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Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in European countries Catia Nicodemo University of Tor Vergata, Rome * January 2007 Preliminary and Incomplete Please do not quote Abstract This paper estimates the participation and the wage equations for married women, using panel data from the European Commu- nity Household Panel (EHCP) corresponding to the wave 1994-2001, for thirteen European countries and explores the difference across- countries in a labor supply contest. The paper first shows the labor force participation equation that de- pends on the personal and family characteristics, the income in house- hold and, in some countries, on the labor status of the husband. There is a considerable variation in the degree of labor market participation rate of women across countries. Finally, I estimate the wage equation for females in a framework of unbalanced panel data models with sample selection. A test for selection bias and a correction procedure are used. The coefficients that affect the wage are very different across-countries. JEL. classification: J2, J3, C2, C3 Keywords: Female participation, labor supply, family benefits, un- balanced panel data * I’m grateful to Sergi Jimenez-Martin and Robert Waldman for their encouragement and suggestions. Thanks also to Franco Peracchi, Nick Longford, Olaf J¨ ourgens for useful comments. 1

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Page 1: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Participation and Wage equations for

Married Women in European countries

Catia NicodemoUniversity of Tor Vergata, Rome∗

January 2007Preliminary and Incomplete Please do not quote

Abstract

This paper estimates the participation and the wage equationsfor married women, using panel data from the European Commu-nity Household Panel (EHCP) corresponding to the wave 1994-2001,for thirteen European countries and explores the difference across-countries in a labor supply contest.

The paper first shows the labor force participation equation that de-pends on the personal and family characteristics, the income in house-hold and, in some countries, on the labor status of the husband. Thereis a considerable variation in the degree of labor market participationrate of women across countries.

Finally, I estimate the wage equation for females in a frameworkof unbalanced panel data models with sample selection. A test forselection bias and a correction procedure are used. The coefficientsthat affect the wage are very different across-countries.

JEL. classification: J2, J3, C2, C3

Keywords: Female participation, labor supply, family benefits, un-balanced panel data

∗I’m grateful to Sergi Jimenez-Martin and Robert Waldman for their encouragementand suggestions. Thanks also to Franco Peracchi, Nick Longford, Olaf Jourgens for usefulcomments.

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Introduction

Married women’s increased participation in the paid labor force was one ofthe most important social changes in Europe in the twentieth century. Themost rapid rise in married women’s participation came after 1950 in everycountry, although the intensity of female labor participation varies acrossEuropean countries.

The Presidency Conclusions of the European Union Council in Lisbon(March 2000) set target for female employment rate was 57 per cent of thepopulation of working age for the year 2005 and 60 per cent for the year2010. The targets for total employment are 67 and 70 per cent respectively.Not every country is required to achieve these targets but the evaluationof their progress is usually done by comparing each country’s performancewith the average.

The literature proposes several explanations for higher female labor forceparticipation, which include an increase in wage rates and educational at-tainment for women, reduction fertility and the increase of divorce rates, butthis trend isn’t uniform for all countries. The employment rates for femaleinactivity are much more different across countries than the unemploymentrates (see figures 1 and 2).

Both employment and participation are influenced by supply and de-mand factors. Employment may be low because many women don’t want toenter the labor market, or participation may be low because too few jobs arebeing offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, lowparticipation rates are explained by women’s preferences and in the secondby employers’ preferences and discouragement on the part of the women. Itis very difficult to disentangle these two effects, and it is made more difficultby the effect of wages on the participation and the employment rates.

In the frictionless neoclassical economic model, the participation ratedrives the employment rate: employment rates differ across countries be-cause of women’s preferences, given technology and wage levels. The coun-tries in our sample have similar technological structures and standards ofliving, so the differences in the employment and participation rates are morelikely due to their institutional structures than to women’s preferences.

Table 1 describes the evolution of the employment rate of women from1960 to 2001 and the distance needed to achieve the Lisbon target. Weobserve that the female employment rate has grown more in the last fortyyears.

Northern countries tend to have a higher employment rate than Mediter-ranean countries, although this rule is not true for Belgium, Ireland andPortugal.

This may reflect the substantial difference among the countries’ institu-tions, such as a rigid labor market, a limited option for part-time work andpoor benefits for the family. As a consequence, women participate less in

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the labor market and have fewer children.The paper analyzes the intertemporal labor force participation behav-

ior of married women, using eight longitudinal waves carried out by theEuropean Community Household Panel (ECHP).

The Panel analyzed only 13 E.U. countries1 for which the required in-formation is available. Sweden and Luxembourg are excluded because theirdata are incomplete and the samples very small.

The sample is reduced to married women born between 1941 – 1965in the survey 1994 – 2001. The sample comprises data on households andindividuals.

This work compares the cross-country labor supply for married womenin different countries. Firstly investigates the relationship between the par-ticipation decision and some variables such as: women’s non-labor income,their education level, the presence of children, experience, the role of thefamily financial conditions and family benefits, the labor market status ofthe husband, and explores how these factors explain the differences in thelevel of participation of married women.

Afterwards I calculate the wage equation in a structure of panel datamodels with sample selection. I consider different econometric methods toestimate this equation. First I consider there isn’t sample selection so Iuse an OLS estimate. Secondly I try to estimate the wage equation with aHeckman Model, in a framework of panel data sample selection, and finallyI consider a model of 2SLS where the equation of interest contains endoge-nous explanatory variables as well as unobserved heterogeneity. Due to theincreased availability of longitudinal data and recent theoretical advances,panel data have become usually used in applied work in economics.

The wage equations of females have the following potential sources ofbias: first, unobserved heterogeneity for unobserved worker characteristics(ability). Second, sample selection bias, that occurs if unobservable charac-teristics, which affect the work decision, are correlated with characteristicsthat affect the process determining the work. Third, experience is likelyto be non-strictly exogenous, even after controlling for heterogeneity andsample selection.

The paper is organized as follows. In section one I discuss the data setused in the analysis and I describe the intertemporal participation behav-ior and demographic characteristics. Section two describes the econometricmethod used to estimate the participation equation of married females. Thisequation includes the personal and family characteristics of married womenand the effect of husband’s labor market status on the women’s labor supply.In Section three I estimate the participation equation and the wage equa-tion for married women, testing for selection bias and using a correction

1Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Hol-lands, Portugal, Spain, The U.K.

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procedure for this bias, as proposed by Wooldridge-Semikina (2006).There is a significant literature on married women’s labor force par-

ticipation (see Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), Blundell and MaCardy(1999)) but few works have compared the thirteen European countries, in aframework of panel data for eight years. To estimate the participation equa-tion I follow the work of Jimenez and Borrego (1997), where they comparecountries’ data set carried out from the CHER (Consortium of HouseholdEuropean Data) and where they estimate the participation and wage equa-tion for only three years with a two-step model of Heckman.

There is a lot of literature that estimates the wage equation and prob-lems related to heterogeneity and relativity under the assumption of strictlyexogenous explanatory variables. Verbeek and Nijman (1992) proposed twotests for selection in panel data.

Wooldridge (1995) proposed a test to correct the selection bias thatoccurs when unobserved effects are correlated with explanatory variables.Kyriazidou (1997) proposed a semiparametric approach for correcting theselection bias. Both the selection term and the unobserved effect are removedby difference between two periods. Rochina and Dustmann (2000) take intoaccount that the non strict exogeneity of regressors can be violated.

The extension literature for endogenous explanatory variables in the pri-mary equation is minimum and relatively recent.

Vella and Verbeek (1999) estimate a panel data model with censored en-dogenous regressors and selection, but don’t allow a correlation between theunobserved effect and exogenous variables in the interest equation. Kyriazi-dou (2001) makes an estimation of dynamic panel data models with selectionand lags of the dependent variable appear in the interest equation and in theselection equation. Garcia, Jimenez and Labega (2006) present an empiricalexample on Spanish data to estimate a wage equation and strike decisionwith a switching model. Finally we have Wooldridge and Semikina (2005)where they estimate a panel data sample selection and propose a test forselection bias and a procedure for correcting this.

1 Sample characteristics

Data

The data analyzed in this work come from a survey by the European Com-munity Household Panel (ECHP), a multi-country annual longitudinal sur-vey collected data since 19942 in 15 European Union Member States underEurostat (Statistical Office of the European Communities) coordination.The data set covers about 130,000 individuals from 60,000 households in

2Belgium, Germany, Hollands, The U.K., Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal,Italy and Spain started in 1994 (wave 1), Austria jointed in 1995 (wave 2), Finland joinedin 1996 (wave 3).

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the fifteen countries which were EU members in 2000, reflecting populationchanges over time through a continuous evolution of the sample. The paneldata cover a wide range of subjects such as demographics, labor force be-havior, income, health, education and training, housing, poverty and socialexclusion, etc. The survey is structured in the form of annual interviews witha particular representative sample of household members in each country.Interviews are conducted following a standardized questionnaire, althougheach country can modify the questionnaire’s wording to some extent, to re-flect their own institutional arrangements.The sample is constructed as an unbalanced panel of all women betweenthe ages of 31 and 53 years, who are married with or without children, andthus are old enough to have finished their formal education and too youngto retire. The size of this sample varies across the countries.

The variables refer to the personal characteristic of individual (age , workexperience, education, etc) and household family ( family income, familybenefits, number of people in the house etc.). Income, family and disabilitybenefits are deflated local currency units.

Information on their husbands has also been extracted (including laborstatus, education and unemployment benefit if received). The definition ofeach variable used in estimates is reported in Table 15.

In Table 2 I present the estimate labor force participation rate of marriedwomen in 1994− 2000 calculated dividing employed (at work or searching awork) by the total population in working age. There is a large heterogene-ity from Mediterranean European countries and Scandinavian countries likeFinland and Denmark. The range varies from 50% for the first group to90% for the second group, this may be caused by substantial differences inthe organization of the welfare state. In the last two years the rate has beenreduced for most of the countries, while Europe was in a recession businesscycle. Ireland seems to be an exception because its employment rate is moresimilar to the Mediterranean countries, which can be interpreted as the re-sult of cultural differences. Another exception is Portugal where the femaleparticipation rate is very high.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 3 present descriptive statistics on a selection of variables of interest,by country, for full sample married women, while in table 4 I compiled thesummary statistics for a subsample (women in the labor market excludingself-employed) in the year 2001.

The data demonstrate large differences in female and male educationlevels among countries, mainly at second and tertiary level of school (from13% of graduates in Portugal to 45% in Finland for females). The numberof males with tertiary level of school is higher than the number of women

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with the same level of school, while the number of male with first level ofschool is greater in Mediterranean countries.

