ParadiplomacyandtheStateoftheNation

ACOMPARATIVEANALYSISFRANCESCADICKSON

InpartialfulfilmentoftherequirementsfortheDegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy

CardiffSchoolofLawandPolitics

CardiffUniversity

Submittedforexamination:2017

ii

DECLARATION

This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any other university or place of learning, nor is being submitted concurrently in candidature for any degree or other award.

Signed (candidate) F. Dickson Date 26/9/17

STATEMENT 1

This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD

Signed (candidate) F. Dickson Date 26/9/17

STATEMENT 2

This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated, and the thesis has not been edited by a third party beyond what is permitted by Cardiff University’s Policy on the Use of Third Party Editors by Research Degree Students. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references. The views expressed are my own.

Signed (candidate) F. Dickson Date 26/9/17

STATEMENT 3

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available online in the University’s Open Access repository and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

Signed (candidate) F. Dickson Date 26/9/17

STATEMENT 4: PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BAR ON ACCESS

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available online in the University’s Open Access repository and for inter-library loans after expiry of a bar on access previously approved by the Academic Standards & Quality Committee.

Signed (candidate) F. Dickson Date 26/9/17

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AcknowledgmentsThisresearchwasconductedwiththegenerousbackingofaCardiffUniversityPresident’sScholarship,alongwiththekindsupportoftheGermanAcademicExchangeService(DAAD)toconductfieldresearchinBavaria.Thethesiscouldnothavebeenproducedwithoutthecontinuousencouragementandunwaveringsupport(includingthroughouttwoyear-longperiodsofmaternityleave)ofCardiffUniversity’sexceptionalWalesGovernanceCentreandeachofmycolleaguesthere,inparticularmygoodfriendManonGeorge.Itwasanunconventionalprocess,mostlyconductedpart-timefromafarminHerefordshire’sBlackMountains,amongsttheday-to-dayrealitiesofaruraltourismbusinessandduringthenap-timesoftwobabies;theunderstandingofallinvolvedatCardiffUniversity,theSchoolofLawandPoliticsandtheWalesGovernanceCentrewascrucial.SpecificthanksareowedtoDr.ChristianBeugerofCardiffUniversityandalltheparticipantsinourco-convenedworkshopon‘theMonstersofDiplomacy’in2014fortheirhelpinrefiningmythoughtsontheinternationalspacethatsub-stategovernmentsoccupy.IalsothankDr.FionaMcConnellofOxfordUniversityandtwoanonymousreviewersfortheircommentsonapieceofworkwhichhasgoneontoformthebasisofPartOneofthisthesis.InScotland,IamespeciallygratefultoDr.AndrewNealfromTheUniversityofEdinburghforselectingmeasapostgraduateresearchparticipantinhisESRC-sponsoredseminarseriesonSecurityinScotland,andfortheexposurethisallowedmetotheScottishpolicycontext.ThiswasofparticularvaluegiventhehighlysensitivenatureofthisissueareainScotlandduringthetimethatthisresearchwasconducted.IowethankstoProfessorPaulBehrensfromEdinburghUniversity’sSchoolofLawforconveningtheconferenceandeditingthesubsequentbook‘DiplomaticLawinaNewMillennium’,forfacilitatingmyattendanceattheconferencewithmy8-weekoldson,andforhishelpfulcommentsonmyworkonthistopic,whichformsthebasisofChapterThreeofthisthesis.InGermany,mythankstoProfessorArthurBenzofDarmstadtUniversityandhisdepartmentalcolleaguesforhelpingtoclarifyanddirectmyresearchinBavaria.ThanksalsotoProfessorChristopherDaaseandhiscolleaguesattheGoetheUniversityinFrankfurtfortheirworkshoponperformingagencyininternationalpolitics,whichprovidedaparticularlyusefulsounding-boardformyearlythoughtsonparadiplomacyandperformativity.MybiggestdebtofgratitudeisowedtomyPhDsupervisor,ProfessorRichardWynJones.Thisisnotonlyforthemanydetailedcommentsonthethesisitselfandtheunparalleledprofessionalsupportandguidancehehasoffered,butalsoforthebroaderresearchculturethathehascultivatedattheWalesGovernanceCentrewhich,amongstmanyotherthings,allowedmeahighdegreeofaccesstotheWelshpolicycontext.Mythankstoallthosebusyindividualswhoparticipatedintheproject,inparticulartothosewhogenerouslygrantedmeinterviewsandwhospokewithmuchcandourandclarity.MylastthanksaretomyhusbandEdandourchildrenfortheirpatience,andtotherestofmyfamilyfortheirmanyhoursofwillingchildcare!

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Abstract

Partofanewcohortofdiplomaticactors,sub-stategovernmentsrepresentaparticularlycomplexchallengeforourunderstandingofinternationalrelations.Theseactorsarebothterritoriallyconstitutedandgovernmental;theylookandsoundverysimilartostates.Crucially,however,theyarenotstatesatall.Whenparadiplomaticrelationsareconductedonthepartofsub-stategovernmentswithastrongregionalidentity,inparticular‘statelessnations’,therecansometimesbechallenge–implicitorexplicit–totheauthorityofthestatetospeakfor,orrepresent,itspeople.Thisthesistakesthreesuchstatelessnations:Wales,ScotlandandBavaria,andanalysestheirparadiplomaticactivities.Theuniquepoliticalcontextineachofthesecasestudiesisusedasaframewithinwhichtounderstandandinterpretboththemotivationsandimplicationsofsuchactivities.Usingaconceptualtoolkitlessfamiliartotraditionalparadiplomaticanalysis,includingsovereigntygames,performativityandmimicry,thestudyexploresthewaysinwhichsub-stategovernmentsacquireinternationalagency,andtheextenttowhichthisagencyiscontestedbyotheractors.Despitetherangeinpoliticalambitionsineachofthestatelessnationsconsidered,theparadiplomaticactivitiestheyconductedwereoftenremarkablysimilar.Whatdiffered,however,wasthewaythattheseactivitieswereinterpreted,dependingonthepoliticalcontextandthetenorofinter-governmentalrelationswithinthestate.Theparadoxofparadiplomacyisthatinmanywaysitremainsunremarkableinitsday-to-daypractices.Yet,atothertimes,sub-stategovernmentsusetheirinternationalrelationshipstomakeimportantclaimsabouttheirstatusandpositionwithintheirstate,thecurrencyofexchangesbecomingthatrarefiedconcept:sovereignty.Usingamarginalsiteofinternationalrelationssuchasparadiplomacy,thisthesisexplorestheheterogeneityofthefieldandthevarietyofrelationshipsthatexistandpersistwithinit.

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Introduction..................................................................................................................................1

Part1:TheParadoxofParadiplomacy.......................................................................................15

ChapterOne:LiteratureReview.................................................................................................16

Paradiplomacy:StructuresandOpportunities.....................................................................................19

I. Globalisation...........................................................................................................................19

II. TheEuropeanUnionandRegionalism....................................................................................20

III. DevolutionandDecentralisation.............................................................................................22

IV. Lecours2002:OpportunityStructures.....................................................................................24

TheAgencyofSub-stategovernments................................................................................................27

I. StatelessNations.....................................................................................................................28

II. The‘Self’andthe‘Other’.........................................................................................................32

III. Paradiplomacy,orMulti-LevelGovernance?...........................................................................34

TheSignificanceofParadiplomacy:ConceptualisingSub-stateActorness..........................................38

I. TheInternationalArena..........................................................................................................39

II. TheDomesticArena................................................................................................................40

TheoreticalFrameworks.......................................................................................................................41

I. TraditionalComparativePoliticsandIRTheory:ABridgeableDivide?...................................42

II. TheabsenceofIR.....................................................................................................................44

Conclusion:ThestateoftheLiterature................................................................................................47

ChapterTwo:AnewtheoreticalFramework.............................................................................49

Introduction.........................................................................................................................................49

Anewframeworkforthestudyofparadiplomacyinstatelessnations...............................................52

I. Delineatingautonomous,diplomaticactivities.......................................................................53

II. Hybridactors,hybridspaces:bringingIRtheoryintotheparadiplomaticfold.......................57

III. Mimicry,performativity,andlearningto‘talktheinternationaltalk’....................................64

IV. ParadiplomacyasaSovereigntyGame...................................................................................67

ResearchQuestions&Design..............................................................................................................71

Methodology........................................................................................................................................75

Methods...............................................................................................................................................76

Table1:AnalyticalFramework.AdaptedfromAdler-NissenandGad,2014:22..................................77

Limitations............................................................................................................................................78

CaseStudies.........................................................................................................................................80

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Part2:Paradiplomacy:TheWhysandTheWherefores............................................................89

ChapterThree:SkirtingOfficialdom...........................................................................................90

Introduction.........................................................................................................................................90

ParadiplomacyandDiplomaticLaw.....................................................................................................91

TheUK’sdevolvedregionsandtheVCDR............................................................................................92

Wales’OverseasOffices.......................................................................................................................96

Scotland’sOverseasOffices...............................................................................................................103

Germany’sBasicLawandtheStatusofBavariaundertheVCDR......................................................112

Bavaria’sOverseasOffices.................................................................................................................115

Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................124

Chapter4:‘It’s[notalways]theEconomy,stupid’:thePoliticsofParadiplomacy.................129

Introduction.......................................................................................................................................129

Sub-stateSovereigntyGames............................................................................................................132

NationBuildingandtheMimicryofStatehood:PlayingtheLongGame...........................................136

I. Wales.....................................................................................................................................139

II. Scotland.................................................................................................................................143

III. Bavaria..................................................................................................................................147

Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................154

Chapter5.Sub-stategovernmentsasInternationalAgents:Learningto‘WalktheWalk’?..157

Introduction.......................................................................................................................................157

ParadiplomacyasPerformance:AnIntroductoryNote.....................................................................160

Thenewrulesofthegame.................................................................................................................162

Speaking‘forthepeople’orspeaking‘likeastate’?ParadiplomacyandLegitimacy........................166

I. ThecuriouscaseofScotland’sPandas..................................................................................172

II. VanguardWalesinCopenhagen&Lesotho..........................................................................176

III. BavariainBrussels.................................................................................................................182

Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................186

Chapter6:Sub-stateDiplomacy:theGood,theBad,andtheUgly?......................................189

Introduction.......................................................................................................................................189

Internationalrelations‘alacarte’?....................................................................................................192

Characterisingsub-statediplomacy...................................................................................................197

I. Paradiplomacyofgoodintentions........................................................................................198

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II. Value-addedparadiplomacy.................................................................................................201

III. Competitiveparadiplomacy..................................................................................................203

IV. Paradiplomacyonthefringesof‘highpolitics’.....................................................................205

V. Theparadiplomacyofrecognition.........................................................................................214

Conclusion:the‘fairweather’diplomats?.........................................................................................218

Conclusion.................................................................................................................................221

Bibliography..............................................................................................................................234

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ForBenjaminRowan&ErinGraceTwojoyousinterruptionstomystudies

Introduction

Whodoesdiplomacy?Weknowthat it’sno longerthemonopolyof impenetrable foreign

offices,ministerswithstiffupperlipsandmanicuredmoustaches.Aplaceremains,surely,for

theappropriatelyattiredattaché,briefcaseinhand.Butwhatofsoftpower,thesubtleplays

ofpublicdiplomacy?TheTwitter-happy,Facebook-friendlyprotagonists,notjustpromoting

thediplomaticmessagesofstates,butofotheractors:faithgroups,advocatesofminority

rights,breakawaygovernments?It’satruism-andyetit’strue-thepracticesofdiplomacy

are changing, proliferating, becoming more inclusive. It is no longer easy to distinguish

‘official’diplomacyfromthiswiderpoolofinteractions.

Atthesametime,inanotherrealm,thepoliticalcurrencyofregionalism,self-determination

andnation-buildinghasanincreasedpotency.Ifonepullsatthisthread,allsortsofissues

come tumbling out. Regions and devolved governments in democratic states clamour for

more authority, more autonomy. Religious and ethnic factions break away into new

unrecognised governments or self-declared states. Indigenous peoples stake a claim on

incorporatedterritory,bethatforaseatatthetable-orforthewholetableitself.Fromcivic

nationalismthroughtocivilwar,thereisacontinuum.However,somethingdoeslinkboth

endsofthisspectrum:theuseofadiplomatictoolkit,toplaywiththerelativerolesorpower

positions that areheld. To secure specific, concreteobjectives or simply to challenge the

statusquo.

Wheretraditionaldiplomacymightfacea‘challenge’fromthepresenceofde-territorialized

actors,NGOs,transnationalcompaniesandinternationalorganizations,whatispresentedby

theabove,territorially-based,categoryofactorsissomethingreallyquitedifferent.Here,the

weakenedboundariesbetweenwhois,andwhoisnot,adiplomatmeetsimilarlyweakened

boundariesaroundwhatis,andwhatisn’t,astate.Weseethegovernment-territorynexus

particularlyclearlyastheseactorsexertsomeformofgovernmentalcontroloveradefined

territory,meaningthattheyhaveanawful lotmore incommonwithstatesthanwithany

NGO.Ofcourse;wemustnotgetaheadofourselves,orsetupstrawmen.Canadaisastate.

HayonWyeisnot(despitetheparodyperformedbytheself-proclaimed“KingofHay”).But

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whatofthestatusofquasi-sovereignactors,unrecognisedordefactostates,autonomous

regions,orregionsactivelyseekingstatehood?WhataboutNorthernCyprus,ortheTibetan

GovernmentinExile?Whatdowemakeoftheremnantsofcolonialism-overseasterritories

such as Guadeloupe, Gibraltar or Guam? What about regions such as Scotland, Venice,

Catalonia,KurdistanorQuebec?It isapparentthatmanynon-stateentitiesinfactpossess

manystate-likequalitiesandcompetences.

Ifdiplomacy is theconductbygovernmentalofficialsofrelationsornegotiationsbetween

states,thenthereisalargemassofgreyarearemaining.Wherethelooseningofdiplomatic

boundaries meets the proliferation of territorially based non-state - yet governmental -

actors,isanarearipeforresearch.Withinthisgrouparenotonlyunrecognisedstatesseeking

formal recognition from the international community, but also a whole host of regional,

governmental actors that increasingly employ the practices of diplomacy as part of their

attempts to reach and represent themselves upon a more global stage. Not seeking

statehood,butperhapsactingoutsideoftherestricted,parochialparameterssetoutforthem

-andoftenappealingtonationalsentimentsastheydoso.

Forregions -somewhorepresentsub-statenations,somewhoseek independence,some

whodoneither-thelureofadiplomatictoolkitishardtoresist.Acrosslargeswathesofthe

world,sub-stategovernments(mostoftenwheretheyareendowedwithaconstitutionalrole

and legislativeprofile) represent the interestsofa territoriallydefinedpeople,onewhose

constituencyoverlapswiththatofanation-state.Owingtothenecessitiesofourglobalised

age,thereareamultitudeofpragmatic,economicreasonsforsuchasub-stategovernment

to develop an international profile. In many cases, however, there are also compelling

politicalreasonsforthemtodoso.Thismaybebecausetheirconstituentsdemandagreater

voicewithin the state. Itmaybe inorder togain tractionona specific issueofparticular

importancetothatcommunity-fromfishingrightstominorityrights.Itmayalsobetoreflect

andpromotetheregion’sidentityoritsdemandsforself-government,nationhoodorother

formsofself-determination.

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Paradiplomacy - these international interactions, carriedoutbygovernmentsandofficials

belowthestate level - isone lenswithwhich to lookatwhat is,essentially,acollisionof

forces:theefflorescenceofaregionalist,sub-statenationalistorself-determinist ideology,

on the one hand, and the diversification and stratification of diplomatic practices on the

other.Theremaybeotherwaysinwhichtoviewthisrelationship,butthesheervolumeof

paradiplomaticexchangesandthedegreetowhichtheyhavebecomecommonplace,yetat

heartnotfullyunderstood,wouldsignalthatthisisagoodplacetostart.Theseemergent-

somemightargue,resurgent-practices,andthetwinforcesorphenomenathattheyreflect

(aburgeoningregionalistideology-andtheaccompanyinginstitutionalframework-andthe

diversification of diplomacy), may be on the periphery of what is considered ‘proper’

internationalrelations. Indeed, itmayseemtoomuchofa leaptodiscusstheminutiaeof

regionalexchangesinthesamebreathasthebighittersoftheIRmainstream:sovereignty,

authority,power.Butitispreciselyinthisunassumingborderlandbetweenthedomesticand

theinternationalthatthesethemesareplayedupon,challengedandreasserted.According

toAdler-NissenandGad(2012:3),enquiryatthemarginsofinternationalrelationshasthe

potentialtoshedagreatdealoflightintotheseforces,allowingthetrueheterogeneityof

practicestocometothesurface.It’sdifficulttoseesuchdynamics,astheyreallyare,when

wearing a ‘Westphalian straightjacket’, one that only allows either/or conceptions of

sovereigntyorstatehoodtobeconsidered(BuzanandLittle,2001:-25;Adler-NissenandGad,

2014:14).

Paradiplomacyisapracticepregnantwithcontradiction.Itcanrepresentasetoftoolsand

mechanisms by which hierarchically subordinate non-state actors attempt to reposition

themselvesinrelationtotheirstatecounterparts.Theyareabletospeakforagiven‘people’

inasensethatoverlapsaconstituencybothlevelsofgovernmentclaimtorepresentand,in

doingso,challengethecorefunctionsofstate-levelactorsandinstitutions.Yet,atthesame

time, itsmain composite activities - theMemoranda of Understanding between regional

governments, cultural exchanges and regional-twinning projects - are ordinary in the

extreme.Oratleast,theymayappeartobeso,giventheassumptionswetendtomakeabout

this tierof government. Likewise, in the self-perceptions andunderstandingsof sub-state

diplomats, their international role is both something minor and even expendable (‘low-

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hangingfruit’, inthewordsofone interviewee),and it isalsoan importantcomponentof

their nation-building projects, both implicit and explicit - some of which seek eventual

secessionfromthestateorafundamentalrecastingofstate-sub-statepowers.Aformof

politicaldoublespeakaboundsinthisterritory.Paradiplomacyisarguedtobe‘allaboutthe

economy’,groundedinthelegitimateandunavoidablyinternationalconcernsofrightfulsub-

stategovernance. Itcanalso,however,beabout identity,politicalpower,nationhoodand

even sovereignty. As this thesis will go on to explore, the broader implications of

paradiplomaticactivity-atleastinitsmostadvancedforms-aresimilarlyboundupinsuch

anoscillatorydynamic.Judgingwhetherornotaparadiplomaticactivityis‘advanced’ornot

is,ofcourse,asubjectiveprocess.However,therearesomeusefulparametersthatwemight

look to: does the activity stray outside of clearly or predominately functional, inward-

investment-seeking territory? Does the activity contradict, challenge or contest the

diplomacyofthestatewhichtheregionsitswithin?Isthereaclearconstitutionalbasisfor

theactivity?Doestheactivitygeneratedebateorcontroversy,withintheregion,thestate,

ormorewidely?Theresponsestothesequestionscanhelptoguideustowardsaclusterof

activitieswhichmayreflectamorecomplexsetofunderpinningforces.

Despite its recent resurgence as an area of academic interest, the extant paradiplomacy

literature has failed to adequately take account of this core feature of the practice - its

paradoxical,contradictorynature-ortoexplorethefullvaluethataninternationalrolemay

haveforsub-stateactorsfromanagency-orientatedperspective.Drivenbymoretraditional

comparativepoliticsperspectives,theviewhas-forthemostpart-beenthatparadiplomatic

actionscanbeexplainedawaybythedrivingforcesofEuropeanintegrationandglobalisation,

new internationalopportunitystructuresnecessitatingan internationalprofile for regions,

whose role is seen as largely reactive. In short, ‘it’s the economy, stupid’. Yet, sub-state

governmentsdisplayatremendousrangeintheirinternationalengagements,aswellasinthe

priorities they pursue on the international stage, and the ways in which they present

themselvestotheoutsideworld.Theyaredoingmorethansimplyrespondingtoexternal

forces: they are cultivating international personalities of different tenors, consciously

developingagencyinadomainwheretheirstatusis,toalargedegree,whattheymakeofit.

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Aspartofthesetop-down,consequentialistapproachestothestudyofsub-statediplomacy,

analyseshaveleanttowardsthedescriptiveratherthantheexplanatory(McConnelletal.,

2012:806).Consequently,suchstudieshaveignoredthewider,moreprobing,questionsthat

paradiplomatic practices can raise. For McConnell et al. (2012: 806) these surround the

legitimisingfunctionsthatdiplomaticactivitymayaccomplish,andtheperformativeaspects

ofparadiplomaticpractice.Meanwhile,thoughrelatedly,therehasbeenalackofwillingness

fromwithinthedisciplineofInternationalRelations(IR)toengagewiththistopic,outsideof

thenarrowerframeofglobalisation.NorhavecontributionsfromtheComparativePolitics

traditiontendedtodrawuponandutiliseinsightsfromotherfields,notablythatofIR,intheir

paradiplomaticinvestigations.Suchanapproach-drawingonthetheoreticalframeworksand

vocabulariesofbothinternationalrelationsandcomparativepolitics-would,however,seem

themostlogicalandappropriateoneforafieldofstudythatislocatedpreciselyontheborder

between the international and the domestic; nestedwithin the structure of a sovereign,

hierarchicalstateyetconcernedwiththeestablishmentofdirectrelationshipsandexchanges

withexternalactorsbeyondthatstate,bothsovereignandotherwise.Suchactivitieshavea

genesis, and indeedhave implications, that relate toboth the international anddomestic

spheres.Indeed,thisborderlandistheareathatAdler-NissenandGadidentifyasbeingmost

noticeablysubjecttothe‘blindness’ofacademicstothefullviewofwhatactuallyoccursin

politics, constrained by ‘either/or’ conceptions of sovereignty and rigid classifications of

politicalrelations(2014:14).

This study seeks to redress these imbalances. The approach adopted here is to place

paradiplomaticactivityinthe‘biggerpicture’,lookinganalyticallyatpreciselywhatitisthat

sub-state governments are doing internationally, the ways that they establish their

internationalagencies,themotivationstheymayhaveforpursuinganexternalroleandthe

implicationsoftheirdoingso.Theaimistouncoverthenuancesandcontradictory‘push-pull’

dynamicsevidentintherolesthatsub-stategovernmentsplayontheinternationalstage.At

thesametime,anattemptismadetoplaceparadiplomacyinacontextwhichallowsusto

see the value that diplomacy and international actornessmayhave for actors other than

sovereignstates.

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Thisthesisprogressesintwomainstages.Thefirststage(ChaptersOneandTwo)looksto

reposition paradiplomacy in a theoretical framework which better takes account of the

broadersignificanceofthepractice.ChapterOnesurveystheexistingliterature,highlighting

the dominance of top-down, structural and descriptive accounts of the practice, and the

absence of international relations narratives. In Chapter Two, a new perspective on

paradiplomatic activity is offered. This includes a deliberate attempt to distinguish

paradiplomatic endeavours - as autonomous, diplomatic activities - from awider pool of

interactions that include aspects of multi-level governance. The argument is made that

consideringthenuanceddifferencesbetweentheconceptsofparadiplomacyandmulti-level

allowsforamoredirectlighttobeshoneonthewaysinwhichparadiplomacytouchesupon

coreareasofstatecompetence,andthechallengesthattheseincursionspresent.Itisposited

thatmulti-levelgovernanceandparadiplomacycanrepresentmeaningfullydifferenttypesof

activity,conductedindifferentways,andwithdifferentaims.Instead,analternativerangeof

theoretical constructs are introducedwhich relatemore closely to the crucial element of

political contestation implicit in much paradiplomatic activity. At heart, it is an agency-

oriented framework. It allows for a consideration of the ways that diplomatic tools are

appropriatedbysub-stateactors,therolestheygoontoplayonaninternationalstageand

themeanings that these newly formed international identities have for such actors, and

indeedtheirstate-levelcounterparts.Specifically,thekeytheoreticalconstructsintroduced

in part oneof this thesis include: sovereignty games (Adler-Nissen andGad, 2012;Adler-

Nissen andGad, 2014),mimicry (McConnell, 2016; Duran, 2015;McConnell et al., 2012),

performativity(Neumann,2003)and-morefamiliartotraditionalparadiplomaticanalyses-

nation-building(Lecours,2002).ThefinalpartofChapterTwooutlinestheempiricalresearch

projectthatfollows,utilisingthealternativetheoreticalframeworkestablished.Itintroduces

thereadertoourthreecasestudies-Wales,ScotlandandBavaria-andthewaysinwhich

these caseswill be examined, via a tripartite analysis: institutional, discourse and praxis,

drawingonarangeofsourcesincludingsemi-structuredeliteinterviews,statutesandofficial

documentation,parliamentaryrecordsandmediareports.

Parttwoofthethesis(ChaptersThree,Four,FiveandSix)addressesasetof-sequential-

researchquestions,drawingonempiricaldatafromthreecasestudies,allofwhichsitatthe

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more ‘developed’ end of the paradiplomatic spectrum. Here, the sorts of paradiplomatic

activitiesthatthesub-stategovernmentengagesingobeyondpurelyfunctional,region-to-

regionexchanges.Theycaninclude‘official’diplomaticrelationshipswithfullnationstates.

Theycanincludelobbyingforsupportonindependenceorsecession.Theymaychallengeor

contestathemeordecisionmadebythegovernmentofastatethattheregionsitswithin,

looking to an international audience to support their cause. Or a region may use an

international cause - the environment, for example - or a particular event or disaster to

highlightdivisionorpoliticaldifferencewithinthestate.Thedecisiontolookspecificallyat

thissetofrelativelyadvancedparadiplomaticactivitiesrestsonthefactthatitisherethat

thechaffingoftheboundariesofstateauthorityismostevident.Thefocusofthisstudyis

indeedthisverypointoffriction,assessingthewaysinwhichdiplomatictoolscanbeutilised

bynon-stateactorsforarangeofpoliticalends;thechoiceofthreestatelessnationsthereby

allowsus to explore those actions less readily understoodwith reference toeconomicor

functional imperatives. For the purposes of this study, a nation is understood to reflect

Anderson’s “imagined community” (Anderson, 2006), and stateless nations – a nation

incongruentwith itsstate -areconsideredaparticular typeofpoliticalcommunity that is

growinginsignificance,“abletocaptureandpromotesentimentsof loyalty,solidarityand

communityamongindividualswhohavedevelopedagrowingneedforidentity”(Guibernau,

2004:1255).

Methodologicallyspeaking,theapproachadoptedissomewhat‘messy’,drawingasitdoes

on concepts both from comparative politics and IR. The particular value of such

methodologicaleclecticisminaproblem(ratherthanmethod)drivenareaofstudyhasbeen

previously established (Krook and Squires, 2006), and this rationale is explored in the

methodologysectionofthethesis.Apullingtogetherofdifferentintellectualtoolkitsseems

onlylogicalwhentryingtounderstandactivitiesthattakeplacewithinanestedstructure,and

thathaveaJanus-facednature.Tounderstandparadiplomacy,we-ofcourse-mustgeta

handleonthetown-twinning,memorandasigning,day-to-daymundanityofthepractice.But

at thesametime,wehave toat least tryandunderstandwhy theactof ‘representation’

abroadissocontestedbystateandsub-stategovernments.Weneedtointerpretthepolitical

calculationsinvolvedinasub-stategovernmentdissentingfromastate-leveldiplomatic‘line’.

8

Certainly,weshouldattempttolocatethepreciseboundariesbetweenstateandsub-state

authoritywhenitcomestoexternalaffairs.Inshort:thetaskisinherentlybroadandvaried,

somustbethetools.Afocusonasiteofinternationalactivitysuchasparadiplomacy,one

thattakesplaceattheveryboundarybetweenthedomesticandthe international,would

seemtonecessitateanapproachthatbringsboth international relationsandcomparative

politicsintothesamefold.

Chapterthreeaddressesthefirstinthesequenceofempiricalresearchquestionsandasks,in

aninstitutionalcapacity,whatexactlyitisthatsub-stategovernmentsareable-andwilling-

todointermsoftheirdiplomacy.Asaproxyfora‘goldstandard’oftraditionaldiplomatic

activity, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) is utilised as a frame of

reference,againstwhichtoassessthescopeofparadiplomacyandthestatusofsub-state

governmentsintermsofinternationalanddiplomaticlaw.Thisisparticularlyimportantowing

tothefinelinethatsub-stategovernmentsmusttreadintermsofwhethertheirdiplomacyis

‘official’or‘unofficial’,whetheritdrawsonthelegalauthorityoftheirstategovernmentsor

whether it is executed independently from it.As the chapterexplores, there is apolitical

choiceattheheartofthisdistinction,particularlyforWalesandScotlandwhomaintainthe

unusualabilityto‘optin’totheVCDRviaco-locationwithUKoverseasmissions,shouldthey

chooseto.ThechapterbrieflyexplorestheongoingrelevanceoftheTreaty,andinparticular

thehostofchallengescurrentlyposedtoitscentralityindiplomaticlaw-manyofwhichalso

relate to theemergenceofnon-statediplomaticactors. It thenmoveson toexamine the

formal statusofparadiplomacy in theUKand inGermany,andprovideanaccountof the

variouswaysthatWales,ScotlandandBavariahavechosentoenacttheirdiplomacy,which

attimesvisiblypushesatthelegalboundariesthattheyoperatewithin.Particularattention

ispaidtothetypesofoverseasrepresentationsthatourcasestudieshaveestablished,and

totherelativedistanceorproximitythatsuchrepresentationsmaintaintothe‘host’-state,to

useCornago’sterminology(Cornago,2010).

On establishing the varied statuses that the three case studies exhibit in terms of their

paradiplomaciesinChapterThree-inotherwords,‘what’formsofdiplomacytheychoose,

orareenabled,topursue-thesubsequentchaptermovesontoconsiderthepoliticallogics

9

underpinningthedevelopmentofsuchdisparatestrategiesandinternationalprofiles.Simply,

whysub-stategovernmentsconducttheparadiplomaticactivitiesthattheydo.ThisChapter

(Four) looks beyond the economic rationales most commonly used to account for

paradiplomacy and instead reframes the issue as a type of sovereignty game; a way of

conceptualising the back-and-forth between sovereign and ‘other’ actors that revolves

aroundtherightfulsitesofpowerandpoliticalauthority(Adler-NissenandGad,2012;Adler-

NissenandGad,2014).Owingtothefactthatinternationalrelationsanddiplomacyarepolicy

areassocloselyalliedwiththeverynotionofsovereigntyitself,thepracticeofparadiplomacy

necessarilyplaysonandchallengesthetraditionalhierarchicalrolesofstateandsub-state

government.Thechapterexplorestheutilityofparadiplomacytothepoliticalambitionsof

eachofourgoverningparties,andthewaysinwhichtheydrawonand‘mimic’thebehaviours

anddiscoursesofstateness:helpingtoanchortheregionorstatelessnationinanaccepted

and familiardiscourse that strengthensandnormalizesnational sentiments in adomestic

setting.Thisisenabledbytakingon(mimicking)theoutwardappearanceofastate:adefining

characteristicofwhichbeingtheabilitytoconductdiplomaticrelations.

Inchapterfive,theprocessesofinternationalagencycreationareexploredingreaterdetail-

probing the question of how sub-state governments go about securing international

legitimacy. In particular, it employs the framework of performativity; going beyond fixed

classificationsofactorsandcapabilitiesandinsteadlookingattheactualinteractionstaking

place.Thechapterinvestigatesaseparate‘performance’,orsetofperformances,fromeach

ofourcase-studiesthattellbothexternalactorsanddomesticaudienceshowthesub-state

governmentseesitself,itsregionorstatelessnation,andtheplacethatitaspirestoonthe

worldstage.Theseinclude:theestablishmentofBavaria’s‘grand’Europeanrepresentation;

theWelshGovernment’sperformancesattheCopenhagenClimatechangeSummitandthose

surrounding the launch of its ‘Wales for Africa’ development assistance programme; and

ScottishdiplomacysurroundingthearrivaloftwoChinesePandasinEdinburgh’szoo.These

process-tracingexercisesprovideadetailedaccountbothof theattemptsat international

agency creation, and theways that such attempts are contestedor conditionedbyother

actors,inparticularhost-stategovernments.Suchaperspectiveattemptstoovercomethe

challengeofanalysingparadiplomaticactivities inawaythat takes intoaccount theoften

10

conflictualmessagessentbyitscomponentactors:sub-statepoliticiansandofficialsaswell

asdiplomatsatthenationallevelandthosefrom‘receiving’statesandregions.Asinchapter

four,thelanguageofmimicryisemployedthroughouttheanalysisinchapterfive.Essentially,

thisallowsustoconsiderthevariouswaysinwhichthesymbolsanddiscoursesofstate-level

diplomacyareusedor‘mimicked’bysub-stateactors.However,ratherthaninvestigatingthe

reasonswhyamimeticstrategymayhelptoestablishandreinforceasenseofnationhoodor

politicaldistinctivenessatadomesticlevel,itisinsteadusedasawaytounderstandhowsub-

stategovernmentsbringlegitimacyandcredibilitytotheirexternalroles,asperceivedbythe

internationalcommunity.Mimicry,inthiscontext,isusedtoaccountforthewaysinwhich

sub-stateactorslearnto‘walkthewalk’and‘talkthetalk’ofaninternationalagent,rather

thanadomesticallyboundactor.

Chapter Six builds on the explorations of ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ in the previous three

chapters to address thebroader significanceof paradiplomatic activity, and ascribe some

characteristicstothenatureofsub-stategovernmentsasinternationalagents.Thefirstpart

of the chapter explores the hybridity of sub-state governments as international actors,

arguingthattheir‘sovereigntybound,sovereigntyfree’status(Hocking,1997)hasimportant

consequences.Theycanbothclaimtolegitimatelyrepresentagiven‘people’,markingthem

apartfrommanyothernon-stateactors,andyetmaintainalargedegreeofselectivityintheir

internationalendeavours.Inourthreecasestudies,neitherWalesnorScotlandnorBavaria

carry theburdenof constitutional responsibility for international affairs, and indeed their

paradiplomaticactivitiesoftentakeplacewithverylittlescrutinyfromeitherparliamentary

ormediasourcesastothesubstanceoftheirinteractions.Whencombinedwiththeabilityto

drawonstate-levelresourcesandreputations(aswellasthoseofthesub-stategovernment

itself),thesefeaturesamounttoaparticulartypeofinternationaloperationalspace,witha

distinctrangeofqualities.Sub-stategovernmentsareabletooccupythisspacetodiffering

ends:allowingthemtoconductinternationalrelationsonalargely‘alacarte’basis,yetfrom

arestrictedmenu.Theultimateconstraintsthatsub-stategovernmentsoperatewithin,and

employ such selectivity within, are hard, unyielding ones: part of the paradox that is

paradiplomacy.ThesecondpartofChapterSixthusmovesontoconsidertherangeofways

inwhichthis-potentiallyquiteprivileged-spacecanbeutilisedbysub-stateactors.Ranging

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fromthe ‘paradiplomacyofgood intentions’, through toparadiplomacy ‘on the fringesof

‘highpolitics’,thissectionidentifiessixseparatecategoriesofparadiplomaticactivitybased

on the nature of the challenge - or otherwise - that such activities represent for other

membersoftheinternationalcommunity,inparticularhost-stategovernments.Thischapter

presents an account of paradiplomacy grounded in both International Relations and

Diplomatictheory.

A concluding chapter exploreswhat is perhaps the central finding of this thesis: that the

contradictorynatureofparadiplomaticactivityresultsinbothsystem-reinforcingandsystem-

disruptive effects (McConnell et al., 2012: 811-812). Such oscillation is perhaps why the

significanceofthephenomenonhasbeensubjecttosuchscantacademicconsideration;itis

many things at once, a result of the ‘push-pull’ dynamics at the heart of the practice.

Paradiplomacyreinforcesthestatusof‘official’,state-to-statediplomacy,throughitsmimicry

of this genre. Furthermore, absolute conceptions of hierarchical state-sovereignty are

reinforcedthroughtheuseofparadiplomacyasastate-buildingtool,evidentinsomeofthe

most advanced cases, and arguably seen in the most recent manifestations of Scottish

paradiplomacy, particularly following on from2016’sUK referendumon EUmembership.

However, at the same time, paradiplomacy dilutes the monopoly that states hold on a

rarefiedformofdiplomacy,simplybyintroducingnewactorsintothegame(McConnelletal.,

2012:811-812);crucially,theseareterritoriallybased,governmentalactors.Theseactorslook

andsoundsomuchlikestatesthemselves-yet,ofcourse,arenotstatesatall.Sothesaying

goes:ifitwalkslikeaduck,swimslikeaduckandquackslikeaduck,weareinclinedtobelieve

itis-infact-aduck.Amorequalifiedconceptionofsovereigntyisthereforepromoted,by

virtueofsub-stategovernmentshavingwrestedsomeelementofcontrol -orat least the

perceptionofanelementofcontrol-inanareaofpolicy,internationalrelations,thatis“so

closely articulated to sovereignty that it is considered the prerogative of the sovereign”

(Adler-NissenandGad,2014:16).

Allofthisimbuesparadiplomaticactivitieswithaparticularsignificance,andperhapsserves

as indication as to how far such sub-state authority or legitimacy can stretch in different

contexts.Thepracticeofparadiplomacy,therefore,maybebestunderstoodasoneextended

12

sovereigntygame:agamethatplaysonandchallengesthelanguageofsovereigntyandits

associatedconcepts-authority,representation,legitimacy.Crucially,thegameappearstobe

playedinordertosecurethestatusofsub-stategovernmentsasrightfulparticipantsinthe

game itself, something seemingly common to each of our case studies, rather than any

particularsetofconstitutionalconcessions(Adler-NissenandGad,2014).Wherethisthesis

departsfrompreviousexplorationsofparadiplomacyinrelationtosub-statenationalismor

nationbuildingisinqualifyingthelinkbetweenthephenomena.Paradiplomacyasitrelates

tosub-statenationbuildingdoesnothavetomeanaconcreteendgoal.Wedonothaveto

proveanimminentwilltosecede,recastdevolutiondispensationsorfederalarrangements

to know thatby conducting certain typesof paradiplomatic activity, andby framing their

interactionsincertainways,sub-stategovernmentsareassertingtheirrightfulparticipation

inasovereigntygame.We’vehadtheducktest,nowfortheelephanttest:somethingthatis

hard to describe, but instantly recognisable when you see it. This is paradiplomacy as a

sovereigntygame.Rarelyisanexplicitclaimtosovereigntymade,butinamultitudeofways,

this right to participate - or seat at the table - is exactly the currency of many of the

paradiplomaticendeavoursdescribedintheempiricalanalysestofollow.

Thevalueofthisparticularstudythusliesbothinthesubjectmatterconsidered,andtheway

thatitisexplored.Regionalidentitiesarebecomingincreasinglysalientatpreciselythetime

when traditional diplomatic boundaries are being watered down, creating numerous

opportunitiesforsub-stategovernmentstorecasttheirpreviouslydomestically-boundroles

andrepositionthemselvesvisavistheirhoststates.Yet,previousstudieshavefailedtoutilise

the full range of available tools and frameworks, particularly those stemming from the

disciplinesofInternationalRelationsandDiplomaticTheory,tounderstandthewaysinwhich

adistinctcategoryofactorhasbeenabletocarryoutthisrecastingwork,andindeedthefull

spectrumofmotivationstheymayhavefordoingso.Thealternativetheoreticalframework

establishedinpartoneofthisthesis,whencombinedwiththeempiricalworkthatfollows,

aimstodojustthis:lookingbeyondthesuperficialexplanationsforsub-statediplomacyand

insteadaccountingfortheunquestionablypoliticaldynamicsthatunderpinit.

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Eachofourthreecaseshasauniqueapproachtotheirparadiplomaticendeavours,though

theymaintainmuch in common. They are cases that we all think we know, correctly or

otherwise.Aboastful,wilfulScotlandeagertoshoutdowntheir‘English’counterpartsatany

opportunity.AndforWales,‘seeScotland…toalesserdegree’:bumblingalongwitharelative

lackofambition,preoccupiedwithconcernsaboutitscrumblingvalleysandprecarioushill

farmers - and the rugby. BenignBavaria, too busy counting its coffers too challenge the

FederalGovernmentinanymeaningfulway;happywiththepivotalrolethattheFederalparty

system allows it to occupy at a state level, getting onwith the job of governing amajor

economy without the navel-gazing that stateless nationalism implies. In important ways,

however, the empirical findings of this thesis turn many of these - admittedly glib -

assumptionsontheirheads.TheScottishGovernmentprioritises‘official’diplomacy,tyingit

intoUK-widerepresentationsoverseas,oftenatthecostofadistinctiveScottishvoice;maybe

the traditional diplomacy of yore isn’t so outmoded after all.Wales,meanwhile, actively

utilisesthewayinwhichitcanoperate‘undertheradar’tobuildexclusiverelationshipsin

partsoftheworldwhereheadlinediplomacycaninhibitstate-levelinteractions.Ithasalso

proved particularly adept at mimicking prevailing international discourses - of gender

equality,e-democracyandenvironmentalism-craftinganinternationalimagethatalignsvery

neatlywithdominantnorms.InBavaria,‘cooperativefederalism’istakingaback-seatinthe

heatofarefugeecrisisthathasdraggeditsGovernment,perhapsunwillingly,intocoreareas

of Federal foreign policy. At the same time, Bavaria’s nationhood is never far from the

forefrontofitsparadiplomacy,somethingwhichishighlyunusualinaGermancontext.

Justastheinvestigationsintoeachofthesethreecaseshaveprovedrich,whentakenasa

grouptheyhavealso illuminatedseveralfeatures,orqualities,thatseemtobelongtothe

operational space that sub-state governments occupy at an international level. As

governmental, yet non-sovereign, actors, sub-state governments are able, but rarely

compelled,toactinternationally.Theybenefitfromgovernmentalresources-acivilservice,

a budget, the symbols and trappings of the office - and often operate with Federal

arrangementsordevolutiondispensations thathavepermeableboundariesbetween sub-

stateandnationalcompetences.Theseboundariesgetfurtherstretchedbyprecedentand

de facto compromises. Bavaria insists on using the term ‘Vertung’ (representation) to

14

describe its Brussels office, despite the fact that it is explicitly forbidden fromenacting a

diplomatic role. In response, the Federal Government simply calls it something different.

WalesandScotlandbothoperateinternationalaidanddevelopmentpoliciesonthepretext

ofadevolvedresponsibilityforsustainabledevelopment.Acompromise,ofsorts.

Thisfluidstatusandabilityto‘pickandchoose’internationalrelationsresultsinwhatmight

beperceivedasanenviableposition:tooptin,oroptout,offoreignpolicyandinternational

affairs, though with some important caveats. While newspapers and parliamentary

committees focus on scrutinising the national government, the activities of sub-state

governmentsoftenslipthroughthenet.Noone is looking,at leastupuntil thepointthat

somethingoutoftheordinarythrustsnationalattentionuponthem-suchastheScottish

Government’s2009releaseofAbdelbasetalMegrahi.Eventhen,poorunderstandingsofsub-

state authority and institutional competences often means that even if attention briefly

focuses at the sub-state level, once again - no one is really surewhere responsibility lies

(Kenealy,2012a:555).Byascribingcharacteristicstotheinternationalpracticesofsub-state

governments,weinchclosertounderstandingthenatureofthechallengethatitmaypose

tomoretraditionalconceptsofinternationalrelations.ForMcConnelletal.,thesetypesof

activity raise profound questions. In their consideration of other non-state actors

(micropatias,internationalreligiouscommunitiesandunrecognisedstates)andtheirmimicry

ofdiplomacy,theyarguethat:

Suchcasesfundamentallytransgresstheinside/outsidebinaryofinternationalpoliticsandshineaspotlightontheroleofcontingencyintheuntidydiscursiveproduction of international recognition, sovereignty and legitimacy(McConnelletal.,2012:811).

Inthetimethathaselapsedsinceworkonthesiswasbegun,severalbroadshiftsinboththe

paradiplomaticandbroadergeopoliticalplaneshave,arguably,takenplace.First,therewas

the2014referendumonScottishindependence-duringwhichtimeScottishofficialswere

extremely reluctant to discuss paradiplomacy, deeming it too politically sensitive. An

argumentperhaps that this isn’t ‘allabout theeconomy’,afterall.Thenwehadthe2016

Brexitreferendumandtheresultingintra-UKfall-out,supreme-courtbattlesandcallsfora

secondScottishvoteonindependence.And,ofcourse,2017sawtheinaugurationofDonald

15

TrumpasAmerica’s45thPresident-adevelopmentwhichwillsurelycatalyseparadiplomats

acrosstheglobe,particularlythosefromAmerica’smoreliberalstates.Allinall,iftherewas

everatimetoseetheimplicationsofamultiplicationofinternationalagents,thecontestation

anddilutionofnationaldiplomacyandthedefinitionoftheboundariesbetweendifferent

tiersofGovernment,thismustbeit.

Part1:TheParadoxofParadiplomacy

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ChapterOne:LiteratureReview

Paradiplomacy-theexternalrelationsofsub-stateorregionalgovernments-isnotanentirely

new practice; its precedents stretch back well into the 19th century, at a conservative

estimation(PaquinandLachapelle,2005::71).However,thelate20thandearly21stcenturies

have witnessed the ‘normalisation’ of the phenomenon (Cornago, 2010), becoming

increasinglywellestablishedasacompetenceofsub-stategovernment,andaconsequential

featureofinternationalsociety.Thisnormalizationreflectscompetingforces:theincreasing

willingnessofsub-stateactorsthemselvestodevelopaninternationalpersonality,andthe

mechanismstheydevelopfordoingso,alongsidetheresponsesofcentralgovernments in

attemptingtomanagethisdevelopment.Thishastypicallytakentheformofnovellegalor

politicalinstrumentsandarrangementsdefiningthecontoursof‘acceptable’behaviourinthis

regard(Cornago,2010:11).Cornagogoesontoarguethat,whilstconventionalapproaches-

specificallyfromwithintherealmofdiplomaticstudies-oftenunder-emphasiseorevendeny

the importance of paradiplomacy, this ‘normalization’ is indeed a “politically relevant

process”(2010:14).

Afullconsiderationofparadiplomacyentailsthreedistinct,ifratherbroad,levelsofanalysis:

structuresandopportunities,motivationsandagency,and implicationsor significance.To

date,paradiplomaticliteraturehasdevotedthevastmajorityofitsattentiontothefirstof

theseaspects,lesstothesecond,andcomparativelylittletothethird.Inaddition,therehave

been few attempts to link these three aspects together in an overarching theoretical

framework (Lecours, 2002: 92). In practice, this has meant that structural accounts of

paradiplomacyhavedominatedtheliterature,eventhough(aswillbeexploredinthisreview)

thevariationinparadiplomaticactivitysuggestsamuchgreaterrolefortheagencyofsub-

stateactorsthanisallowedforundertheseaccounts.Furthermore,thefailuretoadequately

considertheimplicationsofparadiplomacy-withinbothdomesticandinternationalcontexts

- has meant that an incomplete picture of the practice has emerged, and, crucially, the

meaningofthephenomenon,asapoliticalaction,isnotyetclear.Indeed,thecriticismhas

been levied that the current literature fails to take account of the novelty of sub-state

internationalengagementasawidelyidentifiablefeatureofcontemporarypolitics(Aldecoa,

17

1999:83).Alongsidethethreelevelsofanalysisoutlinedabove,thereisafurthertripartite

distinction to consider. The opportunities, motives and ramifications of the practice

materialise and transpire at the regional, state and international levels. This implicates

numerousschoolsofthoughtandareasofresearchinthestudyofthisphenomenon,and

necessitatesananalyticalframeworkdrawingonthetoolkitsofbothcomparativepoliticsand

internationalrelations.Thisisanendeavourthathasgeneratedonlylimited,andsporadic,

enthusiasm;reflectedintheliterature’simbalance.

Ifthefirstdefiningcharacteristicoftheparadiplomacyliteratureisthisimbalance,thesecond

isthecompartmentalisednatureofitsdevelopment.Criekemans(2011b:3),identifiesthree

distinctphasesofparadiplomaticresearch.Thefirstofthesewasawhollyempiricalexercise,

whichexaminedthedistributionofcompetencesbetweenregionalandcentralgovernments,

focussingonthe(domestic)legalandconstitutionaldimensionsofthepractice(dominated

by constitutional law experts). The second phase was also largely empirical, comprising

comparativestudiesofsub-stategovernmentsandexaminationsofterritorialmobilization

thatweredominatedbythefieldsoffederalismandregionalism.Thethird,amorerecent

trend,whichlargelyconsistsoftheworkofCriekemanshimself,alongwithcolleaguesatthe

UniversityofAntwerpandtheClingendaelInstitute(andthusisdominatedbydiplomacyand

foreignpolicyanalysisscholars)seekstosituateparadiplomacyinaninternationalmilieu.It

is argued that considering sub-national diplomacy as an expression of a new territorial

configurationofinternationalpoliticsmightovercomesomeoftheconceptualandanalytical

lacunas that have been identified, such as the lack of analytical frameworks or adequate

explanationsforthedevelopment(CriekemansandDuran,2011).Thedistinctionbetween

thesephasesisnotabsolute,noristheirprogressionstrictlylinear.Forexample,bothLecours

(2002)andCornago(1999)weretentativelyexploringsomeoftheinternationalaspectsof

thephenomenonrightinthemidstoftheliterature’smorecomparativephase.However,this

phasedconceptiondoeshighlightthegeneralcourseoftheliterature’sdevelopment,andthe

waysinwhichindividualfieldsofstudyhaveapproachedthephenomenon:largelyinisolation

fromoneanother.

18

LecoursandMoreno(2001:2)assesstheliteraturefromadifferentperspective,arguingthat

there are two distinct ‘angles’ from which to view the external relations of sub-state

governments.Thefirstisasaconsequenceofvariousotherphenomena(suchasglobalisation

andsupranationalintegration),wherebyparadiplomacyisappropriatedasevidenceofanew

form of contemporary territorial politics. This, the authors argue, has been the “most

popular” angle of analysis. The second, “less visible and less discussed” angle considers

paradiplomacy as a discrete phenomenon, whereby the action of sub-state governments

“projecting themselves onto the international scene and, consequently, becoming

internationalactors”isinvestigatedinandofitself,andwhereterritorialpoliticsisthusseen

as“anexplanatoryvariableforoneparticularinternationalprocess,namelytheinternational

relationsofregions”(LecoursandMoreno,2001:2).

There is an apparent contradiction between the ‘natural’ competences of a sub-state

government (assumed tobe firmly domestically located, concernedwith regional or local

issues that are understood to be bettermanaged by an authority ‘closer’ to the specific

environment)and thepracticeofdiplomacyor international relationson thepartof such

actors.Itwouldthereforeseemclearthatthesecondoftheapproachesmentionedabove,

consideringparadiplomacyasadiscretephenomenon,isinherentlymoreappropriateforits

studythanisthefirst,currentlymorepopular,angleofanalysis.Thisseemsparticularlytrue

whenwerememberthat,inmanyinstances,theappropriationofinternationalremitsbysub-

stateactorsisoften-thoughnotalways-asourceofdomesticpoliticaltension,andtherefore

politicalcapitalislikelytobeexpendedingainingthesecompetences.Itisnotoftenthecase

thatinternationalactornessfallsintothelapsofunsuspectingregionalgovernments.

To assess the ways in which the literature has thus far examined the practice of

paradiplomacy, this chapterwill consider thedistinct factors that havebeen identified as

relevanttothreekeyquestionsregardingthephenomenon:howithasemerged,whyittakes

place,andwhyitmatters.Thetheoreticaldevelopmentofthefieldwillbeconsideredinthe

contextof this finalquestion, lookingat thebarriers to,evidenceofandpotential for the

establishmentofoverarchinganalyticalframeworks.Inshort,thisintroductorychapterlays

out the approaches traditionally taken to paradiplomatic study; highlighting their

19

shortcomingsandsignallingtheneedforanew,morecomprehensiveframework,whichisto

beintroducedinthesubsequentchapter.

Paradiplomacy:StructuresandOpportunities

I. Globalisation

According toHocking (1999:18), theco-occurrenceofglobalisationand localisation isnot

coincidental,butratherthephenomenarepresenttwosidesofthesamecoin;reflecting“the

competing pressures and tensions created by a broader and more integrated global

economy”.Therehasemergeda“symbioticrelationshipbetweencoheringandfragmenting

forces”,whereby“thelocalisnottheantithesisoftheglobal”(Hocking,1999:9).Criekemans

andDuran(2011)meanwhile,highlighttheweakeningofthebarrierspreviouslysegregating

‘high’and‘low’politics,arguingthatthishasimportanteffectsforsub-stategovernmentsas

nationalforeignpolicyagendasbecomelesshierarchical,andthuspermeabletotheinterests

andconcernsoflocalorregionalactors(suchastheenvironment,trade,cultureandminority

rights).Inasimilarvein,Cornago(2010:18-19)emphasisestheestablishmentofregionsas

globally competitive units, as a result of “a new economic geography, institutional

restructuring,newtechnologicalfacilities,cross-nationalmigrationandnewenvironmental

concerns”, arguing that these ‘global dynamics’ can account for the proliferation of

paradiplomaticactivities.

Expandingonthiscentralidea,PaquinandLachapelle(2005:78)arguethatglobalization(and

therelated‘nationstatecrisis’)infactholdsthegreatestexplanatorypowerwhenitcomes

to understanding paradiplomacy. So, the argument goes: the economic imperatives of a

globalizedworldhaveledsmaller(regional)unitstocompetewithoneanotherforrelative

sharesofthe‘worldmarket’.Theauthorsarguethatthisformofeconomiccompetitionhas

come to replace alternative forms, in particular that “between sovereign powers for the

acquisitionofnewterritories”.Theinternationalengagementofregions,therefore,isseenas

afunctionalrequirementofthisparticularglobalorder(PaquinandLachapelle,2005:78).

20

Thedangerofthe‘glocalisation’argument,however,isthatittendstopresentana-historical

narrative,subsumingthepracticeofparadiplomacy intobroaderprocessesall tooreadily,

ratherthanexaminingthephenomenonasadiscreteendeavourwithitsownevolutionary

history.Forexample,inexploringtheroleofconsularrepresentationinanemergingstate-

Norway-LeiraandNeumann(2008)placethepracticeofparadiplomacyinthecontextof

the country’s state-building process,which substantially pre-dates the ‘post-modern’ era.

Likewise,whilePaquinandLachapelle (2005:71)arekeentoemphasise the linkbetween

globalisationandparadiplomacyintheirbook,theyalsoidentifyQuebec’sparadiplomacy,or

at the least strongprecedents for it,asmanifest fromasearlyas thenineteenthcentury.

‘Globalisation’canthereforebeseentoengenderattractiveopportunitystructuresforsub-

stategovernments,whichmayindeedbeakeyexplanationoftheproliferationofsub-state

international activities. But it fails to adequately explain the motivations behind

paradiplomaticaction;apracticethatpredatestheglobalizedera.Itisparticularlyillequipped

toexplainthoseactionsthatarenotclearlyfunctionalorprimarilyeconomicinnature.

II. TheEuropeanUnionandRegionalism

The twin processes of European integration and internal regionalisation (or micro-

macro/inter-intraregionalism)haveprovidedparticularlypronouncedopportunitiesforsub-

statemobilization.Thetwoprocessesaresaidtohavenotonly“coincided”(Aldecoa,1999:

86), but, more specifically, the argument has been made that within the sui generis

environmentoftheEU,the‘newregionalism’hasemergedinresponsetoincreasinglevelsof

interdependence(Sodupe,1999:58).Sodupegoesontoarguethattherelationshipbetween

integrationandregionalisationisamulti-faceted,reciprocalone,whereby“justasintegration

givesanewdimensiontoregionalism,regionalisminturnstimulatesintegration,sincethe

formercontributestoreinforceinterdependence”,andthatoneofthekeydynamicsinthis

process,indeedoneofitsmost“strikingaspects”isinter-regionalco-operation(1999:58).

Cornago, meanwhile (2010: 20) argues that, whilst the establishment of the EU initially

“undermined important sub-national competences”, it gradually came to provide a

“favourable”environment for themobilizationof sub-stategovernments, via itseffecton

“administrativecultures”amongstthememberstatesoftheEU.Concurrently,theEuropean

21

integration process enabled: “the spread of a shared perception concerning the need to

provide institutional venues for mobilizing sub-state governments across the European

region”(Cornago,2010:20).

For Paquin and Lachapelle (2005), European integration is a particularly clear example of

wider ‘internationalization processes’, whereby the proliferation of ‘new’ issues on the

internationalpoliticalagenda,suchastheenvironment,publichealth,transportationandso

on,increasinglyimplicatesub-stategovernmentsintheinternationaldomain.Here,relations

betweensub-stateandcentralstategovernmentsarekey:

Civilservantsandpoliticiansfromsub-stateentitiesworryaboutthefactthatinternationalissuesaffecttheirfieldsofjurisdiction.Sub-nationalentitieswillthussetupinternationalpositionsforthemselvesbecausetheirfailuretoactwouldhavegivencentralgovernmentsa freehand (PaquinandLachapelle,2005:86).

PaquinandLachapellearguethatinordertodefendtheircompetencesfromEU-widepolicy

decisions,whichmayredistributeelementsoftheirauthority,sub-stategovernments“will

pressure their ‘national’ government and European institutions into allowing regions of

Europetoplayagreaterrole”(PaquinandLachapelle,2005:87).

Looking in some detail at the distinct effects of European integration on territorial

mobilization andparadiplomacy,Hepburn andMcLoughlin (2011: 385) point to three key

facets.Firstly,thefactthatmanyEUpoliciesandareasofcompetenceoverlapwith,andhave

significant impact upon, commonly devolved areas of activity means that sub-state

governmentshavesignificantvestedinterestintheEUpolicymakingprocess.Thus,theyare

encouraged to engage,with a presumed legitimacy often lacking in other paradiplomatic

activities,inthisarena.Secondly,thetrendtowardsregionalisationwithinEuropehasopened

upthepossibilityofnewformsofautonomy:somethinglessthansovereignstatehoodbut

greater than devolved authority. Regional parties within EU member states have new

institutionsandnewpoliticalarenasinwhichtoestablishthemselvesasrelevantactors,and

defendtheirinterests:

While territorial political strategies were once focused exclusively on statestructures,regionalactorsnowlobbyattransnationallevelstoadvancetheirgoals,andEuropeanumbrellaorganisationshavebeenformedtorepresent

22

regional party interests in European institutions (Hepburn andMcLoughlin,2011:385).

In particular, the Committee of the Regions (though disappointing some of the more

enthusiastichopesofa‘EuropeoftheRegions’(ScullyandWynJones,2010:5))hasproved

fertilegroundforsub-stategovernmentslookingto“acquireanadditionalstate-likequality,

onethatcouldbuilditsinternalcoherenceandstimulateitsprocessofidentityconstruction”

(Lecours, 2002: 100). Thirdly for Hepburn andMcLoughlin, the ideological nature of the

Europeanintegrationprojecthas“encouraged”sub-statenationalistparties,suchastheSNP,

to adopt a ‘civic nationalism’, based on inclusive criteria and advocating “principles and

themescommontothoseoftheEU-suchassupportforfreetradeanddiversity”(2011:385).

TheEU isnot representativeof thedegreeof integrationwitnessed in regional structures

globally,butasthemostadvancedinstitutionalmanifestationofamoreglobal,andgradual,

trend, it does allow the dynamics of regionalisation, and their relationship to the

development of paradiplomacy, to be seen particularly clearly, and is therefore worth

consideringinthisgreaterdepth.

III. DevolutionandDecentralisation

Part of the ‘new regionalism’, identified in broader processes of governance, particularly

within the EU, relates to the dispersal of power (political, administrative or legislative)

‘downwards’towardstheregions,aswellastothesupranationallevel.Thisisbothasaresult

ofpressure from individual regions themselves (suchasCatalonia),andapartofbroader,

state-widereformprocess(asinFrance)(ScullyandWynJones,2010:5).Thetwoprocesses

of devolution and decentralisation represent alternative institutional embodiments of a

shared logic; that of building regional capacity (Cole and Baudewyns, 2004: 74-75). This

creation of “regional agents”, via devolution or decentralisation, is a logical, perhaps

necessary,precursortosuchagentsthendevelopingan internationalperspective(Lecours

andMoreno,2001:6). Indeed, theadvancementof legislativeautonomywithin regions is

seen by Criekemans (2010c: 38) to be reflected in the increasing sophistication of

23

paradiplomaticactivitiesthroughoutthesecondandthird‘waves’thatheidentifiesastaking

placeinthe1990s-2000s.

As in most federal systems, the ‘regional agents’ created through devolution or

decentralisationarealmostexclusivelydevoidof‘foreignpolicy’prerogatives(withanotable

exception being the Belgian regions), meaning that paradiplomacy falls into a “legal and

constitutionalgrey zone” (Lecours,2008:6). Havingsaid this,however, therearevarious

waysinwhichtheexternalroleofregionalagentshasalegalorconstitutionalbasisofone

sortoranother, thoughtheirrolemaybe-andmostoften is -heavilycircumscribed.The

moreinterestingquestion,then,isperhapscentredaroundwhatsuchregionschoosetodo

withtheirlimitedsetofcompetences,andthevariouswaysinwhichtheboundariesoftheir

internationalremitarechafedbytheparadiplomaticpracticesthattheyundertake.Thelack

of formal responsibility and accountability that regions typically have for ‘foreign affairs’

makesthedecisionofsub-stateorregionalactorstoconsciouslyexpandtheirremitinthis

areaparticularly interesting.Thedistinctqualities that thisengenders - thenon-statutory,

looselyinstitutionalisedspacethatsub-stategovernmentsoperatewithin,thelackofscrutiny

arisingfromthesheerincongruenceofmanyoftheseactivity,theability-yetoftennotthe

obligation-toact,allfeedsintohowparadiplomaticpracticemanifestsontheground,and

thusthepotentialsignificancethat ithas.Thesethemesarecentraltothisthesis,andare

exploredinmuchgreaterdetailinparttwo.

This‘newregionalism’,specificallytheprocessesofdevolutionanddecentralisationthathave

takenplace,particularlywithinEurope,offersenhancedopportunitiesforparadiplomacyto

emerge,owingto its institutionalisationorenhancementofaregionaltierofgovernment.

However, it does not necessarily follow that those regions with the greatest legislative

autonomyarethemostadvancedwhenitcomestotheirparadiplomaticactivities,andvice

versa.Forexample,CriekemanandDuran(2011)considertheparadiplomaticactionofthe

French Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur (PACA), a region that is “devoid of strong legislative

powersoradistinctnational(ist)identity”,that,nonetheless(whencomparedtoothersub-

stategovernmentswithstrongerlegislativepowers),“ispursuingacomparableforeignpolicy,

makinguseofcomparablediplomaticinstruments”.Here,despitethefactthatthe“French

24

foreign ministry still firmly holds the reins of France’s diplomacy”, French regions are

increasinglyutilisingthe(comparativelylimited)remittheyholdinareasof‘low’politicsasa

meanstoactivelydeveloptheirowndiplomaticidentity,eveninternationalactorness(Duran,

2011:340&346).

IV. Lecours2002:OpportunityStructures

Theprecedingsectionshavesoughttoexplorethevariousopportunitystructures,enabled

by the processes of globalisation, European integration and decentralisation, which are

identifiedwithintheparadiplomacyliteratureaspromotingorfacilitatingthephenomenon

thatisparadiplomacy.Beforemovingontoconsiderthe,perhapsmoreintriguing,question

ofwhysub-stategovernmentsthemselveschoosetoutilisetheseopportunitystructuresand

engage in paradiplomacy, it isworth firstly considering a tentative theoretical framework

identifiedbyLecours(2002),whichdrawsattentiontothemulti-locationalnatureofthese

structures. What is required - in order to understand the practice of paradiplomacy -

according to Lecours, is a “multi-analytical framework where regional political systems,

national structures, continental regimes and the global system each contain opportunity

structuresthatconditiontheinternationalagencyofregionalgovernments”(2002:101).This

work represents perhaps the most advanced such framework iterated within the

paradiplomacyliterature,andisthusworthinvestigatinginsomedetail.

Lookingfirstlyattheregionallevel,twoinstitutionalvariablesaregivenexplanatoryweight:

thepartysystem(particularlytheexistenceofnationalistorregionalparties)andtheformal

institutionalpowers,orcourseofdevelopment,oftheregion.Itcomesasnosurprise,argues

Lecours,thatthemostprominentactorsinparadiplomacytendtobelocatedwithinfederal

regions(2002:101). Inevitably,asmanyquestionsareraisedbytheidentificationofthese

two primary regional variables as are answered. For example, though the existence of a

nationalistorregionalistpartymaycertainlypredisposetheregiontowardsparadiplomatic

action,theirexactroleindoingsomaybegreatlydifferentiated.A‘weak’nationalistparty

withlimitedelectoralsupportmaystillcatalysearegion’sparadiplomaticactivityindirectly,

viatheireffectonpartycompetition,incentivisingthirdorgoverningpartiestowardsamore

prominent external role (Royles, 2010: 162-163). Furthermore, the link between

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paradiplomacyandfederalism,andthereforetheweightthatfederalismitselfhaspreviously

been given as an explanatory variable in much paradiplomatic research, is increasingly

questionable.Theprocessesofdevolutionanddecentralisationthathavebeenparticularly

pronouncedwithinEuropeinthelastfewdecadesraisenumerousquestionsastowhether

their open-ended dynamics produce different incentives or opportunities to engagewith

externalactorsthandoesfederalism,wheretheconstitutionalsituationmaybetakentobe

morestatic(theobviousexceptionhereisQuebecanditsrelationswithCanada).

Thesecond levelatwhichLecours identifiesasetofvariables is thenational (state-level).

Here,itistheconstitutionalframework,thenatureofintergovernmentalrelations(which,in

turn,arepartiallybasedonpartycongruenceacrossdifferentlevelsofgovernment(Royles

andWynJones,2010)),themechanismsforregionalrepresentationincentral institutions,

andthestate’sforeignpolicyagenda-specificallywhetherit ismoreorlesspermeableto

sub-state interests - that are seen as key. As referenced previously, Lecours andMoreno

(2001:7)pointtothebreakdownintheconceptualcategoriesof‘high’and‘low’politicsin

thepost-ColdWareraasakeyfactorconditioningthe(re)emergenceofparadiplomacy.

Again, the relationshipbetween thisvariableandparadiplomaticaction isnotabsolute. It

wouldseemthatina‘globalized’age,stateshavelittlechoicebuttoengagewithissueswhich

are particularly permeable to sub-state interests: the environment, for example. The

additionalpresenceof ‘highpolitics’onanationalforeignpolicyagendawouldn’tseemto

precludeparadiplomaticopportunitiesforsuchactors,thoughtheremaybeanargumentas

to the status-reducing effects of foreign policy reporting being focussed on attention-

grabbing ‘highpolitics’,wheresub-stateactorshave-orarethoughttohave- littleorno

presence.

