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8/6/2019 Parties, Ideologies, and Budgets: A Study of Budgetary Trade-offs
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P A R ~ I E S , IDEOLOGIES AND B U D G E ~ S : A STUDY
OF B U D G E ~ A R Y TRADE-OFFS
B y
Joe Todd Adams
D i s s e r t a t i o n
Submitted t o th e F ac ulty o f t h e
Graduate School o f Vanderbilt U n i v e r s i t y
in par t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s
f o r t h e degree o f
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
Pol i t ica l Science
December, 1992
N a s h v i l l e , Tennessee
Date
'0-1 v -1'1 : > - 7 D - ~ ?
10-10 - t i l -
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@ Copyright by Joe Todd Adams 1992All Rights Reserved
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
While doing this study I incurred many debts. I would
l ike to express my gratitude to several people who contrib-
uted thei r time, expertise and support.
For the i r contributions to the collect ion of data on
pol i t i ca l part ies , I would l ike to thank Professors Marina
Arbetman of Tulane Univer si ty , F ranc is G. C astles of the
Australian National Univers ity , Robert Cox o f th e U niversity
of Oklahoma, John Logue of Kent State Universi ty, Eric
Einhorn of the University of Massachusetts a t Amherst,
Charles F. Delzel le of Vanderbilt Universi ty, M. Donald
Hancock of Vanderb il t Univers ity, David Wilsford of Georgia
Ins t i tu te of Technology, and John Williams of Emory Univer-
s i ty . I would also l ike to thank Lieutenant Colonel Clayton
R. Newell and his s ta f f a t the Department of the Army's
Center for Military History for providing data on American
combat deaths.
I would l ike to thank Professor M. Donald Hancock for
h is encouragement and patience during the past three years.
I am especial ly indebted to Professor Jacek Kugler who
provided many useful criticisms and suggestions as well as
several motivating inquiries regarding my progress.
I owe many other intel lectual debts. I am part icularly
indebted to Professors William D. Berry and David Lowery for
i i
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the i r work on conceptualizing budget t rade-offs . This study
i s bu i l t on the i r effor ts to provide a more f rui t ful ap
proach to budgetary analysis.
Most importantly, I would l ike to thank my wife, Drewe
Ann Knight, for her pat ience and understanding in l is tening
to my ideas as they developed. She endured far too many
nights alone while I worked. Her encouragement, pers is-
tence, and affect ion i s great ly treasured. Without her
support th is project would not have been completed.
i i i
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i i
LIST OF FIGURES v i
LIST OF TABLES .................•.......................v i i i
Chapter
I . TRENDS ANDISSUES IN
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES1
An Interest ing Question ..........•..............1
Issues and Recent Trends 9Economic Determinism .•.........................22
American Exceptionalism ....•...................24Party and Policy .....•.....•..•................26
I I . THEORY AND METHODS .....•.....•..•..•............. 30
Introduction .........•........•................ 30A Theory of Ideology .•...........•............. 31A Spatial Arrangement of Ideologies •..........• 33Ideology and Distr ibutive Just ice 43
Policy Character is t ics 48Strategic Opportunities 55A Theory of Tradeoff Behavior ......•........... 59
Americans: Right and Left ..•..•..•............. 62Conceptualiz ing Tradeoffs 69
The General Hypothesis 75
Data Collection and Measurement .............•..76
I nspecti ng t he Poli t ical Variables 87I nspecting t he Dependent Variables ...•......... 98
I I I . CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISONS 106
Introduction ....•....•.............•.•........ 106
Cross-National Patterns 107Summary and Conclusion 113
IV, TRADE-OFFS IN THE UNITED STATES 116
Introduction 116Ideology, Structure and Process 121Hypotheses ......................•...........•. 135Control Variables ...........................•.137
iv
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Preliminary Observations 139Defining the Variables 146
Specifying the Basic Model 153Explaining Trade-offs 174Surnrnary 181
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 183
Principal Findings 183Conclusion: A Peace Dividend? 185
Appendix
A. DATA SOURCES 190
B. QUESTIONNAIRE CONSTRUCTION 193C. MEASUREMENT: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 194
D. RELATED FINDINGS 199War, UnemploYment and Trade-offs 199
BIBLIOGRAPHY 207
v
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. Labor Strength and Percent Moderate Left 90
2. Labor Strength and Percent Moderate Right 91
3. Labor Strength and Anchored Ideological Scores 91
4. Labor Strength and Weighted Ideological Scores 92
5. Relationship between ADA Scores and Party Unity 96
6. Relationship between ADA Scores and Party Unity 97
7. Comparisons of T rade -o ff Measures 100
8. Comparisons of Data Sets for the Heal th Trade-off . . 101
9. Difference between Budget Shares 104
10. Difference between Budget Shares 104
11. Components of Defense Spending: Selected Items 121
12. Defense Outlays and Batt le Deaths 140
13. Defense Outlays and Batt le Deaths (vietnam) 142
14. Education as a Percentage of F ederal Outlays 143
15. Education versus Defense Outlays 148
16. Difference and Proportion Measures 149
17. Difference and Proportion Measures (1940-1986) 150
18. Comparisons of Domestic Trade-off Measures 152
19. Domestic Trade-offs and GNP 163
20 . Democratic Unity During the Vietnam War 166
21. Comparison of Reagan Years with Earl ie r Period 171
22. Unemployment and the Domestic Trade-off 200
v i
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23. Model 2 Predictions of Unemployment 204
v i i
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LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Policy and Ideology 60
2. Left and Right in the Libera l Ideology 68
3. Corre la t ions with u.s. Budget Data 102
4. Cross-National Regression Resul t s 111
5. Average Pres ident ia l Success Rates in the Senate 130
6. Reagan's Success Rate in th e Senate 131
7 . Pres ident ia l Par ty and War: 1940-1990 164
8. Pres iden t ia l Party and the Domestic Trade-of f 165
9. Explaining the Domestic Trade-of f (Po l i t i cs Alone) . . 168
10. The Domestic Trade-of f (With Par t i t ioned Variance> .170
11. Explaining the Domestic Trade-off (The Basic Model) .173
12. Explaining the Health Trade-off 174
13. Explaining the Education Trade-off 175
14. The Education Trade-of f (With Par t i t ioned Variance) .176
15. Differences in Trade-offs : Before and Afte r 1981 178
16. Explaining the Civi l ian Research Trade-of f 180
17. Explaining UnemploYment: Mode l l 202
18. Explaining UnemploYment: Model 2 203
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CHAPTER I
'!'RENDS AND ISSUES IN GOVERNMEN'l'
EXPENDI'l'tJRES
An Interest ing Question
The Cold War has ended. With the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, the poss ibi l i ty of a so-called "peace div i -
dend" in the United States and abroad i s widely discussed.
The question raised by recent changes in the internat ional
context of superpower pol i t ics i s whether the f isca l re -
sources of advanced industr ia l ized democracies wil l be
redirected toward domestic purposes.
Perhaps there is no precedent for such a change, and
therefore, no sol id basis for predicting how the budget may
be sp l i t in the future. Conventional wisdom and a good deal
o f em pirical re sea rch suggest that budgetary distr ibut ions
are re la t ive ly stable in th e sho rt -r un . In fact , few people
have suggested that changes wil l occur rapidly. But the
ra t ionale for the exist ing dist r ibut ion of resources seems
to be fading and defense cut-backs have already begun in
some areas. Does th is mean that other areas of the budget
will benefit? I f so, which areas? Can we predict a t rade
off of th is kind?
1
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2
Even during the Cold War public expenditures changed.
The most noticeable changes included a large expansion of
public services and welfare programs. Not only have bi l -
l ions been spent on defense, but much more has been spent on
the combined categories of heal th, education, and various
kinds of income maintenance programs. Ironical ly , the
al leged arms race was occurring at the same time as the
welfare s tate was approaching i t s zenith.
In effec t , the q ue stio n of whether a peace dividend
should be expected shares the same theoret ical ground as the
issue of the guns-versus-bu tte r t rade-off . Thus, the logi-
cal place to seek an answer to the question of how a poten-
t i a l peace dividend might be distr ibuted i s in the l i t e ra -
ture on budgetary t rade-offs .
The number of papers, ar t ic les and books on the subject
of the g ~ ~ s - v e r s u s - b u t t e r issue has increased markedly
during the l as t two decades. 1 Despite widespread in teres t
and a considerable amount of empirical analysis , theorists
do not agree on the elements of a guns-versus-butter trade-
off . In general , scholarly work on the subject has deal t
with two basic kinds of t rade-offs .
The f i r s t kind of t rade-off is constructed as a hypoth
es is tha t well-being, or quali ty of l i f e , i s affected by
1 See Steve Chan, "The Impact of Defense Spending onEconomic Performance ," Orbis (Summer 1985): 403-34.
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3
mili tary expenditures. S tud ies of this kind of t rade-off
generally consider the effect of defense spend ing on the
economy. 2 Empirical studies on this topic suggest tha t the
influence of defense spending on the economy is not uniform
across a l l countries. Apparently, effects dif fer according
to a country 's level of development, the mixture of i t s
industrial base and whether i t s armaments are imported or
domestically produced. 3 The l i terature suggests tha t what
ever dividend might be achieved in so-cal led quali ty of l i f e
or economic performance i s clearly dependent on several
kinds of qualif icat ions and contingencies.
2 On this point there i s a considerable differencebetween developed and developing countries. For a very goodoverview, see Chan, "The Impact of Defense Spending," 40334. For background on the debate in the United States , seeSeymour Melman, Our Depleted Society (New York, Dell Publ ishing Co., 1965); Bruce M. Russett , What Pr;ce Vigilance?The Burdens of National Defense (New Haven: Yale Universi tyPress, 1970); Morton H. Halperin, Jacob A. Stockfish, andMurray Weidenbaum, The Pol i t ica l Economy of th e M i lit ar y -Industrial Complex, eds. Warren F. Ilchman and Joe S. Bain(Berkeley: Universi ty of California Press, 1973); SeymourMelman, The Permanent War Economy; American Capitalism inDecline (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974); Bruce Russet,"Defense Expenditures and National Well-being," AmericanPol i t ica l Science Review 76 (September 1982): 767-77.
3 Cf. Chan, "Impact of Defense Spending;" David Dabelkoand James D. McCormick, "Opportuni ty Costs of Defense: SomeCrOSS-National Evidence," Journal of Peace Research 2(1977): 146-54; Saadet Deger, "Economic Development andDefense Expenditures," Economic Development and SocialChange 35 (October 1986): 178-96; Steve Chan, "DefenseBurden and Economic Growth: Unraveling the Taiwanese Enigma," American Pol i t ica l Science Review 82 (September 1988):913-20.
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4This study focuses on a second kind of t rade-off: the
t rade-off between categories of government expenditures.
The most common example of th is kind of t rade-off is the
often hypothesized f iscal t rade-off between defense expendi-
tures and various categories of domestic expenditures.
Many studies that examine th is kind of t rade-off indi-
cate tha t the relat ionship between changes in defense expen
ditures and other kinds of expendi tu re s i s re la t ive ly
weak. 4 These studies suggest that expenditures for dif fer -
ent categories appear to be on relat ively independent t ra -
jectories , responding to different pressures and demands
arising from changing economic, demographic and diplomatic
conditions. Changes in international affai rs are frequently
credited with changes in defense expenditures. Shifts in
the demographic composition of the population and economic
performance engender shi f t s in the distr ibut ion of funds
across categories of domestic spending. s
4 Cf. Russett , "Defense Expenditures and NationalWell-being," 767-77; William Domke, Richard Eichenberg, andCatherine M. Kelleher, "The I l lusion of Choice: Defense andWelfare in Advanced . Industrial Democracies , 1948-1978," TheAmerican Pol i t ica l Science Review 77 (March 1983) :19-35; - - Alex Mintz, "Guns Versus Butter: A Disaggregated Analysis,"
American Pol i t ica l Science Review 83 (September 1989): 128593.
S For example, see James L. Clayton, "A Comparison ofDefense and Welfare Spending in the United States and theUnited Kingdom, 1946-1976," Journal of Sociology and SocialWelfare 4 (1978): 401-18; Glenn Palmer, "Alliance Poli t icsand Issue Areas: Determinants of Defense Spending," AmericanJournal of Pol i t ica l Science 34 (1990): 190-211 .
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5
Occasionally, some scholars mix the issues of national
well-being and f iscal distributions in a more complex model
of t rade-offs . In a widely cited study, Bruce Russett
concluded an analysis of the impact of U.S. defense spending
on national well-being with an especial ly inciss ive apprais-
a l of f isca l t rends in the post-war era:
One remarkable fact about th is growth in federaleducation and health spending i s that i t continuedthrough several major periods of mili tary buildup.
