HSC Course core study: World War I 1914–1919:

a source-based study

PRINCIPAL FOCUS

Students use different types of sources and acquired knowledge

to investigate key features, issues, individuals, groups and events

in the study of World War I.

11 War on the Western Front 211

12 The home fronts in Britain and Germany 250

13 Turning points 288

14 Allied victory 310

part 4

Retrospective210

Working with the HSC core

In Stage 5 Australian History, you investigated ‘Australia and World War I’, focusing

especially on the reasons for, and nature of, Australians’ involvement in the war,

the experiences of Australians at Gallipoli and the creation of the Anzac legend.

You also looked at key aspects of war on the home front in relation to both the

conscription debates and the experiences of one group within Australian society.

The four chapters that follow in this book deal with aspects of the war that you

have not previously studied. They introduce you to the main components of the

compulsory HSC core study for the Stage 6 Modern History course — World War I

1914–1919. The war itself lasted from August 1914 until November 1918. This

topic goes one year further, into 1919, so that you can understand the peace

process that followed.

This topic allows you to look more broadly at the war by investigating the

experiences of people of different nationalities who fought in the war in Europe,

on the Western Front. You will also investigate the impact of the war on two home

fronts; important turning points in the war; and the nature of the victory that

emerged from war’s end in 1918.

Like the Preliminary Course core, this is a source-based study so it is an

opportunity and a requirement that you further develop your knowledge and skills

in using and critically assessing a variety of sources. At the same time, you should

keep in mind the historiographical issues that emerge from different parts

of this study.

In further developing your skills as a historian, you will be mainly developing

your skills in critical analysis — the essential skill in the age of ‘information

overload’. You can improve your skills in critical analysis by keeping in mind the

following main points when examining and using sources:

Be clear about the difference between a source and the evidence that might

come from it. A source provides information that might or might not be useful

to what you are studying. Some or all of the source may provide answers to

your questions. If it does, it becomes evidence that can support or contradict a

viewpoint on a particular topic.

Use the sources provided — both here and from your own research — in a

critical way. Don’t just take them at face value. Think about:

— who created the source and what was her/his perspective?

— what was the motive, that is, what feelings, experiences, attitudes or

obligations incited the ‘author’ to create the source?

— what was the purpose of the source, that is, what was the creator’s

intended outcome?

— who was its audience and how might this have affected the information the

source did/did not provide?

— what is the nature of the source and the information it provides — is it

complete? incomplete? accurate? inaccurate? biased? subjective?

emotional? objective?

— how useful and reliable is the source in improving our understanding of

particular aspects of our study of World War I?

Some sources in this chapter are labelled to prompt you to think about these

questions. Think about and address them and you will be doing the work of a

historian. You will also be engaging in and strengthening the skills that will make

you a good HSC Modern History student.

Z

Z

historiographical issues Z� issues related to the ways historians have constructed and presented history over time and to the critical analysis and evaluation of sources for their usefulness and reliability

historiographical issues Z� issues related to the ways historians have constructed and presented history over time and to the critical analysis and evaluation of sources for their usefulness and reliability

War on the Western Front

Source 11.1

A French postcard c. 1915

depicting attitudes towards war.

The French caption translates as:

‘You won’t make tatters of our

glorious and much loved fl ags’.

Whose viewpoint does this

postcard represent? What is

the evidence for this?

KEY DATES

1914

August

Outbreak of World War I

Stalemate on

Western Front; trench

warfare established

1915

April First large-scale

use of poison gas

in conflict

1916

February–December

Battle of Verdun

May Diphosgene gas

introduced

July–November

Battle of the Somme

September Tank

introduced as new

weapon

1917

April–May

Nivelle Offensive

July–November

Battle of Passchendaele

1918

11 November

Ceasefire and armistice

— Allied victory

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

W

In this chapter, you will learn about the following aspects of

World War I:

Z� The reasons for the stalemate on the Western Front

Z� The nature of trench warfare and life in the trenches dealing with

experiences of Allied and German soldiers

Z� Overview of strategies and tactics to break the stalemate including

key battles: Verdun, the Somme, Passchendaele

Z� Changing attitudes of Allied and German soldiers to the war over time

Retrospective212

Introduction

In the early twentieth century, many people saw war as a heroic endeavour.

Soldiers (on all sides) going to war in August 1914 thought that it would be

over by Christmas, when they would return home triumphant at their nation’s

victory. Civilians also thought proudly of their country’s involvement in war

and little of the changes it would make to their daily lives.

Both views were unrealistic. First, only one side could win. Second, after

the initial German advances, the war developed into a stalemate that would

see war continue for years, not months. Civilians would face the loss of

loved ones. Their governments, through the imposition of total war, would

demand that they make significant sacrifices to support their troops on the

battlefront.

The reasons for the stalemate on the Western Front

Once Russia began mobilising its troops, five German armies advanced

quickly, in keeping with the Schlieffen Plan (see page 202), aiming to capture

France in six weeks and avoid fighting a war on two fronts. The stalemate

emerged largely from the failure of the Schlieffen Plan.

The German commander, Helmuth von Moltke (1848–1916), was worried

that strict implementation of the Schlieffen Plan would leave German armies

vulnerable in battle against Russia on the Eastern Front and also on Ger-

many’s border with Alsace and Lorraine. He deviated from the plan by

ordering additional troops to Russia and the Alsace–Lorraine area. Their

absence weakened the impact of the German armies in France and created

communication difficulties between the armies that remained.

When war broke out, the French implemented Plan 17 and advanced into

their former territory in Alsace and Lorraine. By 20 August 1914, German

artillery and machine gun fire from Germany’s sixth and seventh armies had

the French in retreat and preparing to defend Paris against German troops

advancing from the east.

stalemate Z�a deadlock from which neither side can progress

total war Z�a government’s mobilisation of all its resources to support the efforts of its own troops and undermine those of its opponents

stalemate Z�a deadlock from which neither side can progress

total war Z�a government’s mobilisation of all its resources to support the efforts of its own troops and undermine those of its opponents

Source 11.2

A photograph of French

infantrymen in action in

Alsace during early assaults

in August 1914

Source 11.2

A photograph of French

infantrymen in action in

Alsace during early assaults

in August 1914

Von Moltke succeeded von

Schlieffen as the German

Army Chief of Staff in 1906.

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 213

Changes to the implementation of the Schlieffen Plan (see source 10.26,

page 202) undermined its effectiveness. The Plan called for five German armies

to advance through Belgium and Luxembourg to attack France from the north.

The first German army, the troops to the far right of the German advance,

would move as far west as possible and then move east to encircle Paris.

General Alexander Von Kluck (1846–1934), leader of the first army, became

concerned at the long distance separating his army from the other German

armies. He sent his soldiers to the east instead of the west of Paris. This meant

that they would not be able to encircle the city as originally intended. It also

left the Germans vulnerable to attack from the French army retreating from

eastern France and from the soldiers of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF)

who had come to assist in the defence of France and Belgium (see source 11.3).

Belgian, French and British responses also prevented the fulfilment of the

Schlieffen Plan. Belgian troops provided stronger resistance than expected

and delayed the Germans at Liège for nearly a week. The British troops

arrived much sooner than the Germans had expected and surprised the

Germans with the speed and accuracy of their rifle fire at the Battle of Mons.

From 4 September 1914 onwards, the British and French fought the Germans

in the Battle of the Marne. By this time, the German troops were exhausted.

They had suffered in the stifling August heat; they were malnourished because

their food supplies had not kept pace with their initially rapid advance; and

the troops were weary because of the long distances they were required to

walk each day. The German retreat from the River Marne in mid September

cost Germany the quick victory over France it had expected.

Source 11.3

Map showing information related to the German advance into France in 1914 and responses to it

N

1

2

34

56

Belgian resistance and British

intervention slow down the

German advance, preventing

Germany achieving a six-week

victory over France.

Some German troops are

diverted to Russia and

Alsace–Lorraine.

Distance creates

communication difficulties

between invading armies.

Von Kluck deviates from the

Schlieffen Plan and sends troops

east instead of west of Paris.

German troops become

vulnerable to attack from both

French and British forces.

Exhausted and malnourished,

German troops retreat from

the Battle of the Marne and

begin to build trenches from

which to defend the territory

they have gained.

1�

2�

3�

4�

5�

6�

Belgian resistance and British

intervention slow down the

German advance, preventing

Germany achieving a six-week

victory over France.

Some German troops are

diverted to Russia and

Alsace–Lorraine.

Distance creates

communication difficulties

between invading armies.

Von Kluck deviates from the

Schlieffen Plan and sends troops

east instead of west of Paris.

German troops become

vulnerable to attack from both

French and British forces.

Exhausted and malnourished,

German troops retreat from

the Battle of the Marne and

begin to build trenches from

which to defend the territory

they have gained.

1�

2�

3�

4�

5�

6�

SOURCE QUESTION

Explain whether source 11.3 is more useful as an explanation of (a) the reasons for the failure of the Schlieffen Plan or (b) the reasons for the development of the stalemate.

SOURCE QUESTION

Explain whether source 11.3 is more useful as an explanation of (a) the reasons for the failure of the Schlieffen Plan or (b) the reasons for the development of the stalemate.

Retrospective214

Britain and France went on the offensive, trying to outflank German forces in a race to secure territory on the way to the English Channel. The Germans by this time had begun to build trenches to protect their men and serve as bases from which they would defend the territory they had already gained. In doing so, they relinquished their involvement in a war of movement through which, at that time, they might still have been able to defeat the seriously depleted French and British forces.

The British and French built trenches to protect their men during what they saw as a temporary situation, while they fought to try and force the Germans to retreat. They expected to be able to resume a war of movement in the summer months.

The development of trench warfare ended the war of movement and saw war move into a pattern of action and reaction that spread from Belgium across northern France to the Swiss border (see source 11.4). By late 1914, war

on the Western Front had developed into a stalemate.

Seine

Aisn

e

Somme

Marne

River

River

River

River

Central Powers

Allied Powers

Western Front

Paris

LUXEMBOURG

F R A N C E

G E R M A N Y

SWITZERLAND

NETHERLANDS

GREAT

BRITAIN

0 100 200 km

B E L G I U M

North Sea

Strait

of

Dov

er

N

Calais

Dunkirk

Brussels

AmiensSt Quentin

YpresPasschendaele

Neuve Chapelle

Verdun

St Mihiel

Cambrai

ArrasLoos

Reasons for the continuation of the stalemateThe Allied and Central powers all attempted to break the stalemate in 1915: the French attempted this through an unsuccessful campaign in Champagne; the British in March at Neuve Chapelle, where they had heavy losses for only a short-term gain; the Germans unsuccessfully at Ypres in April, where they used poison gas for the first time; and the British at Loos in September.

In 1916, the Germans attempted to destroy the French at the Battle of Verdun (see page 227) and the British responded at the Battle of the Somme (page 233). These battles once again focused more on attrition (wearing down) than on achieving a breakthrough and the resumption of a war of movement.

Western Front Z�the area of fighting in western Europe during World War I. It stretched from the English Channel to the Swiss border and encompassed territory in Belgium and northern France.

Western Front Z�the area of fighting in western Europe during World War I. It stretched from the English Channel to the Swiss border and encompassed territory in Belgium and northern France.

Source 11.4

Map showing the extent of the

area of conflict known as the

Western Front

SOURCE QUESTION

Use source 11.4 to write

your own definition of the

Western Front.

Source 11.4

Map showing the extent of the

area of conflict known as the

Western Front

SOURCE QUESTION

Use source 11.4 to write

your own definition of the

Western Front.

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 215

The stalemate continued until 1918 because:the mechanisms of trench warfare — barbed wire, artillery and machine gun fire — were more suited to defence and a war of attrition than to offencethe continuation of trench warfare made the cavalry charges of previous eras impracticalthe reconnaissance of enemy positions was pooropposing armies had equivalent access to reinforcements and supplies through railway networksneither side developed either a method or weapon of warfare that would force the resumption of a war of movement.

The nature of trench warfareTrench warfare was the main form of warfare used during World War I. It was defensive and, as such, dramatically different from the war of offensives and cavalry charges that the generals had expected and which had been the

main form of warfare in the nineteenth century.

The trench systemThe trench system generally comprised three parallel lines of trenches:

the front line for attack and defencethe support line to which front line soldiers could (if possible) retreat during bombardmentthe reserve line where troops waited for their leader’s call to battle.The rear wall of the support line also contained dugouts. Communication

trenches, dug at right angles, linked the three lines of trenches.The distance between each of the trench lines differed from army to army

and varied from about 60–90 metres between front line and support trenches and 300–500 metres between support and reserve trenches. Armies often also had partially constructed trench systems several kilometres further back to be ready if their enemy forced them to retreat.