ThethirdsetofvariablesidentifiedbyLecoursoccuratthecontinentallevel;situatedwith

theeconomicandpoliticalregimesinaspecificgeographicalsetting,atanintergovernmental

orsupranationallevel,theEUbeingthemostobviousexamplehere.Theexistenceofsuch

regimes,accordingtoLecours,legitimisespoliticalactionthatbypassescentralgovernment,

weakening its monopoly on policymaking or international relations, on account of their

26

“transformation of state sovereignty”. Therefore, it is the degree of cooperation or the

advancementofinstitutionalmechanismsthatrepresentsthepertinentvariableconditioning

paradiplomacyatthislevel(Lecours,2002:103).

ThefourthandfinallevelofanalysisforLecoursistheglobalenvironment,withvariableshere

comprising: the international organisationswithinwhich regions can be represented, the

numberofstateswillingtoengageindiplomaticrelationswithregions,andthelevelofinter-

regional cooperation which takes place. Furthermore, the global economy provides an

attractiveopportunitystructurethroughitsconstitutionoftheregionasaneconomicunitin

itsownright,alongsidethatofthestate(Lecours,2002:103-104).Thethirdvariable,inter-

regionalcooperation,isseenasparticularlyimportantbyLecours,duetoitsself-reproducing

nature:

Indeed,muchlikestateinteractionshavebuiltandsustainedastatesystemwhichinturnhaslegitimisedstatesasthecentralactorsofworldpolitics,thedevelopmentofawebofinter-regionalrelationscouldleadtoaninternationalregional system that would build up the international agency of regionalgovernments.

Lecours’ approach places a strong emphasis on structural variants, or the ‘how’ of

paradiplomacy,and,indoingso,producesaconvincingtheoreticalframeworkthataddresses

thisquestion.However,inordertofullyunderstandthephenomenonofparadiplomacy,and

toworktowardsagenuinelyoverarchingconceptualframework,muchcloserattentionneeds

tobepaidbothtothe‘why?’andthe‘sowhat?’piecesofthisparticularpuzzle.

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TheAgencyofSub-stategovernments

Structuralopportunitiesalonecannotfullyexplainparadiplomaticactivity.Inparticular,they

failtoadequatelyaccountforoneofthekeycharacteristicsofthepractice:itsdiversity.US

states,forexample,haveamplestructuralopportunitiestoengageinternationally,butthe

often-limitedwaythattheyhavechosentodosostandsinstarkcontrasttootherregions:

All the US states and all large cities possess considerable governmentalcapacity to exercise international competencies, and all have used suchcapacitytoengagetheinternationalarena,butneitherstategovernmentsnorlocalgovernmentshaveplungeddeeplyintointernationalaffairs.Instead,theyskimthesurfaceofinternationalaffairsinsearchofspecificbenefitsfortheirjurisdiction(Kincaid,1999:121).

At best, therefore, structural opportunities are a necessary, but ultimately insufficient

conditioninexplainingthepracticeofparadiplomacy.Theroleofagency,ofthemotivations

promptingsub-stategovernmentsthemselvestodevelopaninternationalpersonality,must

also be examined to fully understand the phenomenon. Sub-state governments have

differentlegal,constitutionalandpoliticalpowersandremitsfromcentralstates.Thismeans

thatmany of themotivations assumed to lie behind traditional international relations or

diplomatic endeavours may not apply to the regional setting, and, therefore, that a full

investigationintothepurposesofparadiplomaticactionisnecessary.“Regionsrarelylookto

influencethebehaviourandpoliciesofotherinternationalactors;rather,theytendtohave

themoremodestobjectiveofdevelopinganinternationalpersonality”(Lecours,2002:96&

104).1Exactlywhyregionsmightwishtodevelopthisinternationalpersonalityisacentral

questionforparadiplomaticresearch.

AusefuloverarchingframeworkisdevelopedbyKeating(1999),whoidentifiesthree‘sets’of

motivations lying behind paradiplomatic activity: economic, cultural and political. Looking

firstlyateconomicmotivations,Keatingidentifiesboththedesire(or,perhapsincreasingly,

need)forsub-stategovernmentstoseekinwardinvestment,whichcompelsthemtoestablish

themselvesasattractiveeconomic locations internationally,anda“morealtruisticstyleof

1 Though there are indeed some similarities in the strategies, even aims, of sub-statediplomacyandsmallstatediplomacyCriekemansD.(2011b)RegionalSub-StateDiplomacyToday.DevolutioninaGlobalizedWorld.ChathamHouse,London.

28

external activity” in the programmesof international development assistance undertaken

mostnotablybyEuropeanregions(1999:4).2Culturalmotivations,meanwhile,areoftentied

mostcloselywithlanguagepromotion(KeatingcitesFrenchsupportforQuebec’slinguistic

programmeshere,thoughWales’promotionoftheWelshlanguageinPatagoniawouldbea

different,inter-regionalexample).

More controversial are the politicalmotivations identified by Keating: nationalist regions

“seekrecognitionandlegitimacyassomethingmorethanregions”,while“externalprojection

mayalsoservebyareverseeffecttohelpnation-buildingathome,byshowinglocalleaders

in international contexts”. According to Keating, “even in regions without nationalist

movements,theinternationalarenacanbeusedasaplatformforinternalregion-building,as

wellasfortheprojectionoftheregionalpoliticiansthemselves”(Keating,1999:5).Theneed

for ‘recognition’ by external actors, inherently realised in the conduct of ‘international

relations’isalsohighlightedbyPaquinandLachapelle,whopositthatthisactivity,alongside

theroleofparadiplomacyinthepower-strugglethattheauthorsidentifybetweensub-state

nationsandcentralstategovernments,meansthatparadiplomacyoftenconstitutesakey

component of the quest for legitimacy on the part of ‘stateless nations’ (Paquin and

Lachapelle,2005:82-85). Indeed, statelessnationalism isan importantvariable in itsown

rightandisaddressedinsomedetailbelow.

I. StatelessNations

A key component in many explanations of the less clearly ‘functional’ international

engagementsofregionsare‘statelessnations’.AsAldecoaandKeatingargue(1999b:v),aside

fromthestrongfunctionallogicsderivingfrominternationalcompetition,andthespill-over

effects of meeting such requirements in international trade, political explanations are

required to account for the development of paradiplomacy, “derived from the goals and

strategiesofsub-stateelites,buildingandpromotingthenationor,insomecases,preparing

2Thesemore‘altruistic’economicactivitiesmayperhapsbemoreappropriatelyclassedaspolitical innature,or at the least ‘cooperative’, given that the regiondoesn’t receiveanyspecificeconomicadvantagesfromsuchaction,rathertheyaregenerallyseentoformpartofnation-buildingendeavours.

29

thewayfornationalindependence”.Keating(1997)exploresthisconceptindetail,arguing

that a new type of civic (as opposed to ethnic) nationalist project has emerged inmany

locales:

Civicnationalism isa collectiveenterprisebaseduponcommonvaluesandinstitutions,andpatternsofsocialinteraction.Thebearersofnationalidentityare institutions, customs, historical memories and rational/secular values.Anyonecanjointhenationirrespectiveofbirthorethnicorigins,thoughthecostofadaptationvaries.Civicnationalismisbaseduponaterritoriallydefinedcommunity, not upon a social boundary among groups within a territory(Keating,1997:691).

What theseentitiesdesire,according toKeating, is self-determination.But,hegoesonto

argue; “the end of self-determination is not necessarily a nation-state, since that is a

historically contingent form” (1997: 693). Paradiplomacy legitimises this form of nation

buildingby“placingtheminoritynationinthewiderfamilyofnation-states”.Thisargument,

paradiplomacy-as-stateless-nationbuilding,isalsomadebyLecoursandMoreno(2001:1),

who contend that the “processes of nationalism…logically lead to regional governments

seekingthedevelopmentofaninternationalpersonality”.Royles(2010:142&161),makesa

similarcasewithreferencetoWelshparadiplomacy,wherebytheactionsofWelshLabour,

with“broadagreement”acrossthepoliticalspectrum,areinterpretedaspartofaconscious

nation-building exercise, with international activities “bolstering identity, enhancing

legitimacy and national recognition”. Indeed, Lecours and Moreno argue that

‘multinationalism’, rather than federalism, is the key variable conditioning a region’s

developmentofparadiplomaticactivity,andthattherefore,“paradiplomacy,at least in its

mostdevelopedform,needstobere-conceptualizedthroughatheoreticallinkagewithsub-

stateorstatelessnationalism”(2001:1-3).

LecoursandMorenogoontounpackthislinkbetweennationbuildingandparadiplomacy,

and, indoing so,discern threedistinctaimsorbenefits that sub-statenationalist factions

identify in external engagements. The work of these two authors represents the fullest

considerationofsuchlinksintheliterature,andisthusworthaddressingindetail.Thefirstof

theaimsorbenefitsaccruingfromparadiplomacywithregardstonationbuildingisidentity

construction;“nationalismisaformofidentitypolitics”andsuchidentitiesarediscursively

30

constructed;“creatingandshapingnationalidentitiesnecessitates‘speakingthenation’,that

is,promotingtheideaofanationalcommunity”(LecoursandMoreno,2001:3).

Therearetwoelementstotheroleofparadiplomacyinidentityconstruction.Thefirstisto

dowiththediscourseofinternationalrelations,specificallythefactthatthisdiscourseisone

ofnations, and that, therefore, “the very definition of international agents, at leastwith

respecttoterritorial-institutionalunits,entailsnationhood”.Theauthorsarguethat,when

lookedatfromthisperspective:“thedevelopmentofaninternationalagencyonthepartof

aregionalgovernmentisfullofsymbolicmeaning,andthereforeanattractivestrategicoption

fornationalistleaders”(LecoursandMoreno,2001:3-4).Thesecondelementrelatestothe

domesticaudience:

Highlyvisibleparadiplomaticactivitiesgivenationalistleaderstheopportunityto play to their domestic audience. They provide a scene from whichnationhood can be proclaimed most forcefully…in short, throughparadiplomacy,regionscanbothbehaveasnationsandpresentthemselvesassuch(LecoursandMoreno,2001:4).

Theseconddimensionofparadiplomacy-as-stateless-nation-building restson the fact that

paradiplomatic activity offers an attractive space for the “definition and articulation of

regional/group interests”, which, in turn, contributes to the further development of the

nation’scollective identity.Such interests,entailinga“specificconceptionof thecommon

good”,arebothculturalandideologicalinnature.Intermsofculture,nationalistmovements

“emphasize and politicize cultural distinctiveness; consequently, they tend to define the

‘national interest’ primarily in terms of cultural protection/preservation”.Meanwhile, the

authors continue, emergent nationalist movements tend to develop an “ideological

personality”,whichisthenrefinedwithreferenceto,andprojectedonto,theinternational

stage. Lecours andMoreno citeQuebec nationalists’ strong linkswith tradeunions as an

example here, but the international and sustainable development activities of many

Europeanregions,ScotlandandWales included,wouldalsoappear tobeevidenceof this

ideological personality. Interest definition is seen by Lecours and Moreno as “the most

straightforwardandvisible”componentofparadiplomacy,duetothefactthatsuchactivities

are seen to ‘mimic’more traditional foreign policy discourses, which are “fundamentally

31

about the definition, defence and promotion of a (state) national interest” (Lecours and

Moreno,2001:4).

ThethirdandfinallinkbetweennationbuildingandparadiplomacyasidentifiedbyLecours

andMorenoisthatofpolitical-territorialmobilization.Here,theoften-conflictualnatureof

paradiplomacyinrelationtothe‘host’statepresents“nationalistleaderswithopportunities

tostimulatepolitical-territorialmobilizationbecauseitpitstheregionagainstthecentre,and

sometimesregionalnationalistforcesagainstnon-nationalistones”.Giventhesensitivityof

‘foreignpolicy’,paradiplomacyrepresentsaparticularlyusefultoolinsuchmobilization:quite

simply,itisa“statementaboutpower”(LecoursandMoreno,2001:5).

While thecategoryof statelessnation,andcertainly theparadiplomacy-as-nation-building

argument,remaincrucialtounderstandingthepoliticalmotivationsbehindparadiplomatic

action,manyofthedistinctionsinherentinsucharguments,suchasthatbetweennationalist

andnon-nationalistregions,asidentifiedbyKeating(1999:4-5),orindeedethnicandcivic

nationalisms, are perhaps overly simplistic. Amongst the ‘nationalist’ regions commonly

classedas ‘statelessnations’,therearethose,suchasScotland,whoserulingpartyhasan

explicit independence platform, whilst there aremany others whose ‘nationalism’ is not

necessarily tied to an independence or secessionist agenda, or indeed (exclusively) to a

‘nationalist’party.Theexactmotivations,therefore,behindtheseregions’paradiplomacies,

andnationbuildingprojectsmorebroadly,wouldseemtobesignificantlydifferent,aswould

thesignificanceorimplicationsofsuchactivities.Moregenerallyspeaking,therealsoexist

‘nationbuilding’projectswhichareemployedinapurposefullycooperativewaywithregards

toanexistingstateidentity,Bavariahavingtraditionallybeenanaptexamplehere(Hepburn,

2008a:186).Thewillofdifferentiation,incasessuchasthese,maymanifestinamuchmore

conciliatorystyleofparadiplomacy-as-nation-buildingactivitythanseeninthosecaseswhere

antagonisticrelationsexistbetweencentralandregionalgovernments.

Therefore, whilst there is certainly a significant link between nation building and

paradiplomacy,theexactnatureofthis linkappearstobemorecomplexthan iscurrently

accountedforintheliterature.Someelementsofparadiplomaticactivitycanbeinterpreted

32

asattempts to ‘pave theway’ for independence, suchas inQuebecorScotland,whereas

othersremainpreoccupiedwithidentityconstructionwithinthedomesticconstituency.The

challenges such paradiplomacies may pose to state sovereignty, and the related inter-

governmentaltensionswithintheextantstate,mayalsodiffersubstantially.

Thoughmany authors have acknowledged the variety of potential ‘end points’ to nation

building exercises, there is currently no systematic analysis of the ways in which

paradiplomacy is utilised along this continuum. The relationship between those discrete

goals that are commonly attributed to ‘nation-building’, and the precise nature of

paradiplomaticactivitywouldappeartobeanoverdueitemontheparadiplomacyresearch

agenda.

II. The‘Self’andthe‘Other’

Duran(2011:342)arguesthatthecurrentbodyofliteratureaddressingthequestionofwhy

sub-stategovernmentsengageinparadiplomacyrepresentsadichotomousapproachtothe

phenomenon:”itiseitherconflictingwithorcooperativetothediplomaticactivitiesofthe

state the region is a constitutive part of”. The empirical data,Duran continues, “seem to

justifythisdichotomy”,duetotheprevalenceofparadigmaticcasestudies,focussingonthe

‘usualsuspects’whoseparadiplomacyiseasilyidentifiedaseithercooperativeorconflictual,

and isnotable for that reason (Duran,2011:339&342). Asaconsequence, thestudyof

paradiplomacyoftenignoresthepotentialofmoreconciliatoryapproaches,suchasHocking’s

(1999)multi-layereddiplomacymodel,and,theimplicationfollows,mischaracterisesmuch

of the practice. Duran argues that, in the case of one of the lesser-studied entitieswith

regardstoparadiplomacy(alongsidetheItalian,Argentinean,Brazilian,ChileanandChinese

regions,interalia),theFrenchregionofPACA,diplomaticpractices:

Surpass the often-cited conflictual logic according to which sub-nationalentitieswinwhatthenationaldiplomaticlevelloses….diplomacyisfirstandforemostameansofmediatingbetweentheSelfandtheOther.Seeninthatlight, paradiplomacy can be an integral part of a diplomacy aimed atemphasizing the commonalities instead of the differences or separatenessbetweenpolities(Duran,2011:340).

33

InthecaseofPACA,Duranarguesthatparadiplomacyisrelatedtotwodistinctprocesses:

thatofdecentralisationwithintheFrenchstate,andofidentityconstructionwithintheregion

itself.Thisparadiplomaticactioncanbe,andis,bothcooperativeandconflictualwiththatof

the central state, but, Duran stresses, the key is that such actions “are primarily about

managing relations with ‘others’” (Duran, 2011: 356). In this case, PACA has developed

significantlinkswiththewiderMediterraneanregionasakeypartofitsparadiplomacy:

BytreatingtheFrenchstateandotherFrenchterritorialcollectivesnotonlyaspartofthediplomaticSelf,butalsoasdiplomaticOthers,andbyconsideringtheMediterranean space as domestic, by advocating amultiple diplomaticidentity-Provencal,FrenchandMediterranean-theregionisfillingtherelativevacuumtheFrenchstateleftintheMediterraneanregion…Thustheregionisaffirming the diplomatic Self (PACA), recognising diplomatic Others (otherFrench regions, France, foreign interlocutors) but also the diplomaticSameness(theMediterraneanspace)(Duran,2011:357).

Thepracticeofparadiplomacy,therefore,embodiesprocessofdifferentiationandalignment,

somethingthatrefersnotjusttorelationshipsformedwithotherregionsorstates,butalso

betweentheregionandtheirhoststate,andotherregionswithinthatstate.Thoughnotthe

intentionofDuran,givenhisattempt tomoveaway fromconflictual logics, itwouldeven

seemthatthisconceptualisationcouldbeusedtounderstandtheways inwhichstateless

nationsuseparadiplomacyaspartoftheirnationbuildingendeavours:bothtodifferentiate

themselvesfromcertainactors(thecentralstate,otherregionswithinthestate,particularly

incasesofasymmetricaldemandsforautonomy)andalignthemselveswithothers;whether

theyareother‘statelessnations’(astheBavariangovernmenthasovertlyattempted“Bavaria

isverysimilartoScotland.Weseeourselvesasanation”(EberhardSinner,BavarianMinister,

inHepburn,2008a:184))orotherstates(suchasQuebec’srelationswithFrance).Thisbroad

conceptualisation(paradiplomacyasaprocessofdifferentiationandalignment)ispotentially

ausefuloneinexplainingthemotivationsofsub-stategovernmentsasageneral‘category’

ofactorindevelopingexternalrelations,withtheprecisecontoursoftheserelationsbeing

dependent,essentially,ontherelationshipthattheregionhaswithitsvarious‘others’(be

thatconflictualorcooperative).

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III. Paradiplomacy,orMulti-LevelGovernance?

Aconsequenceofthescantattentiongiventoagency-orientatedaspectsofparadiplomacyis

thattheconcepthasperhapstoooftenbeenequatedwithMulti-LevelGovernance.Here,the

focusofanalysishastraditionallybeenrelatedtogovernanceoftheEuropeanUnion,andthe

variousopportunitystructuresthatthiscreatesforsub-stategovernmentsandotheractors

‘below’ the state.Morebroadly it representsauseful concept toexplaindecisionmaking

dynamicswithintheEuropeansphere,notfocussingjustonthestateastheunitofanalysis

butratheranexusofactorsandthewaysinwhichtheseactorsinteractwithoneanother

(Marks et al., 1996). Marks and Hooghe use multi-level governance to account for the

‘unravellingofthecentralstate’,andtotheoreisenewpatternsofpoliticalinteractionthat

werenolongernecessarilyhierarchicalintheirnature;asetofrelationshipsthatbypassed

thecentralstate,yetwithoutrenderingitirrelevant(MarksandHooghe,2003).Thesethemes

remain hugely relevant for paradiplomatic analysis. However, the conflation of the two

phenomena–paradiplomacyandmulti-levelgovernance–mayproveproblematic.Sucha

conflationispartlydowntothesharedsubjectmatterandoperationalspacesthattheyjointly

inhabit,butitisalsoencouragedbythesheervarietyofactivitiesandpracticescomprising

paradiplomacy,manyofwhichequatetomulti-level-governanceandcanindeedbeuseful

exploredunderthisoverarchingconcept.

Paradiplomacy manifests in numerous guises: at times utterly mundane, at times highly

contentious. The scope of these activities should come as no surprise to students of

regionalism.Regionsandsub-stategovernmentsarethemselvesan“extraordinarilydiverse

group”,possessing varyingdegreesof autonomy (Scully andWyn Jones, 2010: 3) .Unlike

sovereign states, there is nominimum legal or conceptual personality that regions share.

Logically, therefore, the motivations behind the international activities that these actors

undertakealsospanaspectrumofpoliticaldistinctiveness,particularlywithregardstothe

‘host’ state. In itsmore ubiquitousmodes, sub-state internationalismmight relate to the

functionalrequirementsofEuropeangovernance,ortheneedtoattractinwardinvestment.

Initsmostdevelopedforms,however,paradiplomaticactivitiescanspeaktotheambitions

of sub-state nationalism (Lecours andMoreno, 2001: 3). Thesemore developed forms of

paradiplomacytypicallytakethesub-stategovernmentintomorecontentiousareas:whether

35

thatisthematically(recognition,internationalaid,coreareasofthestate’sforeignpolicy),in

termsofthenatureoftheactivity(relationswiththirdstatesordeparturefromastate-held

position).

Whenconsideredintheseterms,thepotentialimplicationsofparadiplomaticactivitiestake

onapoliticalcharge.Forinternationalrelationstheory,thesecouldbeparticularlyprofound.

Unlike themyriadofothernon-stateactorsoperatingat the international level, sub-state

governments are territorially constituted, and this territory overlaps with that of nation-

states. Indeed, for Duran, not only is paradiplomacy a territorially-driven political

phenomenon,meaningthatsubstatediplomats“represent,communicateandnegotiatein

thenameofterritorialcommunities”,theyarealso“politicalexpressionsofthedynamicsof

de-andreterritorializationthatcharacterizeourcurrentinternationalenvironment”(Duran,

2015:63).Fortheminorityofsub-stategovernmentsthatrepresentadistinct‘nation’,the

potential becomes that of undermining a core function of the nation-state itself in

international relations: to speak for ‘the people’ of a given territory. Currently, the

internationalrelationsliteraturehasnoplaceto‘put’actorsthatarenotreadilycategorised

accordingtothe“traditionaldichotomy”ofstateandnon-state(Shadian,2010:486).Indeed,

areifiedconceptionofthenation-state“leadstoanimpoverishedconceptionofwhatthe

‘non-state’entails”(BulkeleyandSchroeder,2011:745). Increasingly,theactivitiesofsub-

stateactors,particularlythoserepresentingdistinctnations,ontheinternationalstageare

makingthisanuntenablesituation.

Takenasawhole,theliteratureonsub-stateinternationalmobilizationhasfailedtodevelop

atheoreticalframeworkabletofullyexplorethesemoredevelopedparadiplomaticactivities,

many of which correspond to the logics of sub-state nationalism. The ‘fuzzy’ boundaries

between frameworks addressing autonomous, diplomatic activities (paradiplomacy) and

morefunctionalengagementinmulti-levelpolicy-makingprocesses(multi-levelgovernance)

havemeant that thesemore distinctive activities have becomediluted in analyses of the

broaderphenomenon.

36

Bothparadiplomacyandmulti-levelgovernanceareconcernedwiththeun-boundingofsub-

stateunitsfromtheirdomesticterritorialsettings.Theseunitsengagetodifferentdegrees

and in various modes with external actors, comprising other regions, third states,

international networks and supranational organisations. As explored in the preceding

sections,thismobilizationisthoughttobepartiallyfuelledbyfunctionalimperatives,suchas

attracting inward investment,or shapingEUpolicy (Hocking,1999;Cornago,2010:18-19;

Tatham, 2010). However, at the opposite end of the spectrum, other, less tangible,

motivations may also be also manifest. These include status-, capacity- or even nation-

building(LecoursandMoreno,2001;Kincaid,1990;Wigell,2013;ColeandPalmer,2011;Wyn

JonesandRoyles,2012;Royles,2010;AldecoaandKeating,1999a;Duran,2011).Intheirmost

developedforms,theseactivitiescanentailtherepresentationofasub-stateunitasadistinct

nationon the international stage,promoting the interestsor valuesofanequallydistinct

‘people’. However, in much of the literature, regional mobilization, manifest in both

paradiplomacy and multi-level governance, is closely allied to the broader processes of

globalisation (Hocking, 1999; Paquin and Lachapelle, 2005), and European integration

(Aldecoa, 1999; Sodupe, 1999;Hepburn andMcLoughlin, 2011). This literature also often

impliesacausalrelationshipbetweenthesewiderphenomenaandsub-statemobilisationin

theinternationaldomain(Hocking,1999:9;CohnandSmith,1996:25;PaquinandLachapelle,

2005:78;Sodupe,1999:58).

NotonlydoesthisfocusonthelogicsofglobalisationandEuropeanintegrationmeanthat

theagencyofregionalactorsthemselveshasattimesbeenneglected,butitalsoleadstoa

confusion between different categories of international activity undertaken by sub-state

governments.Giventhebroadscopethatthephenomenonofsub-stateinternationalisation

encompasses,intermsofthetypesofactor,ofarenasandofactivities,thelackofcoherence

withinthetwomainliteraturesaccountingforthesepracticesisfarfromsurprising.Imprecise

boundarieshaveled,however,toasituationwherepartsoftheostensibly‘paradiplomacy’

literaturedealwithactivities thatmaybebetterconsideredundermulti-levelgovernance

frameworks(forexample:Tatham,2008;2010;2013;Hocking,1999:25).Afurtherdifficulty

arisesfromthefactthatmulti-levelgovernanceitselfisa“multi-levelconcept’:

37

Because itmovesacrossandconnectsdifferentanalyticalplanesandraisesdifferentnormativequestions.MLGisatthesametimeatheoryofofpoliticalmobilisation,ofpolicy-makingandofpolitystructuring,henceanytheorisationaboutMLGmaybecouchedalternativelyorsimultaneouslyinpolitics,policy,orpolityterms(Piattoni,2009:172).

Thus,whentheamorphousconceptofmulti-levelgovernanceitselfbecomesconflatedwith

the narrower frame of paradiplomacy, it may generate an analytical problem:

mischaracterisingandobscuringthesignificanceofparadiplomacy.Sub-stategovernments’

role inmulti-levelgovernance–at least inrecentyears- is typicallythoughttobeafairly

conciliatory practice (where sub-state governments act with a degree of presumed

legitimacy),concerningactivitieswithaclearfunctional impetus.Toocloseanequationof

this conceptwith paradiplomacymay therefore direct attention away froma category of

activities,muchfewerinnumberthoughtheymaybe,wherelesstangiblemotivationsareat

play,andthetoneofinteractionsmaybemorecompetitive.Inconductingparadiplomatic,as

opposedtomulti-levelgovernanceactivities,regionsoftenemulatestate-likequalitiesand,

insomecases,useinternationaldomainstobuildthe‘nation’domestically.Thiscategoryof

activitiesmayspeaktoagreaterdegreeofpoliticalcontestationthanistypicallyprovidedfor

undermulti-levelgovernanceframeworks.

The requirement for such a distinction has been recognised within both literatures, and

tentativestepshavebeentakentowardsdelineatingthedifferentcategoriesofinternational

activities.Forexample,Kincaid(2010)arguesthatthereisachoicefacingparadiplomacy(or,

usinghispreferredterm,constituentdiplomacy)actors:whetherornottoseparateEUand

worldaffairsintheirinternationalremits.Thisisbecause,heargues;“theEUisincreasingly

takingonthecharacteristicofa federalpolityandtherebyacquiringthecharacteristicsof

domesticratherthaninternationalpoliticsandgovernance”(Kincaid2010:23).Meanwhile,in

a study of the various cross-border institutions utilised by regions, Blatter (2001:181)

contends that distinguishing between “instrumental” on the one hand, and “symbolic or

identity-providinginstitutions”ontheother,isacrucialelementoftheirproperanalysis.

38

Moredeliberately,bothPalmer(2008)andKaiser(2005)haveattemptedtomakeanexplicit

distinction between the two concepts. Palmer (2008: 14) considers paradiplomacy as a

potentialcomplementtomulti-levelgovernance,alongsidethemodelof‘Europeandomestic

policy’, in order to “enhance the explanatory potential of the concept of multi-level

governance for understanding the dynamics of sub-statemobilisation in the EU”. Kaiser

(2005:92),meanwhiledistinguishesparadiplomacy“autonomoussub-nationalactioninthe

internationalsphere”,frommulti-levelgovernance,which,lookstoinvestigate“coordinated

policymaking across different territorial levels”. Kaiser argues that, while paradiplomacy

appliesprimarilytotheAmericancontext,andmulti-levelgovernancetotheEuropean,both

practicescanindeedbeevidencedineachdomain.Fromthesetentativestepstodifferentiate

the two concepts, Chapter 2 of this thesis draws deliberate boundaries around them;

suggestingarangeofwaysinwhichtheymayinteractwithoneanother,andincorporating

suchadistinctionintothenewtheoreticalframeworkthatisadvocatedhere.

TheSignificanceofParadiplomacy:ConceptualisingSub-stateActorness

Theimplicationsofparadiplomacy,particularlyastheymanifestontheinternationalstage,

have rarelybeenconsideredaspartofparadiplomatic studies.Asa result, theyareoften

eitheroverlookedentirelyorrelegatedtofunctionalorsecond-orderfieldsofstudy,suchas

publicornetworkdiplomacy.Moresignificantly,sub-stategovernmentsarefrequently,and

hastily,amalgamatedwithwhatHockingtermsthe“graballcategory”of‘non-stateactors’

(1999: 21). This category error - or the lack of specificity implied - elides the key and

internationallypertinentdifferencethatsub-stategovernmentsrepresentdistinctterritories

which overlap, often in highly sensitive and politically salient ways, with nation states,

meaningthatthesignificanceofparadiplomacyisfundamentallydifferentfromthatofde-

territorialised,purposefully‘global’actorssuchasNGOsorMNCs.

It is not just at the international level that the implications of sub-state governments’

internationalactionisunderexplored;Wright(2003:98)arguesthatboththeparadiplomacy

andmulti-levelgovernanceconceptsfailtoadequatelyexaminetheconsequencesofsuch

phenomenaforstate-sub-staterelations.Thislacunacanpartiallybeexplainedbythefact

39

thatsuchconsequencesvarydramatically,dependingonthetypeofparadiplomaticactivity

inquestion;specifically,whetheritoccursinconflictwith,parallelto,orindeedinconcert

withthediplomacyofcentralstategovernments(Criekemans,2010c:38-39).

Byvirtueofthefactthatmuchparadiplomaticactionoccursparalleltothecentralstate,and

isoftenfairly‘(AldecoaandKeating,1999a)’(AldecoaandKeating,1999b:14),therehasbeen

a tendency to de-emphasise its significance. As highlighted above, a similar impulse to

categoriseas‘paradiplomacy’activitiesthatmaybetterbeunderstoodwithreferencetothe

conceptofmulti-levelgovernancecompoundsthisproblemofunder-ormiss-reporting(for

example,Tatham,2008;2010;Blatteretal.,2008).Theparadiplomacyliterature,therefore,

hasfailedtotakeappropriateaccountoftheimplicationsoftheirfield,whilstinternational

relationsscholarsoftenoverlookthepracticealtogether,perhapsduetothe‘methodological

nationalism’ofmainstreampoliticalscience(Hepburn,2009:478;Jeffery,2008:545).

I. TheInternationalArena

Important questions related to the implications of paradiplomacy for traditional

understandings of international relations and the role of the nation state were raised,

somewhatrhetorically,earlyoninparadiplomaticresearch(AldecoaandKeating,1999a:vi;

Lecours,2002:109;Keating,1999:14).However,afterthisinitialflurryofenthusiasm,and

despitean increasing focusonsomeof the ‘international relations’aspectsof theactivity

(suchaspublicdiplomacy,seeHuijgh(2010)),thesefundamentalquestionshaveyettobe

answered,orevenconsideredinanysystematicway.Thusfar,it isscholarsofregionalism

andcomparativepoliticsthathavebeenattheforefrontofparadiplomaticresearch,leading

toanimbalanceintheliterature.

Inpart,thisimbalancemaybeexplainedbythefactthat,dependingontheparticularframe

ofreferenceorlevelofanalysisthatonechooses,the‘international’effectsorimplications

of paradiplomacy can be interpreted within a multitude of different frameworks. For

example,paradiplomacymaybe seenasanalternativeway toconceptualise someof the

processesmore commonly analysed under the framework ofmulti-level governance; the

increasing involvement of sub-state actors on the international stage, and the

40

internationalizationofsub-statepolitics(Kaiser,2005:90).Atthesametime,ifweconsider

paradiplomacy within the broadest possible frame of reference, paradiplomacy may be

interpretedasonecomponent(amongstmany)of‘transnationalism’,orevenevidenceofa

neo-medievalistconfigurationofinternationalrelations(Magone,2006).

This aforementioned imbalance within the paradiplomacy literature has meant that the

aspects of the practicewhich invite an international relations perspective have not been

adequately explored, with fundamental questions regarding the significance of the

phenomenon, and its implications for key units and concepts in IR theory, such as state

sovereignty,leftunanswered.Thisisasignificantvoidinthefieldofresearch:asthestrategies

ofsub-stategovernmentsbecomemorecomplex,andthelegitimacyoftheir international

action develops, the practice becomes increasingly important for international relations

theory.

II. TheDomesticArena

Theimplicationsofparadiplomacyforthecentralstate,fortheregionitself,andfor inter-

governmental relationswithin the state, differ greatly depending on the type of external

relationsbeingconductedbythesub-stategovernment.Criekemans(2010c:38-39)makes

thisdistinctiononthebasisofwhetherparadiplomacyisconductedinconcert,orinconflict,

with that of the central state. In a similar vein, Tatham (2008; 2010) contrasts EU

paradiplomacywhichisconductedthroughthememberstatewiththatwhichbypasses it,

optinginsteadfordirectinterestrepresentationorinteraction.Anotherclassificationrelates

towhethertheexternalrelationsofsub-stategovernmentstaketheformofparadiplomacy

or‘protodiplomacy’,amoreadvanced,oftenantagonisticformofexternalrelationsaligned

tosub-stategovernmentspursuinganindependenceagenda,orwhoareintheprocessof

secedingfromthewiderstate(Duchacek1988,citedinCornago,2010:31-32).

Thus far, however, much of the paradiplomacy literature has fairly modest expectations

regardingthedomesticimpactofparadiplomacy(forexample:Cornago,2010:31-32;Wolff,

2007).Inparticular,Cornago(2010:31-32)arguesthat‘protodiplomacy’isexceptionallyrare,

evenamongstthosesub-stategovernmentswhere“aclearwillofdifferentiationwithregard

41

tothehostingstateexists”. However,despitethecomparativerarityof ‘protodiplomacy’,

thereisnodoubtthatthismoreconflictualpracticeisindeedinevidenceasapartofcertain

sub-state strategies. For example, Scotland’s diplomatic endeavours do indeed seem to

resemble“those initiativesandactivitiesofanon-centralgovernmentabroad thatgrafta

more or less separatistmessage on to its economic, social and cultural link with foreign

nations” (Duchacek1988:240, cited inCornago2010:31).Overt Scottishattempts toalign

themselveswithaScandinavian‘arcofprosperity’,publicdeparturesfromtheUK’sEUpolicy

and the appropriation of a pair of Chinese Pandas as evidence of formal diplomatic links

betweentheregionandtheChinesestate,allseemtocomeveryclosetothisdefinitionof

protodiplomacy. Ifthis isthecase,thenScotland’sparadiplomacysuddenlyseemstohave

muchmoredramaticimplicationsfortheirrelationswiththeUKgovernmentthanisallowed

forunderthetypologyofbothWolff(2007:150)andCornago(2010:31-32).

In part, this limited conception of the challenge posed for central state governments by

paradiplomacy relates to, once again, to the tendency to equate paradiplomacywith the

‘bigger’ concept of multi-level governance. Here, sub-state interactions tend to be less

controversial, and their presence carries greater legitimacy (for example: Tatham, 2008;

Blatteretal.,2008;Tatham,2010).Thereiscertainlyagooddealofoverlapbetweenthetwo

concepts,bothconsideringtheinternationalactionsofsub-stategovernments,butthisrange

ofactivitiesencompassessomequiteradicallydifferenttypesofengagement,rangingfrom

interest representation in EU policy formation to forging bilateral partnershipswith third

states, or initiating international development programmes. Assuming that each of these

activitieshavebroadlyequalimplicationsfortherelationsbetweenthesub-stategovernment

and thecentral stateseems tobepotentiallymisguided,yet thisdistinctionhasnotbeen

examinedindetailwithintheextantliterature.

TheoreticalFrameworks

Astheprevioussectionshavesoughttodemonstrate,theimplicationsofparadiplomacy,both

ontheinternationalanddomesticstages,havebeenallbutignoredwithintheliterature.Two

further,andwidespread,critiqueshavealsobeenmade,regardingthefailuretodevelopthe

general theoretical perspectives or analytical frameworks necessary to understand the

42

phenomenon(Lecours,2002),andtoarriveatadequateexplanationsforthedevelopment

(BursensandDeforche,2010).Inpart,theseshortcomingscanbeaccountedforbythefact

that paradiplomacy falls into something of an academic ‘no man’s land’, between

internationalrelationstheoryandcomparativepolitics.

Atthebroadestlevel,paradiplomacyraisesthe‘bigquestions’thatarecentralto both comparative politics and international relations. Theorizingparadiplomacy…necessarily involves penetrating the structure-agencydebate…more specifically, paradiplomacy is a Janus-faced phenomenonwhoseverynaturedefiesitscategorizationasinternal-domesticorexternal-international,andwhoseexplanationinvolvesconsideringbothinternalandexternalvariables(Lecours,2002:109-110)

Boththepotentialforamore‘joinedup’approachbetweenthedisciplinesofcomparative

politicsandinternationalrelationsandthespecificroleof internationalrelationstheoryin

conceptualisingtheparadiplomacywillbeconsideredinthefollowingtwosections.

I. TraditionalComparativePoliticsandIRTheory:ABridgeableDivide?

International Relations research, according to Caporaso (1997: 564), remains narrowly

focussed on two conceptual categories: the state and the international system. This

specialisation,asaconsequence,largelyignoresdomesticpolitics,resultingina“pronounced

gapwithinthedisciplineasawholebetweendomesticpoliticsandinternationalrelations”.

Given the existence of phenomena, such as paradiplomacy, whose explanations and

implications lie concurrently in the domestic and international spheres, there seems an

intuitiveneedtobridgethisdivideinfutureresearch.Twodifferentschoolsofthoughtexist,

however, regarding whether or not this academic divide is, in fact, bridgeable; the cure

remainsdependentonthecause,andheretherearedivergenthypotheses.

The first is simply that the chasm is a result of academic specialisation and the logic of

divisionsof labour,encouragingpoliticalscientists,forthesakeofexpediency,tofocuson

relativelynarrowframesofreference.Underthishypothesis,thegapsthatcurrentlyexistin

thetwofields’researcharesurmountable,requiringarestructuringofworkingpracticesand

newresearchagendas.Thesecond,however,assumesthat the ‘problem’ issystemic,and

that“bothfieldsareintellectuallyautonomous,standontheirownfoundations,andcannot

43

bereducedtooneanother”.Here,anexplanationisofferedonthebasisthatthediscipline

of international relations is concernedwithstate survival,bargainingandpower,whereas

domestic politics is rule based, preoccupiedwith governance and institutions. Under this

assumption, integrating the research agendas of these separate disciplines is both

unnecessaryandill-advised(Caporaso,1997:564).

Attemptstoincorporatedomesticandinternationalapproachestophenomenawhichspan

thisconceptualdivide,and‘de-compartmentalise’politicalscience(Lecours,2002:109-110),

can, indeed,beidentified.Caporaso(1997)highlightstwoofsuchthatmaybeparticularly

relevanttothestudyofparadiplomacy:1)RobertPutnam’stwo-levelgames,and2)research

concerningthedomestificationofinternationalsystems(withtheEUasthekeyexemplar).

Caporasocites twoworksaskey to the ‘two-levelgame’approach:Putnam’s1988article

‘DiplomacyandDomestic Politics: The Logicof Two-LevelGames’ anda subsequent1993

editedvolumebyEvansetal.,entitled“Doubled-EdgedDiplomacy”. Thebasicpremiseof

these works is that the unitary actor assumption of the state in traditional IR theory is

misleading, resulting in incomplete understandings of ‘international’ phenomena and,

instead, a recognition of the “Janus-faced” nature of the state, “facing simultaneously

outward to the international systemand inward toward variousdomestic constituencies”

should form the basis of a more sophisticated approach (Caporaso, 1997: 566-567). The

editedbook,whichCaporasohighlights,focusesparticularlyonthisprocessofinternational

bargaining, disseminating the domestic and international explanations for particular

configurationsofpowerornegotiatingpositions.AccordingtoMoravcsik(1993:6),thedivide

betweeninternationalrelationsandcomparativepoliticsislessabsoluteinpracticethanitis

intheory:“pureinternationaltheories,whileattractiveinprinciple,tendtodegenerateunder

thecollectiveweightofempiricalanomaliesandtheoreticallimitationsintoexplanationsthat

include domestic factors”. The argument logically follows, therefore, that incorporating

domestic factors into the theory-building stage would allow for more accurate

conceptualisationsofprocessessuchasinternationalbargaining;“allsophisticatedtheories

ofinternationalrelations,domesticandinternational,tendtoconcedethatdomesticactors

areactiveparticipantsinforeignpolicymaking”.Thecontentiousissue,asMoravcsikseesit,

44

iswhichtheoreticalframeworkscanbestaccountfor“observedbehaviour”(Moravcsik,1993:

7).

ThesecondattemptatrapprochementbetweenthetwodisciplinesidentifiedbyCaporasois

thatwhichhetermsthedomestificationofinternationalpolitics(Caporaso,1997:579).Unlike

thetwo-levelgameapproach,thisendeavourcan’tbetracedtoasingleworkorgroupof

scholars, rather it is most closely related to the wealth of research into the emergence,

integrationandoperationoftheEU,asakeyexampleofthewayinwhichdistinctspheresin

theinternationalrealmhavebecomelessanarchic,more“governmentalized”andrulebased.

Ratherthanadvocatingatwo-levelapproach(wherethetwolevelsofinternationalsystem

anddomesticpoliticsare indeedfundamentallydifferent,butmustbothbeconsideredto

impact upon the process of ‘international relations’), as Putnam and Evans et al., this

approachasks:

Towhatextentdomestic and internationalpoliticsdiffer, in termsofdeeporganisingprinciples,theninterpretsthesedifferencesasonesofdegree(notkind),andproceedstoinvestigatethewaysinwhichtheinternationalsystemmay acquire the characteristics of domestic policy’ (Caporaso, 1997: 579-580:579-80)

Paradiplomacy is a prime example of a phenomenon that requires a multi-locational

theoreticalperspectivetoadequatelyaccountforitsdevelopmentanditsimplications.The

two-levelgameapproachtakentoexploreinternationalbargainingwouldseemaparticularly

usefulstartingpointinaddressingtheinternationalanddomesticvariablesrelevanttothe

practiceofparadiplomacy,andisanapproachseeminglymirrored,ifimplicitly,intheworkof

Lecours(2002),citedinprevioussections.

II. TheabsenceofIR

As also intimated above, paradiplomacy has gained surprisingly little attention from

international relations scholars; in fact none of the numerous ‘schools’ in IR theory have

examinedthephenomenon,offeredexplanationsfor itsdevelopmentoraccountedfor its

impactonthefield(theexceptionswhichprovethisruleareBursensandDeforche’shistorical

institutionalist,explanatory,accountofthedevelopmentofparadiplomacy(2010),builtonby

Royles(Royles,2016)).However,theliteratureisinchingclosertoincorporatingthetypeof

45

dynamicexhibitedbyparadiplomacyinto itstheorising;forexample,recentstudiesofcity

diplomacy(Curtis,2011)andglobaldiasporas(AdamsonandDemetriou,2007)havelooked

closelyatthereconceptualisationofunitsininternationalrelationsandthechallengesfora

prioriassumptionsof thenatureand importanceofsovereignstatehood(particularlyas it

relates to nationhood). Clearly, these are questionswhich relate in equal, if not greater,

measuretotheinternationalactivitiesofsub-stateregionalgovernments,particularlythose

whichcanbeclassedas‘statelessnations’.

ThoughthesetwoworkshaveanunambiguousIRfocus,theydrawonthebroader,multi-

disciplinary frameworkof ‘transnationalism’,wherebynewactors (suchas interestgroups

andglobalcorporations)andlociofpoliticalpower(includingsupranationalinstitutionsand

globalnetworks)increasinglyform‘webs’whichtrapwithinthemnationstates,constraining

theirfreedomofmanoeuvreandweakeningtherespectivepoweroftheirdomesticpolicy

apparatus(Cerny,2010:4-5).Sub-stategovernmentsareaparticularlyinterestingcaseinthis

regard;thefactthattheyareterritoriallyconstituted(asopposedtoissuenetworksorglobal

diasporas) on the one hand, but that they are often politically, as opposed to solely

economicallymotivated(incontrasttomostcitydiplomacy),andthattheymayrepresent

competingexpressionsofnationalismwithregardstotheirhost‘nationstate’,ontheother,

meanthattheireffectupontraditionalrolesandconceptionsofthestatewithininternational

relationsispotentiallyofgreatersignificancethaneitherofthetwophenomenacitedabove.

ThispotentialmakestheabsenceofIRresearchexploringthepracticeofparadiplomacyall

themoresurprising.Infact,thetransnationalismliteratureitselfseemstolargelyignorethe

phenomenon,withexaminationsofregionalismconcentratingonlyontheinter-,notintra-

statemode (particularlywith regards to theEU).Meanwhile, though the twoworks cited

above represent interesting steps towardsexploring thesenewdynamics in IR theorising,

bothauthorspointtotheoverallpaucityofresearchorinterestonthepartofinternational

relationsscholarsintheseareas.Specifically,AdamsonandDemetriou(2007:495)arguethat

what little IR theorising does engage with such issues, in particular diasporas and

transnationalidentities:

46

Has beenwritten largely froma postmodernist perspective,with a view todrawing attention to marginalised identities or practices as a means ofcritiquing hegemonic conceptions of the state…A conceptual focus on non-state identities isthereforeoftenpairedtoapoliticalproject locatedwithinthefieldofIR,ratherthananIRprojectthatseekstounderstandtherealworldofinternationalpolitics.

In attempting to explain what he determines as a fundamental flaw in the way that IR

theorising has developed, Neumann (2002: 630-638) argues that an unquestioning, over-

relianceonthe“systemicpointofdeparture”inIR,theWestphalianstatesystem,hasmeant

that;“wehavenowayofdiscussingempiricallytowhatextentthesystemofstatesinfact

remainscentraltoglobalpolitics.Thesystemappearsasontic,asanexogenisedgivenofthe

analysis”.

Inotherwords,ifthesystemofstatesisseenasagiven,thislimitstheextentofempirical

investigationsintootherexplanations,andIRtheorists“bracketoutotherpossiblewaysof

framingglobalpolitics,andsoeffectivelyhamperotherwaysfromemergingmoreclearly”.

Whatisrequired,accordingtoNeumann,isanabandonmentofthestructural-functionalism

inherent in this approach; IR theory should “follow the general turnof anthropology and

sociologyawayfromananalysisbasedonbeliefs,ideas,normsandsoon,infavourofmore

concreteanalysis”.Usingtheexampleofdiplomacytoillustratehispoint,Neumannargues

that,here,itisparticularlyimportantthatthedegreetowhichstateactorsarerequiredto

“grapple”withothertypesofactors,andtheeffectofthesechanges,areproperlyaccounted

for in IR theory, given that the practice of diplomacy “has traditionally been seen as a

mainstay of the states system, and so this should be a case where potentially systems-

transforminginnovationshouldbelessexpected”(Neumann,2002:693).ChapterTwomakes

adeliberateattempttoincorporateamorequalifiedconceptionofsovereigntyandstatehood

intoourframeworkforanalysis,allowingfortheconcreteconsiderationofthewaysinwhich

sub-stategovernmentschallenge,subvertorreinforcethemessagesofstate-leveldiplomacy:

in other words, the ways in which states are forced to grapple with their sub-state

counterparts.

47

Conclusion:ThestateoftheLiterature

The practice of paradiplomacy remains hugely differentiated. At one level of distinction,

paradiplomacycanbebothahighlypoliticised,almostantagonistic,undertaking,generally

by those regions engaged in an explicit nation-building project. Or it can be functionally

driven,tothepointofmundane(Keating,1999:13).Withinthisfirstcategory,similarmeans

mayactuallyreflectverydifferentidealisedends,fromindependence,togreaterautonomy

withinthestateorsimplyenhancedleverageoveraparticularissue.Thisdifferentiationof

bothpracticesandpurposescertainlycompoundsthecomplexityofthephenomenonand

can partly explain the limited development of the overarching theoretical frameworks or

explanatoryapproaches,ascalledforbyLecours(2002)andBursensandDeforche(2010).

Theparadiplomacyliteraturehasdevelopedinasporadic,yetcompartmentalised,fashion,

withcontributionsfromthefieldsofregionalismandfederalismcompletelyeclipsingthose

from the IR traditions.Given the ‘Janus faced’ nature of paradiplomatic activity (Lecours,

2002:110),andthustherelevanceofbothinternalandexternalcausesandconsequencesof

thephenomenon,thisisasignificantshortcoming.Perhapsasaresultofthisimbalancewithin

the literature,structuraldeterminants, suchas legislativeautonomyorglobalisation,have

beengivenparticularlyprominentweightingsinaccountsofthephenomenon’sgrowthover

theprecedingdecades.Whilst the roleof agencyhas steadily gained increasingacademic

attention(Lecours,2002;PaquinandLachapelle,2005;LecoursandMoreno,2001;Duran,

2011; Keating, 1999), the few works that look specifically at the motivations behind

paradiplomacyhavefailedtoadequatelyexploretherelationshipbetweenthemost-oftcited

variables, sub-statenationalismandnationbuilding,andparadiplomaticactivity.Thus far,

this small literature lacks the systematic, comparative analysis required to uncover the

nuancesofthesemotivations,andtheways inwhichsub-stateactorsperceivethetoolof

paradiplomacy. Instead, the paradiplomatic literature has focussed on exploring the

opportunity structures allowing for the mobilization of sub-state actors beyond their

territorial borders. Undoubtedly, this leaves a sizeable and obstructive gap in our

understandingofthephenomenon,andits‘normalization’(Cornago,2010)overthepasttwo

decades.

48

Meanwhile,andrelatedly,theimplicationsofparadiplomacy,bothfortheregionandstate

(intermsofintergovernmentalrelationsandconstitutionaldevelopment)andfortheconduct

andconceptualisationofinternationalrelations,remainunderexplored.Overall,theredoes

appear tobe anunwillingness to speculateon thebroader significanceof paradiplomatic

activity.Giventhat“fewhopeshavebeenmoreregularlydisappointedthanthosefocussing

onthewitheringawayofthestate”(ScullyandWynJones,2010:5),thiscautionisperhaps

unsurprising.However,the‘hybridity’ofsub-stategovernmentsontheinternationalstageis

significant.Thefactthattheyhaveaclaimtogovernmentalcontrol-andoftenappealto(sub-

state)nationalsentiments-overadefinedterritorywhichoverlapsthatofastate,alongside

their‘sovereigntyboundyetsovereigntyfree’status(Hocking,1999)rendersitsuch.When

combined with the absence of any analytical category in which to understand their

internationalactorness,theabovesuggeststhatthephenomenonislongoverdueaplacein

theIRresearchagenda.Systemicchangeisevidencedinthediplomaticsystem(Neumann,

2002:613),andthenormalisationofparadiplomacyisakeypartofthischange.Giventhe

primacyofthediplomaticsystemwithintheinternationalsystemasawhole,theemergence

ofnewactorsandpracticesinthisarenaisimbuedwithsignificanceforinternationalrelations

theory.

Perhapsthekeyconceptthattheextantliteratureonparadiplomacyhasfailedtoadequately

examine isone that finds itself at the coreofboth comparativepolitics and international

relations: sovereignty. The ways in which both regions or ‘stateless nations’ and central

governments view the boundaries of sovereign authority is inextricably linked to

paradiplomacy:tothemotivationssub-stategovernmentshaveinestablishinginternational

actorness, to the responses of central state governments to paradiplomatic actionwithin

their national borders and to the role of quasi-autonomous, territorial actors in the

international system. It is this, surprising, shortcoming that the current project aims to

address,aslaidoutinthefollowingsection.

49

ChapterTwo:AnewtheoreticalFramework.

Introduction

Posited in the previous chapter is a central failure - both of distinctly paradiplomatic

literatures,andthoseofInternationalRelationsmorebroadly-to‘joinup’thepracticesof

paradiplomacywithwiderconceptsandphenomenaininternationalpoliticsanddiplomacy.

ForMcConnelletal.(2012:806),paradiplomaticstudieshavetendedtowardsthedescriptive,

meaning that such accounts “rarely question the legitimating work that diplomacy

accomplishesorattendtotheperformativeaspectsofdiplomaticpractices”.Conspicuousby

their absence within the paradiplomatic literature, according to Criekemans, are “those

studies that employ both traditional comparative politics and an international relations

perspective”(2010a:4).

Aconsequenceofthisoversightisthatmuchoftheanalyticalsignificanceofparadiplomacy

is, in fact, missed. In multiple ways, the practices of paradiplomacy touch on the ‘big

questions’ofInternationalRelations(Lecours,2002:119).Whocountsasadiplomaticactor?

From where does international legitimacy derive? How is the narrative of sovereignty

challenged, subverted or appropriated by non-state actors? This thesis looks to re-site

paradiplomatic study within the discipline of international relations and explore the

implicationsthatparadiplomaticpracticeshaveforthebiggerquestionsofIRanddiplomatic

theory.Thefundamentaldisconnectbetween,ontheonehand,asetofday-to-daysub-state

international activities - activities that can sometimes tend towards thehumdrum,but at

othertimescanrepresentarealchallengetothediplomaticstatus-quo-andsomeofthe

morepressing,andenduringlyrelevant,dilemmasofinternationalpoliticsanddiplomacyis

verymuch the area that this thesis aims to shed light upon. Indeed, aswewill explore

throughoutthisthesis,attimestheverysameactivitiescanbeinterpretedatvariouspoints

alongtheabovespectrum,dependentontheactorsinvolvedandthepolticalcontextwithin

which the paradiplomacy is conducted. A set of general premises underpin the approach

adoptedhere.Thesearethreefold.

50

Firstly, regional or sub-state identities are becoming increasingly salient, a phenomenon

whichissimultaneously-thoughtovastlydifferingdegrees-drivingthedevolutionofcentral

governmentauthorityandlegitimacyinmanyareas,includinginternationalaffairs.Foreign

policyhas traditionallybeen thepreserveofnational governmentsalone, and is “anarea

traditionallysocloselyarticulatedsosovereigntythatitisconsideredtheprerogativeofthe

sovereign” (Adler-NissenandGad, 2014: 16). This imbuesparadiplomatic activitieswith a

particularsignificance,andperhapsservesasindicationastohowfarsuchsub-stateauthority

orlegitimacycanstretchindifferentcontexts.

Secondly, diplomatic practice is diversifying; bothwith regards to the type of actors now

engagedindiplomacy,ofonesortoranother,andintermsofthetoolkitsnowemployedby

diplomaticactors.Suchdiversificationmeansthatrelationshipsandpracticesthatmayhave

traditionally been excluded from the analytical framesof referenceutilisedby diplomatic

theoristsmustnowbeconsideredaspartofthemessierpictureofmoderndiplomacy.

Thirdly,enquiryatthemarginsofinternationalrelationsisacrucialpartofaccountingforthe

multitudeofactivities,actorsandpracticesthatself-evidentlyexistinthisfield.Accordingto

Adler-Nissen and Gad (2012: 3), by “focussing on what appear to be marginal sites of

internationalrelations,weareabletoseemuchmoreheterogeneitythanIRtheoryusually

allowsusaglimpseof”.Thevalueofthistypeofenquiry,therefore,liesnotonlyinthespecific

lessons learnedaboutdiscretepractices -suchasparadiplomacy-butalso in itsabilityto

speaktoabroaderpictureofinternationalrelationships,addingnuanceand,insomecases,

importantripostestotheclaimsofgrandtheory.

Drawingfrombothinternationalrelationsandcomparativepoliticsperspectives,severalkey

conceptswillbeemployedduringthecourseofthisanalysis.Theirselectionandapplicability

tothespecificresearchquestionstobeaddressedwillbediscussedinthefollowingsections.

Each,intheirownway,contributestobuildingapictureofparadiplomaticactivitythattakes

intoconsiderationitsmultiplefacets.Whatactuallyisitthatsub-stategovernmentsaredoing

on the international stage? How do theymanage to position themselves as credible and

legitimateinternationalagents?Whymightsuchgovernmentscovetaninternationalprofile?

51

Dosuchactivitiesholdanysignificancebeyondthatperceivedbythosedirectlyinvolvedin

paradiplomatic exchanges? In short, these concepts - which include hybridity, mimicry,

performativity and sovereignty games - provide the vocabularywithwhich to discuss the

meaningandthepotentialsignificanceofparadiplomaticactivity.

Whatfollowsinthischapterisanattempttobringtogetherthevarious,diverse,aspectsof

paradiplomaticactivityinamorecohesivetheoreticalframework.Thefirstpartofthistaskis

separating out autonomous, diplomatic activities from the wider pool of sub-state

internationalactivity-includingmulti-levelgovernance-thatitsitswithin,andtosketchout

the boundaries of the new approach advocated here. The focus is squarely on ‘affective’

regions, inScully&Wyn Jones’ terms(2010:7-8), thoseregionsorstatelessnationswith

strongsub-stateidentities.However,theanalysisemployedthroughoutthethesiswilltake

fullaccountofthecontoursoftherelationshipbetweenregionalidentityandparadiplomacy;

mapping them in apreciseway rather thanassuminganyuniformity to the linkbetween

them.Crucialtotheapproachadoptedhereisunderstandingandaccountingforthehybridity

oftheoperationalspacethatsub-stategovernmentsfindthemselveswithin:nestedwithin

state structures but carving their own diplomatic identities out with the state. In their

‘sovereignty bound’ yet ‘sovereignty free’ status (Hocking, 1999) we find particular

opportunities,andconstraints,ontheinternationalstage.Theselendadistinctflavourtothe

contributionsthatsuchactorscanmake.Newattentionisgiventothewaysinwhichthese

hybridactorsattempttocarveoutalegitimateinternationalpresence,andspecificallytheir

attempts to either mimic or subvert more traditional state-discourses. Ultimately, the

contention is made that the autonomous diplomatic activities of certain sub-state

governments (namely statless nations) can be perceived asmoves in a variant of Addler

Nissen & Gad’s ‘sovereignty games’ (Adler-Nissen and Gad, 2012; Adler-Nissen and Gad,

2014;Adler-NissenandGammeltoft-Hansen,2008).Theseactorsareassertingtheirrightto

be a participant in such games - through their paradiplomatic interventions - rather than

seekinganyspecificend,inandofitself.Subsequentsectionsinthischapterintroducethe

specificresearchquestions,themethodologyandthecasestudiesthatwillinformanddirect

thisstudy.

52

Anewframeworkforthestudyofparadiplomacyinstatelessnations

Far from being an anomalous aspect of the broader phenomenon of sub-state

internationalism,themore‘developed’paradiplomaciesofregionsorstatelessnationswith

strongsub-state identities (‘affective’ regions inScullyandWynJones’ terms (2010: :7-8))

representoneofitsmostsignificantfeatures.Itistheseambitiousactivitiesthatpresentthe

moreprofoundchallengetodominantconceptsandassumptionsinbothcomparativepolitics

and international relations theory. Necessary for a full understanding of these types of

challengingactivitiesisanadequatetheoreticalframeworkwithinwhichtointerpretthem,

onewhichacknowledgestheneedfordifferentconceptualtoolsateitherendofthisbroad

spectrum.

Reconceptualisingparadiplomacytotakeaccountof itsproperscopeentailsarebalancing

fromsolelytop-down,towardstheinclusionofmorebottom-upexplanans,andfrompurely

structural tomore agency-oriented accounts. It involves distinguishing between different

types of international activity; being able to identify those initiatives that go beyond

functional requirements of regional governance in a globalized era. These forms of

paradiplomacysitatoddswithmuchoftheliterature;aliteraturewhosefocushasoftenbeen

onwhatmightbebettercharacterisedasmulti-levelgovernance.

However, those activities that chafe more profoundly at the boundaries of sub-state

authority, those that compete or conflictwith central state narratives, or indeed seek to

repositionthesub-stategovernmentinrelationtotheircentralstatecounterparts,andthose

that in otherways challengeour understandingof a ‘proper’ role for sub-state units, are

highlyusefulinsightsintothenatureofthephenomenonandthepotentialsignificancethat

it holds. The following sections I. - I.V. set out four ‘stalls’ which shape the theoretical

approachadopted in this thesis: I. delineatingautonomous,diplomaticactivities from the

wider pool of sub-state internationalism, II. conceptualising the hybridity of sub-state

governments and bringing IR theory firmly into the fold, III. accounting for the role and

53

importanceofinternationallegitimacy-andparticularlytheutilityofmimicryasalegitimising

strategy,and,IV.introducingtheconceptofsovereigntygamesasawaytounderstandthe

back-and-forthbetweenstateandsub-stategovernments,andthecontradictory,paradoxical

natureoftheeffectsparadiplomacymayhaveonthesystemofstates.

I. Delineatingautonomous,diplomaticactivities

An initial step towards seeing such activities in clearer focus is distinguishing between

paradiplomacy andmulti-level governance. This task is both a necessary and challenging

exerciseowingtotheoverlapoftheirsubjectmatter,andtheinter-relationshipbetweenthe

two practices (Kaiser, 2005: 90-92). The conception of multi-level governance as being

concernedwithpolicymaking,andparadiplomacyasfocusedonquiteseparate,autonomous

action in the wider international setting, is a useful starting point in drawing distinct

conceptualboundariesaroundthetwoapproaches.Thenatureoftheactivitiesthatmulti-

levelgovernance,ontheonehand,andparadiplomacy,ontheother,looktounderstandcan

bedividedintothebroadcategoriesof‘governance’and‘diplomacy’.Abriefconsideration

of sub-state representation inBrussels shoulddemonstrate this rangequite clearly.Here,

therehasemergedadefactodistinctionbetweenwhathavebeentermedthe‘classicBrussels

offices’,andsomething‘else’,whichisverymuchadiplomaticpresence(ColeandPalmer,

2011::386).TheexamplesdiscussedbyColeandPalmerarethoseoftheWalesEuropean

Centre, pre-devolution, whose role was primarily providing information on funding

opportunitiesforclients(whotypicallyincludedlocalgovernmentsanduniversities),andthe

Wales Brussels Office post-devolution, where the Welsh Government exercise strategic

leadership over the representation, and the unit is deliberately differentiated from local

governmentandpublicagenciesintheprocess.

Moore, meanwhile (2008b: 525-527) makes a more general argument, whereby

constitutional regions inBrussels (whohave“adelegatedsetof legislativecompetences”)

maintaina“strongpoliticaldimensiontotheirwork”,onethatisabsentinthedelegationsof

both‘administrative’regions,andtheregionsofnewmemberstates,whopurposefullydo

notrepresent“historicorlinguisticregions,asnationalgovernmentssoughtconsciouslyto

54

cross-cut inter-ethnic, religiousand linguisticcleavageswithin their state” (Moore,2008b:

:524).Thispoliticaldimensiontothepresenceofsuchconstitutionalregionsisnot,however,

uncontested.Forexample, theGerman federalgovernmenthavecontinued to stress that

Länder representations in Brussels must not action a diplomatic role, with the term

‘Vertreung’(representation)provingparticularlycontentious(Moore,2006::200-202).The

degreeofsensitivityoverthisissuewouldsuggestthat,inactuality,theGermanLänderare

indeedstrayinginto‘diplomatic’waters,adevelopmentthatcanbeseenparticularlyclearly

in the Bavarian government’s 2006move to “lavish and opulent” offices in a high-profile

Brussels’location(Moore,2006::192).

Therealsignificanceofthisdistinction,betweengovernanceanddiplomacy,relatestothe

fact that sub-state governments appear to be increasingly acting outside what has been

understood as their legitimate (limited) external remit. Rather than simply fulfilling the

accepted functions of sub-state governance in those domains now implicated in their

activities(whetherthisistogainresourcesforeconomicdevelopment,ortoarticulatepolicy

preferences),someregionsarealsoconductingarangeofactivitiesthatspeaktodifferent,

perhapsmorecomplex,underlyingmotivations.Thesediplomaticendeavoursmayrelateto

adesireonthepartoftheregiontoenhancetheirstatus,bothasitregardstheir‘host’state,

andotheractors.Dependingonthenatureoftheregionitself,thisexercisemightbegeared

towards building the nation domestically (external identity construction) or be centred

arounddemonstratingstate-likecapacity.Likewise,theymaybeconductedwiththespecific

aimof‘pavingtheway’forindependence,orperhapsgainingtractionwithinthestateovera

specificissue-orindeedaspartofamoresymbolicsovereigntygame(Adler-NissenandGad,

2012;Adler-NissenandGad,2014;Adler-NissenandGammeltoft-Hansen,2008).

Itisthecontentionofthisthesis,andwassuggestedabove,thatmakingthesedistinctions

(betweengovernanceanddiplomacy) isnecessary for theadvancementofparadiplomatic

studies.Withouttherefocussingoftheparadiplomacyframework,totakebetteraccountof

theconceptualtoolsrequiredateitherendofabroadspectrumofactivity,thereisadanger

thata lackofclaritymay leadtotheparticularsignificanceofparadiplomacyasapolitical

actionbeingunder-reported,anditsnoveltyasafeatureofthemoderninternationalsystem

55

being obscured. As Criekemans argues (2010a: 6), “regions and their external activities

come…in many different colours, shapes and intensity when placed in a comparative

perspective”;inordertotakefullaccountofthisvariety,onemustbefullyconsciousofthe

implicationsthatdifferentframeworksmayentail.

Itispositedherethatparadiplomacyandmulti-levelgovernance,typically,considerdifferent

practices (diplomacy or governance), in differentmodes (transnationality or institutional

engagement). Whilst there are certainly exceptions to this very general rule, this broad

distinctionmeansthataconflationofthesetwoconceptsisunhelpfulandrisksbothpractices

being either over or under-reported. The differences outlined abovemay imply different

explanations;therangeactivitiesresultsinasimilararangeofimplicationsforthedisciplines

ofbothcomparativepoliticsandinternationalrelations.Havingsaidthis,itisalsoapparent

from the discussion above that the two concepts often share subject matter, with the

activitiesofsub-stategovernmentsoverlappingintobothframeworks,andthereforeableto

beusefully exploredwith reference tobothparadiplomacyandmulti-level governance.A

primeexampleherewouldagainbetheBrusselsofficesofEuropeanregions.Therearealso

importantconceptualandtheoreticalmarkersofthemulti-levelgovernanceapproachthat

wouldseemexcellentcandidatesforafullerencorporationintotheparadiplomacyliterature.