Expenditures for education rose through the cold warrearmament and Korean War, and during a l l but two ofthe Vietnam War years. Federal spending for healthcontinued to r ise throughout the Vietnam period. Evenduring the four costly World War I I years from 1941through 1944, these civi l ian federal programs continuedto expand. Sacrifices surely were imposed, but theywere largely sacrifices imposed on current consumption,not on the kind o f long-run social investment requiredto build a healthier and better-educated populat ion.Indeed, the problems o f igno rance, i l l -heal th , andmalnutrit ion among many potent ia l draftees during WorldWar I I helped to convince even the most defense-mindedlegis la tors and off ic ia ls that the federal government
had to take remedial action.A second remarkable fact is that support for
inc reased federa l health and education programs wasreasonably non-part isan. Federal spending for educat ion, e.g . , the National Defense Education Act, went upsharply during the Eisenhower years and continued tor i se during a l l but one year of the Nixon and Fordadministrations. Federal health expend itures passedunscathed through the Nixon and Ford years. When theRepublican presidents fe l t compelled to raise defensereadiness, they kept the i nc reases within l imits andaccepted the taxes necessary to maintain social programs. 6
6 Russet t , "Defense Expenditures and National WellBeing," 776.
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6
Russet t ' s observations reveal three dis t inct problems
in analyzing budgetary t rade-offs . Firs t , Russett res t r ic t s
his evaluation of t rade-off behavior to those instances
where the mili tary expenditures increase. Pro-domestic
t rade-offs are not seriously considered. Russett dismisses
such cases because:
Experience with reduc ti ons in m ilita ry spending i sre la t ive ly l imited, occurring in j u s t 16 or th e 39
years in our sample. [Evidence] suggests tha t there i s
some t rade-off in th ese y ea rs , and i n p rin ci pl e we
might analyze y ears w ith mili tary upswings in separateequations from those with downswings. However, thesamples--especial ly for years with mili tary down-swings--would be very small for adequate multivariateanalysis , and th e te chnic al problems of analyzingyearly data for years that were often not adjacentwould be formidable. 7
Russet t ' s remarks are reminiscent of many other schol-
ars who have writ ten on the issu e. A close reading of the
l i tera ture on th is subject reveals tha t there a re uns ta te dassumptions made about the way defense versus domestic
t rade-offs operate. I t appears tha t the majori ty of studies
posi t a zero-sum game where an increase in defense expendi -
tures occurs a t the expense of other programs. I f th is is
t rue, then an equally possible alternative tha t increases in
domestic expenditures occur a t the expense o f defense spend
ing should exis t . This poss ibi l i ty i s dismissed in
Russet t ' s study because the number of cases were too small
7 Russett , "Defense Expenditures," 775, n.7 ( i ta l icsadded) .
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7
for s t a t i s t i ca l analysis . In most studies, the quest ion i s
not addressed at a l l because the concept of a t rade-off i s
i t se l f not clearly defined. I t is p re sent ed a s a hypothe-
sized negative relat ionship between the growth ra tes of two
or more categories of expendi tu re s. Such an approach does
not capture the ful l range of f isca l possibi l i t ies .
Second, the influence of internat ional factors on
budgetary behav ior i s not clear . The widely debated concept
of an arms race w ith i t s emphasis on escalat ion seems to add
very l i t t l e to our understanding of how budgetary outcomes
are determined. Both Soviet and American defense expendi -
tures increased during the per iod Russet t analyzes, yet many
categories of domestic expenditures did not apparently
suffer . Do changes in Soviet mili tary spending ef fec t
t rade-offs in federal outlays as im plied by the arms race
l i te ra ture?
Thi rd , according to Russet t , the succession of
Republican presidents appears to have had l i t t l e influence
on the budgetary changes. Unfortunately, Russet t does not
develop the kind of measures required to t es t adequat ely the
hypothesis that ' ·bipartisanship accounted for the growth in
domestic spending; i t is not included in his model.
Perhaps an adequate measure of partisan influence could
account for the apparently odd combination of events Russet
describes. Of eleven independent variables used in
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8
Russet t ' s study only one dummy variable direct ly measured
the in fl uen ce o f a pol i t ical factor: the pres ident ' s party
af f i l i a t ion . The questio n o f whether part isan pol i t ics
influenced the outcome is a matter of part icu lar in teres t to
stu den ts of pol i t ics , but the l i te ra ture on the effect of
pol i t ics on f i sca l outcomes is inconclusive. A substant ial
l i terature suggests, as does Russett , that economic and
demographic factors account for most of the variance in
budgetary behavior.
In using a predominantly economic and demographic model
to explain trends in expendi tu res, Russe tt is not alone.
This i s the norm in scholarly work on government spending.
One might even say that th is general approach represents a
paradigm. This approach is accepted by a wide range of
scholars in several disciplines. In part , the analyt ical
approach used in Russet t ' s study stems from the kind of
research which preceded i t .
Unfortunately the conceptual and analytical methods em-
ployed in Russet t 's study, and in most of th e re se arc h on
th is issue, cannot adequa te ly address the t ra de -o ff i ss ue .
For a varie ty of reasons, most of the research in th is area
is simply misdirected. This study wil l employ an al terna-
t ive approach. Using direct measures of t rade-off outcomes,
I t es t the hypothesis that part ies have an effec t on t rade
offs in the United States and other advanced industr ial
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9
democracies. A proper t es t of th is hypothesis might yield a
bet te r understanding of condi ti ons requ ir ed for obtaining a
peace dividend.
Issues and Recent Trends
Turning to the l i terature on government expenditures,
one f inds a profusion of studies claiming to explain why
expenditures change. Comparatively less research deals
di rec t ly with the issue of t rade-offs between specific kinds
of expenditures. Instead, there i s a preponderance of
l i terature dea li ng wit h the determinants of one or another
kind of expenditure, usually in isolat ion from other kinds
of spending. Findings in th is body of research are not
unanimous. In part , the dispari ty between findings can be
at t r ibuted to the scope of studies, differences in levels of
analysis , and the level of budget aggregation as well as the
methodological techniques employed. These factors cause
some dispar i t ies , but the l i terature also reveals a variety
of parochial disciplinary preoccupations.
Research on government spending i s the providence of
several academic discipl ines including economics, pol i t ical
science, sociology and public administration. Each disc i -
pl ine brings i t s own questions to the subject o f exp la in ing
the dynamics of th e pub lic purse. A fragmented and special-
ized l i terature on publ ic expenditures has emerged. As a
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10
resu l t , there is l i t t l e common ground on what needs to be
explained.
For economists, the central questions concern the
l imits of government spending and i t s effec t on productiv-
i ty , in teres t rates, inflat ion, international trade, unem-
ploYment and the l ike . For t he s oc io log is t, the centra l
questions re la te to how government expenditures w ill a ffe ct
the quali ty of l i fe fo r various elements of the populace and
relat ions between classes of people. For the specia l is t in
publ ic admini st ra ti on and public finance, scholarly in te r -
es ts revolve around predict ing budget surpluses or defici t s
as well as measuring the eff ic iency of public ly produced
services . Pol i t ica l sc ient is ts have tended to focus on
budgetary process, pol i t i ca l accountabili ty, responsible
f isca l behavior, and the coherence of po li cy ob je c ti ve s. 8
8 The study of the budget process has a long heri tage,but remains t ied to legal and procedural modes of analysis .The centra l finding of th is body of research i s tha t budgetprocesses promote incremental t inkering, as opposed tocomprehensive budgeting. Cf., Avery Leiserson, "Coordination of Federal Budgeting and Appropriations Proceduresunder t he Legi sl at ive Reorganization Act of 1946," NationalTax Journal 1 (1948): 118-25; Charles E. Lindblom, "TheScience of Muddling Through," Publ ic Admin is tra tion Review19 (1959): 79-88; Richard F. Fenno, J r . , The Power of the
Purse: Appropriations Poli t ics in Congress (Boston: Li t t l eBrown and Company, 1966); Aaron Wildavsky, The Pol i t ics ofthe Budgetary Process (Boston: Li t t l e Brown, 1964); OttoDavis, M.A.H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky, "Toward aPredictive Theory of Government Expenditures: U.S. DomesticAppropriations," Brit ish Journal of Pol i t ica l Science 4(October 1974): 419-52; Louis Fisher, Presidential SpendingPower (Pr ince ton: Pr inceton Unive rs ity P re ss , 1975); ThomasW. Wander, F. Ted Hebert, and Gary W. Copeland, eds. , Con-
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11
Some of these concerns in tersect at certain points .
The question of growth in expenditures, what drives i t and
what l imits i t , is one area where the various disciplines
have converged. In part icular , at tent ion has been directed
a t the growth of government expenditures on those items most
closely ident i f ied with the so-called welfare s tate .
Most of th e re se arc h on domestic spending on welfare
and socia l services has focused on demographic and economic
determinants. Accounts of how domestic programs developed
f requent ly descr ibe the his tor ica l sequence of events or
conditions leading to the establishment of social programs
and the corresponding growth in th e pub lic sector for a
s ingle country or se t of countries sharing more or less
s imilar character i s t ics . 9 Other studies emphasize the
aressional Budaetina: Pol i t ics , Process and Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer si ty P re ss , 1984).
9 Descriptive, narrat ive analy ses o f the developmentof the welfare s tate can be found in Hugh Heclo, ModernSocial Pol i t ics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to IncomeMaintenance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); PeterFlora and Arnold J . Heidenheimer, eds. , "The Historical Coreand Changing Boundaries of the Welfare State," in The Development of Welfare States in Europe and North America (NewBrunswick, N.J. : Transaction Books, 1981); Ann Shola Orloffand Theda Skocpol, "Why not equal Protection? Explaining the
Polit ics of Public Social Spending in Britain, 1900-1911,and the United States , 1890s-1920, " American SociologicalReview 49 {December 1984}: 726-50; and Norman Furniss, ed. ,Futures o f the Welfare State {Bloomington, I l l inois : IndianaUniversity Press, 1986}; Richard Rose, "How Exceptional i s
the American Poli t ica l Economy?" Polit ical Science Quarterly104 (Spring 1989): 91-115.
Quanti tat ive studies include: Morris Beck, "PublicSector Growth: A Real Perspective," Public Finance 34
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12
differences between countries, taking a sample of very
different countries for the i r analysis . lO
Most studies find that there i s a general trend toward
expansion of social programs. Expansion has two dimensions.
Firs t , the p ropo rtio n o f th e populatio n targeted fo r p ro vi-
sion of services has generally increased. Second, the range
of benefi ts ava ila ble t o recipients has also increased. One
of the reasons given for the expansion of benefi ts i s tha t
there is a tendency for governments to index benefi ts in
many domestic welfare programs, such tha t increases occur in
a quasi-automatic manner, following the rate of inflat ioL.
Indexing, and expansion in the target population has raised
(1979): 313-55; Morris Beck, Government Spending: Trends andIssues (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981); Frank Gould,liThe Development of Public Expenditures in Western, Indust r ia l ized Countries: A Comparative Analys is ," Pub li c Finance38 (1983 ): 38-69 ; Balbir S. Sahni and Balvir Singh, "On theCausal Directions Between Income and Government Expenditurein Canada," Public Finance 39 (1984): 359-93; Tom W. Rice,"The Determinants of Western European Government Growth,"Comparative Poli t ical Studies 19 (July 1986) :233-57 ; F red C.Pampel and John B. Williamson, "Welfare Spending in AdvancedIndustrial Democracies 1950-1980," American Jou rn al ofSociology 93 (1988): 1424-56.
10 The classic example is Philips Cutright , "Pol i t ica lStructure, Economic Development, and National Social Security Programs," American Journal of Sociology 70 (March 1965):537-50; cf. Sohrab Abizadeh and John Gray, "Wagner's Law: APooled Time-Series, Cross-Sectional Comparison," NationalTax Journal 38 (June 1985): 209-16; Bruce E. Moon andWilliam J . Dixon, "Poli t ics , the S tate , and Basic HumanNeeds: A Cross-National Study," American Journal of Pol i t i -
cal Science 29 (November 1985): 661-94.
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questions about how growth in government expenditures can be
controlled.
After a relat ively rapid expansion of social programs
during the 1960s and 1970s pol i t ic ians and scholars began to
consider whether continued expansion was possible, or had
the growth of th e public sector in the new welfare s ta te
reached i t s apex? With the economic shocks of the mid-
1970s, producing economic crises in many industr ia l ized
countries and the recent phenomenon of stagf lat ion with the
dual problems of unemploYment and inf lat ion, f isca l resourc-
es seemed to be reaching thei r l imi ts . Several countries
began to sh i f t away from expansion of social programs to
programs of auster i ty during the late 1970s and 1980s.
In Bri ta in, Margaret Thatcher 's Conservative Party
began a process of privat izat ion. 11 Meanwhile, the United
States began a defense buildup, and began trimming or post-
poning the implementation of programs designed to combat
poverty or improve opportunit ies for the disadvantaged.
Many observers pointed to th e doc tr in es of pol i t i ca l par t ies
as the cause of these changes.
Whether pol i t ical part ies have a signif icant effec t on
government expendi tu res con tinues to be an item of contro-
11 For a detailed description of programs targeted bythe Thatcher government see Anthony J . Harrison, The Controlof Public Expenditure 1979-1989 (Oxford: Transaction Books,1989), 18-140 , 263-277.
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versy among students of government spending. Research
concerning the effect of part ies on expenditures has also
spawned a debate on whether th e obje ct iv es of redistr ibut ive
programs have been achieved. For instance, debate continues
on the subjec t of whether socia l is t governments tha t espouse
ega li ta r ian po l ic i es actual ly achieve redist r ibut ion through
expenditures, or whether these pol ic ies merely provide a
baseline of income protect ion. Research on th e in flu en ce of
part ies and pol i t i ca l structures has deal t a t len gth w ith
the question of whether pol i t ica l factors improve the aggre-
gate sta nd ard o f l iving, improve economic performance, or
even extend l i fe expectancy and reduce infant mortality.12
Much of this research has focused on government expenditures
12 This topic continues to be a matter of controversy, cf. Cutright , "Poli t ical Structure, Economic Development," 537-50; and Heclo, Modern Social Pol i t ics in Bri tainand Sweden, 227-283; and Richard M. Coughlin and Phil ip K.