Concerning the subsample of employed married women, some of the aver-ages are quite different (although these differences are not statistically signif-icant) than the whole sample. Particularly, we observe a higher percentageof active women with a university degree and a few dependent children. Thefamily benefits that include Child Benefit and Lone Parent Allowance (fam-ilybenef ) are very small for Greece, Spain and Italy, both in the subsampleand in the full sample, while the unemployed benefits for their husbands aresmall for Italy, Greece and U. K. but very high for Spain.

The same trend is followed by the total disability benefits in the house-hold, except for U.K.

All variables of income are measured in local currency units deflated bythe average exchange rate in the sample year, and I take their logarithm.3.

From Table 5 to table 11 I compare the sample characteristics of womenfor which I consider the work activity status during the sample period(1994 − 2001) for each country. Given the large number of possible par-ticipation sequences during the panel, I choose only four of them.

In each table we have the descriptive characteristics of women for fullsample, for women who worked in each year (column 1), for women whonever worked (column 2), for women who had only a single transition fromnonemployment to employment (11111110, 01111111,.....) (column 3), forwomen who had only a single transition from employment to nonemployment(00000001, 10000000,....) (column 4) and in the last column for women whohave more than one transition in participation to labor market.In all countries women who always worked, and so with more experience,tend to be better educated and older, except for Finland where the maximumgrade of education is higher for all other sequences, and for France where it isgreater for females who never worked. In general we observe that women whohave worked for eight years have more children under age twelve and fewerdependent children, and that their household income is lower than women’swho never worked, with the exception of the Mediterranean countries (Italy,Portugal, Greece and Spain).

Family benefits are higher for women who don’t have experience in thelabor market (Denmark and Greece are the exception), while the disabilitybenefits paid to the family are greater for women who work except in Italy,Portugal and the U.K.

Regarding the level of education of their husbands, we note it’s higher inthe sample of women that worked every year, except for France and Irelandwhere we have the inverse, while for Italy husband’s education is in generallower than wives education.

3For France and Austria the wage and the unemployed benefit are in gross amount, Iuse the net/gross ratio

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Below each table, I’ve calculated the distribution of years of women spentin employment by country, and the average rate of participation (partic).This analysis illustrates a significant persistence in employment decisions ofmarried women (full sample) observed annually. For example: if we takethe individual employment of Germany in an independent context from abinomial distribution with fixed probability of 69,59% (the average partic-ipation during the period) we conclude that the 70% of the women in thesample would be expected to work each year and 30% would not. Comparedthis with the distribution of the work years, we find that the sample relativefrequencies of women are 28% and 6% respectively. There is a considerabledifference in the work propensity of women if we compare the frequencydistribution of work years and the participation sequence. This heterogene-ity is observable in the different levels of education, age, nonlabor income,number of children, and in the policy that each government implements forfemale labor supply.

2 The Model

The participation equation is a discrete choice model, where the probabilityto participate pi is different for each individual and depends on the individualand household characteristics.

π = Φ(Xit)

where the Φ(Xit) is the cumulative distribution of the standard normal.The participation equation can be written as:

q∗it = ai + βXit + vit (1)

qit = 1[q∗it ≥ 0] (2)

We need to calculate the marginal partial effect for a unit of change ina particulary explanatory variable Xit, because the coefficients estimates inequation 11 are not directly provided by this information.

The marginal effects are computed in the following expression:

∂i = dΦ(Xit)/d(Xit) = φ(Xit)β (3)

Where φ(·) is the density of standard normal distribution.To analyze the wage equation we need a model for selection bias. The

Heckman bivariate normal selection model represents the classic way fordealing with selection on unobservable variables. The selection on unob-servable occurs when the error term in the outcome equation is correlated

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with the treatment, or with the selection into the sample being used forestimation.

Starting with the Heckman model, I apply it to panel data because thesample selectivity is an acute problem in panel data and in cross sectionwhen we want to study the labor supply.

The bivariate normal selection model was developed in a context for esti-mating a population wage equation when only wage information on workersis observed (Gronau 1974 and Heckman 1976).

The difference between workers and non-workers determines the sampleselection bias because some components of the work decision are relevant tothe wage determining the process and the unobservable characteristics thataffect the work decision and the wage.

The usual setup is as follows. We have a wage equation

W = β′Xi + εi (4)

where W is the hourly wage and is observed only for workers, X areobserved variables related to productivity and εi is the error term that in-cludes all unobserved determinants of wages; it does not matter whether Xis observed for just workers or for everyone, as this information will only beused for workers. A reduced form employment equation is given by

$∗i = Ziγ + µi (5)

where $∗ is a latent index that can be thought of as representing thedifference between the observed wage and the reservation wage, that is thelowest wage at which the individual is willing to accept employment. $i isonly observable and equal to one if $∗

i > 0, where $i is an indicator variablefor employment.

The Heckman model requires the following assumptions:

(a) (ε, µ) ∼ N(0, 0, σ2ε , σ

2µ, ρεµ);

(b) (ε, µ) is independent of X and Z;

(c) varµ = σ2µ = 1

The first assumption represents a very strong functional form assump-tion -namely joint normality of the distribution of the error terms in theparticipation and outcome equations. The second equation assumes thatboth error terms are independent of both sets of observable variables. Thefinal assumption is the standard normalization for the probit selection equa-tion, which is identified only up to scale. Now if we take the expectationsof the wage equation conditional on working we have

E(Wi|$i, Xi) = E(Wi|Zi, Xi, µi) = βXi + E(εi|Zi, Xi, µi) (6)

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The first equality just recognizes the fact that the variables determiningemployment in this model are Z and µ. The second equality comes from thefact that the expected value of X given X is just X. The final term can besimplified by noting that selection into employment does not depend on X,only on Z and µ, so we have:

E(Wi|$i, Xi) = βXi + E(εi|$i = 1) = βXi + E(εi|µi > −Ziγ) (7)

Thus, if we estimate the model using only data on workers, we do not getthe population wage equation, but rather something else. As a result of thisterm, OLS estimation on a sample of workers generally provides inconsistentestimates of the parameters of the population wage (or outcome) equation.

The first method to solve the problem of sample selection was proposedby Heckman in 1974 by a maximum likelihood estimator. With the as-sumption that εi and µi are i.i.d., N(0,

∑), where

∑is a variance matrix

covariance for the errors, and (εi, µi) are independent of Zi we write themaximum likelihood as:

L =1N

N∑i

{Ei ∗ ln[∫ ∞

−Ziγφεµ(W −Xiβ, µ)dµ]

+(1−$i) ∗ [ln∫ ∞

−Ziγ

∫ ∞

−∞φεµ(ε, µ)dµ]

where φεµ represents the probability density function for a bivariatenormal distribution. The previous expression is more similar to the Tobitestimator of type II. If φεµ = 0 then the equation 4 is reduced to product oftwo marginal likelihoods.

The second method for estimating the bivariate normal selection modelis that due to Heckman in 1979, it is sometimes called the ”Heckman two-step”.

The first step of the two-step approach estimates a probit model of par-ticipation. The estimate of γ from this probit model is then used to constructconsistent estimates of the inverse Mills ratio term:

λi(Ziγ) =φ(Ziγ)Φ(Ziγ)

; (8)

where φ(·) and Φ(·), denote the probability density and cumulative dis-tribution functions of the standard normal distribution. In the second stage,the outcome equation is estimated by OLS, where the equation wage includesboth the original X and the constructed value of inverse Mills ratio.

W = β′Xi + εi + νλi (9)

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The inverse Mills ratio is sometimes called a ”control function”, a func-tion that controls for selection bias (Heckman and Robb, 1985). With theinverse Mills ratio included, and under the assumptions noted above, thecoefficients on the X represent consistent estimates of the parameters of thepopulation wage equation. The coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio termestimates ρσε. Since σε > 0 by definition, the sign of this coefficient isthe same as the sign of ρ. The sign of ρ is often substantively useful in-formation, as it indicates the correlation between the unobservable in theselection and outcome equations. The standard t-test of the null hypothesisthat βλ = 0 is a test of the null that there is no selection bias, conditionalon the assumptions of the model.

The bivariate normal selection model is formally identified even if X =Z.

The identification comes from the non-linearity of the inverse Mills ratio.A model that simply included the predicted probability of participationfrom a linear probability model into the outcome equation would not beidentified. However, the X = Z case often results in substantial collinearitybetween the predicted inverse Mills ratio term and the remaining covariatesin the outcome equation. This will be especially strong when there is notmuch variation in the predicted participation probabilities, because thenthe non-linearities will not play a major role. This collinearity will, asalways, lead to large standard errors. More generally, a large Monte Carloliterature illustrates the poor performance of the bivariate normal modelwith no exclusion restriction in finite samples. The exclusion restrictionhere is a variable that belongs in the participation equation but not in theoutcome equation. In other words, it is an instrument.

Panel data sample selection

Sample selection is more frequently used in studies for cross-section and lesscommon to estimate with panel data. Maddala (1993) defines panel data asdata sets on the same individual for different period of time.

The observation in panel data has two dimensions: a cross-section di-mension indicate by i and a time series time dimension indicate by t.Panel data have some benefits as: to control for individual heterogeneity, lesscollinearity among variables, more variability, large numbers of available in-struments, study for dynamics of adjustment etc. Limitations of panel dataare a problem for nonresponse, attrition, measurement of errors, design anddata collection problem etc. More panels are incomplete, especially whenthe panel concerns the household, because some of them move outside thepanel for different cause. In this case the panel is called unbalanced. Moreforms of selection bias and heterogeneity present in the panel data are elim-inated by the fixed effects estimator under the assumption of strictly exoge-nous explanatory variables(see Verbeek and Nijman 1992). Recent papers

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have introduced some endogenous regressor as explanatory variables withselection bias and source of heterogeneity in equation of interest.

Consider the following model:

wit = xitβ + γi + µit (10)

$∗it = Zitγ + αi + εit (11)

$it = 1 if $∗it > 0 (12)

where i, (i=1,......,N) denotes the individual and t,(1,....,T) denotes thepanel. The dependent variable in the primary equation is only observedif $∗

it > 0, so selection bias is introduced. The errors are decomposed inindividual effects (αi, γi), and idiosyncratic errors (εit, µit), while xit is a 1xKvector that contains both exogenous and endogenous explanatory variablesand β is a Kx1 vector of unknown parameters. We allowed a correlationbetween the unobserved effects and the regressor, and some of the elementsof xit are correlated with the idiosyncratic errors εit.