Firstly, multi-level governance places an emphasis on individual actors within a political

system.It‘”demandsthatthesocialanalystexaminethepoliticalactivitiesofthetherelevant

indidiualsandgroupsof individualsas thecausal linkbetweenmacroprocesses…andthe

rulesthatstructurepoliticalregimes”(Marks,1996:23).Inasimilarvein,Marksarguesthat

this actor-centred approach may engender an integration of comparative politics and

internationalrelations,inordertogaina“coherent”understandingofdecisionmaking.Ther

eisadeliberateattemptwithinthisworktoavoid“reifyingthestateasanactorwithinterests

orpreferences”(Marks,1996:24,34).Giventheabove,atthispointitisworthwhileoutlining

threewaysinwhichthetwoconceptscanrelatetooneanother.

Firstly,paradiplomacyandmulti-levelgovernancecanconstitutealternativeexplanationsfor

the same activities. For example, the conduct of ‘border diplomacy’ between European

regions,orparticipationininter-regionalnetworks,maybeexplainedbyparadiplomacyasan

56

aspectofexternal identityconstructionorstatusenhancement (forexampleDuran,2011:

:356-7),butauthorsfromamulti-levelgovernanceperspectivemayarguethatsuchactivities

arearesultofregionsneedingtobuildpolicy-coalitionsinordertopresentastrongervoice

attheEUlevel(forexampleSodupe,1999: :62).Therelevanceofvariousvariables–both

structureandagencyrelated,thoserelatingtosub-state,stateorsupranationaltiers-may

vary, depending on whether the explanation for a particular activity stems from a

paradiplomacyormulti-levelgovernanceframework.

Secondly,theycanrepresentparallelconcepts,consideringdifferentactivitieswithinashared

domainofsub-state internationalism. Itwouldseemthatthis is themostcommonway in

whichtherelationshipmanifestsitself,despitethefactthatthetermshavebeenusedinter-

changeably in parts of the extant literature. For example, paradiplomacy can be used to

explore the conduct of normative international activities, such as international aid

programmes(WynJonesandRoyles,2012),whilemulti-levelgovernanceaccounts forthe

activitiesoftheCommitteefortheRegions(Carroll,2011),inparalleltooneanother,with

verylittleinteractiontakingplacebetweenthetwoapproaches.

Thirdly,thetwocanrepresentcomplementaryapproaches,allowingforthefullexploration

of motivations and opportunity structures behind sub-state international activities that

overlaptheconceptualboundariesbetweenthetwoframeworks.Brusselsofficescanagain

beusedas anexamplehere: thereareboth functional, ‘governance’ requirementswhich

mean that the establishment of such offices is an important activity for sub-state

governments, and they may, to a large extent, determine the size and nature of such

representations.Butthereisalsoawholerangeoflesstangiblefactorsbehindthedegreeof

importancethatasub-stategovernmentattachestoBrusselsrepresentation,andindeeda

varietyoftypesof(diplomatic)activitythattakeplaceundertheaegisofsuchoffices.For

example,theBavariangovernmentmaintainsaparticularlylargeandwell-resourcedBrussels

office,totheextentthatthisrepresentationismuchmorevisible-inaliteral,aestheticsense

- thansomeof thememberstaterepresentations. Its locationmeansthat“everyonewho

57

comes to the European Parliament has to pass it”.3 Quite why Bavaria places so much

emphasisonthisformofinternationalengagementisaquestionthatarguablyrequiresboth

multi-levelgovernanceandparadiplomacyapproaches to fullyaccount for. Overall, there

exist “multiple dimensions of regional representative activity” in Brussels (Moore, 2008b:

:525),andthustheapplicationofthesetwoconceptswouldseemnecessaryfortheirfulland

robustanalyses.

Despitethedegreeofoverlapbetweenthesubjectmatterthatparadiplomacyandmulti-level

governance share, theyalsoattempt to account fordifferent typesof activity, orpolitics,

oftenwithequallydifferentrationales.Theyalsomayrelatetooneanotherinthesenseof

interpreting the same or similar activities in different lights. Therefore the relationship

betweenthemalsodifferssubstantially,dependingontheexactactivitystudied;theymay

representalternativeexplanations,parallelconcepts,orcomplementaryapproaches.Much

greaterclarity is therefore required in the two literatures,both in termsof specifying the

natureofactivitiesconsidered,andbeingexplicitasregardsthechoiceofframework.This

shouldnotbeaparticularlyarduousorcomplicatedtask:thedistinctionsoutlinedabove,such

asbetweengovernanceanddiplomacy,aremadeasamatterofcourseinstate-levelanalysis.

Forthepurposesofthisstudy,afocusonthoseautonomous,diplomaticactivitiesconducted

byourthreecasestudiesisadeliberateattempttorebalancetheparadiplomaticliterature

towardsthesemoreadvancedparadiplomaticdynamics,withacorrespondingemphasison

thepoliticalrationalestowhichsuchactivitiesrelate.Attentionispaid,specifically,totherole

thatdiplomacy-andbeingrecognisedasalegitimateactorininternationaldomains-plays

in thepolitical calculationsand the self-perceptionsof sub-stategovernments. In short, it

focusesonwhydiplomacymatterstothesetypesofactors,ratherthanonwhatfunctional

imperativesexistinthisdomain.

II. Hybridactors,hybridspaces:bringingIRtheoryintotheparadiplomaticfold

3Interviewwithauthor,seniorBavarianParliamentaryOfficial2013

58

International relations theory is a crucial ‘missing link’ in the paradiplomatic literature.

Similarly, thepracticeofparadiplomacyhas failedtomake itontothe IRresearchagenda

itself.Thisisproblematic:theactivitiescomprisingparadiplomacynecessarilyimplicatethe

frameworksofbothcomparativepoliticsandinternationalrelations.Admittedly,themajority

ofactivitiesthatsub-stategovernmentsundertakeintheinternationaldomainmaybeless

thanremarkable;4atleastwithintheEuropeanenvironment,multi-levelgovernanceisthe

dominantdynamic.However,theseparatecategoryofautonomous,diplomaticactivitiesthat

some sub-state governments undertake does pose important questions for international

relationstheory.Evenmoresowhenthesesub-stateunitsrepresentstatelessnationsand

the tone of interactionsmay bemore ambitious, even provocative. Indeed, the external

activities of such actors pose questions at a series of intersections atwhich ambitious IR

theorizingalreadytakesplace:between‘identities,bordersandorders’(Albertetal.,2001).

Suchdynamicsalsofeedintomoreprofoundquestionsregardingtherelationshipbetween

nationhood, statehood and the function of international relations. The post-Cold War

internationalsystemhaswelcomedanumberofnewstateswhichhavebeencreatedalong

thelinesofnationalpopulations,relyingonthe“‘imaginedcommunity’ofthenationforits

legitimacy”.

Yet, state centric theories of IR have failed to adequately explain these developments,

relegatingmanyofthekeyissuesrelevanttotheiranalysis“tothestatusofepiphenomena”

(Hall,1999::4).Thereiscertainlyscopeforparadiplomaticactivitiesbasedonthe‘imagined

communities’ofstrongregions,statelessnations,indigenouspopulationsandDiasporasto

shed someall-important lighton these relationships. Though the focus in this study ison

statelessnations,therelevanceofotherformsofparadiplomaticandmulti-levelgovernance

tointernationalrelationsisofcourseacknowledged.Certainly,economicparadiplomacyhas

distinctimplicationsforIRsub-fieldssuchasinternationalpoliticaleconomy:theroleofglobal

citiesrepresentingakeytransformativedynamicintheinternationaldomain(Curtis,2011).

4 Of course, this same claim could be made of much of the state-level interaction thatcomprisesday-to-dayinternationalrelations.

59

However,themoredevelopedformsofparadiplomaticactivityperhapsbetterillustratethe

currentdisjuncturebetweeninternationalrelationstheoryandemergentpractices.

Sub-stategovernmentsareconceptuallydistinctfromthebroadercategoryofnon-stateactor

duetoakeylineofdemarcation:theyareterritoriallyconstituted.For‘statelessnations’,this

distinctiongoesevenfurther;theyrepresentasinglenation,andthuscanclaim(withvarying

levels of success) to speak for a given ‘people’. Sub-state governments are thus ‘hybrid’

internationalactors (Hocking,1986;1999); their claims topoliticalauthorityareexpressly

territorial,yettheyarenot(legally)sovereign.Assuch,theseactorsaresovereigntybound,

yetsovereigntyfree(Hocking,1999).Inotherwords,theyareboundbythesovereigntyof

their‘host’state(i.e.,theyarenot‘transnational’actorsinthetraditionalsense),yettheyare

alsofreefromtherequirementsandresponsibilitiesoffullmembershipoftheinternational

system.Thisenablesthemtocarveoutdistinctandnicheroles,correspondingtothespecific

ambitionsoftheirgovernments.

Towhatextent,then,doesthe(re)emergenceofthiscategoryofactorontheinternational

stage challenge extant conceptions of the nature of IR and IR theory? Arguably, the

normalizationofparadiplomacyisevidenceoftheweakeningofnation-statesovereigntyas

traditionallydefined.Fromoneperspective,itisemblematicofarelocationofauthoritythat

has resulted from the processes of globalisation, increasing interdependence and

intermesticity (Rosenau,1992;Hocking,1999;FossumandRoussel,2011;LaPorte,2012).

Thephenomenon,therefore,canbeinterpretedasanelementoftransnationalism,whereby

newactorsandlociofpoliticalpowerform‘webs’,trappingwithinthemnation-statesand

constrainingtheirfreedomofmanoeuvre(Cerny,2010::4-5).

Fromadifferentperspective,thepracticeofparadiplomacycouldbeseenasthepartialre-

emergenceofaformofglobalpoliticsthatpre-datesthemodernnation-statesystem.Here,

the prediction of Bull (1977) becomes an interesting marker. Bull contends that, should

modernstatescometoshare“authorityovertheircitizens”and“abilitytocommandtheir

loyalties”withregional/globalandsub-stateauthoritiestosuchanextentthat“theconcept

of sovereignty ceased to be applicable”, we could then say that a neo-medieval form of

60

politicalorderhademerged.Indeed,Criekemans(2011a::715)contendsthat“toacertain

extent, today’s diplomatic practices resemble a pre-Westphalianworld inwhich different

policy levels (macroregional, national, crossborder, substate, regions and cities) each

generatespecifictypesofdiplomaticactivitiesreflectingspecificneedsfeltattheirrespective

territoriallevels”.

Freidrichs (2001)examinestheconceptofneo-medievalism insomedetail,andconcludes

thatthereexistmultiplespheresofauthorityandcompetingorganizingprinciplesthatcan

currentlybeidentifiedintheglobalorder.Challengestothemonopolyofthenation-stateare

basedontwoprocesses,accordingtothisview:thetransnationalmarketeconomy(which

challengesthestate’straditionalmonopolyonlegitimatepoliticalactionintheinternational

sphere),andthefactthatthe“sphereofsymbolicreproduction”isde-couplingfromthestate,

with individual allegiances being directed elsewhere (Friedrichs, 2001). The spectrum of

activities undertaken by sub-state actors on the international stage can been seen to

contribute tobothof theseerodingprocesses,distinguishing themfrommanyothernon-

stateactors.

Morebroadly,thephenomenonofparadiplomacymustformpartofongoingdebateswithin

thedisciplineofIR,astoitsown(in)abilitytoaccountforchangeintheinternationalsystem.

According to Buzan and Little (2001: :24-25), the discipline of IR operates within a

‘WestphalianStraitjacket’,or“thestrongtendencytoassumethatthemodelestablishedin

seventeenthcenturyEuropeshoulddefinewhattheinternationalsystemisforalltimesand

allplaces”.Inasimilarvein,Agnew(1999::503;2005)pointstothefactthatconventional

understandings of the geography of political power are underpinned by a series of

assumptionsthatconceiveofstatehoodasthe“uniquesourceandarenaofpoliticalpower

inthemodernworld…togethertheyservetoputthemodernterritorialstatebeyondhistory”.

ForNeumann (2002: :630-638),meanwhile, “wehavenowayof discussing empirically to

whatextentthesystemofstatesinfactremainscentraltoglobalpolitics.Thesystemappears

asontic,asanexogenisedgivenoftheanalysis”.Self-evidently,“wearenotverygoodasa

discipline at studying the possibility of fundamental discontinuity in the international

61

system...we lack even an adequate vocabulary; andwhatwe cannot describe,we cannot

explain”(Ruggie,1993::144).

Clearly,sovereigntyisakeystartingpointforidentifyingtheeffectsthatparadiplomacyhas,

and may come to have, on the field of international relations; partially through its

multiplicationofthenumberofeffectiveinternationalagentswhoseauthoritystemsfroma

formofgeographicalrepresentation.AccordingtoMingus(2006),sub-stategovernments,as

partofbroadernetworksandstructures,are‘perforating’thesovereigntyofnation-states,in

certainpolicydomains.ThisviewisalsoreflectedintheworkofSendingetal.(2011::782-

791),whopointtothe“complextapestryofactorsandconcerns”acrosstheArcticregion,

necessitatingan“inclusiveactorperspective”intheanalysisofthediplomaticpracticestaking

place.Takingthesedebatesastepfurther,Agnew(1999::506-7)positsthatpoliticalpower

may bemoving from a ‘field of forces’model of territorial sovereignty, to a hierarchical

networkmodelwhereby “cores, peripheries, and semi-peripheries are linked together by

flowsofgoods,peopleandinvestment”.

WhateverimplicationsparadiplomacyhasforIRtheoryare,however,boundtobenuanced.

The activities of sub-state actors represent a crucial aspect of all of the process outlined

above,buttheyappeartoembodysomehowcontradictoryforces.Ontheonehand,atrend

towardsseparatismwithinextantstates“portendsa fragmentationthatcanreinforce the

field of forces model as new states emerge” (Agnew, 1999: :506-7). The utility of

paradiplomacyin‘pavingthewayforindependence’wouldthereforeseemtore-assertthe

dominanceofstate-sovereignty.Ontheotherhand,theroleofregionalunitsthatremain

withinnation-statesinperforatingthesovereigntyofsaidstateswouldseemtoworkinthe

contrarydirection.Thispush-pulldynamicisarecurringthemeinparadiplomacy:itrelatesto

the simultaneously bolstering and eroding effect of the mimicry of state-diplomatic

discourses(McConnell,2016;McConnelletal.,2012),asexploredinthesubsequentsection.

Theinternationalactivitiesofsub-stategovernmentscanalsobeinterpretedasameansto

consciouslyexpandtheirterritorial‘reach’.Ifthe“domain”ofadistinctpolity“includesthose

whoidentifywithit,thespacetheyoccupy,andtheissuesoverwhichthepolityexercises

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influence”,thenparadiplomacymustbeseenasanexpansionofthisdomainonthepartof

sub-stateactors (FergusonandMansbach,1996: :262-3). Wheretheseactorsrepresenta

nation, incongruentwith the state, thiswould seemto representaparticularly significant

dynamic; most notably for state-level actors. While it is not necessarily the case that

expandingthedomainofsub-statepolitiescreatesanequalandoppositeretractionofthe

state’s legitimate domain, there is certainly the potential for a conflict of interests that

manifestsattheinternational,ratherthanthedomestic,level.

Inextrapolatingthepracticeofparadiplomacybeyondthesometimes-parochialconfinesof

federalor comparativepolitics,weare facedwithadifferent typeofnarrative.Here, the

establishment of sub-state governments as international agents, albeit with limited

‘actorness’onaccountof theiropaque legal status, canbe interpretedaspartofawider

phenomenon that gradually blurs the boundaries between sovereign states and ‘new’,

potentially contesting, forms of representation. On the one hand, there currently exist a

sizeablenumberof‘unrecognisedstates’,whichmanageto“survive,andevendevelop”in

theinternationalsystem,despitelackingtheexternalsovereigntyotherwisegrantedbythe

act of international recognition (Caspersen, 2012: :1-2). These entities are able to govern

(moreorlesseffectively),providebasicpublicservicesandenjoypopularlegitimacy,yettheir

unrecognised status results from “the restrictive interpretation on the right to self-

determinationandtheoverridingprincipleofterritorialintegrity”(Caspersen,2012::27).On

theotherhand,non-stateactorswhoarenotterritoriallybound,yetnonethelesscanclaim

torepresentadistinct‘people’arealsodelvingfurtherintointernationalaffairs:Diasporas

andindigenouspeoplesaretwoclearexamplesofthispractice.Shadian(2010)examinesthe

caseof the InuitCircumpolarCouncil, ICC, in itsglobal interactions; representing“an Inuit

polityseekingtogainadegreeofsovereigntyasapoliticalcollective”.Theformofsovereignty

pursuedrevolvesaroundtherighttoparticipateinpoliticaldecisionmaking,ratherthanbeing

basedonterritorialintegrity,athemetowhichwereturnwhendiscussingtheconceptionof

sovereigntygames(Adler-NissenandGad,2012;Adler-NissenandGad,2014;Adler-Nissen

andGammeltoft-Hansen,2008):

TheICCservesasanexampleofacontemporarycollectivepolity-neitherleftoutside the state system nor possessing a state of their own. Rather thesovereigntyoftheICCdependsonitsabilitytomaintainthelegitimacyofits

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myth, which over time has evolved, adapted and changed (Shadian, 2010::504).

Both of these categories, unrecognised states and non-territorial ‘national’ or collective

political actors relate to a central question raised by paradiplomacy: that of sovereignty.

BarkinandCronin(1994::108)problematizethishistoricalconstruct(sovereignty) insome

detail. The authors argue that there has long been a tension between state sovereignty,

“whichstressesthelinkbetweensovereignauthorityandadefinedterritory”,andnational

sovereignty“whichemphasisesalinkbetweensovereignauthorityandadefinedpopulation”.

Thesetwotypesofsovereigntydifferfundamentallyintermsoftheirsourceoflegitimation:

state sovereignty rests on clearly demarcated boundaries and effective institutional

authority,nationalsovereigntyrestsontherepresentationof“communitiesofsentiment”,

forming“thepoliticalbasisonwhichstateauthorityrests”(BarkinandCronin,1994::110-

111).Theauthorsgoontoarguethattherearedistinctperiodsinwhichinternationalnorms

legitimiseoneorotheroftheseformsofsovereignty,butthattheselegitimisingprinciples

are subsequently queried during “major systemic crises”, reverting to a privileging of the

alternativeclaims.

Thepracticeofparadiplomacybystatelessnationsarguablymakesaclaimforthelegitimacy

ofa form ofnational sovereignty:howstates respond to this claim representsanequally

interesting marker as to the dominance of such international norms. At the very least,

stateless nations, autonomous regions and unrecognised states (though in very different

ways)all “question thedirect linkbetween internalandexternal sovereignty” (Caspersen,

2012::11).AsCaspersenindicates,sovereigntyisneitherstaticnorindivisible;normustitbe

absolute. Krasner (1999: :4-5) carefully dissects the construct, delineating between

international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty and

interdependencesovereignty,allofwhichimplydifferentrulesandlogicsofappropriateness.

Itispossible,Krasnerargues,foranentitytohaveoneofthesevariantsbutnottheothers,

potentiallyallowingforthehybrid-natureofstatelessnationsas internationalactorstobe

meaningfullyconceptualised.

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III. Mimicry,performativity,andlearningto‘talktheinternationaltalk’

Atheart,paradiplomacyisanexerciseintransposingdomesticauthoritytotheinternational

stage,craftingaperceivedlegitimacytoparticipationinaffairslocatedoutsideofaregion’s

geographical borders, and - essentially - claiming, or performing into being, a diplomatic

agency thatwas dormant duringmost of the 20th century. The processes involved in the

creationofsub-statediplomaticagencythereforesharemuchincommonbothwithother

non-stateactors,andindeedwithstatesthemselves.Assuch,paradiplomacyoffersonelens

throughwhich toexaminenot just theparticularitiesof sub-statediplomacy,butbroader

diplomaticprocesses,performancesandstructures.

Legitimacy is central to paradiplomatic activity: either being asserted by the sub-state

government,orindeeddeniedorchallengedbyotheractors.Sub-stategovernmentsdrawon

multiple, overlapping and occasionally contradictory sources of legitimacy in their

internationalengagements.Themostcompellingof theseareoftentheir representational

qualities:aselectedrepresentativesofaclearlydefinedcommunityorlocale.Insomecases,

andcertainlyinthoseofstatelessnations,theclaimsofsub-stategovernmentscangoastep

further:torepresentadistinct‘people’.Clearly,theseclaimsoverlapwiththosemadebya

sovereignstate:representingthelargercommunityorterritorywithinwhichthesmallerunit

resides.

The particularity of a sub-state government’s claim to legitimacy is therefore premised

preciselyontheirdifferencetothe‘host’state.Whetherintermsofeconomicprowess,or

high-techindustries-asintheparadiplomaticactivitiesofCalifornia,BeijingandBavaria;their

normative credentials - as in the international and sustainable development activities of

WalesandScotland;or indeedtheir relativedeprivationorpoliticalorethnicsubjugation.

Sub-state governments appeal both to principles of national sovereignty and self-

determination-theattributesorinterestsofa‘people’ofaregionorstatelessnation-and

to functional discoursesof geo-strategic position, territoryor productivity. Such claims to

legitimacyonthebasisofdifferenceorparticularitycanbeidentifiedinsingularinstances,for

examplewhenaregionstandstobedisproportionallyaffectedbyanenvironmentalissue,or

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indeed if its position leaves it particularly vulnerable to conflict or international crime.

Domesticpoliticalconsiderationscanalsotemporarilymobilisetheseclaims.Moreover,the

discourse of particularity may be a near constant theme running through a sub-state

government’s internationalagency,and theclaims itmakes toa legitimatepresence.The

QuebecGovernment, for example, hasbeenable to secureobserver status in theUnited

Nationsonthebasisoftheircultural,linguisticandhistoricalparticularitywithintheCanadian

context(Balthazar,1999)

Thelegitimacy-orotherwise-ofsub-stateexternalrelationsposesseveralquestions.How

can we accurately conceive of ‘mini-diplomacies’ and tentative international relations

emanatingfromactorsthatarenotsovereign,yetoftenclaimtorepresentadistinctpeople

on the international stage? When these representations conflict with positions held at

sovereignstatelevel,whichmostaccuratelyspeaksforthepopulationconcerned-inother

words,whose legitimacy trumpswhose? This conundrum currently plays out on theUK’s

diplomatichorizon.InthecontextofaUK-widereferendumoncontinuedEUmembership,

Scotland’svotestoodincontrasttothatofEnglandandWales.Multiplevoicesfromwithin

theUKarethereforespeakingtothewiderworldonacoreelementoftheUK’sforeignpolicy,

whistlingaverydifferenttune,yetinunmistakablydiplomatictones.

Asub-stategovernment’sinternationallegitimacymaybe(notionally)premisedonqualities

thatitpossesses-betheyrepresentation,democracy,functionorcapacity-however,inorder

for this to be translated into an accepted presence on the international stage, specific

strategiesarerequired.Inshort,howdosub-stategovernmentsensurethattheyarelistened

to, takenseriously,acknowledgedbyotheractors?Akeyway inwhichthis legitimation is

achieved is that ofmimicry: essentially, learning to ‘talk the talk’ and ‘walk the walk’ of

diplomacy. Assuchthisthesisemploysthevocabularybothofmimicry(McConnell,2016;

McConnelletal.,2012)andperformativitytounderstandthewaysinwhichsuchlegitimating

work is accomplished (McConnell et al., 2012: 806). The ideaof ‘mimicry’ in adiplomatic

settinghas clear and compelling links tomuchparadiplomatic activity,whereby sub-state

governmentsoftengotoextremelengthstoappear‘state-like’.

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Inthefullestexaminationofmimicryinadiplomaticsettingtodate,McConnelletal(2012:

804)explorethewaysinwhich“non-statediplomaciesdrawon,mimicandinterveneinthe

realmofformalpoliticalactioninwayswhichbothpromote‘official’statediplomacyasan

ideal and dilute its distinction from other, ‘unofficial’ diplomacies”. Diplomatic

representations,fromamimeticperspective,arethereforenotsolely“strategichegemonic

toolsemployedbyconstitutedpowerstoexclude,butcanalsobetacticallyperformedby

entitiesthatchallengethecompositionandstatusoftheinterstatesystem”(McConnelletal.,

2012:811).Notonlydoesamimeticperspectiveallowustolookempiricallyatthewaysin

which sub-state governments may craft their international messages and diplomatic

representationsinawaywhicheithermirrorsordivergesfromstatepractice,italsoactsas

anotheranalyticallenswithwhichtoexaminetherelationshipbetweenthesub-andcentral-

statetiersofdiplomacy,andthewaysthattheyinteractwith,andpotentiallychallenge,one

another.

Meanwhile-andrelatedly-aperformativeperspectiveallowsustotakeacloselookatthe

waysinwhichasub-stategovernmentcommunicatesitsmessageontheinternationalstage

thatincreasinglylieswithinitsgrasp.Thatmuchdiplomacyisnow‘publicdiplomacy’directed

atmassaudiencesratherthanlimitedtoexchangesbetweenthediplomaticelitesofformally

equalsovereigns,iswidelyunderstood(Huijgh,2010;Huijgh,2012).Aconsequenceofthis

shiftinpracticehasbeenthattheperformativeaspectsofdiplomacyarenowmorevisible;

the‘performance’takesinnewanddiverseaudiences.However,evenwhenenactedinits

mosttraditionalvariants,diplomacyhasalwaysreliedheavilyonperformance;onsymbolism,

mutually understood and reciprocated signs and shorthand (McConnell et al., 2012). The

frameworkof‘Performativity’isprimarilyconcernedwiththeprocessesofagencycreation.

Itis,fairlyloosely,associatedwiththeEnglishSchoolofInternationalRelations,sharingan

interest specifically in the practices of diplomacy (Neumann, 2003: 1). It draws on a rich

history in social theory - from John Austin to Judith Butler - as well as on constructivist

understandingsofinternationalpolitics,butperhapsamoresignificant‘marker’intheway

thatitisutilisedinaninternationalrelationssettingisinfactthebreadthofitsintellectual

underpinnings. A key premise is - essentially - that international agents are made, or

performed into being, rather than simply born (Neumann, 2002; Neumann, 2003). The

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frameworkallowsafocusonthevariouspractices,processesoreventsthatconstitutethe

making of such international agents, in our case sub-state diplomats. Indeed, for

paradiplomacy,thephrase‘Ispeak,thereforeIam’seemstobeparticularlyprophetic.

IV. ParadiplomacyasaSovereigntyGame

Abstracting thepracticeofparadiplomacybeyond itsparochial confines, as thepreceding

sectionshavesought,thereforeleavesuswithquestionsofrealandpressingsignificanceto

contemporary IR theory.Are sub-state governments, in their role as international agents:

perforating or weakening state sovereignty; re-asserting the legitimacy of national

sovereignty;expandingandreconstitutingthedomainofsub-statepolities,furthereroding

the distinction between the international and the domestic; or un-bundling and

disaggregating Caporaso’s (2000) conceptual triangle of ‘territory, sovereignty and

authority’?Beyondthesequestions,theactivitiescomprisingparadiplomacyalsohavesome

utility in highlighting the limits of extant IR theory. Indeed, multi-national states,

unrecognised states and non-state actors capable of conveying the loyalties of distinct

nationalorethnicgroupsontheworldstagedonotexistintheabstract:theyareverymuch

areal,empiricalphenomenon.Asanincreasinglysignificantdynamicinallitsvariousguises,

paradiplomacy deserves a place on the IR research agenda, contributing most clearly to

embryonicdebatessurroundingthedevelopingrolesof‘hybrid’internationalactors.

Theconceptofnationbuildingisusedinvariouswaysandinhugelydifferingcontextswithin

thefieldofparadiplomacy.Forthepurposesofthisstudy,however,whatisofinterestare

the political projects that draw on a strong regional identity, undertaken by sub-state

governmentswithdifferingconstitutionalpreferences.Whether thismanifests in theself-

referentialtermof‘nation’ornotisoflesserimportancethanthefactthesegovernments

recognise a political or cultural distinctiveness in their polity. The basic assumption that

underpins the utility of this framework in exploring paradiplomatic activity is that, for

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statelessnations, theability to ‘speak thenation’ internationally,and touse international

settingstoperformanagencythatoutstrips,orevensimplyaugments,thatcraftedwithin

domesticcontexts,isparticularlyvaluable.Whenthe‘stakes’areraisedinthisway,wenot

onlystandabetterchanceofencounteringandunderstandingthetensionsbetweensub-and

central-statediplomaciesandstatuses,butalsothewaysinwhichinternationalagencyfeeds

backintotheself-understandinganddomesticpoliticalagendasofthesub-stategovernments

themselves;andinevitably,thoseofthecentralstate,also.

Inshort,whenweconsidertheparadiplomaticpracticesofstatelessnations,theunderlying

currencyisoftenthatmostrarefiedbeast:sovereignty.Sub-stategovernmentsassertaform

of sovereignty in their pretensions to an international role, speaking for their people and

interactingwithotheractors-oftenthird,sovereignstates,ontheworldstage.Likewise,for

thecentralstate,whenseekingtomonitororcontroltheinternationalactivitiesoftheirsub-

state counterparts, their rationales often retreat into absolute sovereignty: the ability to

speakwithasingle,unqualifiedvoiceontheinternationalstagebeingcentraltotheroleof

national foreign offices and governments. However, when we consider the practices of

paradiplomacyintheirreal-life,day-to-daymanifestationsweseethatthepictureismuch

morenuancedand, in fact,much lessabsolute.This leadsus toadifferent conception to

sovereigntyperse,thatofasovereigntygame.

ThenotionofsovereigntygamesisonesetoutingreatdetailbyAdlerNissenandGad,and

explored both in their edited volume entitled ‘European Integration and Postcolonial

SovereigntyGames:theEUOverseasCountriesandTerritories’,andwithspecificreference

totheNordicregioninaspecialissueofthejournalCooperationandConflict(Adler-Nissen

andGad,2012;Adler-NissenandGad,2014).InthecontextoftheNordicregion,theauthors

pointtotwinprocesses:Europeanintegrationandincreasingdemandsbypolities,suchas

Greenland,theFaroeIslandsandÅland,forindependence-inoneformoranother.Atthe

heartoftheirexplanationofthesetwinandseeminglycontradictoryprocessesisthenotion

that sovereignty is not absolute, and should not be treated as such; instead it must be

regardedasaqualifiedconcept.Theideaofsovereigntygames,therefore, isallaboutthe

negotiationofsovereignty.Thegames:“involvestrategiesmaybeplayedoutwithreference

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tosovereigntyaseither/or,andtheymayinvolvealternativetypesofpolitiesinadditionto

sovereignstates”(Adler-NissenandGad,2014:14).

The fact that the meaning of sovereignty has - mistakenly, the authors contend - been

understoodasfixedhasresultedinthescenariowherebythedominantmodesofconsidering

worldpoliticsclassifyrelations:

Intermsofeitherhierarchicalsubordinationorexternalequality.Forpoliticalpractitioners,thisleadstoblindnesstootherformsofpoliticalorganization.For academics, it leads to blindness to what (also) goes on in politics - ininternationalpolitics,indomesticpoliticsandparticularlyinthepoliticsontheborderbetween the international and thedomestic (Adler-NissenandGad,2014:14).

Such a border is precisely where paradiplomatic activities take place; territorially basted

actors,nestedwithinthestructureofasovereign,hierarchicalstate,yetestablishingdirect

relationships and exchangeswith external actors, both sovereign and non-sovereign. The

polities discussed by Adler-Nissen andGad sharewith certain sub-state governments the

inabilitytofitneatlyintocategoriesofferedbyconventionaltheoriesofinternationalpolitics.

Greenland or the Faroe islands are “neither formally sovereign nor simply hierarchically

subordinatedtotheirmetropole”(2014:16).Whilemostsub-stategovernmentsareinfact

hierarchicallysubordinatetothecentralstate,formanythereisaconsciouschallengingof

thisstatus,oneoftenexpressedthroughparadiplomaticendeavours.Thisdoesnotalways

translatetoaquestforformalindependence-thoughitcando.Instead,itmaybemanifest

in the extent of competences transferred to the sub-state authority or in thenature and

qualityofrelationshipsbetweencentralandsub-statelevels.Certainly,forthosesub-state

governments identifying in one way or another with the term nation, there is a self-

perceptionthatsharesmuchincommonwiththeNordicexamplescitedabove.

ForAdler-NissenandGad,asovereigntygame:

Involvestwoormoreplayerswho,intheirinteraction,makestrategicclaimsaboutauthorityandresponsibilitywithreferencetoa traditional ‘either/or’concept of sovereignty. Contemporary sovereign states and polities, whichqualify as potential states, manoeuvre between dependence and self-determination - and sovereignty is a card that can be played in thesemanoeuvrings-orplayedon-indifferentways.Notablythearticulationofthe

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either/or conceptof sovereigntyneedneither be explicit nor affirmative inorderforittobevitalforthegame(Adler-NissenandGad,2014:19).

In drawing on the discourse of sovereignty, the ‘games’ themselves therefore have both

system-reinforcing and potentially disruptive effects. Similar effects, in fact, tomimicry -

wherebynon-stateactors’adoptionofaformofstate-likediplomacyisseentobolsterthe

authorityofthelatter,atthesametimeasitdilutestheverydistinctionthatexistsbetween

the official and the unofficial (McConnell, 2016; McConnell et al., 2012). For sub-state

governments,and indeedotherpolities,thevalueofsovereigntygames isrelatedtotheir

ability to position them as legitimate player in the game itself. Post-colonial sovereignty

games,inthewordsofAdler-NissenandGad,“pertainnot(only)tosomeparticularinstance

ofdistributionofauthorityorresponsibility,buttothedistributionoftheverypossibilityof

articulating authority and responsibility” (Adler-Nissen and Gad, 2014: 20). Sub-state

governments,therefore,areabletodeclarethemselvesascountedamongthe‘players’or

meaningful units in a national scene, using the international scene to bring about this

domesticpower-shift.

Insum,anewapproachtoparadiplomacy-theapproachutilisedandadvocatedinthisthesis

-shouldfocus,unapologetically,atthemoredevelopedendoftheparadiplomaticspectrum,

consciously assessing thenatureof the challengepresented to stategovernments,or the

diplomaticstatusquomorebroadly.Instatelessnationsweseeanon-stateactorspeaking

loudlyandclearly for the interestsof,orat least inthenameof,apeople -sometimes in

conflict with a central state authority. We see a traditionally territorially bound actor

construct theirplaceon theworld stage, seek legitimacy for their internationalpresence,

mimickingdominantdiplomaticdiscoursesthatbothsubvertandreaffirmthemonopolythat

statesholdonsuchdomains(McConnelletal.,2012).Welearnabouttheboundariesofsub-

stateauthorityandterritorialreach,theprocessesofinternationalagencycreationandthe

methodsthatcentralstategovernmentshavetoconstrainordenyagency.Wecanprobethe

meaningofofficialdiplomacy;assess thecategoriesanddivisionswehavebeen routinely

employing in the description and analysis of diplomatic practice.We can learn about the

meaning of sovereignty, unpicking the associations between this central concepts and its

variousoffshoots:authority,territory,power.

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ResearchQuestions&Design

Theresearchquestionslaidoutinthissectionreflectthenewfocusandframeworkthathas

beendiscussedabove.They reflect the fact thatparadiplomacyhas recentlyundergonea

processof‘normalization’(Cornago,2010),beingundertakenbyahugelyvariedassortment

ofregionalandothersub-stateactors,inamultitudeofdifferentguises;attimesmundane,

attimeshighlycontentious.Despitetheabsenceofclearconstitutionalauthority,andoften

withoutademonstrablefunctionalimpetus,therealityisthatsub-stateactorsareprojecting

themselvesontotheinternationalstage,developingan‘actorness’thatmuddiesthe(already

murky) waters of the diplomatic system. Where a good proportion of these discrete

paradiplomaticendeavoursarereasonablyeasilyunderstoodandaccountedforwithrelation

to economic incentives (specifically attracting inward investment), or engagement with

Europeanpolicy-making,otheractionsaremore intriguing.Theproliferationofnormative

activities, such as support for international development or climate change initiatives,

alongside increasinglynormal, or ‘state-like’diplomatic relationshipsorencounters (often

wherebyaregionestablishesformal/longertermrelationswithasovereignstate)seemsto

speaktodifferent,morecomplexandperhapsmoresignificantunderlyingmotivations.

Of the relatively small amount of research that has previously been conducted into the

motivationsbehindparadiplomacy,theconceptofstatelessnationalism,anditscounterpart,

nation building, have beenwidely identified as at least highly significant, if not themost

relevant, variables (Lecours andMoreno, 2001; Royles, 2010; Keating, 1997; Paquin and

Lachapelle, 2005). It would seem that these concepts are particularly consequential with

relationtothelessclearlyfunctionalexternalactivitiesmentionedabove.However,thelink

betweennationbuildingandparadiplomacyisundoubtedlymorecomplexthaniscurrently

accountedforintheliterature,notleastbecause‘nationbuilding’isasomewhatamorphous

conceptitself.Whatistheintendedendproductofsuchexercises?Asovereignstate?Greater

devolvedauthority?Someformofconfederation?Self-determinationisclearlyaconceptthat

is in a period of flux, with the interrelated processes of devolution/decentralisation,

supranational regional integration and globalization providing a particularly colourful

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backdrop.Analternativewayofthinkingaboutthisdynamic,whichseemstorevolvearound

therelativepowerandstatusofthestateandsub-stategovernment,iswhatAddler-Nissen

andGameltoft-Hansenterma ‘sovereigntygame’ (2008). In thisview,expandedbyAdler-

NissenandGadinrelationtotheNordicregion(2014),sub-stateinvolvementininternational

affairsmayrepresentatypeofsovereigntygamethatisnotreallyaboutanendgoalofanew

sovereignstate,butratheranassertionofthepolity’srighttoplaysuchagameatall.

Thislackofclarityregardingtheprocessofnationbuildingobscuresnotonlythemotivations

forsub-stategovernmentsinconductingparadiplomacy;italsomeansthattheimplications

of paradiplomacy, in the domestic and international arenas, are ill accounted for. For

example,whilebothScotlandandWalesmightbesaidtobeinvolvedinaprocessofnation

building (constructing and promulgating national identities, carving out areas of policy

differentiationwithregardstocentralgovernment,‘speakingthenation’)andbothundertake

manysimilarparadiplomaticactivities,itisnotnecessarilythecase(giventhequiteradically

different medium-term objectives of the governing parties in each case) that their

paradiplomacies are conducted for the samepurpose, nor that theirmeaning, or specific

implications, can be fused together. Whilst there is clearly a strong and convincing link

betweenparadiplomacyandnationbuilding,themultipleformsthatbothoftheseconcepts

can,anddo,takenecessitatesamuchcloserexaminationoftheselinks,somethingreflected

inthespecificresearchquestionsaddressedhere.Indeed,forthepurposesofthisstudy,a

broaderformulationthannationbuildingorstatelessnationsisemployed,focussingonthe

politicalprojectsofstatelessnationsthatdrawuponastrongsub-statenationalidentity.

Given this lackof conceptual clarity, and thewidelyacknowledgedpaucityofexplanatory

approaches to the study of paradiplomacy, this project will focus on a set of sequential

research questions that, taken as a whole, are intended to help place the practices in a

broadertheoreticalcontext.Theinitialthreequestionsarelargelyempirical innature.The

firstasks:whatsortof internationalrolesaresub-stategovernmentsabletoplayonthe

international stage? The second relates to the ‘why’ of paradiplomatic action, and asks:

beyondeconomicorfunctionalimperatives,whatdrivessub-stategovernmentstodevelop

international actorness? Thirdly, the study will address the question: how do sub-state

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governmentsestablishcredibilityandlegitimacyintheirinternationalroles?Latterly,the

studywillmoveon toask: towhatextentdoes thepracticeofparadiplomacy challenge

dominantunderstandingsofinternationalrelations?Theanswertothisquestionisclosely

related to the findings of the initial empirical analysis: the motivations that sub-state

governmentshaveindevelopinginternationalactornessaffectsthenatureofthechallenge

such actions pose to our understanding of central concepts of IR theory, such as state

sovereignty.Thissecondary investigationwillconstituteamoretheoreticalaccountof the

nature of sub-state governments as international actors, their position in international

society,andtheimplicationsforotherunitsofanalysisinthetraditionalstudyofIR.

Asageneralrule,empiricalstudiesofsub-stategovernments’paradiplomacieshavelargely

focussed on paradigmatic cases, such as Quebec or Catalonia, where such activities are

particularlypronounced(Duran,2011::339).Atthesametime,analmostexclusivefocuson

theEU-relatedactivitiesofsub-stategovernments(Royles,2010::143)hasmeantthatmuch

of the paradiplomatic literature examines activities that could perhaps be better located

within the framework of multi-level governance. There would seem to be pertinent

differences in, for example, a council or local authority in an English region lobbying EU

institutionsforsupporttoaparticularindustryinaneconomicreformpackage,andthoseof

thedirectlyelectedgovernmentofa‘statelessnation’,suchasScotland,forminglong-term,

bilateralpartnershipswiththestatesofCentralandEasternEurope.Likewise,therewould

seemtobeafurtherrelevantdifferenceintheestablishmentofpredominantlyfunctional,

economic, international linkageson thepartof sub-stategovernments inorder toattract

inwardinvestment,andthosesamegovernmentsundertakingovertlynormativeactivities,

such as involving themselves in climate change mitigation networks or developing

internationalaidprogrammes.

Admittedly, some of these distinctions are, in practice, subtle. However, the difficulty of

separatingoutandcategorisingthesedifferenttypesofinternationalactivitydoesnotnegate

the need to do so: in fact, when we consider the, largely unanswered, pleas within the

literature for a re-conceptualisation of paradiplomacy through a linkage with sub-state

nationalism(LecoursandMoreno,2001::1-3),andthemuchmorewidelycitedrequirement

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for the development of theoretical frameworks and explanatory accounts of the practice

(BursensandDeforche,2010;Lecours,2002),thisprocesswouldseemmuchoverdue.

Sub-state governments engaging in diplomatic relations have, according to the literature,

fundamentallydifferentaimsthanthoseofstates.Lecoursargues that, for themostpart,

theseaimsaremore ‘modest’, relatedto thedevelopmentofan internationalpersonality

(Lecours,2002::104).Gettingtothebottomofexactlywhatthismeansinpractice:thevariety

of aims sub-state governments have, their expectations of the influence they are able to

wield,andonwhattypeofactors,necessarilyentailsamuchcloseranalysisofthetypesof

diplomacyorexternalrelationsthatsub-stategovernmentsaredeveloping.Indeed,thevery

notion that sub-state governmentshave international ambitions thatdiffer from thoseof

central-statesisonethatshouldbesubjecttochallenge.

Thusfar,thekeycategoriesthathavebeenusedtoanalyseparadiplomaticactionsrelateto

whethertheyareincarriedoutinconcertwith,parallelto,orareconflictualwiththeexternal

relationsofthecentralstate(Criekemans,2010c).Thoughthisdistinctionisindeedimportant,

italoneisincapableoftellingusmuchaboutwhatthesub-stateactoristryingtoachieve.It

maybethataregionalandcentralgovernmentdisagreeoveragriculturalpolicy,adomestic

debate that can easily be extrapolated to the EU, or even international, level. The

paradiplomaticactionsurroundingthisdisputemaywellbeinconflictwiththatofthecentral

government, but the sub-state government’s aimsmay in fact be domestically located, a

preferential policyoutcome for their constituents, rather thananattempt toestablishan

internationalpersonality.Incontrast,thehighprofileoftheBavariangovernment’sBrussels

office,theirdecisiontoinvestsuchresourcesindirectEUrepresentation,maytellusalot

aboutthewayinwhichthatthishistoric‘nation’seesitself,andthenatureofitsinterestsand

influence,despitethefactthatintermsofdirectlobbyingorpolicypositions,theymaybe

actingparallelto,oreveninconcertwith,theFederalGovernment.

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Methodology

Thestartingpoint,intermsofamethodologicalandtheoreticalframeworktoapplytothis

study,isthattheredoesnotappeartobeonethatcouldbeadoptedinanyuniformsense;a

resultofthevariouslacunasinthedevelopmentofparadiplomatictheoryasoutlinedabove.

Instead,therearearangeofpotentiallyusefulconceptsandframeworksthatexistacross

manyoverlappingandrelateddisciplinesandsubjectareas.Thoughundoubtedlymessy,as

starting points go, it is only in testing and applying these different tools or analytical

perspectives thatwe can start to ‘join up the dots’ betweenwhat is taking place on the

paradiplomatic landscape and the broader international and diplomatic environments.

Purposefully,conceptual tidinessandmethodologicalclarityhave insome importantways

beencompromisedforthefunctionofseekingnewinsightintoanareaofdiplomacythathas

traditionallyonlybeenstudiedinacompartmentalised,andthusfundamentallylimited,way.

Indeed, intheirarticleexaminingapproachesandmethods infeministresearchwithinthe

UK,KrookandSquires(2006:45)explicitlycallfortheprioritisationofmethodologicaland

theoretical eclecticism. Their studydemonstrated “adistinctivewillingness on thepart of

feministstoemployvarioustheoreticalframesandtoexplorepossibilitiesforsynthesizingor

juxtaposingmethodsininnovativeways”.Theauthorsgoontoarguethat“problem-driven

researchshouldbecultivatedattheexpenseofmethod-drivenwork”. Extrapolatingfrom

thisargument,thoughparadiplomaticpracticesrepresentadifferentsetof‘problems’from

thosedominating feminist researchagendas, theydotouchmeaningfullyoncoreareasof

politicallife:authority,nationhood,legitimacy,sovereignty.Inotherwords,theissuesthat

arisefromthepracticeofparadiplomacyareworthyofinvestigation–perhapsparticularlyso

giventhattheydonotfitneatlyintoanestablishedmethodology,andsuchenquiryrequires

thejuxtapositionofmultipletheoreticalframeworks.Ratherthanaimingforarobustmodel

forpredictingfutureparadiplomaticbehaviour,ormodellingparadiplomacyinunchartered

scenarios, theobjectives of this thesis aremore limited. They revolve aroundbuilding an

accurate picture, and a more kaleidoscopic understanding, of current practices and the

meanings that these relativelynew rolesand relationshipshold for theactors involved in

cultivatingthem.

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Broadly, this thesis employs a constructivist methodology, seeking to “capture and

understand themeanings of a social action [paradiplomacy] for the agent performing it’,

recognisingthattheaccountofthescholarstudyingsuchactionisnotfreefromthe“biases

that surround us” (Moses and Knutsen, 2012: 11). The approach draws from Rosenau’s

conceptualisationof international theory (1996:309-310),premisedontheunderstanding

that “it is sheer craziness to dare to understand world affairs…yet dare, we must”. In

addressingthistask,Rosenaucallsfor“asenseofhumilityandpuzzlement”,remaining‘in

aweofthecomplexitiesandchangesatworkintheworld,everreadytoconcedeconfusion

andalways remindingourselves thatourconclusionsmustperforcebe tentative”.Yet,he

continues,thereisarolefortheorisinginthistaskofunderstandingworldaffairs:usingitto

“tease meaningful patterns out of the endless details and inordinate complexities that

pervadeworldpolitics’mechanismsfordoingso(Rosenau,1996:310).

Methods

Forthiscomparativestudy,therearethreemainfociofanalysis:institutional,discourseand

praxis. Within these three areas a variety of materials will be considered, ranging from

constitutionsandmemorandaofunderstandingthroughtoin-depthinterviews.Qualitative

software,Nvivo,willbeusedinordertoaidthecodingandanalysisofthisvolumeofmaterial.

This range of analytical foci and sources is explored in the table below, adapted from a

frameworkenumeratedbyAdler-NissenandGad,whosedistinctionsbetweeninstitutional,

discourseandpraxisanalysisprovedinvaluableinfocussingtheanalysisundertaken(Adler-

NissenandGad,2014:22).

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Table1:AnalyticalFramework.AdaptedfromAdler-NissenandGad,2014:22

Method InstitutionalAnalysis

DiscourseAnalysis PraxisAnalysis

Site Formalscopeofdiplomaticpowers.DevolutiondispensationsorFederalvs.regionaldelegationsofpowers.

NegotiationofmeaningandidentityvisavistheinternationalactornessandlegitimacyofSSGs.

Diplomaticpraxis:theactualscopeofsub-stateinternationalengagement‘ontheground’

Typeofmaterial

Constitutions,MemorandaofUnderstanding,Concordatsandformalizedworkingandinter-governmentalarrangements

Parliamentaryrecords,mediadebate,partypositionpapers,governmentpolicydocuments,officialstatements,official/governmentalsocialmediaprofiles.Qualitative,in-depthinterviews-wherepossible.

Qualitative,in-depthinterviews-wherepossible.Participantobservation.Policydocuments,partypositionpapers,officialstatements,official/governmentalsocialmediaprofiles,

Analyticalstrategy

Understandingtheinstitutionalizationofsub-statediplomaticauthorityandboththelimitsandopportunitiesallowedbygoverningorconstitutionalarrangements

MappingcompetingvisionsoftheexternalidentityoftheSSGandtheproperscopeoftheirinternationalaction-asconceivedbybothsubandcentralstateactors

Lookingattheself-understandings,negotiationprocessesandstrategiesdevelopedinpositioningSSGsasdiplomaticactors.Focusingondiplomaticpractices

Thereweretwowaysinwhichthetimeperiodforanalyseswasnarroweddownineachof

ourthreecases.Firstly,duetotherapidlyevolvingnatureofparadiplomacy,therewasaclear

focus on the current activities of Wales, Scotland and Bavaria. This meant that the

programmes, interactions and institutional arrangements consideredwere – for themost

part-thosethatexistedwhilstthisresearchtookplace.Thisdatacollectingphasebeganin

2013andconcludedin2016.However,owingtothepotentialsignificanceofpartypolitical

controlandthepoliticaldynamicsunderpinningparadiplomacy,therewasabroadertime-

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frame that guided this research and provided the historical context within which

paradiplomacy tookplacewhichdiffered in eachof the case studies. Eachof these time-

framesreflectedacriticaljunctureinthepoliticalcontextofourcasesandwasselectedwith

somedirectionfromtheinitialinterviewsthatwereconducted.ForWales,thetimeframe

withinwhichtheanalysisisgroundedbeginsin1999,withtheestablishmentoftheNational

AssemblyforWales.InScotland,therelevantcriticaljuncturewasinsteadidentifiedasthe

formationof the firstSNPminoritygovernment inHolyrood in2007. InBavaria, the long-

standingdominanceoftheCSUanditscloserelationshipatvariouspointswithagoverning

CDU at the Federal Level meant that the critical juncture that best reflects the distinct

paradiplomacy that is currently conducted is, for our purposes, the premiership of Franz

JosephStrauss,beginningin1978.FranzJosephStrausswasrenownedfordevelopingwhat

hasbeentermed‘Nebenaußenpolitik’or‘foreignpolicyontheside’(Panara,2010),usinghis

statusasaformerFederalpoliticiantodo“todothingsthatnootherMinisterPresidenthad

donebefore”.5Datahasnotbeencollectedforthisentirenear-40yearperiod,rather it is

withinthisframeofreferencethatBavaria’sdistinctiveparadiplomacywillbeinterpreted,as

inScotlandandWales.

Limitations

Therewereanumberoflimitationstotheapproachadoptedinthisresearch,owingtothe

particularsetofcircumstancessurroundingthisstudyandthecasestobeanalysed.Perhaps

themostsignificantoftheselimitationsistheimbalanceinthedatacollectedforeachofthe

casestudies,specificallythelackofinterview-dataintheScottishcase.Thepoliticalcontext

in Scotland during the course of this research meant that officials were reluctant to

participate intheproject;thoughunfortunate,this levelofpoliticalsensitivitydid indicate

interestingdynamicswhichareexploredinsubsequentchapters.IntheabsenceofScottish

interview data, the thesis instead made use of another set of sources which served to

illustratetheintentionsandself-perceptionsoftheScottishGovernmentinitsinternational

endeavours: the policy-papers, debates and exchanges centred around the Scottish

5Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013

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independencereferendumin2014.Inaddition,thecontributionsfromScottishGovernment

officialsaspartofa6-partseminarseriesonSecurityinScotlandgavefurtherinsightintothe

prioritiesandpositionsofScotlandinaninternationalcontext.Thesessionstookplaceunder

‘ChathamHouse’rulesandanexpectationofanonymity.Asecondimportantlimitationwas

thelackofGerman(orWelsh)languageskillsonthepartoftheresearcher.Thismeantthat

all interviewswere conducted inEnglish;however, reflecting the issuearea inquestion–

international affairs – all the relevant interviewees spoke fluent English, and for similar

reasonstheBavarianGovernmentpublishedsubstantiveinformationontheseinanEnglish

languageformat.Issuesrelatedtothechoiceofcasestudiesandcomparisonsbetweenthem

arediscussedinthefollowingsection.

The initial strategy of relying heavily on elite-level interview data was a risky one, and

ultimately it did not reap the intended rewards in terms of the numbers or balance of

participants. Where the initial aim was to secure interviews with three to four key

governmentofficialsoradvisors ineachof thecases, innoneof thecaseswas this target

reached. IntheWelshcase, interviewswereconductedwithfiveofficials,spreadbetween

theWelsh Government and the National Assembly forWales (which, in this case study,

providedausefulinsightintothe‘split’betweenparadiplomaticobjectivesintheexecutive

andlegislativebranches),inBavariatheywereconductedwithtwoofficials–oneeachfrom

theexecutiveandparliamentarybranches–andinScotland,asexplainedabove,therewas

anunwillingnesstoparticipateintheprojectowingtothepoliticalsensitivitiesatthetime.

Two broad factors worked to mitigate these set-backs in the original strategy for data

collection. The first was that, in the Welsh and Bavarian cases, while the number of

intervieweesdidnotreachtheintendedfigure,themostrelevantandappropriateindividuals

didparticipate.Thequalityoftheinterviewswasthereforeveryhigh,andtheaimofprobing

thewaysinwhichparadiplomacyfeedsintotheprioritiesofaspecificsub-stategovernment

and their broader political aims and strategies was met. The other was that alternative

primarysourcesof informationwerereadilyavailable,andintheScottishcasethesewere

particularlyabundant(asoutlinedabove),mitigatingtoadegreetheimbalanceofinterview

data.Theresearchstrategyunderpinningthisprojectthereforepivotedatarelativelyearly

stage; incorporating awider variety of sources of evidence and information andusing an

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analyticalstrategybroughttogetherthreeseparatemodes:institutionalanalysis,discourse

analysisandpraxisanalysis.

CaseStudies

Thecasestudies-Wales,ScotlandandBavaria-havebeenchosenprimarilyonthebasisof

their representing a group of stateless nations, amongst whom the political context is

substantivelydifferent.Inotherwords,whilstallthree‘qualify’asstatelessnations,eachare

governedbypartieswithdifferentpoliticalandconstitutionalpriorities.Thestrengthofsub-

statenationalidentificationalsodiffersacrossthecases,whichwillallowforaconsideration

oftherolethatthisvariablemayplayintheconstructionofsub-stategovernments’external

identities,anddegreesofinter-governmentalcongruenceorincongruencetobeconsidered.

Thecasesfurtherexhibita‘slidingscale’intermsofotherrelevantvariablesidentifiedbythe

paradiplomaticliterature:theextentoflegislativeautonomyandthenatureofthestate/sub-

staterelationship(inparticularthecontrastbetweendevolvedandfederalregionalunits),

the economic positionof the region relative to the rest of the state, and the strengthof

regional/national(ist)parties.

Thevariableofpartypolitical controlwithin the sub-stategovernmenthasnotbeen fully

explored in the literature on sub-state diplomacy, though the related concept of political

congruenceorincongruencehasbeenbetterstudied(forexample,seeWynJonesandRoyles,

2012; Cantir, 2015; Tatham, 2013; Tatham, 2014). Given the agency-driven nature of

paradiplomaticactivity(oftenlackinganyrobuststatutoryunderpinning),andinlightofthe

variationsobservedinthetypeofactivitiesengagedinbydifferentsub-stategovernments,

thisvariableseemshighlyrelevant.Bycomparingacrossthreesub-stategovernmentswith

qualitatively different political contexts, this project seeks to uncover thepreciseways in

whichgovernmentalactorsseektodevelopinternationalagencyandthewaysinwhichthe

internationalspherecanbeutilisedfortherealizationofpoliticalambitions.Theapproachof

thisstudyistodistinguishbetweenexternalactsorrelationsthatareprimarilygovernance-

based, from those whose emphasis is more diplomatic. Whilst recognising that this

delineationisnotstraightforward,norconstructiveinsomeinstances,theargumentismade

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thataparticularfocusonthoseactivitiesthatare,moreorless,autonomousi.e.,notonly

relatedtothefunctionalrequirementsofEuropeangovernance,mayshedsignificantlighton

anaspectofsub-stateactivitythathas largelybeenneglected intheextant literature.For

similar reasons, this project looks to investigate the nature and scope of international

activitiesbothwithinandbeyondtheEuropeanneighbourhood.

The cases were selected from an already narrowed pool: stateless nations within the

Europeancontext.Thelatterpartofthiscriteriastemsfromthefactthattheavailabilityof

broadly similar international and regional opportunity structures for sub-state

internationalismwasdeemedanimportantbase-line,allowingthepeculiaritiesofeachcase

(intermsoftheiruniquerelationswiththecentralgovernmentandtheprioritiespursuedby

politicalactorsatthesub-statelevel)tocometolight.Otherfactorsinfluencedthischoiceof

cases.ThisresearchwasconductedfromCardiff,meaningthatahighdegreeofaccesstothe

WelshGovernmentandthebroaderWelshpolicymakingcontextwasabletobefacilitated.

Thisproved important in termsofdata collectionas accesswas restricted inother cases,

owingbothtogeographyandtothepoliticalsensitivitiesintheScottishpoliticallandscapeat

thetimeofresearch.ThepotentialcomparisonbetweenWalesandScotlandwasdeemedto

beimportantowingtothedivergentpoliticaltrajectoriesoftheirgovernmentsfollowingthe

SNPssuccessinrecentyears,andtheresultingvariationindegreesofincongruencebetween

theUKGovernmentandScotlandandWales.Thus,despitesharingacentralgovernment,

other factors – both in termsof the constitutional framework anddifferingdelegationof

powersmediatingtherolesofthetwodevolvedgovernments,andintermsoftheinfluence

of governing parties at the sub-state level –may be seen to influence the nature of the

paradiplomacy that they conducted, and this was deemed to offer important potential

insight.InBavaria,theopportunitytostudyastatelessnationthatwasanoutlierinitsown

state–intermsofthestrengthofattachmenttothe‘heimat’andthewayinwhichthiswas

representedinitsexternalrelations–providedanimportantcontrasttothetwocasesfrom

inside the UK, as did the settled and written constitutional structure of the German

federation,andtherelationshipoftheLandertoit.Otherpotentialcases–suchassomeof

Spain’s autonomous regions – were considered but ultimately rejected on the basis of

representing paradigmatic cases (e.g. Catalonia and Wallonia) or lacking sufficient

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differentiationintermsoftheconstitutionalstructureandsymmetry/asymmetryofsub-state

competence(relatedtotheUK).

The selection of three sub-state governments that represent a stateless nation was a

deliberateone.Itisacknowledgedthat,asaresultofthepoliticsofregionalandsub-state

nationalidentity,theparadiplomaticactivitiesofWales,BavariaandScotlandmaynotreflect

similar motivations or strategies in regions whose identity is less salient or who do not

representstatelessnations.Itmaybethatthegeneralemphasisonexternalengagementis

greaterinstatelessnations,orthatthetypeofparadiplomacyundertakenisdifferentfrom

that inother regions.Havingsaid this, the threecaseschosenarenotgenerally (with the

mutedexceptionofScotland)amongthe‘usualsuspects’thatfeatureinparadiplomaticcase

studies,suggestingthattheirinternationalendeavoursarenotparticularlya-typical.

Thenotionof‘statelessnations’,simplynationswithouttheirown,correspondingstate,isan

essentiallycontestedconcept.This isunsurprising,giventhefactthatthenation itselfhas

long resided in this category (Hepburn, 2008a: :185). The particular problematique of

statelessnationsforpoliticalscience,however,restsontheirapparentincompatibilitywith

coreunits(infact,thecoreunit)ofanalysis inbothcomparativepoliticsand international

relations: the nation state. In a related vein, Shain and Sherman (1998: :321) point to

phenomenasuchasdiasporasandseparatistmovementsas‘countertheoreticalconcepts’

thatare“inconsistentwiththestructuralrationaleoftheglobalsystem”.Itwouldappearthat

this argument applies equallywell towhat have, latterly, come to be known as stateless

nations;whethersuchentitiescontainstrongseparatistmovementsorwhetherdemandsfor

self-determination manifest in a different way, being largely content with a degree of

autonomyinsidetheoverarchingstate.

Themeaningofthestatecanbedistinguishedfromthatofthenation,andindeednationalism

(Guibernau, 2004: :1252). However, the concepts have become fused together and their

distinctivenessobfuscated, inparttoallowforaconstructtomorereadilyunderstandthe

modernstatessystem.Thenationitselfisperhaps“oneofthemostcontestedconceptsof

our times” (Guibernau, 2004: :1251); its significance being amplified by this symbolically

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loadedterm.Whenwecometoinvestigatethediscretepracticeofparadiplomacy,itselfan

actionverymuchconcernedwithstatusandsymboliccapital(WynJonesandRoyles,2012:

:252),thestatelessnationbecomesaparticularlyrelevantanalyticcategory.Guibernaugoes

ontoarguethat:

To be or not to be recognized as a nation entails different rights for thecommunitywhichclaimstobeone,sincebeinganationusually impliestheattachment to a particular territory, a shared culture and history, and thevindicationoftherighttoself-determination.Todefineaspecificcommunityasanationinvolvesthemoreorlessexplicitacceptanceofthelegitimacyofthestatewhichclaimstorepresentit,or,ifthenationdoesnotpossesastateofitsown,thenimplicitlyacknowledgesthenation’srighttoself-governmentinvolvingsomedegreeofpoliticalautonomy(Guibernau,2004::1251).

However, alongside the inherent symbolismand sensitivity of the termnation, stemming

fromthespecialrightsthat itconfers, thereareadditionalcomplexities incertainpolitical

contextswhichmaymeanthatthetermisdeliberatelynotemployed(WynJonesandScully,

2009::7-8).ThekeyexamplehereisthatofBavaria/Germany,wherenationandnationalism

belong toa categoryof ‘sullied concepts’, associatedwithnational socialism, that remain

politically inappropriate (Hepburn, 2008a: :184). In the Bavarian case, an alternative

conception,theHeimat,isusedtodenoteaverysimilarphenomenon:asub-stateunitwhich

representsanhistoricnationwithitsownculturesandtraditions,thatisseentolegitimately

claima‘special’degreeofself-rule,orpoliticalautonomy,onaccountofthisdistinctiveness

(bothfromthefederalstateasawholeandfromotherLanderwhorepresentmere‘regions’).

This example brings into focus the ongoing debates regardingwhat exactly constitutes a

nation;whetherthatbeobjectivecriteria (suchas language,ethnicityorculture,ashared

history)ormoresubjectivefeatures,whereabodyofpeoplefeel,andarticulatethemselves

asbeing,anation(Hepburn,2008a::186).

Regardlessoftheexacttermusedtodescribethephenomenon,thesignificanceofstateless

nationsisarguedbyGuibernau(2004::1254)tostemfromtheirpositionas“potentialnew

politicalactorsabletocaptureandpromotesentimentsofloyalty,solidarityandcommunity

amongindividualswhoseemtohavedevelopedagrowingneedforidentity”.Relatedly,it

shouldfollowthatthe‘rise’,or,perhapsmoreaccurately,renewedpoliticalmobilization,of

statelessnationshasthepotentialtohaveasignificantimpactonthestateswithinwhose

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borderssuchentitiesreside.Inpart,thenatureofthisimpactdependsupontheapproach

takenbycentralstatestotheaccommodationofsub-statenations,andindeedthestrategies

ofthestatelessnationsthemselves

Giventheshortcomingsintheextantparadiplomaticliterature,itwouldseemthatafocuson

thoseparadiplomaticactivitiesthatcorrespondastatelessnationwouldbeofgreatestvalue.

They are more likely to have some form of political (alongside economic or functional)

motivation,theirinternationalactionsexpressanationalidentitythatisdistinctfromthatof

thecentralstate,andthus,theimplicationsofsuchactivitiesforinternationalrelationstheory

are, potentially, particularly pronounced. Paradiplomacy pushes at the boundaries of

sovereignauthority, blurring thedistinctionbetween stateandnon-stateactor; theexact

natureofthischallengewillbeseenespeciallyclearlywithafocusonthoseregionswitha

salientnationalidentityoftheirown.Exploringthemore‘developed’endofaspectrumof

activity isclearly fraughtwith itsowndangers.What is true foronecategoryofsub-state

actors,isbynomeansapplicabletoall.Additionally,whilesub-statenationsdoindeedengage

in autonomous, paradiplomatic actions that may correspond to the logics of stateless

nationalism,it isalsothecasethattheycarryoutpurelyfunctionalinternationalrelations,

corresponding to the logics of multi-level governance. Likewise, regions that do not

necessarily represent ‘stateless nations’ can also engage in highly ‘developed’ forms of

activity.ThoughCriekemans(2010a::6)correctlyidentifiesthedangersofmisinterpretation

lurkinginanyconsiderationofthe‘nationalism’variable(“whatsomeunderstandasbeing

nationalist (orworse, separatist)might rather be evaluated by others a form of ‘identity

politics’”),acarefulconsiderationofthisrelationshipisnonethelessvitalfortheadvancement

ofparadiplomaticstudies.

Fromtheperspectiveofparadiplomacy, thestrategiesofstatelessnationsareparticularly

interesting.Thisisdue,inpart,tothefactthattherewouldappeartobesomeactivitiesthat

areintrinsictothiscategoryperse(suchasattainingrecognitionoftheirdistinctivenessor

their‘nationhood’,bothfromthe‘host’stateandfromotheractors),andotherswhichwould

appear to depend very much on whether the strategy of the region was to pursue

independence,toseekmaximumautonomywithintheexistingstateortofocusonparticular

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areasofcompetence.Theutilityofparadiplomacy,anditsmodalities,wouldseemtodiffer

dependingontheexactstrategythattheregionwishedtopursue,allowingforacloseanalysis

of the meaning of the practice for the actors themselves, and of their motivations for

employingitsdifferenttools.Giventhefactthatthepossiblerangeofmotivationsis,logically,

broadestfortheactorswiththegrandestambitions, italsoallowsforthefullspectrumof

paradiplomaticendeavourstobeconsidered.