The distance between Allied and German trenches was generally from about 100 to 300 metres. Soldiers called the area that separated them no man’s land.

Trenches formed a kind of zigzag or square-toothed line. This layout was a defensive measure. It minimised the impact of a shell landing in the trench and it prevented attackers from having a clear line of fire down the whole length of the trench. Sometimes a trench line formed a salient, meaning that it ‘bulged’ forward into territory held by the enemy. This was dangerous as it meant that opponents could attack that part of the trench from three directions — frontally and from both sides.

Z

Z

Z

Z

Z

Z

Z

Z

war of attrition Z�a war in which competing sides attempt to achieve victory through the tactic of wearing down their opponents’ armies, fighting power, morale and economies to the point of collapse

war of attrition Z�a war in which competing sides attempt to achieve victory through the tactic of wearing down their opponents’ armies, fighting power, morale and economies to the point of collapse

trench warfare Z�a form of military conflict in which opposing sides fight one another from trenches facing one another

trench warfare Z�a form of military conflict in which opposing sides fight one another from trenches facing one another

dugouts Z�shelters dug into the sides of the trenchesdugouts Z�shelters dug into the sides of the trenches

no man’s land Z�the area separating opposing armies in trench warfare

no man’s land Z�the area separating opposing armies in trench warfare

salient Z�a military position that bulges forward into enemy-held territory and, as a result, could be vulnerable to attack from three sides

salient Z�a military position that bulges forward into enemy-held territory and, as a result, could be vulnerable to attack from three sides

Source 11.5

An aerial photograph taken in

1917 showing the nature of the

trench system between Loos and

Hulluch

Source 11.5

An aerial photograph taken in

1917 showing the nature of the

trench system between Loos and

Hulluch

SOURCE QUESTION

What features of a trench

system can you identify from

this aerial photograph?

SOURCE QUESTION

What features of a trench

system can you identify from

this aerial photograph?

Retrospective216

Duckboards

Firestep

Drainage

No man’s land

Barbed wire

Shellholes

Enemytrenches

Parapet:earth/sandbags

Supporttrenches

Bolthole

Ammunitionshelf

Artillerypositions

Reservetrench

Communicationtrench

Supporttrench

Front linetrench

Sap

Barbedwire

No man’sland

Enemytrenches

The condition of any trench system depended on:

how long and how quickly it had been established

whether the generals viewed it as temporary or permanent

the nature of the ground where it was located

local weather conditions

specific military goals at different times

the extent to which enemy bombardment had affected the trenches.

German trenches were generally stronger, more complex and better

equipped than the Allied ones. This was because the German army,

unlike the British, viewed trenches as a long-term rather than a short-term

proposition. German dugouts, made of reinforced concrete, ranged from about

3.6 metres to as much as three storeys in depth (although this was rare).

British dugouts ranged from about 2.4 to 4.8 metres in depth.

Z

Z

Z

Z

Z

Z

Source 11.6

(a) An artist’s drawing, created in 2007, showing a cross-section of the key features of a front line trench; (b) Diagram, created in 2007, depicting the typical plan of a trench system

Source 11.6

(a) An artist’s drawing, created in 2007, showing a cross-section of the key features of a front line trench; (b) Diagram, created in 2007, depicting the typical plan of a trench system

SOURCE QUESTION

Evaluate the extent to which

source 11.6 provides accurate

information on the key

features of a trench and the

plan of a trench system.

SOURCE QUESTION

Evaluate the extent to which

source 11.6 provides accurate

information on the key

features of a trench and the

plan of a trench system.

(a)

(b)

(a)

(b)

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 217

Individual nations manned their trenches differently. British commanders

put most of their men in the front line trenches. In theory, this had the advan-

tage of ensuring that they could be well defended against enemy advances.

The disadvantage was that many men could be injured or killed in the initial

bombardment that preceded an enemy attempt to capture the trench.

French commanders heavily manned some sections of the front line. They

left other sections with small numbers of soldiers and reinforced the barbed

wire in front of them. If the enemy attacked one of these weaker sections, the

barbed wire slowed the advance and gave time to send in troops from the

more heavily defended sections.

In 1916, the German commanders, General Paul von Hindenburg and

Erich Ludendorff, began development of the Hindenburg Line, a trench

system that they believed would be impregnable. Implemented in 1917, it had

between five and seven lines of trenches and kept two-thirds of the troops

behind the front line.

Source 11.7

Australian soldiers in a front line

trench near Armentieres, France,

in May 1916

Source 11.7

Australian soldiers in a front line

trench near Armentieres, France,

in May 1916

Source 11.8

British soldiers clean a Lewis gun

while others stand to in a front

line trench near Messines,

Belgium, in January 1917

Source 11.8

British soldiers clean a Lewis gun

while others stand to in a front

line trench near Messines,

Belgium, in January 1917

SOURCE QUESTION

What features of a front line

trench can you identify in

sources 11.7 and 11.8?

SOURCE QUESTION

What features of a front line

trench can you identify in

sources 11.7 and 11.8?

Hindenburg Line Z� the German trench system, devised by Generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff and constructed in northern France between 1916 and 1917. The system shortened the front line and enabled the Germans to transfer men to reserve trenches. It incorporated concrete pillboxes armed with machine guns. The goal was to maximise the effectiveness of men and munitions at a time when both were in short supply.

Hindenburg Line Z� the German trench system, devised by Generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff and constructed in northern France between 1916 and 1917. The system shortened the front line and enabled the Germans to transfer men to reserve trenches. It incorporated concrete pillboxes armed with machine guns. The goal was to maximise the effectiveness of men and munitions at a time when both were in short supply.

Retrospective218

Methods of trench warfare

War on the Western Front evolved into a war of attrition rather than break-

through. It took approximately ten times as many men to mount an attack on

an enemy trench as it did to defend it. New weapons of warfare — machine

guns, poison gas, tanks — were either more effective for defence than attack

or, at least initially, not used effectively.

This situation continued until late in the war. Technological improvements

to tanks and improved use of them in 1918 enabled armies to break through

trench lines, engage in offensive tactics and reinstate a war of movement.

For most of the war, commanders continued to rely on:

massive artillery bombardments of enemy positions

use of infantry to defend existing entrenched positions

infantry advances ‘over the top’ (see source 11.9), armed mainly with

rifles, bayonets and grenades, against their entrenched opponents.

These resulted in massive casualties and failed to achieve a significant

breakthrough.

W Soldiers continue towards original objective amid the general chaos and confusion

W Some are wounded or killed as a result of enemy fire

W Attack succeeds in achieving its aim or

W Enemy succeeds in defending its territory or

W Attack is abandoned because of changed conditions

W Soldiers return to trenches

W Roll call to see who is missing

W Wounded taken to obtain medical care

W Soldiers wait until dark to retrieve bodies or additional wounded from no man’s land

W Soldiers attempt to advance towards enemy trenches but it is the enemy who has the advantage

W No man’s land by this time is full of smoke, shell holes and the sound of artillery fire

W Visibility is poor as soldiers try to remain with their group and avoid isolation

W Officer signals men to go ‘over the top’ of the trench and out into ‘no man’s land’

W Soldiers begin to move forward as their enemies race to set up their machine guns

W Some are wounded or killed as a result of enemy fire

10 minutes before the scheduled attack time:

W Officers clarify goals, convey final orders, check equipment and offer encouragement (British troops received a rum ration)

W Soldiers fix bayonets to their rifles

W Barrage of artillery fire to weaken the defences of the enemy’s front line trenches (men, barbed wire, the trenches themselves)

W Soldiers wait until just before sunrise for the order to advance

Z

Z

Z

infantry Z�soldiers that fight on foot, generally with bayonets, machine guns and mortars

bayonets Z�a knife blade which soldiers attached to their rifles and used in close combat with the enemy

infantry Z�soldiers that fight on foot, generally with bayonets, machine guns and mortars

bayonets Z�a knife blade which soldiers attached to their rifles and used in close combat with the enemy

Source 11.9

Flow chart outlining the key

elements of the experience of

going ‘over the top’

Source 11.9

Flow chart outlining the key

elements of the experience of

going ‘over the top’

SOURCE QUESTION

Use the information provided

in source 11.9 to write a

paragraph describing the

experience of going ‘over the

top’ in World War I.

SOURCE QUESTION

Use the information provided

in source 11.9 to write a

paragraph describing the

experience of going ‘over the

top’ in World War I.

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 219

Source 11.10

Table showing the main weapons of trench warfare, their uses and effectiveness

Weapon Use Effectiveness

artillery Both armies used artillery bombardments for both attack and defence. Gunners fired shells from behind their own lines, both before an attack and over the heads of advancing troops.

Artillery bombardments caused 60 per cent of all casualties on the Western Front. Initially some of these were from the perpetrators’ own army. Bombardments preceded a major attack and therefore gave warning of it. They often failed to achieve their goal of destroying barbed wire and enemy trench positions and severely damaged the area of no man’s land over which their own soldiers had to advance. The enemy’s counter barrage made this problem worse. By 1918, artillery fire was more accurate.

bayonets Designers intended the bayonet for use in offensive warfare. While used by both sides for the entire period of the war, opportunities for their use were limited by the defensive nature of the war.

Bayonets were of little use to soldiers facing machine gun fire. In close combat, the bayonet was safer to use than a bullet that might move through the enemy’s body to hit one of the shooter’s fellow soldiers. Soldiers feared bayonet wounds so the bayonet did have psychological impact.

flame throwers (Flammenwerfer)

The Germans initiated the first of 650 uses of its flame throwers in October 1914. The British and French subsequently used similar weapons.

The burning fuel produced by the flame thrower terrified its victims. It was effective as a short-range weapon but the possibility of its cylinder exploding accidentally meant that it could also endanger its user.

grenades All armies had grenadiers formed into bombing groups that would let off grenades along enemy trenches in advance of occupying them. By the end of the war, grenades were being used in combination with infantry attacks. The Germans had large quantities of grenades from the very beginning of the war. The British introduced the famous ‘Mills bomb’ grenade in 1915. A famous use of grenades was during over 12 hours of continual fighting between the Australians and Germans at Pozières in July 1916.

For obvious reasons, grenadiers preferred grenades with timed fuses to percussion grenades which detonated when they hit something. These had to be handled very carefully to prevent premature explosion. Initially unsafe and unreliable, by 1917 the Mills bomb grenade had become a popular and effective means of destroying enemy pillboxes. It was a ‘fragmentation’ bomb, meaning that it exploded into many small, sharp pieces. In 1917, the British ‘No 36M’ reduced the number of non-exploding grenades. Grenade supplies were difficult to carry around and this limited their practicality.

machine guns The Belgians began using these (in the form of the Lewis gun) in 1914 and the Germans followed with the Bergmann gun soon after. From 1915, the British began producing large numbers of Lewis guns, which could be regulated to fire as many as 500–600 rounds/minute, and became very skilled in their use. The British used them as an offensive weapon, whereas the Germans used them for defensive purposes. Both sides established separate machine gun corps in 1915.

Very effective against an infantry attack with firing power of eight bullets per second and able to inflict casualties very quickly. At the same time, the sheer weight of machine guns (30–60 kg), limited their portability. Early machine guns were often dependent on the availability of water to cool them down. Machine guns often jammed. Despite these problems, on average, fire from a single machine gun was as effective as 80 rifles. Machine guns were used most effectively as a defensive weapon with gunners positioned to fire at an attack of enemy infantry.

poison gas, including chlorine gas, mustard gas and diphosgene

The French used tear gas grenades in August 1914 and, after some use of chemicals in shrapnel shells in late 1914, the Germans used chlorine gas in cylinders in 1915 at the second Battle of Ypres. All the Allied armies subsequently adopted gas weaponry, the Germans using 68 000 tonnes by 1918; the French using 36 000 tonnes; and the British 25 000 tonnes.

Men soon learnt to fear blindness or the slow and painful death that this weapon could ultimately cause. While they failed to have a significant impact on battle outcomes, gas attacks did impinge on troop morale. They also initially had the problem that if the wind changed the gas might blow back to injure those who had fired it (see the warning devices in source 11.8). The development of gas shells to be used with artillery helped to overcome this problem. Gas attacks became less effective with the development of improved protective devices.

(continued)(continued)

Retrospective220

Weapon Use Effectiveness

rifles The main weapon used by infantrymen of all armies throughout the war. It was also the main weapon used by snipers. The British preferred the Lee Enfield rifle; the French, the Lebel rifle, with its slow and dangerous loading mechanism; and the Germans, the Mauser.