Given the distributional assumptions, it’s possible to estimate the un-balanced panel data about a Heckman model for panel data and a two-stageleast squares regression model (2SLS) if we have an endogenous regressor.These are methods of extended regression to cover models which violateordinary least squares (OLS) regression’s assumption of recursivity, specif-ically models where the researcher must assume that the disturbance termof the dependent variable is correlated with the cause of the independentvariable.

If there exists a correlation between the regressor and the idiosyncraticerrors we assume a set of instruments denoted as zit that are strictly ex-ogenous on γi and not correlated with µit. We use these instruments inthe first stage of 2SLS to create the new variables (called instrumental vari-ables) which replace the problematic causal variables. The instruments arethe exogenous variables with direct or indirect causal paths to the problem-atic causal variable but which have no direct causal path to the endogenousvariable whose disturbance term is correlated with that of the problematiccausal variable. I use this estimation when I accept that the potential ex-perience is endogenous.

To test the sample selection we start with the model of Mundlak (1978),where if there is a correlation in selection equation between the individualαi and Zi, we need a set of individual exogenous instrument ξzi, so αi canbe written as:

αi = η + ξizi + fi (13)

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where zi is a vector of individual exogenous variables averaged acrossperiod time t. The selection indicator $i is rewritten as:

$it = 1[Zitγ + ξizi + υit > 0] (14)

where υit = fii + εit has zero means normal distribution.If E(υit|µit) is linear, then we have:

E(µit|zi, γi, $i) = ρE(υit|zi, $it) (15)

and the wage equation becomes:

wit = xitβ + γi + ρE(υit|zi, $it) + eit (16)

where eit is an idiosyncratic error term uncorrelated with the regres-sor, the unobserved effect and the selection indicator. If $it is equal toone, using a probit estimation at each period t we obtain the estimationof E(υit|zi, $it = 1) that is equal to: λ(η + ξizi + Zitγ), where λ(·) is theinverse Mills ratio. We put the estimation of λit, in the wage equation andestimate this with a simple regression model or with 2SLS model if wehave endogenous regressor. We use t-statistic for testing the null hypothesisH0 : ρ = 0.

To add more flexibility to the model is possible calculate the interactionterms the λ which time dummies and test the selection with a Wald test.This procedure for correcting the bias and inverse Mills ratio is a consistentestimator of the parameters.

If the null hypothesis is true , so there isn’t selection, then OLS an consis-tent estimator for the primary equation if don’t have endogenous variables.

I applied this procedure for estimate the wage equation for marriedwomen in ECHP.

3 Empirical estimates

Female participation equation

Given the panel structure of data set, I start analyzing the determinants ofthe equation participation of married women. I estimate this equation witha probit random effects model for panel data, because if we try to estimateprobit with fixed effects we have serious problems due to large number of in-cidental parameters that make the estimator inconsistent, but a large T cansolve this problem (see Arellano-Hanhn, 2006). The participation equationwas write before as:

q∗it = ai + βXit + τi + vit (17)

where qit(women1), is a dummy variable which takes 1 if the woman par-ticipates in labor market (working or seeking work) and 0 if she doesn’t.

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I excluded self-employed married women. The equation participation, q∗it,is positive only if the dummy variable equals one. The decision to partici-pate depends on a vector of explanatory variables Xit. This vector includesthe personal and family characteristics of the woman: age, education, chil-dren, family benefit and income house without her wage income, and thecharacteristic of her husband (status of work, education and if he receivesunemployed benefits); β is a vector of unknown parameters and τi and vit

are respectively time invariant effect specific to individual and individualtime-varying error.

Tables 12 and 13 display the estimations of probit participation equationand the marginal effects for probit analysis for each country.

The explanatory variables are divided into four blocks. The first set ofvariables contains personal characteristics such as age (age), the square ofage (agetwo), the woman education and the husband’s education.

The sign of age is positive and significant in all countries, while agetwoin each country is negative and significant, which means that the relationbetween age and female labor force participation decreases with the age, someans an inverted-U shape.

Probably the participation increases until women assume more familyresponsibilities.

Concerning education, I find a propensity to participate that increaseswith the education level. On the average the propensity to participate isabout 30% from secondary degree and university degree and the effect isvery large for several countries.

Education for females at the second and thirdly levels are significant foralmost all countries, while the education of husbands is significative in fewcountries.

The second block of variables describe the fertility of women. I constructthe variables for children children age 0-3, children age 3-6 and children age6-12, which are dummy variables that take 1 if women have children withage under three, six and twelve years. The results show that the coefficientsare significative and its sign in most countries is negative so women who havedependent children reduce their participation to work. Finally the effect ofolder children is not significative for most countries and generally positive.

The public policy on childcare could be very important to explain theparticipation of women across the countries.

The third set of variables represent the husband’s labor status (workstatus) and their unemployment benefit (longhunmp). In several countriesthe labor status of husbands is significant, not for Mediterranean countries,where having an unemployed husband doesn’t encourage women to partici-pate in the labor market, but the sign of coefficients is positive so it meansa positive influence on the participation of women, while the unemploymentbenefits are statistically insignificant for almost all countries but the sign isnegative.

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The potential experiences most important for labor force participationdecision. A measure of potential experience assigns of market experienceto women of the same age and educational status even though their la-bor market histories might differ. The coefficient of potential experienceis significant than reflecting skill enhancement or seniority benefits, whilethe negative effect of potential experience captures reduce productivity overtime, fewer market options available to older individuals.

Finally we have different sources of income in the household: (logincome)the total non-labor income in the house where the employment wife’s incomehas been excluded, the disability benefits and family benefits. All incomevariables are deflated with CPI (Consumer price index) so a comparisonamong years is possible, but at the same time I use the PPP (Purchasingprice power) that allows a comparison among countries.

When we check the data we observe there is a negative income effect onmarried women’s labor participation. All the income variables are significantfor all European countries. The effect is larger for the income household thatfor the benefits in the family and disability benefits, so we may interpret thatother sources of income have more influence in the participation, for examplethe wage of husbands and financial family conditions.

Women’s wage equation

Now I estimate the wage equation with panel data sample selection, withthree different models, OLS, Heckman two step for panel data and 2SLS. Inthe last model I consider the potential experience as endogenous.

When we want to estimate the wage equation for married women we facedifferent problems: selection bias, endogeneity and eventually heterogeneity.

We have selection bias because the dependent variable of wage equationcan be measured only if the individual participates to the labor market.The literature offers estimators for correcting this problem (Heckman 1979,Powell 1994).

Heterogeneity is associated with the unobserved ability and motivationof an individual (ex. education), and if this unobserved individual effectsare correlated with the regressor of the model, the simple estimations withOLS are inconsistent, while panel data solve this problem.

After testing the selection equation described before, I take wage equa-tion 14 and I put inside the inverse Mill’s ratio estimated by probit model foreach period. I estimate this equation by OLS, Heckman and 2SLS modelsso the wage equation is:

wit = xitβ + γi + λit + eit (18)

The wage equation is analyzed on a sample that is limited for mar-ried women born between 1941–1965, excluding those self-employed. I’ve

14

Page 15: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

dropped observations that are inconsistent, and excluded women when theyears of experience exceeds the age, when experience was missing, and whenthey reports a positive number of hours of work and zero wage.

The dependent variable wit is the logarithm of the real monthly wage ofmarried women. The vector of explanatory variables xit includes educationof women, time dummies, experience and experience square, education ofwomen in two different levels. The experience has been calculated as thedifference between the present age and the age when starting the first job.4

More papers use the actual experience but for the ECHP data set wecan’t observe any variables to calculate this, we observe only potential ex-perience.

I use both participants and no-participants married women to estimatethe selection equation, while to estimate the wage equation I use only themarried women that participate to labor market for at least two waves.

Furthermore, in few countries some variables where dropped for estima-tion because they where perfect predictors of one of the two alternatives.

In table 14 and 15 I represent the estimation of the wage equation usingthe OLS regression model, where there isn’t correction for sample selectionand endogeneity, and the Heckman model for panel data selection, where Iput in regression equation the inverse Mill’s ratio, calculated each year witha probit model (λit), to correct the sample selection and all regressors areconsiderate exogenous. In table 16 I tried to estimate a 2SLS model, consid-ering the experience variable as endogenous. The set of instruments zit usedto control the endogenous experience contain : age and it’s square, variablesfor children in three different ages, education of women and education oftheir husbands in two different levels, sources of income in household, andan indicator of the labor status of their husband. All this regressors are con-sidered exogenous. The vector xit in this case is a subset of zit that includeseducation of women, time dummies, experience and experience square.

The result confirms that the Heckman model for panel data is an appro-priate model to estimate the wage equation. First, not all variables whichaffect participation equation are also determinants to estimate the wageequation, and the magnitude of the effects are different. In table 15 we findthat the selectivity correction term λit is significant for most countries anda negative sign is present for countries with a higher rate of employment.

Concerning the experience variable, the effect is different between theOLS and the Heckman models. While in the OLS model the experiencedecreases the wage for most countries, in the Heckman model, experiencehave a positive and significant effect for all European countries. The squareof experience is negative and significant for both models in each country,which means that the relation between experience and wage is the same

4Similar regressions were also computed using experience calculated by age minus yearschooling minus 6. The results do not vary with the measure of experience.

15

Page 16: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

after a high number of years of experience.Regarding the effect of education we find that a higher education level

increases the wage in several countries and the sign is statistically significantin panel data which are corrected for selection bias. We find the same resultsin the OLS regression, while a low level of education has a negative effecton the wage for both estimations.

The magnitude of the effect of each variable is different across-countriesin the Heckman model. In Northern countries the experience has a smallereffect than in Mediterranean countries. The effect of tertiary education isvery low in Italy, while in the rest of countries the magnitude is larger.Having a primary education influences negatively the wage while the effectis reduced for countries with a high female employment rate.

In table 16 I estimate the wage equation with a model of 2SLS, and findthat the experience has a positive effect on the wage, same the Heckmanmodel, but coefficients are lower than in the Heckman model and they aremore significant for Mediterranean countries. The education has the sameeffect in the Heckman model, a higher level of education incises negativelyon the wage equation.

Conclusion

In this paper I first analyze the participation in labor market for marriedwomen in thirteen countries in Europe for a panel of eight years. I foundthat the level of education has a positive influence on the participation, andwomen who have a university degree participate more in the labor market.Another factor that has a positive effect on participation is the age and thelabor status of husbands.

Variables that influence negatively the labor market of females are: thehousehold income, children, in particular dependent children, family anddisability benefits.