Armour, "Methodological Issues in the Comparative Study ofSocial Securi ty: Qual it at ive vs. Quan ti ta tive Analysis andthe Appropriate Use of Data," Internat ional Review of ModernSociology 10 (July-December 1980): 25-48; Douglas Hibbs,"Poli t ical Part ies and Macroeconomic Policy," American
Pol i t ica l Science Review 71 (December 1977): 1467-87; JamesL. Payne, "Inflat ion, Unemployment, and Lef t-Wing Poli t ica lPart ies : A Reanalysis," American Poli t ica l Science Review 73
(March 1979) : 181-85; Douglas Hibbs, "Communicat ions,"American Poli t ica l Science Review 73 (March 1979) : 185-90;Robert W. Jackman, "Soc ia li st Pa rt ie s and Income Inequalityin Western Industrial Societies," Journal of Poli t ics 42
(February 1980) : 135-149; Moon and Dixon, "Poli t ics , theState, and Basic Human Needs," 661-94.
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duce these policies a re gener al ly populated by un-elected
bureaucrats and other c iv i l servants unaff i l iated with major
pol i t i ca l par t ies . While the issue of the relat ive impor
tance of f iscal , monetary and regulatory pol ic ies on econom-
ic performance and social change is very interest ing, and
worthy of continued research, th is s tudy add resses the more
l imited que stio n o f whether pol i t ical par t ies act to al lo-
cate resources in the manner commonly assumed in popular
pol i t i ca l discourse and debated in scholarly journals.
The question posed here i s whether pol i t ical part ies
systematically change the direct ion of government spending.
This quest ion i s intimately t ied to the question of whether
par t ies control public pol icy. I f a party cannot change the
al locat ion of government r esou rc es , t hen i t i s not able to
implement i t s policy objectives. Events during the l a s t
decade seem to in dic ate tha t a correla t ion exists between
changes in the part isan composition of government and subse
quent spending pat terns. Recent pol i t i ca l history seems to
support the idea that part ies influence the allocation of
expenditures.
In the United States during the 1980s, social workers
and advocates fo r social programs in the areas of education
and other social services complained about the Reagan
administrat ion 's lack of financial support for the i r pro
grams. Many social programs experienced cutbacks, and
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f inancial support for proposed programs were not forthcom-
ing. Two theoret ical ly important issues are a t stake in
determining whe ther such complaints are properly directed a t
the Reagan administration. Fir s t i s the que stio n o f whether
budgetary changes are products of a general pat tern of
part isan pol i t ics , whereby increases in the power of one
party, in th is case the election of a president (and senate
majority) from the Republican Party, predictably foreshad-
owed the demise or expansion of specific kinds of programs.
Put different ly, is there something about the Republican
Party that determines how budgets are divided among policy
al ternat ives? Or, is th is an economically driven or idio-
syncrat ic occurrence without any pol i t ical ly generalizable
features? In short, was Reagan personally responsible, qua
Ronald Reagan, for these changes, or was he responsible qua
Republican president? Is there something inherent to the
nature of pol i t i ca l p artie s th at provides a foundation for
predict ing government policy? Some prel iminary observat ions
on th is matter seem espec ia lly relevant .
During the 1980s, the similar i ty of events in United
States and the United Kingdom evoked many commentaries on
the lead ers of those countries. The personal aff ini ty of
President Ronald Reagan and Bri t i sh Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher i s widely recognized. In the United Kingdom under
the Thatcher government, a program of privat izat ion and
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f iscal austeri ty led to the d ismant li ng o f a number of
ins t i tut ions tha t had received suppo rt under previous Labour
Party governments. In part icular , nat ional ized industr ies
were targeted for privatizat ion. This led to a coal miner 's
s t r ike in p ro te st of the government's pol ic ies . 1s
Similar changes occurred in the United States during
the Reagan administration. What Anthony Harrison terms
"off- loading" became a key component of Reagan 's domestic
policy agenda. 16 In the United States, under the Reagan
administrat ion, grants- in-aid to the s ta tes were cut, under
the guise of providing more "local control ," and l i f t ing the
weight of centralized decision-making from the shoulders of
s ta te and local off ic ia ls . u
Changes in both countries seemed to be made a t the
expense of labor in terests and other social groups a t the
lower end of the socio-economic spect rum, which prompts some
15 See Harrison, Control of Public Expenditure, 6,passim.
16 Ibid, 18-83. Cf. Harold Seidman and Robert Glimour,Pol i t ics , position and Power, 4th ed. (Oxford : Oxford Univers i ty Press, 1986), 119-35.
17 Cf. R ichard Nathan and Fred C. Dooli t t le , "Changesduring Reagan's Firs t Term," in Reagan and the States , eds.Richard Nathan and Fred C. Dooli t t le , (Pr ince ton: Prince tonUniversity Press, 1987) 44-66; John E. Chubb "Federalism andthe Bias for Centralization," chap. 10 in The New Directionin American Poli t ics , eds. John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Ins t i tut ion, 1985),273-306. Seidman and Gilmour, Poli t ics , posi t ion and Power,133-6.
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19
sense o f c ompa rab ility . But i s th is a general p atte rn th at
applies to a l l administrat ions that share a so-called con-
servative ideology? Moreover, how do nat ional legislatures
f igure in the equation?
Numerous scholars have found relat ionships between the
part isan composition of national parliaments and growth in
specific kinds of budget allocations . Others argue tha t
social , demographic and economic factors determine govern-
ment expenditures. In cross-nat ional s tudies , i t i s widely
theorized tha t par t ies of the l e f t increase the size of the
public s ec to r, e sp ec ia ll y with respect to domestic expendi
tures on welfare programs .1 8
Some scholars have expressed skepticism that changes in
expenditures result from party influences. They argue that
18 See Douglas Hibbs, Economic In teres t and the Polit i cs of Macroeconomic Policy (Centre for InternationalStudies: MIT, 1975); Hibbs, "Pol i t ica l Part ies and Macroeconomic Policy," 1467-87; David Cameron, "The Expansion of thePublic Economy," American Poli t ica l Science Review 72 (De-cember 1978): 1243-61; Tufte, Poli t ica l Control of theEconomy; Francis G. Castles and R. McKinlay, "Does Poli t icsMatter: An Analysis of the Public Welfare Commitment inAdvanced Democratic States ," European Journal of Pol i t ica lResearch 7 (1979) :169-86; Walter Korpi, "Social Pol icy andDistr ibutional Conflict in the Capital is t Democracies: APreliminary Framework," West European Pol i t ics 4 (1980):
296-316; Francis G. Castles, "The Impact of Part ies onPubl ic Expenditures ," in The Impact of Part ies , ed. FrancisCastles (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), 21-96; Gould, "TheDevelopment of Publ ic Expend itures ," 38-69; Paul Whiteley,Poli t ica l Control of the Macroeconomy: The Poli t ica l Economyof Public Policy Making (Beverly Hil ls : Sage Publications,1986); Duane H. Swank, "The Pol i t i ca l Economy of GovernmentDomestic Expenditures in th e A fflu en t Democracies , 1960-80,"American Journal of Poli t ica l Science 32 (1988): 1121-50.
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20
var ia t ions in expenditures are not his tor ica l ly significant
and tha t pol i t i ca l influences are subordinate to other
factors, part icularly economic and demographic trends. 19
There are several reasons for skepticism. One impor-
tan t reason i s tha t government expendi tu re s t end to change
more slowly than the pol i t ica l environment, especial ly with
respect to changes in public opinion.
Moreover, it is widely recognized tha t changes in
government expenditures from one year to the next are highly
correla ted. Changes in expenditures generally occur in
small increments. 2o For th is and other reasons, the pre-
ponderance of research has focused on socio-economic factors
tha t also change incrementally, or very slowly over tim e.
Indeed, much of the research on the origins of the welfare
s ta te has emphasized the his tor ica l context of the welfare
s ta te . Additionally, certain aspects of a country's po l i t i -
19 See Cutright, "Poli t ical Structure," 537-550; HaroldWilensky, The Welfare State and Equality: Structural andIdeological Roots of Pub li c Expenditu re s (Berkeley : Univers i ty of California Press, 1975); Richard Rose, Do Part iesMake a Difference?, 2d ed. , rev and enl . (Chatham, New
Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1984). For a less assuredaccount of non-part isan influences see Beck, "Public Sector
Growth," 313-55; Beck, Government Spend ing: Trends andIssues.
20 See Charles Lindblom, "The Science of MuddlingThrough," 79-88; Aaron Wildavsky, The Poli t ics of the Bud-getary Process; and Otto Davis, M.A.H. Dempster, and AaronWildavsky, "Toward a Predict ive Theory of Government Expenditures: U.S. Domestic Appropriations," Bri t i sh Journal ofPol i t ica l Science 4 (October 1974): 419-52.
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21
cal cu ltu re are sometimes credited with promoting expansion
of welfare programs and increases in the s ize of the pu blic
sector . Among the factors considered to be in f luent ia l in
promoting expansion in the welfare s ta te are: th e exis te nc e
of a strong labor movement (combined with a strong democrat-
ic soc ia l i s t movement), rel igious aff i l ia t ions (such as
Catholicism), and economic rel iance on the export sector . 21
These perspectives on government spend ing pose al terna-
t ive hypotheses. On one side of the issue are those who
argue tha t pol i t i ca l part ies have an important impact on
expenditures, especially those expenditures related to the
size and complexity of the welfare s ta te . On the o ther sid e
are those who argue tha t government expenditures are econom-
ica l ly determined, as a resul t of industrial izat ion, demo-
graphic composition, economic affluence, and even the
country 's vulnerabil i ty to f luctuations i n i nt er na ti on a l
trade. 22 Economic theories comprise the bulk of scholar-
21 Harold L. Wilensky, "Leftism, Catholicism, andDemocratic Corporatism: The Role of Pol i t ica l Part ies inRecent Welfare State Development," in The Development ofWelfare States in Europe and North America eds. Peter Floraand Arnold J . Heidenheimer, (New Brunswick, N.J. : Transac
t ion Books. 1981) , 345 -82. See also, Flora andHeidenheimer, "The Histor ical Core and Changing Boundaries,"17-34. For a very good overview of t h is l it er at ur e, seeHannu Uusitalo, "Comparative Research on the Determinants ofthe Welfare State: the State of th e A rt," European Journalof Pol i t ica l Research 12 (1984): 403-22.
61.
22 See Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public," 1243-
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22
ship on government spending, but can th ey add re ss the ques-
t ion of how guns versus but ter choices are made?
Economic Determinism
By far the most frequently ci ted and most widely dis-
cussed theory of the growth in public expenditures i s the
theory f i r s t espoused in the 1880s by a German economist,
Adolph Wagner. He hypothesized tha t as populations become
more affluent , the i r demand for public services inc reas
es . 23 This theory has received widespread acceptance among
economists and pol i t ical sc ient is ts alike. 24 A closely
related school of thought suggests tha t increases in govern-
ment spending resu l t from the pressures of powerful in terest
groups.25
Some theor is t s have argued that extending government
benefi ts generates a rachet effec t whereby, once offered,
23 For a concise descr ipt ion, and empirical t es t ofWagner's Law, see Abizadeh and Gray, "Wagner's Law: A PooledTime-Series," 209-16.
24 See James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, "The Expanding Public Sector: Wagner Squared," Public Choice 31 (1977):147-50; Rice, "The Determinants of Western European Government," 243.
25 Cf. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 42-63 ; Morr isFiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977): 29-49. Theseaccounts are firm ly r oo ted in the ear l ie r work of David B.Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,Inc. , 1951); and v.o. Key, Pol i t ics , Part ies and PressureGroups Fourth Edition (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company,1958) .
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23
public welfare programs are pract ica l ly i r revers ible . 26
This dynamic i s based on the observation that such benefi ts
are ra re ly r ol le d back to previous levels . 27 The authors
of this theory, Peacock and Wiseman, argue tha t growth in
such expenditures occurs in the wake of war. They theorized
tha t popu la tions sub jected to the s t ra ins of war expect a
payoff for the i r deprivation during the war. In the i r view,
a kind of quid quo pro between pol i t i ca l e l i te and the
population tends to in cre ase expenditures. This theory is
supported by the expansion of social expenditures in many
Western democracies following the Second World War.
Other theorists argue tha t the very nature of demo-
cratic government i t s e l f mil i ta tes against f isca l re -
s t ra in t . 28 The t rad i t ional form of th is argument i s tha t
office holders increase payoffs to voters to influence
elec tora l outcomes. A closely related theory is tha t , in
addit ion to the elec tora l needs of pol i t ic ians , in te res t
26 See Alan Peacock and Jack Wiseman, The Growth ofPublic Expenditure in the United Kingdom (Pr ince ton: P rince
to n Univ ers ity P res s, 1961).
27 See Dirk Wolfson, "Controlling the Welfare State: ACase Study of Retrenchment in the Netherlands," PublicFinance, 42, no. 2 (1987).
28 See Anthony Downs, "Why the Government Budget Is TooSmall in a Democracy," World Pol i t ics 12 (1960) : 541 -563 ;Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent.
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24
groups conspire, sometimes in collaboration with bureau-
crats , to expand public expenditures. 29
According to t he se per spec ti ves , part ies contributes
l i t t l e or nothing to the explanation of changes in expendi-
tures . Together, such theories const i tute what has been
termed a "par ti san inva r ian t hypothes is ," suggest ing that
part ies do not affect expenditures. Instead, expenditures
are subject to the influences of in teres t groups, pol i t ical
cycles, or economic condit ions, regardless of the party in
power.