Aside fromthespecificagendasof statelessnations in seeking independenceordomestic

autonomy,thefactthattheyrepresentalternative,sometimesconflictual,identitiestothose

associatedwithacentralstate,meansthatparadiplomacyhasaparticularlyusefulapplication

forsuchentities:inallowingthemto‘speakthenation’.Theuseofparadiplomacyasanation-

buildingtoolhasbeenwidelyidentifiedwithintheliterature(seeforexampleKeating,1997;

Royles,2010;LecoursandMoreno,2001),andwouldseemtobeparticularlyimportantwith

regardstothesortofidentity-constructionthatappearstobeevidentincertainnormative

paradiplomaticactivities,suchasinternationalaidorsustainabledevelopmentprogrammes.

Likewise,thenation-buildingandidentity-constructinglogicsofparadiplomacymaywellbe

evident in attemptsmadeby stateless nations, or at least certain partieswithin stateless

nations, to self-consciously place themselves within this category, bringing with it the

legitimate claims to special treatment as associatedwith the term ‘nation’, as argued by

Guibernau(2004::1251).TheexampleofBavariawillbeexploredbelow,butthequestionof

inter-sub-national networking, and the effects of policy learning and exchange between

statelessnationsinthecontextofparadiplomacyisonethatisripeforresearch.

Bavaria is a German Lander with strong sub-state competence, able to exert a unique

influenceontheFederallevel,owingtotherelationshipbetweenitsgoverningCSUparty–

whichhasalong-standingdominanceintheLander-andoneofthemainFederalparties,the

CDU.Ithasperhapsthemostcomplexidentityofallofthethreecasestobeconsideredin

thisproject.Itdefiescategorisation,notbeingeasilytranslatedintotheconceptofstateless

nationalism as we understand it from archetypal cases, such as Scotland or Catalonia

(Hepburn,2007:109).However,asweshallexplorebelow,thestrategiesofthedominant

CSUparty are in fact very similar to those employedbymoreprominent ‘nation-building

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parties’withinsuchstatelessnations.Indeed,theCSUappeartobeself-consciouslyplacing

Bavariawithinthisexactcategory:

BavariaisoneoftheoldeststatesinEurope…weareverydifferentfromtherestofGermany,weliketobeindependent.Wefightformorecompetencesand powers for the regions…Bavaria is very similar to Scotland. We seeourselvesasanation’ (EberhardSinner,BavarianMinisterofEuropeanandFederalAffairs,quotedinHepburn,2008a:184).

DatafromacomparativestudyofEuropeanregions(CANS) illuminatesthisopaquestatus

quiteclearly.Bavariaappearswithinagroupofsevenregions(outof14surveyed)whose

attachmenttotheregionisgreaterthantothestate,butdoesnotappearinthesub-group

ofregionswithinthiscategory(numberingfiveofthoseseven)whohave“whatwouldappear

tobea strong senseofnational identity” (asopposed toa regionalone) (Wyn Jonesand

Scully,2009:3-4).Inconsideringthisdata,theauthorshintatakeyfactorwhichmayexplain

the apparent disjuncture between the strength of sub-national identity and the lack of

‘national’attachment:Germany’suniquepoliticalcontext.

ThecaseofBavariaisfascinating…withBavarianidentityapparentlyexhibitingmany of those features classically associated with nationality and nationalidentity: the typeof identity thatmighthavedeveloped intoa fully formedsenseofnationalidentityindifferenthistoricalcircumstances(WynJonesandScully,2009:4).

As mentioned previously, the term ‘nation’ is rarely used in the German context, its

connotationsbeingalmostentirelynegative.InBavaria,thetermHeimatisinsteadusedto

denoteasimilarconcept.However,accordingtooneauthor,“whetheronechoosestoterm

BavariaNationorHeimat,theunderlyingideologyfollowsnationalistprinciples”(Sutherland,

2001:26).TheextentofCSUdominanceinBavariameansthattheyinevitablyshape,and

even “determine” constitutional debates, compelling other parties to respond (Hepburn,

2007:142);politicalpartiesarekeyactorsintheestablishmentofnationalidentities,andthe

CSU has proved particularly effective in this regard (Hepburn, 2008a: 186). According to

Sutherland(2001:27-28):

Notonlydoes theCSUwant tocomeacrossas thebestparty to representBavarianinterestsinGermanyandEurope,itwantstostyleitselfastheonlytrueBavarianparty…ithas largelysucceeded increatinganelisionbetweenpartyandnation.

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Part of the complexity to the Bavarian identity, asmentioned above, relates to itsmulti-

layered aspect, where affiliationwith the central state is seemingly undiminished by the

strengthoffeelingataregional/Landlevel.Thereexistsaclearhierarchy,oratleastconscious

differentiationofallegiances,commonlyexpressedas:‘BavariaisourHeimat,Germanyisour

VaterlandandEuropeisourfuture’(Sutherland,2001:22).TherelatedpolicyoftheCSUis

similarlycomplex,beingatoncehighlysupportiveoffederalismandsteadfastthatBavaria

requiresmaximumautonomywithinthisstructure,leadingtodifferinginterpretationsofthe

party’s stance: as both nationalist and federalist (Hepburn, 2007: 109). According to the

former;“onlythesubstitutionofthetermHeimatforNationdistinguishesthestrategyofthe

CSUfromarchetypalnation-building”(Sutherland,2001:30).However,andinformedbythe

other side of this peculiar Bavarian coin, the party’s support for federalism, and the

contentedlyco-existingidentitiescorrespondingtotheBavarian,GermanandEUlevelsdo

distinguishthenatureofthisnation-buildingprojectfromthoseseeninbothScotlandand

Wales.

BothWales and Scotland exhibit a muchmore convincing ‘national’ attachment to their

respectiveregions.TheCANSstudyreferencedabovedemonstratedthatbothcaseshavea

degreeofattachmenttotheregionthatis“genuinelystriking,standingoutfromtherestboth

in termsof thestrengthof feeling for thepeopleof therespectiveregions,aswellas the

weaknessofsuchsentimentsatthelevelofthestate”(WynJonesandScully,2009:5).In

addition,andtoafargreaterextentthananyoftheotherregionssurveyed,bothScotland

andWalespreferredtheterm‘nation’todescribethemselves(asopposedtoregion)standing

at83%and70%respectively(ibid:8).ThenationbuildingprojectsofbothScotlandandWales

are similarly well established, though with different accents. Indeed, the UK stands out

internationally for the “extent towhich it has given recognition both to the plurinational

characterofthestateandtherightofnationswithinittoself-determination”(McEwan,2017:

70-71).BothScotlandandWaleshavemadeuseoftheopportunitystructuresprovidedby

asymmetricdevolutionin1999,whichcreatedaScottishParliamentandaNationalAssembly

forWales–thelatterofwhichhasbeensubjecttoseveralconstitutionalrevisions(WynJones

andScully,2012).Sincethe2011electionstotheScottishParliament,anSNPgovernment

has been pursuing an explicit independence agenda, with an (ultimately unsuccessful)

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referendumtakingplacein2014,andastatedintentiontoreturntothequestiononcethe

UKhasexited theEU.ThecurrentWelshLabourgovernment,meanwhile,hasbeenmore

concernedwith‘buildingthenation’domestically,and‘speaking’itmoreforcefullywithinthe

UK,arguablywithanaimtoredresssomeoftheasymmetriesofUK-widedevolution;with

somesuccess,inthecontextofthetwonewGovernmentofWalesActsthathavebeenadded

totheUKStatutebookssincethisresearchbegan.

Thisselectionofcases,aswellasprovidingtheaforementioned‘slidingscale’intermsofthe

strengthofsub-statenationalidentityandautonomy,andthecontrastingrangeofpolitical

contexts,allowsforfurtherinterestingcontrasts.Thefirstoftheseregardstheconstitutional

structuresofGermanyandtheUK,potentiallyallowingfortheparadiplomacy-relatedeffects

ofastatic,federalsystem,incontrasttoanasymmetricalsystemofdevolution,subjectto

seeminglyconstantcallsforrevisionorredressfrombothScotlandandWales,tocometo

light.Thisrelationshipwillbeexploredthroughoutthethesis,buttheredoesappeartobean

indicationofitmanifestinginperhapsacounter-intuitiveway;inparticularthatfederalism

may constrain a sub-state government more than devolution. Secondly, the disparate

economicresourcesofthethreesub-stategovernmentsunderconsideration,withBavaria’s

positionasoneof thewealthiest regionsgloballyand indeedrelative to its state,andthe

success of its specific approach to economic development, presented by the CSU as ‘the

Bavarianway’ (Hepburn,2008a:189)providingaparticularly interesting case, shouldalso

helptoilluminatethefullrangeofmotivationsbehindparadiplomaticaction.WithintheUK,

afurthereconomiccontrastcanbefoundintermsoftherelativepositionsofScotland-one

ofthestate’swealthiestregions-andWales,oneofitspoorest.

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Part2:Paradiplomacy:TheWhysandTheWherefores

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ChapterThree:SkirtingOfficialdom

Introduction

Wheredothe internationalactivitiesofsub-stategovernments ‘fit’ intheglobal legaland

diplomaticorder?Thoughtypicallylooselyinstitutionalisedandfrequentlynon-statutory,the

paradiplomaticpracticesofWales,ScotlandandBavariadoallhavesomesortofformalbasis,

varied though they may be. One perspective with which to compare and assess these

foundationalelementsoftheirparadiplomaciesis inrelationtoTheViennaConventionon

International Relations, a central document in international law which demarcates who

‘counts’asanofficialdiplomatandthewaysinwhichdiplomacybetweensovereignstates

mustbecarriedout.Itrepresentsa‘high-watermark’indiplomaticpractice.50yearsonfrom

its incarnation, questions have been raised about the extent towhich the treaty reflects

currentdiplomay(Behrens,2017).Reciprocally,theparadiplomacyofsub-stategovernments

offers auniquevantagepoint fromwhich toaddress suchquestions.How thisdiplomacy

manifests,howitdiffersfromsovereign-states,andtheinteractionbetweendiplomatsand

paradiplomatsmayyettellussomethingaboutthestatusandrelevanceoftheVCDRasit

entersits6thdecade.Cansub-statediplomatscarryoutasimilarrangeofactivitiestotheir

state-levelcontemporaries?Doesbeingpartofanofficial,diplomaticallyaccreditedmission

alterthesubstanceofsub-state‘diplomacy’?Inwhatsenseisparadiplomacysupplementary

to,orincompetitionwith,statediplomacy?Theseareallquestionsaddressedinthischapter,

wheretheinternationalrepresentationsanddiplomaticpersonalitiesofScotland,Walesand

Bavaria are considered. As such, the chapter both utilises the ‘gold standard’ of official

diplomacy tochart the relativepositionsofour three sub-stategovernments,and further

drawsupontheseparadiplomaticactivitiestoreflectonthecurrentstatusand‘fitnessfor

purpose’oftheTreatyitself.

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When trying to place paradiplomatic activities in the context of other pressures on the

traditional diplomatic landscape, as described and accounted for by the VCDR, themost

obviousmatch for itsdistinct challengesare thosealsoposedby the increasinglyassured

diplomaticidentityoftheEuropeanUnion.MuchofwhatWoutersandDuquet,intheir2012

articleontheEUandinternationaldiplomaticlaw,pointtointermsofthequasi,state-like

but non-state features of the EU as an international actor could also apply to sub-state

authorities(WoutersandDuquet,2012).BoththeEUandvarioussub-stateauthoritiestry

andinfluenceforeigngovernments(atlocalandnationallevels),haveformalarrangements

with such foreign governments (and occasionally with international organisations), and

maintainanetworkofoverseasrepresentationsthatoftenhaveasimilarfunctionalremitas

traditional nation-state Embassies (Wouters and Duquet, 2012). However, the two cases

divergemostsubstantially intwokeyareas.Firstly,somesub-stategovernments-notably

WalesandScotlandasdevolvedregionsoftheUK-areabletoformally‘opt-in’totheVCDR

throughoperatingoutof theofficialdiplomaticmissionsof their ‘host’ state.Thisunique,

chameleon-likeabilitytochoosethestatusandcharacterof itsdiplomaticrepresentations

makestheinternationalactivitiesofthesesub-stategovernmentsapotentiallyilluminating

casestudyininternationallaw,andinparticularthewaysinwhichtheVCDRrelatestonon-

statediplomacy.Secondly,forothersub-stategovernmentsthatdonothavetheabilityto

‘opt-in’ to theVCDR, such asBavaria, the absenceof any formaliseddiplomatic presence

meansthattheymust‘skirtofficialdom’.Thestatusoftheirparadiplomaticactivities-ortheir

diplomacy-isambiguous,andthusitsinteractionswithsubjectsoftheVCDR,andindeedthe

ways inwhich theirownandother governments attempt to characterise theirdiplomatic

relations,shedsfurtherlightonthesignificanceofararefiedformofstate-statediplomacy

thattheVCDRembodies.

ParadiplomacyandDiplomaticLaw

Forthosestudyingparadiplomaticpractices,thereisacentralparadox:howdowereconcile

the international presence of sub-state governments with the fact that they are not

recognisedaspossessinganydegreeofsovereignty.Asnon-sovereigns,paradiplomatshave

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noindependentstandingunderthetreaty,yet-undoubtedly-theirdiplomacyoftenlooks

and sounds very similar to that carriedoutby states. Sub-state identity is an increasingly

salientoneandsub-stategovernments,asdiplomaticagents,possessbothrepresentational

qualities and official resources - highly prized diplomatic commodities. Therefore the

diplomacy that they undertake stands apart from that of other non-state actors; NGOs,

Diasporas,multi-nationalcompanies,preciselybecauseof itssimilaritytostatediplomacy.

Theirrelationshiptothecentraltreatyindiplomaticlawisthusbothcomplexandpotentially

illuminating.

Sub-stategovernmentsrepresentanimportantexampleoftheabilitythatnewactorshave

toenterintointernationalpoliticsandbecomediplomats.Inthiscase,akeyfeatureofthe

newdiplomacyinquestionisitshybridstatus,possessinggovernmentalqualitiesyetwithout

anoverarchingresponsibilityforforeignaffairs(Hocking,1997).Awayfromtheinstitutional

checksandbalancesthatcomewithsucharesponsibility,alongwithpublicattentionsand

expectations,sub-stategovernments facea lessrigidoperationalcontext thantheirstate-

levelcontemporaries.Howthisimpactsonthecomposition,andquality,oftheirdiplomatic

endeavoursisawiderquestionthatwillbeaddressedbothinthisandsubsequentchapters.

InrespecttotheVCDR,themostpertinentquestionwouldseemtobewhetherthelegaland

politicaldifferencesthatthetreatyidentifiesbetweensub-andstate-leveldiplomacyactually

resultinameaningfuldivergenceintheirdiplomaticpractices.

TheUK’sdevolvedregionsandtheVCDR

InthissectionwewillbeconsideringtheUK’sconstitutionalprovisionsinrelationtosub-state

diplomacy, and the activities of the Welsh and Scottish devolved governments in an

internationalsphere.Therearemanyotherstates-unitaryandfederal -thatpermittheir

sub-state territories to carryoutparadiplomatic activities, to various extents. TheBelgian

regionshavethelargestdegreeofinternationalautonomy;representativesofFlandersand

Wallonia have Belgian diplomatic status and are permitted to sign official international

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treaties,in-facttheyareoftensolelyresponsiblefordoingso.Otherregions,meanwhile,do

notalwaysbenefitfromdiplomaticstatusfortheirofficials.Catalonia,forexamplehastried

andfailedtosecure it (Keating,2010b).Some largeEuropeanregions,ontheotherhand,

maintainasignificantamountofdomesticautonomybutaregenerallycontentwithstate-

leveldiplomaticrepresentation.Bavaria,aswillbediscussedinasubsequentsectionofthis

chapter,hasmultipleoverseastradeandinvestmentofficesreflectiveofitssizeandGDP,yet

only twoGovernment representationsbesides itsBrusselsoffice - Quebecand theCzech

Republic,bothofwhichbuildonhistoricalties.6

TheUK’sarrangementsarerelativelypermissive,fallingroughlyatamid-pointintermsofthe

international activities that sub-state governments are able to engage in. International

relations(includingrelationswiththeEuropeanUnion)remainfirmlytheresponsibilityofthe

UKGovernmentandParliament.Thereis,however,aclearrecognitionintheMemorandum

ofUnderstandingbetweentheUKanditsdevolvedregionsofsuchdevolvedregions’interest

ininternationalaffairs‘wheretheytouchondevolvedresponsibility’(UKGoverment,2010:

B4).Specificconcordats,supplementarytotheMOU,setoutingreaterdetailarrangements

for internationalandEuropeanaffairs in thecontextofdevolution.Threepassagesareof

particularrelevancetothedevolvedregions’diplomaticstatus,andareworthcitingindetail.

As regards representation in theEuropeanUnion, theconcordatsetsoutanarrangement

wherebydevolvedregionscanmaintaindirectrepresentationsolongasitformspartofthe

widerUKrepresentationinBrussels.Thepassagebelowissubjecttotheprecedingparagraph

B4.26statingthat“thestatusandfunctionsoftheUKPermanentRepresentationinBrussels

astheinstitutionrepresentingtheUnitedKingdomwithintheEuropeanUnionwillcontinue

unchanged”:

B4.27Thedevolvedadministrationsareable to takepart in the less formaldiscussionswiththeinstitutionsoftheEUandinterestswithinotherMemberstates. Subject toparagraphB4.26above, thedevolvedadministrationsareable, and have chosen to establish an office in Brussels, to assist directrelationships, including with other regional governments and with the

6Interviewdata,seniorofficialoftheBavarianStateGovernment2013

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institutionsoftheEuropeanUnion,sofarasthisservestheexerciseoftheirpowersandtheperformanceoftheirfunctionsaslaiddowninthedevolutionlegislation and so far as it is consistent with the responsibility of the UKGovernmentforrelationswiththeEU.TheDevolvedAdministrationEUoffices(DAEUOs)arepartofUKReporganisationalstructureandtheirUK-basedstaffarepermanentUKcivilservants issuedwithBritishdiplomaticpassports.Aspart of the diplomatic representation of the UK they are subject to theauthorityof thePermanentRepresentative in respectof theusual issuesofpersonalconduct.Onthisbasis,thedevolvedadministrations’EUoffices,havediplomaticstatus,andarenotifiedtotheBelgianauthoritiesbythePermanentRepresentationaccordingly.BothUKRepandtheDAEUofficeswilldevelopworkingprocedureswhichreflecttheneedtobalancetheinterestsofallpartsoftheUK(UKGoverment,2010).

According to thesearrangements thestatusof thedevolvedadministrations inBrussels is

reasonably clear: they have diplomatic status because they form part of an official UK

representation.UndertheVCDRtheyarediplomaticagentsofasovereignstate-theUK.So

far,sostraightforward.ThekeyinstitutionsoftheEuropeanUnionarerestrictedtoMember

States,naturallylimitingtheroleofsub-stategovernmentsandcreatingafairly‘neat’division

betweenofficialandunofficialpracticesinBrussels.Whenweturntotheinternationalrole

sub-stategovernmentscanplayinaglobalsetting,thepicturebecomesmorecomplex.Under

theheading‘RepresentationOverseas’intheconcordatonInternationalRelations,Common

Annex(D4),wefindthefollowingpassage:

D4.15Thedevolvedadministrationsmayestablishofficesoverseaswithintheframework of their responsibility for devolved matters (including for theprovision of information on devolved matters to the public, regionalgovernments and institutions, and promotion of trade and inwardinvestment).TheywilldosoinconsultationwiththeFCO.Whereappropriate,suchrepresentationmightformpartofaUKDiplomaticorConsularMission.Therepresentativesof thedevolvedadministrationcould thenmakeuseofthediplomaticbag,theFCOtelegramandothercommunicationssystems,andbe accorded diplomatic status in accordance with local customs andoperational requirements. The FCO will recover the costs of the servicesprovidedin linewith itspracticeforchargingUKGovernmentDepartments.UKEmbassies,HighCommissionsandotherMissionsoverseaswillcontinuetoservetheinterestsoftheUKasawholeandtoco-ordinateallofficialactivity(UKGoverment,2010).

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Here,weseethatsub-stategovernmentsarepresentedwithaclearchoiceintheiroverseas

representation:bepartof anofficialUKmissionand receive the resources andprivileges

associated, or ‘go it alone’. The choice is also thereforewhether to ‘opt in’ to the VCDR

through operating as a subsidiary of the UK Diplomatic or Consular mission, or operate

outsideitasrepresentativeswithoutdiplomaticstatus.Thepassagefurthermakesreference

toadistinctionbetweenofficialandunofficialactivities,somethingthatwillbeexploredin

further detail as part of this chapter. Lastly, the following paragraph on diplomatic and

consularrelationsmakescleartheUK’sretentionofoverallauthorityandresponsibilityunder

theVCDR:

D4.23TheFCOwill continue tobe responsible forpolicyondiplomaticandconsular relations with other countries and on all matters concerninginternationalorganisationsrepresentedintheUK.TheFCOwillcontinuetobethechannelsforallofficialcommunicationsonmattersrelatingtoForeignandCommonwealthconsulatesandinternationalorganisationsandtheirstaff inNorthern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. The FCO will inform the devolvedadministrations of all career consular appointments in Northern Ireland,ScotlandandWales.TheFCOwillconsultthedevolvedadministrationsaboutthe establishment of new consular offices, new honorary consularappointments,andothernewofficeswherepersonnelwillhaveprivilegesandimmunities(e.g.certainculturalcentresandtradeoffices)inNorthernIreland,ScotlandandWales.Thedevolvedadministrationswillimmediatelypassontothe FCO any representations made by diplomatic/consular missions andinternationalorganisations.ThedevolvedadministrationswillalsopromptlynotifytheFCOofanyallegedbreacheswithintheirdevolvedcompetence.TheFCOwill thentaketheappropriateactionundertheViennaConventionsonDiplomaticandConsularRelationsoranyapplicableConsularConventionorHeadquartersAgreement(UKGoverment,2010).

Onthebasisofthesethreeextracts,andtakingthedocumentsintheirentirety,wecanmake

aseriesofsuppositionsastothediplomaticstatusoftheUK’sdevolvedgovernments.The

firstoftheseisthattheycan,indeed,berepresentedinternationallybytheirowndiplomatic

agents.Thelimitstothisrepresentationarethat,inordertoconduct‘official’diplomacy,sub-

statediplomatsmust‘opt-in’totheVCDRandoperateoutoftheUK’soverseasEmbassies

and Consulates, being under their auspices and ultimately accountable to the FCO. The

second,however,isthatrepresentativesofWales,ScotlandandNorthernIrelanddonothave

tooperateoutofsuchUK-widemissions.Instead,theycan-in‘consultation’withtheUKFCO

-establishindependentofficesoverseas,butsuchofficesdonotbenefitfromthestatusofan

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official diplomaticmission. The outstanding question is therefore,with official diplomatic

statuswithinthegraspsoftheUK’ssub-stategovernmentswhywouldtheychoosetooperate

withoutit?Whatisthevalueofthediplomaticcommoditieslistedinthesecondextractabove

-thediplomaticbagandofficialcommunicationssystems-forWales,Scotlandandindeed

Northern Ireland? What types of unofficial diplomacy can they conduct outside of this

system?

Wales’OverseasOffices

Aconsequenceofdevolutionin1999wasthenewabilityforWalesto“autonomouslyengage

withtheworldoutside”.This,accordingtothesameseniorWelshGovernmentadvisor,stood

in contradistinction to the international strands of the previousWales Office’s activities,

whereengagementwas“verymuchasasub-setoftheUK”.Suchanautonomousplatform

hasresultedintwostreamsofexternalengagement,onedrivenbytradeandinvestmentand

onedrivenbypolicy-“theabilitytoinfluencepolicyortotakepartinpolicyformation”.7Itis

within this context that the status and activities of Wales’ overseas offices must be

considered.

The Welsh Government has an overseas network consisting of 14 offices (including its

representationinBrussels)andaround32staff,alongside20-25officialsworkingonexternal

relationsandrelated issueswithintheWelshGovernment’sOfficesathome inWales.89A

separate,relativelynew,officeinLondonhasbeenestablishedtopromoteWalestooverseas

investorsandvisitingVIPs.ThereisalsoaseparateteamofthreestaffbasedinCardifflooking

aftertheWalesforAfricaprogrammeandleadingonfairtradeissues.WithinWalesitselfthe

FirstMinister takes responsibility for international issues - he is officially theMinister for

Europe, Wales for Africa and International and External Relations. Other departments -

7Interviewdata,seniorWelshGovernmentadvisor20138Wales’overseasrepresentationwasoncemuchmoreextensive-withrepresentationsinAustraliaandmanyEuropeancountries,but-likemanyothersub-stategovernments-wasscaledbackratherdrasticallyinwhatwaswidelyreportedtobeacost-cuttingexercise9Thesefiguresareaccuratefor2016,asaretheequivalentsforScotlandandBavaria

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economy, science and transport, education and culture - also have a role in specific

internationalpolicyareas.Walesisalsoamemberofseveralmultilateralfora-thenetwork

ofregionalgovernmentsforsustainabledevelopment(nrg4SD),theconferenceofEuropean

regionswith legislativepower (REGLEG), theconferenceofperipheralmaritimeregionsof

Europe(CPMR).

Reflectedintheseexamples,theEuropeanpolicycontextisreallywhereWales’international

activitiesaremostcloselyfocussed.Partly,thisisbecauseoftheinstitutionalaccesspoints

providedtoregionswithinEuropeanstructuresandpolicymakingprocesses,partlyitisdue

to thedirect impactof EuropeanpolicyonWales itself. Indeed, a keyWelshgovernment

advisormadeclearthatoutsideofthisEuropeancontext,theabilityofsub-stategovernments

to contribute is greatly weakened; “different parts of the world have different resource

positions, they have different political traditions…and it becomes correspondingly more

difficulttooperateatagloballevelatthesub-statelevel,andmuchlessmeaningfulIthink”.10

The Welsh Government published their first written international strategy in July 2015,

detailinganumberofobjectives:strengtheningtheWelsheconomy,enhancingtheprofile

and reputation ofWales, developing effective bilateral andmultilateral relationships; co-

operatinginthesharingof informationandbestpractice; increasingWales’ influencewith

‘appropriate’ multilateral and international organisations and contributing to sustainable

development and ‘responsible global citizenship’. The strategy stresses the “ultra-

competitive”globalenvironmentfacingWales,andtheneedtoseekoutopportunitiesinkey

locations,nurturinglinksandrelationshipsbuiltovertime(WelshGovernment,2015d).

Atacountry-level,WaleshasrepresentationinBelgium,China,theUAE,India,Ireland,Japan

andtheUSA.TheseoverseasofficesworkcloselywithWelshGovernmentMinisters,who,

according to the international strategy “have a crucial role in supporting business and

diplomaticrelationshipsatthehighestlevels”(WelshGovernment,2015d).Butwhattypeof

‘diplomacy’dotheMinistersandoverseasofficescarryout?OfWales’14internationaloffices

10Interviewdata,seniorWelshGovernmentadvisor2013

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outsideoftheUK,allthreeChineseofficesalongsiderepresentationsinMumbaiandJapan

arehousedoutsideofBritishEmbassiesorConsulates.InShanghai,theWelshGovernment

representativehasrecentlyrelocatedto‘Britishhouse’,which-whileoutsidetheConsulate

- houses the British Council and the China Britain Business Council. In Dubai, Bangalore,

Ireland,inallfiveUSAofficesandinBrussels,WelshGovernmentrepresentationsformpart

of British Embassies, British Consulates, British High Commissions or, in Brussels, UKREP.

Numerically, this means that 5 out of 14 offices operate outside of the VCDR, its

representationsarepartofan‘unofficial’poolofdiplomacythattakeslargelyonaregion-

region basis. As such there seem to be some identifiable benefits to such independent

representation that make forgoing co-location with the UKFCO - and the associated

diplomaticresources-worthwhile.Theimplicationsofthiswillbeconsideredingreaterdetail

inasubsequentsectionofthechapter.

Within Wales itself, the international affairs department carries out functions that may

appearsimilartotheUKFCO;“weadviseondiplomaticissues,protocol”aswellasworkingto

raisetheprofileofWalesinternationally.Whiletherewassomesuggestionthatcolleaguesin

Whitehall would take umbrage at the suggestion that Wales has its own foreign office,

functionally the department represents its “nearest equivalent”. Nonetheless, theWelsh

Governmentstaffworkingboth inandoutofWalesaren’tusually identifiedasdiplomats,

despitetheirday-to-dayworkbeing“thediplomaticside”ofexternalrelations.11Thecurrent

FirstMinisterCarwynJonesinstigatedareorganisationshortlyafterhetookofficein2011

andbroughttheseoverseasofficesunderhisportfolio,andthereforeoperationallyunderthe

remitoftheInternationalRelationsdepartment.Arguably,thismoverepresentsabroader

shifttowardsviewingoverseasrepresentationaspartofamorecohesiveinternational-or

diplomatic-strategy.

Despite Wales having its own international offices - both co-located with the FCO and

independentofit-itisalsoclearthatsuchrepresentationisexpectedtoformasupplement

11Interviewdata,seniorWelshGovernmentofficial2013

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totheactivitiesoftheUKFOandotherUK-widebodies,whohavearemittopromotethe

interestsofalltheUK’sconstituentparts.AccordingtoWales’internationalstrategy:

We maintain our own network of offices abroad where we have stronginterests to represent but these are a supplement, not a replacement, forwider UK representation. We cannot replace the reach and depth of UKrepresentationabroad,nordoweaimtodoso.WeworkwithUKbodiestoensurethatinterestsarereflectedandwedrawonUKresourcestoassistinthedirectpromotionofWelshpriorities(WelshGovernment,2015d)

EvenwheresuchstronginterestscallforadirectrepresentationfromWales,co-locationas

partofawiderUKrepresentationclearlyhas itsadvantages. Itappearsthatthesemay, in

part,dependupontheattitudesandlegalrequirementsinthereceivingstate.Forexample,

theWelshGovernment’srepresentativeintheUAEispartoftheUKBritishEmbassybecause

of the specific international context there;adiplomaticpassport is “necessary to liveand

workthere”.Likewise,intheEU,Waleshasdiplomaticmembersofstaffonitsteam,asthe

WelshGovernmentisable-indeedrequired-toactaspartofUKREP.Workingrelationships

withtheUKFCOare“generallygood”,aconcordatgovernstherelationshipandtheWelsh

Governmentwilltakeadviceif“somethinginnovativeorpossiblyconfrontationalcomesup.

Ifwe’reinvolvedinaparticularcountryandwe’rehavingavisitforexamplethenwe’lltake

expertadviceontheUKline”.12‘Generallygood’relations,ofcourse,impliesthatsometimes

theserelationsarenotsogood;adynamicthatisexploredinChapters4and5ofthisthesis.

TherationaleforwhattheWelshGovernment,asanindependententity,canandcannotdo

diplomaticallyisalwaysreferredbacktodevolvedcompetences.IfWalesisresponsiblefora

policyareadomestically,thenit-andbroadlytheUKGovernment-acceptsthatwherethis

areahasaninternationaldimension,theWelshGovernmenthasalegitimateinterestinit.

Onewayofconceptualisingthisaccepteddiplomatic‘space’istoconsideritaborderzone,

with“abackstopanda frontstop”.Thebackstop in thiscasewouldbe issueswhere the

Welsh Government knows that acting or intervening would be stepping clearly into the

territoryoftheUKFCO.Forexample,theWelshGovernmentasbeenlobbiedfromtimeto

12Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentOfficial2013

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timeonhighlycontroversialissues-CongoleserightsundertheCongoDRC,the‘Armenian

question’(bothfromgroupswantingtheWelshGovernmenttorecogniseagenocide,and

indeedfromtheTurkishAmbassadordissuadingthegovernmentfromenteringthedebate)-

and has had to defer in these instances to the competence of the UKFCO. There is the

potentialforWelshMinisterstopassonsuchrepresentationsinformallytotheUKFCO,but

forthemostpart“thereisabackstop,thereisalinewewon’tcrossintermsofcompetence”:

Inreturnfortherecognition[fromtheUKGovernment]thatwehavetherighttoact in relation to theseareas…because they relate toour competences,thereisadutyonusnottoactonareasovertherewhichareclearlynot…andwherewewouldrisk,albeitatthemargins,sendingoutamixedmessage…acontrarymessagetothatoftheUKstateasawhole.13

With issuessuchas these,where there isaclear“UK line”,onhumanrights forexample.

Accordingtoadifferentinterviewee:

We’recarefulnottotrespassoutsideourpatch.IfwearetoldbytheFCOthatacertaincountryisnotinfavourorisnon-gratathenwewouldn’tarrangeameetingwithourministerandarepresentativeofthatcountry.WearepartoftheUK,wehaveourownsetofresponsibilities,it’snotinourinteresttotryanddevelopourownwayofdoingthings.14

Asforafrontstop,theWelshGovernmentwouldtherefore“onlyinterestourselvesinthe

thingsforwhichwehavedevolvedresponsibility”.Occasionally,however,maintainingaclear

dividinglinecanbe“alittlebittricky”.Thereisa“fuzzyarea”inthemiddleofsuchaborder

zone,wheretheWelshGovernmentmayactbecausethey“thinkit’stherightthingtodo”.

The examples quoted here were REGLEG, which aroused some suspicions in the UK

Government when Wales joined the organisation in 2000, and activities around climate

change.15

Nevertheless,unliketheScottishGovernment,whoseactivitieswe’llconsiderinthefollowing

section,theWelshGovernmenthasprioritisedregion-regioninternationallinkages,whichare

rarely subject to any significant controversy. In fact, a second seniorWelsh Government

officialnotedthat,whereastheScottishGovernmenthastwomembersofstaffat theUK

13Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentAdvisor201314Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentOfficial201315Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentAdvisor2013

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EmbassyinBeijing,theWelshGovernment“don’thavepeopleintheEmbassy,sittingonthe

side”.Instead:

We’re developing relationships at regional level - Beijing municipalgovernment,Chongquinggovernment,Shanghaigovernment.TheScotsaren’ttakingthatsameapproach.Sothey’resittinginsidetheEmbassyandIthink,though I’m not sure anyonewould admit it, that’s caused certain tensionsbecausetheScotswanttodealdirectlywiththeChineseGovernment.16

Dealing with foreign regional governments doesn’t necessarily mean, however, that the

‘diplomacy’ is always informal, or simply ‘public diplomacy’. Though the UK’s sub-state

governmentscannotsigninternationaltreaties,thereisaformalelementtomuchoftheir

work. Bilaterally,Memoranda of Understandingwere a frequently usedmodus operandi,

particularlyintheearlyyearsofWales’paradiplomacy.Theyhavefallenoutoffavourrecently

-“wedon’tnowlookforapieceofpapertomakearelationshipwork”-thoughtheyarestill

widely used in China,where theMoUs are taken as a gesture of goodwill and away of

“opening up the dialogue”.17 Ministerial visits also form a key part ofWales’ diplomatic

relationships.VisitsfromtheFirstMinisterinparticularareseenashugelyimportant,butall

ministerialvisitsareviewedasawayto“opendoors”,particularlyincountriessuchasChina

whereGovernmentalstructuresaresosignificant.18TheWelshFirstMinisterisacabinet-rank

Minister in theUKGovernment,and thus shouldbenefit fromthesameFCOsupportand

facilitationasotherUKGovernmentMinisters.Whetherthisalwaysbearsoutinpracticeis

questionable,problemswithfasttrack,forexample,havebeencitedininterviewdata.

Indeed,theChinesecontextoffersaparticularlyinterestingcasestudyinthedecision-making

processaround‘optingin’to,orindeedoutof,theVCDR.TheWelshGovernmenthaspursued

a close relationship with the Chinese region of Chongquing since 2006, when the first

MemorandumofUnderstandingbetweenthetworegionswassigned.InSeptemberofthat

year,aWelshAffairsOfficerwasassignedtotheBritishConsulateGeneral inChongquing,

taskedwithtakingforwardtheWales-Chongquingrelationship,andwasquicklyfollowedby

16Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentOfficial201317Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentOfficial201318Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentOfficial2013

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a second post a year later. However, in January 2011 theWelsh Government opened a

separateofficeinChongquing,andthetwopostswererelocatedthere.Theofficeislocated

neartoboththeBritishConsulateGeneralandtheBritishCouncil,butisnotformallypartof

the Consulate. In the case of Chongquing, both private interview data and published

ministerialreportshintattheadvantagesperceivedbytheWelshGovernmentindistancing

themselvesfromtherestoftheUK.AccordingtoawrittenstatementbyHuwLewis,aWelsh

GovernmentMinisterwhovisitedChongquingin2013:

Wales’relationshipwithChongquing…hasbeenthrivingsincethesigningofthefirstMOUin2006.TherelationshipisthemostextensiveandmostactivebetweenanypartoftheUKandChina.MyvisittoChinawasaneye-openingexperienceinanumberofways.IhavebeenhugelyimpressedbythewayourstaffonthegroundhavebuiltuptheprofileandreputationofWales,workingthroughtheGovernmentrelationshipswehaveestablished.ItistestamenttothestrengthofthoserelationshipsatGovernmentlevelthatWaleshaslargelybeenable toavoidgettingcaughtup in thetensionswhichareapparentatnationalUKandChinalevels.19

Operatingindependentlyataregion-regionlevelmeansthatwithouthavingtheburden,the

responsibility of all of foreign policy, there is an element of discretion, an element of

maximising the relationships for specificpolicygoals.Contrary towhatonemightexpect,

therefore,itappearsthatincertaincircumstances,notbeingpartofanofficialEmbassyor

Consulatemayactuallybebeneficialtorelationships‘ontheground’,particularlyincountries

such as China where controversial foreign policy issues abound. Where the decision on

whetherornottoco-locatemaybemadeonthebasisofpracticalities,insomecasesthishas

otherconsequences:helpfullyextricatingtheactivitiesofasub-stategovernmentfromtheir

state-contemporaries.Thissaid,however,therearealsosecurityissueswhichmaymakeco-

locationimpractical,andtheseareapparentalsointheChinesecontext.20

Alternately, explanations for co-location with British Consulates may also confound

expectations.In2002,theWelshGovernmentopenedits‘flagship’USofficeinNewYork’s

Chrysler building. However, in the face ofmounting criticism over the operating costs of

overseasofficesingeneral,andthisoneinparticular,theofficewascloseddownin2011and

19WelshGovernmentMinisterHuwLewis,writtenstatement14thMarch201320Privatecorrespondence,WelshGovernmentofficialJuly2015

103

staffmovedto theUKConsulate,amovewidely reportedtobe forcost-savingreasons.21

Thereiscertainlyalinkbetweenparadiplomacyandtheeconomicclimate-oneborneout

clearlyinWalesfollowingthefinancialcrisisin2008;“thesub-nationaldiplomacysceneislow

hangingfruitwhenitcomestore-orderingprioritiesinatimeofmonetaryausterity”.22Inthe

faceofexamplessuchasthis,thedecisionofwhetherornottoutilisethediplomaticstatus

andresourcesoftheUKGovernmentthroughoverseasco-locationappearlargelypragmatic,

possiblyrelatedmoretothecostofcommercialpropertyindifferentlocationsthantothe

valuetoWales’diplomacyofoperatingundertheVCDR.Indeed,thegeneralprincipleguiding

theWelshGovernment’soverseasofficelocationisthat,where“practicalandeconomically

viable”,co-locationisthepreferredposition.23

Scotland’sOverseasOffices

Making a comparison between the diplomatic strategies of Wales and Scotland is not

straightforward. Firstly, the Scottish SNP Government has clear ambitions for Scottish

independence, ambitions at the forefront of global attention during 2014’s referendum.

Secondly, Scotland’s overseas representation is divided between the activities of Scottish

DevelopmentInternationalandtheScottishGovernment,unlikeinWaleswheretheWelsh

Government itself is theonlyoutward-facinggovernmentalbody.SDIhas29offices in19

countries,includingScotlanditself,whiletheScottishGovernmenthasonly4international

officesinBrussels,Washington,TorontoandBeijing.SevenofSDI’sinternationalofficesform

partofofficialBritishrepresentations.Importantly,allfouroftheScottishGovernmentoffices

alsoformpartofofficialUKEmbassies,Consulates,HighCommissionsorUKREP.Wherethe

status of the ScottishGovernment’s overseas offices is perhaps simpler to assess than in

Wales; they are all official diplomatic representations as they operate out of official UK

missions, the status of Scottish Development International’s offices is less clear. The

unambiguoustradeandinvestmentfocuswouldseemtoimplythattheseofficeswerenot

21BBCnewsreport‘WalesstafftoleaveNewYorkChryslerbuilding’23rdDecember201022Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentAdvisor201323Privatecorrespondence,WelshGovernmentofficialJuly2015

104

diplomaticentities,yettheirco-locationinseveninstanceswithofficialUKmissionssuggests

otherwise. As in the case of Wales’ overseas offices, it appears that housing Scottish

representations within UKmissions is often a more pragmatic choice - both in terms of

accessingforeignpolicymakersandinsimpleeconomicterms-than‘goingitalone’,butthis

isachoicewhichisdependentonthecountrytheofficesarelocatedwithinandtheattitudes

ofthisreceivinggovernment.

However,whatsetsthetwodevolvedregions’diplomacyapartmostmarkedlyisthatScottish

diplomacy is frequently directed at national governments, in contrast to the Welsh

Government’s region-region partnership approach. This shift can be traced back to the

formation of an SNP government in 2006, where they immediately began to “expand

Scotland’s role internationally” (Fabiani, 2014: 32). This took the form both of new

geographical and thematic foci (towards Asia and an expansion of the international

developmentfund),andintermsofthelevelofresourcesdirectedatinternationalaffairs:

seeinga54%real-termsincreasebetweenthebudgetfromthefinancialyear2004-2005to

2009-2010 (Fabiani, 2014: 36). According to former Scottish Government Minister for

Europe, External Affairs, Culture and the Gaelic Language Linda Fabiani, “the principal

differencebetweentheSNPGovernmentanditspredecessorswastheyweverydeliberately

presentedScotlandasanationinitsownright,rejectingthenotionthatScotlandissimplya

regionoftheUnitedKingdom”(Fabiani,2014:32).ReturningtotheScottishGovernment’s

current focuson relationswith states, agoodexample canbe found in the statedaimof

Scotland’s North American offices is to establish “solid government to government

relationshipsatFederalandstatelevel”.Thishasbeenachievedthroughfrequentmeetings

withtheStateDepartmentandestablishinglinkswithWhiteHousestaffintheUS,whilein

Canada“withtheassistanceoftheHighCommission”Scottishrepresentativeshavemetwith

“keyfederalofficialsfromanumberofministries”.Scottishoverseasofficesalsosupportlinks

with both the Scottish Canadian Parliamentary Association in Ottawa and the Friends of

Scotland Caucuses in the US Senate and House of Representatives. This overseas

representation in North America is the “Scottish government’s diplomaticmission to the

region”:

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As such it has a role to play within the wider diplomatic communities inWashingtonDC and inOttawa. Over the past year, the SAO has sought toengage more pro-actively with diplomats from other nations to heightenawareness of its existence and to establish connections and network.ExamplesincludemeetingwithanumberofindividualsfromEUMemberStateEmbassies,individualsfromCentralandSouthAmericanEmbassies,engagingwiththeWorldBank,theInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank,thinktanksandothermulti-nationalorganisations(ScottishGovernment,2015b:para28).

In China, the Scottish Government office in Beijing facilitates cooperation between the

ScottishGovernmentandboththeStateCouncilinChinaandtheLegislativeCouncilinHKSAR

(ScottishGovernment,2015b:para20).24Meanwhile,Ministerialvisitsfocusonnationallevel

politicians,apparentinbothAlexSalmond’shighlypublicisedvisittoChinain2010andNicola

Sturgeon’smorerecenttripstobothChinaandWashingtonin2015.AccordingtoProfessor

Michael Keating, giving evidence to a Scottish Parliamentary enquiry in 2010 “nationalist

Governmentswanttosigndealswithstatesbecausethatenhancestheirstatus”.Yet,atthe

same time “when it comes to practical functionalmatters, all Governments of whatever

complexionarelookingforregionallevelinterlocutors”(MichaelKeating,citedinareportof

theScottishParliament,2010:1718).Indeed,itisnotthecasethattheScottishGovernment

forgoesregionallinksentirely-theypartnerwith‘prioritygeographicareas’inChinasuchas

Shanghai,TianjinandProvinceofShandong-ratherthat,unlikemanyregionalgovernments

operatinginternationally,theyalsoaimtodealdirectlywithforeignnationalgovernments.

This focus on nation-state interactions is significant when assessing the effects that

paradiplomatic activity may have on the relevance of the VCDR. Scottish Government

diplomats are party to the convention as they operate exclusively out of official UK

representations, most often dealing with official diplomatic representations of a foreign

government.Thetypeofdiplomaticactivitiestheyengageinthereforemirrorstate-practices

veryclosely,yettheirdiplomaticstatusisoneloanedfromtheUKGovernment.Thereisan

24Written submission from the ScottishGovernment on thework of its overseas offices,providedtotheScottishParliament’sEuropeanandExternalRelationscommitteeaspartoftheirConnectingScotlandEnquiry.Meeting26thMarch2015.Paragraph20

106

outstandingquestionlurkinghere:wheredoScottishdiplomatstaketheirpoliticaldirection

from,LondonorEdinburgh?

Taking the internationalactivitiesof theScottishGovernmentat facevalue,onecouldbe

forgivenforassumingthatitwasasmallstate,ratherthanasub-stateauthority.However,

thevastmajorityofScotland’sdiplomaticactivitiestakeplacewiththefacilitationoftheUK

FCO:ministerialvisits,culturaldiplomacycarriedoutthrougheventsandactivitiesinBrussels

andtheScottishgovernment’sotheroverseasoffices,theoverseasofficesthemselvesand

engagementwith EU institutions. In a letter to the convenor of the Scottish Parliament’s

EuropeanandExternalRelationsCommittee,theSecretaryofStateforScotlandpointstothe

factthat,ofthe50internationalvisitsmadebytheScottishGovernmentina16monthperiod,

mostofthesewerefacilitatedbytheUKGovernment(SecretaryofStateforScotland,2014).

TheproportionofvisitsthattheFCOisrequiredtofacilitateseemstodependonthetarget

country in question, their openness towards sub-state governments, and the level that

Scottish GovernmentMinisters wish to access.Meetings with private firms and business

leadersmayformapartoftheScottishGovernment’sdiplomaticactivitiesthattheyareable

toorchestrate independently,butaccess toMinisters ina foreignnationalGovernment is

somethinggenerallymediatedbyUKauthorities.25

Whensub-stategovernmentsoperatesolelyataregion-regionlevel,thismaybeinterpreted

asanareaofdiplomaticactivitysubsidiarytothattakingplacebetweennationstatesand

thereforeonewhichfallsoutsidethescopeofthetreaty,andthetypesofactivitywhichit

wasintendedtoregulate.However,whenonesub-stategovernmententersintodiplomatic

relations with a foreign nation-state government, this strays more clearly and perhaps

disruptivelyintoadomaintypicallyreservedforstates.Theseactivitiesmaybepreciselythe

typeofinteractionsthatfallsquarelyundertheremitoftheVCDR,yetthepeculiarstate-like

yetnon-sovereignstatusofScotlandasadevolvedregionoftheUKmayyetexcludeitasan

independent entity from the terms of the treaty. In official diplomatic activities, Scottish

25ThefailureofAlexSalmondtosecuremeetingsindependentlywiththeFrenchandChinesegovernmentswasthesubjectofaseriesofreportsintheDailyTelegraphin2012,basedondossiersreceivedinresponsetotheirFOIrequests

107

diplomatswouldbe‘borrowing’theirstatusfromtheUKGovernment,yettaketheirpolitical

directionfromelsewhere.Howthissplitbetweenpoliticalaccountabilityandlegalstatusor

authoritymightmanifestinthefutureisakeychallengeforthefuturerobustnessoftheVCDR

asatreatyregulatingformaldiplomaticrelations.

One particularly ‘thorny’ issue in this area is recognition. In their analysis of the EU’s

diplomatic identity,Wouters andDuquet (2012: 33) point to thepossibility of a situation

whereby“theEUintendstoaccreditadiplomaticrepresentativetoathirdcountrythatisnot

recognizedbyall27memberstates”.Thiscouldhappen,theauthorsargue,despitethefact

that EUmember states retain theexclusive competence to recognizeother states and/or

governments,whichisapreliminaryconditiontoenterintodiplomaticrelations.Statesare

theonlyactorsininternationallawthatareabletorecognizeotherstates-“beitdejureor

de facto”. In thecaseof sub-stategovernments, similar scenarioshavearguablyemerged

already.TheScottishGovernment,forexample,hasunequivocallycalledfortherecognition

ofanindependentPalestinianState.InalettertotheUKForeignSecretaryPhillipHammond

inOctober2014,ScottishExternalAffairsMinisterHumzaYousafarguedcalledon theUK

Government“totakeactionandformallyrecognisethestateofPalestine”,andalsooutlined

“theScottishGovernment’ssupport fortheopeningofaPalestinianconsulate inScotland

andhighlightedtheneedforaPalestinianembassyintheUK”(PressReleasefromtheScottsh

Government,2014b).ThoughScotlanditselfcannotformallyrecognisePalestine,theissuing

of such unequivocal views on its status inevitably complicates perceptions of the UK’s

position.SimilarissueshaveariseninWales,where-inlargepartduetothesizeoftheSomali

DiasporawithinWales-theNationalAssemblyandtheWelshGovernmenthavebeenkey

targetsforactivitiesdesignedtosecureinternationalrecognitionforSomaliland.Inperhaps

the most contentious ‘diplomatic’ move, the National Assembly for Wales extended an

invitationtotheSomalilandgovernmenttoattendtheRoyalopeningoftheSeneddin2006,

aninitiativeinterpretedbytheSomaliland-andWelsh-pressesasofficialrecognitionofthe

break-awaygovernment’slegitimacy(TheSomalilandTimes,2006;WalesOnline,2006).

Thedifferencebetweentheactivitiesofsub-stategovernments,ontheonehand,andsmall

stategovernmentsontheothermaybeonethatisincreasinglydifficulttodiscernonaday-

108

to-daylevel.However,underinternationallaw,thisdistinctionremainsapertinentone.The

difference also has some relevance in a more pragmatic sense: the Welsh Assembly’s

reported ‘recognition’ of Somalilandor the ScottishGovernment’s support for a separate

Palestinian statedoesnot carry the samediplomaticor legal forceas similaractionsbya

sovereignstate.However,atapoliticallevel,this‘unofficial’recognitionmayindeedhavean

effect,albeitalesserone.Theambiguitysurroundingthestatusofsub-stategovernmentsis

compoundedbywidespread confusion regarding the architectureof devolvedor regional

government(suchasbetweentheNationalAssemblyforWalesasalegislature,andtheWelsh

Government as an executive) and the lack of a designated ‘foreign office’ from which

diplomaticmessagesaredirected.

Turning to Scotland’s approach to international affairs more generally, the Scottish

Government’s latest international strategy, published in2015, calls for an ‘embedding’ of

internationalisation across its areas of competence. It also points to the fact that

internationalisationhasbeenidentifiedasanintegralstrandinScotland’sEconomicStrategy,

and therefore,aswithmost sub-stategovernmentsparticipatingatan international level,

boosting trade and investment is a key priority taken forward to international

representations.However,thestrategyalsoidentifiestheimportanceofScotland’sroleasa

“goodglobalcitizen”,meaningthat:

Scotlandwillcontributetowidergoalsofpromotinginternationalstabilityandequalityinotherworldregions,which,inadditiontotheforemostobjectiveofworkinginpartnershiptodeliverpositivelocalchange,canacttosupportlong-term human and economic security within Scotland. As part of thiscommitmentwewillcontinueouradvocacyofhumanrights,wewillcontinuetocontributetothemultilateralmanagementofinternationalcrises,andwewillcontinuetodeliverourdistinctiveinternationaldevelopmentprogramme(ScottishGovernment,2015c:10).

It is not typical for sub-state governments to have this type of pronounced normative

dimensiontotheirparadiplomaticactivities,howeverthereareotherinstancesofsub-state

governmentsprioritisinginternationalaidanddevelopment.BothFlandersandtwoSpanish

regions, for example, have close development links with parts of South Africa and Latin

America respectively (MichaelKeating, cited ina reportby theScottishParliament,2010:

1720-1721).Similarly,theFinnishregionofAÅlandhasbuiltareputationaroundpromoting

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its distinct model of conflict resolution and normative diplomacy around this area more

generally (Wigell, 2013). Wales shares some similar ambitions to Scotland, notably in its

WalesforAfricaprogrammeandactivitiesaroundaFairTradeWales. Indeed,thoughthe

stated ambition to be a ‘good global citizen’ and the prominence that normative issues

receive isdistinctiveaboutScotland’s international strategy,Waleshasalso foregrounded

theseissuesinmorerecentdocuments(WelshGovernment,2016),andlegislationsuchas

theWell-beingofFutureGenerations(Wales)Act2015.Whatisperhapsmoresurprisingin

Scotland’scase,however,isthatdespiteitsverylimitedformalcompetenceintheareasthat

mightequipitsglobalroleininternationalcrisismanagementorgoodglobalcitizenry,ithas

achievedsignificantrecognitioninthisareaaspartofits‘nationbranding’efforts(Scottish

GovernmentStrategicResearch,2012).Whetherit’saspeechaboutgenderequalitytothe

ChineseFriendshipAssociation,declarationsonUKGovernmentdefenceandinternational

developmentpolicyortheappropriationofChinese‘pandadiplomacy’,Scottishdiplomacy

aimstoinfluencenational-levelpoliticians,offeritsown‘line’onforeignpolicyandgenerally

take its brandof good global citizenry to theworld stage (see 'no aidmoney formilitary

interventions',ScottishGovernment,2013a;'AlexSalmondbamboozledthepubliconpanda

advert', The Independent, 2012; Speech by FirstMinister Nicola Sturgeon to the Chinese

FriendshipAssociation,ScottishGovernment,2015a).

Alongside its international offices and those of SDI, the ScottishGovernment engages on

specific policy issues identified in separate policy documents, aswell as its One Scotland

PartnershipCountryPlanswithChina, India,Pakistan,CanadaandtheUSA.Aspartof the

SNP’sprogrammeforGovernment2014-2015aseriesofInvestmentHubsin“keyoverseas

locations”willbepiloted,bringingtogether“resourcesandpartnersinparticularlocationand

co-ordinateanddeliveractivityontheground”(ScottishGovernment,2015c:6).Withinthe

ScottishGovernmentitself,underFirstMinisterNicolaSturgeonthereisaCabinetSecretary

forCulture,EuropeandExternalAffairsaswellasaMinister forEuropeand International

Development.These titles reflectasubtleshift in theScottishGovernment’s international

prioritiespost-referendumthatforegroundstheEuropeancontextevermorestrongly:the

Cabinet Secretary’s previous title was Culture and External Affairs and the Ministerial

portfoliowasforExternalAffairsandInternationalDevelopment.

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Forsub-stategovernments,actingwithintheEuropeancontextisperhapsseenasamore

legitimate extension of their domestic competences than forays into the broader

internationalenvironment;itcertainlyrepresentsamore“institutionalisedandhabitualised

context” (Wyn Jones and Royles, 2012: 251). There is a general acknowledgement of

Scotland’slegitimateinterestindecision-makingataEuropeanlevelasitimpactsdirectlyon

Scotland itself in numerous policy areas. In the wake of 2014’s referendum on Scottish

independence,andinthespectreofasecondUK-widereferendumonEUmembership,this

contextnowoffersScotlandaspacetoconductparadiplomacythatbothengagesdirectly

withpolicymakingthroughitsrepresentationunderthebannerofUKREPandallows itto

foregroundits‘pro-Europeancredentials’tobothdomesticandEuropeanaudiences.

Undoubtedly,Scotland’sinternationalpresencehasbeenmarkedstronglyinrecentyearsby

theindependencereferendum.ThisappliestotheactivitiestheScottishGovernmentwishes

toengagein,positioningitselfasapro-Europeansmallcountry,naturalkintoitsneighbours

inthe‘Nordicarcofprosperity’.ItisalsorepresentedintherelationshipbetweentheScottish

andUKGovernments,whohavebeenonopposingsidesofahighlycontroversialcampaign,

and-naturally-whoseworkingrelationshiphasbeendulychallenged.Italsomeansthere

has been a wealth of speculation, in policy documents or position papers and from

parliamentaryinquiries,sheddinglightonthewaysinwhichthediplomacyofScotlandasa

sub-stategovernmentisseentobeconstrained(orotherwise)onaccountofthisstatus,how

itwoulddifferasanindependentstate,andthusonthecurrencyofofficialdiplomaticstatus

moregenerally.

TheviewoftheSNP, immediatelypriortothereferendumonScottish independence,was

thatScotlandwouldbebetterservedbyhaving“diplomatsdirectlyservingitsinterestsinkey

countries”,not just inBrussels,WashingtonandBeijing (ScottishGovernment,2009:para

4.5). Thesamepositionpaperarguedthatundera‘DevoMax’modelofdevolutionthere

could be ‘Scottish interest sections’ in British Embassies in major European countries,

alongsidetheScottishGovernment’sexistingoverseasrepresentation.Thispositionwould

seemtosuggestthatthereisnomajordissatisfactionwiththerolethatScottishGovernment

111

officialsareabletoplaywhentheyactasdiplomatsaspartofUKoverseasrepresentations.

Indeed,thepositionpaperfailstociteanyrealbenefitsthatawhollyseparaterepresentation

fromanindependentScotlandwouldrealise.

FromtheUKGovernment’sperspective,nothingwasguaranteedintermsofanyindependent

Scotland’sabilitytoutiliseexistingUKdiplomatic,securityandintelligenceresources.There

mightbeoverlappinginterestsbetweentherestoftheUKandanindependentScotland,but

theUKwouldonlycooperatetotheextentthatitwasinitsowninterest(UKSecretaryof

StateforForeignandCommonwealthAffairs,2013:para17).TheSecretaryofStatesummed

uptheexistingrelationshipasfollows:

Thebenefitsofthissupportandcollaborationaresubstantialforexampleinterms of promotional services in support of Scottish-based business, andpositioning Scotland within the UK offer, access to project leads andpromotionalactivitiesdesignedtoattract foreigndirect investment. It is forthis reasonthatmanyof the22ScottishGovernment’sofficesoverseasarelocatedwithin the UK’s Embassies and High Commissions (UK Secretary ofStateforForeignandCommonwealthAffairs,2013:para17).26

Certainly, there is an argument that the ability of Scotland, and theUK’s other devolved

regions,toutilisea‘two-track’diplomaticstrategy;drawingonUKstructuresandresources

as well as initiate independent activities, may magnify their international influence, and

effectiveness,inrelationtosimilarsizedsmall-states.Forexample,ithasbeenarguedthat

Scotland’s influence in the European Union may actually be weakened should it gain

membership as a small member state, rather than a region of a much larger state (UK

SecretaryofState forForeignandCommonwealthAffairs,2013:para105).27 Importantly,

however,thisaddedvalueisonlyrealisedwherethesub-stateandnation-stategovernments

haveoverlappinginterests.Inthecontextofthe2016referendumontheUK’smembership

oftheEuropeanUnion,andtheScottishGovernment’scallsinitswakeforasecondvoteon

Scottishindependence,itseemsunlikelythatanyresidual‘addedvalue’remains.

26ThisnumberincludesSDIoffices.27ThisargumentisstronglyrefutedbytheScottishGovernment.

112

Germany’sBasicLawandtheStatusofBavariaundertheVCDR

Germany’s Federal Constitution, the Basic Law or Grundgesetz (GG), enumerates specific

rolesfortheLänderinthefieldofforeignpolicy.Article32[ForeignRelations},below,states

that:

1. RelationswithforeignstatesshallbeconductedbytheFederation2. BeforetheconclusionofatreatyaffectingthespecialcircumstancesofaLand,that

Landshallbeconsultedinatimelyfashion.3. InsofarastheLänderhavepowertolegislatetheymayconcludetreatieswithforeign

stateswiththeconsentofthefederalgovernment

Underpinning this Article is the idea that the Federal Republic of Germany should be

represented as awhole, rather than as separate Länder (Nass, 1989: 165); a noteworthy

ambitiongiventhattheLänderthemselveswereconstitutedpriortotheFederalRepublic.

TheformalrightsoftheLänderinforeignpolicyareexercisedinthreeprincipalways:through

theirFederalchamberintheBundesrat(Article59),theirconsultationonalltreatiesaffecting

theirexclusivecompetences,andintheiroriginalrighttoconcludeinternationaltreatiesas

identifiedinArticle32(3)above(Nass,1989:-166).

However,thedraftingofArticle32leftoutstandingquestionsastotheroleitprescribesthe

Länderandaseriesofthesescanbeidentifiedregardingthedistributionofforeignrelations

competence between the Federal and Land levels. These range from a centralist

understandingwherebytheFederationisentitledtoenterintotreatiesinallfields,oreven

to implement any legislation it deems necessary to fulfil its foreign policy, through to a

federalist interpretationwhereby theFederationonlyhas rights to conclude international

treatieswithin its own, narrow, areas of legislative competence (Panara, 2010: 62-63). In

practice,however,arrangementsastoforeignaffairsaregovernedbytheLindauagreement

of1957,arguably“thebasisofmodernGermantreaty-making”thatsurvivedthereunification

processandisakeyfeatureofGermany’ssystemof‘co-operativefederalism’(Hernandez,

2013:502).UndertheLindauagreementtheLänderagreedtodelegate-forthemostpart-

theirtreaty-makingpowerstothefederalgovernment;allowingittoconcludetreatiesinits

113

ownrightwhenthesubjectwasdeemedtobeofpredominantlyfederalconcern-including

consulartreatiesandtreatiesconcerningtheestablishmentormembershipofinternational

organisations. In return, the Federal government agreed that, where a treaty was of

predominantly Länder concern, they would seek their approval before the agreement

became internationally binding (Hernandez, 2013: 502; Panara, 2010: 63-64). Though the

Lindau agreement is not constitutionally binding itself, Panara (2010: 64) contends that

infringement of the Agreement would arguably be “justiciable before the Federal

Constitutional Court since it would amount to a breach of the unwritten constitutional

principleofFederalloyalty(Bundestreue)”.

TheBasicLawdoesnot,however,speaktoanyareaofinternationalactivitybeyondtreaty-

making.Onceagain,thisleavesuswithquestionsastowhatsortsofactivitiestheLänderare

permitted toundertake.Undera strict interpretationofArticle32“contactsbetween the

Länderandforeigngovernmentsthatdonotservetoconcludeorexecutetreatiesarenot

permitted”, an interpretation further supported by the notion of external unity that

underpinsthearticle in itsentirety(Nass,1989:176).However,Nassgoesontoprovidea

contrastingviewpoint;ifArticle32onlyregulatesinternationalrelations,meaningdiplomatic

and consular relations, treaty relations “and other acts and deeds vis-à-vis states and

internationalorganizations”,otheractivitiesbytheLänderwouldnotbeforbidden,though

“theprincipleofallegiancetothefederationimposesuponthemcertaindutiesofloyalty”.

However,Nassconcludes,neitherextremeview“matchesconstitutionalreality”(Nass,1989:

167-168).AccordingtoPanara(2010:67),theLänder’sforeignrelationspower“islimitedto

signing internationalagreements.Thisprecludesthemfromperformingunilateralacts, for

example the recognition of foreign states or governments”. However, the Länder’s

agreementswith “those entitieswhichhaveno international legal personality (regionsor

othersub-stateentities),lieoutsideofthesphereofapplicationofArticle32(3)GG.Therefore

theFederalGovernment’sconsentisnotrequired”.

Whenitcomestooverseasrepresentationandministerialvisits,thereisacleardemarcation

between economically driven activities and diplomatic visits, the later being exclusively

organisedbytheGermanDiplomaticService“workingtocommoninterests”(Keating,2010a:

114

paragraph7.1),onceagainreflectiveofGermany’ssystemofcooperativefederalism.Indeed,

Länder overseas offices (which, as will be discussed below, are predominantly those of

Bavaria)includingthoseinBrusselsdonothaveanysortofdiplomaticstatus.Undertheterms

of the VCDR, therefore, German Länder, and Bavaria specifically for the purposes of our

discussion,arenotpartytotheconvention.ThequestionastowhethertheGermanLänder

haveanyinternationalsubjectivityintheirownright,however,isperhapshardertoanswer.

Ländercanmakeinternationaltreatiesintheirownname,yetthesetreatiesaresubjectto

consentbytheFederalGovernment,makingitunclearastowhotheinternationalsubject

actually is.AccordingtoPanara(2010:66)theprevailingviewisthat“theLänder’s limited

internationalsubjectivityisnotinherent,but‘conferredby’article32(3)GG.Thisshouldhave

arealconstituenteffectontheircapacitytoact.Consequently,ifaLandconcludesatreaty

withoutfederalconsent,thisshouldbeconsideredasbeingconcludedultraviresinrespect

ofbothdomesticandinternationallaw”.Therefore,despiteBavaria’sunusualabilitytosign

internationaltreatiesinitsownname,itcannotdosoindependently,i.e.intheabsenceof

approvalfromtheFederalGovernment.

In practice, though Länder do make use of this ability to sign international treaties, the

resultingagreementsaregenerallyfocussedonlocal-levelandcross-borderissues.DrPaul

Fischer from the Bavarian State Chancellery, giving evidence to the Scottish Parliament’s

ConnectingScotlandenquiry inMarch2015,outlinesBavaria’spositionasconcernstreaty

makinginsomedetail:

InoutliningthemainfeaturesofBavaria’sinternationalrelationspolicy,IwanttoemphasiseatthestartthatconductingexternalrelationsisaconstitutionalrightoftheGermanLänder.AlthoughArticle32(1)oftheBasicLawreservesforeignaffairstothefederalstate,Article32(2)allowsindividualstateswithintheir sphere of competence, which includes culture, education, media,security, health and environmental protection, and in agreement with thefederal Government, to negotiate and conclude treaties with foreigncountries.Bavariahasalwaysmadeuseof that constitutional rightandhastherebymaintaineddiplomaticrelationsbelowthelevelofforeignpolicy…Wewould not call most of them [Bavaria’s international treaties] treaties; wewouldcallmostofthemadministrativeagreements.WehavesignedonewithTunisia,forexample,anditwasnotatreatyof international lawbutoneinwhichourAdministrationsagreedtoworkinspecificfieldsofcooperation.Itisquiteraretohaverealtreaties…theyareveryrare(Fischer,2015).

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Despite the conservativeway inwhichBavaria’s international treaty-making powers have

manifested,theoveralltrendisforLändertohaveanincreasingroleininternationalaffairs,

andthisisespeciallysoinBavaria(Panara,2010;Moore,2006).Thisisinpartduetoamore

generalreorganisationoftheGermandiplomaticserviceunderForeignMinisterKlausKinkel

duringthe1990s,wherebyclassicaldiplomaticmissionswererequiredtoextendtheirremits,

takingonimportanteconomicdevelopmentroleswhichrequiredthemtoworkmuchmore

closelywithLändergovernments.Additionally,globalisationandEuropeanintegrationhave

meant that “the fields of jurisdiction of the Länder… public administration, economic

development and cultural education, all these have achieved much more international

dimensions”.28Atthesametime,theactivitiesoftheEUareincreasinglyencroachingupon

Ländercompetences.InthecaseofBavaria,thishasresultedinanelementofeuro-scepticism

that feeds into itsEuropean-paradiplomacy,oftenexertingaconservativepressureonthe

Federal Government in this regard and being particularly vigilant when it comes to

Subsidiarity monitoring.29 In this context, the emphasis Bavaria places on its high-profile

Brusselsrepresentation(‘SchlossNeuwahnstein’accordingtocritics(Moore,2006))seemsto

reflectattemptstoportraythedistinctiveness,economicandpoliticalcloutoftheregion.