One of the most important weapons of the war, rifles were much easier to transport than most weapons. Effectiveness depended on the skills of the user. British rifle fire at Mons in 1915 was so fast (15 rounds per minute) that the Germans thought they were using machine guns. Armies could not maintain this level of skill and accuracy as they became reliant on non-professional soldiers. While rifle fire was suited to targets at up to 1400 metres away, the gunner’s accuracy declined at distances greater than 600 metres. The Lee Enfield Rifle was the most effective rifle. Soldiers valued its sturdy design and its rapid fire. The Mauser was more suited to use by snipers than to situations requiring rapid fire.

tanks First used by the British at the Somme in 1916 and subsequently by the French from April 1917. It wasn’t until the whole British Tank Corps took them into operation at the Battle of Cambrai, in November 1917, that their value really became obvious. The Germans began using them effectively from April 1918.

Initially of limited value as they were very slow, liable to break down, had poor maneouvrability (they could only move in a forwards direction) and were extremely uncomfortable for their occupants. By early 1917, tanks were being used more effectively in crashing through enemy lines, although infantry support lagged far behind. By 1918, German field guns were able to fire at them. Australian General Sir John Monash made very effective use of tanks in early July 1918 in coordination with artillery and aircraft to destroy enemy positions ahead of an infantry advance at Le Hamel. As a result, it took his forces only 93 minutes to attain their objective.

trench mortars This was a tubular weapon from which soldiers could fire a projectile at angles above 45 degrees. The projectile then fell straight to the ground (if effective, into the enemy trench). The Germans used the minewerfer and the British used the Stokes 3-inch mortar.

While effective when fired from one trench to another against enemy machine gun or sniper positions in a time of static warfare, the trench mortar was of little use after the resumption of a war of movement in 1918.

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. From the information provided in source 11.10, which weapons were

most/least effective in fighting on the Western Front?

2. Research some other weapons that could have been included in this table.

How would you rank them in comparison with those that have been included?

Life in the trenches: experiences of Allied and German soldiers

The stalemate resulted in soldiers spending years living in trenches. This

meant years living largely outdoors — although in a confined space — in

all weather conditions. It meant years of poor health, inadequate sanitary

conditions, poor washing facilities and often unreliable access to food and

drinking water. Experiences of trench life differed according to nationality,

rank, role and the nature of the fighting at any given time. What follows here

refers mainly to general experiences of trench life.

Source 11.10Source 11.10

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 221

The routine of trench lifeTrench life combined feelings of boredom, comradeship, extreme discomfort,

endurance and fear. It also incorporated experiences of waiting for action,

hard and often dangerous physical labour, hunger, thirst, disease, poor sani-

tary conditions, mental breakdown and incidences of extraordinary self-

sacrifice and heroism.

Evening sets in wet as we march up to the line . . . today is Sunday because Snow

who still keeps a diary told us.

We’re a strange-looking crowd. Each man wears a wet greatcoat over which

is buckled his equipment. Most of us have the breech and the muzzle of our rifle

swathed in strips of bagging or blanket to guard against the mud and rain. We

don’t wear puttees as the weight of the mud pulls them down around our boots,

but strips of sandbag instead. Some of the men wear rubber knee-boots, but they

are not of much use in the forward trenches as they either get pulled off in the

mud or fill with mud and water.

Onto our equipment hangs a water bottle, bayonet, entrenching tool and handle,

whilst on our chests we wear our gas respirator bulged out over one hundred and

twenty rounds of ammunition. On our backs, our haversacks contain iron rations and

odds and ends. Six sandbags are rolled and strapped above the haversack, whilst

under it hangs a wet blanket neatly rolled into a heavy ball of dead weight. We are

lucky we aren’t carrying bags of bombs and picks and spades as well. A few miles of

lumping all this stuff along and we realise the truth of Darky’s saying, ‘A man wants to

be strong in the back and weak in the head to make a good infantryman.’

On through the mud. Away in front, enemy flares sweep up, burst, scribe a circular

luminous sweep and drop to earth . . . The flares are on three sides of us. We always

seem to be approaching the centre of a horseshoe of fireworks. As we near the line,

the flares mount higher above the horizon which is marked by the belching sheet

flames of firing guns or the quick stabbing flame flowers from bursting shells . . .

Source: E. P. F. Lynch, Somme Mud: the War Experiences of an Australian Infantryman in France 1916–1919, Will Davies (ed.), Random House Australia, Sydney, 2006, p. 27.

Source 11.11

A photograph of French troops

manning a listening post in

a snow-covered trench on

the Western Front, in the

winter of 1917

Source 11.11

A photograph of French troops

manning a listening post in

a snow-covered trench on

the Western Front, in the

winter of 1917

SOURCE QUESTION

Describe the conditions

in the trench shown in

this photograph.

SOURCE QUESTION

Describe the conditions

in the trench shown in

this photograph.

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What is the main content of

source 11.12 and what do

you think was the author’s

purpose in recording it?

2. What does source 11.12

indicate about the attitudes

of these infantrymen?

3. Explain whether this is a

primary or a secondary

source on trench life.

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What is the main content of

source 11.12 and what do

you think was the author’s

purpose in recording it?

2. What does source 11.12

indicate about the attitudes

of these infantrymen?

3. Explain whether this is a

primary or a secondary

source on trench life.

Source 11.12

An extract from E. P. F. Lynch’s

Somme Mud describing his advance

to the front line. Lynch handwrote

the memoirs of his war experiences

in 1921. He typed them in the early

1930s in the hope of having them

published. Finally, one of his

grandson’s friends edited and

published the material in 2006.

Consider impact on reliability

author

Source 11.12

An extract from E. P. F. Lynch’s

Somme Mud describing his advance

to the front line. Lynch handwrote

the memoirs of his war experiences

in 1921. He typed them in the early

1930s in the hope of having them

published. Finally, one of his

grandson’s friends edited and

published the material in 2006.

Consider impact on reliability

author

Retrospective222

Soldiers spent differing amounts of time in each of the different sections

of the trench system. A common pattern across the entire period of the war

was 15 per cent of time in the front line trench, 20 per cent of time in the

support trench, 30 per cent of time in the reserve trench and 20 per cent of

time in a rest area. Activities such as training, travel, leave and hospitalisation

accounted for the remaining 15 per cent of time. All this changed in response

to particular events and circumstances, for example, whether or not the trench

system was fully established; whether a major attack was underway.

Boredom was a common complaint and waiting or preparing for action

was a common experience. Soldiers took turns at the various tasks needed

to maintain trench security — repairing barbed wire or duckboards, rein-

forcing sandbags, being on guard duty, carrying out reconnaissance of enemy

positions and activity, obtaining new supplies — and also tasks such as the

retrieval of bodies or of the wounded from no man’s land. Soldiers with

specialist skills acted as snipers or in constructing new trenches. Sometimes

the tedious nature of trench routine resulted in distracted soldiers being

wounded, perhaps fatally, by enemy sniper fire.

DangersLife in the trenches was always potentially dangerous. At dawn and dusk

each day, the times when poor visibility gave the enemy an advantage, British

soldiers followed the order to ‘stand to’. That meant they had to spend up to

an hour, armed, equipped and on the alert for an enemy attack.

From January to June 1916, before it even began the massive Somme offen-

sive (see pages 233–8), the British army sustained over 100 000 casualties. The

noise of shellfire was deafening and sniperfire an ongoing threat. Soldiers

sometimes tried to cop a blighty so that they could (at least temporarily)

escape the dangers and stress of front line action.

Soldiers suffered shell shock from the very early months of the war. It

represented the huge psychological impact of constant exposure to shellfire

and the fears associated with it. While doctors began to search for effective

treatments, military commanders often viewed shell shock as an attempt by

the cowardly to avoid or escape from military service. Shell-shocked soldiers

who wouldn’t or couldn’t obey orders sometimes deserted and even suicided.

Many received unsympathetic punishments including increased front line

duty, court martial and even execution.

I knew a simple soldier boy

Who grinned at life in empty joy,

Slept soundly through the lonesome dark,

And whistled early with the lark.

In winter trenches, cowed and glum,

With crumps and lice and lack of rum,

He put a bullet through his brain.

No one spoke of him again.

You smug-faced crowds with kindling eye

Who cheer when soldier lads march by,

Sneak home and pray you’ll never know

The hell where youth and laughter go.

snipers Z�marksmen who waited in hiding for opportunities to shoot soldiers in the opposing trenches

snipers Z�marksmen who waited in hiding for opportunities to shoot soldiers in the opposing trenches

cop a blighty Z�obtain a wound which was serious enough to require the victim to be sent back to England

shell shock Z�a psychological disorder with physical symptoms ranging from irritability and poor concentration to inability to move in a coordinated manner

cop a blighty Z�obtain a wound which was serious enough to require the victim to be sent back to England

shell shock Z�a psychological disorder with physical symptoms ranging from irritability and poor concentration to inability to move in a coordinated manner

Source 11.13

The poem Suicide in the Trenches by British war poet Siegfried Sassoon. Sassoon (1886–1967) served as an officer and was a patient at Edinburgh’s Craiglockhart Hospital, famed for its treatment of shell shock victims.

perspective

content/message

Source 11.13

The poem Suicide in the Trenches by British war poet Siegfried Sassoon. Sassoon (1886–1967) served as an officer and was a patient at Edinburgh’s Craiglockhart Hospital, famed for its treatment of shell shock victims.

perspective

content/message

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 223

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What experiences do you think might have motivated Sassoon to write this poem?

2. What is the poem’s message and what was Sassoon’s purpose in writing it?

3. List the emotive language Sassoon uses.

4. Evaluate the source’s reliability for someone investigating the impact of trench

warfare on soldiers’ attitudes.

5. How could a historian use this poem?

Gas warfare was another source of danger and fear. After some early French

and German uses of gas warfare in 1914, the German army began firing cylin-

ders of chlorine gas in 1915. Of greater concern were phosgene, which caused

death within 48 hours, and mustard gas. Victims of mustard gas didn’t feel

any effects until hours later when they developed blisters and began feeling

the excruciating pain caused by damage to the lungs and eyes.

Over time, more sophisticated gas masks came into use. Despite this, by

the end of the war, 91 000 soldiers had died as a result of gas warfare and

1.2 million had suffered its effects.

It was Thursday evening, April 22nd, 1915 . . . We had just fought our first big

action in the fight for Hill 60.

We had had a gruelling time, and had left many of our comrades on its slopes.

We survivors were utterly spent and weary; but we felt in good heart, for only an

hour ago we had been personally congratulated by Sir John French . . .

As we gazed in the direction of the bombardment, where our line joined the

French, six miles away, we could see in the failing light the flash of shrapnel with

here and there the light of a rocket. But more curious than anything was a low

cloud of yellow-grey smoke or vapour, and, underlying everything, a dull confused

murmuring.

Suddenly down the road from the Yser Canal came a galloping team of horses,

the riders goading on their mounts in a frenzied way; then another and another,

till the road became a seething mass with a pall of dust over all.

Plainly something terrible was happening. What was it? . . . in the northerly

breeze there came a pungent nauseating smell that tickled the throat and made

our eyes smart . . .

One man came stumbling through our lines. An officer of ours held him up with

levelled revolver, ‘What’s the matter, you bloody lot of cowards?’ says he. The

Zouave was frothing at the mouth, his eyes started from their sockets, and he fell

writhing at the officer’s feet. ‘Fall in!’ . . . The battalion is formed into line, and we

dig ourselves in.

It is quite dark now, and water is being brought round, and we hear how the

Germans have, by the use of poison gas, driven a French army corps out of the

line, creating a huge gap which the Canadians have closed pro tem . . .

About midnight we withdrew from our temporary trenches and marched about

for the rest of the night, till at dawn, we were permitted to snatch what sleep we

could under a hedge . . .

We were now in the area of the ill-fated French Colonial Corps. Ambulances

were everywhere, and the village of Brielen, through which we passed, was

choked with wounded and gassed men. We were very mystified about this gas,

and had no protection whatever against it . . .

First published in C. B. Purdom (ed.) Everyman at War (1930).

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What is the perspective of

the author of source 11.14?

2. What information does

he provide about the first

gas attack and in what

ways is it useful?

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What is the perspective of

the author of source 11.14?

2. What information does

he provide about the first

gas attack and in what

ways is it useful?