I f these t heor ie s a re correct with respect to the
influence of pol i t i ca l part ies, then there should not be a
correlat ion between the strength of certa in kinds of part ies
and cer tain kinds of expenditures. The l i terature , however,
indicates that some researchers have found jus t tha t (even
when controlling for economic and demographic variables) .
American Exceptionalism
The controversy over the part isan impact on expendi-
tures has important implicatio ns for stu dents of American
pol i t i cs . For decades , American po l it ic a l s c ie n ti st s have
cr i t ic ized both the Democratic and Republican part ies for an
29 Cf. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the WashingtonEstablishment, 87-93; Lowi, The End o f L ib er al ism.
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25
apparent inabi l i ty to provide voters clear al te rna t ives .
I t i s well known that American part ies do not maintain
the level of party discipline found in most other democra
cies. This fact is at t r ibuted to a variety of influences
including the structural fragmentation of party organiza-
t ion , party members who act as policy entrepreneurs for
the i r own electoral advantage and the tendency of part ies to
become enmeshed in interest-group pol i t ics a t the expense of
coherent policy making.
Coupled to these characterizations of the two major
par t ies , students of American pol i t ical values have s tressed
the non-ideological character of the electorate . Indeed,
th is i s an enduring theme in most studies of American pol i t -
ica l thought.
For more than 150 years, one of the most frequently
c it ed au tho ri ti es on the character of American pol i t i ca l
thinking has been Alexis De Tocqueville. His comments about
the United States in the 1830s have been recognized for
thei r enduring relevance. Among his many comments on the
character of Americans, he wrote tha t "I think no country in
the civil ized world is less attention paid to philosophy
than in the United States . ,,30 Moreover, De Tocqueville
noted tha t Americans tended to be more occupied with busi-
30 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed.Phil l ips Bradley, Vol. I, pt.2 ch. 10 (New York: Knopf,1945), 3.
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26
ness than people in Europe. This description f i t s well into
other accounts of Americans being individual ist ic , se l f -
interested, and pragmatic. This character izat ion has domi-
nated most subsequent analyses of pol i t i c s in the United
States . Ideology is not considered to be an important
feature of American pol i t ics .
Pragmat ism, and a commitment to a general notion of
l ib er al ism a re consis tent charac ter iza t ions of the American
pol i t i ca l cul ture . 31 In comparison with other most
European democracies, t he id eo logi ca l differences between
part ies in the United S tates a re relat ively minute. In a
manner of speaking, many scholars consider the United States
to be "exceptional" in i t s deviation from the ideological
dist inct ions found in other Western democ racie s. L ikewise,
i t has been suggested that U.S. expenditures patterns are
equally excep tional, lagging behind other advanced indust r i
alized democracies in the development of a number of social
programs. This study will examine the empirical val idi ty of
th is assessment of American pol i t ics .
Party and Policy
Much of the previous research on the influence of
par t ies on expenditures has included references to par ty
31 The two most prominent works on th is su bjec t areLouis Hartz, The Liberal Tradit ion in America (New York:Harcourt, Brace, 1955); and Richard Hofstadter, Liberalismin America (New York: Vintage Books, 1958).
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27
ideologies. A host of di f fe rent coding methods have been
employed in this f ield with mixed resu l ts . At the root of
this kind of analysis i s the presupposi t ion that par t ies
dif fer in thei r preferences for part icular kinds of pol i
cies . Exactly how or why t he se d if fe rences should obtain i s
frequently l e f t to the imagination of th e read er. Even
those studies that suggest tha t part isan ideologies play a
par t in determining expenditures devote l i t t l e time explain
ing the connections between ideology and the kinds of ex
penditures under consideration.
To the extent that generalizations can be made from
th is area of research, there appears to be a scholarly
consensus tha t lef t - leaning part ies tend to support, a t
leas t rhetorical ly, expenditures for social programs, while
more conservat ive, or right-leaning par t ies tend to support
expenditures for defense and minimize the amounts spent on
social programs.
Several gaps in the explanations presented in the
l i terature are apparent. Few accounts describe what i s it
about the ideology that promotes one kind of bias as opposed
to another. I f there i s an underlying principle operating,
i t i s rarely made expl ic i t . In short, the content of what
i s being measured when l e f t - or right-wing parl iamentary
seats are being counted i s not f ul ly spec if ied. What i s
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28
missing i s a defini t ion of the theoret ical content of the
terms l e f t and r ight .
Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartor i describe the l e f t -
r ight continuum as being in the "social change/ soci al equal -
i ty domain." This i s consistent with many descriptions of
ideologies found in the philosophically oriented l i terature ,
but rarely mentioned in empirical, quant i ta t ively oriented
studies . 32 Sani and Sar tor i ' s comment on the content o f
the lef t - r ight continuum suggests that the Left favors
social change and social equali ty more than the Right.
Colloqui al cat ch phrases, such as "bleeding heart ," or "hard
r ight ," capture much of the sense tha t Sani and Sartori
intend in describing th is domain.
Popular and scholarly perc ep ti on s o f t he ideolog ical
lean ings o f pol i t ical groups are often ar t icula ted in spa-
t i a l descriptions which note the depth and degree of those
leanings. Pol i t ica l groups on both sides of the l e f t - r igh t
continuum are percieved as being moderate or radical in
thei r adherence to ideological posi t ions.
Par t ies of the le f t are often descr ibed a s advocates of
"progressive," social programs and adherents of social
change. Part ies of the r ight are characterized as being
32 Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartori , "Polarization,Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies,"Western European Party Systems, Edited by Hans Daalder andPeter Mair, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983), 310.
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29
le ss s en sit iv e to the issue of inequali ty and generally
opposed to social change. As mentioned, there i s a wide-
spread perception that these leanings are a matter of de-
gree, where those part ies at the extremes are considered
radical as opposed to more moderate, or even centr is t par-
t i es . These perceptions of the pol i t ica l landscape are not
frequently ar t iculated systematically. For this reason, i t
i s adviseable to inspect the more cogently art iculated
philosophical ground latent in the perception that a po l i t i -
cal party is more or less support ive of s oc ia l e qu ali ty and
social change (A more extensive treatment of th is matter,
and a d is cu ss ion o f re la ted measurements, is presented in
the fol lowing chapter ) .
These perceptions are used to t es t the very general
hypothesis that policy al ternat ives stem from the ideolog-
i ca l commitments of pol i t ic ians . Moreover, it i s theorized
that pol i t ic ians associate themselves with other like-minded
people in organized pol i t i ca l part ies. Explaining the
connection between ideology and public policy i s the subject
of the next chapter.
The following discussion draws on the work of scholars
in the f ield of pol i t ical philosophy to relate three major
ideological persuasions, or orientations, to specif ic kinds
of pol ic ies and then to a theory of budgetary t rade-offs .
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CHAPTER :I I
THEORY AND METHODS
Introduction
This chapter develops a theory of how ideologies are
re la te d to budgetary t rade-offs . The f i r s t step in this
process i s to establ ish the theoret ical content of the l e f t -
r ight continuum which wil l be used to measure the principal
independent variable. The "social equal i ty/social change
domain" that Sani and Sartor i mention, provides the focus
for the discussion of the theoret ical construct of the
continuum. This i s a necessary step in explaining why
part ies should matter to budgetary outcomes.
What i s developed in the following sections i s a theory
of what i s inside the "black box" so frequently referred to
in systems models of pol i t ics . By developing a description
of the concep tua l con tent o f a l e f t - r igh t dimension, I am
postulat ing that the in ternal mechanisms of government
operate according to a set of generalizable rules . To
define these rules, and thereby the content of the dimen-
sion, I refer to the work of pol i t ical philosophers, whose
area of expertise is the definit ion of ideological content.
In the in teres t o f b rev ity and s imp li ci ty t hr ee "ideal
types" of the most preval en t i deo log ie s are developed below.
30
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31
The ideologies considered include socialism, class ica l
l iberalism, and conservatism. Drawing on the cr i t i ca l
an aly se s o f scholars who specialize in the f ie ld of moral
and pol i t ical philosophy, a select ion of key character ist ics
are ident i f ied. More variety of opinion exists than can be
catalogued coherently in a single study, so some narrow
issues are not t reated here. With these l imitations in
mind, what is being asserted is the plaus ibi l i ty of the
soci al equa li ty /soci al change dimension suggested by Sani
and Sartor i across a spectrum of pa rty ideo log ie s. These
characterizations are intended to i l lus t ra te why certa in
kinds of biases toward policies should be expected by par-
t ies that fa l l more or less to the r ight or l e f t .
A Theory of Ideology
Since the word was coined in the eighteenth century,
the concept of ideology has been defined in many di f fe rent
ways. The most common way o f descr ib ing ideology is as a
bel ie f system or "world view," through which social real i ty
is interpreted. This part icular understanding of ideology
emphasizes the cognit ive effects that a publ ic ly o rien ted
phi losophy has on an individual 's interpretat ion of percep-
t ions, pol i t i ca l at t i tudes and public values. In th i s
respect, the analogy of a "prism" is frequently used to
describe the way that an ideology affects cognitive opera-
t ions. Thi s ana logy is similar in many ways to what has
been conceptualized as an "operational code," or ra ther a
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se t of predisposi t ions to select ively receive and respond to
events . According to th i s view, ideology generates a sensi-
t iv i ty to part icu lar kinds of s t imul i , and blindness to
other kinds of s t imul i , structuring the kinds of consider
at ions which inform decision making. 33 In essence, di f fe r -
e nt id eo lo gie s provide al ternat ive frames of reference, o r
ways of thinking,34 and thereby constra in the menu of con-
ceivable pol icy a l te rna t ives avai lable to c erta in actors .
Pejorat ively , the term "ideology" i s sometimes used to
mean a kind of stubborn adherence to a se t of soc ia l objec-
t i ves . In th i s view, an ideology fu nctio ns as a kind of
secu lar t heology, p rov id ing the basis for moral and po l i t i -
ca l judgements. Alternatively, ideologies are sometimes
viewed as socia l conveniences, as ra t ional izat ions or j u s t i -
f ica t ions fo r po l it ic a l a c t iv i t ie s . In this view, ideology
does not t ru ly provide a cause for act ion, but is a cloak or
33 See Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (NewYork: Basic Books, 1960), for an excel lent treatment of howb elie fs a ff ec t the interpretat ion of events . The r e la t ion
ship of core b el ie fs to ideology i s explained qui te well inElinor Scarbrough, Pol i t i ca l Ideology and Voting: An Exploratory Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 24-49. There la t ionship of the cognitive view to cybe rne ti c theo ry i squi te in teres t ing . Cf. Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Gov-
ernment (New York: The Free Press, 1962); Bradford P.Keeney, Aesthet ics of Change (New York: The Guil fo rd Press ,1983), 12-109 . Theoretical metaphors di ffer considerably.I n c yb ern et ic theory, what I am describing is a matter ofthe cal ibra t ion of receptors.
34 See Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, t rans .
Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt BraceJovanovich, Publishers, 1985), 70-108.
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33
instrument of pol i t i ca l power, serving more basic in teres t -
seeking motivations. 35
This study tentat ively posits former view tha t ideolo-
gies are art iculated "world views" having significance in
determining pol i t i ca l values and, thereby, how decision
makers formulate and choose pol i t i ca l al ternat ives . The
u t i l i ty of employing ideo log ica l descr ipt ions to predict
behavior will determine th e e xte nt to which th is ten ta t ive
commitment i s warranted.
A Spatia l Arrangement of Ideologies
The essence of the no tion of l e f t and r ight employed in
th is analysis i s a spat ia l re la t ionship. This section will
describe ordinal re la t ionships between ideologies by refer-
ence to certain core values, such tha t one ideology i s "more
than" ano ther with respect to i t s menu of jus t i f ica t ions for
supporting certain kinds of policies. The following charac-
terizat ions should not be taken as arguments tha t ideologies
are themselves s t r ic t ly unidimensional. Each of the major
ideological movements being descr ibed has , within i t s own
system o f v alues, certain con tr ad ic tions , o r tens ions , which
produce some inconsistency and, in some cases, incoherence.
Thus, the following descriptions are meant to i l lus t ra te the
35 See Eric Voegelin, Science Poli t ics and Gnosticism{Chicago: Regnery, 1966}i see also Alasdair MacIntyre,Against the Self Images of the Age {Notre Dame: Notre Dame
University Press, 1970}.
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34
reasons for a general bias , or predisposition toward a
part icu lar viewpoint.
The method employed below is speculat ive, re lying as i t
does on c r i t i ca l commentaries which frequently display
ul ter ior aims in presenting opposing views. Nevertheless, I
believe tha t t he charac te ri za tions are val id insofar as the
assert ions concern the l imited number of issues addressed.
I t seems appropriate to begin with the ideologies of
the Left, which have received the most scholarly at tent ion.
I t i s widely acknowledged tha t s oci al is t p a rt ie s take inspi-
rat ion, i f not specif ic po li cy ob jec ti ves , from Marxist, or
neo-Marxist theories . Contemporary Marxists theor is t s tend
to shy away from the systematic, quanti tat ively styled
arguments presented in Das Kapital, preferr ing instead to
focus on the normative humanistic values of Marxism. The
famous dictum, "From each according to his abi l i ty , to each
according to his need," o r v aria nts th ereo f, has continued
to be the cornerstone of socia l is t thought. 38 The rea l iza-
t ion of a more jus t distr ibut ion of economic and socia l
benefi ts the centerpiece of socia l is t values.
38 This quotation is found in Marx's "Crit ique of theGotha Program," [See Robert Tucker, The Marx-Engles Reader,2nd ed., (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 531.] but somescholars at t r ibute i t to the French social i s t , Louis Blanc,in dating as early as 1848 [See George Seldes, The GreatThoughts, With a Foreword by Henry Steele Commager. (NewYork: Ballantine Books, 1985), 274.].