These results mean that the economic policy plays an important role forincreasing the participation equation, because for example an increase inthe policy of childcare and nursery development provides women with moretime to dedicate to the labor market. The targets imposed in the PresidencyConclusions of the European Union Council in Lisbon, in March 2000, arefar away for most countries.

Concerning the wage equation, both the experience and a higher level ofeducation have a positive effect on it, while a low level of education has anegative effect in most countries.

The magnitude of the effect of each variable is different across-countries.

16

Page 17: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

References

[1] Askildsen, J.E., B.H. Baltagi and T.H. Holmas, 2003,Wage policy in the health care sector: a panel data anal-ysis of nurses labour supply, Health Economics 12, 705-719.

[8] Chamberlain, G., 1980, Analysis with qualitative data,Review of Economic Studies 47, 225-238.

[3] Dustmann C., and M.E. Rochina-Barrachina, 2000, Se-lection correction in panel data models: an applicationto labor supply and wages, IZA Discussion Paper 162.

[5] Kyriazidou, E., 1997, Estimation of a panel data sampleselection model, Econometrica 65, 1335-1364.

[5] Kyriazidou,E., 2001, Estimation of dynamic panel datasample selection models, Review of Economic Studies 68,543-572.

[6] Borrego-Jimenez, 1997, Married women labor supply : acomparation analysis, Cesp

[7] Mundlak, Y., 1978, On the pooling of time series andcross section data, Econometrica 46, 69-85.

[8] C. Nicoletti and F. Peracchi 2002: A cross-country com-parison of survey participation in the ECHP, Workingpapers of the. Institute for Social and Economic Research

[9] Semykina-Wooldridge, 2005: Estimating panel datamodels in the presence od endogeneity an selection: the-ory and application, working paper

[11] Vella, F. and M. Verbeek, 1999, Two-step estimation ofpanel data models with censored endogenous variablesand selection bias, Journal of Econometrics 90, 239-263.

[11] Verbeek, M. and T. Nijman, 1992, Testing for selectiv-ity bias in panel data models, International EconomicReview 33, 681-703.

[13] Wooldridge, J.M., 1995, Selection corrections for paneldata models under conditional mean independence as-sumptions, Journal of Econometrics 68, 115-132.

[13] Wooldridge, J.M., 2002, Econometric analysis of crosssection and panel data. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. 33

17

Page 18: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Figure 1: Female inactivity and unemployment as per cent of pop-ulation of working age, 2000

Source: Oecd

18

Page 19: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Figure 2: North and Mediterranean Countries Female inactivityrate, 2000

19

Page 20: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Table 1: Female employment rate 1960 – 2000 Persons aged 15 to64 yearsCountry 1960 1980 2000 Men 2000 Lisbon Distance (a)Denmark 42,70 66,20 71,20 80,40 11,20Finland 54,90 65,00 64,30 69,70 4,30Norway 26,10 58,40 73,40 88,10 13,40Sweden 38,10 67,60 72,10 76,20 12,10U.K. 43,10 54,50 65,20 79,30 5,20

Belgium 29,60 35,00 51,10 69,80 -8,90Germany 35,00 34,80 58,10 73,50 -1,90Ireland - 32,20 52,20 74,00 -7,80

Hollands - 35,70 62,10 81,10 2,10Austria - 53,40 59,30 78,10 -0,70Greece - 30,70 40,40 70,20 -19,60Italy 28,10 33,20 39,70 68,50 -20,30Spain 21,00 28,40 40,30 70,30 -19,70

Portugal - 47,10 60,10 75,90 0,10France 42,90 50,00 53,10 69,80 -8,90

(a) Lisbon distance is the percentage differ-

ence between the female employment rate in

2000 and 60% (b) source OECD 2000

Table 2: Female employment rate

Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001Germany 68,01 66,52 65,88 65,43 66,02 64,79 64,02 63,80Denmark 89,61 89,90 86,35 87,10 86,33 86,25 85,01 84,69Holland 56,23 64,93 58,53 58,19 59,46 57,21 56,38 57,47Belgium 70,41 70,63 70,64 69,19 67,71 66,55 64,50 65,61

France 64,31 66,52 65,81 63,77 63,91 64,12 62,79 61,69U.K. 64,27 63,97 65,29 65,55 64,31 63,15 63,40 60,87

Ireland 32,99 34,47 36,31 39,64 41,46 43,33 45,87 43,62Italy 40,79 40,49 39,31 39,91 39,16 39,25 37,16 37,47

Greece 38,39 38,40 36,16 35,84 34,99 30,89 32,41 31,26Spain 34,51 36,56 37,68 37,28 37,28 35,87 36,62 38,23

Portugal 59,95 58,49 58,52 57,87 57,62 57,88 55,80 55,26Austria - 51,61 52,20 50,33 50,50 49,63 49,88 49,51Finland - - 86,71 86,39 84,18 84,17 83,95 80,70

20

Page 21: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Tab

le3:

Sum

mar

yst

atis

tics

offu

llsa

mple

Coun-

try

n.o

bs

age

fe-

male

sec-

ondary

edu-

cati

on

fe-

male

ter-

tiary

edu-

cati

on

chil-

dre

nage

6-1

2

chil-

dre

nage

3-6

chil-

dre

nage

0-3

adult

houlo

gin

-com

e

dis

-abili-

ty-

benef

fam

-ily-

benef

work

statu

s

hus-

band

sec-

ondary

edu-

cati

on

hus-

band

ter-

tiary

edu-

cati

on

un-

em

-plo

y-

benef

Ger-

many

1203

46,5

50,5

70,1

80,1

70,0

40,0

12,5

610,6

70,3

04,7

40,8

50,5

60,3

30,6

9

6,9

70,5

00,3

80,3

80,1

90,1

10,7

50,7

81,6

23,7

10,3

50,5

00,4

72,2

7D

en-

mark

551

46,6

40,5

20,1

50,1

20,1

10,0

72,2

612,2

00,4

83,7

90,9

30,5

30,3

60,2

6

7,0

40,5

00,3

50,3

20,3

20,2

50,5

20,8

41,8

83,7

50,2

50,5

00,4

81,4

1H

ol-

land

1049

45,4

50,0

00,9

90,1

90,1

50,0

72,4

810,8

00,7

44,1

50,9

10,0

10,0

00,1

6

6,4

80,0

70,0

80,3

90,3

60,2

60,7

50,8

32,3

93,5

10,2

80,1

00,0

71,1

0B

el-

giu

m436

43,9

50,3

40,1

90,1

00,1

30,0

62,5

713,8

70,8

35,9

80,9

60,3

60,4

00,3

4

6,1

00,4

70,3

90,3

00,3

30,2

30,8

20,4

82,4

43,3

80,2

00,4

80,4

91,5

8

Fra

nce

850

45,8

50,1

20,6

10,2

20,1

00,0

62,6

111,9

20,6

52,9

90,9

00,1

00,2

50,4

7

6,2

70,3

20,4

90,4

10,3

00,2

30,7

80,7

62,1

13,6

80,3

00,3

00,4

31,9

5U

.K.

881

46,3

00,1

60,4

00,1

30,1

10,0

72,4

29,7

50,6

93,8

70,8

90,1

80,5

00,0

87,2

80,3

70,4

90,3

40,3

10,2

50,6

90,7

12,2

43,6

50,3

10,3

90,5

00,7

2Ir

e-

land

297

46,3

90,4

30,3

30,1

70,1

60,0

82,9

710,0

10,4

75,0

90,9

20,3

90,2

10,8

0

6,7

20,5

00,4

70,3

80,3

70,2

71,0

40,5

01,9

33,0

10,2

70,4

90,4

12,4

1It

aly

712

45,5

90,5

20,3

00,1

50,1

30,0

72,7

910,3

00,2

70,4

00,8

50,4

60,1

70,0

36,5

50,5

00,4

60,3

60,3

30,2

60,8

71,0

71,4

51,5

70,3

60,5

00,3

80,2

2

Gre

ece

341

44,8

70,3

30,3

50,1

40,1

10,0

72,8

915,1

00,2

20,3

80,8

90,2

70,3

50,2

8

6,2

90,4

70,4

80,3

50,3

10,2

60,9

51,5

31,3

11,6

00,3

20,4

40,4

81,4

1Spain

490

45,0

90,2

20,4

10,1

60,1

30,0

82,9

514,7

30,7

30,1

90,9

00,1

80,3

20,3

96,4

60,4

10,4

90,3

70,3

40,2

71,0

21,0

52,3

91,2

00,2

90,3

90,4

71,7

0Por-

tugal

618

45,9

20,1

20,7

00,1

20,0

90,0

42,7

814,4

60,4

43,7

30,8

80,1

20,1

20,2

2

7,0

30,3

20,4

60,3

20,2

80,2

00,8

61,1

11,7

92,8

80,3

20,3

20,3

31,3

3A

us-

tria

404

44,6

40,6

80,1

90,1

40,0

90,0

32,7

612,7

90,2

75,1

10,8

70,8

00,1

10,2

7

6,3

00,4

70,3

90,3

50,2

80,1

80,8

80,5

11,4

93,7

90,3

40,4

00,3

11,4

5Fin

-la

nd

713

47,3

70,3

90,1

60,1

10,1

20,0

52,3

711,7

61,7

63,8

30,8

80,3

90,3

90,7

8

6,9

00,4

90,3

70,3

10,3

20,2

30,6

10,7

73,1

23,5

80,3

30,4

90,4

92,3

4

Sta

ndar

ddev

iati

ons

init

alic

s,Full

sam

ple

:al

lm

arri

edw

omen

was

bor

n19

41-1

965

21

Page 22: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Tab

le4:

Sum

mar

yst

atis

tics

ofsu

b-s

ample

Coun-

try

num

.O

bs

age

fe-

male

sec-

ondary

edu-

cati

on

fe-

male

ter-

tiary

edu-

cati

on

chil-

dre

nage

6-1

2

chil-

dre

nage

3-6

chil-

dre

nage

0-3

adult

houlo

gin

-com

e

dis

-abili-

ty-

benef

fam

-ily-

benef

work

statu

s

hus-

band

sec-

ondary

edu-

cati

on

hus-

band

ter-

tiary

edu-

cati

on

un-

em

-plo

y-

benef

Ger-

many

1058

46.6

00.5

60.1

80.1

70.0

30.0

12.5

510.6

40.2

64.6

20.8

50.5

60.3

30.7

0

6.8

90.5

00.3

80.3

70.1

80.1

10.7

50.7

41.5

23.7

30.3

50.5

00.4

72.2

7D

en-

mark

546

46.5

90.5

10.1

40.1

20.1

20.0

72.2

512.2

00.4

73.8

10.9

30.5

30.3

60.2

6

7.0

10.5

00.3

50.3

20.3

20.2

50.5

20.8

51.8

63.7

50.2

50.5

00.4

81.4

1H

ol-

land

815

45.3

20.0

00.9

90.2

00.1

40.0

72.4

610.7

50.7

84.0

00.9

00.0

00.0

00.1

8

6.3

20.0

00.0

90.4

00.3

50.2

60.7

30.9

12.4

43.5

20.2

90.0

00.0

71.1

8B

el-

giu

m428

43.9

00.3

40.1

90.1

10.1

30.0

62.5

713.8

70.8

45.9

90.9

60.3

60.4

00.3

5

6.0

40.4

70.3

90.3

10.3

30.2

30.8

20.4

82.4

63.3

80.2

00.4

80.4

91.6

0

Fra

nce

850

45.8

50.1

20.6

10.2

20.1

00.0

62.6

111.9

20.6

52.9

90.9

00.1

00.2

50.4

7

6.2

70.3

20.4

90.4

10.3

00.2

30.7

80.7

62.1

13.6

80.3

00.3

00.4

31.9

5U

.K.