Source 11.14

Extract from the memoirs of

Anthony R. Hossack, describing

the first gas attack . Hossack

served on the Western Front

from 1914 until July 1917 and

then again in early 1918.

content

perspective

nature

content

Source 11.14

Extract from the memoirs of

Anthony R. Hossack, describing

the first gas attack . Hossack

served on the Western Front

from 1914 until July 1917 and

then again in early 1918.

content

perspective

nature

content

Retrospective224

Gas! GAS! Quick, boys! — An ecstasy of fumbling

Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time,

But someone still was yelling out and stumbling

And flound’ring like a man in fire or lime.

Dim through the misty panes and thick green light

As under a green sea, I saw him drowning.

In all my dreams, before my helpless sight,

He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning.

If in some smothering dreams you too could pace

Behind the wagon that we flung him in,

And watch the white eyes writhing in his face,

His hanging face, like a devil’s sick of sin,

If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood

Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs

Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud

Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues,

My friend, you would not tell with such high zest

To children ardent for some desperate glory,

The old Lie: Dulce et Decorum est

Pro patria mori.

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What are the similarities and differences between sources 11.14 and 11.16?

2. Which words convey the feelings of the writer?

3. Evaluate the usefulness and reliability of these sources for a historian studying

gas warfare on the Western Front.

4. The Latin phrase in the poem means ‘It is sweet and right to die for your

country’. Why does the poet call this ‘the old Lie’?

Source 11.15

A 1918 photograph of a line of British soldiers waiting for treatment after being blinded by mustard gas in a German attack at Bethune, France

Source 11.15

A 1918 photograph of a line of British soldiers waiting for treatment after being blinded by mustard gas in a German attack at Bethune, France

SOURCE QUESTION

What can you infer from

source 11.15 about the

military advantages of the

use of mustard gas?

SOURCE QUESTION

What can you infer from

source 11.15 about the

military advantages of the

use of mustard gas?

perspective

content

purpose is to convey

this message

Source 11.16

An extract from Dulce et

Decorum est by the British war poet Wilfred Owen (1893–1918). The poem describes the experiences of soldiers walking towards a rest area. Owen wrote the poem between late 1917 and early 1918. He died on the Western Front seven days before the war ended.

perspective

content

purpose is to convey

this message

Source 11.16

An extract from Dulce et

Decorum est by the British war poet Wilfred Owen (1893–1918). The poem describes the experiences of soldiers walking towards a rest area. Owen wrote the poem between late 1917 and early 1918. He died on the Western Front seven days before the war ended.

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 225

Trench rationsSoldiers often joked about the quality of the food they received. By 1916, the

impact of blockades meant that both Allied and German commanders strug-

gled to provide soldiers with good diets in terms of both meat and calorie

intake. British soldiers survived on daily rations of corned beef (bully beef),

days-old bread and stale biscuits. By 1917, cooks were making bread from

ground turnips and pea soup had become the staple food item. Hot food trans-

ported from the field kitchens arrived cold or at best lukewarm. Soldiers also

complained that the officers seemed to be dining very well by comparison.

I was Captain Morrison’s servant . He was a multi-millionaire and he used to pay

for a lot of the stuff that came to the Officers’ Mess. Before we went to France

in 1915 I had to go to Fortnum and Mason’s and arrange for what you might call

tuck boxes to be sent out to the Battalion regularly. Then I had to go to Berry’s,

the wine merchants, and place an order with them — a bottle of 1900 port to be

sent to us every three days and cases of whisky and brandy. They used to arrive

marked with a red cross. Medical comforts! . . .

It used to arrive in batches . . . boxes of tinned stuff, mostly, like galantine

of chicken, soups, puddings, tins of fruit, tins of grouse and pheasant, ham

— everything you could think of for the Officers’ Mess. We used to have that much

stuff that we couldn’t cart it about with us, so we had to make dumps here and

there. Often we didn’t go back to the same place, so there must have been some

farmhouses who did very well out of us! . . .

Quoted in Lyn Macdonald, Somme, Penguin Books, UK, 1993 p. 274.

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What does source 11.17 indicate about the author’s perspective?

2. What do you think was his purpose in writing this account?

Source 11.18

A photograph showing a mobile field kitchen preparing food for German troops on the

Western Front in 1918

Source 11.17

A comment from

William Jackman,

who was a private in

the Grenadier Guards

perspective

attitude

content

Source 11.17

A comment from

William Jackman,

who was a private in

the Grenadier Guards

perspective

attitude

content

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. In what way does source

11.17 support soldiers’

complaints about officers’

rations? How is it not useful

in this regard?

2. What information does

source 11.18 provide

about food facilities on the

Western Front?

3. Find two or three sources

providing comparisons

between soldiers’ and

officers’ food on the Western

Front. Giving consideration

to the usefulness and

reliability of these sources,

what are your conclusions?

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. In what way does source

11.17 support soldiers’

complaints about officers’

rations? How is it not useful

in this regard?

2. What information does

source 11.18 provide

about food facilities on the

Western Front?

3. Find two or three sources

providing comparisons

between soldiers’ and

officers’ food on the Western

Front. Giving consideration

to the usefulness and

reliability of these sources,

what are your conclusions?

Retrospective226

Health and sanitation issuesRats, feeding off decomposing bodies, became as big as cats. With one pair of

rats able to produce 800 additional rats a year, they were a constant problem

and their attacks on bodies horrified those who saw the results.

In the first winter of the war, the British army had to deal with 20 000

cases of trench foot. The problem arose from the long periods of time

men spent with their feet, sock and boots all underwater and in unsanitary

conditions. Unless they dried their feet and changed their socks frequently,

soldiers might not realise they had a problem until it was too late to treat it.

Their feet would go numb, the skin turn blue and, once gangrene had set

in, amputation would become necessary. Supplying soldiers with multiple

pairs of socks and a protective cream made of whale oil — and making them

use them — became essential to maintaining their health.

Source 11.19

A photograph showing the damage caused by trench foot if not treated

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What do you think were the photographer’s motive and purpose in creating

source 11.19?

2. Who would have been its likely audience at the time it was created? Give

reasons for your answer.

Soldiers suffered continual infestations of body lice and often spent their

spare time discussing and implementing de-lousing strategies for getting rid

of ‘chats’. The army regularly put uniforms in delousing machines while men

went (two or three times a month) to communal washing facilities. The men,

who had already waged a battle to remove the lice from the seams of their

clothing, didn’t get their own uniform back.

Female lice produced about twelve eggs a day. Lice eggs were hard to

destroy and hatched within a month. Soldiers were constantly scratching to

relieve the terrible itching that resulted. Lice also caused the intense pain and

high temperatures associated with trench fever.

trench foot Z�a problem caused by long-term exposure to conditions where feet could not be kept dry. Untreated, it would result in amputation.

trench foot Z�a problem caused by long-term exposure to conditions where feet could not be kept dry. Untreated, it would result in amputation.

trench fever Z�a disease, caused by lice, affecting up to 15 per cent of any army. It kept men out of battle but wasn’t fatal.

trench fever Z�a disease, caused by lice, affecting up to 15 per cent of any army. It kept men out of battle but wasn’t fatal.

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 227

Source 11.20

An extract from the German novel All Quiet on the Western Front by Erich Maria Remarque (1899–1970), first published in Berlin in 1929. Remarque’s novel was based on his experiences on the Western Front from mid 1917 until early 1918.

It’s a nuisance trying to kill every single louse when you’ve got hundreds of them.

The beasts are hard, and it gets to be a bore when you are forever pinching them

between your nails. So Tjaden has rigged up a boot-polish lid hanging on a piece of

wire over a burning candle-end. You just have to toss the lice into this little frying

pan — there is a sharp crack, and that’s it.

We’re sitting around, shirts on our knees, stripped to the waist in the warm air,

our fingers working on the lice . . .

Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front, translated from the German by Brian Murdoch, Vintage, London, 1996, p. 54.

SOURCE QUESTION

What is the tone of source 11.20? In what ways might this source be useful to

historians?

Dysentery was another experience common to trench life. It resulted from

the poor sanitation of the latrines (communal toilet pits). The demands of

fighting often didn’t leave time for new ones to be dug and soldiers made do

by using shell holes instead. When water supplies were inadequate, soldiers

drank the often contaminated water from shell holes. The danger of dysen-

tery was that soldiers could die as a result of becoming dehydrated.

Tactics and strategies to break the stalemateWar on the Western Front was largely a war of attrition. The static nature of

trench warfare made it difficult for any nation to achieve victory. The Allies

and the Germans used a variety of tactics — including artillery barrages

followed by infantry assaults, ‘bite and hold’, ‘leapfrogging’ and infiltration

— in their attempts to break the stalemate. They also used new technology

such as machine guns, gas and tanks.

In 1916, British, French and German soldiers engaged in two of the worst

battles of the war — the Battle of Verdun and the Battle of the Somme. The

high costs of both battles increased the enmity between the opposing sides,

led soldiers to question their own leaders and remained etched in their

nations’ memories for generations to come.

The Battle of Passchendaele, in the second half of 1917, also resulted in

high numbers of casualties and was the battle that became the symbol of the

futility of the tactics used to break the stalemate.

Verdun 1916: the attempt to ‘bleed the French white’The Battle of Verdun lasted from 21 February to 18 December 1916. It was the

longest battle of the war and was engineered in response to the goal of the

German commander, General Erich Falkenhayn, to ‘bleed the French white’.

He believed that he would be able to use this attrition tactic so successfully

that the battle would break the stalemate and allow Germany to win the war

or at least be able to begin peace negotiations.

dysentery Z�an illness related to the inflammation of the lining of the large intestine. Symptoms include stomach pains and diarrhoea and perhaps also vomiting.

dysentery Z�an illness related to the inflammation of the lining of the large intestine. Symptoms include stomach pains and diarrhoea and perhaps also vomiting.

tactics Z�actions taken to deal with specific problems and achieve the goal of a particular military strategy

tactics Z�actions taken to deal with specific problems and achieve the goal of a particular military strategy

The ongoing impact of these battles was evident on their ninetieth anniversaries in 2006 and 2007. Nations and individuals commemorated the battles with official ceremonies, the production of documentaries, the publication of new books on their nature and significance and special exhibitions in war museums.

The ongoing impact of these battles was evident on their ninetieth anniversaries in 2006 and 2007. Nations and individuals commemorated the battles with official ceremonies, the production of documentaries, the publication of new books on their nature and significance and special exhibitions in war museums.

Retrospective228

Goals and tactics

The fortified French garrison at Verdun, 200 kilometres north-east of Paris,

was a source of French national pride even though French commanders

had decided early in the war that it provided little of military value for

them. To the French people themselves, Verdun was a fortress site that had

existed since Roman times and the last town that Prussia defeated in the

Franco-Prussian war. Given this, and the improvements made to Verdun’s

fortifications in the 1880s (see source 11.22), it would have been a huge blow

to French morale to have Verdun fall into German hands.

Verdun

Douaumont

VauxSouville

River

Meu

se

0 5 10 km

Verdun salient

Fort

N

SOURCE QUESTION

In what ways do sources 11.21 and 11.22 indicate Verdun’s significance for France?

Falkenhayn was determined to exploit Verdun’s huge symbolic value for

the French and force them to fight a lengthy battle there which, through a

campaign of attrition, would destroy France’s ability to continue fighting.

Verdun’s location, on a French salient into German lines, gave the Germans

the advantage of being able to approach Verdun from three sides.

Source 11.21

Photograph showing the

medieval city gate at Verdun

Source 11.21

Photograph showing the

medieval city gate at Verdun

Source 11.22

A diagram showing the

fortifications around Verdun

by 1916

Source 11.22

A diagram showing the

fortifications around Verdun

by 1916

Some historians believe

that Falkenhayn only came

up with this rationale in

his post-war memoirs, in

order to justify his actions

there. Others, notably

Robert T. Foley, argue that

Falkenhayn consciously

pursued this strategy in the

knowledge that Germany

could not withstand a

protracted war.

Some historians believe

that Falkenhayn only came

up with this rationale in

his post-war memoirs, in

order to justify his actions

there. Others, notably

Robert T. Foley, argue that

Falkenhayn consciously

pursued this strategy in the

knowledge that Germany

could not withstand a

protracted war.

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 229

The nature of fighting

The French, acting on intelligence reports that an attack on Verdun was

imminent, called in two additional divisions and began reinforcement of the

trench system. In February 1916, the Verdun garrison contained only 30 000

soldiers. When Crown Prince Wilhelm, commander of the Fifth Army and

son of Kaiser Wilhelm II, directed the German attack there on 21 February,

he had as many as one million troops at his disposal.

The attack began on 21 February 1916 with a massive German artillery

bombardment. Then came flame throwers and attacks from three army corps.