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Among socia l is ts , debates have raged for over one
hundred years about what aspects of Karl Marx's writ ings are
relevant to the practical circumstances of the socia l is t
movement. Marx's theory of revolution has been modified and
amended by many of his followers, who hoped to see a t rans
formation of society through peaceful means. 39 Orthodox
Marxists have tended to adhere the bel ief that the contra-
dict ions of capital ism cannot be resolved peacefully and
tha t the real izat ion of the communist society depends on the
violent overthrow of exist ing pol i t ical ins t i tu t ions , with
the dictatorship of the prole tar ia t presiding over the
t ransi t ion to the s ta te less society. Despite the i r stated
aim, Marxist part ies have been less revolutionary in the i r
act ivi t ies than the i r rhetoric would suggest. 40
Soc ia li st p a rt ie s , on the other hand, tend to be more
moderate than the i r communist counterparts in adhering to
Marxist doctrines. 41 Moreover, in many in stances th e dif -
39 Karl Kautsky is credited as being a central figurein the schism tha t developed within the soc ia l i s t movement.Lingering tensions between Communists and Social Democratshave continued to this day. For a concise narrat ive discussion of this problem, see Robert C. Tucker, The Marx-Engels
Reader, 2d ed., (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1972),xxxiv-xxxvi.
40 The classic commentary on th is subject is RobertMichels, Poli t ica l Part ies , t rans . Eden and Cedar Paul(Glencoe, I l l ino i s : The Free Press, 1915, reprinted 1949) .
41 See Charles Hobday, Communist and Marxist Part iesof the World (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio, 1986).
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36
ferences between communists and socia l is ts over th eir in te r-
pretat ions of Marx have re su lte d in enduring b i t t e r antago-
nisms. 42 In g en eral, socia l is t part ies tend to balk a t the
more radical methods and aims of the communist part ies ,
which tend to be relat ively more doctr inaire and mili tant in
the i r approach to pol i t ics . Nevertheless, soc ia l i s t part ies
have tended to advocate highly egal i tarian object ives ,
endorsing redistr ibut ion of income in part icular, and wealth
in general . 43
One important aspect of soc ia l i s t thought has been the
extension of egal i tarian values beyond nat ional boundaries.
This in ternat ional i s t or universal is t ic perspective is
congruent with a concern for human equali ty, and di ffers
from the re la t ive ly more par t icu la r i s t i c concerns of other
ideologies to which we now turn .
42 The or1g1ns of such disagreements begin with theFir s t Internat ional , with the disagreements betweenProudhon, Marx, Lassall and others. A number of works provide detai led narrat ive accounts of the spl intering ofcontemporary soc ia l i s t part ies . See Thomas T Mackie andRichard Rose, The International Almanac of Electoral History2d ed. (New York: Facts on File, Inc . , 1982); V incent E.
McHale, ed . , Pol i t ica l Parties of Europe (Westport, Conn. :Greenwood Press, 1983); Hobday, Communist and Marxist Part i es of the World; see also Keesing's Contemporary Archives(London: Keesing's Limited, various issues) ; Facts on File ,(New York: Facts on File , Inc. , various i ssues) .
43 Social is ts have also advocated the national izat ionof industr ies . See J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: Allen & Unwin, 1938).
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I f communism, or radical socialism, i s viewed as one
pole of an ideological continuum, conservatism is often
described as the opposite pole. In essence, the common
notion of conservatism includes a par t icular is t ic , i f not
parochial aspect. 44 For conservat ives, the realm of ac-
ceptable policy is l imited to what has been t r ied success-
ful ly. Conservatives tend to view the world as f ini te , with
few poss ib i l i t i e s for posi t ive change. 45 While socialism
emphasizes the transformation of society and the confl ic t
between classes, conservative theorists emphasize the pres-
e rv atio n o f social order and domestic tranquility.46 In
44 For an excellent treatment of conservative thought,as well as socia l is t and l ibera l thought, see Karl Mannheim,Ideology and Utopia, 229-39, passim.
45 The theme of l imited and unl im ited "vi sions " devel oped by Thomas Sowell, Conflict of Visions (New York: Will iam Morrow and Company, Inc. , 1987), corresponds closelywith the writings of Alasdair MacIntyre, Af te r V ir tu e. 2d ed(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1984); idem WhoseJust ice? Which Rationali ty? (Notre Dame: University of NotreDame, 1988). MacIntyre argues against the universa l is t ic ,post-enlightenment moral philosophies of l iberalism andsocial ism, largely from the per spec tiv e o f a par t icular -i s t i c philosophy that emphasizes and embraces the notion o fpractices embedded in the his tor ica l ground of a t radi t ion( i .e . way of l i fe ) with purposes internal to that way ofl i f e , outside of which moral discourse becomes confused forlack of an in te l l ig ible point of reference, resul t ing in the
decay of moral agency.This perspective i s highly reminiscent of Mannheim's
treatment of conservative thought. See Mannheim, Ideologyand Utopia, 229-30.
46 For a cri t icism of conservative thought generally,and Edmund Burke in part icu lar , regarding a lack of purposeand the tendency to blind adherence to convention, seeMacIntyre, After Virtue, 221-22; idem, Whose Just ice , Which
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38
contrast to the socia l is t vision of the perfect ibi l i ty of
society, conservat ives tend to s ee inhe rent l imits to the
potent ia l benef i ts of change. For conservatives, socia l
change is a matter of prudence. 47
With i t s preoccupation with the r isks and dangers of
change, conservative ideology should not be confused or
equated with capi ta l i s t ideology ( treated here as an aspect
of l iberal ism), which lauds the r isk -t aking ind iv idual and
the social benef it s a ssociat ed with entrepreneurship. Under
a good many circumstances, la issez fare capitalism and
soc ia l l ibe rta riani sm i s a threat to conservative values.
In fact , conservative rhetoric and theory advocates the
prohibi t ion of certain economic and social ac t iv i t i es in the
in teres t of public decency and preservation of the moral
community. 48 For similar reasons, there is no inherent
prohibit ion of redist r ibut ion in conservative thinking.
Some modicum of redist r ibut ion of income or wealth may be
Rationality?, 217-218; Cf. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia,229-33.
47 See Sowell, A Conflict of Visions, 25-27; ManheimIdeology and Utopia, 229-39 . .
48 The debate between Sir Patrick Devlin, "The Enforcement of Morals," Proceedings of the Brit ish Academy(London: Oxford Univer si ty P re ss , 1959) and H.L.A. Hart,"Social Solidari ty and the Enforcement o f Mora lit y," Univers i ty of Chicago Law Review 35 (1967): 1-13; cf. Michael J .Sandel, "Mora lity and the Liberal Ideal ," The New Republic(May 17, 1984): 15-7; Cf. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia,238-9, on the issue of moral harmony.
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advisable from time to time as a paternal i s t ic manoeuver in
maintaining social order. But as a matter of prudence,
there i s a strong t endency toward maintaining the s tatus
quo. Accordingly, conservative theorists do not promote the
idea of changing the dis tr ibutions of goods, but express a
preference for maintaining and protecting exist ing dis t r ibu-
t ive arrangements , whatever those arrangements may be. 49
Law and order, t radi t ion, re l igios i ty and preservation
of social o rde r tend to be the touchstones of conse rvat ive
rhetoric and play a central ro le in defining what conserva-
tism i s about. L iberalism, on the other hand, appeals to
pr incip le in ways that run counter to both conservative and
social i s t values.
Within the t rad i t ion of l ibera l pol i t i ca l thought, the
question of d is tr ibu ti ve ju st ic e has been a persistent area
of disagreement and debate. With an emphasis on principle
and r ights , l ibera l theorists have been ambivalent toward
redist .r ibutive policies. While most l ibera l theorists
recognize a need for providing an equitable means of oppor-
tunity, the general thrust of l iberalism eschews governmen-
ta l i nt er vent ion for the purpose of adjusting economic
outcomes. One of the core values of the l ibera l ideology is
49 See Lowi, End of Liberalism, 45; cf. Mannheim,Ideology and Utopia, 230-9.
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40
a preference for minimal government intervent ion. 50 For
the l ibera l , the Lockean caveat holds t rue tha t "government
is best when i t governs least ." A redistr ibut ive policy,
l ike government i t se l f , is viewed negatively.
At best , government is seen as a necessary evi l and
something to be minimized i f a t a l l possible . Indeed, many
l ibera l theorists argue tha t red is t ribu tive po l ic i e s harm
society by in terfering in a semi-automatically se l f -adjus t -
ing social marketplace (though not a l l l ibe ra l theor is ts
maintain th is view) .5 1 In th is sense, l iberal ism i s the
intel lectual bulwark of capital ism. However, l iberal ism
also supports the ideal of equal opportunity, which offers
l imited support for redist r ibut ive policies in cases where
the viabi l i ty of economic and social opportunities are at
stake, or as adjustments for market dis tor t ions . 52
50 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (NewYork: Basic Books, 1974). See also James S. Fishkin, Just ice , Equal Opportunity, and the Family (New Haven: Y a Univer si ty P re ss , 1983) for a discussion of l ibera l tensionsand ambivalence toward the use of the s ta te in preservingcore principles . For a discussion of why debate withinl iberalism fa i l s to e st ab li sh c le ar boundaries for the useof the s ta te , see Willmoore Kendall, "The 'Open Society' andI ts Fallacies ," American Pol i t ica l Science Review 54 (Decem-ber 1960): 972-79; cf. MacIntyre, Whose Just ice?
51 Cf. M ilton Friedman, There's No Such Thing as aFree Lunch (LaSalle, I l l inois : Open Cou rt, 1974 ); JohnRawls, A Theory of Just ice (Cambridge: Harvard Universi tyPress, 1971); James S. Fishkin, Just ice, Equal Opportunity,and the Family (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
52 See Fishkin, Just ice, Equal Opportunity, and theFamily; cf. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia.
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41
By comparison to the socia l is t and the conservative
visions of dis t r ibut ive just ice , l iberalism fa l l s uneasi ly
in the middle. While i t i s possible to construct an argu-
ment for temporary pol ic ies of redis t r ibut ion within a
system o f conse rvat ive values, as a matter of prudence in
support of maintaining social order, a recurrent theme in
l ibera l discourse is the recommendation of a consistent
modicum of redis t r ibut ion as a matter of principle . 53 On
the other hand, the thrust of socia l is t thought is toward a
t ransformation of society in which redis t r ibut ion of soci-
eta l benefi ts i s a central pol i t i ca l objective.
Implici t ly , this l ine o f r ea soning has influenced many
studies on budgetary allocations, where l e f t party control
i s hypothesized to be re la ted to increased welfa re expendi
tures . Alternatively, r ight party control is hypothesized
to depress welfare expenditures , while increasing expendi-
ture on defense. While most studies are fa i r ly clear about
why l e f t of center, or s oci al is t p a rt ie s favor welfare
expenditures over defense, few s cho la rs exp la in why part ies
of the r ight would tend to favor defense expendi tu res per
see Perhaps it i s taken for granted that the r ight sees i t s
53 A good example of this concern i s found in Rawls, ATheory of Just ice. Rawls' v ersion o f redistr ibut ive just icei s to provide the leas t well off in society with a bonuswhen anyone else in society gains an improvement in thei rown condit ion. This standard has been widely cri t ic ized,for obvious reasons.
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42
nemesis in communism and therefore endorses foreign policies
of containment.
The right-favoring-defense hypothesis i s supported, in
some studies, by empirical regulari t ies , but the philosophi-
cal basis for such a hypothesis i s rarely art iculated and
remains speculative. According to Will iam Schneider, the
af f in i t ies o f right-w ing poli t ic ians transcend national
boundaries because of a shared in teres t in confronting
communism. He writes:
Conservative in ternat ional ists are anti-detente andpromilitary. They al ign ideologically with the in te r national Right, which i s to say that thei r primarymoral commitment is to the free world in i t s confrontat ion with communism. Liberal in ternat ional i s t s are prodetente and ant i -mil i tary. S4
This statement seems to crystal ize the conventional
wisdom r egarding the intent ion of the l e f t toward the mil i -
tary, but few studies expl ici t ly de fin e th e relat ionship of
l e f t i s t part ies to defense policies. The connection may l i e
in the way tha t defense policies re la te to other pol ic ies .
Certain types of policies change the exis t ing dis t r ibu-
t ion of societal benefits more than others . The archetypi-
cal redist r ibut ive policy i s the welfare t ransfer payment.
While the impact o f wel fa re payments on income inequal i ty i s
S4 William Schneider, II Public Opinion, II in The Makingof America'S Soviet Policy, ed. Joseph S. Nye (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1984), 16-17; cf. Jerrold E. Schneider, Ideological Coalitions in Congress (Westport,Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1979), 59-80.
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43
not firm ly established, 55 it i s certainly a pol i t ic ized
issue with di rec t relevance to ideological values. 56 In
fact , the issue of poverty, i t s causes and remedy is an area
where ideological arguments and pol i t i ca l at t i tudes are most
clearly ar t icu la ted . Policies aimed dealing with pover ty
ra ise ideological ly charged questions --questions related to
d i st ri but iv e j us ti ce .