Bavaria’sOverseasOffices

BavariaisthemostactiveofalltheGermanLänderwhenitcomestooverseasrepresentation,

and indeed paradiplomacymore broadly. In fact it is the only Land thatmaintains a full

network of overseas offices, and the offices themselves are a relatively new concept for

Bavaria,onethat theBavarianGovernmentclaims isproving“verysuccessful…youhavea

permanent presence there, you can develop really modern networks”.30 Alongside its

overseas offices, Bavaria has several formalised areas of international activity: the

28Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial201329Interviewdata,seniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial201330Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013

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international contacts of the members of the state government31, intergovernmental

commissions-withbothstatesandthirdregions,inter-regionalworkinggroups,cooperation

withconsularcorps(whichareparticularlynumerousinBavaria),aswellasprovidingsupport

for agencies with an international focus and individual projects. These broader external

relations are driven by a relatively recent written strategy that aims to codify and

institutionalise the much more personalised and ad hoc approach of previous Minister

Presidents.32

Intotal,Bavariahas23officesoverseaswithaglobalrepresentation,includinginEurope,the

USAandChina.Forthemostpart,theseofficesarecommercialinnature,thedecisionabout

wheretositethemisdrivenalmostexclusivelybyeconomicconsiderationsandtheirremitis

veryclearlytradeandinvestment.33TheofficesaremostlyrunbytheChamberofCommerce

andpartlyfundedbytheGovernment,runninginclosecooperationwiththeprivatesector

(Keating,2010b:1722appendix2).Thereare,however,threerepresentativeofficesthatdo

haveapoliticalfunction:Quebec,Brusselsand,mostrecently,theCzechRepublic.Someof

Bavaria’soverseasoffices-includingthe‘political’representationinQuebec-areco-located

withtheGermanChamberofCommerce,but,unliketheco-locationofScottishandWelsh

officeswithBritishEmbassies,arenotable to ‘opt in’ to thediplomatic statusofGerman

Federalinstitutions.

Bavaria’s Quebec office was established in Montreal in 1999, building on a cooperation

agreement already a decade old. The office has a “special status, accredited with the

Government of Quebec”, largely because “Quebec itself encourages this representation”

(Keating, 2010b: paragraph 4.3). Meanwhile, the representation in Prague “is quite

special…forhistoricalreasons,afterthewar,relationswithourneighbourstheCzech’swere

difficult…itisagreatachievementtohavethatofficeandrepresentationinPrague”(Fischer,

2015: 5). This office was established as part of a broader rapprochement between the

31 These contacts are appraised and monitored in an unusually thorough way, withaccompanyingstatistics.Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial201332Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial201333Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013

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BavarianandCzechGovernmentsthatalsosawhigh-levelministerialvisitsbetweenthem.

Indeed,CzechPrimeMinisterSobotka“regardedtheopeningoftherepresentativeofficesto

beasignificantevent,andonewhichwillagainraiseCzech-Bavarianrelationstoanewlevel”

(GovernmentoftheCzech-Republic,2014:pressrelease).FromtheBavarianperspective,the

symbolismofsuchanofficeoverrodeconcernsastoitspracticalityoreconomicviabilitythat

wouldnormallyrulethesetypesdecisions.34

Within the EU context, Bavariawas one of the first Länder to open a Brussels office. An

‘informationoffice’wasopenedin1987beforebeingupgraded-initsownestimation-to

theRepresentationoftheFreeStateofBavariafollowingtheratificationoftheMaastricht-

TreatyandtheestablishmentofthecommitteeoftheRegionsintheearly1990s.European

representativeofficesareconsideredthe“most importantareaofexternalactivityforthe

GermanLänder”(Panara,2010:61).Bavaria’sBrusselsoffice,followingarelocationin2004,

isparticularlysymbolic,asexpressedbyoneseniorBavarianofficial:“it’sgrand,it’shistoric…

it’sanexclamationmarksayingwearehereinBrussels…we’reinthisbigareaandwetook

thishistoricbuildingsoeveryonewhocomestotheEuropeanParliamenthastopassit”.35

Bavaria’sEuropeanoffice-andthoseofitsLandcontemporaries-has,however,beenthe

subjectofcontroversyastotheirnomenclatureanddiplomaticstatus.TheLänderBrussels

officesaremodelledaroundtherepresentationofLändergovernmentsinBerlin,wherethe

dual roles of policy-influencing and representation are carried out using largely “soft

instruments”ofpoliticalinfluence(Moore,2006:196).Questionswereinitiallyraisedasto

the legality of these offices but by 1991 “the general legal consensus was that these

institutionswereconstitutionallyacceptable,aslongastheiractivitiesdidnotrunintothe

territory of classic diplomacy reserved for the federal government, such as consular or

diplomaticactivities”(Moore,2006:196).Ofparticularcontroversyisthetermbywhichthese

EUofficesareknown.GermanLänder - includingBavaria -opt to refer to theirEuropean

34Indeedtheeconomiccredentialsofthisofficewereclaimednottobeafactorweighingintothedecisiontoopenit.Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013;Interviewdata,seniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial201335Interviewdata,seniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial2013

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offices as Vertretungen or representations, directly contradicting the spirit of a new

constitutional regulation, theEUZBLG,which“accepted the legitimacyofLänderoffices in

Brusselsaspermanent‘links’totheEUinstitutions,providedtheseactedmerelytosupport

Länderdomesticcompetencesanddidnotimpingeuponthefederalgovernment’sdiplomatic

role”. Federal officials in the German Permanent Representation in Brussels are “strictly

warnednottousethetermVertretungwhenreferringtotheLänderoffices,regardlessofthe

offices’ownnames,and to instead refer to thesesimplyasLänder informationorLiaison

offices(Moore,2006:200-202).

Bavaria’sextravagantEUofficesinparticularareseentofloutthisregulation,inestablishing

“astrongphysicalpresencefortheBavariangovernmentintheEU”andenhancing“thescope

of its political capability on European matters”, it is “clearly a representation of Länder

interests in Brussels” (Moore, 2006: 202). However, despite continued non-

acknowledgementofthetermbythefederalgovernment,itseemsthatthecontroversyover

theroleofLänderrepresentationshasabated,at leastonaday-to-daylevel;thequestion

“ariseseverynowandagain…thefederal levelhasacceptedthatwearethere”.36Despite

this,whencomparingitsparliamentaryEuropeanrepresentationwithitsScottishandWelsh

counterparts,oneBavarianintervieweeremarkedthattheFederalGovernment“wouldnot

eventhinkofgivingusdiplomaticstatus”.37

Alongside, and indeed illustrated by, the overseas officesmaintained by the Freistaat of

Bavaria, there are perhaps three key features which are particularly distinctive about its

‘diplomacy’.Theseare: itsability to interactwithstate-levelactors (in theabsenceofany

diplomaticstatus),theparticularrolethatBavarianpoliticianscanplayinternationallyowing

totheirpositionwithintheFederalgovernment,andtheself-assurednesswithwhichBavaria

carriesouttheroleof‘criticalfriend’bothtotheFederalGovernmentandtotheEU.

36Interviewdata,seniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial201337Interviewdata,seniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial2013

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TurningfirstlytoBavaria’srelationshipswithforeignstates,wearepresentedwithaclear

narrative:“ifyouwanttounderstandBavariaandhowitoperatesinternationallytodayyou

havetolookathowBavariahasevolvedhistoricallyandculturally.HowBavariahasevolved

economicallyandasaresultofthathowtheconstitutionalandthepoliticalframeworkisin

whichweoperate”.38Bavaria’ssize,thestrengthofitseconomy,itshistoricsignificanceand

uniquepoliticalstatuswithintheFederalRepublicallgrantitaspecial‘status’thatallowsit

tointeractwithsovereignstatesonamuchmoreequitablefootingthanmanyotherregions.

This impacts Bavaria’s own paradiplomatic ambitions; its public strategy “Bavaria in the

world” highlights its manifold interactions with foreign Governments; “usually several

meetingsareheldeveryweek, inBavariaandabroad”39,aswellastheway inwhich it is

viewedandpartneredbystatesthemselves.Accordingtooneinterviewee:

Theanalysis that these statesmake is thatBavariamaynotbea sovereignstate,buttheylookatthesize,attheimportance,attheeconomicpower,andwhen you look at Bavaria in that context, even today by sheer physicalpresence,weoutweighperhaps8or9insidetheEuropeanUnion.Soweare,Bavariaitselfisbiggerthanmanystates.40

TheBavarianStateGovernmentdoesnotusethisadvantageindiscriminately.Instead,there

is a clearly targeted and sophisticated attempt to use these state-like characteristics to

interactwithnationstatesofasimilarsizeinitsEuropeanneighbourhood,muchaswefound

evidenceforinthecaseofScotland.Commentingonthelargenumberofforeignconsulates

inside Bavaria, which, at 110, is the highest concentration outside of Berlin, the same

intervieweeelaboratedonthisrelationship:

For them, for the Ambassador, it’s much easier for the Consul-General inMunichtodealwiththeBavarianGovernmentandmuchmorefruitfulforthecountry… very often an Ambassador in Berlin is one Ambassador amongstmanyothers.AndhehastoaccesstheChancellorandtheAdministration,sheisdealingwiththeRussiansandtheAmericans,somaybeherewehavemoreattentionforthesmallerones”.41

38Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial201339BavariaintheWorld40Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial201341InterviewData,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013

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Thecompetitiveovertonesinthisexplanationwillbeexploredinfurtherdetailinsubsequent

chapters, but for the purposes of our current discussion the focus remains Bavaria’s

concentrationonaparticulartypeofforeignstatewithwhichtoconductitsparadiplomacy.

Adifferentintervieweeexpandsfurther,alludingtoanintra-EuropeanhierarchyandBavaria’s

positionwithinit:

Itmightalsodepend[Bavaria’sabilitytointeractwithstates]ontheweight,sotospeak,ofBavaria.ForExampleourMinisterPresident…hehasforexamplemetMrSamarasfromGreece,soaregionmeetsattheinternationallevel…IhaveseenlastweektherewasadelegationofCzechrepresentativestotheParliamentandtheysaidthatBavariawasakeypartnerand…‘Itisunthinkablefor them to go to Berlin without having stopped in Munich’… So this isinteresting,nowthat,fromtheEUperspective,weareregions…butstillwecan…wereallycangoquitefar.OfcourseasIsaiditdepends,wewouldnotclaimtohaverelationstotheFrenchGovernment-it’snotreally,thisissomesortofthingthefederallevelshoulddo.42

Fromthisseriesofextracts itappearsthatBavariatargetsstateswithwhich itcan‘work’;

similarsizedentities-either intermsofphysicalsizeoreconomicorpoliticalsignificance,

while leavingtheFederalRepublic’skeyallies,suchasFrance,aside.Theexplanationthat

relationswiththeFrenchGovernmentissomethingreservedfortheFederallevelseemsto

berelatedtothepreclusionofBavariafrom‘diplomatic’relations,thoughtheseparationof

suchrelationsfromotherareasofarelationshipbetweenBavariaandasovereignstatemight

seemsomewhatartificial.Panara(2010:68)explainsthismoratoriumasfollows:

TheLänderperformotheractivitiesintheinternationalarena[beyondtreatymaking]. For example they often meet representatives of foreigngovernments. This type of activity can have no diplomatic status becausediplomaticandconsularrelationsaretheFederation’sexclusiveresponsibility.TheLändercannotdepartfromthefundamentalguidelinesoffederalforeignpolicy.Thisistopreventthemfromdevelopingwhatisusuallyreferredtoas‘Nebenaußenpolitik’,whichtranslatesas‘foreignpolicyontheside.

As an example of this type of activity, Panara (2010: 68) cites the example of ameeting

betweentheMinisterPresidentofBavariaandtheIndianMinisterofFinancein2007,where

theyagreedonanannualmeetingoneconomic relationsbetweenBavariaand India that

42InterviewData,SeniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial2013

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would take place in Munich. Though Panara argues that this does not represent a “full

‘Bavarian foreign policy’, it is significant”. Indeed, what marks the distinction between

diplomaticactivityor‘foreignpolicy’andthesesortsofhigh-levelencountersisparticularly

difficulttoenumerate.ThisisespeciallysogivenBavaria’sstatedfocusonconsularactivities,

akeyareaoftraditionaldiplomacy.

Compounding this ambiguity is the special significance of Bavaria in Germany’s Federal

politics,owingtothecurrentFederalCDU-CSUcoalitionGovernmentandtheCSU’slonger-

standingroleasafederallysignificantparty.Thishasveryclearimplicationsforthestatusof

theMinister-PresidentofBavaria,asleaderoftheCSU.Thisstatureisdeterminedbyexternal

perceptions,andtheseinturnare“determinedbythefactthatheistheheadofthepolitical

partyoftheCSUandhasdirectinfluenceintheFederalgovernment”.Assuch,thirdparties:

Knowthat,orarebeingtoldbydiplomats,thatheisprobably…numbertwoorthree in German politics. And that Chancellor Merkel cannot do anythingwithouthisconsent.Andthisissomethingofcoursethatweighsin.43

Thishasimplicationsatapersonallevel.ThedevelopmentofBavarianparadiplomacyowes

much toMinisterPresident Francis Strauss, a Federalpoliticianwho returned toBavarian

politicsbringingwithhimbothaforeignnetworkandnamerecognition.Strauss:

StartedtodothingsthatnootherMinisterPresidenthaddonebefore.LikegoingtoRussia.Andthen…becausehewasknownasapoliticalfigure…sotheydecided,theylookedathimandsaid‘heythisissomebodywecantalkto’.Sohewasintroducedanditwaseasyforhimtogetaccesstopeoplethatwerenotonthesamelevel.Becausehecamefromtheotherlevel.44

Additionally, Germany’s constitutional structure, and in particular the importance of the

Bundesrat,canprovidevariousopportunitiesforforeignnetworking,andthepositioningof

BavariaalongsideneighbouringEuropeanstates:

TherewasacaselastyearwhereBavariawasthepresidentoftheBundesratand ourMinister President hemade some trips, of course not as BavarianMinisterPresidentbutasarepresentativeofGermany,ofthesecondchamber,toeven,torepresentGermanytosomeheadsofGovernment-IthinkhewenttotheNetherlandsandtoBelgiumandsoon,sothisisaccordingtothe…its

43Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial201344Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013

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legalundertheGermanconstitutionitwasnoBavarianforeignpolicyofcoursebutitshowsthatalso,theregionshaverightstodoforeignpolicy.45

However,thepoliticallyimportantrolethatBavariaplayswithinGermanFederalpolitics,and

indeedthesignificancegrantedtoLänderingeneralundertheGermanconstitution,canalso

translateintoarestrictiveorconservativeforceuponGermanforeignpolicy.TheCSUhave

been vocal in their criticisms of what they see as Chancellor Merkel’s lenient policy on

migration,most notably in thewake of the refugee crisis of 2015. Absent fromBavaria’s

paradiplomaticportfolioisanyofthedevelopmentornormativeparadiplomacyseeninboth

ScotlandandWales.Relatedly,Bavaria’sattitudetotheEuropeanUnionismeasuredintone.

In particular, it has long been concerned about EU policy encroaching on its legislative

capacity,andittakesseriouslyitsroleasa“criticalbutconstructivepartner”ofboththeEU

andtheFederalGovernment.46

Indeed,theroleof‘criticalfriend’isonethatappearstimeandagaininreferencetoBavaria’s

externalactivities,andinrelationtotheirpositionvisavistheFederalGovernment.Once

again,Bavaria’suniquehistoryisrelevanthere.UnlikeboththeFederalRepublicandthepost-

unification‘hyphenated’Länder,Bavariahasexisted,withalmostidenticalborders,formore

than1500years,andwithaparticularlystrong“unbroken” identity.47Bavaria,whoseown

constitutionwascreatedin1946,wastheonlyLändertoinitiallyrejecttheproposedBasic

Law in 1949, believing it to have too few [centrifugal] federalist elements.48 Bavaria,

therefore,can“affordtobethecriticalpartner”,but-owingtotheconstitutionalandpolitical

stability of the German federation, indeed its own brand of ‘cooperative federalism’ -

“withoutquestioningthefederalismasawhole.So…itmaybeabit,well,thecounterpartto

Berlin…. forexampleheretheCSUtries tobeabitmoreright thanMerkel’sBerlinat the

moment but this is some sort of good-cop, bad-cop game”.49 In the absence of the

45Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial201346Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial201347Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013.SeealsoHepburnE.(2008a)TheNeglectedNation: The CSU and the Territorial Cleavge in Bavarian Party Politics.GermanPolitics17:184-202.48Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013.49Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial2013

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independencedebates currently coursing through inter-governmental relations in theUK,

Spain or Belgium, the stability of German Federalism allows Bavaria some all-important

politicalleeway.

Moregenerally,Bavariaseesitselfascooperating“very,verywell”withFederalorganisations

-indeed,itreliesheavilyonfederalinstitutionswhenitcomestoaccessingforeignstructures,

embassies andministerial visits. However, “when wemeet there is always some sport -

there’sapoliticallanguage,weareBavariansandsoweplaywiththeimages,sowehavea

playfulandcolourful languagewhenwespeakbut…infactweareboundbythecommon

interest”.50ThiscongruenceofinterestsisparticularlypronouncedgivenBavaria’seconomic

status,whichallowsittoplayasignificantroleinthedirectionofGermany’s“innovationand

export driven economy”; other Länder are envious of this role, but “they don’t have the

budgets”.51

Astheprecedingpassageshaveoutlined,BavariahasnostatusundertheVCDR;itisnotparty

totheconventioninitsownright,norisitpermittedto‘optin’viaco-locationofitsoverseas

officeswiththeFederalRepublicofGermany.ThepositionoftheFederalGovernmentisalso

clearintermsofBavarianothavingtheabilitytoconductforeignrelations,inparticularthose

‘tools’inherenttoGermany’sownfederalforeignpolicy-diplomacyandconsularrelations.

However, here we also find grey-areas, and contradictions in term. Bavaria maintains

relationships with foreign sovereign states, it even signs negotiates and concludes

international treatieswith such states. It also has a select few ‘political’ offices overseas,

premisedonrelationshipswithstates(intheCzechRepublic),powerfulregions(Quebec)and

international organisations (Brussels). It boasts the highest concentration of foreign

consulatesoutsideofBerlin,andacknowledgestheattractivenessofitsowngovernmentas

a point of access for these Consulate-Generals. Its European office is quite deliberately

positionedsothatanyvisitortotheEuropeanParliamentmustencounterit.Itisdifficultto

reconcile this realitywithviewthatBavariadoesnotmaintaina foreignpolicy,orat least

50Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial201351Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013

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diplomaticrelations. However,equilibrium,ofsorts,seemstoexist.Forexample,Bavaria,

and other German Länder, maintain that their European offices are Vertretung or

‘representations’. The Federal Government hasn’t challenged this development in the

German Constitutional Court, yet they forbid their own representatives from using this

terminologytodescribewhattheytermthe‘informationoffices’oftheLänderinBrussels.A

commonly understood ‘line’ exists which the Bavarian Government is clear not to cross,

seemingly in return for the cooperation of the Federal Government in orchestrating an

advancedparadiplomaticplatform.Crucially,andincontrasttotherelationshipbetweenthe

Scottish and UK Governments, these endeavours are rooted in a congruence of - largely

economic - interests, and set within a robust framework of constitutional stability and

cooperativefederalism.Itiswithinthiscontextthathigh-levelrelationswithstates,suchas

IndiaandRussia,havebeenallowedtotakeplacewithlittleinthewayofcontroversy.52In

the contrast between Scotland and Bavaria we perhaps see similar behaviours being

interpretedinmarkedlydifferentways,owingtothepoliticalcontextineachcase.

Conclusion

Intryingtosurveythediplomaticrepresentationsofsub-stategovernments,Scotland,Wales

andBavariainthisinstance,Berridge’sclassificationof‘unconventional’bilateraldiplomacy

(2005:137-143)isperhapsuseful.Thoughthistypologyisintendedtodescribetheactivities

ofstates,whenresidentembassiesofthe‘conventionalkind’cannotbemaintainedforone

reasonor another, functionally - and indeed in some terminology - theseunconventional

activities describe fairly accurately the diplomacy of many sub-state governments. For

example,theWelshGovernment’soverseasthatoperateoutsideofofficialUKmissions,and

Bavaria’sthree‘political’officesbearmanyofthesamecharacteristicsofwhatBerridgeterms

‘representativeoffices’;“amissionthatlooksandoperatesmuchlikeanEmbassy,theonly

52Havingsaidthis,relationsbetweenBavariaandRussiasince2016havebeguntocauseagreatdealofpoliticaltensionwiththeGermanFederalGovernmentandwillbeexploredinChapterSixofthisthesis.

125

differencebeing its informality” (Berridge,2005:45emphasisoriginal).Additionally,akey

structureofunconventionaldiplomacyasexposedbyBerridge,interestsections,isprecisely

what the Scottish Government have called for under any possible ‘devo max’ model of

devolution,allowingthemtohaveamoreclearlydistinguishedrepresentationinsideBritish

embassiesabroad(ScottishGovernment,2009).

There is, therefore,aprecedentandaseriesofstructuresrelatingtosub-statediplomatic

representationsabroad-bothwhentheyoperateaspartof,and independent from,their

hoststate’smission.However,theproliferationofparadiplomaticactivitiesstillpresentsas-

yet-unansweredquestions.WhichGovernmentare ‘paradiplomats’ultimatelyaccountable

to?Ifco-locationwereinoperation,thenonewouldassumethiswastheforeignofficeofthe

host-state.53 However, where this might at times be a murky area - at other times it is

abundantly clear that political direction is taken from the devolved, not the national

government. In Scotland’s case, for example, the Scottish Government representation in

Brusselsisclearthattheytaketheirpoliticaldirectionfrom“Edinburgh,notLondon”(Scottish

Government,2009:para2.6).Anotherkeyoutstandingissueisthepracticeofrecognition.

Asdiscussedearlierinthechapter,sub-stategovernmentsarenotabletoofficiallyrecognise

breakawaygovernmentsorindependentstates,yettheydohave-anoftenpublic-viewon

suchmatters. Though their informal support or recognitionmay not carry anyweight in

internationallaw,itisnotatalldifficulttoimagineascenariowheretheirpositionswereused

toinfluenceothermembersoftheinternationalcommunity,and,certainly,mayconfuseand

evenhampertheirhost-state’spolicyinthisarea.Equally,onemightspeculatethatpositions

held‘undertheradar’bysub-stategovernmentscouldevenbeutilisedbyacentralstate,in

ordertosignaltacitsupportorimproverelations.

The titleof thischapteruses thephrase ‘skirtingofficialdom’. It isworth returning to this

centralthemeinconcludingthesediscussions.WalesandScotlandbothcarryoutofficialand

unofficialdiplomaticactivities.InWales’case,theGovernmenthasoverseasrepresentations

53 Indeed this iswhat theMemorandumofUnderstandingbetween theUKandDevolvedGovernmentsstatesinnouncertainterms.B4.27,D4.23

126

that form part of official UK diplomatic missions and representative offices that are

independent of the UK’s diplomatic structures, and thus by definition are ‘informal’

diplomaticentities.Astheprecedingsectionsdiscussed,thedecisionofwhetherornottoco-

locatewiththeUKGovernment,andgiveWelshrepresentationsdiplomaticstatus-‘opting

in’ to the VCDR - is made, perhaps surprisingly, on a fairly pragmatic basis. The Welsh

Governmentdoesnotseemtoexperienceanymajorproblemsincarryingouttheir‘brand’of

diplomacy outside of UK missions, and indeed - as referenced in the discussion of the

Chongquingrepresentation-actingoutsideofanofficialrepresentationmayevenhaveits

advantages.InthecaseofWales,itsemphasisonregion-regionlinkagesmeansthat‘informal’

diplomacyis,inmostinstances,perfectlyadequateforitsneeds.Diplomacybetweenregional

governmentsof thiskindmay lookandsoundmuch like ‘official’or ‘formal’diplomacy, it

certainlyhasthepompandceremonytofit,yetitremainsoutsideofthescopeoftheVCDR,

subsidiarytointeractionsatanationstatelevel.

Meanwhile, none of Bavaria’s international offices - including its three ‘political’

representations,enjoydiplomaticstatus.However,eventhoughtheserepresentationsare

un-affiliated and thus outside of the scope of the VCDR, interactionwith nation states is

possible,particularlysowhentheseareofasimilargeographicalsizeorweighttoBavaria

itself,thoughrelationswithstatesofavastlydifferentstatushavealsobeenevidencedinthis

Chapter.TakingplacewithinaparticularcontextofGermancooperativefederalism,Bavaria’s

economic prowess, political significance and independent historical status - alongside the

heightenedstatureawardedtoitspoliticiansasaresultofitsroleinaFederalconstitution-

a lack of diplomatic status does not seem to hamper the activities of Bavaria’s overseas

offices.Aswith all paradiplomatic activities takingplaceoutsideof themore regimented,

institutionalisedscopeofformalstate-staterelations,contextisking.Similarly,theaccordof

interestsbetweenBavariaandtheFederalGovernment,particularlyundercurrentgoverning

arrangements,meansthatMinisterialvisitsandotherhigh-levelaccessisabletobearranged

byFederal institutionswith little friction.Meanwhile, the fact thatBavariamaintainsonly

three ‘representative’ offices - aspartof amuch largernetworkof tradeand investment

offices - perhaps signals the Bavarian government’s satisfaction with diplomatic

representationasaconstituentpartoftheFederalRepublic.Arguably,thisdynamiciseasier

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toachieveinafederationofpreviouslyconstitutedstatesthaninasystemofdevolutionsuch

astheUK,wherethedevolvedgovernmentsaresubsidiarytothenationalparliament,and

onceagainBavaria’ssecureidentity,Germany’ssystemofcooperativefederalism,andthe

CSU’s position within the Federal government all aid the smooth-operation of inter-

governmental relations. As for the status of Bavaria’s diplomacy, however, we do see

qualitatively different interpretations emerge, even a formof political ‘doublespeak’. The

BavarianChancelloryseethemselvesasbeingabletocarryout“diplomaticrelationsbelow

thelevelofforeignpolicy”.Yet,asourdiscussiononthecontroversysurroundingtheLänder’s

Brusselsofficesdemonstrated,theFederalGovernmentmaintainsthattheproperscopeof

Länderactivitiesexpresslyprecludesdiplomacy,somethingreservedtothefederallevel.In

theBavariancase,itappearsthatitislesstheprocessofdiplomaticnegotiationthatis‘off

limits’,ratherthanthesubstanceofcertainforeignpolicyareas.Thecontoursofthisexclusion

seem to vary along with the broader political context at the time, as strained relations

betweentheCSUinBavariaandChancellorMerkel’sFederalGovernmentsince2016have

demonstrated.

ForScotland,meanwhile,thedecisiontohostitsgovernmentalrepresentationsexclusively

withinUKdiplomaticmissionstellsussomethingdifferentyetagain.Inthiscase,theScottish

Government’sdesiretointeractwithstate-levelrepresentations,someofwhichareofvastly

differentsizeandinternationalsignificancethanitself-inChina,intheUSA,inJapanandin

Canada-meansthatitrequirestheformalityanddiplomaticstatusthatco-locationwiththe

UKbrings.Scotlanddoesalsomaintainrelationswithsmallerstates,ofanequivalentsizeto

itself:ithasofficesinDublinandOslo,forexample.However,theScottishexperienceperhaps

demonstratesthecontinuedimportanceof‘official’diplomaticrepresentations,amessage

oftensubsumedbydiscussionsofthebroadeningofdiplomaticpractices,theproliferationof

diplomaticactorsandtheweakeningof thetraditionaldiplomaticsystem.Tosecurehigh-

level access with states, to engage with the “wider diplomatic community” (Scottish

Government,2015b:para28)andtobeaccordedthestatusofadiplomat-forallsortsof

practicalreasons-theScottishGovernmenthasdeterminedthatactingundertheumbrella

oftheUKstate,andthusunderthetermsoftheVCDR,isanecessaryfeatureofitsoverseas

representation.Somewhatironically,thebitternessofthepillinthiscase-giventheScottish

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Government’sdesireforindependence,andgenerallyfraughtinter-governmentalrelations-

isperhapstestamenttotheenduringrelevanceofamoretraditionalstyleofdiplomacy.

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Chapter4:‘It’s[notalways]theEconomy,stupid’:thePoliticsofParadiplomacy

Introduction

Byasignificantmargin,themostcommonlymaintainedexplanationforsub-statediplomacy

isaneedtopursueinternationaltradeandinvestment. Inotherwords, ‘it’stheeconomy,

stupid’.And,certainly,sub-stategovernmentsdoneedtofightfortheirplaceintheglobal

market,andmanyaremakinggreatsuccessesofdoingso.Aseconomicunits,leadingregions

-theCaliforniasofthisworld-outweighmanystatesintermsoftheirsizeandsignificancein

the globalmarketplace. Likewise, domestic policy platformsoften rely on the sourcing of

extra-nationalfunds,andtheelectoralsuccessofsub-stategovernmentsisthuspremisedon

theirabilitytomaketheregionknownasanattractiveplacetodobusiness.

However,beyondtherolethateconomicdevelopmentundoubtedlyplaysinthefortunesof

sub-stategovernments,thereareotherreasonsthatthe‘economycard’isbeingplayedso

consistently.Primarily, it representsaway tonaturallyplacesub-stategovernments inan

internationalcontext.Writinginthelate1990s,CohnandSmitharguedthat“international

involvementisstillnotconsideredtobean‘ordinary’activityformostsub-nationalunits,as

it is for central governments” (1996: 33). Though such activity has become much more

common in the intervening years, it maintains what Hocking described as an “aura of

inappropriateness” (1999: 36). Economic development, meanwhile, is seen as a primary

rationaleofsub-stategovernance:cloakingparadiplomaticactivity inthissamelegitimacy.

For example, Wyn Jones and Royles (2012: 256) contrast the international trade and

investmentpromotionactivity inWaleswith its internationaldevelopmentpolicy,arguing

that the former “is very clearly related to a devolved competence, namely economic

development,providingarobustlegalbasisforWAG’srole”.Intheeyesofarangeofactors

therefore - domestic constituencies, international partners and host-state governments -

paradiplomaticactivityisseenasmore‘normalised’inaneconomiccontext.

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Relatedly,byvirtueoftheircoremission,internationaltradeandinvestmentactivitiesofsub-

stategovernmentsareinabetterpositionwhenitcomestonowubiquitousbudgetcutsand

re-prioritisation.TurningagaintotheWelshcase,thefollowingextractfromaninterviewsets

outthisrelationshipquiteclearly:

Thereisareally important interplaybetweenthestateoftheeconomyandthesub-nationaldiplomacyscene,becausethesub-nationaldiplomacysceneis low hanging fruit when it comes to re-ordering priorities in a time ofmonetaryausterity.Andweourselvesarenotimmunefromthat.We’vehadto,inthelast4-5years,bemuchmorequestioningaboutourabilitytojumpontoaeroplanesandgohereorthere,orwherever…wehaven’twithdrawncompletely,butwehavetothinkmuchmorecarefully.54

Therefore,ifaneconomiccasecanbemadeforparadiplomacy-ataskmadealltheeasierif

this isdirect tradeand investmentpromotion, though the ‘logic’ canalsobe stretched to

other profile raising activities - it acts as insulation against pressure to retrench to the

domesticsphere.

Appealingtoeconomicmotivationsforparadiplomaticactivitythuslendsitlegitimacy,while

helpingtoinsulateitfrombudgetarypressures.However,thefactisthattheactualpractice

ofsub-statediplomacy-ingeneralterms,aswellasspecificallyinourthreecases-goeswell

beyondthescopeoftradeandinvestmentpromotion.Thereareclearlyothermotivationsat

play.Theparadiplomacyliteraturehintsatwhatthesemightbe: identityconstructionand

thegenerationofsymboliccapital (Royles,2010;WynJonesandRoyles,2012),normative

ambitions(Wigell,2013),themobilisationofaterritorialcleavage(Hepburn,2008a),togain

policytractionatnationallevels(Albina,2010)and-mostresolutely-nationbuilding(Keating,

1997; Keating, 1999; Lecours andMoreno, 2001; Lecours, 2002; Lecours, 2007; Lecours,

2008).Ifweaskthequestion,therefore,‘whydoregionsgoabroad’,inthewaysoutlinedin

thepreviouschapter,theanswersareatonceideological,instrumentaland-perhapsinterms

ofgetting‘sweptupinthetide’-sometimesreactive.

ThisChapterconsidersthepoliticsofparadiplomacy;theways inwhichdifferingdomestic

and international contexts and themotivations of sub- and nation- state actors result in

54Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentOfficial2013

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particulartypesofinternationalactivity,modesthatdonotcorrespondtopurelyeconomic

rationales. Inotherwords, itaskswhysub-stategovernmentsconductthemoreadvanced

paradiplomatic activities that they do - both in our three cases and more broadly. The

paradiplomatic literature has established that nation building (as a broad term) is a key

motivator for sub-state governments in their international endeavours. However, this

relationshipneedstobeconsideredingreaterdetailifwearetofullyunderstanditsnature.

Not all sub-state governments use paradiplomacy to ‘build the nation’ in the sameway.

Instead,arangeofstrategiesareusedtoachieveavarietyofgoals.ForWales,aligningitself

withthedominantinternationaldiscoursesofsustainabledevelopment,genderequalityand

citizenengagement isaway toplace thenation ina similarlyenlightenedgroupof ‘good

internationalists’,reinforcingthe“mythofWelshradicalism”.InScotland,paradiplomacyaids

nationbuildingbyaligningtheScottishGovernmentwithsimilarlysizedstates,mimickinga

foreign policy that puts it in a special category among its Nordic neighbours. In Bavaria,

paradiplomacy is used to demonstrate state-like economic and administrative actorness,

emphasisingBavaria’shistoryasasovereignstate.

Asastartingpoint,thischapteracceptstheassertionsoftheparadiplomaticliteratureand

acknowledges thatparadiplomacy isaparticularlyuseful tool in sub-statenationbuilding.

However, it probes this relationship further and - in doing so - reframes paradiplomatic

interactions as part of a sovereignty game. By using this terminology, the intention is to

conceptualise and account for the ‘back and forth’ between states and sub-state

governments that revolve around the rightful or legitimate sites of power and political

authority.Whileacceptingthebasicutilityofparadiplomacyinnationbuildingendeavours,

thisanalysistakesastepbackandplacesparadiplomacywithinthecontextofabigger-and

much longer - sovereigntygamethat sub-stategovernmentsareplayingwith theirnation

statecounterparts.Whilenation-buildingispartofthisgame,thegameitselfisbroader-itis

about the relative roles and power relationships between the state and the sub-state

government. It is these - traditionally hierarchical - roles and relationships which

paradiplomacy necessarily plays on and challenges. A brief outline of the framework of

sovereigntygamesfollows,beforethechaptermovesontoassessthenatureofthegames

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beingplayed ineachofourcasestudies,andtheways inwhichparadiplomacyfeeds into

them.

Sub-stateSovereigntyGames

IntheirexaminationofWelshparadiplomacy,WynJonesandRoyles(2012:251)arguethat

sub-state diplomacy represents a particularly good field within which to study inter-

governmentalrelations,orIGR.Thisisduetothefactthattheleadingroleoccupiedbystates

ininternationalaffairs,aswellasthe“prerogativesandprivilegesthatareentailedbyit”,are

veryoften“jealouslyguarded”bystates:

Especiallyinthecontextofregionalactorswithinthebordersofthestatewhochafe at the restrictions inherent in thedesignation ‘stateless nation’. Sub-state diplomacy increases the potential for tension in central - sub-staterelationsandcanthereforehighlightthelimitsofIGR:ormoreprecisely,thepotentiallylimitinganddiscipliningroleofsovereigntyonrelationsbetweenstatesandregionalactors(WynJonesandRoyles,2012:251).

Anotherwaytocharacterisethisrelationship,andtheback-and-forthbetweenthestateand

thesub-stategovernment,iswiththevocabularyofasovereigntygame.ForAdler-Nissenand

Gad(2014:3),sovereigntygamesare,fundamentally“strategicclaimsinrelationtoauthority

and responsibility referring to sovereignty”. Thegames themselves, theauthors continue,

play out in “discourses, institutions and practices”, and in playing such games the actors

eventuallyendup“stretchingthemeaningandfunctionsofsovereignty”.

Byvirtueoftheassociationbetweenstatehoodanddiplomaticactorness,theinternational

relationsof sub-stateunits necessarily touchon - even in an implicit sense - sovereignty.

Therefore,aswellasparadiplomacyrepresentingausefulframeworkforexploringtherole

and limits of intergovernmental relations, the functioning of these inter-governmental

relationships,perhapsintheirmostbroadsense,furtheroffersanilluminatingframefrom

whichtounderstandthemotivationsandconditioningfactorsbehindsub-statediplomacy

itself. Different types of intergovernmental relationships - in terms of party political

congruence,thedivisionofcompetencesbetweentiersofgovernmentandtheinstitutional

andworkingarrangementsinplace-allpotentiallyimpactuponthenatureandthescopeof

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paradiplomatic practices that the sub-state government engages in. In other words, the

precisecontoursoftherelationshipbetweenthedifferentactorsinasub-statesovereignty

gameareconstitutivetothenatureofthegameitself.

Ifweaccept themetaphorof a sovereignty game,we can identify them in allmannerof

guises.Callsforincreasedpowers,forcompetenceoverspecificissuesandrenegotiationsof

thebasisoffederalordevolvedarrangementsallrepresentclaimsaboutrelativepowerand

authority. These claims are often made with an appeal to popular sovereignty and are

grounded in the moral framework of self-determination. Paradiplomacy is one field, or

operationalspace,inwhichthisgameisplayedouttogreateffect.Thisisduetohowclosely

foreign affairs and the very nature of sovereignty are tied together. By conducting

paradiplomacy, sub-state governments are making a strategic claim about power and

authority - namely over a competence or issue area that sits within the broader field of

diplomacyor foreignaffairs. This strategic claim is theessenceof a sovereignty game.At

heart,suchactivities-inourthreecasestudies-seemtobeallabouttherecognitionofthe

sub-state government as something more than a ‘mere region’. It doesn’t have to be

recognitionasanaturalstate-in-waitingorevenapotentialstate,butratherthatithassome

sortofspecialstatusandsignificancewarrantingits‘seatatthetable’.

Sub-statesovereigntygamesare in fact remarkablysimilar towhatAdler-NissenandGad

categoriseaspost-colonialorpost-imperialsovereigntygames(Adler-NissenandGad,2014)

-indeedmanyoftheseunitswouldalsofallundertheumbrellatermofbeing‘sub-state’.For

Adler-NissenandGad,theconceptofapost-colonialsovereigntygameisawaytounderstand

the “interplay between postimperial relations and European integration”; it allows for

analysisofhow“micro-politiesmanoeuvrebetweendifferentcentres”,their‘metropole’or

referentstateandtheEuropeanUnion.Fortheauthors,post-colonial‘micropolities’–here,

AdlerNissenandGadarelookingspecificallyattheNordicregion–representaspecialtype

ofactor:

Beingneither formally sovereignnor simplifyhierarchically subordinated totheirmetropole,theself-governingcountriesarepoliticalentitiesthatdonotreadily fit the conceptual categories offered by the conventional theory

134

addressing international politics and international law… Self-governmentarrangementsmayevenincludethetransferofjurisdictioninsomeareasofforeign affairs (Loukacheva, 2008:109) – an area traditionally so closelyarticulatedotsovereigntythatitisconsideredtheprerogativeofthesovereign(Adler-NissenandGad,2014:16)

It is a way to ‘open up’ the concept of sovereignty and explore the ways in which it is

negotiated,takinginarangeofpossibleself-governingarrangementsanddegreesofrelative

subjetivity(Adler-NissenandGad,2014:7,14).

Just like postcolonial sovereignty games, sub-state sovereignty games revolve around the

acknowledgement of the polity or ‘potential state’ as a player of the game. The key

difference,however,isthatthe‘potentialstateness’ofsub-stategovernmentsasabroader

groupismorecontested,andtherelationshipbetweenthestateandsub-stategovernment

ismoretraditionallyhierarchical.Nonetheless,inthecaseofsub-stategovernments,itisthis

very right to participate that is beingnegotiated throughparadiplomatic actions, and the

acceptance of the claim varies to a significant degree across states and sub-state

governments.Insub-statesovereigntygames,paradiplomacy,inparticular,becomesaway

tomarkoutthe‘special’statusofthepolitythroughencroachingonatraditionallystate-held

domain,andinotherwaysrevolvesaroundthestatusoftheregionwithinthestate.Thechart

belowoutlinesthesovereigntygamestructureasenvisagedbyAddler-NissenandGad,with

theadditionofsub-statesovereigntygamesbytheauthor.

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Essentially,theargumenthereisthatstatelessnationsmayconductparadiplomacyaspartof

asovereigntygame,oneplayedwiththeimplicitobjectiveofbeingacknowledgedasarightful

playerinthisgameitself.Thesovereigntygameisaboutthestatusoftheregionwithinthe

state,ratherthananysetend-pointorfixedobjective:itisplayedoutintheactionsofthe

sub-stategovernmentsandthecounter-actions,reactionsorrestrictionsfromthestate.Itis

shaped by the parties in power at each tier of government and the system of inter-

governmentalrelationsbetweenthestateandthesub-statelevel.

Sovereightygame:"strategicclaimsinrelationtoauthorityandresponsibility,referringtosovereignty"Adler-Nissen,2014:3

Atleasttwoplayers;asharedunderstandingofthegamebeingplayed;animplicitorexplicitreferencetoaneither/orconceptionofsovereignty;nofixedrules;centresaroundtherelationaldistribution

ofsubjectivity(Adler-NissenandGad2012).

VerticalGamesAtleasttwoplayers- involvesthe

allocationofcompetencesbetweensub-state,stateand

internationalactorssuchastheEU(Adler-NissenandGad,2012)

Postcolonialsovereigntygames:involvetheacknowledgementofthepolityor'potentialstate'asaplayerofthegame(Adler-NissenandGad,2012)

Firstround:polityaquiresindependence, becomesastateandthegamebecomesahorizontalone(Adler-

NissenandGad,2012,

Remaindersofthisprocess getstuckinthefirstround,don'taquire

independence. Nowthesovereigntygameisplayedthroughthetacticalnon-acquiringofindepdnece (Adler-

NissenandGad,2012)

Othersoveriegntygames:EU/memberstates.Revolvesaroundrelative

competencesandpowerdistributions(Adler-NissenandGad,2012)

Sub-statesoverigntygames:aboutacknowledgingthattheregionhassomesortofclaimtospecialstatus.

Firstround:someregionsseekandaquireindependence (becomesahorizontalgame),ortherightto

vote/decideuponindependence (claimtoaseatatthetableaccepted-

remainsaverticalgame)

Regionsnotactivelyseekingstatehoodorwhohavetiredandfailedtoaquireitnonetheless

utilisetheirclaimtoaseatatthetable,thegamebecomesaboutthestatusoftheregionwithin

thestate

HorizontalGamesAtleasttwoplayersofequal

(formal)status- mostcommonlybetweenstates(Adler-Nissenand

Gad,2012)

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Thenotionofsovereigntygames,asAdler-NissenandGammeltoft-Hansenarekeentopoint

out (2008: 7), is intended only as a heuristic device. However, the focus on a game as

comprisedofplayers,rulesandmovesisonethatisparticularlyusefulinthiscontext.Itisa

wayto“openup’theconceptofsovereigntyandconsideritsnegotiation,insteadoftreating

it as a static condition (Adler-Nissen andGad, 2014: 7, 14) Rather than focussing on the

perceivedend-goalofgoverningparties,wecan insteadconsiderthegame in itsentirety.

Much like devolution, famously “a process, not an event”, a sovereignty game is not

somethingwithadefinedend-point-itisthegameitself,ratherthananyeventualscore,that

isthesubjectofthisstudy.

NationBuildingandtheMimicryofStatehood:PlayingtheLongGame

Anessentialelementofasovereigntygameistheperformanceofsovereignty.Inotherwords,

tomakeastrategicclaimaboutauthorityandresponsibility,asub-stategovernmentmust

perform the narrative of sovereignty. In ‘vertical’ sovereignty games, “political and

administrative elites are playing on the different legal and symbolic structures related to

sovereigntytoenhancetheirautonomyinboththedomesticandthe internationalarena”

(Adler-Nissen andGammeltoft-Hansen, 2008: 12).Oneway for sub-state governments to

enact this performance of sovereignty is through the mimicry of a type of actor whose

sovereigntyisundisputed,andindeedisacentraltenetoftheircharacterandstatusonthe

worldstage:thesovereignstate.Suchmimeticperformancescanthereforebeunderstoodas

movesinthesovereigntygame,moveswhichmayrecastthebalanceofpowerbetweenstate

andsub-stateactorsorimpacttheself-perceptionoftheaffectiveregion.

Theconceptof‘mimicry’,forthesepurposes-astrategyofoutwardlydemonstratingstate-

likecharacteristicsintheabsenceofformalsovereignty(McConnell,2016;McConnelletal.,

2012)is,fundamentally,allaboutperception.Theperceptionsofexternalactorsthattheunit

hassomesemblanceoflegalcompetenceordiplomaticauthoritymatterseventhoughsuch

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competence may, in fact, be absent. This feat is achieved by playing on the powerful

associationsbetweensovereignty,diplomacy,statehoodandnationhood.Insomeinstances

thismimicrymaytaketheformofparody;forexample,‘micropatias’orself-declaredstates

thatrepresentaprotestmovementdrawheavilyonformalisedperformancesandestablished

narrativesaroundsovereigntyandinternationalrecognition(McConnelletal.,2012:810).In

other cases, such as those of break-away governments and unrecognised states seeking

formalrecognitionasafullstate,themimicryundertakenhastheclearaimofestablishing

theirrightorappropriatenessasthelegitimaterepresentativeoftheirpeopleandeasingthe

path towards full statehood by appearing as natural kin to existing members of the

internationalcommunity.InthecaseoftheTibetanGovernmentinExile(TGiE),thestrategy

adopted is one keen to “appropriate symbols of legitimacy in order to maintain their

governmentalclaims,withthe“languageofstateness”(HansenandStepputat,2001:9)being

particularlyimportantastheynegotiatetheirplaceontheinternationalstage”(McConnell,

2016:806).

Ifweacceptthatakeymotivatorforparadiplomaticactivityisthedesireto‘buildthenation’

domestically, thenamimetic framework isonewithinwhichwecanmost clearly see the

processunfolding.Inonesense,paradiplomacyispartofanation-buildingprocessinthatit

helps to anchor the nation in an accepted and familiar discourse that strengthens and

normalizesnationalsentimentsinadomesticsetting.Thisisenabledbytakingon(mimicking)

theoutward appearanceof a state: a defining characteristic ofwhichbeing the ability to

conduct diplomatic relations. In this regard, the goal of nation building is realized in a

domesticsetting,withintheaffectiveregionitself.Inanothersense,mimicryhelpstoconvey

the image of the nation outwards, again by appearing state-like and therefore more

legitimate in the eyes of the international community. Coming full circle, this enhanced

international legitimacy further reinforces the perception of the sub-state government as

something ‘morethan’amereregionwithin itsownconstituency,andwithinthestateas

whole.This, inturn, iswhatasovereigntygameisallabout:relativepowerandauthority.

Indeed, it neededent be within the restricted parameters of identifiable nation building

projectthatthisdynamicplaysout,itislessthe‘nation’componentthatiscriticalthanthe

desire touseastrongsub-state identityaspartofapoliticalproject,makingastatement

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aboutrelativepowerandauthority.Thewaysinwhichmuchparadiplomacycanbeconstrued

as projecting and bolstering an identity that chimes with dominant liberal international

norms,forexamplearounddemocracypromotion,genderequalityandenvironmentalism,

canbeseenasevidenceofthisrelationship.

McConnell(2016)pointstothisphenomenon-ofcraftinganinternationalmessageto‘fit’

dominantinternational,predominantly‘Western’norms-inthecaseoftheTGiE.Here,the

argumentisthat“therationaleformuchoftheTGIE’sinvestmentinstate-likeinstitutions,

practicesanddiscourses’”hasbeenthe‘seekingoflegitimacy’;“oftheexileadministration

wanting to prove itself trustworthy and deserving of support in the eye of international

audiences”(McConnell, 2016: 161). This formof diplomacy and statecraft hasbeenabout

crafting a message and an identity that fit in with the expectations of contemporary

internationalpolitics.It’s“aclassiccaseoftellingparticular(Western)audienceswhatthey

wanttohear”.Inthiscase,itisthattheTibetanpeoplearepeaceful,democratic,concerned

withtherightsofWomenandtheenvironment.Infact,McConnellgoesontoarguethat,“in

recentyearstheTGiEhasbeenengagedinanalmosttick-boxexerciseofmeetingthecriteria

ofthesenormsofgoodgovernance”(2016:160).

Thereareclearparallelsbetweenthisexerciseandthenorm-driveninternationalactivitiesof

ScotlandandWales,bothintermsoftheprecisethemesthataredrawnuponandtheways

in which such messages attempt to marry the external perceptions of the nation with

dominant international norms. Most notable in this regard are their international

development programs - Wales for Africa and Scotland-Lesotho - but the work of both

Scotland and Wales around the UK’s response to climate change and the democracy

promotion exercises of the legislatures in both nations (specifically with regards to e-

democracy and citizen engagement) also point to such a project of norm-alignment. In

Bavaria,theroleofmimicryintheirparadiplomaticendeavoursappearsmorecloselyaligned

totheireffectivenessandeconomicactorness,key‘state-like’characteristics,ratherthanany

thematic mimicry of liberal international norms. Having said this, they do also conduct

normativeparadiplomacy-seenmostclearlyinthetechnicalandlegalassistanceprovidedto

emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. An outline of the nature of the

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sovereignty game being played in each of our case studies, and the range of mimicking

strategiesthateachsub-stategovernmentemploysintheirparadiplomacies,willbeexplored

inmoredetailbelow.

I. Wales

ThesovereigntygamebeingplayedinWalesisonethatcouldbedescribedasvolatile.AsWyn

Jones&Scullyargue:“therecordofWelshconstitutionbuildingisarecordoffailure…the

successiveedificesconstructedhavebeencharacterizedbyalmostcontinualinstability”(Wyn

JonesandScully,2012).Theoriginaldevolutiondispensationagreedin1998andgrantingonly

secondarylaw-makingpowerswasprofoundlyflawed.Theagreementwasreplacedin2006

byanewGovernmentofWalesActformallyseparatingtheNationalAssemblyandtheWelsh

Assembly Government and unlocking some primary lawmaking powers - though heavily

circumscribed.ThepowersoftheNationalAssemblywerefurtherenhancedin2011,allowing

full law-making powers - though still in limited areas conferred to the Assembly by

Westminster.DespitetwofurtherGovernmentofWalesActs,thescopeofthepowersheld

bytheNationalAssemblyforWalesarestillthesubjectofdebate,bothintermsofthespecific

issueareasoverwhichtheAssemblyhascompetence,andontheprincipleofaconferred,

ratherthanreserved-powers,modelofdevolution.Inadditiontothisconstitutionalvolatility,

otherfactorsleavetheirmarkonthenatureofthesovereigntygamebeingplayedinWales.

TheelectoraldominanceofWelshLabour,andthe‘clearredwater’historicallyseparating

WelshLabourfromitsnationalcounterparts,hasmeantthatthenation-buildingprojectin

Waleshasnotbeenmonopolisedbyasub-statenationalistparty,butratherhasbeenamore

inclusiveproject towhichpartiesacross thepolitical spectrumseemtosubscribe to,with

greaterorlesserenthusiasm(RoylesandWynJones,2010:253).Inmorerecenttimes,there

is a sense thatUK-wide Labour party has insteadmoved to the ‘left’ ofWelsh Labour; a

different dynamic perhaps, but the key element of differentiation remains. Lastly, party

politicalincongruenceacrossthewholeoftheUKmeansthattherearemorethantwoplayers

in this sovereignty game: Scotland is used as a reference point, to seek additional or

reconfiguredpowersandtoprovideprecedentandcontextforWales’externalrelations.The

natureofthisgameasitplaysoutinaparadiplomaticframeisexploredbelow.

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ThewaysinwhichtheNationalAssemblyforWales,asadevolvedlegislature,engagesinthe

projectofnation-building is particularly illuminating, andpoints to theways inwhich the

mantleofnationhoodaddsprestigeandlegitimacytodifferenttiersofgovernment(Lecours

andMoreno,2001;Lecours,2002;Keating,1999).TheNAfWcanbeseentohavecarvedout

adistinctiveapproachtoparadiplomacy,onethatwasledthematicallybytheprioritiesofits

Presiding Officer, Welsh Labour’s Rosemary Butler between 2011-2016.55 These themes

definedabody-widestrategyadoptedfor internationalengagement,basedaroundcitizen

engagement,e-democracy,sustainabilityandscrutiny.Addedtothislististheissueofgender

equality,whichthePresidingOfficerprofiledinanumberofinwardvisitsandpublicevents.56

According to senior officials within the Assembly, the point of distinction between their

approach to paradiplomacy and that of the Welsh Government is that, where the

Government requires economic outputs from its interactions, the Assembly is “driven by

democraticgoals”.57Thedesiretobeseenas“abeaconforlearning”-forexamplesharing

bestpracticeonscrutinywithAfricanParliamentsofasimilarsizetoWales’devolvedbody-

speaks clearly to a strategyofmimicry; promotingdominant international norms to third

countries-mimickingthediplomaticanddemocracypromotionrolesofWesternstates-isa

waytoevidencetheirprevalencewithinWalesitself.Asanationbuildingmechanism,this

allows the nation and the values it embodies - as a young, transparent and tolerant

democracy,“small, smartandsuccessful” (Royles,2010) - tobecommunicatedexternally,

demonstratingtotheinternationalcommunityitscommitmenttothesenormsbyespousing

themelsewhere.Thisformofmimicryalsoactstobuildthenationinternally,bringingthe

prestigeofaninternationaleducator,anexemplarinthefieldofdemocracybuilding,backto

thehomefront.

TheWelshGovernment’sparadiplomaticactivitiesalsohaveastronglinktosuchdominant

international norms, despite the economic rationales that are frequently cited. This is

particularlyapparent inthewaysthattheirdiplomaticendeavours feed intothe ‘myth’of

Welshradicalism(WynJonesandRoyles,2012)andthe‘clearredwater’betweentheWelsh

55Interviewdata,SeniorNationalAssemblyforWalesofficials,201356Interviewdata,SeniorNationalAssemblyforWalesofficials,201357Interviewdata,SeniorNationalAssemblyforWalesofficials,interview2013

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andUKLabourparties.WynJonesandRoylesexploretherolethatWelshparadiplomacyplays

in identity-building, finding that this has not primarily been seen in themobilisation of a

territorialcleavagebyasingleparty,butinallparties’responsestotheemergenceofone.

Suchevidencecanperhapsbededucedfromthefactthat-asinScotland-itwasLabourand

Conservativepoliticianswho“playedtheleadingroleinsub-statediplomacy”.Thiswaspartly

becauseofthe“politicalusefulnessofsub-statediplomacyforsuch‘unionist’politiciansasa

meansofundermining‘nationalistclaimsthatindependenceisaprerequisiteforengagement

ininternationalaffairs”(WynJonesandRoyles,2012:253).However,theauthorscontinue

withtheirsuspicionsthattherewasmorethansimpleinstrumentalismatplayintheWelsh

case,arguingthat“membersofstate-widepartiesmaywellsupportthedevelopmentofsub-

statediplomaticactivitynotonly toheadoff ‘theNats’butalsobecause they themselves

subscribetoanationbuildingprojectatthesub-statelevel”(2012:253).Thisnation-building

project, the authors argue, can explainmuch of theWelsh Government’s paradiplomatic

activity;“inparticular,theprogrammeexpressedadesiretoprojectacertainvisionofWelsh

nationhoodthatstressesinternationalismasacoreelementofthe‘radicaltradition’,itself

oneoftheconstitutivemythsofWelshpolitics”(WynJonesandRoyles,2012:260).InWales,

theinformalityofmuchparadiplomaticactivityallowsforadistinctidentitytobeplayedout

inamultitudeofwaysthattranscendtherelativelynarrowscopeoftheWelshGovernment’s

authority under their current devolution dispensation. Furthermore, the coherence of

paradiplomatic activities around the themes of international development - including

brandingWalesa‘thefirsteverfairtradenation’,theprotectionofminoritylanguagesand

actiononclimatechangeseemstosuggestastrategicalignmentwithdominantinternational

norms,bolsteringitsnation-buildingproject.

Onewouldassumethatpartypoliticalcongruenceorincongruence(where"governmentsat

differentlevelswithinastateareledbydistinctpoliticalparties”(McEwanetal.,2012:187)–

would matter greatly in a sub-state sovereignty game. However, evidence from Wales

demonstratesthattherelationshipbetweenthesetwovariablesisnotatallstraightforward;

constitutionalissuesandterritorialcleavagescross-cutthemoretraditionalleft-rightaxisof

theUK’spartypoliticalsystem.Aswehaveseen,itisnotjustsub-statenationalistpartieswho

engageinnation-building,utilisingparadiplomacyintheprocessesand-likewise-it isnot

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necessarilythecasethatparty-politicalincongruencewillalwaysmanifestinanantagonistic

paradiplomaticstance.ThecasesofWalesisinfactquitecomplexinthisregard.Despitea

furtherdegreeofincongruencebetweenWelshandUKGovernmentsfollowingtheformation

of a Conservative - Liberal Democrat coalition Government in Westminster in the 2010

Parliament(whereaspreviouslyaWelshLabour-PlaidCymrucoalitioninWalesandaLabour

GovernmentinWestminsteralignedthetwoGovernmentsalongleft-leaningterms),there

remainedasurprisinglevelofcontinuityintermsofWelshparadiplomaticactivity.Thiscould

partlybeattributedtotherebeingalesspressingneedforthegroup-interestdefinitionand

territorial-mobilizationfunctionsofparadiplomacy,giventhatthedomesticagendasofthe

two governments are already divergent to a significant degree. Indeed, one Welsh

intervieweepointstothefactthat,contrarytowhatonemightexpect:

TherealdivisionwithintheUKintermsofpolicydynamics,fromtheWelshcontext,isnotbetweentheLabourpartyinWalesandtheConservativepartyat theUK level, the real difference is between Cardiff Bay andWhitehall…whoeverisinpoweratWestminsterandWhitehall,itisstillWestminsterandWhitehall… in the internationalcontext, that’s themore importantdivision,it’sthedivisionbetweendifferenttiersofgovernment.Thisisprobablymoresignificant, in away, than the difference between the parties, the politicaldifference.58

That this divisionbetweendifferent tiers of governmentwas the salientone, rather than

anythingmorepartypolitical, lendweighttotheargumentthat - ratherthanbeingabout

specificissuesorparty-politicaldynamics,thesovereigntygameisfirstandforemostabout

relativepower and subjectivity.Additionally, the existenceof party-political incongruence

between Welsh Labour and the (then) Conservative-Liberal Democrat UK Government

coalition actually enabled inter-governmental relations thatwere in someways improved

fromthestatus-quoante.AccordingtothesameWelshGovernmentinterviewee:

Inasense,when…thecoalitiongovernmentcameinthreeyearsago,therewas probably an element of sort of mutual relief… at that point, if theadministrationheredisagreeswiththeadministrationthere,itfeelsentitledtosaysoveryfreelyandveryeasily,there’snoembarrassmentaboutsayingsoandtheyexpectthatandtheyacceptit.Where,ofcourse,withtheLabouradministrationstheyhadtoburythemandthesesortofsubterraneancables

58Interviewdata,seniorWelshGovernmentofficial2013

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werelaidinplace,everythinghadtobeunder-ground,inacuriouswaynowitisalittlebiteasiertodisagree.Yes,there’stension,everyoneexpectstheretobetension,youcantalkaboutthetensionsnow.59

This‘mutualrelief’hasbeenenabled,however,bythefactthattheincomingUKGovernment

coalitionhasnotattemptedto‘clampdownorinhibitourabilitytooperateinthisspace”,

insteadhonouringthe“protocolandprecedentswhichexist”.60However,currentUKpolitical

discussionaroundBrexitwillundoubtedlyintroducenewstrainsonthisrelationship,notleast

becausethe‘stakes’arenowsomuchhigher.

InWales,therefore,weseeaclearattempttoaligna‘newdemocracy’withdominant,liberal

andinternationalistnorms.TheWelshGovernment’smimicryofboththisparticularnarrative

andmorebroadlyofthesymbolsandlanguageofstatenesscanbeconstruedaspartofan

attempttobuildthenationdomestically,toenhancethecredibilityofWalesasa‘realplayer’,

deserving of a seat at the international table. Specifically, paradiplomacy - owing to its

informal, largely non-statutory nature - enablesWales to perform sovereignty in amore

visible and arguably convincingmanner than it is traditionally allowed, within its narrow

purviewofconferredpowers.Thismeansthatitremainsaparticularlyeffectivetoolforthe

WelshGovernment,andseemstorepresentacoreelementofitsbroadersovereigntygame

andefforts toreposition itself inrelationbothtotheUKGovernmentandotherdevolved

nations.

II. Scotland

ThesovereigntygamethatScotlandplaysisonewithheightenedstakes.UnlikeinWalesor

Bavaria,theprospectofanindependent-i.e.fullysovereign-Scotlandisacredibleone;the

Scottish Government in 2014 directly raised this prospect through a referendum of the

Scottishelectorate.Althoughthevoteresultinanarrow‘no’toScottishindependence,the

59Interviewdata,seniorWelshGovernmentofficial201360Interviewdata,seniorWelshGovernmentofficial2013

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gamewasindeliblymarkedbythemovesmade-bothbytheScottishGovernmentincalling

forthevote,andbytheUKGovernmentinitsacknowledgementoftherightoftheScottish

peopletoultimatelydecideoncontinuedmembershipoftheUnion.Thegameisalsomarked

bytherecentparty-politicaldominanceoftheSNP,adominancethat‘ought’tohavebeen

impossibleunderthevotingarrangementsagreedfortheScottishParliament(Cairney,2011:

2)and,asinthecaseofEuropeanpost-colonialsovereigntygames,isoftenplayedoutwith

referencetotheEU-inparticular,withthenarrativeofanindependentScotlandintegrated

withinaEuropeanUnion.

Just as the nature of the sovereignty game in Scotland stands apart fromour other case

studies,Scotland’snation-buildingproject,andtherolethatparadiplomacyplayswithinit,is

alsomarkedlydifferent to that evident inWales andBavaria. Formany statelessnations,

Walesincluded,independence-aneventualstatecorrespondingwiththenation-isnotthe

overridingaimofnationbuildingefforts,at leastnot inthemediumtermperspective.For

Scotlandhowever,alongsidenationssuchasCataloniaandFFlanderss, there isarguablya

moreexplicitprogrammeofstatebuildingthatistheperceivedend-pointof‘softer’nation

building strategies. In these instances, the value of sub-state diplomacy is potentially

heightened:notonlydomimickingstrategiesenhancethecredibilityofthestatelessnation,

by allowing it to appear a natural bedfellow of established states, they also allow an

alternative‘state’messagetobecommunicated,differentiatingthestatelessnation-interms

ofitsstyleofdiplomacyorinternationalpolicy-fromthehoststate.Thistwin-trackapproach,

seekingbothcredibilityasaninternational‘player’anddistancefromthehoststate,wasvery

much in evidence in the period leading up to Scotland’s independence referendum in

September2014,anditisherethatthisanalysiswillfocus.TheScottishGovernment’swhite

paperon independence setsout, ina chapteron international relationsanddefence, the

pointsofdifferentiationenvisagedundertheconditionsofa ‘yes’voteinthereferendum.

SeveralthemesemergethataremarkedintheirexplicitdistancingfromUKpolicy:levelsof

militaryspending,approachestonuclearweaponry,attitudestowardstheEuropeanUnion,

the relative importance of international consensus and coalition building, the placing of

constitutional ‘locks’ on military action, and the value of international development and

peace-building.

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Introducingthissectionofthewhitepaper,theScottishGovernmentlayouttheiralternative

visionforforeignanddefencepolicypost-independence:

Under our plans, Scotland’s foreign, security and defence policies will begroundedinaclearframeworkofparticipatinginrules-basedinternationalco-operation to secure shared interests, protecting Scotland’s people andresourcesandpromotingsustainableeconomicgrowth(ScottishGovernment,2013b:206).

So far, so uncontroversial; though there does seem to be an implied rebuke to the UK

Government in this statement. Indeed, the chapter then moves on to draw lines of

comparisonbetweentheenvisagedapproachofan independentScotlandandthecurrent

andhistoricalinternationalpoliciesoftheUKGovernment,lamentingthefactthat“weare

representedbyaWestminsterGovernmentthathasbaseditsactionstoooftenondifferent

international priorities.We see thatmost clearly inmatters ofwar andpeace and inour

relationshipwiththeEU”(ScottishGovernment,2013b:209).Drawingthisdistinctionmost

markedly,thewhitepapercontinues:

WhiletheUKseeksanabilitytoprojectglobalpower,anindependentScotlandcan choose a different approach. If in government, we will direct ourinternational efforts, first and foremost, into deepening and consolidatingrelationshipswith friendsandpartners,newandold,across theworldand,throughthis,expandingopportunitiesforpeopleandbusinessesinScotland(ScottishGovernment,2013b:210).

WhiledistancinganindependentScotlandfromtherestoftheUK,thewhitepaperisalso

keentodrawallegiancesandmakereferencetoexistingstateswhoseapproachestoforeign

policyweremoreorlessinlinewiththatbeingproposed.Thisstrategyfurtherevidencesthe

Scottish Government’s twin track approach to its nation-building efforts: at once placing

Scotlandhappilyamongstacohortofothersmall,liberaldemocraciesandatthesametime

allowingtheirdistinctiveness,andthespecificvaluesofScotlandasastatelessnation,indeed

state-in-waiting, to be articulated. The first element of this strategy is exemplified in the

followingpassage:

Scotlandstartswithanenviablereputationandastronginternationalidentity.Ourinternationalbrandisoneofourmostimportantassetsasacountry.Evenwithout independent status, Scotland’s international brand value alreadyranks15thoutof50nations,accordingtointernationalcomparisonspublishedin2012.Scotlandhascontinuallyscoredhighlyandisrankedsimilarlyto-and

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oftenaheadof - other comparably-sized, high incomedemocracies suchasDenmark, Finland, Ireland and New Zealand (Scottish Government, 2013b:210-211).