By the end of the third day of fighting, the French had retreated to within

eight kilometres of Verdun itself, although they still controlled the forts at

Douaumont and Vaux.

Source 11.23

A photograph of French troops in the line of heavy shellfire during the Battle of Verdun, February 1916

SOURCE QUESTION

How might a historian use source 11.23?

In response to General Joffre’s orders, General Henri-Philippe Pétain (1856–

1951) assumed command of Verdun on 24 February. He reversed the policy

of withdrawal and ordered reinforcements to come from all over the Western

Front. Ultimately, 78 per cent of French infantry regiments served at Verdun,

which became known as the ‘mincing machine’ of the French army.

Pétain organised work teams to keep open and maintain La Voie Sacrée (the

‘Sacred Way’), the only link between Verdun and its supply depot at Bar-le-

Duc. Trucks carrying men, munitions and supplies became crucial to France’s

ability to hold Verdun.

By the end of February 1916, French troops had halted the German advance

— although they had lost Fort Douaumont on 25 February. German troops

were advancing faster than the artillery that they needed to protect them and

consequently suffered high casualties for any gains they made.

Visit the website for this book and click on the Verdun weblinks for this chapter (see ‘Weblinks’ page viii) for additional information on the Battle of Verdun.

Visit the website for this book and click on the Verdun weblinks for this chapter (see ‘Weblinks’ page viii) for additional information on the Battle of Verdun.

Retrospective230

Source 11.24

A 1916 cartoon by Dutch cartoonist Louis Raemaekers commenting on the German

campaign at Verdun

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. Who are the people shown in source 11.24?

2. What is the cartoonist’s message in source 11.24?

3. What techniques does he use to convey this message?

Despite major German offensives in April and May, the French continued

to hold out against them. Pétain gained a promotion and on, 1 May, General

Robert Nivelle (1856–1924) took his place. The Verdun motto Ils ne passeront

pas (‘They shall not pass’) became an inspirational catchcry in propaganda

campaigns designed to boost French morale.

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 231

Source 11.25

A 1916 French postcard praising the efforts of the French troops in standing fi rm at Verdun

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. Who was the audience for this postcard?

2. What motivated the production of this postcard and what was its purpose?

3. What attitudes does it express and who would have supported these views?

In May 1916, the Germans introduced diphosgene gas, a new weapon of

chemical warfare. After a three-month siege, they gained control of Fort Vaux

on 7 June and, over the next month, continued on to try and break through

French lines.

The Verdun campaign was becoming as much of a drain on German

resources as on French resources. The French, despite their successes, were

near breaking point and greatly in need of the hoped-for diversion of German

troops to the Somme (see pages 233–8).

From July 1916 onwards, Germany faced more diffi culties at Verdun. These

resulted from the need to send 15 German divisions to counter a Russian

offensive on the Eastern Front and additional troops to counter the British-

led offensive on the Somme. In August, General Paul von Hindenburg (1847–

1934) and his co-commander, General Erich Ludendorff (1865–1937) replaced

General Falkenhayn.

French General Nivelle favoured offensive tactics and this suited General

Charles Mangin (1866–1925), the commander of France’s Third Army at

Verdun. From October onwards, with new guns at their disposal, the French

moved on to the counter offensive. Mangin recaptured Fort Douaumont and

Fort Vaux and, by mid December 1916, had recaptured most of the land the

Germans had captured in the previous 10 months.

diphosgene gas Z�used in artillery shells, its vapours could penetrate gas masks

diphosgene gas Z�used in artillery shells, its vapours could penetrate gas masks

Retrospective232

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. Who would be the likely and unlikely audiences for source 11.26 in 1916?

2. What significance would source 11.26 have for the French at Verdun in 1916?

Significance

The battle ended on 18 December 1916 with neither side having made any mil-

itary gains and both having sustained a very high cost in casualties. French

casualties totalled 378 000 (of whom nearly 32 per cent died) and German

casualties 337 000 (of whom over 29 per cent died).

Source 11.27

French historian Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau comments on his view of the significance of the Battle of Verdun

Verdun . . . is a place of identity of France, of France-ness . . . There was no

battle before, and no battle after, which was so important in the French

memory . . .

The French troops were unprepared in Verdun . . . [The Germans had] a huge

advantage in artillery, especialy in heavy guns . . .

French soldiers or German soldiers the same — felt completely lost,

completely abandoned . . . There are no trenches anymore because of the

heavy bombardments . . . and soldiers are alone or in small groups everywhere

with no officers . . . no stretcher-bearers. No food. No letters.

In [French soldiers’] eyes, the battle was a defense of their women, their

wives, the children . . .

Quoted in interview for the 1996 TV series The Great War and the Shaping of the 20th Century,

www.pbs.org/greatwar.

Source 11.26

A photograph from 1916 showing German prisoners captured by the French at Verdun

Source 11.26

A photograph from 1916 showing German prisoners captured by the French at Verdun

purpose — to convey

the significance of the

Battle of Verdun for France

content

purpose

purpose — to convey

the significance of the

Battle of Verdun for France

content

purpose

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 233

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What does Audoin-Rouzeau identify as the problems facing the French at Verdun?

2. What, in his view, gave the battle meaning for French soldiers at the time?

3. In what way does this support the general view of the reasons for the Germans initiating the battle?

4. Film source. Watch Stanley Kubrick’s 1957 film Paths of Glory inspired by events related to the struggle for control of Fort Douaumont. Discuss as a class your answers to the following questions.

(a) Outline the main story of this film. Why do you think it was banned in France for nearly twenty years?

(b) What does it reveal of Stanley Kubrick’s attitudes and of his purpose and motivation in making the film?

(c) Identify aspects of the film that you think do/do not accurately depict the experiences of soldiers in World War I.

(d) Evaluate its usefulness and reliability for a historian studying the Battle of Verdun.

The Somme 1916: the issue of leadershipThe Battle of the Somme, fought between July and November 1916, was

the British-led attempt to break through German defences, partly as attri-

tion, partly in the quest of a decisive victory. The offensive spread along a

40-kilometre front from both sides of the River Somme north of Paris. People

remember it for the huge numbers of dead and wounded that resulted from

it and also for controversy surrounding the role of the general who planned it

— General Sir Douglas Haig (1861–1928), Commander-in-Chief of the British

Expeditionary Force.

Goals and tactics

The French Commander-in-Chief, General Joseph Joffre (1852–1931), nick-

named ‘Papa’ Joffre, had initially planned an attack in the Somme area as a

French offensive with British support. It was to be part of the strategy that the

Allies agreed to at a conference at Chantilly in December 1915 — the strategy

of engaging the Central Powers in virtually simultaneous battles on all fronts

in mid 1916.

The demands on the French at Verdun changed this. General Haig and his

deputy, General Henry Rawlinson (1864–1925), took over the planning and

manning of the battle, with French troops in a comparatively minor role. In

addition to British forces, the Allied forces at the Somme included French

troops and troops from Australia, Canada, Newfoundland, New Zealand and

South Africa. One of the main aims of the campaign became creating a reason

to force the Germans to withdraw troops from Verdun. Its tactics were a

mixture of frontal assaults aimed at achieving a breakthrough and attrition.

The nature and consequences of fighting

German aerial reconnaissance noted the beginnings of Allied preparations

on 7 April 1916. These were not taken seriously, due to the Germans’ poor

opinion of British fighting ability. In the weeks that followed, further fore-

warnings, in the form of overheard telephone messages and the movements

of British reconnaissance aircraft, led the Germans to take defensive action.

Newfoundland became part

of Canada in 1949.

Newfoundland became part

of Canada in 1949.

Retrospective234

By 2 June, German reconnaissance advised the need for additional troops

at the Somme to reinforce the troops already there. Falkenhayn sent four

divisions and some heavy artillery to reinforce the German position. This

gave them up to 16 divisions divided between front line and reserve line

trenches. The German troops were well positioned. They had located their

trenches on high ground and built their concrete-lined dug-outs up to nine

metres below ground level.

On 24 June 1916, prior to sending troops over the top, Allied troops began

what was to be a five-day massive artillery bombardment of German barbed

wire and dugouts. Due to bad weather, the bombardment went on across a

seven-day period. When the attack began, troops would also explode 10 mines

that they had installed under the German trenches.

The infantry had in front of them a triple line of German defences which went back from the front line for six or eight kilometres — three lines of defence, each defended by a chain of concrete pill-boxes, which were machine-gun posts, surrounded by acres of barbed-wire entanglements. The whole thing depended on our artillery being able first of all to locate and then smash up the concrete machine-gun posts and then with the field guns to sweep away the wire entanglements. This was the primary essential. Well, bombardments started with 1,500 British guns — 450 of them were heavies — but, unfortunately, the weather broke. For five days of the six of the bombardment there was low cloud and drizzle. Air observation was impossible and artillery observation was very hampered. The fact was that neither did they pinpoint the machine-gun posts opposite them, they also failed to cut the wire and the failure of the cutting of the wire was most disastrous.

Our procedure at that time was to use a shrapnel shell which burst about twenty feet above the ground and the hail of bullets going forward when the shell burst in the air swept away the wire entanglements. But it all depended on the accurate setting of the time fuze which ignited the shrapnel shells and our munition factories were only just getting into full swing. There were a lot of manufacturing faults in the fuzes. They didn’t all burn the right length and, I’m afraid, a lot of the half-trained gunners of the New Army Divisions didn’t set the fuzes exactly accurate. The fact was that many of the shells burst too high and the bullets dropped into the ground,

and the fuze didn’t work and it buried itself into the ground so the wire was left.

Quoted in Lyn Macdonald, Somme, Penguin, London, 1993, (First published by Michael Joseph Ltd, 1983) pp. 48–9.

Source 11.28

A photograph (c. August 1916) showing 8-inch howitzers being fired as part of a British artillery bombardment of German trenches on the Somme

Source 11.28

A photograph (c. August 1916) showing 8-inch howitzers being fired as part of a British artillery bombardment of German trenches on the Somme

SOURCE QUESTION

Of what feature of the Somme

campaign does source 11.28

provide evidence?

SOURCE QUESTION

Of what feature of the Somme

campaign does source 11.28

provide evidence?

Source 11.29

Major J. Marshall-Cornwall’s account of the implementation of British tactics at the Somme

Source 11.29

Major J. Marshall-Cornwall’s account of the implementation of British tactics at the Somme

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What is the main subject

matter of source 11.29?

2. Who wrote the source and

from what perspective was

he writing?

3. What did he consider to be

the ‘primary essential’?

4. What problems does he

identify and what did he

conclude were the results

of these?

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What is the main subject

matter of source 11.29?

2. Who wrote the source and

from what perspective was

he writing?

3. What did he consider to be

the ‘primary essential’?

4. What problems does he

identify and what did he

conclude were the results

of these?

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 235

At 7.30 am on 1 July 1916, 13 British infantry divisions and 11 divisions of

French infantry went over the top on the first day of the Battle of the Somme.

Many soldiers carried packs weighing between 32 and 40 kilograms laden

with the trench repair equipment. This would enable them to successfully

defend the German trenches they captured and hold off German attempts to

regain lost territory.

General Haig ordered the soldiers to advance at walking pace in wave

formations along a 40-kilometre front towards the supposedly destroyed

German trenches. Commanders were free to develop their own individual

responses within this general framework and could order cavalry regiments

to move in as required to take up gaps in the German lines.

A British mine exploded 10 minutes early and alerted the Germans that

the attack was due to start. Geoffrey Malins, an official film cameraman

making the film The Battle of the Somme, later recorded his recollections of

this (source 11.30).

Source 11.30

Official film cameraman Geoffrey Malins’ description of the detonation of the mine at

Hawthorn Redoubt at 7.28 a.m. on 1 July 1916

The ground where I stood gave a mighty convulsion. It rocked and swayed. I

gripped hold of my tripod to steady myself. Then for all the world like a gigantic

sponge, the earth rose high in the air to the height of hundreds of feet. Higher and

higher it rose, and with a horrible grinding roar the earth settles back upon itself,

leaving in its place a mountain of smoke.

I swung my camera round onto our own parapets. Then another signal rang out,

and from the trenches in front of me, our wonderful troops went over the top. What

a picture it was.

G. H. Malins, How I Filmed the War (first published 1920), Imperial War Museum/Battery Press, 1993, pp. 162–3.

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What was the perspective of the author of source 11.30?

2. How did this differ from the perspective of the author of source 11.29? Support

your answer with evidence from the sources.

