Government, 34Soviet Union Treaty (proposed), 40States: Alexander the Great, 8; ancient, 9, 10; early

ancient 6, 7; early Turkic, 11; Islamic, 16; medieval,17, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28; Mongols, 22, 23, 24;post-Soviet, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45; Russian, 32, 33;Soviet, 35, 37, 38

Steppe. See Eurasian steppeSum (Uzbekistani currency), 45Sumbad Mag, rebel leader (Khorasan), 16Sunnis, 17, 19. See also IslamSyr Darya River, 5

Tajikistan, 2; independence, 43, 46, 47, 48, 50; naturalresources, 3, 39; population, 2, 4, 43; Russianadministration, 32, 33; Soviet administration, 37,38; Soviet economy, 39

Tajiks, 4Taliban, 47Tamerlane. See TimurTan Khaghan, ruler (Turks), 11Tarim River basin. See Eastern TurkestanTashkent (Uzbekistan), 33, 34Taxes, 13, 21Tenge (Kazakhstani currency), 41Territorial disputes, post-independence, 46, 48. See also

BoundariesTerrorism, war on international, 47Timur, ruler (Timurids), 25Timurid Empire, 25, 26, 27Toghril Bek, ruler (Seljuks), 19Tolui Khan, ruler (Mongols), 23Trade, 2, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 21, 25, 29; 19th century, 32;

post-Soviet, 50Trans-Caspian Province Government, 35

123Index


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Transoxiana, 6, 10, 27Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia

(TRACECA), 50Transportation, 13, 21, 33, 50Tselina (virgin land campaign), 39Tulip (Yellow) Revolution (Kyrgyzstan), 42Tumin (Bumin) Khagan, ruler (Turks), 11Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 35Turkistan Governor-Generalship, 32Turkmenbashy, president (Turkmenistan), 44Turkmenistan, 2; independence, 44, 49, 50; natural

resources, 3, 39, 49; population, 2, 4, 44; Russianadministration, 32, 33; Soviet administration, 37,38; Soviet economy, 39

Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline(TAPIGP), 49

Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey Gas Pipeline (TITGP), 49Turkmens, 4. See also TurkomansTurkomans, 26, 28, 31. See also TurkmensTurks, 11, 14, 18, 23

Ulugh Bek, ruler (Timurids), 26Uluses, 23. See also MongolsUnited Tajik Opposition Party, 43Uprisings: 8th century, 16; 19th century, 33; early 20th

century, 34; interethnic Soviet, 40

Urbanization, 33. See also CitiesUSSR, dissolution of, 40Uzbek Khanate, 27Uzbekistan, 2; independence, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50;

natural resources, 3, 39, 49; population, 2, 4, 45;Russian administration, 32, 33; Sovietadministration, 37, 38; Soviet economy, 39

Uzbeks, 4, 27Uzgen (Kyrgyzstan), 40

Valleys, 1Vernyi. See AlmatyVirgin land campaign (tselina), 39Volga River, 21

Water resources, management of, 48Western Karakhanids, 18Western Khanate, Turkic, 11White Army, 36White Horde (Mongols), 23World War I, 34

Yueh-Chih, 8, 9

Zhuses, 30. See also KazakhsZoroastrianism, 7, 12. See also Religions

124 Index


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About the Author

Rafis Abazov is an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the HarrimanInstitute/School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia

University, New York. Rafis Abazov’s area of expertise is in the field ofmodern Central Asian and Russian/Soviet politics and history. Hisresearch and teaching interests include public policy and governance, thehistory of cultural development and population movement in the RussianEmpire and Soviet Union with a focus on Central Asia, and comparativehistory of Central Asia and the Middle East. He was awarded the NATOresearch fellowship for research on foreign policy formation in CentralAsia; the Institute of Advanced Studies of the United Nations Universityresearch fellowship and a British Academy visiting fellowship.

Rafis Abazov has written five books and a number of other publica-tions on economic and political development in Eurasia. His most recentbooks include Historical Dictionary of Kyrgyzstan (Scarecrow Press, 2004),Historical Dictionary of Turkmenistan (Scarecrow Press, 2005), The Cultureand Customs of the Central Asian Republics (Greenwood Press, 2007) andThe Culture and Customs of Turkey (Greenwood Press, 2008). His researcharticles were published in various academic journals including EurasianStudies, The Central Asian Survey, Nationalities Papers, Post-CommunistEconomies and some others. He has also contributed articles to theEncyclopaedia of Modern Asia (2003), the Encyclopaedia of Nationalism(2001), the Encyclopaedia of National Economies (2002) and some others.


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Documents

Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of Central Asia ||