Ideology and Distr ibutive Just iceThis study posits the view tha t ideologies provide
jus t i f ica t ions for public pol ic ies . Two dis t inc t issues are
raised in debates about the jus t i f i ca t ion fo r using govern-
ment to change the distr ibut ion of goods, one re la t ing to
individuals in society and another relat ing to the nature of
society i t se l f . Ideologicial proponents define th ese issu es
according to the i r own frame of reference, which is deter-
55 Cf. Jackman, "Social is t Part ies and Income Inequali ty ," 135-49; Moon and Dixon, "Poli t ics , the State, andBasic Human Needs ," 661-94.
56 See Darrel Montero, "The Guns and Butte r Is su e:Trends in American Public Opinion," Journal o f Sociology and
Social Welfare 5 (1978): 135-149; Philip Arthur Au Claire ,"Public Attitudes Toward Social Welfare Expenditures,"Social Work 29 (March-April 1984): 139-144; Larry J . Griff inand Kevin T. Leicht, "Poli t icizing Welfare Expenditures inthe United States ," in Futures of the Welfare State, ed.Norman Furniss (Bloomington: Indiana Univer si ty Press ,1986), 320-356; James R. Kluegel, "Macro-economic Problems,Beliefs about the Poor and Attitudes Toward Welfare Spending," Social Problems 34 (Feb ruary 1987) : 82-99.
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44
mined by a set of core values which are frequently re la ted
to a sense of his tor ica l purpose.
Firs t , is the question of whether or not the recipient
i s des erving o f public support. The selection of a c r i t e r i -
on for making this kind of judgement is inescapably ideolog
ica l in nature. 57 Second, i s the question of how a pol icy '
w ill affe ct the structure and pract ices of social ins t i tu -
t ions, or rather , the nature of socie ty.
In general, the cr i t e r i a for a rec ip ient ' s worthiness
i s increasingly more res t r ic t ive , or rather less encompass-
ing, as one moves across the spectrum from l e f t to r ight .
Cons iderat ions of a rec ip ient ' s worthiness tend to be based
more on characterological cri ter ia for t ho se holding r ight-
wing views, whereas left-wing ideologies tend to profess a
universal concern for humanity. In the la t te r view, the
speci fi c cha rac t er is t ic s of the individual are not impor-
tanto Generally, for the r ight the recipient i s considered,
qua individual, bearing specific claims according to custom,
class, or merit. Alternatively, for the l e f t the recipient
57 I t i s doubtful tha t the cr i t e r i a of one ideology
would even be in te l l ig ible to adherents o f certa in otherideologies. Because such cri ter ia are inherent to thesystem of bel iefs of which they are a part (in a senseendogenously derived), they may not be t ranslatable to com-
peting systems of th ought. Neverth ele ss, adherents ofcompeting ideologies do disagree about pol i t ical means andends, but frequently "talk past one another." For a moreextensive treatment of th is issue see MacIntyre, Whose
Just ice , Which Rationali ty?, 349-403.
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45
comes bearing human r ights , needs, or circumstance. For the
conservative, governmental responsibi l i t ies are prescribed
by considerations of the re la t ive significance of the
claimant 's evidence. For the socia l is t , governmental re-
sponsibi l i ty is l imited, i f a t a l l , by the existence of
exper t ise or resources to provide remedies. s8
On the ques tio n o f how public policies affec t the
society as a whole, the considerations of each ideology are
equally divided. For the conservative, the matter i s clear-
ly one of s tab i l i ty and order. For the soc ia l i s t i t is a
matter of meeting human needs, where the order of society i s
rearranged to provide an ega li ta r ian d i s tr ibu t ion . For the
l ibera l , social order i s considered important insofar as it
affec ts the individual and his or her l i fe chances, his or
herl iber ty
toengage in self -def ined pursuits , and whether
i t is being main ta ined as a fa i r e n v i r o ~ ~ e n t fo r economic
and socia l in teract ion. Stabi l i ty is valued for i t s role in
assis t ing the advancement of these principles through a
reasonable expectation that the rules of the game wil l be
observed, but new rules are necessary when the playing f ie ld
becomes too uneven.
Ideo log ica l considera tion of the effects of a public
policy on social order follow a gradation from an in t r insic
58 For a discussion of the role of ideology in determ ~ n ~ n g the l imits of governmental intervention see Sowell, AConflict o f V isio ns, 18-39.
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46
value to an instrumental value. For conservat ives, poverty
and soc ia l i nequa li ty are par t of a natural order, an un
avoidable character ist ic of a f ini te world. Poverty needs
no part icular explanation for the conservative, i t jus t i s ,
as a matter of immutable social fact . Charity is jus t i f ied
as a means of prese rv ing the order of society . For the
l ibera l , poverty i s i t se l f not a problem, unless i t is
persistent , that i s , when i t is inter-generational and l i f e
long. Then i t raises questions about the opportunit ies for
individuals who get stuck in poverty.
According to the classical l ibera l view, in a fa i r
market people r i se and fa l l according to rules of fa i r
competition and exchange. To th e e xtent that any group or
class of people do not r i se (and fal l?) according to the i r
meri ts , the ques tio n o f fairness becomes an issue for the
l iberal . Is there discrimination? Are opportunit ies being
made ava ila ble to everyone? Have car te l s or monopolies
blocked part ic ipat ion and advancement? These are the con
cerns of the l ibera l .
For the l ibera l , keeping the playing f ie ld level , and
the rules fa i r is the key to the problem of (persistent)
poverty. For the social i s t , poverty i s a product of a
maladjusted society, of unresolved contradictions and dis
to rtio ns, th at once corrected, will remedy the pl ight of the
poor. According to socia l is t thought, economic and pol i t i -
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47cal ins t i tut ions cause poverty, and t ransforming those
ins t i tut ions to meet human needs is the answer to the prob-
lem of poverty. Thus, the tendency to support
redistr ibut ive pol ic ies is affected two ways: by the l imits
that the ideology places on the val idi ty of individual
claims and by the relat ive importance of soci al s tr uc tu r es
vis-a-v is individual needs. These l imits , and the range of
concerns that jus t i fy them, become more narrow as one moves
from l e f t to r ight .
Returning to the question of defense policy, i t seems
reasonable t o pos tu la te that , where the s tab i l i ty of the
social "regime" is a central concern, there should be more
concern for i t s preservation from outside th rea ts . Con-
versely, when the structures of society are viewed more or
less as instruments of pol icy, there ought to be less impor-
tance attached to the i r preservation. In ei ther case, there
i s always a need to provide securi ty . The difference might
jus t be the margin o f par anoia that one id eo logy en joys over
another concerning what i s a t stake. But when the in t r ica-
cies of t radi t ions, the r i t es of re l igion and subt le t ies of
family re la t ions are a t stake, small changes are fundamental
changes. While dyed-in-the-wool socia l is ts see t radi t ion
and r i tua l as v es tig es o f ignorance and superst i t ion, con-
servatives see in them "a way of l i fe ." Their interpreta-
t ions of what i s at stake and what should be done to pre-
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48
serve the status quo should also dif fer sharply. Percep
t ions of danger outside of so cie ty a re quali tat ively dif fer -
ent for socia l is t and conservatives. Domestic policies are
generally less apt to produce the kind of radical change in
social inst i tut ions that might be expected by an invasion or
defeat in war --which might be seen as the ultimate social
change, shor t o f revo lu tion. 59
Against these concerns, expectations of policy conse-
quence should provide a basis for predicting how the b iase s
described above should play out among part ies holding views
more or less to the right or l e f t . Some policies , by the i r
very nature, should be more appea li ng than others.
Policy Characteristics
Welfare policies have typically provided the focus of
r esea rch dea li ng with the part isan impact on expenditures.
However, many other kinds of p ublic policy a re redis-
t r ibutive as well . While welfare t ransfer payments may be
immediately redis tr ibutive, heal th and education policies
are potent ial ly more lasting in the ir redist r ibut ive impact.
The public provision of hea lt h s ervi ce s has the p ote ntia l to
redistr ibute the chances of l iving longer. Access to
educat ion prov ides ind iv iduals wi th l i fe- long opportunit ies
with potent ial ly redis tr ibutive consequences. These conse-
59 See Mancur Olson, The Rise and Declin e o f Nation s(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 75-117.
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49
quences may be re la ted to the range of pol ic ies tha t might
be endorsed by adherents of one or another ideology. Ideo-
logical considerat ions may also inform the way th at p olic ie s
a re spe ci fi ed .
Pol icy opt ions are not l imited to the questio n o f
whether or not a part icu lar kind of service or benefi t wil l
be provided, but also the terms by which they are made
available , and to whom. Whether a service i s provided on a
means-tested basis , or a non-means tes ted basis i s one such
policy opt ion.
Expenditures on higher education may subsidize those
who might not re ce iv e t he se s er vic es i f they were not pub
l i c ly produced, provided tha t the service i s made available
to everyone, regardless of the abi l i ty to pay. In essence,
expenditures on higher education redistr ibute goods tha t
would otherwise be available a t market prices only to those
members of society who could bear the cost of purchasing
them. These kinds of pol ic ies are rarely conceptua li zed as
being economic intervent ions , but they are. The i ssue of
economic intervention has been, and continues to be, an
issue of continuing controversy in ideological debate.
These concerns are related to whether a policy wil l
provide symmetrical or asymmetrical outcomes. A symmetrical
outcome i s one where a l l members of society share equally in
the re su l t . In an asymmetrical outcome, some members take a
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50
la rger share of the resul t , be i t posit ive or negative, than
others . Symmetrical outcomes are less l ikely to change the
socio-economic status quo than asymmetrical outcomes.
Redistr ibutive pol ic ies are defini tely asymmetrical, but may
not necessarily benefi t the lower classes .
The difference is more than whether policies are viewed
as zero-sum or positive-sum. Even with an asymmetrical
outcome, both sides may real ize a posit ive gain, jus t as the
beneficiar ies of a symmetrical outcomes. The dist inct ion i s
whether the "relat ive," or marginal posi t ion of class of
beneficiary is changed vis-a-vis other benef ic iar ies .
The l ikelihood of a policy producing asymmetrical or
symmetrical outcomes has been ident i f ied as a cr i t ica l
factor in determining how tha t policy wil l be promulgated
and implemented. Distr ibut ive pol ic ies , where nearly
everyone gets a piece of the pie , a re cha ract er iz ed as
consensual policies. Conflict is low and implementation
relat ively easy. Redistr ibutive, or asymmetrical policies
are characterized as being more conf li ctua l, e speci al ly when
those policies are implemented quickly.60
60 See Paul Berman, "Designing Implementation to MatchPolicy Situation: A Contingency Analysis of Programmed andAdaptive Implementation," Paper Delivered at the AnnualMeeting of the American Pol i t ica l Science Association, 1978,11; Gordon Chase, "Implementing a Human Services Program:How Hard Will I t Be?" Public Policy 18 (Fall 1979) : 385-6;cf. Robert F. Durant, e t a l , "From Complacence to Compliance: Toward a Theory of Intergovernmental Relations,"
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51
The question o f symmetry has part icu lar relevance to
th is study, as i t raises t he que sti on of social equity and
social change, both of which a re r ele vant to notions of
d i st ri but ive ju st ic e .
One of the key dis t inctions made between pol ic ies i s
the difference between those tha t distr ibute goods gener
al ly , tha t i s to almost everyone in the society, and those
poli cie s th at provide goods to a select group. Distr ibut ive
and redist r ibut ive policies have received considerable
scholarly attention as a resu l t of growth in the public
sector . Popular , consensua l pol ic ies , had apparently gotten
"out of control" during the l as t three decades. Theorists
who take this view, l ike Mancur Olson or Theodore J . Lowi,
argue tha t distr ibut ive poli cy a reas tend to be dominated by
in teres t groups and that such programs are not checked by an
ideological brake. 61 A similar argument i s presented by
Glenn Palmer.
Writing on the difference between the pol i t i c s of
domestic policy and foreign policy, Palmer ut i l izes a pol i -
cy-issue typology to ana lyze defense and domestic t rade-
offs . His categorization re l ies on the dist inct ion between
poli cie s th at have a high or low potential for redis-
Administration and Society 17 (February 1986) 433-59.
61 Cf. Lowi, The End o f L iberal ism; Olson, The Rise andDecline of Nations.
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52
t r ibut ion. The dist inct ion he employs depends on whether a
government policy provides benefits tha t are divisible and
individually consumed or goods that cannot be easi ly divided
and consumed individually.
For the purposes of this study redistr ibut ive policies
include t ransfe r payments, and services that would normally
be available only through private vendors. Transfer pay
ments are clearly l iable to redis t r ibut ion, though th is is
not a necessary characteris t ic of t ransfer outlays.62
Services are more complicated and require closer inspect ion
to determine whether they are redistr ibut ive.
Welfare t ransfers allows recipients to consume goods
and services which are divis ible and exclusive. With such a
policy, there i s a c le a r po ten ti al for a redis t r ibut ion of
benefi ts among groups of individuals. On the other hand, as
Palmer a rgues, expendi tu re s for public safety and defense
provide services that , at l eas t in theory, are not divis i -
ble. 63 For example, one person's enjoyment of law and
62 According to William D. Berry and David Lowery, II An
Alternative Approach to Understanding Budgetary Trade-offs,"American Journal of Pol i t ica l Science 34 (1990) : 690, "Lib
era l and conservatives each have the i r preferred t ransferprograms and specif ic consumption p re fe rences , but l iberalsand conservatives are unlikely to have di f fe rent preferencesabout the re la t ive u t i l i ty of consumption and t ransfersexpenditures per se, as these two categories of spending areto a considerable extent ' subs t i tutable . ' "
63 See Palmer, "Alliance Poli t ics and Issue Areas, II
191-3, 208.