OncethesimilarqualitiesofScottishandotherrelativelysmall,liberaldemocracieshavebeen

established, the white paper then moves on to transposing those aspects of Scottish

nationhood, their national values of tolerance, openness and pragmatism, onto the

frameworkofforeignanddefencepolicy.Theimplicitcontrastrunningthroughthefollowing

passageisthatbetweensuchvalue-ledapproachestointernationalaffairsthatdrawstrongly

onsoft-powerresourcesandarecoheredaroundarespectforcoalitionsandmultilateralism,

versusthemilitarismanduni-orbilateralismoftheUKstate-whoseoverseasfootprintis

basedon “an imperial past” and “adesire formoreglobalpower” (ScottishGovernment,

2013b:211):

An independent Scotland canemulate comparable countrieswith themosteffective approach to international affairs: soundly based policies whichenable the country to engage seriously and competitively in the world;rigorous priorities for our international focus; and the right externalrelationshipstoadvanceandprotectour interests.CountriesofcomparablesizetoScotlandtake leadroles in internationalorganisations.Sweden,NewZealand,SwitzerlandandFinlandhaveallmadesignificantglobalcontributionsto security, peace and reconciliation initiatives. New Zealand, for example,playedakeyroleintheOsloProcessthatbannedclusterbombsandsimilarweapons.Thesenationscapitaliseontheirsoftpowerandbuildcoalitions-normallyinformalandrelatedtospecificissues-toadvancetheirobjectives.Theeffectivenessofa coalition lies less in the sheernumbers involvedandmoreintheirabilitytodevelopstrongandsoundargumentsfornegotiations(ScottishGovernment,2013b:225).

ThedistinctionbetweenanindependentScotland’sinternationalpoliciesandthoseoftheUK

isdrawnmostclearlywithregardstodefencepolicy,andnuclearweaponrymorespecifically,

asthefollowingpassagedemonstrates:

AnindependentScotlandwillhavetheopportunitytodecideourowndefenceprioritiestoensureoursecurity,inpartnershipwithouralliesandwithinthewiderinternationalcommunity.ItwillbethepeopleofScotland,throughourParliamentwhowilldecidewhetherornotouryoungmenandwomenaresent towarandwecanchoose, throughourwrittenconstitution, toput inplace safeguards to ensure that Scottish forceswill only ever participate inmilitaryactivitythatisinternationallyrecognisedaslawfulandinaccordancewiththeprinciplesoftheUNcharter(ScottishGovernment,2013b:234).

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InsteadoftheUK’sperceivedmilitarism,anindependentScotlandwouldinstead“createan

approachtodefencethatpositionsusaspartnersforpeaceinthewiderworld”,takingits

place as a non-nuclearmember of NATO and committing to the compete withdrawal of

Trident.Partofthisnewapproachwouldbethedevelopmentofawrittenconstitutionfor

Scotland,banningnuclearweaponsonScottishsoilandincludinga ‘triple lock’onmilitary

deployments (ScottishGovernment,2013b:235-236). The inclusionof thispolicy -on the

developmentofawrittenconstitution-allowsforthefurtherdistancingofanindependent

ScotlandfromtheUKanditsarcane,perhapsoutdatedunwrittenconstitutionandthe‘old

boy’s club’ of Westminster politics. Instead, it places the Scottish nation amongst an

assemblage of modern, liberal, democracies who prioritise an open and accountable

parliamentaryprocess.

These particularmoves,made by Scotland in its sovereignty games throughout the 2014

referendum process, all highlight the broader strategy that Scotland employs in its

paradiplomacy.Specifically,itmimicsacertaintypeofstate:asmall,liberaldemocracyakin

toitsNordicneighbours.Duringthereferendum,thenatureofthesovereigntygamechanged

asadirectchallengewasmadetotherelativepowerdistributionbetweenScotlandandthe

UK;itwasnolongeraboutaseatatthetableasa‘potential’state.

III. Bavaria

ThesovereigntygameevidentinBavariaisonepremisedonanaltogethersounderandmore

settledconstitutionalarrangementbetweenitandtheFederalGovernment.UnlikeinWales

and Scotland, the power dispersal between state and sub-state government is both

(reasonably) clear and stable. Instead, the game is played largely with reference to the

financialburdenandresponsibilitybornebyBavaria,withoccasionalmovesmadetoremind

theFederalandotherLandGovernmentsofthiswillingactofself-sacrifice.Thehistoryof

Bavaria as a sovereign is frequently played on and referenced as a way to push at the

boundariesoftheirformalconstitutionalcapabilities,inareassuchasEUrepresentationand

policy input -witha key componentof its sovereignty gamesbeing the resistanceof any

further encroachment (as the Bavarian Government sees it) by the EU on their own

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competences.Therefore,whilethesovereigntygamesbeingplayedinBavariamaybe‘milder’

than those in ScotlandandWales,bothofwhom - indifferentways -want to recast the

relationshipbetweenstateandsub-stategovernment, thegamedoes indeedharness the

discursive power of sovereignty in appealing to the special status of Bavaria within the

German Federation. In the current political climate,whereBavaria’sGovernmentwish to

exertaconservativemoderatingforceontheFederalCoalition,thisgameisplayedinmultiple

arenas-boththroughtheactionsoftheBavarianStateGovernment,andthroughthePrime

Minister’sroleintheFederalGovernment.

ForBavaria,thewaysthatparadiplomaticactivityfeedintoitsnation-buildingprojectstand

apartfromthosedemonstratedinWalesandScotland.Almostentirelyabsentareappealsto

dominant,liberal,internationalnorms.Instead,thehistoryofBavariaasan‘ancientstate’,

andboththepoliticalandeconomicpowerthatitcurrentlywieldswithintheGermanFederal

Republicare theresourcesuponwhich itdraws in itsmimicryofstatehood.Thematically,

Bavarianparadiplomacyinfactdepartsfromsuchdominantnorms,reflectingaconservative

agendathatiswarybothofEuropeanintegrationandbroadermigration.Thenationthatis

reflectedandbolsteredthroughsuchengagements,therefore,isonewhoselegitimacystems

fromtheessentialtenetsofstatehood:effectiveness,influenceandthehistoricalarchitecture

ofafullyfledgedsovereign.Whatisbeingmimicked,inthiscase,isnotthespecificdiscourse

ofdominantinternationalnorms,butinsteadtheefficiencyandeconomicactornessofastate

perse.The internationalpersonalitythat iscreated,however, isalsoonethatreflectsthe

national distinctiveness of the Bavarian people, both rebellious and self-assured in their

traditions;traitsthattheconservativeparadiplomacyofthestateperformsforthebenefitof

domesticandinternationalaudiences.

ThenarrativeofBavarianstatehoodisthusoneofaneffectiveandancientstate,willingly

relinquishinganelementofsovereigntytobelongtotheGermanFederation,butevermindful

ofthefactthatitpossesssuchstate-likequalitiesinitsownright.Bavaria’scurrentborders

are“almostidentical”toitsorigins:“theshapehassomehowbeentransformedbydifferent

events,butthecoreofitisstilltheresince1500years”.ImportanttoBavaria’scurrentstatus

istheperiodofWiltesbarkrule,between1180and1919,analmost800yearperiodof“one

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singledynasty leadingthispartof theworldandshaping its identity”.Thisstable identity,

combinedwiththegeographicalpositionofBavaria,allowedittooccupyaparticularplacein

thehistoryofEuropeasa‘middlepower’:

Bavariahasalwaysbeenakindofamiddlepowerinsidealltheseturmoilithasconsidered itself - ithasstrivedtobe-amore importantpower,bymaybetryingtobecomeking,theKaiser,orEmperor,andhasalwayshadcoalitions,it has always beenmarked.Munich has never achieved the ambitions thatwere there to Paris, Vienna, Berlin and Rome - because these are reallydescribedthefour,thequadranglethatwearelocatedinthecentreof,whichhasalwaysshapedthespecialinfluence.61

ThisnarrativeisoneinextricablyboundwiththepoliticalidealsandobjectivesofBavaria’s

dominantparty,theCSU-apartywhoseverysuccessisinturnboundupintheirabilityto

carveoutandmobiliseadistinctterritorialcleavageinthestate’spolitics(Sutherland,2001).

According to Hepburn, the CSU hasmobilised a Bavarian identity “as part of its political

project”(Hepburn,2008a:184-185),andtheirabilitytoharnesstheideaofBavariancultural

distinctivenesshasbeenkeytotheirgainingpoliticalpower(HepburnandHough,2012:93).

TheinternationalstageisaparticularlyusefulonewhenitcomestoarticulatingthisBavarian

identity. Speaking in relation to the choiceof the term ‘nation’ todescribeBavaria, in an

English-speakingcontext,HepburnseessuchdeclarationsasevidenceoftheCSU’sdesirefor

Bavaria“tobeconsideredasadistinctpoliticalandculturalentityonaparwiththestateless

nationsofthedevelopedworld”(Hepburn,2008a:185).Asamoveinthesovereigntygame,

Bavariaisappealingtoothersub-stategovernmentsinternationallyandclaimingmembership

ofthismoreexclusiveclubofnations.ThereisarelateddesireonthepartofBavarianofficials

and politicians for their international activities to reflect and reaffirm Bavaria’s ‘special

history’;ahistorythatprovidesenduringlyrelevantreferencepointsinanexplanationofhow,

andwhy,Bavaria’sparadiplomacyhasevolvedtoitscurrentstate.Thefollowingextractfrom

an interviewwitha seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,discussing the leadershipofKing

Maximilianduringthe30yearswar,demonstratesthislinkagewell.62

His philosophy was to lead an internal reform of the state, not a reformthroughreformationbutinternalreform.HecalledupontheJesuitshecalled

61Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentOfficial,201362Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,interview2013

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on theDominicans and other clergy that should conduct a reform. And heconducted a reform of the state and he reigned over Bavaria… during thisperiodthewarofthirtyyearsandhecameoutwithalmostabalancedbudget.Sothisisreallyacomparison,Idon’twanttodrawtheseparallelstoooftenbut this was a remarkable man, his decisions shaped really Bavaria anddeterminedthepositionofBavaria insidethethenconfessionallyseparatedpartsofGermany,itwasreallyhismarkthatheleftuponBavaria.63

Indeed,itsdistinctivehistorybindsBavariatothevery“birthofEurope”.64Thiscentralityto

the major events in European and latterly German history has left Bavaria with a self-

assuredness that marks it apart from other German Länder, and is reflected in their

understandingoftherelationshipbetweentheFederationandstategovernments:

Soin1946theBavarianconstitutionwhichisnowourconstitutionwasmade,andin1949,onlyin1949,theGermanconstitution.SoitsanimportantfacttonotethattheLänderwereconstitutedbeforethefederalrepublicofGermany,anditwastheLänderthatsattogetheranddrafted-underthesupervisionofthealliedforces-anewconstitutionforGermanyandthenvotedonit.AndBavariavotedagainstthenewconstitutionbecauseitwassaidtohavetoofewfederalist elements - in our case federalismmeans centrifugal rather thancentripetalpowers-andso,butatthesametimeitwasdecidedthatifalltheothersacceptedwewouldgothroughanyway.Sothisiswhathappened.AndthenwebecamepartofthisnewfederalrepublicofGermany,Bavariawasoneofthe-youcanseebythename-wasoneofthestateswhowasleftfairlyuntouched in its historical shape, unlike all those who have these hyphennames,youcanseeitbythehyphenthattheyarecomposedasnewentities.65

The legacy of Bavaria’s unbroken identity, its centrality to the ‘birth of Europe’ and its

historical‘middlepower’statusisthatitseesitselfasapolitywithmuchtoteachincipient

states.Akeystrandofitsinternationalactivitiesrelatetothesupport-whatmightotherwise

betermeddemocracyassistance-ofcountriesinCentral,EasternandSouth-EastEurope“on

thewayintotheEU”.Itis,inotherwords,normativeparadiplomacy.Specifically,theBavarian

Governmentfocuseson:“thefightagainstorganisedcrime,cross-bordercooperationamong

administrative bodies, the exchange of expertise and qualification of executive staff”,

63Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,201364Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,201365Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,interview2013

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primarily through the frameworkof twinningprojects. Examples includeexperts from the

Bavarian judiciary providing advice on legislation in countries of Eastern and South-East

Europeinfieldssuchasunder-coverinvestigationandthefightagainstcorruption,andthe

advisoryserviceofBavarianadministrativepersonnelonissuesinvolvingstatesupervisionof

localauthorities(BayerischeStaatskanzlei,2010).Thisformofnormativeparadiplomacymay

notfollowtheprecisetrajectoryofinternationaldevelopmentprojectsinWalesandScotland,

andthebroadernarrativesaroundthemmaydiffer,yettheemphasison‘officialtoofficial’

learning and exchange is really quite similar to the reciprocal approach to sustainable

developmentthatisatthecentreofboththeWalesforAfricaandScotlandLesothoprojects.

Themimicryof this typeof lowprofile, pragmaticdemocracyassistance is alsoa formof

diplomacythatdemonstratesitsstate-likequalitiesinapragmaticway,focussedonexpertise

andexperience.Thisparadiplomacy thusdisplays thoseattributesofBavariannationhood

thatarepremisedonitshistoryasanancientstateanditsoverallcompetenceandpolitical

prowesswithinaFederalstructure.

ContrastedwithWales’paradiplomacy-drawingonthe‘mythofWelshradicalism’-Bavaria’s

paradiplomacydrawsonperceptionsofefficiencyandtransparency,demonstrablyapartof

theself-identificationoftheBavariannation.DemocracyassistanceinCentral,Easternand

South-EastEuropealsobuildsonaspectsofBavariannationhoodthatrelatetoitsmorerecent

history - and indeed the aspect of ‘self-sacrifice’ implied in its ratification of theGerman

Constitution despite the perceived lack of protection for Länder autonomy. Perhaps in a

consciousrejoindertoitslegacyasthebirthplaceoftheNazimovement,Bavaria’sresponse

toGermanreunificationinthe1990spresentedanopportunitytorecastthenationinamore

positivelight,willinglyabsorbingsignificanteconomiccostforthebenefitoftheFederation

asawhole:

In 1990 with the unification came the enlargement or the unification ofGermanywhichledagain,Bavariapositioneditselftobeproudtobepartofthis–it’sanunquestionedsituationthat,nobodyeverinBavariawithalltheseparatism that is part of our political folk lore, has never questioned theunificationprocess.Idon’tknowifitissurprisingbutitisnoteworthy,thatthis

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issomethingthatwasevenwithalltheeconomicdifficulties,hasneverbeenquestioned.66

After German reunification, the population of Bavaria expanded significantly, leading the

state to become “muchmore German and international than it used to be”, leading the

reunificationphasetomark“anotherera”inthestate’sdevelopment,allofwhichfeedinto

itscurrentnation-buildingexercises.67

Theparadiplomacyofsub-stategovernmentsreflectshugelydifferentlevelsofcontestation.

Of course, whether or not a region cooperates with state-activities, or adopts a more

confrontationalstancecanvaryonanadhocbasis,butitcanalsobediscernedasanoverall

featureofparadiplomaticstrategy,intermsoftheprevalenceofoneapproachovertheother.

IntheGermancontext,Bavariaiskeentostressthatitconducts‘foreignaffairs’,ratherthan

‘foreign policy’, a reserved area of activity which remains solely the purview of Berlin,

something which Criekemans argues is reflected in the limited number of ‘political’

representationsthatitmaintainsabroad(Criekemans,2010b:41).However,despitethefact

thatBavaria’sCSUisacorememberoftheFederalGovernmentcoalition,thediplomacyof

Bavariacouldbeinterpretedasbeingslightlymoreconflictual-oratleastassertive-thanone

mightexpect.Bavarianofficialshavespokenoftheroleof‘criticalfriend’thattheyareable

andwillingtoplayintermsoftheirparadiplomacy,vis-à-vistheFederalgovernment.Thisrole

is facilitated both by the constitutional stability of the Federal Republic and Bavaria’s

individualstrengthwithinit;“nooneisreallyquestioningussowecanaffordtobethecritical

partnerwithoutquestioningfederalismasawhole…wearestrongregionswithinastable

state”.68Thisroleofcriticalfriendentailsadegreeofpolitical‘play’;withinanoverall“spirit

ofcooperation”,thereremains“somesport,there’sapoliticallanguage-weareBavarians

andsoweplaywiththeimages”.69TheBavarianCSUpositionsitself,quitecarefully,as“abit

more right” thanMerkel’sBerlin, aspartof a “good-cop,bad-cop routine” related to the

unique position of the state within the Federal coalition government. Bavaria’s recent

66Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,2013.67Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,2013.68Interviewdata,seniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial201369Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013

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responsetomassmigration-thistimefromoutsideEurope-hasinturndemonstratedthe

limits to its openness, and has precipitated amore ‘hard-line’ diplomatic stancewhen it

comestoissuesaroundmigration.

Indeed,theweightofBavaria-inpoliticalandeconomicterms–seemstomakeitparticularly

attractiveasathepartnerfortheFederalGovernmentinmanyinternationalendeavours;the

claimfromaseniorBavarianGovernmentofficialisthatotherGermanstatesareinsomeway

“envious” of the extent that they are able to cooperatewith the Federal Government, a

positiondeemedunavailabletootherGermanLänderbecausetheysimply“don’thavethe

budgets”.70Itisthiscombinationofaneconomicallyprivilegedposition,withthehistorical

weightandcurrentpoliticalsignificanceofBavaria-andtheleadersofitsgoverningCSU-

thatseemstoallowBavariatocarveitsownrelationswithstates,notablyGreeceandthe

CzechRepublic,andtoensurethatitseuro-scepticismisheardveryclearlyonbothGerman

andEuropeanstages.71Thisconservativeapproachtointernationalpoliticsmayalsomanifest

asaconstrainingforcewithintheFederalCDU-CSUcoalition,thoughthis‘behindthescenes’

influence is harder to assess. The public criticism of ChancellorMerkel’s response to the

2016/2016-refugee crisis from Bavarian State Premier Horst Seehofer and other CSU

politicians indicates thatsuchpressures,on issueswithkey foreignpolicy implications,do

indeedexistwithintheFederalcoalitionGovernment(DeutscheWelle,2015).

The Bavarian Government’s paradiplomacy thus reflects both its own, autonomous,

internationalstanding-asanhistoricallyimportantpower-andthedesiretoensurethatit

maintains its privileged position with relation the Federal Government. In other words,

Bavaria’suniquepositionwithinGermany-andtheroleof‘criticalfriend’thatitplaystothe

FederalGovernment-bothfacilitateandmotivateitsparadiplomacy.Theinternationalstage

offersanimportantarenaforBavaria’sculturalandpoliticaldistinctivenesstobeperformed

for the benefit of multiple audiences: both within the state and the Federation. The

sovereigntygamebeingplayedinBavariais,inmany-perhapssubtle–ways,differenttothat

70Interview,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,201371Interview,seniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial,2013

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in bothWales and Scotland. Bavaria has always occupied an unusual positionwithin the

broadlystableGermanFederation:aprevioussovereignstatewithaparticularly longand

consistent ‘un-hyphenated’ history,72 it was the only Länder to reject the German

Constitution,beforeeventuallyratifyingitfortheperceived‘greatergood’.Ithasbeenthe

mostactiveLänderinparadiplomatictermsandhasconsistentlypushedattheboundariesof

its legal competence, particularly in the representative functions of its overseas offices,

notablyinBrussels.TheBavarianGovernmenthasplayedonthisspecialstatusinthemoves

that itmakesaspartof theirbroader sovereigntygame:using thesemarkersasaway to

safeguard its competences (which it seesasunder threat fromEuropean integration)and

regionaldistinctiveness.

Conclusion

Webeganthischapterwithreferencetotheeconomicrealitiesfacingsub-stategovernments,

anditisworthbrieflyreturningtothatstartingpoint.Allparadiplomaticactivityrepresents

an expenditure of resource: whether that is the running costs of a full overseas office,

entertainingvisitingVIPs,theplaneticketsandhotelroomsrequiredfor ‘overseasjaunts’,

theadministrativeburdenofbelongingtonetworks,signingMemorandaofUnderstanding-

eventheMinisterialtimeandenergiesinvolvedinresponding,via.pressrelease,toglobal

issuesorcrises.Thecurrentfinancialcontextfacingsub-stategovernments,atleastinEurope,

isstraightened,andgovernmentatalllevelsfacesnewexpectationsintermsofaccountability

for themoney that theyspend.Given this, thequestionofwhysub-stategovernments in

thesecircumstancesstillpursueparadiplomacy-where itdoesnotprovideanobvious,or

arguable,economicreturnonpreciousinvestment-isonethatweshouldcontinuetoask.

Theanswerisn’teasilydeducible.Veryrarelyisthereasingle,clearandrationalecalculation

thatwe can point to. Do sub-state governments use paradiplomacy to ‘build the nation’

domestically?Yes,undoubtedly.Inreality,however,theydothisinvariouswayandtovarious

ends.Thevalueasovereigntygamesmetaphorliesinallowingustoconsiderthismultitude

72Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013

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ofmotivationsonthepartofallthecompositeplayers,themovesinthegamemadebothby

thesub-stategovernmentanditsnation-statecounterpart(orotheractors-withScotland

often providing a frame of reference for Wales’ sovereignty game), and the shifting,

expansionandcontractionoftherulesthatthegameoperatesunder.Inshort,itenablesus

toseeafullerpictureofthemorepoliticalmotivationsthatdriveparadiplomacy,anactivity

thatisoften-owingtothecloseassociationbetweeninternationalagencyandsovereignty

orstatehoodperse-astatementaboutrelativepowerandauthority.Thesestatementsare

notalwaysexplicit,nordomovesinthegamehavetoberationallydirectedtowardsanything

atallforthemtostillbe“meaningfullyconceivedasincludedinthegame”(Adler-Nissenand

Gad,2014:18).

Thesovereigntygamesbeingplayedineachofourcasestudiesdifferinimportantways:there

aredifferentconfigurationsofpowerbetweeneachofourcasesandtheirrespectivestate

governments, aswell as different systems of intergovernmental relations and degrees of

party-politicalcongruence.Though,perhapssurprisingly,eachcase-atdifferenttimesandin

differentways-utilisesthestrategyofmimicryinasimilarrangeofways:toappearasnatural

kintoexistingstates,todemonstrateadherencetodominant,liberalinternationalnormsand

to emphasise state-like capacities or effectiveness. The games themselves encompass a,

perhapsmoredistinct,varietyofmoves:towardsindependenceinScotland,aprotectionof

existingcompetences inBavariaandan incrementalrebalancingofdevolvedandreserved

powersinWales.

And, yet. These sovereignty games are also remarkably similar. At heart, the gamebeing

played in each of these three cases is about the recognition of their ‘special’ status, as

somethingmorethana‘mereregion’.Sovereigntygames,togobacktoAddler-Nissenand

Gad’sconception,areabouttheveryconstitutionofoneoftheparties‘asapartytothegame’

itself(Adler-NissenandGad,2014:20).Inreachingandconductingthemselvesuponaworld

stage,making forays intoanareaofpolicy “so closelyarticulated to sovereignty that it is

considered the prerogative of the sovereign” (Adler-Nissen and Gad, 2014: 16),

paradiplomatsaredoingmorethansimplydealingwiththenecessaryoverspillofdomestic

competence.Insum;‘it’sallpolitical’.

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Chapter 5. Sub-state governments as International Agents: Learning to ‘Walk the

Walk’?

Introduction

Agency is a relatively unexplored concept in the field of paradiplomacy. That structural

dynamicshavetakentheforegroundinanalysesofsub-statediplomacyowesmuchtotiming;

regions and ‘stateless nations’ were (re)establishing themselves as units of political

significance just as the tide of globalisation, internationalisation and ‘intermestic’ politics

swepttheinternationalrelationsstage.Therewasclearlyanimportantinterplaybetweenthe

twophenomena.Theblurringofboundariesbetweenthedomesticandtheinternational,and

thoseseparating‘high’and‘low’politics,thediffusionofpoliticalauthorityamongststates

andneweractorsofincreasingsignificanceallimplicatedsub-stategovernmentsinstructures

and policy areas previously beyond their competences. Sub-state governments have

undoubtedlyusedthismorefavourablecontexttopursuetheir internationalambitions,at

othertimestheyhavebeenlesswillinglythrustintoareasthatareoutsidetheirchosenframe

ofreference.However,thenaturallinkagesbetweenthesetwobroadcategoriesofchange

and transformation do not necessarily embody a causal relationship, or at the least any

causalityisnotasatisfactoryexplanationfortheentiretyofparadiplomaticactivity.

Therelationshipbetweenthe‘new’contextandopportunitiesfacingsub-stategovernments

andthewaysinwhichtheychoosetoreacttoitisonethathasnotbeenfullyproblematized

withintheparadiplomacyliterature.ThekeyexceptionstothisrulearetheworksofLecours

(2007;2002;2008;LecoursandMoreno,2001),whohasexplicitlyaddressedthequestionof

sub-stateagencyinthecontextofnationbuildingandtheroleofparadiplomacyinidentity-

construction,andKeating(1999),whoattemptedtocategorisethemotivationsregionshad

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inpursuinginternationalprofiles;political,culturalandeconomic.Therelativesideliningof

agencyisallthemoresurprisinggiventhatthevarietyofsub-statediplomacyisoneof its

defining features. According to Criekemans (2010b: 39) “researching regional sub-state

diplomacy is sometimes like comparing appleswithpears: they look and tastedifferent”.

Whilstsome- indeedmuch-ofthisvarietycanbeaccountedforbystructuraldifferences

withintheregionorstatelessnationitself,intermsofforeignaffairscapacitiesforexample,

thereisclearlyanothersidetotheparadiplomacystory.Asexploredintheprecedingchapter,

thewaysinwhichsub-stategovernmentschoosetoparticipateininternationalaffairsseems

todependnotjustonthequalitiesoftheregionitselfbutonthepoliticalchoicesmadebyits

government,which in turnare informedby thedynamicsofparty competitionand inter-

governmentalrelationswithintheregionandthewiderstateitsitsinside.

Thischapterlooksindetailatthewaysinwhichdifferentsub-stategovernmentsconstruct

their international agency. In particular, it employs the framework of Performativity to

investigatethediscrete‘performances’thattellbothexternalactorsanddomesticaudiences

howthesub-stategovernmentseesitself,itsregionorstatelessnation,andtheplacethatit

aspires to on the world stage. A Performativity framework attempts to go beyond fixed

classifications of actors and capabilities and instead look at the actual interactions taking

place,andthemessagesthattheseactionsconveytobothinternalandexternalaudiencesin

the process. In important ways, this perspective overcomes the challenge of analysing

paradiplomaticactivitiesinawaythattakesintoaccounttheoften-conflictualmessagessent

byitscomponentactors:sub-statepoliticiansandofficialsaswellasdiplomatsatthenational

levelandthosefrom‘receiving’statesandregions.Relatingbacktothemetaphorofasub-

state sovereignty game, here we are examining the moves in the game: how the game

manifestsonaday-to-daybasisandtheways inwhichsub-stategovernmentsareableto

positionthemselvesascredibleinternationalagents.

Paradiplomacyisindeedafield,andapractice,fullofcontradictions.Ontheonehand,we

are told that sub-state internationalism is ‘all about theeconomy’,anecessaryactivity to

maintainandsupportone’sdomesticpolicyplatform.Yet,ontheother,thepoliticalrhetoric

thatsurroundseventhemostmundaneactivityhasclearovertonesofmuchgrander,and

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more overtly ‘diplomatic’ ambitions. And again, this political rhetoric then dissipates into

surprisinglyamicableworkingarrangementsandrelationsonthepartofofficialsinsub-and

nation-stategovernments.Inturn,the‘official’or‘party’linefromnation-stategovernments

isalternatelyoneofnon-acknowledgementofparadiplomacyasamatterofanysignificance,

toonewherethepracticeinfringesuncomfortablyonnationalcompetencesandthecohesive

diplomaticidentityofthestate.Moreover,sub-stategovernmentsmayuseparadiplomacyto

gainpowervis-à-visthecentralstate,whilstatthesametimethecentralstatemayusetheir

regions’paradiplomacyasa typeof ‘backchannel’,bolsteringnational foreignpolicy.The

frameworkofPerformativityallowsustoinvestigatetheempiricalpracticeofparadiplomacy

inawaythatbringstheseinherenttensionsandcontradictionstolight,tellingamuchmore

nuanced-and,hopefully,accurate-storyintheprocess.

InadditiontoemployingaPerformativityframework,thischapteralsoexplorestheroleof

legitimacyinitsanalysisofsub-stateagencycreation.Whenengagingdirectlyininternational

politics, sub-state governments display a range of strategies aimed at legitimising their

internationalactivities.Indeed,legitimacyisacrucialpartofinternationalactornessinandof

itself. Some opt to ‘mimic’ state-like diplomacy (McConnell et al., 2012), whereas others

choosetooperatemoreinthemodeofanNGO,focussingmore-or-lessexclusivelyonone

issuearea.Thischoicemanifestsinthenatureoftherelationshipssoughtandmaintainedon

theinternationalstage,andthese‘positionings’inturnarticulatedifferentmessagesabout

the perceived status of the sub-state government itself, and the broader international

positionthattheyaspireto.The‘legitimacyquestion’isafurtherareathattheparadiplomacy

literaturehasyettoaddressinanydepth.Yet,therangeoflegitimatingstrategiesthatsub-

stategovernmentsemploytoenhancetheirclaimstointernationalagencyareprobingnot

just for the study of paradiplomacy, but also for the ‘bigger’ questions of International

Relations. Questions such as: who ‘counts’ as an international actor? What weight do

internationalnormsandlogicsofappropriatenesscarryintheprocessofagencycreation?

Howisagencydeniedorconditionedbytheactivitiesofstatesorotheractors?Whatisthe

relationshipbetweeninternalandexternallegitimacy?

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Despitetheoverlapofterminology:mimicry,sovereigntygamesandlegitimacy,thefocusof

thischapterisdistinctfromtheoneimmediatelyprecedingit.Here,ratherthanconcerning

ourselves with the motivations that sub-state governments have for conducting their

paradiplomacies,andthewaysinwhichtheconfigurationsoftheiruniquesovereigntygames

influencethesedrivingforces,thefocusisinsteadonhowtheseactorsmanagetoexecute

theirstrategiesontheglobalstage.Inotherwords,itinvestigatestheprecisemoveswithin

thesovereigntygamethatallowsub-stategovernmentstodevelopaninternationalprofile:

learningto‘walkthewalk’and‘talkthetalk’ofdiplomats.

This chapter progresses as follows. After a brief introduction to the framework of

Performativityandadiscussionofitsapplicabilitytoparadiplomaticstudies,thesubsequent

section uncovers the precise ways in which sub-state governments attempt to bring

legitimacytotheirinternationalroles,bothinternallyandexternally,specificallylookingto

the framework of ‘mimicry’ as a particularly useful legitimising strategy. Finally, three

exampleswillbeexploredwhichdemonstratetherolethatanindividualperformance,ora

set of performances, can have in securing this legitimacy, as well as the processes of

contestation that go with it: the establishment of Bavaria’s ‘grand’ new European

representation;thelaunchofthe‘WalesforAfrica’developmentassistanceprogrammeand

ScottishdiplomacysurroundingthearrivaloftwoChinesePandasinanEdinburghzoo.The

arguments put forward here build on the idea that ‘lessons from the margins’ can be

particularlyilluminating(McConnelletal.,2012;Hocking,1999).Bylookingatthereal-life,

day-to-daypracticesofdiplomacyascarriedoutbyamarginalandcontesteddiplomaticactor

wecanpotentially learnsomethingmoreaboutdiplomacyand internationalpoliticsmore

generally.These implicationswill thenbeaddressed ingreaterdetail inchaptersixof this

thesis.

ParadiplomacyasPerformance:AnIntroductoryNote

Theframework-orvocabulary-ofPerformativityhassociologicalrootsandmaintainsloose

EnglishSchoolandconstructivistassociations,atleastwithinitsapplicationstoIRresearch;

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thoughitstheoreticalunderpinningsarenotablyfluidandvaried,drawingonaparticularly

widerangeofsources(inaninternationalpoliticscontextseeNeumann,2003;McConnellet

al.,2012;Barry,2013;Ringmar,2012;Weber,1998;Bueger,2011).AccordingtoNeumann

(2003:341):“insteadofassumingasetoffunctionsandastatestructureandthendeducing

asetoftruthclaimsfromtheseassumptions,agrowingnumberofscholarshavebegunto

scrutinize how world politics are actually performed”. This shift in focus allows for the

heterogeneityofinternationalpolitics,and,cruciallyforthepurposesofthischapter,lends

itselftoanexplorationofthewaysinwhichinternational‘agents’becomeso.

ArecentworkshoponthisthemeexploredthePerformativityframeworkinmoredetail.In

the context of controversial, or perhaps unexpected, ‘performances’ from a variety of

marginalinternationalrelationsactors,fromfinancialmarketstoarmedrebels,theworkshop

askedaseriesofquestions.Dodifferentperformancescreatedifferentqualitiesofagency?

Howare‘self’and‘other’linkedinperformancesofagency?Canperformancesofagencyfail,

andifsowhataretheconsequences?Howisagencydenied,sabotagedorde-constructed?

Theexplicittaskoftheworkshopwasto“makevisibletheworkthatgoesintotheproduction

ofactorsininternationalpolitics”.73

Forparadiplomaticinvestigations,thesequestionsareallkey.Sub-stategovernmentswere

traditionallythoughtofasdomesticallyboundactors,yettheyareincreasinglylookingtothe

international sphere, attempting to establish themselves as legitimate actors in this new

context.Thereforethere isaclearanddefinedprocessofagency-creationtobeexplored.

Meanwhile, the ‘nested’ context thatparadiplomacynecessarily takesplacewithinmeans

thatmessagesaresimultaneouslybeingsentand receivedbyavarietyof relevantactors.

‘Performing’ international politics conveys meaning to external actors (in terms of the

capacitiesorrelevanceofsub-stategovernmentsaspolicymakers),todomesticaudiences

(intermsoftheimageportrayedoftheregionanditsinternationalstatus),andtothe‘host

state’ itself, perhaps challenging their competence in certain areas. A Performativity

73 ‘Performativity and International Politics’, workshop held at the Goethe University

Frankfurtonthe21st-22ndFebruary2014.Authorinattendance.

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frameworkfurtherlendsitselftoexploringingreaterdepththedynamicbetweenhost-state

and sub-state governments; in particular the ways that agency-creation may be policed,

constrainedorindeedfacilitatedbytheformer.

TheframeworkofPerformativityalsohasanaturalcongruencewiththeroleof‘mimicry’in

thelegitimationofsub-statediplomacy,whichitselfisaboutperformingandre-performing

narrativesofinternationalactorness,statesmanshipanddiplomacy(McConnelletal.,2012).

The extent to which the international performances of sub-state governments mimic or

otherwisethetraditionaldiscourseofstate-diplomacyperhapstellsussomethingbothabout

the discrete aims of that actor, andmore broadly about the pervasiveness of those pre-

existinginternationalnormsthemselves.

Thenewrulesofthegame

Totheextentthatparadiplomacyhasbecome‘normalised’(Cornago,2010)inthepasttwo

decades, this has not occurred in a vacuum. Much has been written about opportunity

structures provided by the processes of European integration and the related rise of

regionalismanddevolution,bothwithintheEUandbeyond(Hepburn,2007;Hepburn,2009;

Elias, 2008; Keating, 2008; Keating, 1999; Hepburn, 2008b; Carter and Pasquier, 2010;

Aldecoa and Keating, 1999b; Aldecoa and Keating, 1999a; Moore, 2008a; Bursens and

Deforche,2008).Butthereisperhapsalsoamessier,morecontestedstorytobetoldaround

theunbundlingofsub-stategovernmentsfromtheirdomesticpolicysettings.Authorssuch

as Buzan and Albert (2010: 333) and Schreuer (1993: 450) have highlighted thede facto

functionaldifferentiationintheinternationalsystemthathasarisenfromanewdiversityof

actorsentering intoarrangementswithoneanother.Bothof theseauthors -writing from

different disciplines and seventeen years apart - also argue that their respective fields,

international relations and international law, have failed to properly account for these

changes. For example, Schreuer (1993: 450) argues that the typical classification of such

agreements, specificallybetween sub-stategovernments, as “extra-legal andnotproperly

belongingtothesphereofinternationallaw”,is“probablymoretheexpressionofaninability

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tocometotermswiththisphenomenonthananadequatedescriptionofreality”.Perhapsa

caseofthediscipliningfunctionofstate-sovereigntydiscourses,activitiesfallingoutsidethese

parameters are - knowingly or otherwise - reclassified as non-diplomatic, extra-legal and,

therefore, largely inconsequential. Inthespecificcontextofsub-statediplomacy,Hocking

(1999:21)arguesthat:“manyofthetermscoinedduringthe1980stodescribe[sub-state

diplomacy]…suchasparadiplomacyorprotodiplomacy-aresuggestiveofasecond-orderset

ofactivities,pale imitationsof ‘real’diplomacy,andhelptodisguisethedistinctivenessof

whatisbeingexamined”.

Literatureonthis ‘newphenomenon’and its relationshiptothedisciplineof international

relations abounded for a period in the late 1980s - early 2000s, specifically in termsof a

disaggregation of concepts bundled up in the “Westphalian myth” or “Westphalian

syndrome”(Caporaso,2000).Severalauthorsquestionedthefield’sabilitytoconceptualise

suchachange,giventhepervasivenessofestablishednorms(Ruggie,1993;Caporaso,2000;

Albert et al., 2001). Specifically, Ruggie (1993: 140-143) argues that there is “an

extraordinarily impoverished mind-set at work”, one only able to “visualize long-term

challenges to the system of states only in terms of the entities that are institutionally

substitutableforthestate”.Hecontinuesthat:

Wearenotverygoodasadisciplineatstudyingthepossibilityoffundamentaldiscontinuity in the international system; that isaddressing thequestionofwhetherthemodernsystemofstatesmaybeyielding insome instancestopostmodernformsofconfiguringpoliticalspace.We lackevenanadequatevocabulary;andwhatwecannotdescribe,wecannotexplain(Ruggie,1993:143).

Theconsequenceofsuchaninabilitytoaccountforthesechallengestothenormsofabsolute

sovereignty, authority and territoriality is that certain areas of international activity are

‘down-graded’,andnotconsideredintermsoftheirpotentialimpactorsignificanceonthis

higher plane of international society. For Lapid, the International Relations discipline’s

“fascinationwithsovereignstatehoodhasgreatlydecreaseditsabilitytoconfrontissuesof

ethnicnationhoodandpoliticalotherhood”(Lapid,1996:10citedinShainandBarth,2003:

460). Forthepurposesofourdiscussion,asimilarargumentmaybemadeasitrelatesto

scantattentionpaidtoparadiplomaticactivityfromwithinthefieldofInternationalRelations.

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Thoughhighlycontested,onecouldcertainlymaketheargumentthattheappropriationof

internationalpolicyspacebysub-stateunits,andinmanycasestheclaimstorepresentation

they make, has theoretical consequences for the discipline of International Relations. In

particular,thecompetingclaimsastowhocanauthoritatively‘speakforthepeople’,onthe

one hand, and theways inwhich the external identity of a statemay be altered by the

internationalactivitiesofitsconstituentunits,ontheother,wouldseemtobeacorepartof

whatRuggiedescribesasthe“unbundling”ofterritoriality,acentralconceptwhoseneglect

onthepartofinternationalrelationsscholarshetreatsasakinto“neverlookingattheground

oneiswalkingon”(1993:173).Indeed,byallowingsub-stategovernmentsaroleinexternal

affairs,limitedbycontextualandconstitutionalfactorsindifferentstates,boththestateand

sub-state governments may be conceived of entering into what Caporaso (2000: 4-5)

describesasa“sovereigntybargain”,oneofmanysuchbargainsthatmustgoun-accounted

forbecause“conceptssuchassovereigntyandterritorialityhavebeentreatedasiftheycould

takeontwopossiblevalues-presentorabsent,sovereignornotsovereign,territorialornon-

territorial”.Onceagain, the frameworkof sovereigntygames seemsparticularly apthere,

allowingustobetteraccountfortherangeofpossibilitiesregardingthedistributionofpower

andauthorityamongstdifferenttiersofgovernment.

However, as much as the language of Westphalian sovereignty might constrain the

explorationofempiricalshiftsinthepracticeofglobalpolitics,thelanguageoftransformation

and change may equally misrepresent the precise nature of these developments. In a

paradiplomaticcontext,Hocking(1999:20)contendsthat“iftherehasbeena‘powershift’

inworldpolitics,underpinnedbyneweconomic forcesandthegrowing influenceof ‘new

actors’ such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), it has been more subtle than

sometimessuggested,andmappingitisprovingtobeacontentiousexercise”.Intheoretical

terms,paradiplomaticactivities,therefore,canbecaughtbetweentheproverbialrockand

hard-place:appropriatedasevidenceofsystemicshifts inglobalpoliticsordismissedasa

largelyirrelevantprovincialpractice.Themorenuancedstorystrugglestobetold.Analysing

paradiplomacyinprocess,ratherthanevent,terms,inparticularthewaysinwhichitrelates

tothetrajectoryofsub-statenationalismand‘soft’nationbuilding,maybemoreilluminating.

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In sum, considering paradiplomacy as part of a messier, more contentious story of the

multiplicityofpoliticalagencyinthepost-coldwareraissomethingmorethan‘explainingit

away’asaconsequenceofthepre-determinedlogicsofglobalization,Europeanintegration

and regionalism. Such political agency on the part of sub-state governments, as we will

explorebelow, ispotentially transformative in itself: in theways that itchallenges -often

implicitly - the authority of other actors. The agreements, relationships and institutions

createdbysub-stateactorsaspartoftheirinteractionswithoneanotherdrawontypically

‘governmental’attributesandsourcesof legitimacy: representativeness,effectivenessand

territoriality.Ifthese,then,arethe‘newrulesofthegame’,thepoliticalagencyofcertain

sub-stategovernmentshas changed the structural context that all sub-stategovernments

now face in the international sphere. Is paradiplomatic activity thus informed by an

expectationthatthis iswhatsub-stategovernments ‘should’bedoing;muchasregions in

asymmetric states are ‘learning to catch thewave’ of constitutional reform and regional

autonomy(Hombrado,2011)?Theroleofinter-grouplearningandnormcreationamongst

sub-stategovernmentshasbeenlittlestudiedinaparadiplomacycontext,yetthereisclear

evidence of this sort of referencing from the actors themselves. For example, Bavaria

frequentlyusesitscontemporariestoconveymessagesaboutpreciselywhat‘type’ofactor

it is: it’s a ‘regional leader’, placed alongsideother economically advanced, constitutional

regions inaglobalnetworkof thatnomenclature, it’sanation “very similar toScotland”

(MinisterPresidentEberhardSinner,citedinHepburn,2008a:185),butnot“comparable”to

‘separatist’ Catalonia.74 The ‘new rules of the game’ thus both reflect the new-found

internationalagencyofsub-stategovernments,andthecontextthatsub-stategovernments,

asabroadercategoryofactor,findthemselveswithin.Consideringitfromthisperspective

perhapsprovidesamorecontested,overtlypoliticalandagencyfocussedaccountthanthose

ofglobalizationandregionalism,atleasttheformerofwhichhasatendencytotreatregions

themselvesaspassiveparticipantsintheprocess.Aperformativityframework,meanwhile,

allowsustomoreaccuratelyaccountfortheparadoxicalnatureofparadiplomacy:thepush

74 Interviewdata, SeniorBavarianParliamentaryOfficial 2013.Hepburn citationof coursereferstoScotlandbeforetheSNP’sfirstminoritygovernmentin2007.

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andpulldynamicsthatseemtobeafeatureacrossallofourcasestudies.Paradiplomacyboth

challengesandreinforcesstate-leveldiplomacy.Looking indetailat theexact interactions

takingplace, freefromrigidassumptionsaboutwhatthesub-statetiercanandshouldbe

doingonaninternationalstage,allowsthesecontradictoryforcestocometothefore.

Afocusonthepoliticalagencyofsub-stategovernmentsisthereforeakeycontributionof

thischapter. Inordertoappropriateinternationalspace,sub-stategovernmentsmustfirst

make some sort of claim as to their international legitimacy. In other words, they must

convinceotheractorsoftheirvirtueontheglobal,ratherthanthelocal,stage.Thistaskisin

manywaysapriori-whatcomesnextistheday-to-daybusinessof‘walkingthewalk’and

‘talking the talk’ of an international actor. The concept of legitimacy as it relates to

international relations is addressed below. The utility or otherwise of mimicry as a

legitimating strategy will also be examined, before we move on to consider three short

examples - from each of our case studies - which demonstrate these aforementioned

processesofagencycreationandcontestation.

Speaking‘forthepeople’orspeaking‘likeastate’?ParadiplomacyandLegitimacy

AccordingtoMulligan(2006:349-350):“fewproblemsloomlargerinpoliticallife,inboththe

theoryandpracticeofgovernment,thanthosephrasedintermsof‘legitimacy’”.Assuch,he

continues,legitimacyhas“cometotheforeasa‘masterquestion’ofinternationalrelations”.

Itisatonceaconceptthat“seemstosignifysomecrucialandreasonablydiscretefeatureof

politicallife”,andyetatthesametimeishighlyelusive,alliedwitharangeof“conceptual

affiliates” from “legality to popular approval to moral appropriateness”. In other words,

despitetheinherentambiguityoftheterm,itisusedbyboththeoristsandpractitionersasif

thedefinitionisinsteadconcrete,compoundingthislackofclarity(Mulligan,2006:349-351).

ForCollingwood(2006:439)“inaneraofglobalisation,discrepancieshaveemergedbetween

political ideas and the realities of the global distribution of power”. Relatedly, therefore,

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Collingwood argues that two particular questions result from such discrepancies: “the

questionofwhichactorsshouldexercisepowerattheinternationallevel”,and“whichrules

shouldgoverntheiraction”.Attheheartofsuchquestionsisthenotionthattheprocessesof

globalisation cited above “have given economic and political power to actors that are

insufficiently accountable to citizens”, in contrast to the “formal accountability” owed to

votersbydemocraticstates(Collingwood,2006:446).Debateaboundsastowhois,andwho

isnot,alegitimateactor,aswellastowhattherelationshipbetweeninternalandexternal

legitimacyoughttobe.Suchdiscussiontakesinissuesfromtheperceivedinternalillegitimacy

ofpostcolonialAfricanstates, lacking“affinitywithconstituent sub-stategroups” (Okafor,

2000:522),totheEuropeanUnion’srecentlyestablishedexternal legitimacy,craftedfrom

notionsofa“normative,value-driven”internationalpolicy”(Youngs,2004:415).

Thediplomacyof sub-stategovernments,however,poses slightlydifferentquestions.The

formallinkbetweenvotersandtheirdemocraticallyelectedgovernmentdoesexist,inexactly

thesamewayasbetweenastateanditscitizens.Thequestionisperhapsinsteadwhether

thislegitimacyextendstoareasbeyondtheir‘usual’andoverwhelminglydomesticspheres

of activity. If “’legitimate’ behaviour is rightful behaviour: undertaken by the appropriate

authority, in line with an agreed set of rules, and with appropriate or intended effects”

(Collingwood,2006:444),thenthechallengeforsub-stategovernmentsistomakeaclaimto

suchappropriatenessbothintheinternationalfieldsitenters,andintermsofthewaysin

which itoperates.Forparadiplomacy, therefore, the ‘legitimacyquestion’ is twofold.Sub-

state governments, particularly those representing stateless nations, covet legitimacy in

termsof representing their ‘people’; there canbe competitiveovertones to suchactions,

representing their people better, or more accurately, than the state. The Scottish voice

following the 2016 Brexit referendum arguably reflects a key example of this dynamic.

Additionally,sub-stategovernmentsattempttoestablishalegitimacytotheirinternational

activities,a‘right’toactintheglobalarena.Forsomesub-stateactors,therefore,practicing

diplomacyinawaythatmirrorsitsmostprestigiousform,inter-statediplomacy,isamethod

of achieving such legitimacy. This is both because of the axiomatic relationship between

diplomacy and representation (Sharp, 1999) and because of the role of diplomacy in

conferringlegitimacy,asadiscourseof“recognitionandauthority”(McConnelletal.,2012:

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804).Thisisthecasenotonlywithinter-statediplomacy,thoughthismaybeapinnaclein

the regard, but also with other forms of diplomacy that appear ‘official’ in one form or

another.Inanothervein,thegroundingofparadiplomacyindomesticcompetences-orissue

areaswherethe‘rightness’ofsub-stateinvolvementistakenmore-or-lessforgranted-also

actsasasourceoflegitimacy,withsub-stategovernmentsappealingtotheirpositionatthe

‘receivingend’ofglobalgovernanceonavarietyofissues,fromtheenvironmenttoterrorism.

Makingsuchclaimstolegitimacy,for‘new’diplomaticactors,isperhapsmadeaneasiertask

bythediffusionofauthority(bothtowardstransnationalorganisations,ontheonehand,and

sub-stategroupsontheother)that-arguably-hasalreadytakenplace,leaving“redefined

criteriaofpolitical legitimacy” in itswake (Rosenau,1992:256). What, then,might these

redefinedcriteriaofpoliticallegitimacylooklike?Takingoneforthrightview,forGuibernau

(1996:59-62)thematterisinfactstraightforward,atleastasitappliestothe‘downward’

direction of travel: a legitimate state is one that corresponds to the nation, where an

illegitimatestateisonewhichiscomprisedofdifferentnations.Forthegroupofsub-state

governments representing ‘stateless nations’, this classification is clearly significant, and

indeedmuchoftheirmoreadvancedparadiplomaticactivityrepresentsaclearcontestfor

exactlywhichauthoritymostaccurately‘speaksforthepeople’ofthenationinquestion.The

roleofforeignpolicy,inparticularitsexclusionfrommostconstitutionalprovisionsforsub-

stateautonomy,eveninthecaseoffederations,iscrucialforGuibernau(2004:1254).Itis

this exclusion that precludes such sub-state nations from practising meaningful

independence, a sentiment that perhaps highlights the importance of paradiplomatic

practices-especiallyinthosecaseswhereastatelessnationemploysparticularlyadvanced

andambitiousstrategies-forthepurposesofmimickingtheforeignpolicyfunctionsofthe

state,andthevalueofthesymboliccapitalthatsuchstrategiescangenerate.Guibernausees

statelessnationsasaparticulartypeofpoliticalcommunity,onegrowinginsignificanceand

“able to capture and promote sentiments of loyalty, solidarity and community among

individualswho seem to have developed a growing need for identity” (Guibernau, 2004:

1255).

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However,evenifweaccepttheargumentthatsub-statepoliticalcommunities,particularly

those representing distinct nations, are ever-more salient and growing in significance,

establishinglegitimacyintheirinternationalendeavoursisaseparateprocess,onewhichis

beingsharedwithothernon-stateactorsoperatingattheinternationallevel.Indiplomatic

terms,theissueoflegitimacyisessential,representingthebasisforrecognitionoftheactors

involvedininternationalaffairsandthenconferredonindividualpoliticalactorsindiplomatic

negotiations (La Porte, 2012; McConnell et al., 2012). There is also perhaps a revealing

tautology in evidence here: in the international realm, the key source of legitimacy is

international recognition. Other forms of legitimacy exist, including democratic

representativeness-throughelectionsinthecaseofgovernments-orthe“delegation”of

thislegitimacytointernationalbodies(LaPorte,2012:450).Inthecaseofnon-sateactors,

legitimacy is granted - by the public and other political actors - on the basis of their

‘representativity’, or their “capacity to represent the public’s interests in deliberation

processes.” Here, La Porte is referring primarily to NGOs and other transnational

organisations,andthis‘representativity’correspondstothequantityorqualityofthecitizens

who share their ideas, values or initiatives” (La Porte, 2012: 454). In addition to these

representativequalities,theideaofeffectivenessasanalternatesourceoflegitimacyhasalso

been considered from the view of non-state actors (La Porte, 2012: 452); signified by

expertiseforNGOsandpolicy-networks(Sharp,1999:55),orbyeconomicprowessandthe

abilityto‘getthingsdone’inthecaseofcities(Acuto,2013;BulkeleyandSchroeder,2011;

Curtis,2011).

Fordirectlyelectedsub-stategovernments,abletodrawon‘representative’legitimacy,their

claimstoaroleoutwiththebordersofthestatearepremisedontwodistinctnarratives.The

firstisthat,“foreignaffairsarenotautonomous-theyarealwaysaboutsomething”(Hocking,

1986: 480). In other words, claims to legitimacy are based on a sub-state government’s

domesticcompetencesandthe‘necessary’internationalcomponentsorramificationsofsuch

domesticpowers.Accordingto‘BavariaintheWorld’,publishedbythestateGovernment,

“forahighlyadvancedstate likeBavaria,withadeeply rooted identity, it is impossible to

imagine a sound future development without it being embedded in an international

framework”(BayerischeStaatskanzlei,2010).Thesecondnarrativerestsontheroleofsub-

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stategovernments,aselectedofficialsoftheregionorstatelessnation,inrepresentingthe

specificinterestsofthatregionwheretheydifferfromthoseofthehost-stateatlarge.For

example,intheUK,newlydevolvedregionswereabletoparticipateinEUpolicyprocessesin

muchmoreformalisedandextensivewaysfollowingtheelectionofsub-stateauthoritiesin

1999,drawingona“newsourceoflegitimacy”(Bulmeretal.,2006:77).

Insum,legitimacyisaconceptthatiscentraltoparadiplomaticactivity:eitherbeingasserted

by a sub-state government, or indeed denied or challenged by other actors. Sub-state

governments draw on multiple, overlapping and occasionally contradictory sources of

legitimacyintheirinternationalengagements.Themostcompellingoftheseareoftentheir

representational qualities: as elected representatives of a clearly defined community or

locale. In some cases, and certainly in those of stateless nations, the claims of sub-state

governments can go a step further: to represent a distinct ‘people’. Clearly, these claims

overlapwiththosemadebyasovereignstate:representingthelargercommunityorterritory

withinwhichthesmallerunitresides.

The particularity of a sub-state government’s claim to legitimacy is therefore premised

preciselyontheirdifferencetothe‘host’state.Whetherintermsofeconomicprowess,or

high-techindustries-asintheparadiplomaticactivitiesofCalifornia,BeijingandBavaria;their

normativecredentials-as intheinternationalsustainabledevelopmentactivitiesofWales

andScotlandorthedemocracyassistanceprogrammesofBavaria;or indeedtheirrelative

deprivation or political or ethnic subjugation. Sub-state governments appeal both to

principles of national sovereignty and self-determination - the attributes or interests of a

‘people’ofaregionorstatelessnation-andtofunctionaldiscoursesofgeo-strategicposition,

territoryorproductivity.Bavariaisperhapsacase-in-pointofsuccessfullycombiningthese

twodiscourses.Theirdiplomaticactivityisbothsteepedinitshistoryandspecialstatusasa

‘Freistaat’(it’s‘reusablepast’touseHepburn’sterm(2008a::187)),andstrategicallyfocussed

aroundthenarrativeofitshigh-techindustry,abalancingactmanifestinthephrase‘laptop

undlederhosen’(Criekemans,2010b::41).Suchclaimstolegitimacyonthebasisofdifference

orparticularitycanbeidentifiedinsingularinstances,forexamplewhenaregionstandsto

bedisproportionallyaffectedbyanenvironmental issue,or indeed if itsposition leaves it

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particularlyvulnerabletoconflictorinternationalcrime.Domesticpoliticalconsiderationscan

alsotemporarilymobilisetheseclaims-the2014Scottishindependencereferendumbeinga

keyexamplehere.Moreover,thediscourseofparticularitymaybeanearconstanttheme

runningthroughasub-stategovernment’sinternationalagency,andtheclaimsitmakestoa

legitimatepresence.ThepremiseofmuchofQuebec’sparadiplomacy,forexample,isthatof

itscultural,linguisticandhistoricalparticularitywithintheCanadiancontext.Morebroadly,

however, we can point to a particularly prevalent - and arguably effective - legitimating

strategy for the international activitiesof sub-state governments:mimicry. This feature is

seenineachofourthreecasestudies,thoughinremarkablyvariedguises.

Lookingtolocatetheparticular‘unofficial’diplomaciesofthosenon-stateactorsthataspire

tosomeaspectsof‘stateness’,McConnelletal(2012:804)arguethatby“adaptingBhabha’s

notionofmimicrytodiplomaticdiscourse,itdemonstrateshownon-statediplomaciesdraw

on,mimicandinterveneintherealmofformalpoliticalactioninwayswhichbothpromote

‘official’ state diplomacy as an ideal and dilute its distinction from other, ‘unofficial’

diplomacies’”.Indoingso,theauthorsbothidentifythestrategiesusedbynon-stateactors

tolegitimisetheirinternationalactivities,andatthesametimeaccountforthecuriouseffects

thatsuchactivitieshaveonother,officialdiplomaticactors.Inthissecondregard,unofficial

diplomaciesareunderstoodasboth“resemblanceandmenace”(McConnelletal.,2012).By

mimicking symbolsof statehood -adorningmeetingsandconferenceswithnational flags,

designating‘foreignoffices’orministries-andre-performingnarrativesofstatesovereignty

throughattemptsto“imitateformalandofficialdiplomaticpractices”,non-stateactorsare

seenasbolsteringthevery internationalsystemthattheyalsochallenge.Yet,atthesame

time,theirverypresenceontheinternationalstage,andtheextenttowhichtheyareableto

claim a portion of the international legitimacy typically reserved for states, weakens the

state’smonopolyonsuchconcepts,andindeedchallengesthe“compositionandstatusofthe

interstatesystem”(McConnelletal.,2012:804).

ThecasesconsideredbyMcConnelletal.-theTibetanGovernmentinExile,theInternational

Christian Embassy in Jerusalem and Micropatrias (such as the Democratic Republic of

Bobalania-“selfdeclarednationsthatmimicandinmanywaysparodyestablishedsovereign

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nation-states”) - all constitute “remainders”, left over from the ‘legitimate’ international

system.Accordingtotheauthors,“itistheirexcessthatprovidestheconstitutiveoutsideto

thediplomatic realm. Evenas their existence threatens that system, the system relieson

themforrepresentationalforcetoreifysystematicnorms”.However,atthesametime,the

cases also “illustrate the representational power that can be tapped into through those

discoursesandpractices”(McConnelletal.,2012:811).Thesystemiceffectsofsuchunofficial

diplomaciesarethereforemoderated:mimicryrepresentsanimportanttoolorstrategyfor

non-stateactorswishingto‘tapinto’moreconventionalformsoflegitimacyandauthorityon

theworldstage,whileatthesametimefundamentallyrestatesandreaffirmstheprivileged

status of states as the preeminent actors in international relations. In other words, the

system-reinforcing effects of mimicry might account for the tepid ways in which

paradiplomaticactionisunderstoodtohavetransformedtherealmofdiplomacy:forhow

subversivecansuchactivitiesbe,ifmimicryisthesincerestformofflattery?Thefollowing

section considers the ‘mimicked’ performances of Scotland,Wales and Bavaria in detail,

highlighting theways inwhich theofficial and theunofficial interact and, in turn,help to

constituteoneanother.

I. ThecuriouscaseofScotland’sPandas

TheScottishGovernment’sincreasinglyconfidentparadiplomacycanperhapshelptoshed

important light on the relationship between official and unofficial diplomacies, and the

contest for legitimacy in representing ‘the people’ of Scotland. Indeed, one particular

performancecanillustratetheprocessofinternationalagencycreation-andcontestation-

quiteclearly.TheScottishindependencereferendum,andthelongcampaignleadinguptoit,

provedastrongcatalystinthedevelopmentofinternationalagency.Areasof‘high’politics-

thosetypically‘outofbounds’forsub-stategovernments-suchassecurityanddefencepolicy

-weresuddenlybroughtintothediscursivearenaoftheScottishGovernment,facedwiththe

prospectofScotlandassumingthemantleofstatehood.Institutionaldevelopmentsquickly

followed: a ‘DefencePolicyUnit’was soonestablished, aswas a newministerial post for

ExternalAffairsandInternationalDevelopment.Asaconsequence,Scottishministers-often

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controversially - entered into debates on aspects of theUKGovernment’s foreign policy,

claiming a legitimate voice in the ‘big questions’ facing the state as a whole, from the

recognitionofPalestinetointernationalaidpolicy.

TheScottishGovernmenthasmadenosecretof itsambition to strengthen relationswith

China.Since2006, theyhavepublishedtwo5-yearstrategiesdedicatedtodevelopingthis

relationship,citing-inthemostrecentstrategy-that:

The 2012-13 once in a decade transition in national leadership in Chinapresents every country with fresh challenges and opportunities forestablishingbroaderanddeeperlinkswithChina…TheScottishGovernmentiscommittedtodevelopingalong-termrelationshipwithChinabasedonsharedvalues,partnershipandtrust(ScottishGovernment,2012).

As part of this overall strategy, the Scottish Government outlines four guiding principles

underpinning “all of Scotland’s dealings with China and against which success will be

measured”:securingsustainableeconomicgrowth,respectforhumanrightsandtheruleof

law, understanding of culture and increasing Scotland’s influence (Scottish Government,

2012).

ItiswithinthiscontextthatthenarrativeemployedbytheScottishGovernmentfollowingthe

arrivaloftwoChineseGiantPandasinEdinburgh’sZoo,mustbeunderstood.ThatTianTian

and Yang Guang are now firmly ensconced on Scottish soil could not have escaped the

attentionofanyvisitortoEdinburghairportinDecember2011,orindeedforseveralyears

afterwards; life-sized cardboard cut-outs of the pairwere one of the first sights to greet

inboundpassengers. Itwaswith similar fanfare that the ScottishGovernment announced

their arrival, taking out a full-page advert in Scottish newspapers with the headline

‘CelebrationoflinksbetweenScotlandandChinaaspandasarriveinEdinburgh’.Thearticle

wentontostate:

Scotland’slinkswithChinagobackalongway-fromthe19thcentury,whentradingfirstbroughtteatoourshores,tothemoderndaywithScotspupilslearning Mandarin. Now, in a symbolic gesture of friendship between thecountries,andfollowingfiveyearsofpoliticalanddiplomatictalks,theChinesearegifting twogiantpandas to live in Scotland,under the custodianshipofEdinburghZoo…ThePandas’presenceisasignofastrengthenedalliancewithChina,andopensupnewopportunitiesintrade,cultureandeducationwith

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the world’s fastest growing economy. So as the countries’ relationshipcontinuestoflourish,it’sfittingthatthetraditionalScotssongAuldLandSyneiswidelyknowninChinaastheFriendshipSong.(ScottishGovernmentadvert,citedbyBBCScotland,2012).

Despitethefactthatthe‘pandadiplomacy’wasofficiallyconductedbetweentheChineseand

UKstates(withtheagreementbeingsignedbetweenthetwogovernmentsinLondonand

witnessedbyUKDeputyPrimeMinisterNickCleggandVicePremierofChinaLiKeqiang),

albeitwithacommercialagreementinplaceforthepandastobehousedatEdinburghzoo,

theScottishGovernmentattemptedtoappropriatethisaction.Theirclaimwasthatthe‘gift’

wasevidenceofthestronglinksbetweenthetwonations-ChinaandScotland-onemade

severaltimesinsubsequentcampaigns.Giventhatthepandas’arrivalinEdinburghcoincided

withahigh-profiletrademissiontoChinabyAlexSalmondandotherScottishofficials,the

appropriationofthe‘pandadiplomacy’appearedtobeareasonablyorchestratedattemptto

demonstrateScotland’sautonomousinternationalstanding,assomethingmorethan-and

distinctfrom-apartoftheUK.Indeed,duringhisvisittoChinaAlexSalmondisquotedas

stating, once again, that “The great gift of these giant pandas symbolises the great and

growing relationship between Scotland and China, which we will take further forward

tomorrowwhenVicePremierLiandImeetanddiscussScotlandandChina’sbusiness,cultural

anddiplomatic linkswhicharegrowingeverstrongertothebenefitofbothnations”(Alex

Salmond, cited by BBC Scotland, 2011). In all but name, this interactionmimicked - very

effectively-officialdiplomacybetweensovereignstates.

Infact,theaforementionedScottishGovernmentadvertwaslaterbannedbytheadvertising

standardsauthorityformisleadingthepublicaboutthecommercialnatureofthedeal;the

term‘gift’wasfoundtobemisleading(BBCScotland,2012).Meanwhile,theinterpretation

oftheUKForeignandCommonwealthOfficeandUKDeputyPrimeMinisterNickCleggwas

that thearrivalof thepandaswasa “reflectionof the strength”of their relationshipwith

China:“itshowsthatwecanco-operatecloselynotonlyoncommerce,butonabroadrange

of environmental and cultural issuesaswell”.AnFCOMinister added that “beingable to

welcomethesepandastodayistheculminationofmanyyearshardworkinboththeUKand

China…the loan symbolisesa strengtheningofour relationshipwithChina…Iamsure that

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thousandsofBritishpeoplewill enjoy visiting thepandas” (Press release,UKForeignand

CommonwealthOffice,2011).

Meanwhile, the Chinese Ambassador to the UK is quoted as stating that: “Pandas are a

Chinesenationaltreasure.Thishistoricalagreement isagift tothepeopleoftheUKfrom

China.Itwillrepresentanimportantsymbolofourfriendshipandwillbringourtwopeople

closer together” (Press release, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2011). Friendship

between two peoples and two nations is a theme which runs through each of these

statements,yetitisclearthatthereissomediscrepancyintermsofexactlywhichtwopeoples

and two nations are linked by such friendship. How successful Scotland has been in its

attemptstoclaimadiplomaticrelationshipwithChinathroughthisperformanceremainsto

beseen.Thetussleover ‘ownership’of thepandadiplomacy -ahugely importantpartof

China’sforeignpolicy(Hartig,2013)-couldbeseenfromtheminutethatthetwopandas

toucheddownatEdinburghairport and is still beingplayedout. Scotland’s relationswith

Chinahavebecomeacornerstoneofitseconomicdevelopmentstrategy,andthesymbolof

thetwopandasisonethattheScottishGovernmentwaskeentocapitaliseupon.Indeed,as

paradiplomaticperformancesgo,thiswasremarkablyclear-cutinitsattempttosanctionits

ownlegitimacy.Fromreferencingsharedattributesofnationhoodthroughtoasophisticated

mimickingofofficial,high-levelbilateraldiplomacy,theScottishGovernmentwereableto

both make a claim for the rightness of its place as China’s partner - as the legitimate

interlocutorsfortheScottishpeople-andfortheappropriatenessofitsactivitiesindiplomatic

terms,inthewakeofits“fiveyearsofpoliticalanddiplomatictalks”(ScottishGovernment,

citedbyBBCScotland,2012).