783

46.2

20.1

60.3

80.1

40.1

10.0

72.4

39.7

50.6

33.8

30.9

00.1

90.5

10.0

77.1

30.3

70.4

90.3

50.3

10.2

50.6

90.7

12.1

33.6

40.3

00.3

90.5

00.6

8Ir

e-

land

272

46.1

80.4

40.3

10.1

80.1

60.0

82.9

710.0

40.4

55.1

60.9

30.4

00.2

10.6

9

6.5

40.5

00.4

60.3

80.3

70.2

81.0

40.4

71.8

82.9

70.2

50.4

90.4

12.2

3It

aly

707

45.6

20.5

20.3

00.1

50.1

30.0

72.8

010.3

00.2

70.4

00.8

50.4

60.1

80.0

36.5

60.5

00.4

60.3

60.3

30.2

60.8

71.0

71.4

51.5

80.3

60.5

00.3

80.2

2

Gre

ece

335

44.8

40.3

30.3

40.1

40.1

10.0

72.8

915.1

00.2

20.3

80.8

90.2

70.3

60.2

4

6.2

70.4

70.4

80.3

50.3

10.2

60.9

41.5

41.3

31.6

10.3

10.4

50.4

81.3

1Spain

483

45.1

10.2

20.4

10.1

60.1

30.0

82.9

614.7

30.7

50.2

00.9

00.1

90.3

30.3

86.4

30.4

20.4

90.3

70.3

30.2

81.0

31.0

62.4

11.2

10.2

90.3

90.4

71.6

8Por-

tugal

614

45.9

10.1

20.7

00.1

20.0

90.0

42.7

814.4

50.4

33.7

20.8

80.1

20.1

20.2

0

7.0

40.3

20.4

60.3

20.2

80.2

10.8

51.1

11.7

72.8

80.3

20.3

20.3

31.2

9A

us-

tria

386

44.5

80.6

80.1

80.1

40.0

80.0

32.7

712.7

90.2

45.0

90.8

80.8

00.1

10.2

9

6.2

30.4

70.3

80.3

40.2

70.1

70.8

90.5

11.4

53.8

00.3

30.4

00.3

21.4

9Fin

-la

nd

707

47.3

50.3

90.1

60.1

10.1

20.0

62.3

711.7

51.7

43.8

30.8

80.3

90.3

90.7

7

6.8

90.4

90.3

70.3

10.3

20.2

30.6

10.7

73.0

93.5

80.3

30.4

90.4

92.3

3

Sta

ndar

ddev

iati

ons

init

alic

s,su

b-s

ample

:al

lm

arri

edw

omen

was

bor

n19

41-1

965,

emplo

yed

orse

arch

ajo

b

22

Page 23: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Tab

le5:

Sam

ple

char

acte

rist

ican

dye

ars

spen

tin

tow

ork

Ger

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2

23

Page 24: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Tab

le6:

Sam

ple

char

acte

rist

ican

dye

ars

spen

tin

tow

ork

Holland

Bel

giu

m

Em

pl.

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44.4

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542.0

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male

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0.5

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male

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24

Page 25: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Tab

le7:

Sam

ple

char

acte

rist

ican

dye

ars

spen

tin

tow

ork

Fra

nce

U.K

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Em

pl.

8 years

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gle

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gle

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age

44.8

133.5

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male

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ondary

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on

0.2

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00.3

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male

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ondary

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0.4

60.3

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80.4

50.5

3

fem

ale

secondary

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0.1

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male

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8

25

Page 26: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Tab

le8:

Sam

ple

char

acte

rist

ican

dye

ars

spen

tin

tow

ork

Italy

Gre

ece

Em

pl.

8 years

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pl.

0 Years

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gle

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gle

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from

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age

44.5

639.4

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134.0

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male

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ondary

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on

0.1

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00.2

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ssfe

male

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ondary

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on

0.4

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fem

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0.5

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fem

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6

26

Page 27: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Tab

le9:

Sam

ple

char

acte

rist

ican

dye

ars

spen

tin

tow

ork

Spain

Port

ugal

Em

pl.

8 years

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pl.

0 Years

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gle

trans.

to Work

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gle

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from

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pl.

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gle

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age

44.1

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male

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on

0.5

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male

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fem

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part

ic.

1.0

00.0

0-

--

N.Y

ears

work

N.Y

ears

work

0-

100

0-

100

1-

-26.7

210.4

411.4

41

--

29.0

48.5

611.6

42

--

9.2

413.5

712.9

02

--

11.4

012.8

413.4

43

--

8.4

012.9

412.3

53

--

6.9

913.6

713.1

74

--

8.5

713.3

612.7

14

--

8.4

613.5

612.6

35

--

7.7

313.7

812.5

45

--

4.4

113.0

812.5

36

--

6.5

513.5

713.1

66

--

6.6

213.4

412.0

87

--

9.4

112.1

112.9

37

--

7.7

213.6

712.6

38

100

-23.3

610.2

311.9

68

100

-25.3

711.1

811.8

8

27

Page 28: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Tab

le10

:Sam

ple

char

acte

rist

ican

dye

ars

spen

tin

tow

ork

Aust

ria

Fin

land

Em

pl.

8 years

Em

pl.

0 Years

Sin

gle

trans.

to Work

Sin

gle

tras.

from

Work

Mult

i.tr

ans.

Em

pl.

8 years

Em

pl.

0 Years

Sin

gle

trans.

to Work

Sin

gle

tras.

from

Work

Mult

i.tr

ans.

age

44.3

540.7

142.8

833.7

037.0

6age

44.1

942.5

043.2

536.2

738.2

9le

ssfe

male

sec-

ondary

educati

on

0.1

70.0

20.1

40.0

20.1

7le

ssfe

male

sec-

ondary

educati

on

0.4

90.5

00.5

70.5

20.4

6

fem

ale

secondary

educati

on

0.6

80.5

70.6

90.7

20.7

0fe

male

secondary

educati

on

0.3

90.2

50.3

20.3

00.4

5

fem

ale

tert

iary

ed-

ucati

on

0.1

50.4

00.1

70.2

60.1

3fe

male

tert

iary

ed-

ucati

on

0.1

20.2

50.1

00.1

80.0

9

childre

nage

6-1

20.1

50.2

10.1

50.0

90.0

9ch

ildre

nage

6-1

20.1

20.2

50.1

20.0

90.0

6ch

ildre

nage

3-6

0.0

50.2

90.1

50.2

10.2

6ch

ildre

nage

3-6

0.1

70.5

00.2

40.3

00.3

0ch

ildre

nage

0-3

0.0

30.0

70.0

70.3

30.1

6ch

ildre

nage

0-3

0.0

80.2

50.1

50.2

30.2

6lo

gin

com

e12.8

312.7

912.7

512.6

912.7

3lo

gin

com

e11.8

312.1

011.8

911.8

111.7

7dis

abilitybenef

0.1

90.0

00.1

30.2

00.0

9dis

abilitybenef

1.6

30.0

01.2

51.1

81.0

4fa

milybenef

5.4

56.9

35.2

26.3

36.1

8fa

milybenef

4.8

35.8

55.1

34.6

95.2

7husb

and

sec-

ondary

educati

on

0.8

20.7

90.8

20.8

40.7

5husb

and

sec-

ondary

educati

on

0.3

70.2

50.4

40.5

00.5

0

husb

and

tert

iary

educati

on

0.1

10.0

70.1

10.0

90.1

7husb

and

tert

iary

educati

on

0.4

40.5

00.3

90.2

50.3

2

unem

plo

ybenef

0.2

41.0

50.3

30.8

80.3

7unem

plo

ybenef

0.4

72.0

30.6

51.5

90.8

6part

ic.

1.0

00.0

0-

--

part

ic.

1.0

00.0

0-

--

N.Y

ears

work

N.Y

ears

work

0-

100

0-

100

1-

-37.5

510.3

114.3

91

--

45.9

115.2

821.0

22

--

15.7

116.0

916.5

12

--

13.9

817.4

723.1

03

--

9.2

015.7

814.8

83

--

11.3

517.4

719.9

14

--

5.3

615.9

414.7

54

--

11.6

118.2

317.7

55

--

8.0

515.4

714.8

15

--

5.5

418.0

19.7

66

--

7.6

615.1

613.0

56

100

-11.6

113.5

48.4

67

100

-16.4

811.2

511.6

0

28

Page 29: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Table 11: Sample characteristic and years spent in to work

IrelandEmpl. 8years

Empl. 0Years

Singletrans. toWork

Singletras. fromWork

Multi.trans.

age 43.59 43.67 41.59 36.13 40.47less female sec-ondary education

0.38 0.17 0.21 0.09 0.21

female secondary ed-ucation

0.49 0.33 0.65 0.52 0.47

female tertiary edu-cation

0.12 0.50 0.15 0.39 0.33

children age 6-12 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.14children age 3-6 0.31 0.17 0.24 0.22 0.21children age 0-3 0.16 0.08 0.18 0.39 0.23logincome 10.00 10.10 10.00 9.88 9.97disabilitybenef 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.30familybenef 5.91 6.48 5.85 4.86 5.72husband secondaryeducation