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53
order does not dim in is h ano th er person's enjoyment of the
same good. Likewise, national defense is not con sid ered an
individual ly divisible good and i s generally not considered
to be redist r ibut ive in i t s effec ts . Of course, th ere are
potent ial "side-payments" to specif ic groups under certain
circumstances. This is obvious where employment and govern-
ment contracts are concerned. Palmer asser t s that domestic
benefi ts of mili tary expenditures may be asymmetric under
c onditio ns o f l imited war. 54 But, ge nera lly , th e benef i t
of nat ional securi ty i s not considered to be div is ib le among
ci t izens of a country. The question of whether defense
spending i s properly conceptualized as a benefi t has i t s e l f
s t i r red much controversy.
Some scholars have argued t ha t m i li ta ry spending
fu nctio ns as a surrogate employment policy or as a method of
industrial development, part icularly for developing nat ions.
There has been a l ively debate surrounding the economic
impact of mili tary spending. Many s chola rs b el ieve tha t it
diminishes economic growth by consuming valuable economic
resources without contributing to the supply of marketable
f inished products. 55 Whether defense spending can be gen
era l ly describ ed a s a benef i t i s subject to considerable
doubt.
54
55
To th e e xte nt that one adheres to the theory of
Ibid, 197-8.
See Chan, "The Impact of Defense Spending."
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54
deterrence, appropriations for this purpose might be loosely
described as a non-divisible benefi t .
These characterizations of government policies are
subject to certain excep tion s as i l lustrated by the case of
side paYments in defense spending, but some public policies
are more l ikely to result in redist r ibut ive outcomes than
others .
According to Olson, governmentally produced benefi ts
that are divisible are subject to the dynamics of col lect ive
action. Benefits shared within the class of recipients are
divisible and exclusive relat ive to other groups in society.
Generally, the concept of collect ive goods applies to those
goods result ing from the efforts of organized in teres t
groups who receive those goods direct ly . With respect to
welfare policies , one could argue tha t welfare recipients
const i tute a potential interest group in support of in -
creased welfare paYments; however, many people have noted
tha t aff luent people sometimes advocate increasing benefi ts
to the poor. Because welfare recipients are not generally
well organized, some scholars have argued that the bureau-
crats who administer welfare and other social s erv ic e p ro
grams become surrogate lobbyis ts f or those programs.66
66 See William Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representat ive Government (Chicago: Aldine and Ather ton, 1971 );Fiorina, Congress: The Keystone; cf. Beck, Government Spending, 3-6.
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55
For Olson, and many other public choice theor is t s ,
parliamentary bodies are condu it s through which in teres t
groups achieve the i r objectives. Members of parliament do
l i t t l e to mediate or modify these demands in the public
choice perspective. Bureaucracies, in teres t groups and
elec tora l ly motivated poli t ic ians are responsible for ex
panding benefi ts as widely as possible. I f this i s t rue,
ideology shou ld not matter and benef i ts should expand unt i l
the median vote r obje cts . I f ideologies do matter, then
they should help predict shifts in spending for di fferen t
programs. Under what conditions might we expect such a
shif t?
Strategic Opportunities
The opportunity for a government to make major changes
in p olicy i s not present at a l l times. As Machiavelli
noted, luck, timing and good judgment play a part in the
careers of poli t ic ians, but the most important factor i s
power. 67 While i t i s poss ib le to develop hypotheses re -
garding the judgements and timing of pol i t ic ians , good
67 See Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and the Dis
courses. With an Introduction by Max Lerner, (New York:Modern Library, 1949) 23-30, 91-4. Machiavell i 's commentsabout changing inst i tut ions might be generalized to thecontext of developing and implement ing changes in policy aswell . For Machiavelli , p roper t iming is an in tegra l par t ofany pol i t i ca l stra tegy. Whether i t i s waiting for the ful lforce of one 's mili tary, planning a counteroffensive, ord is po sin g o f one's henchmen, Machiavelli f requen tly notesthat there are proper and improper moments to take act ion.
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56
fortune i s not so easi ly operationalized. What Machiavelli
points out i s that there are more or less opportune moments
to take act ion. This sentiment i s echoed in the work of Ira
Sharkansky. He suggests that , "the availabil i ty of new
federal programs, technological change, or a combination o f
pol i t ical happenings that generate a 'r ip e' l eg is la ti ve
opportunity, may precede major changes. ,,68 Whether a pro-
gram i s cut from the budget or expanded may be a function of
the correlat ion of forces opposing and supporting that
program, as determined by the abi l i ty of the opposition to
ra l ly i t s members.
A weakness on the par t of one party i s the advantage of
the other . P arties in disarray might be circumvented by
more organized par t ies . These conditions offer pol i t i ca l
pa rt ie s s tr at eg ic opportunit ies for changing the shape of
the budget. 69
The s t ra teg ic opportunit ies of a party a re la rg ely
dependent on the number of seats , or legis la t ive votes, that
the party can control . I f coali t ion governments must be
formed, then the power of any part icular par ty i s checked by
68 Ira Sharkansky, Spending in the American States(Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1968), 16 ( i ta l ics added).
69 For a more detai led discussion of "strategic opportu nities" in ideological pol i t i c s , see Jane H. Bayes, Ideologies and In teres t Group Poli t ics (Novato: Chandler & SharpPublishers, 1982), 14-7.
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57
the members of other part ies in the coal i t ion. In the
United States Congress, achieving par ty discipl ine is a
challenge. Maintaining party unity in congressional voting
is s imilar to maintaining coal i t ions formed in multiparty
systems. Of course there are other constraints .
Structural obstacles may play a par t in providing
strategic opportunities. For example, in president ial
systems, where executive and legislat ive functions are
separated, ins t i tut ional arrangements provide checks on the
power of part ies to con trol po lic y. Controlling both
branches is a potential advantage. In other systems the
pr incipal obstacles may l ie in t he bureaucat ic structures.
In general, democratic policy making is a cumbersome
process. Successful implementation of a policy change often
req uires th e oversight and protection of legis la t ive members
who check on i t s progress and development from time to
time. 70 Without legis la t ive "fixers" who, in conce rt w ith
other a l l ies in government, shepherd i t s development, a
program can die in the post-legislat ive implementation
phase, result ing in reduced outlays for tha t purpose. While
there is considerable variety in the pol i t i ca l p roce ss es o f
th e countr ie s sampled in th is study, I would expect tha t new
program in the areas of public services, and changes in
70 See Eugene Bardach, The Implementation Game (Cam-bridge: MIT University Press, 1984).
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58
expenditures fo r e xis ting programs should take a t l eas t one
year , and probably two or more years, to become ful ly imple-
mented. Of course, some programs can be implemented more
rapidly than others. For example, t ransfer paYments may be
increased or decreased almost immediately, but the implemen-
ta t ion of a social services program i s a much more complex
and time consuming endeavor.
Policy making i s not a discrete moment in time, but a
process, which does not t ermina te with the passage of l eg is-
la t ion . Most studies on th e su bje ct of the government's
effec t on spending posit a one-year lag, assuming that what
happened l as t year wil l effec t this year 's outcome. Such a
mechanistic view of policy making ignores the fact tha t many
programs are reviewed, investigated and "pushed" throughout
the l i fe-span of th e polic y. I f neglected during the next
year , there may be not a program in operation.
In the United States, members of Congress are
cont inual ly inves tigat ing the implementation of pol ic ies and
hearing tes timony regarding the i r progress. 71 Perceived
weaknesses in a program's performance might be exploited by
opponents of tha t policy, in Congress or in t he admin is tr a-
t ion , to bring i t to a hal t , or slow i t s progress. Thus, a
71 For an excellent treatment of the subject of par t i san involvment in congressional hearings, see David R.Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Law Making andInvest igat ions 1946-1990. New Haven: Yale University Press,1991.
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59
commitment at one point in time i s not sufficient for a
program's survival . As Max Weber put i t ,
Poli t ics i s a strong and slow boring of hard boa rd s.I t takes both passion and perspective. Certainly a l lhis tor ica l experience confirms the t ruth - - tha t manwould not have attained the possible unless time andagain he had reached out for the impossible. 72
The idea that the effects of part isan influences should
emanate from a discrete point in time seems untenably naive.
This consideration i s incorporated into the models con-
s tructed in the following s ta t i s t ica l analyses. Exact
specif icat ions are discussed in more d eta i l in Chapters I I I
and IV.
A Theory o f T rade-o ff Behavior
From the foregoing discussion o f id eo lo gie s one can
construct a ta ble th at describes the hypothesized linkage
between part isan ideologies and biases toward certain kinds
of pol ic ies . Based on the previous discussion o f i deolog ie s
and types of public policy, we might expect part ies of the
l e f t and r ight to have different incl inations toward public
pol ic ies . Some ideologies provide more jus t i f ica t ions for
cer ta in kinds of policies than others . 73 A very crude, but
72 Max Weber, "Poli t ics as a Vocation," in Gerth andH.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays inSociology, t rans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (NewYork: Oxford Univer si ty P re ss , 1970, repr in t ) , 128.
73 Cf. Lowi, End of Liberalism, 45-9.
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reasonable matching of ideological biases toward di fferent
kinds might appear as fo llow s:
TABLE 1
Policy and Ideology
Party Ideology
Policy Issue ] ;&l l . Right
Education Services POSITIVE NEGATIVE
Hea lth Servi ces POSITIVE NEGATIVE
Welfare Policies Posit ive Negative
Unemployment Benefi ts posi t ive negative
Retirement Benefi ts posi t ive negative
Military Expenditures Negative positive
These pol ic ies are ordered in a gradation. At the top
of the l i s t are those kinds of policies which would have the
most enduring effec t on the dist r ibut ion of social benefi ts .
Toward the bottom of the l i s t are items in which
redistr ibut ive consequences dissipate in a re la t ive ly short
t ime, and defense which i s general ly not associated with
redis t r ibut ion a t a l l .
According to the overwhelming scholarly consensus,
part ies toward the l e f t tend to endorse the expansion of
social services. On the other hand, part ies of the r ight
a re charac te ri zed as mil i tar i s t ic and f iscal ly conservat ive.
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The hypothesized bias of l e f t part ies toward t ransfer pay-
ments must be qualif ied with considerations of whether the
t ransfers are l ikely to be redist r ibut ive. Many programs
tha t re ly on t ransfer payments are not means-tested. That
is , not a l l t ransfer payments are made on the basis of
economic need. For example, many pensions, veterans bene-
f i t s and retirement supplements do not provide money to
lower income people. In fact , one of the frequently ci ted
reasons for the expansion of t ransfer payments has been tha t
they are pol i t ica l ly popular and most effect ive for the
electoral success of incumbent off ic ia ls when they are
distr ibuted as widely as possible . 74
In g en eral, the chart reflects the postulate that the
agendas of le f t leaning part ies dif fer most from r ight
leaning part ies where redist r ibut ion i s a t issue. Conven-
t ional wisdom indicates tha t left-wing part ies favor labor
unions, while right-w in g part ies favor capi ta l i s t or busi-
ness in teres ts . These social ins t i tu t ions provide the basis
for class s t ra t i f ica t ion and social different iat ion in
indus tr i al i zed soc ie t ies .
Accordingly, part ies leaning to the r ight , with an
in teres t in the preserva tion of societal order, would be
more l ikely to promote programs to defend soci al s tr uc tu r es ,
74 See Tufte, Poli t ical Control, 105-136; Lowi, End ofLiberalism; Fiorina, Congress; Berry and Lowery, "An Alternat ive Approach," 690.
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such as defense and perhaps, police protection. While the
preservation of exist ing social structures i s not entirely
neutral (but pro te ct s exi st ing e l i te ) , there is l i t t l e
evidence tha t defense pol ic ies a re gener all y l iable to
downwardly red is t r ibute payoffs.
Within the l iberal t radi t ion, there are grounds for
leaning s of a l e f t versus r ight nature. In l igh t of certain
t ensions wi th in l iberal ism, i t is possible to discriminate
between a lef t - leaning and right-leaning schools of thought.
These relat ionships might be t ransla ted into the context of
American pol i t ics by examining how l ibera l tensions might be
resolved.
Americans: Right and Left
The terms l e f t and r ight are usually reserved for
discussions of European pol i t ics , while discussions of
American pol i t ics are framed in the language of l iberal
ver sus conserva ti ve , denoting a narrower range o f id eo lo gi
ca l differences in the l a t t e r context . The dimensional
nature of "l iberal versus conservative" disputes within the
l iberal t radi t ion i s approximate to the l e f t versus r ight
differences found in the context o f European pol i t ics , but
fa r more narrow by comparison.
Liberal ism has come under attack from several quarters
during the la s t two decades. Even within the ranks of
l iberal thought, theor is t s have become troubled by the
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ideology's fai lure to provide coherent responses to emerging
social questions. While many cri t iques of l iberalism have
focused on the problems of equality and fairness , there has
been relat ively l i t t l e attention paid to the his tor ica l
aspect of l iberalism.
Liberalism i s fundamentally grounded in adherence to
"rat ional" principles . In i t s preoccupation with pr incip le ,
l iberalism is ahis tor ica l . Principles, as conceived by
l iberals , do not lend themselves to his tor ica l exception,
but are considered to be expressions of what is universal ,
regardless of time or space.
Liberal principles are frequently expressed in the
idiom of individual r igh ts . Rights are most clearly ar t ic -
ulated in expressing principles that l imi t governmental
author i ty. I n dev ia ting from p rin cip le , o r r at he r v io la ti ng
individual r ights , government subjects i t se l f to sl iding
down one or another "slippery slope."