Additionally,thisperformanceof‘pandadiplomacy’shouldbeseeninthepoliticalcontextat

thetime.Earlierintheyearthe2011ScottishParliamentelectionhaddeliveredthefirstSNP

majoritygovernment,indeedthefirstmajoritygovernmentaltogethersincetheParliament

itselfwasopened,afeatwidelylaudedinthecontextofamixed-memberelectoralsystem

designedtomakesucharesultimprobable(Cairney,2011:2).WithAlexSalmondreturning

as FirstMinister, a referendumonScottish independencewasnow firmlyon thepolitical

cards.TheEdinburghAgreement,anundertakingon thepartofboth theScottishandUK

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GovernmentstoensurethatareferendumonScottishindependencecouldtakeplace,was

signedonthe15thofOctober2012andfollowedmonthsofprotractednegotiationsbetween

the two governments. Therefore the timing of the pandas’ arrival takes on an added

significance:itfellduringaperiodinwhichtheSNP,withanewlystrengthenedmandate,was

positioningScotlandasapotentialstate-in-waiting.Demonstratingtheirabilitytonegotiate

withadominanteconomicactorsuchasChinawasacrucialcomponentinthistask,allowing

leadingpoliticianssuchasAlexSalmondtoplaytheroleofglobalstatesperson,‘mimic’high-

status,bilateraldiplomacyandcommunicatetheSNP’sambitionsforsovereignstatehoodto

audiencesinScotland,acrosstheUKandindeedglobally.

II. VanguardWalesinCopenhagen&Lesotho

‘PeopleinWaleshavebighearts.Theybelonginasmallcountrybut,ohman,theyreallyhave

thekickofamule’.ArchbishopDesmondTutuonhisvisittoWales,October2012

The international performances of Wales, as a sub-state government, are not normally

directedat third states (aswe seeevidenceof inbothScotlandandBavaria), though the

branding of ‘Nato Wales’ held in Newport during 2015 arguably acts to mediate this

distinction.Predominantly,thefocusisonregiontoregionandmultilateral,network-based

engagement. Inthis ‘casestudywithinacasestudy’,therefore,we’ll lookattwodifferent

performances that speak to the same broad narrative. This narrative reflects the use of

domesticstatutoryinstrumentsanddevolvedauthorityoverissueswithaclear‘genesis’in

theNationalAssemblytoconsciouslybroadenthelimitedinternationalremitthatWaleshas

underthetermsoftheGovernmentofWalesAct2006. Waleshasprovedadeptatusing

thesedomestically-groundedinstrumentstolinktodominantliberal,internationaldiscourses

andtotie itself intoglobalprogrammesandstructures-forexampletheUN’sMillennium

DevelopmentGoalsorinternationalclimatechangefora.AclearattempttogroundWales’

internationalengagementsinterritorywhereithasaperceivedlegitimacy,derivedfromthe

devolvedresponsibilitiesthatthesub-stategovernmenthasatadomesticlevel,canbeseen

in itsparadiplomacy.Theseareasareconsciouslyexpanded;networkingopportunitiesare

seizedandtheprofile-raisingandnationbuildingadvantagesofsuchactivitiesarereaped.

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ThetwosetsofperformanceswewillconsiderarethoserelatingfirstlytoWales’involvement

intheNetworkofRegionalGovernmentsforSustainableDevelopment(nrg4SD)-asafounder

ofthegroupandthenactingasco-chairduringtheCopenhagenSummitonclimatechange-

and secondly theWales for Africa programme, the basis for its launch in 2006 and the

subsequent piece of legislation that builds on its novel legal framework, the 2015 Future

GenerationsAct.

Nrg4SDwasformedafteraworldsummitonsustainabledevelopment inJohannesburg in

2002.Waleswas a key foundingmemberof the group, chairing the session atwhich the

participants signedup to the ‘GautendDeclaration’,bringing thenetwork into fruition. In

RhodriMorgan’swords, ‘thiseventwouldnothave takenplacewithout the leadershipof

Walesandothercoreregions’(Royles,2012:173).AkeyperiodforWales’involvementinthe

networkcamepost2007whenJaneDavisonbecameMinisterforsustainability,environment

andhousing.Shethenbecameco-chairin2009,aperiodwhichplacedherintheinternational

spotlightleadinguptotheCopenhagenSummit.Duringthisperiodshewas‘highlyvisiblein

representing the network internationally’ (Royles, 2012: 175). Using a direct method of

influence, in the runup toCopenhagenshe“representedboth thenetworkandWalesat

severalhigh-profileevents”,andthenduringthesummititself:

ShemetanumberofseniorinternationalleadersandcounterpartsacrosstheUK, chaired UNDP and climate group side events and spoke at eventsorganised by the European Environment Agency and the United Nationsenvironmentprogramme.DayafterbeingelectedtheFirstMinisterofWales,CarwynJonessymbolicallyattendedtheclimateleader’ssummitarrangedbythe climate group and spoke at a UN HABITAT-sponsored side-event inCopenhagen(Royles,2012:175).

In one notable exchange, Governor of California Arnold Schwarzenegger praised ‘Welsh

effortstotackleclimatechange’,tellingJaneDavidsonandherofficialsto‘keepupthegood

work’.DavidsonwasattendingthereceptionattheCopenhagenSummit,hostedbyGovernor

Schwarzenegger,inhercapacityaschairofNrg4SDandastheWelshMinisterresponsiblefor

climatechange;anenhancedplatformwhichhadseenherdeliveranaddressto“political

leadersaroundtheworld”ontherolethatsub-nationalgovernmentcanplay ineffortsto

tackleclimatechange(BBCWales,2009).Alloftheseperformancesreflectthewaysinwhich

adomesticplatformorrationalewithinWales-inthiscasethestatutoryresponsibilityithas

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for sustainable development - can open international doors, providing an international

legitimacyandaplatformitwouldotherwiselack.

Undoubtedly, therehas been a high level ofministerial commitment to the issue areaof

sustainable development and to nrg4SD and these have been crucial to the international

rewardsthattheactivitieshaveborne:

WAG’s [the Welsh Assembly Government] strong political engagement innrgd4SDhasclearlybenefitedWalesinachievingahigherprofileandhasgivenan international platform for its sustainable development policies… morebroadly, WAG’s engagement has contributed to strengthening Walesinternational profile and branding. One interviewee explained ‘there areimmenseopportunitiesthathavebeenaffordedtothenetworkandthereforeto the regions/country of which the chair represents in terms of issues ofrepresentationandbeingabletohavethatregionalgovernmentdialogueonaworldstage(Royles,2012:176).

Essentially, this is a case where learning to walk the international walk, and talk the

internationaltalk,hascometoWalesthroughtheconsciousexpansionoftheir-relatively

narrow, in the context of our other two case studies - domestic remit. The Welsh

Government’sdiplomacysurroundingtheCopenhagenSummitportrayedthemessagethat

Wales-asaregionchargedwithimplementingclimatechangelegislationandcarryingthe

statutoryresponsibilityforsustainabledevelopment-deservedavoiceinnegotiationsaimed

at creating an international regulatory framework in this same issue area. By consciously

linkingthelocalandtheglobalelementsofthisdebate,theyhavehelpedtopositionregional

governmentsperseasalegitimateactorinthisfield.Initsothercapacityaschairofnrg4SD

during these negotiations,Waleswas afforded a higher profile and an official role in the

proceedings,allowinginteractionswithinternationalorganisationsandanaudiencewhichit

mayotherwisehavestruggledtoattract.

Thiscarefulgroundingofparadiplomacyinthedomesticobligationsofsub-stategovernance

is somethingwhichwe see frequently inWales. According to one seniormember of the

NationalAssemblyforWales,whetherornotanissueareahasagroundinginthelegislative

competenceofWalesiscrucial:

Clearly…themeatandpotatoesofforeignaffairsisastatelevelresponsibility.Buttheninthemindsoftheactorsthereisquitealotofroomforaninterest

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in foreign relations because politics is conducted in a global world, in aEuropeanworld,invariousstructures.SomeofwhichhaveverydirectlinkstoWales-Europeanregionalpolicyforexample-CAP,environmentincreasingly,there’slots.SothatdrawsusintotheEuropeandimension.Butthenclimatechange agendas draw you into activities, the UN. But it tends to be fairlyfunctional…towhatdoesrelatetodevolvedresponsibilities.75

Indeed,thesameintervieweegoesontoarguethatwhereanissuehasa“genesis” inthe

NationalAssembly,thisenablestheinternationaldimensionsoftheareatobetakenon,and

iswheresub-stateactivitiesareabletocontributemosteffectively.ThecontextofWales’

internationalperformancesarethereforekeytotheirperceivedlegitimacyandeffectiveness.

Foradifferentinterviewee:

Groupslikenrg4SD,organisationslikethatwhichhaveanEUbasebutwhicharetryingtointeractwithothergroupsacrosstheglobe,Isupposenasensearekindofpioneeringorganisations,andIguessit’sthekindofglobalclimatechangeinfrastructurewhichhavemadethatpossibleinthatsortofcontext.SoIthinktherehastobeacontextforthesesortsofthings.Ithinkinanidealworldyoumightbeabletosay‘well,regionscandoitforthemselves’,andyouknow.Ithinktherealityisthattherehastobeaninternationalcontextwhichisdrivenbysovereignstatesinorderforthesub-statestobeabletomakeameaningfulcontributionofthebackofthat.Andthat’smysenseofit.76

This same rationale - of Wales’ international legitimacy stemming from its devolved

competences-canbeseen,andarguablyhasbeenstretchedinamoredeliberatefashion,in

theWelshGovernment’s flagshipWales for Africa programme. AsWyn Jones and Royles

explain(WynJonesandRoyles,2012),thestatuarybasisforthisinitiativewasfarfromclear-

cut:

Given…thatinternationaldevelopmentisareservedmatter,theconstitutionalbasis for Assembly action required some innovative interpretation of itspowers.Consequently,lawyerswereinvolvedin‘wadingthroughlegislation’seekinggroundsonwhichWalesmightact.Theconceptof ‘mutualbenefit’becamecentral to justifyingWAG’sactions.BothWalesandthedevelopingworldweretobebeneficiaries(WAG2006,1).Theconcernwithconstitutionalproprietywashighlightedbythefactthatthe‘everyparticularactionthatwehavetakenundertheframeworkhasbeencheckedwithlawyers...thereisalegal paragraph attached to every submission sent to the FirstMinister toapprovethespendingofmoney’(WynJonesandRoyles,2012:260).

75WelshAssemblyMember,interview201376SeniorWelshGovernmentAdvisor,interview2013

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The performance of Wales in the field of international development is therefore one

grounded in a hard-fought appropriation of the issue area and a novel statutory basis of

mutual reciprocity. Broader themes also feed into Wales’ performances in this regard,

however:theimageofWalesasanoutwardlooking,tolerantnation,makingan‘identifiably

Welsh’contributiontointernationaldevelopment.Incelebrating10yearsoftheWalesfor

AfricaProgramme,aWelshGovernmentreportmakestheselinksratherclearly:

Waleshasalwaysbeenanoutwardlookingnation,keentoplayourpartintheworld.Tenyearsago,inkeepingwiththatoutwardlookingspirit,welaunchedourWalesforAfricaprogrammetoencouragemorepeople inWalestogetinvolvedwithdevelopmentwork inAfrica… thesepartnerships characterisetheWelsh approach to international development, where experiences andknowledgearesharedinaspiritofmutualrespectandreciprocity.Thisvibrant,civil-society based approach has seen friendships formed acrossWales andAfrica, as people work together practically, purposefully and meaningfullytowardsachievingtheUN’sSustainableDevelopmentGoalsSGDs.ThevisionoftheSDGsisthatofashared,sustainablydevelopedwordinwhichnooneisleft behind. The Welsh Government is committed to being a part of theresponsetoachievingthis(WelshGovernment,2016).

Notonly,therefore,areWales’performancesaspartofthisprogrammeaimedatbringing

forwardanovelapproachtointernationaldevelopment,buttheyalsoallowWalestotieitself

to broader international structures and discourses - such as the UN’s sustainable

development goals - enhancing its international legitimacy as it is seen to make an

‘identifiablyWelsh’contributiontothisissuearea(Government,2006),arguablyinafashion

whichisreadilyunderstoodandacceptedbyothermembersoftheinternationalcommunity.

ThemessagesWalessendsinthisregardarenotofasub-stategovernmentattemptingto

challengeorcircumventtheactivitiesofasovereignstate,butinsteadbringasmaller-scale,

practical, network-based approach to a global issue area.Once again, politicalwillwithin

Waleshasappearstohavebeenattheheartofthisprocess.Asoneintervieweeputsit:

WithWalesforAfricayoucouldperfectlywellargue,andpeopledofromtimetotime, ‘what’sthatgottodowithus’,we’renotanaidgivingbody’…so Isuppose,andactuallythattakesmetothesecondpointIwasgoingtomake,that’saverygoodexample,inthatwe’redrivenbyourownpowers,butwe’realsosortofdrivenbypolitical judgement,politicalwillandIthinkWalesforAfricaisagoodexampleofthat.Imean,Ithinkbasicallyit’sbecauseMinisters,

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thisGovernment,thepreviousGovernment,wanttodoit.BecausethereisapoliticalwillandpoliticalenthusiasmtohaveanengagementbetweenWalesasadevelopedcountryandotherpartsofAfricawhichareun-developedorless-developed.Andagainthough,interestinglyinthecaseofWalesforAfricaIthinkthatwasacasenotjustofpoliticalwillhere,butpoliticalwill incivicsociety,wherepeoplewerealreadydoingstuff.77

The ‘creative’ interpretationofWales’ devolutiondispensation to allow for theWales for

Africaprogramme(aidedtoalargedegreebytheprecedentsetbyScotlandinitsLesotho

programme),aswellasthemodelofreciprocityborneoutbythisparticularmodelhavealso

inspirednewlegislationinWales,explicitlyharnessingthefuturewellbeingofWelshcitizens

toa rangeofglobal issuesand thereforebringing them in to thediscursive foldofWelsh

politics:

WalesforAfrica’scontributiontotheSDGs[SustainableDevelopmentGoals]helpstofacilitateanidentifiablyWelshresponseoninternationalactionbasedaroundco-developmentinapartnershipapproach…inapioneeringpieceoflegislation, the Welsh Government’s Wellbeing of Future Generations Act(2015)commitsustoimprovingthesocial,economicandculturalwell-beingof Wales. Since its passing, public bodies in Wales are more focussed onhelping Wales demonstrate its commitment to the seven wellbeing goalsincludingGoal7-a‘GloballyResponsibleWales’(WelshGovernment,2016).

According to a director of Division for Sustainable Development in the Department of

EconomicandSocialAffairsattheUnitedNations:

TheWales Future Generations Act captures the spirit and essence of twodecadesofUnitedNationsworkintheareaofsustainabledevelopmentandservesasamodelforotherregionandcountries…wehopethatwhatWalesisdoingtodaytheworldwilldotomorrow.Action,morethanwords,isthehopeforourcurrentandfuturegenerations(WelshGovernment,2016).

In Wales, the international performances around climate change and sustainable

development do not typically attempt to mimic traditional state-state diplomacy or

discoursesinthewaysthatwefindevidenceofinScotland.Havingsaidthis,crucialtomany

oftheWelshparadiplomaticendeavoursexploredabove-andelsewhereinthisthesis–are

theprecedentsthatScotlandhassetinthesesameareas.WalesforAfricaispremised,toa

large extent, on Scotland’s international development programme in Lesotho. Indeed,

77Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentAdvisor,2013

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ScotlandalsobelongstomanyofthesamenetworksasWalesandhasasimilarfocusonareas

suchasclimatechangeandtheUN’sMillenniumDevelopmentGoals.Thedifferenceisthat

in addition to thesenetworkbased,multilateral activities, Scotlandalso engages inmuch

more ‘state-like’ endeavours which inevitably alter the ways in which its broader

paradiplomaticpresenceisinterpretedbyotheractors,inparticularlytheUKGovernment.

ReturningtoWales,intheabsenceofsomeofthemoreambitiousorcontroversialactivities

seen in both Scotland and Bavaria, theWelsh Government has been able to operate in

perhaps a more benign political context when it comes to paradiplomacy. Wales has

successfully draw upon on the legitimacy and the representational opportunities of both

broader regional networks - such as nrg4SD - and of international organisations and

structures, such as the UN, specifically in relation to its millennium development goals.

Notableinitsapproachhasbeenthepainstakinggroundingofinternationalprogrammeson

climate change and international development in domestic statutory authority and

legitimacy. It has also been seen to perform something ‘identifiably Welsh’ on the

international stage: the role it has executed is not one easily confusedwith a state, but

somethinginherentlysmallerscale.Incommittingtoanapproachofmutualreciprocity,both

intheWalesforAfricaprogrammeandundertheWalesFutureGenerationsAct,Wales is

harnessingthepowerofitssmallersize,thenecessitiesofgroundinginternationalaidinits

ownbenefit,abilitiesandcompetencesinordertocreateanapproachthatismorelikelyto

bewelcomedbytheinternationalcommunity-andtheUKGovernment-andatthesame

timeisarguablymorepurposefulandperhapseffectivethanalternativemodels(Anyimadu,

2011).

III. BavariainBrussels

PortrayingandharnessingthenotionofBavarianculturaldistinctivenesshasbeencrucialin

termsofgaining,andmaintaining,politicalpowerintheLand,andhasbeencentraltothe

successofthegoverningCSU(HepburnandHough,2012:93).Thishasobviousimplications

fortheinternationalactivitiesofBavaria,particularlywithinEurope;representingakeyarena

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for the performances of Bavaria as a strong, economically successful former sovereign,

groundedbyitsspecialhistoricalsignificanceandculturalidentity.Thereis,therefore,aclear

domesticpoliticalmotivationinperformingBavaria’sculturaldistinctivenessinternationally.

Indeed,inBavariawefindthatthe‘special’positionoftheFreistaat-inbothhistoricaland

economicterms-isfrequentlyreferencedaspartofitsclaimstolegitimacyininternational

arenas.AccordingtoBavarianMinisterEberhardSinner;“Bavariaisoneoftheoldeststates

inEurope…weareverydifferentfromtherestofGermany,weliketobeindependent.We

fightformorecompetencesandpowersfortheregions”(Hepburn,2008a:194).Thisclaimto

‘special significance’ is reflected in the attention paid by Bavarian officials to its ‘un-

hyphenated’ status; the image of Bavaria as a long-standing, unchanging presence in the

worldisakeypartofitsattemptstoappear‘state-like’,incontradistinctiontothe“cluttered

identity” of the “hyphenated states”, such as Baden-Württemberg or North-Rhine-

Westphalia.78Similarly,Bavariaisabletoemployitstreatymakingpowernotonly“tocreate

substantial content-based cooperation with other partners”, but also - importantly - “to

further‘build’and‘enhancetheinternational-legalrecognitionoftheregion’”as“aplayer

that should be taken seriously in the “international arena’” (Criekemans, 2010b: 45);

mimickingthetreaty-basedinternationalarrangementsmaintainedbystates.

Bavaria’srelationshipwiththeEuropeanUnionstandsoutamongstitssub-stategovernment

peers.Thereasonsforthisaretwofold.Firstly,Bavariahasaparticularlywell-resourcedand

impressiverepresentationintheheartofBrussels,marking itsstatusas ‘oneoftheoldest

statesinEurope’.However,atthesametime,thestate’sEuropeaninteractionsarestrongly

markedbyitseuroscepticism,withsubsidiaritylegislationandmonitoringbeingtheforemost

areas of its activity. This euro sceptic approach to EU politics has much to do with the

assessmentthatEuropeanpolicyisencroachinguponthenaturalterritoryofLändersuchas

Bavaria,‘hollowingout’theroletheypreviouslyoccupiedandleavinginsufficientroomfor

sub-stateinfluencewithinEuropeaninstitutions.Indeed,theroleoftheBavarianParliament’s

EUrepresentativeseemstobethedirectscrutinyandmonitoringofEuropeaninstitutions

78Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentOfficial2013

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themselves, rather than keeping its own Bavarian Government in check.79 From the

scrupulouspracticeoftheEarlyWarningSystemtothecontinuedcritiquesofthesubsidiary

system,boththeBavarianParliamentanditsGovernmenttakeituponthemselvestobethe

activewatchdogsofsub-statecompetence,consideringitbotharightandadutytobethe

“criticalbutconstructivepartneroftheEU”.80

Setamongstthisbackdrop,theestablishmentofBavaria’scurrentBrusselsrepresentationin

2004canbeconsideredanimportantperformanceofits‘special’significanceinEurope,not

onlymimickingbutinfactoutshiningtheofficialrepresentationsofmember-states,including

itsownFederalGovernment. Thespecific context isalso importanthere.Theopeningof

independentLänderoffices inBrusselswas initially“highlycontroversial”,with“questions

raisedastotheirlegality”,undertheGermanConstitution.Indeed,theresponseoftheLänder

themselveswasto“workinitiallytofudgethebasisuponwhichtheirfirstEUofficeswere

built”(Moore,2006:196).ThebuildingofBavaria’scurrentrepresentationwasthereforea

clear signal both to the Federal Government, and to European institutions, of Bavaria’s

legitimatepresenceinEuropeanaffairs.AccordingtoMoore(2006:192):

ThenewBavarianEuropeanUnion(EU)representation,whichopenedattheend of September 2004, has set an important precedent among regionaloffices in Brussels. Paid for and lavishly renovated at a cost of almost E30million to the Bavarian taxpayer, the building cuts an impressive figure,sandwichedbetween the EuropeanParliament building in Brussels and thenewCommissionheadquarters.ThepresenceofBavariaintheEUisthussettobecomeonewhichwillbeevenmoredifficulttooverlook

Speakingofthenewrepresentation,aseniorBavarianparliamentaryofficialreasonedthat:

It’sgrand.It’shistoric….It’sanexclamationmarksayingwearehereinBrusselsandwearenotanywhere,we’renotinsomeofficebuilding-we’reinthisbigarea and we took this historic building so everyone who comes to theEuropean Parliament has to pass it. So this part of…the strategy, or themessage,tosay…wedosomethingreallyspecial.81

79Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianParliamentaryOfficial201380Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianParliamentaryOfficial201381Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianParliamentaryOfficial2013

185

Indeed,thismessageofBavarian‘specialness’amongstsub-stategovernmentsissomething

ofarecurringtheme.Accordingtoadifferentinterviewee,Bavaria’sabilitytointeractwith

sovereignstates-suchastheCzechRepublic-dependsuponthecalculationthatsuchactors

makeastoBavaria’sownstatus.Thedeterminationfollows,therefore,that“Bavariamight

notbesovereign”,butitssize,importanceandeconomicpower,meansthatthey“outweigh

perhaps8or9[memberstates]insidetheEuropeanUnion”.82

In light of this self-perception, the Bavarian representation in Brussels again looks to

represent a convincing performance of its power and status. Through mimicking, in an

elaboratefashion,theofficialrepresentationsofmemberstates,Bavariaisplacingitself-in

purelyvisualterms-inthisvery‘category’ofactor,distancingitselffromitssub-statepeers

intheprocess.GiventheimportanceoftheterritorialcleavagewithinBavarianpolitics,such

ademonstrationofstatusthusreflectsavarietyofmotivationsthatthesub-stategovernment

mayhaveforitsparadiplomacy.Byenhancingitsabilitytoinfluence,andultimatelyconstrain,

Europeanpolicy,aswellasmonitortheactivitiesofEuropeaninstitutions,Bavarialooksto

safeguarditsownareasofcompetence.Atthesametime,however,suchperformancessend

amessageof stature to the federalgovernment - reasserting its roleas ‘critical friend’ to

Berlin, as well as bolstering Bavarian identity and cultural distinctiveness. Critics of the

representationhavearguedthatit“harksbacktothedaysofKingLudwigII”,andbranded

theoffices“SchlossNeuwahnstein”-theturretedhilltopcastlebuiltfortheKingduringthe

19thcentury(Moore,2006:192).However,giventhecentralityoftheFreistaatnarrativeto

Bavaria’sparadiplomacy,andtheroleofits‘specialhistory’inunderstandingitsstatusboth

insideGermanyandbeyond,suchcriticismsseemtolosetheirpotency.Instead,theybecome

a rather apt caricature of Bavaria’s current international position: a self-assured, critical

partner of the Federal Republic, with a privileged international status stemming from its

uniquehistory,andfacilitatedbyitseconomicprowess.

82Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentOfficial2013

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Conclusion

Simply by conducting even the most humdrum of paradiplomatic activities, sub-state

governmentsareengaged inbuildingtheir internationalagencies.Byreachingoutbeyond

theirdomesticremits,aprocessofagencycreationisunderway.Examiningthisprocessfrom

aperformativityperspectiveallowsusto“makevisibletheworkthatgoesintotheproduction

ofactorsininternationalpolitics”.83Ofcourse,withagencycreationcomescontestationand

theclosepolicingofboundaries:wehaveseenthismanifestinnumerousguisesaspartof

thecase-studiesabove.FromtheUKandScottishGovernment’stussleoverChina’sactof

‘Panda diplomacy’; to the slow acceptance and unspoken compromise over Bavaria’s

Europeanrepresentation,andindeedthestatusofallLand‘Vertung’;tothepainstakingand

‘creative’interpretationofthestatuebooksinWalesandScotlandtoallowalegalbasisof

mutualreciprocityintheirinternationalaidefforts.

ForMcConnelletal,paradiplomaticscholarshiphastraditionallyfocussedonthedescriptive,

ratherthantheanalytical,meaningthat“thesescholarsrarelyquestionthelegitimatingwork

thatdiplomacyaccomplishesorattendtotheperformativeaspectsofdiplomaticpractice”

(McConnelletal.,2012:806).Thischapterhassoughttoraisethoseveryquestions.Wehave

considered the various ways in which sub-state governments have attempted to secure

legitimacy through the nature of their diplomatic interactions: drawing on their

representational qualities;mimicking core features of official, bilateral diplomacy;making

explicit their position on the ‘front line’ of global governance. Key differences were also

identified in the range of performances we considered, both in terms of what form of

diplomacythesub-stategovernmentundertookandinthewaysthatthelegitimacyofthese

actionswasgrounded.InBavaria,wesawtheliteral‘trappingsofstatehood’mimickedina

highlyvisualfashionwiththestrategiclocationandscaleofitsBrusselsrepresentation.In

thiscase,Bavariadrewheavilyonitshistoryasasovereignanditseconomicprowessinorder

topositionitself-inageographicalsense-askintofullEUmemberstates,ratherthanother

83 The aimof the Performativity and International Politics’,workshopheld at theGoetheUniversityFrankfurtonthe21st-22ndFebruary2014.Authorinattendance.

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regions. InScotland,anactofbilateraldiplomacyactuallyexchanged - in ‘official’ terms -

between China and the UK was appropriated as evidence of a diplomatic relationship

betweenChinaanditself,asasub-stategovernment.Mimickingverycloselythediscourse

and procedures involved in official bilateral diplomacy, Scotland was performing an

international agency more closely resembling a small-state, rather than a sub-state

government.InWales,activitiesaroundclimatechangemitigationsawitadoptaprimarily

networkbased,region-to-regionapproach,drawingonthelegitimacyofitsdomesticremit

as a governmental actor at the implementation-end of global decision making on the

environment.Throughitspositionasco-chairofnrg4SDWelshMinistersgainedaccesstoa

rangeofinternationalorganisationsandahigh-level,globalaudience,conferringthisprofile

andlegitimacyonseparateperformancesinitsowncapacityasasub-stategovernment.In

its Wales for Africa programme and in the Future Generations Act of 2015, the Welsh

Governmenthaveconsciouslyexpandedtheirdomesticremittoencompassaninternational

andsustainabledevelopmentfunction,drawingbothonthesestatutoryrequirementsandon

dominant, liberal and international discourses - aligned to and associated with broader

programmes, suchas theUN’smillenniumdevelopmentgoals - toachieve legitimacyand

credibilityasanagentinthissphere.Itisimportanttonote,however,thattheseprocess-

tracingexercisesprovidedonly isolatedexamples. Theyare intendedtodemonstrate the

range of ways in which sub-state international agency is created and in which sub-state

governments seek legitimacy in these roles, rather than to ascribe a hard-and-fast set of

characteristicsabouteachofourcases.Indeed,Scotlandalsocontributestoclimatechange

foraandmaintainsaninternationaldevelopmentprogrammewithaverysimilarbasisandin

similarwaystoWales,aswellasexhibitingaperhapsmorecontentiousrangeofstate-like

mimickingactivities.

Ashighlightedattheoutsetofthischapter,itisdifficult,whenlookingattheinternational

agencies of sub-state governments, to avoid being subsumed by either of two - equally

unhelpful - arguments: that paradiplomacy is either system transforming or entirely

parochial,andinconsequential.Consideringingreaterdetailthree‘caseswithinacasestudy’

hashopefullyenabledustoseetheprocessesofagencycreationandcontestationwithsome

greater clarity; processes which lend evidence to neither of the extreme interpretations

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mentionedabove.Thesubsequentchapterwillreturntothecentralquestionunderpinning

this and the preceding chapters, which - at heart - has to do with the consequences of

paradiplomacy.Itattemptstooutlinetherangeofwaysinwhichthepracticematters,both

intheoreticalterms-forthedisciplinesofinternationalrelations,comparativepoliticsand

diplomaticstudies-andinamoreempiricalsense.

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Chapter6:Sub-stateDiplomacy:theGood,theBad,andtheUgly?

Introduction

Hybridityisnotanewconceptwithininternationalrelations(Hocking,1999;Hocking,1997;

Hocking, 1986) .With the proliferation of non-state actors associated with globalisation,

regionalintegrationandmultilateralism,notonlyisitatruismtosaythatthestateisnolonger

theonlyinternationallyrelevantactor,butalsothatthehostofotheractorsoperatingatthe

international level possess differing qualities and characteristics. The international

personalitiesoftheseentitiesareoftenhybridones:supranationalinstitutionscanactinways

previouslyreservedtostates,asanarbiterofinternationalforce,forexample,yetmaynot

poses the representational qualities of states themselves. International NGOs or citizens’

groupsmaylegitimatelyrepresenttheinterestsofconstituentgroupsoverlappingwiththose

of states; yet not have the diplomatic authority or institutional capacity to serve these

interestseffectively.Suchhybridityissignificantinthesensethatitopensupnewdiplomatic

space,presentingalternativepracticesthatoperateunderadifferent-perhapslessstringent

-setof‘rules’.Indeed,allowingforthissortofinternationaldifferentiationhastheoretical

consequences.AccordingtoSidaway(2003,p.174citedinMcConnelletal.,2012:811)“this

suggeststoothepossibilityofotheranalyticalframeworks…beyondthepresenceorabsence

of undifferentiated sovereign power, towards a contextual understanding of different

regimes,apparatus,expressionsandrepresentationsofsovereignty”.ForAdler-Nissenand

Gad,postcolonialmicro-polities“mimecertainaspectsofsovereignty”,appearing‘sovereign

butnotquite”.Thisproducesa“hybridisationwhichquestionssovereigntyasaneither/or

concept”(Adler-NissenandGad,2012:8).

Sub-state governments are a particular type of hybrid actor: able to represent a distinct

constituencythatoftenidentifies,inameaningfulway,withthatregion.Thisisparticularly

true in cases where the sub-state government represents a ‘stateless nation’, such as

Scotland,CataloniaorQuebec,butitisnotexclusivelyintheseinstancesthatregionalidentity

is salient. Indeed, in the context of increasing regional autonomy, and in the shadow of

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independencedebatesinScotland,FLändersandCatalonia,alongsidethemoreubiquitous

pressuresof‘glocalisation’(Hocking,1999),regionalorsub-stateidentityisanincreasingly

importantone.Notonlydosub-stategovernmentshavethis representationalquality,but

theyareabletocombineitwiththe‘official’resourcesofgovernment:Ministers,Parliaments,

CivilServantsandbudgets.Bothofthesefacetsoverlap,andsometimesdirectlychallenge,

theirequivalentsatcentralstatelevel:state‘national’identity,stateofficialsandsoon.The

hybridity of sub-state governments is therefore found in their ‘sovereignty bound’ yet

‘sovereignty free’ nature (Hocking, 1999); they carry out diplomatic activities often very

similartosmallerstates,yetcruciallylackexternalsovereigntyandautonomousdiplomatic

authority under international law.84 In turn, this raises questions over the status and

significanceoftheirdiplomacyasitrelatestootheractors.Inparticularcircumstances,sub-

stategovernmentscan‘speak’fortheentirestate(suchaswhenactingaspartofstate-wide

delegationsinEUfora)aswellasfortheregion,attimesinconcertwithstate-diplomacy,at

timesdirectlycontradictingit.

However,withveryfewexceptions,foreignpolicy-atleastinitsmoretraditionalsense-is

notwithintheofficialpurviewofsub-stategovernments.85Wherethereisarole,itisalimited

one:relatedtotheunavoidably‘international’aspectsofdomesticcompetences.Indeed,the

very concept of sub-state ‘paradiplomacy’ remains illogical for some: where national or

Federalgovernmentsaretaskedwithexternalrelationsandthe‘high’politicsofdiplomacy,

securityanddefence,theroleoftheregionallayeristomanagethelocal:schools,hospitals

andhousing.Theprincipleofsubsidiarity,wherebydecisionsaretobetakenatthelowest

appropriatelevel,enshrinedinEUtreatylaw,wouldalsoseemtolimitthe‘natural’abilities

84Somesub-state‘representations’abroad-includingWalesandScotland-canbegranteddiplomaticstatusthroughcooperationwiththehost-states,operatingthroughtheauthorityofthatstate.85 One key exception proving this rule is the case of Belgium, where bothWallonia andFlandershaveconstitutionalresponsibilityfortheirownforeignrelations.Additionally,theFaroeIslandsweregrantedtheabilitytoenterintoforeignrelationsbyaspecificActbetweentheautonomouscommunityandDenmarkin2005,arguablyasawaytoappeasedemandsforenhancedself-rule.

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of the sub-state tier in such fields.Certainly,UKopinionpolling repeatedlybearsout this

disassociationbetweentheregionalandtheglobalintermsofconstitutionalpreferences.86

Allofthis-thelackofconstitutionalandinstitutionalcompetence,theconceptualdissonance

andtheabsenceofpublicpressureforregionstoassumecontrolinthisdomain-rendersthe

actualscopeofsub-stateinternationalrelationsallthemoresurprising.Withoutsignificant

‘push’factors,itseems-astheprecedingchaptershavesoughttodemonstrate-thatmany

sub-stategovernmentsarenonethelesschoosingtodevelopinternationalagency.Sub-state

governmentsthusrepresentakeystudyinthewaysinwhichnewactorsareabletoenter

into international politics and become ‘diplomats’. As international entities, sub-state

governmentshavebothrespondedtoaseriesofnewopportunitystructures(providedforby

internalreorganisationwithinstates,aswellasnewinstitutionsandfinancialforcesatapan-

regionalorgloballevel(Lecours,2002))and-crucially-havedemonstratedaseemingdesire

toappropriatethisdomainfortheirownaims.

This chapter addresses, andultimately rejects, the arguments that sub-statediplomacy is

something inherentlyprogressive(‘democratising’ foreignpolicy),dangerous(undermining

thestateorencouragingrampantnationalism),orindeedinconsequential(‘provincialismwrit

large’). Instead, the central argument developed here is that, much like the diplomatic

behavioursofstates,paradiplomacycanindeedcontributetoglobalpoliticsallsortsofways

-bothwelcomeandunwelcomefromtheperspectiveofstates themselves.However, the

significanceofthepracticeextendsbeyondthispragmaticlevel.Sub-stategovernmentsare

able todoparticular ‘things’ in theirdiplomacy,byvirtueof theirhybridstatus.Sub-state

diplomacy looks and sounds very similar to that of states, yet they are not states. This

86 One recent survey into Welsh constitutional preferences found that only 15% ofrespondents thoughtthatNationalAssembly forWalesshouldhavecontrolof theareaofforeignaffairsanddefence,contrastingwithotherareaswherefurtherdevolutionhadbeensuggested,suchaspolicing(63%),renewableenergy(70%)andcourtsandcriminal justice(35%).BeaufortPublicOpinionSurveyonNonFiscalPowers,evidencetotheCommissiononDevolution in Waleshttp://commissionondevolutioninwales.independent.gov.uk/files/2013/08/Beaufort-Opinion-survey-on-Non-Fiscal-powers.pdf

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ambiguitycanresultinundoubtedly‘messy’scenariosandrequiresthatthephenomenonbe

problematizedinamuchfullersensewithininternationalrelationsanddiplomatictheory.In

doingso,thechapteracknowledgesthetaskoutlinedbyHocking(1999:18-21),inengaging

withthewaysinwhichsuchhybridcases“moveusbeyondprofitlessdebatesastowhoare

andwhoarenotsignificantactorsinworldpolitics”.

Internationalrelations‘alacarte’?

InWales, Scotland and Bavaria, the ‘spectre of the state’ both limits and informs much

paradiplomaticactivity.Forexample,whilsttheScottishGovernment’sinternationalrelations

areoftenlikenedtothoseofsimilarsizedsmallstates(particularlythosethatScotlandiskeen

toalign itselfwith intheScandinavian‘arcofprosperity’),whoalsotendtooperateniche

diplomaticstrategies,itisinfactthedevolvedstatusofScotland,anditsmembershipofthe

UK,thatrendersthecontextmarkedlydifferent.Ontheonehand,thiscontextnecessarily

limitsthetypeofdiplomaticactivitiespossible.Itexcludes,forexample,securityanddefence,

andasdiscussedinsubsequentsectionsofthischapter,thisisnotnecessarilytotheregion’s

detriment, often leaving their profile intactwhilst the sovereign state bears the brunt of

unpopulardecisionsordiplomaticfracas.Meanwhile,thisstatusmakesthearticulationofa

distinct international identity all the more important for sub-state governments, as it is

deemednecessarytodistinguishbetweendevolvedorregionallevelandnationalorfederal

positions, values and decisions. Normative diplomacy, focussing on international

development,climatechangeordemocracyassistance,forexample,thereforecomprisesa

significantelementWalesandScotland’sexternalactivities(asinBavariaalso).Ontheother

hand,however,sub-stateaccessbothtotheUK’sinternationalresourcesandreputation,but

also,thoughheavilycircumscribed,toitspolicy-makingmachinery,meansthatfornationsor

regions of their size, Scotland and Wales have greater potential for agenda-setting, as

opposedtoopinion-taking,oninternationalissues.InBavaria,meanwhile,thefactthatthe

dominant party, the CSU, also frequently - including in the present period - occupy a

significantpositioninFederalpolitics,owingtothecoalitiongoverningarrangements,also

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allowsforatwin-trackapproachtointernationalinfluence.Therefore,thoughthenumbers

ofareasinwhichsub-stategovernmentscanact‘autonomously’arelimited,theyareableto

draw upon a broader framework of both hard and soft power resource through their

membershipofthehoststateitself.

The essential characteristics of sub-state governments as diplomatic agents are therefore

informedbothbytheirambiguous,hybridstatus(asgovernmental,butnon-sovereignactors)

andtheroleofpowerrelations-fundamentallyasymmetric-betweenthesub-andnation

state (with sub-state diplomacy always taking place within this ‘spectre of the state’).

Together, these characteristics, and the international context facing sub-state diplomats,

combinetocreateauniqueoperationalspace,onequalitativelydifferentfromthatwithin

whichstatesoperate.

Sub-state governments undertake a range of activities thatmay appear largely similar in

composition to thoseundertakenby smaller states. These activity clusters includeborder

diplomacy,participationininternationalandmultilateralfora(suchaspreviouslymentioned

nrg4SD)andsolicitinginternationaltradeandinvestment(maintainingrepresentativeoffices

abroad). They often develop some element of niche or normative diplomatic strategy -

including‘normentrepreneurship’(Wigell,2013)-andtheyrelyheavilyonpublicdiplomacy

(Huijgh, 2010) to reach global audiences. Some aremoreor less explicitly geared around

achieving independence (sometimes termed proto-diplomatic strategies (Duchacek, 1990;

Soldatos,1990)),whilstthemajorityofregionshavenosuchimmediateaim.Instead,their

engagement in the international sphere does not appear to be a precursor for sovereign

statehood,and,indeed,theirhybridnature(Hocking,1999;1997)wouldseemtobeamore-

or-lesspermanentfeatureoftheinternationalsystem.

Atthesametime,thereremainimportantdifferencesbetweentheinternationalagenciesof

sub-andsmall-stategovernments.Sub-stategovernmentsarealmostuniversallyexcluded

fromadirectroleinareasof‘highpolitics’,inparticulardefenceandsecuritypolicy.Theylack

membership of most influential international organizations and typically have smaller

institutionalcapacitiesinthefieldofdiplomacyandinternationalaffairs.Thestatusofsub-

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state diplomacy is therefore ambiguous. On the one hand, many sub-state governments

conduct‘official’diplomaticrelationswithstatesthemselves,implyinganequalitythatbelies

theirdisparatelegalstatuses.Ontheotherhand,thebulkofsub-statediplomacytakesplace

ona region-region level - oftenwith the samepompand ceremony seenwith traditional

diplomacy,yetnotpossessingthesameweightassimilararrangementsbetweensovereign

states,whichwouldtakeprimacy.

Thepracticeofparadiplomacybystatelessnations,evenwheresecessionisnotthegoalof

governingparties,arguablymakesaclaimforthelegitimacyofaformofnationalor‘popular’

sovereignty:howstatesrespondtothisclaimrepresentsanequallyinterestingmarkerasto

thedominanceofsuchinternationalnorms.Attheveryleast,statelessnations,autonomous

regionsandunrecognisedstates(althoughinverydifferentways)all“questionthedirectlink

betweeninternalandexternalsovereignty”(Caspersen,2012::11).Isitpossible,asKrasner

argues(1999::4-5),foranentitytohavecertainsovereignvariantsbutnotothers,rendering

the concept of sovereignty neither static nor indivisible, nor absolute? If we accept this

distinction,wepotentiallyallowfor thehybrid-natureofstatelessnationsas international

actorstobemeaningfullyconceptualised.

Sub-state governments are able to occupy a unique operational space; one defined and

expandedprimarily-thoughnotexclusively-throughtheir interactionswithoneanother.

This space has particular qualities, being largely symbolic, non-statutory, only loosely

institutionalisedandhugelyvaried.Alongsidethehybridnatureofsub-statediplomacy,the

utilisation of this operational space, and development of a specific type of international

profile,hasaclearandonceagaindifferentiated linkwithprocessesofdomesticpolityor

nationbuilding-andismarkedbythenatureofrelationswiththehoststate.

The ambiguous status of sub-state governments as international actors allows them to

maintainaparticulartypeofinternationalprofile;donningadiplomatichatonlyincertain

circumstances. These actors are both free from the requirements (in terms of financial

resourcesandpoliticalcapital)ofhighpolitics,securityanddefenceand,atthesametime,

able to ‘skirt around’ controversial diplomatic issues under the cover of lacking such a

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responsibility.Takentoitsextremes,sub-stategovernmentsmightbeableto‘freeride’on

the foreignpolicy of their host-state, accentuating distinctivenesswhere this has positive

connotations(theCSU’ssuccessintransformingBavariaintoahigh-techeconomy,theSNP’s

anti-nuclearperspectiveorWales’interestininternationaldevelopmentorgenderequality),

yetdeferringtostate-widecompetencewhenadistinctprofilewouldnotbebeneficial.

TheScottishcontextofferssomeimportantinsightsintothepossibleadvantagesofthehybrid

international profiles maintained by sub-state governments. In numerous respects, the

internationalstandingofScotlandasadistinctnation isveryhigh. In recentsurveyof the

internationalreputationsof50nations,Scotlandrepresentedthesinglenon-sovereignnation

tobepolled inaglobalcohort, ranking15th in termsof recognition (ScottishGovernment

StrategicResearch,2012).Scotlandwas“scoredandrankedsimilarlyandoftenaheadofthe

othersmaller,highincome,liberaldemocraciesontheindex:Denmark,Finland,Irelandand

New Zealand”. Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, Scotland’s

strongestratingwasintheareaofgovernance,which“considerspublicopinionregardingthe

levelofnationalgovernmentcompetencyandfairness,aswellasitsperceivedcommitment

toglobal issues suchaspeace,povertyand theenvironment”. In the2012poll, Scotland

climbedto13thpositiononthisindicator,themostsignificantimprovementinperceptions

comingfromtheinternationalstage(ratherthanfromUKpanels):

Scotland’s reputation has improved for its endeavour to reduce globalpoverty, followed by its efforts in protecting the environment, andresponsibilityintheareasofglobalpeaceandsecurity(ScottishGovernmentStrategicResearch,2012).

Thatadevolvedgovernmentwithnoformalcompetenceinareasofglobalpeaceandsecurity

canbuild andmaintain sucha strong international reputation in theseareasof activity is

borderingontheextraordinary.Indeed,thisfeatcanberelatedtothefactthatmuchofthe

work that sub-state governments ‘do’ on the international stage is restricted to public

diplomacy(Huijgh,2010):areflectionofboththelimitedformalscopefordecisionmakingor

‘high’diplomacy,andthecomparativeadvantagethatnon-stateactorscandevelopinthis

regard.Thesuccessofsuch‘soft’enterprisesintheScottishcontextiscertainlyevidencedby

suchdata.

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Partofthisrelativesuccess,however,canperhapsbeattributedtothelackofotherburdens

ofinternationalactornessthathavefallenonScottishactorsandScottishresourceswhenit

comestointernationalaffairsand,moreimportantly,foreignanddefencepolicy.Suchissues

wererecentlyforegroundedinthecontextoftheScottishindependencereferendum.Much

hadbeenmadeofScotland’sexternalreputationandhencethehypothetical international

standing of Scotland as an independent state. However, from the position of a devolved

nation, the ScottishGovernmenthasperhapsbeenable to give the illusion of far greater

international agency that it actually maintains. The Scottish Government has not been

required to invest significant resources in, for example, comprehensive diplomatic and

consular representation (instead Scottish officials are located in a smaller number of

strategically important locales,co-locatedwithUKmissions).Similarly, ithasbeenable to

benefitfromthehardpower,geo-politicalstrategicinfluenceandeconomicweightoftheUK,

inadditiontotheUK’sconsiderablesoft-powerresources.Indeed,thequestionofwhether

Scotlandcouldexpecttoachieveanetgaininforeignpolicyterms,inapost-independence

scenario,recurredtimeandagaininbothinHolyroodandWestminsterduringthecourseof

thereferendumcampaign(forexample:UKHouseofCommonsForeignAffairsCommittee,

2013;ScottishGovernment,2013b).87Maintainingtheillusionofparticipatoryrightswithout

theaccompanyingresponsibilitiesoffull-membershipoftheinternationalsystemcanmean

that sub-state governments, on occasion, are in an optimum position to achieve their

particular international ambitions. Under more benign circumstances, there would be

nothing‘bad’ordisconcertingaboutthisscenariofromastate’sperspective.However,inthe

contextofanincreasinglyfractiousrelationshipwiththeUKgovernment,Scotlandmaywell

be viewed as an unwelcome ‘free-rider’ on the UK’s diplomatic profile, by virtue of its

selectiveapproachtointernationalengagement.Thereverseofthisargument,however,can

perhapsbestbedisplayedbyScotland’scurrentpredicamentastheUKpreparestoleavethe

European Union; evidence of the hard, non-negotiable constraints that border the

operationalspacethatsub-stategovernmentsareabletooccupy.

87 These issues are raised in the report of the UK House of Commons Foreign AffairsCommittee:‘ForeignpolicyconsiderationsfortheUKandScotlandintheeventofScotlandbecominganindependentcountry’,May2013

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Characterisingsub-statediplomacy

Ifwetakethehybridityofsub-stategovernments,andtheuniqueoperationalspacethatthey

occupy, as our starting point then the effects or implications of paradiplomacy can be

conceptualisedinnumerousways.Theabilitytopick-and-chooseinternationalrelationson

an‘alacarte’basis(albeitfromarestrictedmenu),couldbeconceivedofasatypeoffree-

riding,afairlypejorativeconceptthatnonethelesswoulddescribethosecaseswheresub-

statediplomacybecamecompetitivewith thatof thecentral state.Toexpand thecycling

metaphor,perhapsmoregenerously,sub-stategovernmentscouldbeseento‘free-wheel’in

thevacuum leftbehindstate-diplomacy:drawingonbroader state resourcesandpolitical

capitalbutinsulatedfromthesamelevelsofscrutinyandexpectation-nottomentionlegal

andconstitutionalobligations.Thispositionmightbeconceivedasareasonablyprivileged

one, and it certainly has an impact on the sorts of activities that sub-state governments

choosetoengagein.Theeffectsoftheseactivitiesforthebroaderdiplomaticsystem-aswell

asspecificactorswithin it - canmanifest inseveralways,andwewillbriefly survey them

below.Fromtheperspectiveofhoststates,paradiplomaticactivitiesmightbeperceivedas

largelybenign(theparadiplomacyof‘goodintentions’)orindeedhelpfultospecificforeign

policy aims or the international reputation of the state as a whole (value-added

paradiplomacy).However,othertypesofactivitymaybeperceivedasthreateningthehost-

state’s standing, principally in commercial terms, as sub-state and host-state diplomatic

strategies compete for finite resources (competitive paradiplomacy). Perhaps of greater

significanceforstates,andarguablytakingongeo-politicalimplications,arethoseinstances

where a sub-state government enters the ‘big leagues’ of diplomacy, through contesting,

undermining or befuddling key parts of the state’s foreign policy (paradiplomacy on the

‘fringes’ of high politics and the paradiplomacy of recognition). The ongoing fallout from

2016’s Brexit referendum in the UK is arguably a telling example of this dynamic. The

following sections of this chapter go on to explore these tentative categories of activity,

demonstrating the range of ways that paradiplomacy manifests, and the meaning or

significancesuchpracticesholdforavarietyofotheractors.Thediscussionaimstoilluminate

thepotentialcomplexityofcertaintypesofparadiplomaticactivity.

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I. Paradiplomacyofgoodintentions

The unique operational space that sub-state governments occupy can be utilised for

normativegoods-includingtothebenefitofstatesthemselves,addinganothertooltothe

rangeofstrategiesavailablefordealingwithprotractedinternationalissues.Lookingbeyond

ourthreecasestudiestemporarily,theexampleoftheautonomousregionofÅland,whose

‘special arrangements’ vis-à-vis Finland have been regarded as a possible template for

resolvingethnicconflictinothersettings(Wigell,2013::67),isparticularlyillustrativehere.

Wigell’sstudyidentifiesÅlanditselfaspracticingnormentrepreneurship:utilisingitshistory

andspecial statusasanautonomousregionas its ‘internationalcard’,andadvocatingthe

‘Ålandexample’asamodelforinternationalconflictresolution.Suchnormentrepreneurship

hasitsrootsinboth“genuinelyaltruisticreasons”,and,importantly,inthenormativecapital

that such internationalactivitycangenerate forÅland -particularly in relation toFinland.

AccordingtoWigell(2013::77)“thenormativepowerÅlandgainsthroughthepromotionof

the Åland Example can thus be used to influence its domestic relationswith the Finnish

government”. Wigell then queries the seemingly conspicuous absence of the Finnish

government’s activities in promoting the Åland example, given its proactive use of norm

entrepreneurshipinotherdomains.Wigellarguesthatpartofthisreluctance(thoughthere

werealsoimportantfactorsrelatingtothebalanceofpowervis-à-visÅlanditself)topromote

thisdomesticexamplerelatestotheconcernofdiplomatsthat“promotingtheÅlandExample

may harm Finland’s diplomatic relations with certain states in which minority issues are

sensitive,suchasSpainorTurkey”(2013::82).ForÅlanditself,therearenosuchconstraints

ontheirinternationalactivities.Atthesametime,the‘specialstatus’and‘livedhistory’of

Ålandperhapsmakesitbetterplacedtofulfiltheroleofnormentrepreneursinthisdomain

thantheFinnishstate.

Indeed,normativediplomacyhasbecomeamainstayofmuchsub-stateparadiplomacy.As

discussedintheprecedingchapter,BothWalesandScotlandhavedesignatedinternational

developmentprogrammes(andScotlandhasrecentlyappointedaMinisterforInternational

Development)whichhavebeenlaudedfortheirnovelapproach,representinganadditional

modelofdevelopmentpremisedonreciprocityandmutualexchange.Thefeaturesofthis

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‘model’wereinfactinformedbytherequirementbybothWalesandScotlandtojustifytheir

endeavoursundertheirresponsibilityforsustainabledevelopment-lacking,astheydo,any

formalcompetenceforinternationaldevelopment.However,thisunusualarrangementhas

provedparticularlybeneficialasamoretargetedapproachsupplementingtheactivitiesof

the UK state (Anyimadu, 2011). In this case, the unintended consequence of sub-state

governments’qualitiesandlimitations intheinternationalsphere isanenhancedrangeof

toolswithwhichtoaddressakeyglobalissue.Wherethereiscertainlyawelcomedegreeof

symboliccapitalgeneratedforWalesandScotlandthroughtheirinternationaldevelopment

activities,onecannotentirelydiscountthemoregenuinenormativeambitionsbehindthe

programmes.ForWynJonesandRoyles(2012:260)thereisnocontradictionbetweenthe

role that the ‘Wales for Africa’ programme plays in projecting - and promoting - welsh

internationalismandthe“genuinecommitmentofmanyAssemblyMemberstointernational

development”.

Normativeparadiplomacy inBavariaarguablyemerges from itsunique ‘burdenofhistory’

and is manifest in the special relationship it pursues with the Czech Republic. Relations

betweenthetwohavehistoricallybeenchallengedbythepost-warrelocationoftheSudeten

people, fromwhat is today theCzechRepublic, toBavaria. TheBavarianoffice inPrague,

openedin2014,representsacleardeparturefromitsotheroverseasoffices,whoselocations

are determined primarily by commercial rationales. According to the head of Bavaria’s

external relations department, Dr Paul Fischer, the representation “is quite special… for

historicalreasons,afterthewar,relationswithourneighbourstheCzechsweredifficult,itis

a great achievement tohave thatoffice and representation inPrague” (Fischer, 2015: 5).

Moreexplicitly,aseniorBavariangovernmentofficialcommentedthat,whenitcomestothe

‘specialrelationship’thatHorstSeehoferhasbuiltwiththeCzechRepublic,“considerations

suchasreallywhetheritisuseful,orpracticalarealsocompletedby[the]question‘isn’tthis

important now, symbolically?’88 In the Bavarian parliament, too, the idea of setting up a

Czech-Bavarian parliamentary assembly was “not with a particular economic interest” in

88Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,2013

200

mind,but rather tohave“good relations”with theirneighbours,where,at that time, the

relationshipwas“strained”.89

Indifferentways,therefore,allthreecasesdemonstratethenormativeambitionsthatcan

driveparadiplomacyintheabsenceofwhatmayregardedasa‘soundbusinesscase’.This

doesnotmeanthattheseactivitiesbringnobenefitintotheregionorstatelessnationitself;

there are potential gains to bemade both in reputational terms - which aid the ‘nation

branding’exercisesthatsub-stategovernmentsacrosstheboardareinvolvedin-andwith

regardstotheleveragethatthesub-stategovernmentholdsinaninter-governmentalsetting.

For the host-state, normative paradiplomatic activities on the part of their sub-state

governmentswouldseemtobeparticularlydifficulttoargueagainst;thismaygosomeway

towardsexplainingtheleewaygiventoScottishandWelshgovernmentsinconstructingthe

legal bases of their international development programmes. In another sense, however,

normative paradiplomatic activities sit - as other forms of sub-state diplomacy - on a

continuum.Arangeofdifferentfactorsandobjectivesmustfeedintodecisionsonwhereand

howto invest the limitedresources,bothdiplomaticallyand inmonetaryterms, thatsub-

stategovernmentshaveattheirdisposal.Therefore,isolatingnormativeambitionsoverand

aboveanationalorregionalinterestisnotalwaysstraightforward.Furthermore,thereare

certainlycases-suchastherecognitionbytheScottishParliamentandtheWelshAssembly

of the Armenian genocide - where normative objectives drive an activity that then has

unwelcome diplomatic ramifications for both the sub-state and nation-state government,

changingthecharacterandtheimplicationsoftheparadiplomacyitself.Nevertheless,much

aswiththediplomacyofnation-states,theparadiplomaticactivitiesofWales,Scotlandand

Bavariacannotalwaysbereducedtoinstrumentalism;normativelogicshaveaplaceindriving

anddeterminingsomeendeavoursand,inthecasesofWalesandScotland,havecometobe

adistinguishingfeatureoftheiroveralldiplomaticportfolios.

89interviewdata,SeniorBavarianParliamentaryofficial,2013

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II. Value-addedparadiplomacy

Thatsub-stategovernmentshavetheirowninternationalagendas-limitedinscopethough

they tend to be - has not escaped the attention of national or ‘host state’ governments.

However, for the most part, in our three case studies, the activities of the sub-state

governmenthavebeenenabledandtoleratedtoperhapsasurprisingdegree.Atan‘official

to official’ level, there is an acceptance and an understanding of the role that sub-state

governmentsareseekingtoplayinternationally.AccordingtoaseniorWelshpolicyadvisor,

theUKGovernmentare“content,moreor less”whenWales involves itself in“thesortof

issuesforwhichwehaveresponsibilityinWales”.90Meanwhile,aseniorWelshGovernment

civil servant characterises theworking relationshipwith the FCOas good, “it justworks…

we’re not in touchwith themevery day,we take their advice if something innovative or

possibly confrontational comes up”.91 Sticking with the Welsh case, the area of climate

changeisonewhereitsinterestsfirmlycoincidewiththoseoftheUKgovernment,andthere

is evidenceof a collaborative approach to international climate policy that arguably adds

value to theUK’sownefforts. TheWelshGovernmentworked closelywith theUK in the

context of the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in 2009 and gained UK Government

ministerial support to recognise the role that sub-stategovernmentshave in the“climate

changeagenda”(Royles,2011).WaleshasfrequentlyparticipatedinofficialUKdelegationsto

ClimateChangesummits(ashasScotland)-forexampleatCouncilofEnvironmentMinisters

meetingsleadinguptotheCopenhagensummitandmostrecentlytheParisSummitin2015

-recognisingtheroleofdevolvedgovernmentsinthispolicydomain.Inthisparticularissue

area,where-asinthecaseoftheUSFederalGovernmentanditsstates-differenttiersof

governmentoftenhaveconflicting interestswhen itcomestoclimatechange, in termsof

boththeeffectsandtheburdensofimplementationfelt,thereisarguablyclearvaluetobe

addedbythepresentationofaunitedfrontininternationalnegotiations,somethingwhich

hasprovedtothebenefitofboththeWelshandUKGovernments.

90Interviewdata,seniorWelshGovernmentpolicyadvisor,2013.91Interviewdata,seniorWelshGovernmentOfficial,2013

202

Morebroadly,ineachofourthreecasesthereisanargumenttobemadethatthedistinctive

nationalidentitiesperformedparadiplomaticallycanaddvaluetothediplomaticprofilesof

thehost-state.This logicplaysout in twodistinctways.Firstly, theattributesofsub-state

governmentsthatarepublicisedaspartofparadiplomatic‘profileraising’activitiescan-for

themostpart-beseento‘ruboff’onthestateasawhole,encouragingtourismorinvestment

thatisnotjustconfinedtooneregion.TheUKGovernment’spromotionofStDavid’sdayor

BurnsNight(hostingspecialeventsinoverseasEmbassiesandusingsocialmediatopublicise

Scottish andWelsh visitor attractions or exports)would seem to evidence this perceived

benefit. Secondly, with the normalisation of paradiplomatic activity, and the associated

ascendancyofcorrespondingnorms-oftherightsofregionstoparticipateininternational

affairswhereitcorrespondstoadomesticcompetence,andtheneedtoallowforminority

representation - the relationshipbetweenahost stateand its sub-stategovernmentshas

cometorepresentanimportantpartoftheirinternationalprofile,andhenceacomponent

of their ‘soft power’. This requirement was a key consideration in the UK Government’s

diplomacyinthemidstoftheScottishreferendumonindependence,whereitwasatpainsto

ensurethatitsoverseasstaffwerewellinformedandrespectfulofthediscussionsandwere

seentobeenablingthedemocraticfreewillofScottishvoters.Accordingtoareportcompiled

by the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, therewas an opportunity to “show a

peacefuldemocracyinaction”,inlightoftheinternationalinterestintheUKGovernment’s

approachtothereferendum(UKParliament'sForeignAffairsCommittee,2013:para74).In

contrast,Spain’shandlingofaproposedindependencereferenduminCatalonia,culminating

in“adefactostateofemergency”,“endingCatalanhomerule”weeksbeforethecontentious

votewasduetotakeplace(TheGuardian,2017)perhapsdemonstratesmostclearlytherisks

toahost-state’sinternationalreputation.

Thereare,ofcourse,subtletiestotheinteractionsofhost-stateandsub-stategovernments

whichmayrenderparadiplomacybeneficialtothecentralgovernmentatsometimes,and

less so at others. In Bavaria, this dynamic currently appears to be shifting. The CSU has

traditionallyplayedtheroleof‘badcop’totheFederalCoalitionGovernment’s‘goodcop’to

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themutualadvantageofbothgovernments.92ConservativevotersinFederalelectionshave

beenreassuredbytheCSU’smoreeuroscepticand‘rightwing’policies,oftenplayingout

most noticeably in its interactions with the EU and the ‘watchdog’ role it elects to play

amongstGermanLänderwhenitcomestotherightsofstatesandsubsidiarity,helpingto

keepthesevoterswithintheCSU/CDUblock.However,aswillbeexploredinasubsequent

section of this chapter, the recentmigration crisis and the CSU’s dim view of Chancellor

Merkel’s handling of it, have led to a marked shift in the relationship between the two

coalitionpartners,callingintoquestionthemutuallyadvantageous‘goodcop,badcop’game

theyhavepreviouslyplayed.

III. Competitiveparadiplomacy

The‘bad’ofparadiplomaticactivity is,ofcourse,nottoodissimilarfromthe‘bad’ofstate

leveldiplomacy.However,theseareperhapsoccasionswheretheabilityto‘pickandchoose’

international activitiesmanifests in a competitive relationshipwith the host-state. In this

mode,thesub-stategovernmentisabletominetheinternationaldomainforspecificbenefits

whilst deferring to the competence - and drawing on the resources - of the state-level

government.Theeffectsofthistypeofparadiplomacyarenotassumedtobedestabilising

fortheinternationalsystem;rathertheymaybeparticularlyunwelcomeorconcerningfrom

theperspectiveofstate-leveldiplomats.

TheWelshGovernment,forexample,maintainsparticularlycloselinkswiththeChongquing

MunicipalGovernment inChina; relations ithasbeenbetterable tocultivatewithout the

requirementtoengagewithmorecontroversialdiplomaticissuesaroundtheChinesestate.

ConcernsoverhumanrightsstandardsandthestatusoftheDalaiLamainevitablycomplicate,

andrendermorechallenging,UK-Chinarelations.TheWelshGovernment,however,isable

to extractmaximum economic and cultural benefits from their engagementwith various

Chinese Municipal governments, and avoid such matters of high-politics and diplomacy

entirely. The implications of this hybrid international profile are therefore that, in some

92Interviewdata,seniorBavarianParliamentaryOfficial,2013

204

respects,relationswithsuchChineseregionsarestrongerwithWalesthantheyarewiththe

UK.93Indeed,thesameofficialwentontoelaboratethispointwithananecdoteaboutthe

UK calling on Wales to facilitate meetings with Chongquing officials. This has practical

implicationsfortheWelshGovernment:allowinganeaseofaccesstogovernmentofficials

andpolicymakersthatisanecessaryrequirementofmaintainingeconomiclinkageswithin

thehighlygovernmentalizedChinesecontext.

However, the framework that theWelshGovernment - and sub-state governmentsmore

generally-operatewithinis,ofcourse,qualitativelydifferentfromthatoftheUK(andother

state-levelgovernments).Foronething,theinternationalactivitiesofsub-stategovernment

arealmostentirelyunregulated.Beyondtheir lackofstatutoryunderpinning,activitiesare

notsubjecttoanywherenearthelevelofmediaandotherscrutinythattheactivitiesofstate-

level actors encounter, both domestically and at an international level. The role of

parliamentaryscrutinyinmonitoringdiplomaticactivitiesisakeyareaofcontrastinthecases

ofbothWalesandScotland-incomparisontotheirWestminstercounterparts.Therelatively

smallsizeofthesetwoinstitutions,theNationalAssemblyforWalesinparticular,andthe

lackofinternationalexpertiseintheirmembershiplimitthedegreeofmeaningfulscrutiny

thattheexternalrelationshipsmaintainedbydevolvedgovernmentsaresubjectto.Thefocus

ofthetwoparliamentarybodiesonlegislative-asopposedtoMinisterial-scrutinymeans

thatnon-legislative;quasi-diplomaticactivitiesareableto‘passundertheradar’.

Itdoesnotseemtobesolelyattheregionallevelthattherewardsofparadiplomaticaction

canbereaped.Theinternationalpresenceofsub-stategovernmentsalsoprovidesadditional

accesspointsforawholehostofotheractors:states,multi-nationalcompanies,NGOsand,

indeed, third regions. These nodal points have unique qualities, related to the recurring

themeofhybridity.Mostnotably, the ‘scale’of regionalgovernmentmeans that theyare

oftenabletoofferthirdpartiesahighlevelofaccesstothestructuresofgovernment,andin

particularMinisterial ‘face time’, that represents a greatly valued diplomatic commodity.

Indeed,theBavariangovernmenthasskilfullyusedtheirrelativesizeand‘approachability’in

93AsjudgedbyaseniorWelshGovernmentOfficial,interviewdata2013

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theircommercialparadiplomacy,withtheservicesthatitisabletoprovideforinternational

investors and trade partners - by virtue of its reduced scale - being key elements of it

success.94Again,thereisnothinginherentlybadaboutthistypeofactivity;ratheritmaybe

perceivedasunhelpful -perhapsevenundermining - for thehost-state’sowncommercial

diplomacy,beingseeninovertlycompetitiveterms.

IV. Paradiplomacyonthefringesof‘highpolitics’

Despite the insistence, in all three of our cases, that economic rationales dominate

paradiplomacy, and foreignpolicy in its traditional sense is exclusively reserved to states,

once can find exceptions that question this overriding rule. Spanning a spectrum of

motivations - from the commercial, to inter-governmental relations and even normative

ambitions-instancesofactivitieswhich,intentionallyornot,fallatthefringesof‘highpolitics’

andclearlyhaveimplicationsfortheforeignpolicystrategiesofstates,canbefoundinboth

ourScottishandBavariancases.