0.43 0.17 0.50 0.61 0.42

husband tertiary ed-ucation

0.32 0.33 0.24 0.09 0.18

unemploybenef 0.15 2.89 0.18 1.19 0.80partic. 1.00 0.00 - - -N. Years work0 - 1001 - - 41.55 9.63 13.122 - - 14.53 13.64 14.663 - - 8.11 13.37 14.754 - - 8.11 13.90 14.625 - - 8.45 13.64 14.096 - - 5.74 12.83 11.847 - - 5.74 13.90 9.328 100 - 7.77 9.09 7.60

29

Page 30: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Tab

le12

:P

robit

esti

mat

esof

labor

forc

epar

tici

pat

ion,(d

epen

dent

vari

able

:A

ctiv

e)

Coun-

try

age

agetw

o

fe-

male

ter-

tiary

edu-

cati

on

fe-

male

sec-

ondary

edu-

cati

on

chil-

dre

nage

6-1

2

chil-

dre

nage

3-6

chil-

dre

nage

0-3

login

-com

e

fam

-ily-

benef

dis

-abili-

ty-

benef

expe-

rience

hus-

band

sec-

ondary

edu-

cati

on

hus-

band

ter-

tiary

edu-

cati

on

work

statu

s

un-

em

-plo

y-

benef

Ger-

many

0.5

34∗∗∗

-0.0

63∗∗∗

0.8

83∗∗∗

0.2

39∗∗

0.1

21∗∗

-0.7

65∗∗∗

-0.6

04∗∗∗

-0.5

84∗∗∗

-0.0

31∗∗∗

-0.1

01∗∗∗

-0.0

36∗∗∗

0.3

34∗∗∗

0.3

88∗∗∗

-0.1

96∗

-0.0

21∗∗

0.0

39

0.0

04

0.1

37

0.0

93

0.0

61

0.0

69

0.0

84

0.0

42

0.0

11

0.0

11

0.0

09

0.1

0.1

19

0.1

17

0.0

09

Den-

mark

0.7

40∗∗∗

-0.0

84∗∗∗

0.9

59∗∗∗

0.5

55∗∗∗

0.0

44

0.0

04

-0.4

64∗∗∗

-0.7

67∗∗∗

-0.0

55∗∗∗

-0.1

06∗∗∗

-0.0

56∗∗∗

0.4

91∗∗∗

0.7

20∗∗∗

-0.2

81

-0.0

26∗

0.0

68

0.0

07

0.1

42

0.1

21

0.1

32

0.1

11

0.1

29

0.0

93

0.0

18

0.0

14

0.0

17

0.1

31

0.1

49

0.2

30.0

16

Hol-

land

0.6

97∗∗∗

-0.0

72∗∗∗

0.3

95∗∗∗

0.2

04∗∗

0.1

39

-0.2

90∗∗∗

-0.3

18∗∗∗

-0.2

92∗∗∗

-0.1

05∗∗∗

-0.1

24∗∗∗

-0.1

62∗∗∗

0.1

22

0.1

7-

0.4

94∗

-0.0

07

0.0

61

0.0

07

0.1

28

0.0

95

0.0

88

0.0

89

0.1

04

0.0

51

0.0

13

0.0

12

0.0

04

0.1

08

0.1

24

0.2

65

0.0

16

Bel-

giu

m0.7

17∗∗∗

-0.0

81∗∗∗

1.5

83∗∗∗

0.3

73∗∗∗

0.2

27∗

0.0

73

-0.0

47

-0.2

45∗∗∗

-0.0

08

-0.0

38∗∗∗

-0.1

37∗∗∗

0.2

29∗

0.0

91

-0.6

30∗∗

-0.0

19

0.0

84

0.0

09

0.1

73

0.1

19

0.1

27

0.1

13

0.1

33

0.0

70.0

18

0.0

15

0.0

11

0.1

20.1

59

0.2

80.0

2

Fra

nce

0.6

54∗∗∗

-0.0

75∗∗∗

0.8

80∗∗∗

0.2

72∗∗∗

0.2

47∗∗∗

-0.2

04∗∗∗

-0.5

83∗∗∗

-0.2

46∗∗∗

-0.0

62∗∗∗

-0.0

41∗∗∗

-0.0

63∗∗∗

0.2

97∗∗∗

-0.1

22

-0.0

27

0.0

21∗

0.0

51

0.0

06

0.1

43

0.0

79

0.0

94

0.0

73

0.0

88

0.0

44

0.0

10.0

12

0.0

04

0.0

78

0.1

35

0.1

40.0

12

U.K

.0.5

57∗∗∗

-0.0

62∗∗∗

0.5

29∗∗∗

0.0

84

0.1

68

-0.4

17∗∗∗

-0.9

55∗∗∗

-0.1

00∗∗

-0.0

80∗∗∗

-0.1

50∗∗∗

-0.0

75∗∗∗

0.2

10∗

0.0

47

-0.0

40∗

0.0

54

0.0

06

0.1

02

0.1

01

0.1

03

0.0

79

0.0

95

0.0

49

0.0

14

0.0

12

0.0

08

0.1

12

0.1

03

0.0

21

Ire-

land

0.2

76∗∗∗

-0.0

29∗∗∗

1.0

19∗∗∗

0.3

73∗∗∗

0.2

14∗∗

-0.5

51∗∗∗

-0.2

14∗∗

-0.3

85∗∗∗

-0.1

08∗∗∗

-0.1

08∗∗∗

-0.1

37∗∗∗

0.1

66∗

0.4

31∗∗∗

-0.3

56∗∗

-0.0

30∗∗

0.0

72

0.0

08

0.1

69

0.1

05

0.0

84

0.0

88

0.1

01

0.0

68

0.0

19

0.0

16

0.0

19

0.0

93

0.1

54

0.1

44

0.0

13

Italy

0.7

45∗∗∗

-0.0

78∗∗∗

1.5

98∗∗∗

1.1

94∗∗∗

0.0

68

-0.1

59∗∗

-0.2

67∗∗∗

-0.1

61∗∗∗

-0.0

34∗∗

-0.0

04

-0.1

49∗∗∗

0.1

96∗∗

0.8

16∗∗∗

-0.2

88∗∗

-0.0

42

0.0

52

0.0

06

0.2

02

0.1

0.0

78

0.0

81

0.0

95

0.0

27

0.0

15

0.0

17

0.0

05

0.0

97

0.1

95

0.1

45

0.0

84

Gre

ece

0.6

31∗∗∗

-0.0

67∗∗∗

1.8

20∗∗∗

0.5

38∗∗∗

0.0

09

0.0

05

-0.3

70∗∗∗

-0.0

76∗∗∗

-0.0

09

-0.0

70∗∗

-0.1

37∗∗∗

0.1

67

0.4

72∗∗∗

-0.1

78

-0.0

09

0.0

69

0.0

08

0.1

70.1

30.0

94

0.1

19

0.1

42

0.0

22

0.0

23

0.0

30.0

06

0.1

17

0.1

57

0.1

75

0.0

29

Spain

0.4

43∗∗∗

-0.0

47∗∗∗

1.7

59∗∗∗

0.7

51∗∗∗

0.1

11∗

-0.1

57∗∗

-0.3

51∗∗∗

-0.1

43∗∗∗

-0.0

05

-0.0

1-

0.0

96∗∗∗

0.1

10.3

53∗∗∗

0.0

19

0.0

02

0.0

49

0.0

05

0.1

26

0.0

95

0.0

67

0.0

72

0.0

87

0.0

25

0.0

17

0.0

12

0.0

05

0.0

92

0.1

10.0

89

0.0

1Por-

tugal

0.4

69∗∗∗

-0.0

53∗∗∗

1.0

50∗∗∗

0.3

04∗

-0.0

57

-0.2

49∗∗

-0.3

25∗∗∗

-0.1

60∗∗∗

0.0

29∗

-0.0

41∗∗∗

-0.1

22∗∗∗

0.2

02

0.6

25∗∗

0.0

57

-0.0

36∗

0.0

59

0.0

06

0.2

26

0.1

73

0.0

89

0.1

0.1

26

0.0

33

0.0

15

0.0

14

0.0

06

0.1

72

0.2

59

0.1

78

0.0

19

Aus-

tria

0.9

35∗∗∗

-0.1

16∗∗∗

1.4

83∗∗∗

0.5

18∗∗∗

0.1

26

-0.9

23∗∗∗

-0.2

16

-0.3

58∗∗∗

-0.0

42∗∗

-0.0

75∗∗∗

-0.0

50∗∗∗

0.0

13

0.1

05

-0.0

32

-0.0

40∗∗

0.0

83

0.0

09

0.3

55

0.1

68

0.1

14

0.1

22

0.1

50.0

82

0.0

17

0.0

19

0.0

16

0.2

04

0.3

60.2

85

0.0

19

Fin

-la

nd

1.0

71∗∗∗

-0.1

17∗∗∗

0.7

84∗∗∗

0.1

49

-0.0

66

-0.0

27

-0.9

30∗∗∗

-0.8

03∗∗∗

-0.0

52∗∗∗

-0.0

70∗∗∗

-0.0

69∗∗∗

0.3

44∗∗∗

0.5

71∗∗∗

-0.2

42

-0.0

31∗∗

0.0

81

0.0

09

0.1

53

0.1

17

0.1

14

0.1

12

0.1

41

0.0

97

0.0

18

0.0

12

0.0

17

0.1

11

0.1

44

0.1

87

0.0

14

not

epva

lue:

.01

-**

*;.0

5-**

;.1

-*;