Artillery bombardment failed to achieve its goal. While it had launched

1.5 million shells at the German lines, these were dispersed across a

40-kilometre front and the bombardment failed to destroy the barbed wire

protecting the German trenches. With many poor quality shells failing to

explode, the German defences remained unaffected in many places. The

Germans’ heavily fortified dugouts protected their soldiers during the

artillery bombardment. German artillery remained intact and ready to fire

on advancing Allied troops.

When Allied soldiers advanced into the churned-up ground of no man’s

land, they advanced into a non-stop barrage of German fire. They became

easy targets as their attempts to pass through the German barbed wire

only made them become more entangled in it. The Allied troops did not

have the machine gun power needed to respond effectively. Battlefield

communications were poor and it was hours before leaders learned of

the scale of the disaster they had unleashed.

Retrospective236

SOURCE QUESTION

How useful and reliable is source 11.31 for a historian studying British soldiers’

experiences of going ‘over the top’ on 1 July 1916?

The first of July 1916 came to be remembered as the worst day in the history

of the British-led forces. Nearly 20 000 Allied troops died on the first day and

40 000 were wounded. The attack failed to achieve a large-scale breakthrough,

although French divisions had some success.

That was a stupid action, because we had to make a frontal attack on bristling

German guns and there was no shelter at all. We were at the back, but C Company

really got wiped out. We had a lot of casualties but they lost all their officers,

all the NCOs, the lot — all cleaned out! We knew it was pointless, even before

we went over — crossing open ground like that. But, you had to go. You were

between the devil and the deep blue sea. If you go forward, you’ll likely be shot.

If you go back, you’ll be court-martialled and shot. So what the hell do you do? . . .

You just go forward, because the only bloke you can get your knife into is

the bloke you’re facing.

There were dead bodies all over the place . . . [from] previous attacks.

What a bashing we got. There were heaps of men, everywhere — not one or two

men, but heaps of men, all dead. Even before we went over, we knew this was

death. We just couldn’t take High Wood against machine guns. It was ridiculous.

There was no need for it. It was just absolute slaughter . . .

Quoted in Lyn Macdonald, Somme, Penguin, London, 1993, p. 162.

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What military tactic is Hay describing in source 11.32?

2. Which words and phrases describe his attitude towards it?

3. What information does he provide about the results and which weapon does he

link to them?

4. Explain whether or not the experience Sergeant Hay describes was typical or

atypical of what soldiers encountered at the Somme.

Source 11.31

A still from Geoffrey Malins’ film, Battle of the Somme, showing a group of British soldiers going over the top and through barbed wire at the start of the infantry assault on 1 July 1916. Malins staged recreations of some battle scenes.

Source 11.31

A still from Geoffrey Malins’ film, Battle of the Somme, showing a group of British soldiers going over the top and through barbed wire at the start of the infantry assault on 1 July 1916. Malins staged recreations of some battle scenes.

Source 11.32

An extract from the account of British Sergeant Bill Hay of the Royal Scots 51st Division, commenting on his experiences of the Battle of the Somme in mid July 1916

perspective

motive for source

purpose — to convey

this message

Source 11.32

An extract from the account of British Sergeant Bill Hay of the Royal Scots 51st Division, commenting on his experiences of the Battle of the Somme in mid July 1916

perspective

motive for source

purpose — to convey

this message

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 237

Haig insisted that the campaign continue and sanctioned the use of new

tactics, including, in August 1916, that of creeping barrage. This tactic

aimed to achieve a breakthrough by utilising the dust clouds from artil-

lery bombardment to provide greater protection for infantry advancing in

a frontal assault. Unlike artillery barrages in advance of an attack, it did not

alert the enemy that an attack was imminent. In theory, the infantry could

take an enemy trench before the enemy had time to react to the cessation of

the artillery bombardment.

The weakness in the tactic was that it had to be precisely timed and coordi-

nated and did not allow for flexibility in response to changing circumstances.

Soldiers needed to advance at a pace of 50 metres a minute. Soldiers who

moved too fast might become victims of their own army’s artillery fire. At the

Somme in 1916, the infantry couldn’t keep pace with the artillery and so gave

time for the Germans to resume their positions and be ready for its arrival.

This was an important beginning that showed the potential advantages

in the simultaneous use of attack tactics. The Somme showed that creeping

barrage would be a tactic best suited to use on small targets and one that

would play a part in a strategy to break the stalemate of trench warfare.

The introduction of the tank

In August and September 1916, the battle became largely one of attrition,

although the British introduction of a new weapon of warfare — the tank

— on 15 September did maintain hopes of progress. Tanks could pass over

barbed wire and withstand machine gun fire but, at this early stage in their

development, they were too slow and unreliable to make any significant dif-

ference to the outcome of the campaign. Fewer than two-thirds of the 49

tanks available that day reached the start point; of these, only two-thirds

actually went into action; and, once in action, many became bogged in the

mud of no man’s land.

In late November 1916, with the onset of winter weather conditions,

including heavy snowfalls, General Haig decided to call a halt to the Somme

campaign. By this time, one million Allied and German soldiers were dead

and the Allies had gained, at most, only 12 kilometres of territory.

creeping barrage Z�the use of a wall of artillery fire immediately in front of the advancing infantry. As the artillery gunners moved forward to destroy enemy trenches, the infantry, following behind, was ready to take control of a trench once the artillery fire had ceased.

creeping barrage Z�the use of a wall of artillery fire immediately in front of the advancing infantry. As the artillery gunners moved forward to destroy enemy trenches, the infantry, following behind, was ready to take control of a trench once the artillery fire had ceased.

Canadian troops used

creeping barrage

successfully at the Battle of

Vimy Ridge in 1917.

Canadian troops used

creeping barrage

successfully at the Battle of

Vimy Ridge in 1917.

Source 11.33

A photograph of a British Mark I

tank that broke down while

crossing trenches on route to

Thiepval in September 1916

Source 11.33

A photograph of a British Mark I

tank that broke down while

crossing trenches on route to

Thiepval in September 1916

SOURCE QUESTION

To what extent is source 11.33

representative of the

performance of tanks during

the Somme campaign in 1916?

SOURCE QUESTION

To what extent is source 11.33

representative of the

performance of tanks during

the Somme campaign in 1916?

Retrospective238

Significance: historiographical issues

Captain von Hentig, of the German Guard Reserve Division, described the

Battle of the Somme as the ‘muddy grave of the German field army’. Military

historian, Gary Sheffield, argued in his 2003 book, The Somme, that the battle

actually cost the German army the war: ‘without it the entente would not have

emerged victorious in 1918’. Clearly one historiographical issue is the extent

to which this is true. Further study and reading will help you to make up

your own mind.

The other historiographical issue relates to Haig’s leadership. Critics of

General Haig see him as a foolhardy commander who was slow to utilise

new ideas, especially in relation to new battle tactics. They claim that he

had a poor understanding of the nature of trench warfare and little respect

for the lives of his men, who, at the Somme, he effectively used as ‘cannon

fodder’. Other historians praise Haig’s success in building up the strength of

the British forces and his willingness to employ new methods of fighting that

eventually helped the Allies win the war.

Lyn Macdonald (source 11.34) warns us of stereotypes that fail to take account

of the complexity of the factors leading to a certain decision or result.

Source 11.34

An extract from historian Lyn Macdonald’s ‘Foreword’ to her book, Somme

With the benefit of hindsight and the cultivation of the habit of criticism, it is

tempting to condemn those whose duty it was to conduct the war and even to

marvel at the attitude of those who saw it as their duty to fight it. The very horror

of their experience has given birth to a widely held emotional view of the war in

which every Tommy wears a halo and every officer above the rank of captain

a pair of horns . . .

Lyn Macdonald, Somme, Penguin, London, 1993, p. xiii.

Source 11.35

Historian Peter Simkins of London’s Imperial War Museum commenting on the Battle of the Somme

[B]y the middle of the Battle . . . the weapon system . . . isn’t yet properly

balanced . . . There is not enough heavy artillery.

The gunners do not know how to apply all their techniques to maximum

benefit. The machine gun corps . . . has not yet worked out its tactics properly.

This is the first appearance of tanks . . . Cooperation with aircraft is not yet fully

developed; and even the poor bloody infantry on the ground — the balance of

their weapons isn’t yet right.

. . . you can get brave men to advance at any time. But it’s sustaining the

impetus of the advance once they’ve gone over the top that’s important. If they’ve

got the wrong weapons with which to fight, if they’re carrying rifles and bayonets

and they’re up against machine guns, the formula is wrong . . .

Quoted in interview for the 1996 TV series The Great War and the Shaping of the 20th Century, www.pbs.org/greatwar.

SOURCE QUESTION

What is the author’s message

in source 11.34 in relation to

our interpretation of the Battle

of the Somme?

SOURCE QUESTION

What is the author’s message

in source 11.34 in relation to

our interpretation of the Battle

of the Somme?

SOURCE QUESTION

What does Peter Simkins

suggest in source 11.35 are

the lessons that the Allies

could take from the Somme?

SOURCE QUESTION

What does Peter Simkins

suggest in source 11.35 are

the lessons that the Allies

could take from the Somme?

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 239

Passchendaele 1917: the war of mudGoal and tactics

In 1917, British, Australian, New Zealander and South African soldiers

attempted to break through German lines in Belgium and gain control of the

important German railway junction at Roulers. If successful, the plan was to

then move on to capture the German naval bases at Ostende and Zeebrugge.

This followed concern about the ongoing threats to Allied shipping from

German U-boats and torpedo boats.

Engaging the Germans here would also help to draw pressure off the

French army. Since the Nivelle Offensive earlier in 1917, the French army

had been trying to address problems of desertions, mutinies and general dis-

obedience that severely threatened its ability to continue fighting.

General Haig, who commanded the campaign, believed the scheme pro-

vided an opportunity to defeat Germany. He believed that the German

army, after losses of 350 000 men in April and May, was suffering from low

morale and on the verge of collapse. While he believed a breakthrough, using

leap frog tactics, was possible, the leaders who condoned the operation

effectively only gave permission for a continuation of attrition tactics.

Nature and consequences

To gain their objective, the Allies had to gain control of the village of

Passchendaele (Passendale), near Ypres. German artillery gunners held the

high ground above the Ypres salient on the Messines Ridge.

A preliminary attack began on 7 June 1917 with massive and carefully

targeted artillery bombardment. The Allies gained a foothold on the

German-controlled Messines Ridge and control of territory from which to

launch the main offensive on 31 July.

On 18 July, the Allies resumed artillery shelling of German defences in

advance of the attack scheduled for 31 July. This alerted the Germans to

the likelihood of an attack. They also had the advantage of higher ground

and a wide view of their attackers’ movements. Allied casualties reached

32 000 on the first day.

The land around the village of Passchendaele was reclaimed swamp which,

after heavy artillery bombardment, became waist-high liquid mud. August

rain made the problem worse. Deep shell craters filled with water and joined

to form lakes of slimy water. Aerial reconnaissance was impossible. Soldiers

had to transport shells via mules walking on duckboards. They then had to

clean the shells before usage. Tanks would not work.

Over a 14-week period, Allied troops made 10 attempts to break through

to Passchendaele. By late August, despite huge numbers of casualties, there

was little gain.

Men, equipment and animals became bogged down in mud and flooded

fields. After only a short break, General Haig insisted that the attack proceed.

Advancing across no man’s land meant walking, with full kit, on duck-

boards laid on top of the muddied and shell-holed fields. Some troops drowned

because no-one could rescue them if they missed their footing and fell into the

mud. When Haig’s chief of staff visited the battlefield, he reportedly had tears

in his eyes as he said, ‘Good God, did we really send men to fight in that?’

Nivelle Offensive Z�General Nivelle’s massive French attack on German lines between Royle and Reims in 1917. It began on 16 April and ended on 9 May. The battle gained no territory and resulted in 187 000 French casualties and troops no longer willing to support their leaders.

Nivelle Offensive Z�General Nivelle’s massive French attack on German lines between Royle and Reims in 1917. It began on 16 April and ended on 9 May. The battle gained no territory and resulted in 187 000 French casualties and troops no longer willing to support their leaders.

leap frog Z�the tactic of moving by stages, from one objective to another, with new troops moving forward to take on each successive stage

leap frog Z�the tactic of moving by stages, from one objective to another, with new troops moving forward to take on each successive stage

Retrospective240

In September 1917, General Plumer implemented the new tactic of

bite and hold — proceeding through small gains and moving from shell

hole to shell hole to take territory. By mid October, casualties had reached

100 000 and Allied forces were exhausted. With troop reinforcements

from the Eastern Front and the use of mustard gas, it seemed that the

German army had the upper hand.