In Bavaria, perhaps the most controversial example of what some commentators have

considereda ‘foreignpolicyon the side’under the leadershipofHorstSeehoferoccurred

recently. In the context of particularly tense relations between Berlin and Moscow -

heightenedbya ‘warofwords’overarapeallegationmadebyaRussian-Germanwoman

against a refugee - the CSU’s condemnation of ChancellorMerkel’s ‘open door’ refugee

policy, and thepresenceof EU sanctions againstRussia, theBavarian leadership’s visit to

Moscow in early February 2016 drew widespread criticism. The following extract from

GermanbroadcasterDeutscheWelledemonstratesthetoneofthereactionwithinGerman

presses:

SeldomhaverelationsbetweenBerlinandMoscowbeeninsuchapoorstateas they are now. Even Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Angela Merkel’s man fordiplomacy,cannotshiftopinionsintheRussiancapital.Andnow,inthemiddleof this diplomatic deep freeze, Horst Seehofer… will honour Kremlin bossVladimir Putin with a visit on Thursday. Seehofer, of all people - Merkel’s

94Interviewdata,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial,2013

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biggestrefugeepolicycritic.Amanthatlovestopolarize.Thewrongmaninthewrongplaceatthewrongtime?(DeutscheWelle,2016).

Internationalcommentatorsfurtherpickeduponthepotentiallydestabilisingimplicationsof

thevisitforChancellorMerkel’sforeignpolicy.AccordingtotheBBC’sInsideEuropeblog,the

visit “coulddomore toundermine thanboost theBerlinGovernment”; itwas - formany

Germanpoliticians“asteptoofar”(BBCNewsblog'InsideEurope',2016).Meanwhile,the

IrishTimescitesthevisitascausing“alarmandannoyanceinBerlin”,takingplacewhilethe

“timingisdelicate”,andtheWallStreetJournaltermsthemovea“provocationoftheGerman

Chancellor”, the agenda covering topics where he has clashed with Merkel previously -

migrationandsanctionsagainstRussia(TheIrishTimes,2016;TheWallStreetJournal,2016).

Reuters reports theCSU’sdefence that the trip isprimarilymotivatedbygood relations -

especiallyintrade-betweenBavariaandRussia,butarguesthatcriticsarenotreassured.The

articlecitesRoderichKiesewetter,aforeignpolicyspokesmanfor‘Merkel’sconservativesin

Parliament’asstating“SeehoferhasclearlypositionedhimselfagainsttheChancellorinthe

debateonrefugees-Ireallyhopehedoesn’tgoonthistrip”,andNielsAnnen,seniormember

of the Social Democrats,Merkel’s junior coalition partner commenting “Foreign policy is

madeinBerlin,notinMunich”(ReutersUK,2016).

The trip itself was organised by the mayor of Moscow, a typical arrangement for the

internationalvisitsofregionalleadersandonewhichwouldordinarilyhavecloakedthetrip

inthelegitimacyofregionalinterests.However,inthiscase,thevisitclearlyspoketoother

motivations. Intergovernmental relationswere transparently atplay;Bavaria,owing to its

geographicalposition,hasbeenatthefrontlineofChancellorMerkel’srefugeepolicyandits

CSUgovernmenthavebeenhighlycriticalofthepolicyandofMerkel’shandlingofthecrisis.

Indeed,BavarianleaderSeehoferarguedinSeptemberthat:“thesituationinSyriacouldnot

be brought under controlwithout Putin’s help” (DeustcheWelle, 2016). The level of this

personalcriticismofChancellorMerkel’sleadershipseemstogowellbeyondthe‘goodcop,

bad cop’ game that Bavaria plays with the Federal Government, the mutual advantage

arguablyerodedinthiscase.95 Indeed,thereisalsoatransparentcongruenceofinterests

95Interview,seniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013.

207

betweenRussiaandBavariathatstandsincontrasttothepolicyofBerlin:bothgovernments

wanttoseeanendtoEUsanctionsthatarehamperingthesignificant levelsoftradethat

havepreviouslyexistedbetweenthem,tradeespecially importanttoBavaria’sagricultural

sector.ChancellorMerkel,meanwhile,hasinsistedthattheissueofsanctionsshouldnotbe

discussed until “the cease-fire agreed between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian

troopsisrespected”(ReutersUK,2016).

Therefore, in thisparticularcase, the ‘domestic’concernsofBavaria - toendthe influxof

refugeesandtoincreaseagriculturalexports-havebeentransposedontoaninternational

contextwherekeyforeignpolicyconsiderations,forbothRussiaandGermany-indeedthe

EU-areatplay.DeutscheWellearguesthat“theCSU’sbrandofforeignpolicyhasalwayshad

somethinguniqueabout it”andthatHorstSeehofer“seeshimself inthistradition”.What

marksthechangehere,thearticlecontinues,isthat,whereSeehofer’s“foreignjaunts”were

previously about theeconomic interestsofBavaria, the “floodof refugeeshas givennew

arguments to the Bavarian’s foreign policy ambitions. Since refugees began arriving in

GermanyviaBavaria,thestate’sdomesticpolicieshavebecomefederallyandinternationally

relevant.Thatisanovelty”(DeutscheWelle,2016).

Indeed, the transcript of themeeting betweenHorst Seehofer and President Putin - one

arrangedwiththeassistanceofSeehofer’spredecessor,EdmundStoiber-showsveryclearly

thattheambitionsoftheBavariangovernmentinthisinstancegowellbeyondthedomestic,

andthatthevisitisinterpretedbybothleadersaspartofabroaderactofrapprochement.To

begin with, the meeting is grounded in Bavarian-Russian economic relations, and the

‘friendship’ between the two governments, referencing the ‘legendary’ 2006 meeting

betweenPutinandStoiber,wheretheRussianPresident“plannedtostayforanhour,but

endedupstayinguntilmidnight”.However, thecontentof thediscussionsquickly turn to

foreignpolicy,asthefollowingextract-fromHorstSeehofer-demonstrates:

WehavecomeherefromthefreestateofBavaria,whichtraditionallyhasveryintensivetieswithRussia,andwewanttomaintaintheseties.Bavariaispartofthefederalgovernment.Wearepartofthegovernmentcoalition,andwethinkitisourduty,thedutyofourheartsandsouls,toputabitmoretrustbackintoourrelations.Wethinkthisisessentialintoday’ssituation,lookingatwhatishappeningintheworld.Iamverypleasedthatyousaidtodaythat

208

wearenotcominghereasplotters.Neverintherun-uptoanyofmypreviousvisits to other countries, have I heard as much untruthful and inaccurateinformationasIhavethistime.Whatismostimportantforusistodeepenourrelations,aboveall,orcourse,oureconomicrelations,butthisisnotouronlygoal.Ithinkweneedtodothesameinculturetoo,andinscience.Thesearethingswewilldiscusstoo.Intoday’sglobalisedworld,weinBavaria,withourpopulationof13million,areverymuchaware,ofcourse,ofwhatishappeningeveryday inourworld,whether inSyriaor inUkraine,whetherrefugeesorcrime.Andwebelievethatonlybyactingtogether,andnot inconflictwitheachother,canwesolvetheseproblems. In thisdesire,weseeknot toactagainstourfederalgovernment,buttogetherwithit,andweactnotagainstRussia,buthopetoworktogetherwithRussia(PresidentPutin,2016).

PresidentPutinthenresponds:

Asforvariousrumours,thisisinevitable,butwebothsharegreatresponsibilityformaintainingjobsandcontinuingculturalties,andweknowyourattitudeand your desire to do everything possible to normalise relations betweenRussiaandEuropeandRussiaandGermany.Wearecertainlygratefultoyouforthis(PresidentPutin,2016).

Interpretingthesignificanceofthisexchangeinforeignpolicytermsrequiresustorecallthe

uniquestatusoftheCSUbothinBavariaitselfandwithintheFederalRepublic.Thecurrent

FederalGovernmentcoalition,andthelong-standingalliancebetweentheCSUandtheCSU

give both current and previous Bavarian leaders an international platform that goeswell

beyond that offered to otherGerman Länder.Horst Seehofer’s senior role in the Federal

Governmentmeansthatthirdparties“knowthat,orarebeingtoldbydiplomats,thatheis

probably…numbertwoorthree inGermanpolitics.AndthatChancellorMerkelcannotdo

anythingwithouthisconsent.Andthisissomethingofcoursethatweighsin”.96However,it

isequallyimportanttorecallthatthisvisittoMoscowwasnotundertakenbyHostSeehofer

asarepresentativeoftheFederalGovernment,butratherasthePrimeMinisterofBavaria.

ThevisitwasarrangedbytheMayorofMoscowandexplainedintermsofBavaria’simportant

relationshipwithRussia-onegroundedinmutualtrade.Thatthemeetinghadsignificance

beyond Bavaria’s regional interests, nonetheless, was made explicit in President Putin’s

referencetotheeffortsofHorstSeehoferto“normaliserelationsbetweenRussiaandEurope,

RussiaandGermany”.Thecontentoftheexchangewasthereforeoneofforeignpolicy,ina

tonewhichcontradictedthepreviouspronouncementsofChancellorMerkelandostensibly

96Interviewdata,SeniorBavarianGovernmentofficial2013

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wasatoddswithcurrentFederalGovernmentpolicy.HorstSeehofermetwithChancellor

Merkelaheadofthevisit,andwillhavereceivedbriefingsonthediplomaticpolicyofGermany

inrelationtoRussiaandthekeyforeignpolicyissueslikelytobediscussed.However,having

been‘backedintoacorner’bytheBavarianleadership-onechallengingChancellorMerkel

onmultiplefrontsoverthisperiod-thelevelofcontrolthattheFederalGovernmentinfact

maintainedoverthisexchangeappearstohavebeencompromised.

It is in this manifestation - where contentious aspects of the host state or Federal

government’sforeignpolicyappeartohavebeenchallengedorunderminedbyoneofitssub-

stategovernments-thattheimplicationsofparadiplomacypotentiallytakeonageo-political

significance.InUK,asimilarsituationarosewhenaSNPdelegation,includingMPsandMSPs,

led by former Scottish First Minister and current SNP foreign affairs spokesman in

WestminsterAlexSalmond,visitedIranduringDecember2015,shortlybeforetheliftingof

sanctionswhich followed an agreement between the E3+3 (France, Germany, UK, China,

RussiaandtheUSA)andIranonanucleardeal.Thoughthisagreementwasreachedonthe

14thJuly2015,sanctionswereonlyliftedoncetheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencyhad

verifiedthatIranhadcompletedallthenecessarystepstoreach‘implementationday’,on

the16thJanuary2016.ThevisitfollowedincrementalandtentativeimprovementsintheUK’s

relationshipwithIran:aUKEmbassywasreopenedinTehraninlateAugust2015,withPhillip

Hammondattendingtheopeningceremony,thefirstBritishForeignSecretarytovisitthecity

since2003.TheSNP’svisitwasarranged-andfunded-bytheIranianParliament.

Nestedwithin inaclear,andarguablycompelling,businesscase forScottish-Iraniantrade

following the lifting of sanctions, there was also a nascent foreign policymessage being

conveyedbythedelegation.AccordingtoAlexSalmond:

The international agreement with Iran and rapprochement with theWestwhich has accompanied it, is the single most positive development ininternationalrelationsoverthepastyearandthemostimportantdiplomaticachievement of the Obama administration. Now that Iran has taken thesestepsforwardtoreturntotheinternationalcommunity,manycountrieshavebeenpursuingtheprospectofanewmarketplacefortheirgoodsandanewtradingpartner.ItisvitalthatScotlandisnotleftbehindasoutkeystrengths,particularlyineducation,agriculturaltechnology,oilandgasandfinance,arepreciselywhatIranwillfindusefulafter25yearsofsanctions…byestablishing

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adialoguebasedonthesoundScottishprincipleofenlightenedself-interest,wearebuildingapartnershipthatwillservebothcountrieswellforthefuture(AlexSalmond,citedinHeraldScotland,2015b).

Meanwhile,anotherdelegateonthetrip,BillKiddMSP,theSNP’schiefwhipatHolyroodwho

alsoco-chairsaparliamentarygroupfornuclearnon-proliferationanddisarmament,states:

“Scotland has a world-wide reputation, both civically and politically, foroppositiontothecontinuedexistenceofnuclearweaponsbothathomeandinternationally and the Scottish Government is both in favour of a nuclearweaponsconventionandofUNGeneralSecretaryBanKiMoon’sFive-Point-Planforaworldfreefromnuclearweapons…Iran’sre-emergenceontheworldstageasafullinternationalpartnerinthedebateonnucleardisarmamentcanonlyenhancetheprospectsofachievingthatgoal,whichistheaimofthegreatmajorityofnationsandpeoplesacross theglobe” (BillKidd,cited inHeraldScotland,2015b).

The visit to Iran entailed meetings with “the full range of government ministers and

parliamentarians at the highest level, including foreign affairs minister Dr Zarif and the

speakeroftheparliamentDrAliLarijani”,aswellassecuringagreementforanexchangeof

full trade delegations in the spring of 2016 (Alex Salmond, cited in BBC News, 2015).

AccordingtoSNPMPTasminaAhmed-Sheikh,thedelegationhadraisedtheissueofhuman

rightsduringthevisit:

OfhugeimportanceisDrZarif’sreplytoAlexSalmondthatIranispreparedtodiscuss the issue of human rights in an even-handed way with Europeancountries. This included constructive discussion including the use of capitalpunishmentfordrugtrafficking.Thispointstorealprogressbecomingpossibleonavexedissueandisavindicationofourpolicyofengagementanddialogueinsteadofconfrontationandhectoring(TasminaAhmed-Sheikh,citedinBBCNews,2015).

AccordingtoanIraniannewsagency,Tasnim,AlexSalmondfurthertoldthespeakerofthe

Iranian Parliament that Scotland’s “ruling party has always been against the decisions

Westerners make against Iran and believes these decisions, which have caused many

problems for Iran aswell as other countries, are fundamentallywrong” (Herald Scotland,

2015b).AreportcompliedbytheSNPdelegationfollowingthevisitwassubmittedtoScottish

Ministersandlaterreleasedunderfreedomofinformationlaws.ThereportarguedthatIran

‘recognisesScotlandasseparatetotherestoftheUnitedKingdom’,quotinganIranianvice-

ministeras tellingAlexSalmondthat“thedoor isnotopentoeverydelegation thatvisits

Iran”,but that thecountry iswilling toworkwithScotland.Meanwhile theheadof Iran’s

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parliamentarycommitteeonforeignpolicyissaidtohaverecognisedaconnectionbetween

IranandScotlandgoing“beyondeconomicties”(HeraldScotland,2016).

Demonstratingthe ‘foreignpolicy’contentofthisexchange,AlexSalmondtoldtheHerald

Scotland,onhisreturnfromIran,thatthetriphighlightedhowScotland‘canuseitspolitical

profiletocreateforeignpolicyinitiativesandopportunitiesthattheUKgovernmentwould

finddifficultyinaccessing’,andreferencedthewarmwelcomeScotlandreceived,enjoying

‘much more ministerial access than the recent UK Trade and Investment delegation to

Tehran’.AccordingtotheformerFirstMinister“oppositiontoWesternadventurisminthe

MiddleEast,abilateralstanceintradetalksandtheintenttoholdopendiscussionswithout

lecturingandheckling”areallareaswhereScotlandcan‘outplay’Westminsterwhenitcomes

toforeignpolicy(HeraldScotland,2015c).

TheUKGovernment’sreactiontothetripwasnotmadepublic,thoughseveralUKpoliticians

voiced opposition. Alistair Carmichael, the former Liberal Democrat Scottish Secretary

accused the SNPof ‘hollowingout’ the roleof theUKGovernment in Scottishpublic life.

Specifically,hearguedthat“buildingrelationswithacountrywhichhastherecenthistoryof

Iran isadelicateand finelynuancedbusinessandmanypeoplewillwonderwhetherAlex

Salmondisbest-placedtodoajoblikethat”(HeraldScotland,2015a).Meanwhileaformer

ScotlandOfficeminister, Labour’sGeorge Foulkes, interpreted the visit asAlex Salmond’s

attempt to usurp the role of foreign secretary: “it’s a very dangerous precedent really.

RelationsbetweenBritainandIranareimprovingbutarestillverydelicate.Forsomeonelike

Salmondtogocouldcreatetremendousproblems.It’sveryunwise”(HeraldScotland,2015a).

Despite the lack of official comment from the UK Government on the visit, an exchange

betweenAlexSalmondandPhillipHammond’sForeignOfficeisperhapsmoreindicativeof

theirpoliticalrelationship.AccordingtoaGuardianreport“AlexSalmondpaysforsupperin

Tehran-andtriggersconstitutionalcrisis”(TheGuardian,2016),theUKFCOsentamessage

totheScottishdelegation,whilstenroutetoTehran,explainingthattheywerenotentitled

toembassyhospitality.AccordingtoAlexSalmond,thiswas“quiteaseriousmatterbecause

itindicatesthedeeppoliticisationoftheForeignOfficeunderHammond…theForeignOffice

permanentunder-secretaryshouldbeputtinghisfootdowntomakeitclearitistheBritish

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ForeignOffice,nottheToryForeignOffice”.Fortheirpart,aspokeswomanfortheForeign

Officesaid“overseaspostsfollowclearguidanceonarrangementsforvisitingparties.Visiting

politiciansfromasinglepartyareofferedageneralpoliticalbriefing,butitisnottheroleof

overseaspoststoprovidehospitalityortoarrangemeetingsunlessitisforanofficialvisiton

hermajesty’sgovernmentbusiness”.Itis,however,worthpointingoutthatBritishembassy

officialswere included in talks during the visit, including on human rights, trade and the

nuclearpact,andthatthestaff‘ontheground’weresaidbyAlexSalmondtobehelpfuland

cooperative(TheGuardian,2016).

Atonelevelofanalysis,theSNPdelegationtoIranandthepoliticalrhetoricsurroundingit

representsa‘storminateacup’;AlexSalmond-knownforbeingaprovocativeandoutspoken

advocateofScotland’sindependentinternationalstanding-noisilymarkingouttheterritory

of his new role as the SNP’s foreign policy spokesman. It was, after all, not a Scottish

Government delegation, and thus the talks held were by their nature exploratory - no

memberof thedelegationwasauthorised tocommit theScottishGovernment to specific

policy.ThefactthattheScottishGovernmentitselfhasappearedreticenttocommentonthe

triporpublicallydiscussthecontentoftalkswouldindicatethattheyperhapsaretakinga

more cautiousapproach to the relationship.However,whenexamining theeffectsor the

implicationsofparadiplomaticactivity,thereisperhapsatouchofMarkTwain’s‘neverlet

thetruthgetinthewayofagoodstory’.Inotherwords,atageopoliticallevel,thefactthat

itwasnot the ScottishGovernment, but rather adelegationof SNPpoliticians fromboth

Westminster and Holyrood that were taking a forthright view on the future relationship

betweenScotlandandIran,onmajorareasofforeignpolicysuchasnuclearproliferationand

humanrights,andontheperceivedfailingsoftheUK,and‘thewest’moregenerally,may

bearlittlerelationonthelastingperception.

Therearealsoinstanceswheretheparadiplomaticactivitiesofasub-stategovernmenttouch

at the fringes of high-politics unintentionally, or where circumstances beyond the

government’scontroldrawthemintodebatesofatenoroutsideoftheir‘comfortzone’.At

theleast,thiscanbewhereasub-state’sforayintothe‘bigleagues’ofdiplomacycanbegin;

theinternationalspotlightthatasub-stategovernmentreceivescan,ofcourse,thenbeused

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tofurtherother,morecontentiousaims.Anotableexampleinthisregardistheinternational

diplomacy surrounding the release of AbdelbasetAl-Megrahi, on compassionate grounds,

from the Scottish prisonwhere he had been serving a sentence for his role in the 1988

Lockerbiebombings.Thecomplexitiesofthiscase(involvingtheUK,Scotland,theUSAand

Libya-aswellasbothcommercialandpoliticalsensitivities)meantthatmisinterpretation

andcontradictionwererifeinitsreporting,andassuchScotland’s‘diplomacy’surrounding

theinternationalramificationsofthedecisionwasprimarilyofadefensivetone.However,

accordingtoKenealy(2012a:555),asthecaseunfolded,“Scotland’sparadiplomacyshifted

fromastrategyofavoidancetooneusingthereleasetofurthertheideaofanindependent

Scotland.PresentingthereleaseinsuchawaywastobolstertheideaofScotlandasadistinct

entitywith its own set of values, laws and customs and possessing an ability to operate

autonomouslyontheinternationalstage”.

Kenealy characterises the decision as constituting a “two-level process: the British

Government’s behaviour was characterised by commercial interests; and the Scottish

Governments by calculated compassion” (2012a: 556). In sum, he argues that the

paradiplomaticelementofthecasestemsfromtheScottishGovernment’sdecisiontorelease

Al-Megrahioncompassionategrounds,asopposedtounderaprisonertransferagreement

(thepreferredapproachoftheUKGovernment).Hegoesonto isolatetheparadiplomatic

performancesofbothScottishjusticesecretaryKennyMacAskill(placing“aheavyemphasis

onScottishvaluesandidentity”)andAlexSalmond,who“advancedaseconddistinction.The

BritishgovernmenthadblendedjudicialandcommercialissuesintheirdealingswithLibya;

Scotlandhadactedproperlyandinaccordancewithdueprocess”(2012a:569-570).Kenealy

concludesthat:

Thenarrativesweretightlyconstructedandendlesslyrepeatedafteraugust2009.TheopportunitiesforMacAskillandSalmondtoexploittheal-MegrahisagawouldhavebeenunavailablehadAl-Megrahibeentransferred.ThePTA[prisonertransferagreement]narrativewouldhavehadtoincludeBritain,sothedecisionwouldhavelackedadistinctly“Scottish”tone.InthemarginleftbytheBritishgovernment’spursuitofitsnationalinterest,ScotlandfoundawaytoadvancetheideathatiscentraltoitsownnationalinterestasdefinedbytheSNP.WhetherScotland’scompassionwasconsciouslycalculatedoragenuinesenseofcompassionthatsimplycreatedapositiveby-productmight

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alwaysbeunknown.However,itwascertainlyawell-orchestratedandwell-executedpoliticalmove(Kenealy,2012a:570).

In this case, the ScottishGovernment’s ‘right’ tomake a legal decision on the release or

otherwiseofAl-Megrahioncompassionategroundswasunquestionable,indeedScotland’s

autonomous legal system is much older than its devolved parliament. Arguably, it

demonstratesthe‘unintended’internationalimplicationsofsub-statecompetences;proof-

ifanywasrequired-oftheeffectsofglobalizationandintermesticpolitics.ThattheScottish

Governmentinitiallyresistedownershipoftheissue-knowingtheentrenchedinterestson

eithersideofthedebate-furtherspeakstotheseunintendedconsequencesonthepartof

thesub-stategovernmentitself;‘drawingthemin’,lessthanwillingly,toanissuewherethe

national interests of theUSA, theUK and Libyawere all at stake.However, the eventual

coursestruckbytheScottishGovernmentisequallyillustrative;seizinganopportunitytoput

‘clearredwater’,toborrowfromWelshpoliticaldiscourse,betweenthepoliciesofScotland

andtheUK, forthebenefitofbothdomesticand internationalaudiences.Thisstrategyof

“calculatedcompassion”wasoutwiththecontrol-andpresumablytothedislike-oftheUK

Foreign Office. It was a situation both born from and reflective of a process of inter-

governmentalnegotiations,leadinguptoScotland’sdecision,thatdemonstrateda“lackof

willingness on the part of theUK government towork to the letter and the spirit of the

concordats [on international relations]” (Kenealy,2012b:61).As such, the caseevidences

boththefragilityoftheUK’ssystemofintergovernmentalrelations,‘bindinginhonour’only

(Kenealy,2012b:68)andthevalue tosub-stategovernmentsofan international stageon

whichtoperformitsowndistinctiveness.

V. Theparadiplomacyofrecognition

Sub-stategovernmentsaredrawnintorecognitiondebatesfromvariousangles.Ontheone

hand,manysub-stategovernmentspossesssimilar‘defacto’qualitiesofstatehoodtothose

seeking formal recognition as a sovereign state, despite not claiming such a mantle for

themselves.Assuchtheyarebothapointofcomparisonandreferenceforavarietyofactors

when determining whether or not to grant recognition for breakaway governments or

seceded states - particularly for those governments whose own states possess strong

independenceornationalistmovements.Ontheotherhand,somesub-stategovernmentsdo

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indeed seek sovereignty, and are therefore actively involved in the task of securing

international support for their secession from a host state, an activity termed

‘protodiplomacy’intheparadiplomaticliterature(Duchacek,1988a;1990).Additionally,as

hybrid entities whose own diplomacy spans a spectrum of ‘official-ness’, sub-state

governmentsareoftenatargetforunrecognisedstatesthemselves,whererecognitionmay

notcarrythefullweightofinternationallawbutinsteadenhanceclaimsofmoralauthority

orpoliticalappropriatenessandtieintobroadernarrativesoftheinternationalacceptanceof

theaspirantstateorregime.Lastly,intheirinternationalmodes,allsub-stategovernments

seekaformofrecognition:notgenerallyassovereigns,butaslegitimateinterlocutorsoftheir

constituentsandaseffective internationalagents intheirownright;stakingtheirclaimto

theirstatusasa‘player’intheiruniquesovereigntygame(Adler-NissenandGad,2012;Adler-

NissenandGad,2014;Adler-NissenandGammeltoft-Hansen,2008).Forexample,Europe’s

‘stateless nations’ often seek a form of recognition from the European Union, yet not

necessarilyasafullyfledgedstate,ratherassomething‘more’thanaregion(Nagel,2004:

74). The ‘line’ between seeking this sort of recognition, and recognition thatmight be a

precursortostatehoodisnotonethatisalwaysclear-cut,andassuchcanrepresentanarea

ofconcernfornationalgovernments.

Unlikethefieldofinternationallaw-whichhaslongdebatedtheseissues-“recognition,asa

generaltopic,hasreceivedrelativelylittleattentioninIR”(Ker-Lindsay,2012:3).Andyet,the

authorcontinues:

Recognition, and non-recognition, is very important. Quite apart from itsimportantpolicyimplications,itisofcentralsignificanceforasubjectthattriesto understand how various actors interact with one another on theinternational stage. Recognition is not just about how states accept oneanother.Itisabouthowtheydefinetheentireinternationalsystem(2012:3).

AccordingtoKer-Lindsay,whilstweknowrelativelylittleaboutthesortsofstrategiesusedby

states attempting to prevent recognition, this belies its significance. Such significance

transcendsthesmallnumberofcaseswearefamiliarwithandbearspotentialrelevanceto

the “20-25 significant separatist movements” within Europe alone; “the coming decades

could see theemergenceofan independentScotland,Flanders,Greenland,Cataloniaand

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Basque Republic… indeed, the prospect of secessionist claims, albeit to wildly differing

degrees…loomsovermostcountries”(2012:5).

Though“strictlyspeaking,recognitionrefersonlytothepracticeofstates”(Ker-Lindsay,2012:

6),itisclearthatthatotheractors-intheirinteractionswithandpronouncementsonaspirant

orsecessioniststates-havearoletoplay.Indeed,Ker-Lindsaygoesontoarguethat:

There is also a far looser usage of the term ‘recognition’ that not onlyincorporatestheformallegalacceptanceofastatebyotherstates,butalsoincludes degrees of acknowledgement by states short of actual legalrecognition. Italsoextendstothe legitimacyconferredbymembershipofarangeororganizationsandparticipationininternationalactivitiesandevents.Again,thesetypesofactivities-especiallythosecarriedoutbyinternationalorganizationsandvarious sportingandculturalassociations -donot in factamount to recognition in its correct sense. Nevertheless, these acts areextremelyimportantintheirownright.Theyallservetostrengthenthestatusofthecontestedstateandcontributetosecuringorstabilizingitsplaceintheinternationalsystem(2012:6-7).

Thesewideracts,accordingtothesameauthor,“signalthataterritory is, insomewayor

another,understoodtobeadistinctpoliticalunitininternationalpolitics”(Ker-Lindsay,2012:

7).Indeed,forCasperson(2009:47-48),de-factostatescancreateeffectivestatehoodinthe

absenceofformalrecognition,“internalsovereigntyis,inotherwords,notruledoutbylack

of external sovereignty”. Returning to themultiple forms that recognition can take, Ker

Lindsay(2012:8)arguesthatthemostusefuldistinctiontobemadeiswithregardtoexpress

or implied recognition. Express recognition refers to situations whereby “a state openly

announces itsdecisiontorecognizethestate inquestion”.Meanwhile, incasesof implicit

recognition, “no formal announcement” is made, “but the situation is such that it can

reasonablybededucedthatrecognitionexists”.Inordertosignalsuchimplicitrecognition,a

statemightcarryoutarangeofactivities:sendinganofficialdelegationtoanindependence

ceremony, dispatching an “official reply” to communications from the territory seeking

recognition,“thatimplicitlyitexplicitlyacknowledgesitsacceptanceasastate”,concludinga

politicalordiplomaticbilateraltreatyorexchangingdiplomaticrepresentatives(Ker-Lindsay,

2012:9).

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In the activities of Wales and Scotland, we can find evidence of sub-state governments

engaginginactivitiesthatcouldamounttobothimpliedandexpressrecognition.Inlargepart

duetothesizeoftheSomaliDiasporawithinWales,theNationalAssemblyandtheWelsh

Governmenthavebeenkeytargetsforactivitiesdesignedtosecureinternationalrecognition

forSomaliland.Inperhapsthemostcontentious‘diplomatic’move-albeitnotonemadeby

theexecutivebranchofWales’Government-theNationalAssemblyforWalesextendedan

invitationtotheSomalilandgovernmenttoattendtheopeningoftheSeneddonthe3rdof

March2006,an initiative interpretedbytheSomalilandpressasofficialrecognitionofthe

break-awaygovernment’slegitimacy(TheSomalilandTimes,2006).Thedifferencebetween

theactivitiesofsub-stategovernments,ontheonehand,andsmallstategovernmentsonthe

othermaybeonethatisincreasinglydifficulttodiscernonaday-to-daylevel.However,under

international law, this distinction remains a pertinent one. The difference also has some

relevance in a more pragmatic sense: the Welsh Assembly’s reported ‘recognition’ of

Somalilanddoesnotcarrythesamediplomaticorlegalforceassimilaractionsbyasovereign

state.However,atapolitical level, this ‘unofficial’ recognitionmay indeedhaveaneffect,

albeitamoremutedone.Theambiguitysurroundingthestatusofsub-stategovernmentsis

compoundedbywidespread confusion regarding the architectureof devolvedor regional

government(suchasbetweentheNationalAssemblyforWalesasalegislature,andtheWelsh

Government as an executive) and the lack of a designated ‘foreign office’ from which

diplomaticmessagesaredirected.

Lessambiguously,inOctober2014theScottishExternalAffairsMinisterHumzaYousafwrote

totheForeignSecretaryPhillipHammondtoarguethattheUKshouldrecognisePalestineas

anindependentstate.AheadofavoteintheUKHouseofCommonsonthetopic-inwhicha

motion supporting recognitionwas carried, albeitwith the abstention ofUKGovernment

Ministers - the ScottishMinister also spokeof the ScottishGovernment’s support for the

upgrading of the Palestinian representation in the UK to embassy level “with immediate

effect”,andoftheirsupportforaseparatePalestinianconsulatetobeopenedinScotland.In

a press release from the Scottish Government, Humza Yousaf comments: “we firmly

encourage both Israel and Palestine to reach a sustainable, negotiated settlement under

internationallaw,whichhasatitsfoundationmutualrecognitionandthedeterminationto

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co-existpeacefully” (ScottishGovernment,2014a).For itspart, theUKGovernmentstates

that-whileitsgoalisindeedanegotiatedtwo-statesolution-itreservestherighttogrant

recognitionatatimeofitsownchoosing,whereitwouldbeofgreatestbenefittothepeace

process.AccordingtoMiddleEastMinisterTobiasEllwood,thetimingofanyrecognitionwas

critical; “you can after all only play this card once” (BBC News, 2014). Given the UK

government’sperceptionoftime-sensitivity inthisparticularcase,aswellasthereactions

thattheScottishpositiongeneratedinglobalpresses,itwouldindeedappearthatthisactof

- or ‘mimicking’ of - an express form of recognition had real foreign policy implications.

Though,liketheHouseofCommonsvote,theeffectsofsuchactivitiesare‘symbolic’,such

symbolism can be impactful, particularly where it builds towards a ‘critical mass’ of

internationalsupport.

TheactivitiesofbothWalesandScotlandinthetwoinstancesabovearguablyamounttowhat

Ker Lindsay described as helping to “strengthen the status of the contested state and

contributetosecuringorstabilizingitsplaceintheinternationalsystem”(Ker-Lindsay,2012:

7). From a post-structuralist perspective, diplomacy can be “productive of geopolitical

space”, and as such the activities of sub-state governments in the high-stakes game of

recognitioncanbeinterpretedassomethingofrealsignificance.Togetherwiththeactivities

ofother ‘outliers’of the international system, sub-stateparadiplomacycan illuminate the

“tensionbetweenformaldiplomaticpracticesandnon-stateactors”(McConnelletal.,2012:

806).

Conclusion:the‘fairweather’diplomats?

ForAdler-NissenandGad (2012:3),by“focussingonwhatappear tobemarginal sitesof

internationalrelations,weareabletoseemuchmoreheterogeneitythanIRtheoryusually

allowsaglimpseof”.Inthecaseofparadiplomacy,whetheronerecognisesgreatertruthin

thefree-ridingorfree-wheelingmetaphorsoutlinedabove,itisclearthatthelargedegreeof

flexibilitythatsub-stategovernmentspossessintheirdiplomaticactornessputsthematodds

withtheirstatecontemporaries.Inmanyways,thisflexibilitycanrepresentanadvantagein

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diplomaticterms:sub-stategovernmentsareabletodirecttheir(generallylimited)resources

towardsonly‘win-win’endeavours.Whencrisesoccurorhostilityarises,whensituationsare

intractable or relationships become difficult or embarrassing, or even simply where it

wouldn’tbepoliticallyexpedienttointervene,thesub-stategovernmentisabletodeferto

state-widecompetence.Ultimateresponsibilitydoesnotrestwiththeregion.Whenstate-

diplomacy is unattractive for any reason, sub-state governments can seek to distance

themselvesfromit-asthecaseofScotland’spronouncementsonoverseasaidexpenditure

demonstrates.Thisisnottosaythatallsub-stategovernmentsoperateinthisnarrowlyself-

interestedway,ratherthattheirambiguousstatuswouldallowthemtodosoinawaynot

easilyreplicatedbyotheractors.

Inasmuchasthere isnothing inherently ‘bad’aboutsub-statediplomacy,nordoesthere

seemtobeanythingparticularly‘good’aboutitfromanethicalordeontologicalpointofview.

‘Smaller’ isnotalwaysbetter, anda recent studyof SouthAfrican regionspresentsa key

challenge to the argument that paradiplomacy is necessarily either a democratizing or

developmentalforce(Nganje,2014).Indemocraticterms,thelackofscrutiny-fromregional

parliaments, localmedia, inter-partycompetition-ofparadiplomaticactivity,aidedbythe

fact that it tends to be relatively uncontroversial and often ‘unspectacular’ (Aldecoa and

Keating, 1999b: :19) in nature, is surely a concern for anyone concerned with ‘good

governance’.Indeed,couldmuchparadiplomaticactivitybereducedtoavanityexerciseon

thepart of regional politicians? Lesspejoratively, couldparadiplomacy really be all about

symbolism-withstate-levelactorsallowingsub-stategovernmentsto‘play’atforeignpolicy

as an appeasementmechanism? The case of Tatarstan arguably demonstrates that using

paradiplomacyasawaytomakecredibletheinternaldiscourseofsovereignty,whichinthis

casemayactuallybecentredaroundrationalisteconomicclaims, isacrediblestrategyfor

some sub-state governments (Albina, 2010: :123). Themeaning of such paradiplomacy is

thereforeonepremisedalmostentirelyarounddomesticconcerns-dosuchactivitiesreally

representachallengetothestate-centricdiplomaticsystem?

Infact,itwouldseemtobeinits‘uglier’manifestationsthatparadiplomacyraisesthemore

pertinent questions for diplomatic studies. This dynamic is one addressed in detail by

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MarciacqinthecontextoftheRepublikaSrpskaandBosniaHerzegovina(Marciacq,2015).

Here,theauthorargues,thecontestingofstate-levelauthoritybyasub-stategovernment

has different implications in the context of a ‘malfunctioning state” such as Bosnia and

Herzegovina,where‘lengthystate-buildingeffortshavenotalleviatedtheriskofinstability’.

The author continues that the development of the Republika Srpska’s paradiplomacy is

“driven by ethno-political competition, facilitated by state and sub-state actors’ mutual

disregard,andthatitbothechoesandamplifiesthesystemicmalfunctioningofBosniaand

Herzegovina”(Marciacq,2015:329).Itisnotautomaticallythecasethatsub-statediplomacy

infragilestatesaccentuatessuchfragility(viahollowingoutthefunctionsoftheemergentor

malfunctioningstate),ratherthevariableseemstobethewayinwhichsub-statediplomacy

develops,specificallywhetheritis“drivenbycooperationorcompetition”(Marciacq,2015:

343). The roleof sub-statediplomacy in fragile states is certainly anunderexploredone,

somethingthatMarciacqarguesisparticularlyunfortunate‘giventherelevanceofsub-state

diplomaticstudiestostate-buildingtheories”(2015:332).

Theambiguityofsub-stategovernment’sdiplomaticstatus-combinedwiththeirwillingness

toshareopinionsoncontroversialissues-hasapotentiallyerosiveeffectoncentralconcepts

andpracticesininternationalrelations,suchasrecognition.Atthesametime,asimilareffect

could arguably be seen on the unquestioned legitimacy of states as principal diplomatic

agents.Wherethesub-stategovernmentcanbeseentomoreaccuratelyrepresenta‘foreign

policy’positiononthepartof itsconstituents,thisbecomesaclearchallengeforthoseat

central-state level. In the context of increasingly salient regional and sub-state national

identity,thischallengewouldappeartobeaparticularlyimportantone.

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Conclusion

Thisthesisusedparadiplomacyasa lensthroughwhichtoexaminetheconfluenceoftwo

separate forces: the efflorescence of regionalism and sub-state nationalism and the

diversificationandstratificationofdiplomaticpractice.CurrentpoliticaleventswithintheUK

and thewiderEuropeanneighbourhooddemonstratehowrelevant thispotential collision

remains. In Scotland, a resounding ‘no’ vote to theUK leaving the EU stood in clear and

uncomfortable contrast with the popular vote throughout the rest of the UK.What has

followed is a set of interrelated debates and political disagreementswhich, according to

McEwan, fundamentally expose “the difficulties in reconciling rival self-determination

claims”:

‘TheBrexitvotehasalsoraisedagaintheissueofScotland’splacewithintheUK, and for some justifies reconsideration of the decision the Scottishelectorate made to remain within the UK by rejecting independence in2014…… the ‘one nation’ nationalist rhetoric of theUKGovernment in theaftermathofthevoteisatoddswiththeplurinationalcharacteroftheUnitedKingdom’(McEwan,2017).

Scotland’smanydisagreementswiththeUKGovernmentoverthewayinwhichtheBrexit

resultistranslatedintopolicy,itsthwartedattemptstosecureasecondreferendumandits

formulationofalternativescenariosforScotland’s futurerelationshipwiththeEUhaveall

beencarriedoutortransposedontoaparadiplomaticplane.Here,theirdesiretorepresent

what they see as the legitimate interests of their nation, a distinct ‘people’ or political

communitythathasexpressedafirmdesiretoremainpartoftheEU,hascomeupagainst

somehardand–fornow,attheleast–immovableboundaries.TheUKGovernment’sview

hasbeenthatitis“thedecisionofthewholeoftheUKwhichmustberespected”,anditis

theirjobalonetonegotiatetheUK’sdeparturefromtheEU(McEwan,2017:66).Evenwhen

European leaders such as Jean-Claude Junker rushed to meet with Nicola Sturgeon

immediatelyfollowingthevote,admittingthatScotlandhad“wontherighttobeheardin

Brussels”,thiswasquicklyfollowedbyareminder:Junkerwouldnot“interfereinaninner

Britishprocess”(BBCNews,14thDecember2016).Thesehardbordersarethatofsovereignty,

oftheviewsofotherEUMemberStatesunwillingtosetaprecedentwithconsequencesin

their own neighbourhoods – such as Spain and France, both of whom opposed the EU

negatingpotentialmembershipforScotland(BBCNews,29thJune2016).However,thereisa

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broaderfunctionthatparadiplomacyperhapsachievesinthiscontext.Byarticulatingthevery

separatenessofScotlandtotheUK,andinframingtheissueasoneofScotland’srighttoa

differentkindofself-determinationthantheonesoughtbytheUKGovernmentinextricating

itselffromtheEU,theScottishGovernmentreinforcesitssenseofnationhood,andmakesa

case for requiring additional political resources to adequately represent and govern ‘its

people’. In this context, paradiplomacy allows the imagining of the Scottish political

communitytobedefinedincontrasttotheinternationalobjectivesandprioritiesofother

actors, in this case theUKGovernment. For theUKGovernment, thismust represent an

unwelcome aspect of the ongoing debate. As Segura argues, sub-state governments can

presentaveryspecificchallengetostate-authority:

‘Sub-stateinternationalactionsformpartofthegrowingbodyoftransnationalrelationswhicharecharacteristicofthecontemporaryinternationalsystem,but states are especially wary of these due to their formal, symbolic andmaterial proximity to state-level foreign policy,which remains an exclusiverealm of state power. It is for this reason that sub-state governments,especially intheir initialphasesofprojection,havehadtoexertpressuretofindtheirplaceontheinternationalscene,andthisexplains,atleastinpart,thecontroversialdimensionoftheirinternationalaction’(GarciaSegura,2017:345-346)

The Brexit debate inevitably raises questions about both the nature and the location of

sovereignty in ways that perhaps blur and befuddle the objective lines of demarcation

betweentheUKasastateandScotlandasasub-stategovernment.AsMcEwanargues:

‘Theconceptof‘apeople’isoftensynonymouswith‘anation’asthebasisofsolidarityandlocusofsovereignty…butdeterminingwhoorwhatconstitutesanation, andwhodoesn’t, is no less ambiguous.Contrary to somebeliefs,nationsarenotprimordialcommunitiesbutaresociallyconstructedovertimeand,whilemanysharesomeculturalorlinguisticcharacteristic,migrationandcultural plurality make these insufficient criteria of nationhood. A sharednational identity and mutual sense of belonging – captured in BenedictAnderson’s (1991) celebrated definition of nations as ‘imagined politicalcommunities’ – overcomes the limitations of objective criteria’ (McEwan,2017:70).

WhilstScottishinterventions–diplomaticandinter-governmental–maynothavesecureda

‘specialdeal’forScotlandintheBrexitfallout,theymaysignalsomethingmoresignificant.

Indeed,thecontrastingself-determinationnarrativesinScotlandthewiderUKperhapsreflect

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whatAwan-Scullyarguesistheincreasinglackofshareddebatesandsharedpoliticalchoices

acrosstheUKthatmightworktotieapoliticalcommunitytogether,giving itthesenseof

beinga‘coherentandunitednation’.Thenatureofthe‘electoralmenu’acrosstheUKhas

changed in fundamental ways: “voters in the UK’s four nations are increasingly being

presentedwithfundamentallydifferent,andlargelydisconnected,setsofpoliticalopinions”.

Thiselectoraldisunityhaspotentiallyprofoundimplicationsandis“deeplyproblematicfor

thelong-termunityandintegrityoftheUK”:

‘IntheabsenceofagenuinelyBritishpartypolitics,theBritishstatemayhavealimitedlifeexpectancyasacontinuingandunitedentity’(Awan-Scully,2018:5).

Whereparadiplomacyfitsintothisbigger,contemporarypicture,isintheabilityitgivesthose

sub-stategovernmentswhorepresentastatelessnationto‘speakthenation’internationally

andenhancetheirlegitimacyasarepresentativeoftheirdistinctpeople,whilstalsofurther

refiningandhighlightingthedistinctivenessoftheirnationasaseparatepoliticalcommunity,

byeitheraligningordistancingitselfinrelationtootheractors.Paradiplomacyfunctionsas

boththecauseandtheconsequenceofthisbiggershiftinthecharacterofsomeplurinational

states–suchastheUK.Sub-stateactorsareempoweredbyaninternationalvoicetoseek

andeffectchange,andtheyarerequiredtodevelopaninternationalvoiceasaresponseto

change.Inotherwords,paradiplomacybothprovidesthetoolkitforpoliticalmobilisation–

the ability to look and sound ‘state-like’, to seek inward investment, develop normative

programmesofassistanceorkinships–andreflectsandstrengthensanunderlyingforcethat

advances steadily in thedirectionof a greater role fornon-stateactors, specifically those

representingadistinctpoliticalcommunity.

The intentionof this thesiswas to examineparadiplomatic activity in away that resisted

treatingitsmoreambitious,developedelementsasmereaberrations.Instead,thosetypesof

activities,andtheuniquepoliticalcontextsthatinform,driveandmediatethemwereatthe

centreoftheanalysis.Anattemptwasmadetolookatparadiplomacyitselfinasystematic

andwholesaleway,askingaseriesofquitesimplequestionsrelatedtothecolloquial‘what’,

‘how’,‘why’and‘so,what?’.Oneaimwastodefinesomecommonalitiestotheactivitiesthat

sub-stategovernmentswereengagedininternationally.Anotherwastogiveamoreovertly

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politicalaccountofthemotivationsthatsub-stategovernmentshadforventuringoutonto

the world stage and to explain the ways in which they went on to construct a form of

internationalagencyandlegitimacy.Sequentially,thethesisthensoughttoprobetherange

ofpossiblewaysinwhichdifferenttypesofparadiplomaticbehavioursmightbeinterpreted

and perceived by other actors in the international system, and to begin the process of

categorisingthisvarietyofactivities.

Therewerealsoexploratorystepstakentowardssignpostinganewtheoreticalapproachto

paradiplomacy that might allow a move away from the descriptive accounts that have

dominatedtheliterature(McConnelletal.,2012:806).PartOneofthethesis,ChaptersOne

andTwo,setoutthisstall;arguingthatparadiplomacyhadbecometoocloselyassociated

withtherelatedconceptofmulti-levelgovernance,disguisingsomeofthemorenoveland

perhapschallengingfeaturesofparadiplomacyitself.Itcalledforamorethoroughgrounding

of paradiplomacy within the field of international relations, allowing an actor-focussed

explorationof the practices and characteristics of sub-state governments as international

agents.Thispartofthethesis introducedthereadertoanalternativesetofconceptsthat

wereusedinthesubstantiveanalysistofollow,principally:sovereigntygames,mimicryand

performativity.Theprincipalcontributionsmadetotheliteratureofparadiplomacyinthese

sectionsrelatedtoafairlyradicallyreorientationofthetheoreticalframeworktowardsthe

disciplineofInternationalRelationsandspecificallytoalargelyconstructivistapproachwith

someimportantelementsofpracticetheory(Neumann,2002;BuegerandGadinger,2018).

PartTwoofthethesisaddressedasetofbroadlysequentialresearchquestions,attempting

toteaseouttheparadoxesseeminglyinherentinparadiplomaticactivity.InChapterThree

weexaminedthelegalandconstitutionalbasisofparadiplomacyineachofourcasestudies

andsawthatthiswassubstantiallyvaried,somethingborneoutinotherstudies:“researching

regionalsub-statediplomacyissometimeslikecomparingappleswithpears:theylookand

taste different” (Criekemans, 2010b: 39) . A key distinction between our cases was the

provisionmadeintheUK’sMemorandumofUnderstandingforbothScotlandandWalesto

‘optin’totheViennaConventiononDiplomaticRelations,andtoreceiveofficialdiplomatic

status, through operating out of the UK Government’s own diplomatic missions. Under

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Germany’sBasicLawtherewasnosimilarprovisionandallofBavaria’sdiplomaticrelations

were‘unofficial’andnotpartytotheconvention.Bavaria,foritspart,hasothercapabilities

lackinginbothScotlandandWales,notablytheabilitytomakeinternationaltreaties,though

thereisstillsomedebateabouttheextentandinterpretationofthesepowers.Evidentacross

allthreecaseswasadegreeofcompromiseandpragmatismwhichoftenshapedthenature

of overseas representation. From Scotland’s willingness to co-locatewith UKmissions to

Bavaria’sincremental‘stretching’ofitsrepresentationalanddiplomaticfunctions,throughto

theconsciousexpansionofScotlandandWales’remitforsustainabledevelopmenttoallow

for their respective African international aid programmes. This investigation also

demonstratedtheextenttowhichindividualcircumstancesandvariedpoliticalandhistoric

contextsinformedtheparadiplomaticstrategiesusedbyeachofourthreecasestudies,and

indeedthepartnerstargeted:WalesandPatagonia,BavariaandtheCzechRepublic,Scotland

andtheNordicregion.Waleswasseentofocusmoreorlessexclusivelyontargetingother

regionsand indeed regionalnetworkswhereasbothScotlandandBavariaexpanded their

activitiestoincludethirdstates,aidedbyfactorssuchastheeconomicweightofBavariaand

thesuccessfulnationbrandingeffortsofScotland.

InChapterFourweexploredtheconundrumthateconomicmotivations,thoughundoubtedly

crucialtomuchparadiplomaticactivity,couldnotaloneexplainthevariedwaysinwhichit

wasmanifest-ornarrated-ineachofourcasestudies.Whilethe‘economicargument’may

help to ground paradiplomacy in a perceived legitimacy and overcome its “aura of

inappropriateness”(Hocking,1999:36),thenatureofsub-stateactivitiesdemonstratedthat

therewerefurtherpiecesofthispuzzletobeuncovered.Reflectingonthepoliticalcontexts

ofeachofourcasestudies, itbecameapparentthatthecurrencyofmuchparadiplomatic

activitywas,infact,sovereignty.Whatwastakingplace,therefore,couldbeinterpretedas

partofwhatAddler-NissenandGadterma‘sovereigntygame’:theback-and-forthofasub-

andcentralstategovernmentasitrelatestotheir‘relationalsubjectivity’(Adler-Nissenand

Gad, 2014; Adler-Nissen and Gad, 2012). Given that paradiplomacy entails a sub-state

government touching on a key area of activity typically reserved for states, there is a

referencebeingmadetosovereignty-evenifitremainsimplicit-andtothelegitimacyofa

sub-stategovernment’sparticipationinsuchafield.

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Variousaccountsofparadiplomacyhavehoned-inontheconceptualcategoriesofstateless

nationsandnation-building,oftenmaking thedistinctionbetweenparadiplomacyand the

morecontentious‘protodiplomacy’,ortheexternalactivitiesofa‘stateinwaiting’(Duchacek,

1990; Duchacek, 1988b). Though there is indeed an important interplay between these

forces,theanalysispresentedheresawthismanifestinginperhapslesslinearordirectional

terms.Whenviewedthroughthelensofasovereigntygamewecanseethevaluethatsimply

beingacceptedasaplayerinthegameitself,regardlessofanyfixedconstitutionalorpolitical

end-point,has for sub-stategovernments. Indeed, theanalysispresented inChapterFour

argues that this conception of a game, playing on the associations and meanings of

sovereignty,mighthelptoexplainthebroadlysimilarwaysinwhichparadiplomacywasbeing

conducted across cases whose governing parties held markedly different views on their

constitutionalteleology.Thoughtheconfigurationsofeachofthesovereigntygamesinour

case studies did differ, at heart they were all about the recognition of the sub-state

government as aplayer in its owngame. There appears tobe a commonattempt touse

paradiplomacytomakeastatementaboutrelativepowerandauthority.

In Chapter Fivewe questioned the process of international agency creation, employing a

performativity framework to understand the ways in which sub-state governments have

sought legitimacy and credibility as international actors. These processes are not

unchallenged, indeedcontestationandnegotiationwerehighlyvisible in relation to these

attemptsatagencycreation:fromtheUKandScottishGovernments’tussleoverthePanda

diplomacy, to the slow acceptance of Bavaria’s European office and its ‘representation’

function.Thechapterexploredthewaysinwhichlegitimacyhasbeensought:throughsub-

stategovernmentsdrawingheavilyontheirrepresentationalqualities,throughmimickingthe

discourse and symbols of states and through appealing to dominant liberal international

norms.

InChapterSix,weconsideredthecharacteristicsthatsub-stategovernmentsseemtoshare

whenoperatingasinternationalagents.Theyoccupyaninternationaloperationalspacethat

is largelynon-statutory and is very loosely institutionalised, nor is it subject to significant

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levels of scrutiny. In possessing an ability, yet no corresponding obligation, to act

internationally, sub-state governmentsmight be seen to ‘free-ride’ on the foreign policy

competencesoftheirstates.Examplesofthistypeofbehaviour,oratleaststrongprecedents

forit,emergedfromsomeoftheinterviewsconductedaspartofthisresearch.Theabilityof

devolved governments in the UK to ‘pass under the radar’ and refuse to be drawn on

contentiousforeignpolicyissueshasmeantthatrelationshipswithrelatedorrelevantparties

wereleftunscathed.However,suchinstancesremainisolated.Instead,amoreaccurateway

toconceiveofthisselectivitywhenitcomestointernationalrelationsisthatofasub-state

government ‘free-wheeling’ in thespacebehind thehigh-politicsof inter-statediplomacy.

Thispotentiallyallowsthemtodevelopnichediplomaticstrategiesornovelinstruments,such

asthereciprocalapproachtointernationalaidshowcasedbyScotlandandWales(Anyimadu,

2011)or the focuson technicaldevelopmentassistance inCentralandEasternEuropeby

Bavaria. It also allows sub-state governments to focus on those areas or relationships of

greatestbenefittothem,whetherthatisineconomic,political,culturalorotherterms.The

chapteridentifiedarangeofscenariosorcategoriesofactivitythataimedtodemonstrate

thevarietyofwaysinwhichparadiplomacymayimpactuponorbeperceivedbyotheractors:

the paradiplomacy of good intentions, value-added or competitive paradiplomacy,

paradiplomacyonthefringesofhighpoliticsandtheparadiplomacyofrecognition.Eachof

thesecategoriesistentativeandwouldbenefitfromrefinementinthecontextofadditional

datafromabroaderrangeofcase-studies.However,theyareintendedforourpurposesasa

blunt tool to enumerate and identify the potential complexity of paradiplomacy as a

‘normalised’featureofglobalpolitics.

Inpullingtogetherthevariousthreadsoutlinedabove,wereturntoAdler-NissenandGad’s

argumentthattheunassumingborderlandsofInternationalRelationsispreciselytheareain

whichtoseetheheterogeneityofthefield,and‘enquiryatthemargins’isanimportantway

to develop International Relations theory(Adler-Nissen and Gad, 2012: 3). Expanding the

‘analyticalgaze’ofdiplomacyallowsustoincorporatetheselessonsfromthemarginsinto

ourunderstandingsofsomeofthemostfundamentalquestionsof internationalrelations:

“legitimacy, recognition, statecraft and sovereignty” (McConnell et al., 2012: 804). Rather

than assuming a set of capabilities that sub-state governments have internationally, this

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thesisinsteadprobedtheactualpracticesoftheseactors,andindoingsoilluminatedarange

ofwaysinwhichparadiplomacyinteractswithandchallengesthetraditionallyhierarchical

rolesofstateandsub-stategovernment.

Amongseveralthingsthatthisthesisdidnotdo,however,twoareparticularlyimportantto

note.Thefirstoftheserelatestothetimeperiodduringwhichdatawascollected,whichhas

meantthatthechangesandchallengesresultingfromtheUK’sreferendumonleavingthe

EuropeanUnionin2016havefallenoutsideofthescopeofthisresearch.Theperiodfollowing

thisreferendum,andthewaysinwhichthe‘Brexitquestion’hasunfoldedinbothScotland

andWales has broughtmany of the latent tensions noted in this thesis to the fore, and

undoubtedly in other ways would have added important data and insight to the study.

Nonetheless,thesedevelopmentshavearguablyshoneabrighterlightontheparadiplomatic

practicesoftheUK’sdevolvedregionsandmayhelptocatalysefurtherresearchinthisarea.

Indeed, the themes explored in the course of this study, and the tentative framework

introduced for amoreactor-centred theoryofparadiplomacymayprovideaplatform for

understandingthe‘Brexit’fallout.

Secondly,initsfocusonthemoredevelopedaspectsofparadiplomacy,thoseconverselyless

developedactivitieshavenotfeaturedheavilyinthisaccount.Thoughattemptshavebeen

madetodrawcomparisonsonthetone,contentandrelativelevelsofresourcedirectedat

differentaspectsofparadiplomacyfromourthreecasestudies,thereisnodetailedanalyses

of,forexample,theeconomicorcommercialparadiplomacythatBavaria,WalesandScotland

allconduct,oroftheroutineinteractionsofthesegovernmentswiththestructuresofthe

EuropeanUnion.This is for tworeasons.Ontheonehand,such interactionsareprecisely

wherepreviousresearchhasbeendirected,andusingmuchbiggerpoolsofdatathanthis

projecthadaccess to.Ontheotherhand, the fact that thiswasacomparativestudythat

lookedtounderstandthe‘biggerpicture’ofparadiplomacyandattemptedtodiscernsome

commonfeaturestoparadiplomaticinteractionsinthecasesofsub-statenationsmeantthat

timeandresourceswerestrictlylimited.Prioritywasthereforegiventothoseareaswhere

theclarityofanoverwhelmingeconomicorfunctionalbusinesscasewaslackingand,assuch,

othermotivationsweremoreevidentlyondisplay.

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Furtherareasweresimplybeyondthescopeoftheresearchprojectunderpinningthisthesis.

Thereactionstoandperceptionsofparadiplomacyonthepartofcentral-stateofficialsand

politicianswouldhavebeen fascinating to investigate througha seriesofelite-interviews;

telling the other side of our ‘sovereignty games’ story. The broader question of how

paradiplomacy is understoodby actors other than the sub-state government itself seems

enduringlyrelevantandwasonlyaddressedpartially in thisstudy.One immediatearea in

whichthismightbeprobedisthroughananalysisofconsularrepresentationwithinregions,

reflectingonthevaluethatexternalpartiesseeintheirrelationshipswithsub-stateactors.

TheattractivenessofMunichandEdinburgh(thoughnotCardiff,afurthersharpcontrastin

theperceptionsofeachofourcases)aslocationsforconsularrepresentationwasremarked

upon at several points during this study and indicates, once again, the ways in which

international agency helps to constitute the self-perception of the region or sub-state

government itself.Morebroadly, future research in this areamayusefully probe the link

between stateless nationalism and the sorts of advanced paradiplomatic interactions

uncovered in this thesis, using the categories of activity identified here to highlight any

differencesor similarities in the sortsofparadiplomacy thatother sub-stategovernments

carryout,particularlythat–comparativelyverylargegrouping–ofsub-statelocaleswitha

regionalidentitystoppingshortofsub-statenationalism.Inotherwords,dothefindingsin

thisthesis–relatedtoasmallsub-setofregions–alsohaveimplicationsforamuchlarger

group,andthusrepresentamoresignificantandpersuasivephenomenon?

In concluding this thesis,we return briefly to two common themeswhich have emerged

stronglythroughouttheanalysispresentedabove.Thefirstofthesethemesrelatestothe

factthat,asever,contextisking.Paradiplomaticactivitiesarebytheirnaturemulti-locational.

Sub-stategovernmentsarenestedwithinabroaderstatestructureandmust insomeway

transcendorbypassthatstructureandforgedirectrelationshipswithotheractors:regions,

organisations or third states. The political context, therefore, does not only include that

withintheregion,butalsothatofthestateandtherelationshipbetweendifferenttiersof

government. The diplomacy of sub-state governments does not occur in a vacuum: the

spectreofthestateloomslarge.Similarly,theuniquepoliticalcontextfacingeachofthesub-

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stategovernmentsfeaturedinthisanalysishasbeenkeynotonlyintermsofthemotivations

behindparadiplomacy,butalsotothewaysinwhichthisparadiplomacyhasbeenreceived

byotheractors.

Itisperhapssurprising,giventhepoliticaldifferencesseeninBavaria,ScotlandandWales,

that the nature of their paradiplomatic activities, the images that they cultivate

internationallyandtheinstitutionalarrangementsunderpinningtheirexternalpresenceare

allrathersimilar.Certainly,thereareareaswhereScotlandandBavariagobeyondthesorts

ofactivitiesconductedbyWales,inparticularwhenitcomestotargetingnationstatesrather

thanthirdregions.Thereareundoubtedlythematicdifferences,too.Butthemoreinteresting

markerisinsteadthedifferingwaysthattheseoftenbroadlysimilarbehavioursareperceived.

InScotland,forexample,reactionsfromboththeUKGovernmentandotherScottishandUK-

widepoliticalpartiestodiplomacyonIran,India,thereleaseofAbdelbasetal-Megrahi,the

Palestinianquestionandnumerousotherissuesarealwaysrefractedthroughtheprismof

Scottishindependence,andaresubjecttothepoliticalfaultlinesandsuspicionsthatexistin

thiscontext.ContrastedwithBavaria,whoseeconomicclouthasaffordedithigh-levelnation-

stateaccess(includingwiththoseofavastlydifferentsizeandstandingtoitself,suchasIndia),

thereisamarkeddifferenceinthewaythatsuchactivitiesareperceived.Aidedbyadegree

ofparty-politicalcongruenceintheFederalandBavariangovernmentsandarecenthistory,

andstrongpoliticalnarrative,ofco-operationalfederalism,Bavariahasbeenabletopursue

itsparadiplomacyinaverydifferentclimatethanthatfacingScotland.

Theimportanceofterritorialcleavages,themechanismsofintergovernmentalrelationsand

themoregeneraltenorofrelationsbetweendifferentlevelsofgovernmentwasreaffirmed

timeandagaininthecourseofthisresearchproject.IntheUK,forexample,theperceived

challengetothedevolvedgovernments’scopetoconductparadiplomacywasnotacaseof

party-political incongruence across a left-right axis, but rather in terms of the territorial

cleavagesatplay;“whoeverisinpoweratWestminsterandWhitehall,itisstillWestminster

andWhitehall… in the international context, that’s the more important division, it’s the

231

divisionbetweendifferenttiersofgovernment”.97Thedegreetowhichtheuniquepolitical

contextineachofourcasestudieshasimpactedthewaysinwhichtheirparadiplomacyis

understood isperhapstobeexpected. Inmanyways,andcontrarytothe impressionthat

paradiplomaticactorsoftengive,paradiplomacyisapoliticallychargedactivity.Tensionsare

almostboundtoariseinthisfieldbecausetheareaitself-diplomaticrepresentation,foreign

affairs, international relations, however one frames it - touches so closely on a key state

prerogative.

Thisbringsustothesecondoverarchingthemethatwewillconcludewith:theparadoxical

nature of paradiplomacy. On the one hand, we can understand paradiplomacy as a

sovereigntygamethatdrawsonfundamentaltenetsofpowerandauthorityandisaboutthe

relativepositionofthesub-stategovernmentvis-a-visits‘host’state.Evenintheabsenceof

anydesire to fundamentally recast thestate- sub-state relationship, thegamecanstillbe

played:with the ‘endpoint’being theveryconstitutionof thesub-stategovernmentasa

legitimate player in the game itself (Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2008; Adler-

Nissen andGad, 2014; Adler-Nissen andGad, 2012). In this understanding, the sub-state

governmentperformsitsinternationalagencytobothdomesticandinternationalaudiences,

indoingsoextendingtheir‘territorialreach’(FergusonandMansbach,1996)andmakingan,

oftenimplicit,referencetosovereignty-drawingonthemeanings,associationsandsymbols

ofbothdiplomacyandstatehood(McConnelletal.,2012;McConnell,2016).

On the other hand, however, the day-to-day realities of paradiplomacy are often

‘unspectacular’innature(AldecoaandKeating,1999a:19),andonlyinisolatedincidentsdo

we see tensions flare in away that reflects the underlying dynamics of contestation and

appropriationthathavebeenidentified.Similarly,whilethemimicryofstate-likediplomacy

bysub-stategovernmentspunctuatesthemonopolythatstatesholdinthisdomain,thefact

thatparadiplomacylooksandsoundssoremarkablysimilartothediplomacyofstatesalso

actstoreinforcethissamedominance.Sub-stategovernmentsbecomeboth“resemblance

97Interviewdata,SeniorWelshGovernmentofficial,2013.

232

andmenace”; they (non-stateactors)both “elevate ‘official’ statediplomacyas ideal and

diluteitsdistinctionfromother,‘unofficial’diplomacies”(McConnelletal.,2012:811):

Thesespacesofdiplomaticmimicrycanbeimaginedasremaindersleftoverand left behind as the ‘legitimate’ international space is continuallyconstituted. It is their excess that provides the constitutive outside to thediplomaticrealm.Evenastheirexistencethreatensthatsystem,thesystemreliesonthemforrepresentationalforcetoreifysystemicnorms(McConnelletal.,2012:811).

Is paradiplomacy, therefore, just something and nothing? One factor pointing towards a

differentexplanationisthepolitical‘doublespeak’thataboundsinthisterritory.Whilemany

of theaccountsgivenbygovernmentalofficials,aspartof the researchunderpinning this

thesis, pointed to the generally benign and workmanlike context surrounding their

paradiplomaticendeavours,wemustremembertoquestionthesourceofsuchaccounts.As

washighlightedbytheunwillingnessofScottishofficialstodiscussparadiplomacyaspartof

this project, both civil servants and politiciansmaywell bemindful of the nature of the

impressionsthattheygive,preciselybecauseofthepotentialforthistobesuchapolitically

sensitivearea,one“socloselyarticulatedtosovereigntythatitisconsideredtheprerogative

ofthesovereign”(Adler-NissenandGad,2014:16).Thesubjectmatterwetouchuponwhen

discussing paradiplomacy is one that inherently chafes at the boundaries of sub-state

authority,andthereforewemusttriangulatethestorieswearetoldindifferentcontexts.

Theconceptualdissonanceofparadiplomacy:thedifficultywehaveinreconcilingactswhich

lookandsoundliketheyareconductedbystates,butyetarenotbeingconductedbystates

atall,pointstothefactthatsomethinginterestingisindeedhappeninginthisdomain.Itis

happeningatthemarginsofinternationalrelations,yetitlendsinsight,providesparameters

andgivesindicationsofthedirectionoftravelintermsofmuch‘bigger’questions.Weare

perhapsbestledbacktoKrasner’sclassificationsofsovereignty’smanyvariants:international

legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty and interdependence

sovereignty,eachwiththeirownrulesandlogicsofappropriateness(Krasner,1999).Inthe

variedactivitiesofsub-stategovernments,wearguablyfindsomeoftheseelements,orat

leastprecedentsforthem.Certainly,theuniquecharacteristicsofsub-stategovernmentsas

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diplomaticactors-‘sovereigntyboundyetsovereigntyfree’(Hocking,1999)-presentanew,

incremental,setofchallengesforIRtheory. Inabroadersensetheyalsopointtothevast

heterogeneityofinternationalrelations,andofthemultitudeofrelationshipsthatexistand

persistoutsideofthe‘Westphalianstraightjacket’(BuzanandLittle,2001:-25;Adler-Nissen

andGad,2014:14).

234

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