Stan

dard

devi

atio

nin

ital

ics,

Yea

rdu

mm

yva

riab

les

are

in-

clud

edbu

tno

tre

port

ed

30

Page 31: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Tab

le13

:M

argi

nal

effec

tsof

labor

forc

epar

tici

pat

ion

Coun-

try

age

agetw

o

fe-

male

ter-

tiary

edu-

cati

on

fe-

male

sec-

ondary

edu-

cati

on

chil-

dre

nage

6-1

2

chil-

dre

nage

3-6

chil-

dre

nage

0-3

login

-com

e

fam

-ily-

benef

dis

-abili-

ty-

benef

expe-

rience

hus-

band

sec-

ondary

edu-

cati

on

hus-

band

ter-

tiary

edu-

cati

on

un-

em

-plo

y-

benef

work

statu

s

Ger-

many

0.0

86∗∗∗

-0.0

10∗∗∗

0.1

68∗∗∗

0.0

54∗∗∗

0.0

14

-0.1

98∗∗∗

-0.1

25∗∗∗

-0.1

60∗∗∗

-0.0

11∗∗∗

-0.0

34∗∗∗

-0.0

06∗∗∗

0.0

65∗∗∗

0.0

75∗∗∗

-0.0

11∗∗∗

-0.0

68∗∗

0.0

06

0.0

01

0.0

11

0.0

10.0

13

0.0

15

0.0

18

0.0

07

0.0

01

0.0

02

0.0

01

0.0

12

0.0

13

0.0

02

0.0

27

Den-

mark

0.0

85∗∗∗

-0.0

10∗∗∗

0.1

41∗∗∗

0.0

87∗∗∗

0.0

14

0.0

07

-0.0

66∗∗∗

-0.1

76∗∗∗

-0.0

03∗

-0.0

25∗∗∗

-0.0

04∗∗∗

0.0

48∗∗∗

0.0

72∗∗∗

-0.0

13∗∗∗

-0.0

67∗

0.0

06

0.0

01

0.0

11

0.0

10.0

18

0.0

14

0.0

19

0.0

11

0.0

02

0.0

02

0.0

01

0.0

11

0.0

12

0.0

02

0.0

4H

ol-

land

0.1

17∗∗∗

-0.0

11∗∗∗

0.1

68∗∗∗

0.0

89∗∗∗

0.0

62∗∗∗

-0.0

74∗∗∗

-0.0

26

-0.0

78∗∗∗

-0.0

23∗∗∗

-0.0

23∗∗∗

-0.0

30∗∗∗

0.0

26

0.0

17

-0.0

07∗∗∗

-0.0

6

0.0

08

0.0

01

0.0

16

0.0

14

0.0

15

0.0

16

0.0

19

0.0

09

0.0

02

0.0

02

0.0

04

0.0

17

0.0

20.0

03

0.0

52

Bel-

giu

m0.1

10∗∗∗

-0.0

12∗∗∗

0.2

90∗∗∗

0.0

81∗∗∗

0.0

75∗∗∗

-0.0

73∗∗∗

-0.0

94∗∗∗

-0.1

38∗∗∗

-0.0

02

-0.0

16∗∗∗

-0.0

23∗∗∗

0.0

20.0

05

-0.0

20∗∗∗

-0.2

07∗∗∗

0.0

10.0

01

0.0

15

0.0

15

0.0

22

0.0

20.0

23

0.0

12

0.0

02

0.0

02

0.0

01

0.0

16

0.0

17

0.0

03

0.0

55

Fra

nce

0.1

00∗∗∗

-0.0

11∗∗∗

0.1

66∗∗∗

0.0

88∗∗∗

0.0

45∗∗∗

-0.0

37∗∗

-0.1

00∗∗∗

-0.1

12∗∗∗

-0.0

19∗∗∗

-0.0

19∗∗∗

-0.0

07∗∗∗

0.0

56∗∗∗

-0.0

20

-0.0

83∗∗∗

0.0

08

0.0

01

0.0

15

0.0

12

0.0

15

0.0

15

0.0

17

0.0

08

0.0

02

0.0

02

0.0

02

0.0

12

0.0

15

0.0

02

0.0

29

U.K

.0.0

47∗∗∗

-0.0

05∗∗∗

0.1

07∗∗∗

0.0

54∗∗∗

0.0

68∗∗∗

-0.1

15∗∗∗

-0.1

73∗∗∗

-0.0

58∗∗∗

-0.0

17∗∗∗

-0.0

38∗∗∗

0.0

10∗∗∗

0.0

33∗∗

-0.0

27∗∗

-0.0

19∗∗∗

0.0

08

0.0

01

0.0

10.0

13

0.0

16

0.0

16

0.0

18

0.0

07

0.0

02

0.0

01

0.0

02

0.0

14

0.0

10.0

04

Ire-

land

0.0

71∗∗∗

-0.0

08∗∗∗

0.3

20∗∗∗

0.0

72∗∗∗

0.0

54∗∗∗

-0.1

14∗∗∗

-0.0

18

-0.1

63∗∗∗

-0.0

23∗∗∗

-0.0

22∗∗∗

-0.0

11∗∗

0.0

79∗∗∗

0.0

73∗∗∗

-0.0

11∗∗∗

-0.0

94∗∗∗

0.0

12

0.0

01

0.0

20.0

14

0.0

19

0.0

16

0.0

19

0.0

11

0.0

03

0.0

03

0.0

05

0.0

14

0.0

19

0.0

02

0.0

28

Italy

0.0

54∗∗∗

-0.0

05∗∗∗

0.3

27∗∗∗

0.1

91∗∗∗

-0.0

03

-0.0

41∗∗∗

-0.0

25∗∗

-0.0

53∗∗∗

-0.0

12∗∗∗

-0.0

01

0.0

14∗∗∗

0.0

29∗∗∗

0.0

56∗∗∗

0.0

14

-0.0

96∗∗∗

0.0

05

0.0

01

0.0

20.0

09

0.0

10.0

09

0.0

11

0.0

04

0.0

02

0.0

02

0.0

01

0.0

08

0.0

15

0.0

12

0.0

15

Gre

ece

0.0

60∗∗∗

-0.0

06∗∗∗

0.2

90∗∗∗

0.0

66∗∗∗

0.0

13

-0.0

02

-0.0

28∗∗

-0.0

40∗∗∗

0.0

04∗∗

-0.0

03

0.0

01

-0.0

01

0.0

79∗∗∗

-0.0

07∗

-0.0

13

0.0

06

0.0

01

0.0

19

0.0

11

0.0

11

0.0

12

0.0

12

0.0

04

0.0

02

0.0

03

0.0

01

0.0

10.0

14

0.0

03

0.0

21

Spain

0.0

43∗∗∗

-0.0

04∗∗∗

0.3

87∗∗∗

0.1

57∗∗∗

-0.0

05

-0.0

47∗∗∗

-0.0

45∗∗∗

-0.0

40∗∗∗

-0.0

05

0.0

01

0.0

02

0.0

15

0.0

49∗∗∗

00.0

25

0.0

06

0.0

01

0.0

14

0.0

13

0.0

11

0.0

10.0

12

0.0

04

0.0

03

0.0

02

0.0

01

0.0

11

0.0

11

0.0

02

0.0

17

Por-

tugal

0.0

11

00.3

80∗∗∗

0.1

16∗∗∗

-0.0

31∗

-0.0

71∗∗∗

-0.0

86∗∗∗

-0.0

62∗∗∗

0.0

05∗∗

-0.0

15∗∗∗

0.0

23∗∗∗

0.0

76∗∗∗

0.0

16

-0.0

02

0.0

51

0.0

09

0.0

01

0.0

21

0.0

22

0.0

18

0.0

19

0.0

22

0.0

06

0.0

02

0.0

02

0.0

02

0.0

22

0.0

31

0.0

04

0.0

43

Aus-

tria

0.1

09∗∗∗

-0.0

14∗∗∗

0.2

89∗∗∗

0.1

05∗∗∗

-0.0

02

-0.2

27∗∗∗

-0.0

19

-0.1

04∗∗∗

-0.0

14∗∗∗

-0.0

20∗∗∗

0.0

02

0.0

05

-0.0

43

-0.0

15∗∗∗

-0.0

31

0.0

14

0.0

02

0.0

25

0.0

16

0.0

24

0.0

22

0.0

30.0

13

0.0

02

0.0

03

0.0

05

0.0

21

0.0

34

0.0

03

0.0

65

Fin

-la

nd

0.1

05∗∗∗

-0.0

11∗∗∗

0.1

19∗∗∗

0.0

26∗∗

0.0

02

0.0

19

-0.1

55∗∗∗

-0.1

68∗∗∗

-0.0

03

-0.0

16∗∗∗

0.0

09∗∗

0.0

47∗∗∗

0.0

70∗∗∗

-0.0

12∗∗∗

-0.1

33∗∗∗

0.0

10.0

01

0.0

14

0.0

12

0.0

17

0.0

16

0.0

24

0.0

11

0.0

02

0.0

01

0.0

04

0.0

11

0.0

13

0.0

02

0.0

39

not

epva

lue:

.01

-**

*;.0

5-**

;.1

-*;