Fighting continued until 6 November 1917, when the Canadians took

Passchendaele. When the Canadians began their advance in this area in late

October, they incurred 12 000 casualties for the gain of only a few hundred

metres. By early November, they had lost 80 per cent of two divisions.

Significance

The Battle of Passchendaele, also known as the third battle of Ypres (Ieper),

was the last major campaign of attrition tactics in World War I. It came to

symbolise the futility of much of the fighting on the Western Front. The Allied

forces suffered over 300 000 casualties and the Germans suffered 260 000.

Military analysts then and since have criticised Haig for having continued

the offensive — regardless of its costs in casualties — and for not having been

more flexible in the choice of tactics. Others say that Haig had to continue

trying to win the war or at least improve the Allied position (both on land

and at sea) before American troops arrived and undermined Britain’s poten-

tial to take the leading role in any subsequent peacemaking process.

The Battle of Passchendaele cost the Allies the opportunity to send reserves

in to exploit the success that the Allied Tank Corps had achieved in a break-

through at the Battle of Cambrai. The heavy losses there meant that the Allies

could not keep hold of their gains. From early April 1918, German troops

began to re-take the land they had lost.

The stalemate continued at the end of 1917. In 1918, the German army

launched an offensive which broke the stalemate. The Allied forces used this

situation to implement improved tactics of bite and hold and infiltration

(see chapter 13), and made more effective use of weaponry, especially the tank,

to gain victory.

Source 11.36

A 1917 photograph showing

Australian troops walking across

the battlefield of Ypres in 1917

Source 11.36

A 1917 photograph showing

Australian troops walking across

the battlefield of Ypres in 1917

SOURCE QUESTION

What is the significance of

source 11.36 for our

understanding of the Battle of

Passchendaele?

SOURCE QUESTION

What is the significance of

source 11.36 for our

understanding of the Battle of

Passchendaele?

Australian War Memorial

Negative No. E01220

Australian War Memorial

Negative No. E01220

bite and hold Z�a tactic requiring soldiers to use speed and surprise to occupy a small section of the enemy’s front line and then to defeat counterattacks

bite and hold Z�a tactic requiring soldiers to use speed and surprise to occupy a small section of the enemy’s front line and then to defeat counterattacks

The USA declared war on

Germany on 6 April 1917.

The USA declared war on

Germany on 6 April 1917.

infiltration Z�small-scale assault platoon attacks on poorly defended areas in the enemy front line

infiltration Z�small-scale assault platoon attacks on poorly defended areas in the enemy front line

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 241

Change over time: Allied and German soldiers’ attitudes to the war

This section focuses on the nature of changing attitudes over the period of the

war and its aftermath up to 1919. The headings used try to capture something

of key themes and experiences that shaped attitudes at particular times.

August 1914: Enthusiasm at war’s outbreakLooking back from the perspective of Australian attitudes in the early

twenty-first century, it is surprising to observe that, for the most part, young

men marched willingly towards war in 1914. Many believed themselves and

their nations to be superior to their enemies and that ‘might’ and ‘right’ were

on their sides. For some, the motivation to become involved arose from peer

pressure, a sense of adventure, the need to gain employment and/or the

desire to escape family problems.

Only a minority in any country actively opposed the war. This group

included socialists, opposed to the idea of fighting other workers, and consci-

entious objectors who opposed the war itself and/or whose religious values

questioned the justification for killing or wounding other human beings.

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. How do you think a young man might have reacted to these photographs in 1914?

2. What do you think motivated the photographers to take these photographs?

3. What purposes could the photographs have been used for at the time?

4. Evaluate the usefulness and reliability of these photographs for a historian

studying responses to the outbreak of war in 1914.

1914: the Christmas truceJust over four and a half months later, the experiences of warfare seemed

to have modified these nationalistic, pro-war attitudes and created a shared

sense of empathy among soldiers. They sought refuge from the horrors and

discomforts of the trenches and longed to experience the comforts, goodwill

and camaraderie traditionally associated with the Christmas season.

(a) (b)

Source 11.37

Photographs showing responses to the outbreak of war in Berlin and London: (a) A group of young men in Berlin express their enthusiasm at the announcement of the general mobilisation of German troops in 1914; (b) Photograph outside a London recruitment office in 1914

(a) (b)

Source 11.37

Photographs showing responses to the outbreak of war in Berlin and London: (a) A group of young men in Berlin express their enthusiasm at the announcement of the general mobilisation of German troops in 1914; (b) Photograph outside a London recruitment office in 1914

Retrospective242

In the third week in December 1914, military personnel from opposing sides

on the Western Front began negotiations for a Christmas ceasefire that would

last up to five days. At the same time, many leaders feared that meeting and

mixing with the enemy could make it hard to maintain discipline.

On Christmas Day 1914, the sound of German soldiers singing familiar

Christmas carols like ‘Silent Night’ (Stille Nacht) encouraged Allied soldiers

to respond. They met with their enemies in no man’s land to exchange gifts

of cigarettes, show photos of the families and loved ones they had left behind

and communicate through song and where possible, with words. This was

made easier by the fact that a significant number of Germans spoke good

English as a result of having worked in Britain in the pre-war period.

Source 11.38

A contemporary artist’s

depiction of the beginning of the

December 1914 Christmas truce,

from The Illustrated London News,

9 January 1915

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What information does

source 11.38 provide about

the Christmas truce?

2. What was the artist’s motive

and purpose?

3. What aspects of the source

might affect its reliability and

what conclusions would you

draw about this?

Reports of such meetings

concerned leaders on both sides.

Sir John French, Commander

of the British Expeditionary

Force, ordered his officers to

prevent such occurrences.

British commanders tried to

maintain military discipline by

ordering regular artillery and

mortar bombardments by day,

and trench raids at night, to

keep the men focused on war.

Soldiers themselves did not

always support a truce. Men on

both sides of the conflict found

it hard to share ‘good times’

with people with whom they

were still currently at war. One

German officer gave a very

bitter response to a British

attempt to initiate a truce.

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 243

Gentlemen — You asked us yesterday temporarily to suspend hostilities and to become friends during Christmas . . . we refuse to make any such agreement. Although we do not doubt that you are men of honour, every feeling of ours revolts against any friendly intercourse towards the subjects of a nation which for years has, in underhanded ways, sought the friendship of all other nations [but our own], so that with their help they might annihilate us; a nation . . . professing Christianity . . . whose greatest pleasure would be to see the political disappearance and social eclipse of Germany.

Gentlemen, you are not, it is true, the responsible leaders of English politics, and so you are not directly responsible for their baseness; but you are Englishmen, whose annihilation we consider to be our duty. We therefore request that you take such action as will prevent your mercenaries, whom you call

‘soldiers’, from approaching our trenches in the future.

Quoted in Stanley Weintraub, Silent Night: the Remarkable Christmas Truce of 1914, Pocket Books/Simon & Schuster, London, 2002, pp. 148–9.

SOURCE QUESTION

In what ways is the content of source 11.39 supported and/or contradicted by your knowledge of the events of the Christmas truce and to what extent is it representative of events at that time?

SOURCE QUESTION

In what ways is the content of source 11.39 supported and/or contradicted by your knowledge of the events of the Christmas truce and to what extent is it representative of events at that time?

motive for source

purpose — to convey anti-British feeling and reject the attempted Christmas truce

Source 11.39

An extract from the response that a German officer gave in reply to a British attempt to initiate a Christmas truce in 1914

motive for source

purpose — to convey anti-British feeling and reject the attempted Christmas truce

Source 11.39

An extract from the response that a German officer gave in reply to a British attempt to initiate a Christmas truce in 1914

Source 11.40

A poster advertising Christian Carion’s 2005 film Joyeux Noël (‘Merry Christmas’), depicting experiences related to the 1914 Christmas truce. The words at the top of the poster mean ‘December 1914. A true story that history has forgotten’.

SOURCE QUESTIONS

Watch the movie Joyeux Noël

then answer the following

questions.

1. What do you think

motivated the director/

producer to make this film?

2. What do you think were its

purpose and message?

3. Who was its likely

audience?

4. What information does

the film provide on

attitudes and experiences

on the Western Front in late

1914? Do some additional

research to judge the

extent of its accuracy.

5. Evaluate the usefulness

and reliability of Joyeux

Noël for a historian

studying soldiers’

attitudes in late 1914.

Source 11.40

A poster advertising Christian Carion’s 2005 film Joyeux Noël (‘Merry Christmas’), depicting experiences related to the 1914 Christmas truce. The words at the top of the poster mean ‘December 1914. A true story that history has forgotten’.

SOURCE QUESTIONS

Watch the movie Joyeux Noël

then answer the following

questions.

1. What do you think

motivated the director/

producer to make this film?

2. What do you think were its

purpose and message?

3. Who was its likely

audience?

4. What information does

the film provide on

attitudes and experiences

on the Western Front in late

1914? Do some additional

research to judge the

extent of its accuracy.

5. Evaluate the usefulness

and reliability of Joyeux

Noël for a historian

studying soldiers’

attitudes in late 1914.

Retrospective244

1915: still there and growing disillusionedBy 1915, experienced soldiers and newly arrived volunteers could no longer

automatically associate participation in war with ideas of ‘glory’ and national

‘greatness’. Soldiers focused on coping with the harsh realities of trench

warfare and doing what they could to find humour in difficult circumstances.

It was often easier to make fun of the hardships of war than to focus on its

grim reality and soldiers expressed these attitudes in cartoons, newspapers

and comedy skits. While most obeyed orders to go ‘over the top’, it was with

a realistic awareness of the risks and the costs.

1916: ‘Lions led by donkeys’?Attempts to achieve a breakthrough in 1916 called into question the skills of

the commanders. In the post-war decades, English speakers began to refer

to the relationship between soldiers and their commanding officers as ‘lions

led by donkeys’. Contemporary journalists had voiced similar thoughts, often

characterising officers (making war plans from the comfort of a French château)

as largely privileged, incompetent and uncaring of how many lives they lost.

Novels like Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front, and

memoirs like Robert Graves’ Goodbye to All That and George Coppard’s With

a Machine Gun to Cambrai, reinforced this view.

The battles of 1916 were a turning point in relation to soldiers’ attitudes.

From questioning leadership many turned to questioning why they were

there and who indeed was the real enemy — the generals of your own army

or soldiers themselves from opposing armies.

Source 11.41

An extract from George Coppard’s memoir With a Machine Gun to Cambrai. Coppard was a

volunteer who served on the Western Front from June 1915 onwards. He sent his memoirs

to the Archives of the Imperial War Museum. The Museum’s Director, impressed with the

work, helped organise its publication.

Hundreds of dead were strung out like wreckage washed up to a high-water

mark. They hung there in grotesque postures. From the way the dead were

equally spread out . . . it was clear there were no gaps in the wire at the time of

the attack.

Concentrated machine gun fire from sufficient guns to command every inch

of the wire had done its terrible work. The Germans must have been reinforcing

the wire for months. . . .

How did our planners imagine that Tommies, having survived all other

hazards . . . would get through the German wire? Had they studied the black

density of it through their powerful binoculars? Who told them that artillery

fire would pound such wire to pieces, making it possible to get through? Any

Tommy could have told them that shell fire lifts wire up and drops it down,

often in a worse tangle than before.

Quoted in Ben Walsh, Modern World History, Second edition, Hodder Murray, London, 2001, p. 35.

perspective

motive for source

note indications of purpose

and perspective

perspective

motive for source

note indications of purpose

and perspective

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 245

Source 11.42

Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, then a pilot in the Royal Flying Corps, describes the impact

of the Somme

In the minds of the men of my generation the year 1916 stands for only one thing:

the battles that were waged on the Somme during the summer and the autumn.

In those battles died the last shreds of that blithe spirit with which we had set

off to the war nearly two years before, and in its place came the disillusionment

that was to enter into the hearts and the minds of so many of my generation.

The war had become a bitter test of endurance. The Battles that were waged no

longer lasted just a few days; they stretched out, in some cases over periods of

weeks, and they were all fought in highly congested areas and under the most

gruesome conditions . . . It was in that year of 1916 that the world which we had

been brought up to believe in finally seemed to fly to pieces, and the bare mention

of the Somme will never fail to give us cause to ponder for a moment and to recall,

each in his own way, what it meant to us.

From Sholto Douglas, Combat and Command, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1963, p. 102.

1917: Mud and mutinyThe failure and high costs of the 1917 Nivelle Offensive had a devastating

and lasting impact on the morale of the French army. French morale was at

an all-time low. Troops mutinied, refusing to continue suicidal frontal attacks.

The military failure and loss of life of the Nivelle Offensive also increased

the hostility towards the autocratic and inflexible discipline exerted within

the French military. Nearly 500 French soldiers received the death penalty

after being tried for offences related to their failure to obey military orders.