Stan

dard

devi

atio

nin

ital

ics,

Yea

rdu

mm

yva

riab

les

are

in-

clud

edbu

tno

tre

port

ed

31

Page 32: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Tab

le14

:Est

imat

esfo

rth

em

onth

lyw

age

equat

ion,O

LS

model

Coun-

try

expe-

rience

exp2

fe-

male

ter-

tiary

edu-

cati

on

less

fe-

male

sec-

ondary

edu-

cati

on

unm

-plo

y-

ment-

benef

login

-com

e

dis

-abili-

ty-

benef

fam

-ily-

benef

chil-

dre

nage6-

12

chil-

dre

nage

3-6

chil-

dre

nage

0-3

Ger-

many

0.1

89∗∗∗

-0.4

64∗∗∗

0.7

60∗∗∗

-0.3

63∗∗∗

-0.0

20∗∗

-0.5

02∗∗∗

-0.1

04∗∗∗

-0.0

26∗∗

0.1

53∗∗∗

-0.8

57∗∗∗

-0.8

26∗∗∗

0.0

23

0.0

42

0.1

05

0.0

99

0.0

09

0.0

44

0.0

14

0.0

10.0

58

0.0

89

0.1

03

Den-

mark

0.1

78∗∗∗

-0.4

40∗∗∗

0.3

19∗∗∗

-0.7

62∗∗∗

-0.0

34∗∗

-0.3

65∗∗∗

-0.1

19∗∗∗

-0.0

43∗∗∗

0.1

93∗

-0.0

62

-0.4

62∗∗∗

0.0

41

0.0

70.0

86

0.1

31

0.0

17

0.0

81

0.0

17

0.0

13

0.1

02

0.0

99

0.1

24

Fra

nce

-0.0

31∗∗∗

-0.0

76∗∗∗

0.8

12∗∗∗

-0.1

14

0.0

18

-0.1

45∗∗∗

-0.0

42∗∗∗

-0.0

44∗∗∗

0.3

74∗∗∗

-0.3

62∗∗∗

-0.7

85∗∗∗

0.0

11

0.0

21

0.1

62

0.0

81

0.0

12

0.0

41

0.0

12

0.0

09

0.0

84

0.0

77

0.0

95

U.K

.0.0

44∗∗

-0.2

34∗∗∗

0.4

92∗∗∗

-0.1

44∗

-0.0

31

-0.0

01

-0.1

44∗∗∗

-0.0

72∗∗∗

0.2

25∗∗∗

-0.6

03∗∗∗

-1.0

32∗∗∗

0.0

20.0

37

0.0

80.0

78

0.0

20.0

45

0.0

15

0.0

13

0.0

65

0.0

87

0.1

1Ir

e-

land

-0.0

09

-0.0

80∗∗

0.9

67∗∗∗

-0.5

39∗∗∗

-0.0

52∗∗∗

-0.0

13

-0.0

80∗∗∗

-0.0

65∗∗∗

0.3

25∗∗∗

-0.5

72∗∗∗

-0.3

24∗∗∗

0.0

26

0.0

39

0.1

67

0.0

96

0.0

13

0.0

52

0.0

17

0.0

16

0.0

89

0.0

94

0.1

08

Italy

-0.0

99∗∗∗

0.0

29∗∗

0.7

38∗∗∗

-0.5

63∗∗∗

-0.0

69

-0.0

69∗∗∗

-0.0

01

-0.0

06

0.0

66

-0.1

34∗∗∗

-0.2

73∗∗∗

0.0

10.0

14

0.2

23

0.0

73

0.0

65

0.0

15

0.0

07

0.0

08

0.0

44

0.0

49

0.0

6

Gre

ece

-0.0

85∗∗∗

0.0

39∗∗

0.7

04∗∗∗

-0.4

25∗∗∗

-0.0

24

-0.0

2-

0.0

22∗∗

-0.0

16

0.0

64

-0.1

24∗

-0.3

36∗∗∗

0.0

13

0.0

18

0.1

21

0.0

78

0.0

18

0.0

21

0.0

11

0.0

15

0.0

64

0.0

71

0.0

83

Spain

-0.0

69∗∗∗

0.0

21

1.0

53∗∗∗

-0.7

51∗∗∗

-0.0

12

-0.0

40∗∗

-0.0

11

-0.0

16

0.1

41∗∗

-0.2

78∗∗∗

-0.4

40∗∗∗

0.0

11

0.0

16

0.1

38

0.0

91

0.0

08

0.0

17

0.0

09

0.0

15

0.0

56

0.0

61

0.0

76

Por-

tugal

-0.0

57∗∗∗

-0.0

35∗

0.6

01∗∗∗

-0.7

85∗∗∗

-0.0

26

-0.0

87∗∗∗

-0.0

35∗∗∗

0.0

39∗∗∗

0.0

17

-0.2

29∗∗∗

-0.3

03∗∗∗

0.0

12

0.0

20.1

77

0.1

50.0

16

0.0

23

0.0

11

0.0

12

0.0

62

0.0

79

0.1

06

Aus-

tria

0.1

97∗∗∗

-0.5

20∗∗∗

1.1

47∗∗∗

-0.4

41∗∗∗

-0.0

37∗∗

-0.1

88∗∗∗

-0.0

57∗∗∗

-0.0

10.0

67

-0.9

47∗∗∗

-0.5

65∗∗∗

0.0

37

0.0

61

0.2

39

0.1

46

0.0

17

0.0

54

0.0

19

0.0

14

0.0

92

0.1

31

0.1

79

Fin

-la

nd

0.2

94∗∗∗

-0.6

66∗∗∗

0.6

25∗∗∗

-0.2

02∗

-0.0

30∗∗

-0.3

57∗∗∗

-0.0

61∗∗∗

-0.0

63∗∗∗

-0.0

38

-0.0

55

-0.8

04∗∗∗

0.0

28

0.0

51

0.0

96

0.1

10.0

14

0.0

66

0.0

12

0.0

15

0.0

76

0.1

23

0.1

27

not

epva

lue:

.01

-**

*;.0

5-

**;

.1-

*;Yea

rdum

my

variab

les

are

incl

uded

but

not

re-

por

ted.

Sta

ndar

der

ror

inital

ics

32

Page 33: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Table 15: Estimates for the monthly wage equation, Heckmanmodel

Countryexperi-ence

exp2femaletertiary

education

lessfemale

secondaryeducation

lambda

Germany 0.022∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ -0.067∗ -0.465∗∗∗

0.008 0.015 0.033 0.038 0.089Denmark 0.005 -0.022∗ 0.130∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗

0.006 0.012 0.019 0.032 0.051France 0.015∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗ -0.002

0.005 0.01 0.035 0.031 0.054U.K. 0.001 -0.011 0.293∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗

0.006 0.012 0.039 0.038 0.077Ireland 0.004 -0.026 0.550∗∗∗ -0.429∗∗∗ -0.159

0.017 0.031 0.046 0.052 0.124Italy 0.027∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ 0.014

0.004 0.009 0.021 0.021 0.047Greece 0.038∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗

0.006 0.016 0.03 0.038 0.035Spain 0.050∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ -0.472∗∗∗ 0.057

0.009 0.02 0.038 0.044 0.039Portugal 0.046∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ -0.652∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗

0.006 0.014 0.035 0.033 0.029Austria 0.031∗∗ -0.055∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗ -0.106

0.013 0.026 0.058 0.05 0.083Finland 0.006 -0.011 0.236∗∗∗ -0.036 -0.145∗∗

0.006 0.011 0.021 0.024 0.062note pvalue: .01 - ***; .05 -**; .1 - *;Year dummy vari-ables are included but notreported. Standard error initalics

33

Page 34: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Table 16: Estimates for the hourly wage equation, 2SLS model

Coun-try

expe-rience

exp2lambda

lessfe-

malesec-

ondaryedu-

cation

fe-malesec-

ondaryedu-

cation

fe-maleter-tiaryedu-

cation

Ger-many

0.016∗ -0.021-

0.227∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗0.128 0.069

0.009 0.018 0.067 0.154 0.153 0.155Den-mark

0.001 -0.007-

0.109∗∗∗-

0.132∗∗∗-

0.230∗∗∗

0.006 0.012 0.030 0.013 0.016 0.025The

Nether-land

0.014 -0.024-

0.233∗∗∗-0.136

-0.436∗∗∗

-0.467∗∗∗

0.010 0.021 0.059 0.124 0.125 0.129Bel-gium 0.025∗∗

-0.036 -0.0380.158∗∗

-0.112-

0.326∗∗∗

0.010 0.023 0.024 0.067 0.070 0.074

France 0.064∗∗∗-

0.107∗∗∗0.073

0.624∗∗∗0.112 -0.145

0.010 0.020 0.050 0.125 0.124 0.124

U.K. 0.004 -0.008-

0.206∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗0.118

0.010 0.018 0.061 0.126 0.127 0.125Ire-land

-0.036∗∗

0.058∗ -0.038-

0.201∗∗∗-

0.736∗∗∗-

1.054∗∗∗

0.016 0.031 0.115 0.040 0.036 0.050

Italy0.064∗∗∗

-0.119∗∗∗ 0.020** 0.723∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗

0.190∗

0.009 0.0200.047**

0.101 0.099 0.099

Greece 0.106∗∗∗-

0.238∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗

0.013 0.0340.041**

0.043 0.042

Spain0.111∗∗∗

-0.200∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗

0.013 0.026 0.042 0.038 0.042Por-tugal 0.058∗∗∗

-0.109∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗

-0.443∗∗∗

-0.984∗∗∗

0.009 0.019 0.027 0.042 0.049 0.043Aus-tria 0.048∗∗

-0.071-

0.023**-

0.429∗∗∗-

0.638∗∗∗

0.023 0.0440.068** 0.060***

0.065

Fin-land 0.016∗∗

-0.024 -0.046-

0.249∗∗∗-

0.304∗∗∗

0.008**0.016 0.041 0.017 0.022

note pvalue: .01 - ***; .05 -**; .1 - *;Year dummy vari-ables are included but notreported. Standard error initalics

34

Page 35: Participation and Wage equations for Married Women in ... · being offered to attract women into the labor market. In the first case, low participation rates are explained by women’s

Tab

le17

:V

aria

ble

defi

nit

ions

Vari

able

Definit

ion

Wom

enSam

ple

ofw

om

enm

arr

ied

age

30-5

4

Wom

en1

=1

ifth

ew

om

an

work

or

seek

for

ajo

b,0

oth

erw

ise

Act

ive

=1

ifw

om

enpart

icip

ati

on

tola

bor

mark

et,0

oth

erw

ise

Dum

∗D

um

my

for

tim

e

Age

Age

ofin

div

iduals

Aget

wo

Square

ofage

/10

Fem

ale

educa

tion

less

than

seco

ndary

=1

ifth

ew

om

an

has

thir

dle

vel

educa

tion,0

oth

erw

ise

Fem

ale

seco

ndary

educa

tion

=1

ifth

ew

om

an

has

seco

nd

level

ofed

uca

tion,0

oth

erw

ise

Fem

ale

tert

iary

educa

tion

=1

ifth

ew

om

an

has

firs

tle

vel

ofed

uca

tion,0

oth

erw

ise

Childre

nage

6-1

2=

1if

the

wom

enhas

childre

nle

ssth

an

12yea

rsold

,0

oth

erw

ise

Childre

nage

3-6

childre

nw

ith

age

3–6

yea

rs

Childre

nage

0-3

childre

nw

ith

age

0–3

yea

rs

Ow

ner

house

Dum

my

=1

ifth

ehouse

isow

ner

Adult

hou

Num

ber

ofadult

sin

the

house

hold

Fam

ilyben

efLog

fam

ily

ben

efits

inth

ehouse

hold

Login

com

eLog

ofnola

bor

inco

me

inth

ehouse

hold

excl

usi

on

ofin

com

ew

ife

Dis

abilityben

efLog

realdis

ability

ben

efits

inth

ehouse

hold

Logw

age

Natu

rallo

gofth

ew

om

en’s

hourl

yre

alw

age

Exper

ience

Pote

nti

alex

per

ience

(pre

sent

age

-age

when

start

edw

ork

)

Exp2

Square

ofpote

nti

alex

per

ience

Ten

ure

Yea

rsofex

per

ience

incu

rren

tjo

b

Ten

2Square

ofte

nure

Husb

and

less

than

seco

ndary

school

=1

ifth

ehusb

and

has

firs

tle

vel

ofed

uca

tion,0

oth

erw

ise

Husb

and

seco

ndary

educa

tion

=1

ifth

ehusb

and

has

seco

nd

level

ofed

uca

tion,0

oth

erw

ise

Husb

and

tert

iary

educa

tion

=1

ifth

ehusb

and

has

seco

nd

level

ofed

uca

tion,0

oth

erw

ise

Unem

plo

yben

efLog

ofunem

plo

ym

ent

ben

efit

ofhusb

and

Work

statu

sSta

tus

ofw

ork

ofhusb

and

Lam

bda

Inver

seM

ills

rati

o

Lam

∗Lam

bda

inte

ract

ion

wit

hdum

my

tim

e

35