Approximately 10 per cent of these sentences were carried out.

The French military eventually responded to this crisis by sacking Nivelle.

It also improved food supplies and provided longer leave entitlements.

However, the French military could no longer rely on its infantry to perform

in battle and had to abandon thoughts of further offensives for some time.

Casualties had become so vast by mid April in 1917 that mutinous poilu [name

given to French soldiers in World War I] in division strength, refused to return to

the trenches on one French front at Aisne. What officialdom later down-played as

‘collective indiscipline’ would be suppressed and lead to 3,427 court martials and

554 death sentences unreported in censored French newspapers. (Only forty-nine

soldiers — fifty-three by other accounts — were actually shot.) Germans too, in

regimental numbers, refused to return to the front.

Stanley Weintraub, Silent Night: the Remarkable Christmas Truce of 1914, Pocket Books/Simon & Schuster, London, 2002, p. 198.

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. Who is the author of source 11.43?

2. What problem is he describing and what two pieces of evidence does he provide

in support of this view?

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. Who are the authors of

sources 11.41 and 11.42

and from what perspective

is each of them writing?

2. What evidence do these

sources provide of soldiers’

attitudes in 1916 and what

experiences have led to

these attitudes?

3. What do the two sources

have in common?

4. Explain which of the

two authors you think

appears more bitter

about his situation.

perspective

content/message

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. Who are the authors of

sources 11.41 and 11.42

and from what perspective

is each of them writing?

2. What evidence do these

sources provide of soldiers’

attitudes in 1916 and what

experiences have led to

these attitudes?

3. What do the two sources

have in common?

4. Explain which of the

two authors you think

appears more bitter

about his situation.

perspective

content/message

Source 11.43

An extract describing the impact of the Nivelle Offensive on the French army, from Stanley Weintraub, Silent Night. Weintraub is Professor Emeritus of Arts and Humanities at Pennsylvania State University and the author of a number of biographies on leading literary figures, as well as cultural and military histories.

Source 11.43

An extract describing the impact of the Nivelle Offensive on the French army, from Stanley Weintraub, Silent Night. Weintraub is Professor Emeritus of Arts and Humanities at Pennsylvania State University and the author of a number of biographies on leading literary figures, as well as cultural and military histories.

Retrospective246

At the beginning of the war, military law allowed the death sentence for

offences including sleeping or being drunk on guard duty; self-inflicted

wounds; disobeying orders; assaulting an officer; desertion; mutiny and com-

munication with the enemy. The British army imposed the death penalty on

304 soldiers between 1914 and 1918, mostly for offences committed on the

Western Front. Fifty-three per cent of those who received the death penalty

had been found guilty of desertion in the years 1916 and 1917.

Soldiers themselves were often sympathetic towards the plight of those

condemned to death both because of their youth and because they were often

victims of shell shock. Soldiers who participated in firing squads recorded

their own reluctance to carry out such duties and the fact that it was often

left to an officer to ‘finish off’ the execution because the shots fired had either

missed the prisoner or failed to kill him.

I believe that an important modification of the death sentence also took

place in 1917. It appeared that the military authorities were compelled to take

heed of the clamour against the death sentences imposed by courts martial.

There had been too many of them. As a result, a man who would otherwise

have been executed was instead . . . purposely placed in the first wave to cross

No Man’s Land and it was left to the Almighty to decide his fate. This was the

situation as we Tommies understood it, but nothing official reached our ears . . .

Shylock, in demanding his pound of flesh, had got nothing on the military

bigwigs in 1917.

Quoted at www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk.

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What information does Coppard provide in source 11.44?

2. What does it suggest about the attitudes of both soldiers and their leaders in 1917?

3. What does it indicate about Coppard’s own attitude and what evidence does the

source provide to support this?

1918: Victory and defeatWar weariness affected soldiers of all armies in 1918. It resulted from:

the long period of time that nations had been engaged in war

the apparent futility of many of the tactics used

increased difficulties in maintaining supplies to the battlefront as the

home fronts of various nations were at or near collapse.

French commanders could no longer rely on troops to go ‘over the top’

on order. Increasingly, soldiers engaged in mutinous behaviour or chose to

desert. Officials responded desperately by meting out harsher punishments

and threatening violence towards those who refused to obey orders.

By 1918, the German home front was no longer either able or willing to

support the war effort. Soldier morale was hard to maintain in an atmosphere

where many had come to question what they were fighting for and why their

leaders had not yet made peace. Soldiers home on leave joined anti-war pro-

tests in cities all over the nation. By late 1918, it was clear that Germany was

facing defeat and that the nation was on the brink of a revolution.

Z

Z

Z

motive for source

message

note attitude and

subjective language

Source 11.44

An extract from George Coppard’s

With a Machine Gun to Cambrai,

published in 1969. In October

1916, Coppard was wrongly

accused of having a self-inflicted

wound. He was later exonerated.

motive for source

message

note attitude and

subjective language

Source 11.44

An extract from George Coppard’s

With a Machine Gun to Cambrai,

published in 1969. In October

1916, Coppard was wrongly

accused of having a self-inflicted

wound. He was later exonerated.

Chapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 247

Source 11.45

An extract from German soldier Erich Maria Remarque’s novel All Quiet on the Western Front,

which was based on his experiences on the Western Front from mid 1917 until early 1918

Everyone is talking about peace or an armistice. Everyone is waiting. If there is

another disappointment, they will collapse, the hopes are too strong, they can

no longer be pushed aside without exploding. If there is no peace, then there will

be a revolution . . .

If we had come back in 1916, we could have unleashed a storm out of the pain

and intensity of our experiences. If we go back now we shall be weary, broken-

down, burnt-out, rootless and devoid of hope. We shall no longer be able to cope.

No one will understand us — because in front of us there is a generation of

men who did, it is true, share the years out here with us, but who already had

a bed and a job and who are going back to their old positions, where they will

forget all about the war — and behind us, a new generation is growing up, one

like we used to be, and that generation will be strangers to us and will push

us aside. We are superfluous even to ourselves, we shall grow older, a few will

adapt, others will make adjustments, and many of us will not know what to do

— the years will trickle away, and eventually we shall perish . . .

I am very calm. Let the months come, and the years, they’ll take nothing more

from me, they can take nothing more from me. I am so alone and so devoid of

any hope that I can confront them without fear. Life, which carried me through

these years, is still there in my hands and in my eyes. Whether or not I have

mastered it, I do not know. But as long as life is there it will make its own way,

whether my conscious self likes it or not.

Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front (translated from the German by Brian Murdoch), Vintage, London, 1996, pp. 206–7

(first published Berlin, 1929).

‘A land fit for heroes?’In the aftermath of the war, soldiers felt angry at the slowness of attempts to

repatriate them. Once home, they often found it difficult to adjust to everyday

life and many felt their efforts were not sufficiently recognised or rewarded.

Shared wartime experiences, which had created a sense of camaraderie among

one another, had isolated some from the societies and loved ones from which

they had come.

Governments failed to live up to soldiers’ expectations that they create

what the British termed a ‘land fit for heroes’. Defeated nations, soon to be

burdened by the economic demands of peace treaties and reconstruction,

struggled to address the peacetime needs of those whose sacrifices resulted

in defeat. Many felt betrayed. In Germany, this became a factor that assisted

the growth of right-wing parties like the Nazi Party under the leadership of

Adolph Hitler.

The victors struggled to address working-class ex-soldiers’ expectations

that their governments provide them with improved quality of life and

opportunities. The Bolshevik Revolution inspired many working-class

ex-soldiers to become more politically active in the post-war years. Most had

no desire to be called to military service again.

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What is Remarque’s message in source 11.45 and what do you think was his motivation and purpose?

2. Create your own file of sources that provide evidence of Allied and German attitudes in each of the years 1914 to 1919. Try to find sources from a wide range of the Allies who fought on the Western Front. Analyse your sources and try to identify:

(a) differences in attitudes according to rank, nationality, class and religious affiliation

(b) similarities in attitudes across nationalities

(c) attitudes expressed in response to a particular battle

(d) what the sources emphasise, ignore and do/do not provide evidence of

(d) change over time and indicators of turning points in relation to attitudes.

Use this as the basis for writing up your conclusions under the heading ‘Allied and German soldiers’ attitudes to war’.

perspective

nature of source

note significance of this comment in relation to changed attitudes over time

motive for source

date

SOURCE QUESTIONS

1. What is Remarque’s message in source 11.45 and what do you think was his motivation and purpose?

2. Create your own file of sources that provide evidence of Allied and German attitudes in each of the years 1914 to 1919. Try to find sources from a wide range of the Allies who fought on the Western Front. Analyse your sources and try to identify:

(a) differences in attitudes according to rank, nationality, class and religious affiliation

(b) similarities in attitudes across nationalities

(c) attitudes expressed in response to a particular battle

(d) what the sources emphasise, ignore and do/do not provide evidence of

(d) change over time and indicators of turning points in relation to attitudes.

Use this as the basis for writing up your conclusions under the heading ‘Allied and German soldiers’ attitudes to war’.

perspective

nature of source

note significance of this comment in relation to changed attitudes over time

motive for source

date

Bolshevik Revolution Z� Russian revolution of 1917, which brought to power a government proclaiming to recreate society for the benefit of its workers

Bolshevik Revolution Z� Russian revolution of 1917, which brought to power a government proclaiming to recreate society for the benefit of its workers

Retrospective248 Retrospective248

HSC exam practice

Source-based questions: War on the Western Front 25 marks

Attempt Questions 1–3.

Allow about 45 minutes for this section.

Question 1 (5 marks) Marks

(a) What, according to Source A, did trench defences provide? 2

(b) List two features of war on the Western Front that you can identify in Source B. 2

(c) From the information provided in Source B, name one benefi t that the tank

could potentially provide. 1

Question 2 (10 marks)

Explain why attempts to break the stalemate failed in the period 1914–1918.

Use Sources A and B and your own knowledge to answer this question. 10

Question 3 (10 marks)

Assess how useful Sources C and D would be for an historian studying the changing

attitudes of Allied and German soldiers over the period 1914–1918.

In your answer, consider the perspectives provided by the TWO sources and the

reliability of each one. 10

Source A

An extract from The First World War (1999, p. 57) by military historians Robin Prior and Trevor Marshall

As late as 25 December [1914] . . . Joffre sent his forces forward against strongly entrenched

opponents in conditions of blinding snow, low cloud, fog and mud. Their endeavours availed

nothing. Like First Ypres, they simply reinforced the grim message that had proclaimed itself

in the west since the Aisne in September: that trench defences serviced by ample manpower

and suffi cient weaponry possess a terrible capacity to repel attack.

Source B

Photograph from

1917 showing a

British Mark III tank

crossing a trench on

the Western Front

249Chapter 3 Z Yankees and Confederates in the American states in the mid nineteenth centuryChapter 11 Z War on the Western Front 249

Source C

An extract from Siegfried Sassoon’s ‘Finished with the War: A Soldier’s Declaration’. He wrote

this to his commanding offi cer in July 1917, not long after his friend, David Cuthbert Thomas,

died on the Western Front. It was subsequently published in the British press and read

in Parliament.

I am making this statement as an act of wilful defi ance of military authority, because

I believe that the war is being deliberately prolonged by those who have the power to end

it. I am a soldier, convinced that I am acting on behalf of soldiers. I believe that this war,

on which I entered as a war of defence and liberation, has now become a war of aggression

and conquest . . .

I have seen and endured the sufferings of the troops, and I can no longer be a party to

prolong these sufferings for ends which I believe to be evil and unjust.

I am not protesting against the conduct of the war, but against the political errors and

insincerities for which the fi ghting men are being sacrifi ced . . .

On behalf of those who are suffering now I make this protest against the deception

which is being practiced on them; also I believe that I may help to destroy the callous

complacency with which the majority of those at home regard the continuance of agonies

which they do not share, and which they have not suffi cient imagination to realise.

S. Sassoon, July 1917

Source D

An extract from Stanley Weintraub, Silent Night (2002, pp. 197–8), in relation to the Christmas truce

of 1914

Although the unchanged reality of war is that the shots ordered by increasingly remote

presences are absorbed by ordinary humans, Christmas 1914 reopened imaginations to the

unsettling truth that at each end of a rifl e, men were indeed the same.

Only a few failed attempts at truce occurred in 1916 and 1917. But as New Year’s Day

came in 1918 the commanding offi cer of the 1st Hampshires noted in his diary, ‘Enemy

attempted to fraternize on our left, but were shot at by us, otherwise a quiet day’.