In c on tra st to socia l is t movements, which seek some
kind of end-state objective, se t in the context of his tor i -
cal change, or conservatism, which i s bound to his tor ica l
experience, l ib e ra li sm f loa ts in the realm of ideas. 75
75 See Manheim, Ideology and Utopia, 219-29; IsaiahBerlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Michael J . Sandel, ed.Liberalism and I t s Crit ics , 15-36; Rawls, A Theory of Just ice ; Ronald Dworkin, "Liberalism," in Sandel, ed. Liberalism and I ts Crit ics , 60-79.
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What i s missing in the l iberal t radi t ion i s a vision of
history. Without such a v isio n, the re i s no overarching
social aim. Moreover, with i t s extensive array of arguments
in favor of individualism, tolerance, and the sancti ty
representation (pluralism), there is no basis for defining a
h ie ra rchy o f values by which to discriminate between compet
ing pol i t i ca l claims. By default , a few commonly shared
preferences substi tute for intel lectual ly coherent social
objectives . This can be seen in the kinds of debates in
which l iberals engage.
TYPically, debate among l iberals degenerates into
ut i l i ta r ian assertions, which cannot be resolved by appeals
to commonly shared conceptions of the "good," precisely
because there are no commonly accepted defini t ions of what
consti tutes "the good. ,,76 Moreover, many of the fundamen-
ta l tenets of l iberalism are mutually incompatible as James
S. Fishkin has pointed out. 77
Fishkin argues that three tenets of American l iberalism
pose a trilemma, whereby unstab le sequen ti al solutions may
be constructed on an ad hoc basis , but not s imultaneou sly .
76 See Willmoore Kendall, "The 'Open Society' and I t sFallacies ," American Polit ical Science Review 54 (December,1960): 972-9; cf . MacIntyre, After Vir tue, 6-35.
77 See Fishkin, Just ice, Equal Opportunity, and theFamily.
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ly . The three horns of his trilemma are the principles of
equali ty o f oppor tuni ty , autonomy of the family (in i t s
al locat ions of i t s own resources), and selection on the
basis of merit . Government intervention has the potent ia l
to affec t a l l three principles .
Taxation (for non-essential purposes) cuts into the
autonomy of the family, by taking a share of i t s resources
and allocating those resources for public use. Equality o f
opportunity i s promoted or discouraged by the governmental
intervention in making education available, enforcing ant i -
discrimination regulations, etc . Select ion on the basis of
merit deals with rewarding individuals based on successful
competition. This principle i s supported by market forces,
where individual advancement depends on personal
acheivements. Fishkin argues that a l l three principles are
held to be immutable and universal by the great majo rity o f
Americans --and inconsistent .
In pract ice , t he se val ue s are joint ly incompatible.
Any two, but not a l l three, principles can be maintained a t
the same time. Autonomy of the family and select ion on the
basis of merit may be compatible, but there is no guarantee
of equality of opportunity. Equality of opportunity and
autonomy of the family may be compatible, but not with
select ion on the basis of merit, for the playing f ie ld must
be level led by adjustments to markets. Select ion on the
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basis of merit and equality o f oppor tuni ty may both be
compatible, but not w ithou t doing violence to the autonomy
of the family, since i t s resources must be allocated to
provide the opportunit ies tha t sustain select ion on the
basis of merit .
Fishkin believes that t he se tens ions might be addressed
sequentially, one or two a t a time, in his tor ical ly mapped
pol ic ies . This remedy, however, must do violence to the
immutable qual i ty claimed by the principles .
An al ternat ive to Fishkin 's suggestion is th at l ib era ls
do not, in pract ice hold to a l l three as immutable pr inc i
ples . While granting that these principles are widely
shared, I believe tha t i t i s typical of l iberals to discount
one or another of these tenets in forming a personal public
philosophy. While the philosophy may require ad hoc solu-
t ions, individuals are noted for ta i lor ing thei r own in ter-
preta t ions of p rin cip le s to f i t thei r personal biases . 78
In doing so, there i s a poss ibi l i ty that one of the immuta-
b le ten ets becomes mutable ( i .e . discounted), via personal
interpretat ion. Moreover, I postulate tha t there i s an
underlying l e f t and r ight dimension in the select ion of
which principle to discount. The key i s the principle of
equality o f opport un it y.
78 See James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg. "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement andDisagreement." Journal of Pol i t ics . 22 no.2 (1960) :276-294.
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A posi t ion "to the rig ht" w ith in l iberalism tend to
discount equality of opportunity in favor of autonomy of the
family or select ion on th e b asis of meri t . This reinforces
ex is ti ng soci al inequal i t ies . Liberals fur ther "to the
le f t" tend to discount both selection on the basis of merit
and autonomy of the family in favor of equal i ty of oppor-
tuni ty. This i s the most red is tr ibu t ive a l te rna tive .
Between these posi t ions is a moderate view that discounts
(within some l imits) the autonomy of the family o r s ele ctio n
on the basis of meri t (but not both) in favor of equal i ty of
opportunity. The logical properties might be expressed a a
series of t ransit ive relationships, where t he se t en si on s are
resolved by means of a kind o f d is coun ting , or emphasis.
Consider t he posi ti on s A, B, and C, where A is equality
of opportunity, B is selection on the basis of merit , and C
is the autonomy of the family. One may rank one principle
over ano ther in a t ransit ive ordering of the kind used by
ra t ional choice theor i s t s .79 Six t ransit ive orderings of
these principles are possible (see Table 2) :
79 See William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, &L
Introduction to Posit ive Poli t ical Theory, ( E n g l e w o o ~Cli f fs : Prentice-Hall , Inc, 1973), 16-9 .
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TABLE 2
Left and Right in theLiberal Ideology
Rank
Firs t
Second
Third
LEFT
A A
C B
B C
CENTER
C B
A A
B C
RIGHT
B C
C B
A A
Thus, underlying tensions within l ibera l thought might
yield a l e f t / r igh t dimension by vir tue of cer t ian kinds of
interpretat ions, or personal solutions to l iberal ism's
i nheren t t ens ions.
I expect partisan divisions between Democrats, who are
typically described as being to the center- le f t , and Repub-
l icans, who tend to be to the c en te r- righ t, to have an
impact on the way budgets a re a ll ocat ed . By implicat ion,
th is impact should also af fect the shape of t rade-offs
between c atego rie s o f government spending.
The following section deals w ith the concept of a
t rade-off and specif ies i t s operational defini t ion. Drawing
heavily from the work of William Berry and David Lowery, I
present a cri t ique of previous work on the subject and
emphasize the necessity for t rade-offs to be defined in
directional terms.
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conceptualizing Trade-offs
One of the best cri t iques of t rade-off s tudies i s
presented by William D. Berry and David Lowery. 80 They
raise three object ions to the t rad i t ional approach to study-
ing t rade-offs . Firs t , the l i terature has focused on a
l imited number of potent ia l t rade-offs . As mentioned in
Chapter I , the t rade-off between defense and domest ic expen
di tures i s the primary focus of the trade-off l i terature.
Trade-offs between categories of domestic expenditures may
also be made, but comparatively less at tent ion has been
devoted to choices between categories of domestic spending,
or for tha t matter, different c atego rie s o f spending within
the defense budget. 81
Second, the conventional modeling strategy used in
t rade-off studies does not explain budgetary outcomes. This
is the i r most important cri t ique, for i t points to the
essence of what a t rade-off i s . In short, the use of re-
gression analysis, with one category regressed on another
does not reveal the direction of the t rade-off . Regression
analysis only describes the magnitude, but not the direct ion
80 See also Chan, "Impact of Defense Spending onEconomic Performance," 433-434.
81 See also, Mintz, "A Disaggregated Analysis," whichdeals with the level of aggregation in studies of t radeoffs .Berry and Lowery not that o ther cat egori es of expendituresmay be rel evant sub ject s for analysis, but ignore the aggregation problem.
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of the t rade-off . Coefficients produced in regression
analysis des cr ib e th e slope of th e r eg re ss ion l ine . A
negative slope ( i.e . s ta ti st ic a ll y significant negative
coeff ic ient) i s interpreted as evidence of a t rade-off .
This method does not include a measure of the actual
division of an identif ied amount between the two categor ies .
A negative coeff icient does not describe whether A gained or
B gained, but rather, whether A and B are generally moving
in opposite directions . 82 For this reason, regressions and
correla t ions between budget categories are not very useful
in analyzing the most important aspects of t rade-offs . A
conceptualization that accounts for both the direction and
size of a t rade-off i s required.
Third, Berry and Lowery point out that "the concept of
a t rade-off is poorly def ined in the l i t e ra ture . ,,83 The
concept of a t rade-off is grounded in the notion tha t an
increase or dec re ase o f one item occurs a t the expense or
benefi t of another item.
A s t r i c t definit ion might require that a l l of the
increase or decrease in budget category A be accounted for
by an equal decrease o r in crea se in another category B.
82 Moreover, when variables are defined in percentageterms, regression analysis can produce spurious resul ts .See William D. Berry, "Testing Budgetary Theories withBudgetary Data: Assessing the Risks," American Jo urnal ofPol i t ica l Science 30 (1986): 597-627 .
83 Berry and Lowery, "An Alternative Approach," 700 .
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This i s empirical ly and theoretically unlikely. Such a
conceptua li zat ion requi res the assumption that the re la t ion
ship between A and B be independent from changes in any
other budget category, such that funds for A and Bare
subject to subst i tut ion with one another, but not with any
other category. This seems to be an unreasonable assump
t ion, because the thing being allocated is money, which is a
quintessential ly fungible commodity.
Nowhere in the l i te ra ture is such a conceptual izat ion
proposed. Instead, t rade-off ' s are presented as hypotheses.
That is , t rade-offs are not d ef in ed as direct ly observable,
empirical ent i t ies , but rather as educated guesses about the
persistence of a relationship between two or more catego
r ies .
This approach dances around the issue o f exp la in ing why
al locat ions change. The que stion o f whether a t rade-off
exis t s , i f dwelt on long enough, becomes absurd. I t i s
obvious tha t a t rade-off must be made i n a ll oc at in g f ini te
resources among different purposes. What t rade-of f s tudi es
intend to "get at ," i s how the dist r ibut ion of budgetary
al locat ions are determined. Thus, any dist r ibut ion of
r esou rces involves some kind of t rade-off .
Unfortunately, most studies do not direct ly examine the
dist r ibut ion i t se l f . This is the bas ic cont ribu tion that
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William Berry and David Lowery have made to research in th is
area. They actually look a t the dist r ibut ion i t se l f .
Berry and Lowery ut i l i ze a conceptual izat ion that
re l ies on the ident if icat ion of an amount, or base, which is
sp l i t between two categories.
I n exp la in ing the i r conceptual izat ion, a number of
conside ra tions a re introduced that might impinge on the
defini t ion of the base, which is described as a "pool." The
f i r s t consideration concerns th e n atu re of the budgetary
process. Recognizing that the l i te ra tu r e is inconclusive on
the question of whether budgets are determined in a "top-
down," or "bottom-up" manner, and noting that budgetary
changes are incremental in nature, they identify the "pool"
as the increment o f in cre ase or decrease in the budget.
They fur ther res t r ic t the ident i ty of th is pool as being
that amount of the budgetary increment that i s eventual ly
sp l i t between A and B. This quantity (A+B) is what they use
as the base to measure the trade-off between A and B.
A second considerat ion concerns the sequence of events,
or processes, by which amount of th is pool is determined.
Noting the work of other scholars who conceive of increments
as a set of expectat ions, or "minimum aspirat ions," (about
the expected t ra jectory of spending) for each category,
Berry and Lowery briefly discuss the poss ibi l i ty of using a
"f loat ing pool" as the base.
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This i s an in tr iguing idea. In brief , th e n otio n i s
that the process of budgeting i s grounded in the ra t ional
expectat ions tha t various agencies have about future levels
of funding. These "aspirat ions" are based on a varie ty of
considerat ions, including the minimum needs of exist ing
programs. Amounts above or below what i s required to main
ta in exist ing program levels i s d efined as the pool to be
sp l i t between programs. They also speculate on the possi
bi l i ty that decisions might be made in a sequence, whereby
minimum al locat ions are made, and what i s "leftover" from an
i n i t i a l al locat ion i s then sp l i t among categories.
Acknowledging tha t the measurement of a "f loat ing pool"
increment i s exceedingly complex, they re t rea t to the more
t ractable defini t ion of a pool as the actual increment of
spending which A and B jo int ly share. Thus, the ident i ty of
the pool i s the sum of increments for A and B. Increments
(INCREM) for each category are determined by subtracting
th is year ' s spending from l as t year ' s spending:
I N C ~ = SPEND t - SPENDt _1 (1 )
Postulating a hierarchical sequence of decisions, which
include both top-down and bottom-up cons iderat ions l eading
to tra de -o ff choices, they suggest that a t rade-off between
the objectives of f isca l policy ( i .e . balancing the budget)
and programmatic objectives i s made s imultaneously with the
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determinat ion of the to ta l budget increment. At a la t te r
stage in the process a decision regarding the sp l i t between
categories is made. The amount of the increment for each
category (AMT) is calculated in the manner described above
for the to ta l spending increment. The pool i s thus defined
as the sum of these amounts:
POOL = AMT(A) + AMT(B) (2 )
Where:AMT(A) = SPEND (A) t - SPEND (Al t-l'
and, AMT(B) = SPEND (Bl t - SPEND (Bl t - l
I t i s important to note that an increment may be ei ther
posit ive or negative. As Berry and Lowery explain:
While our theory of the budget process assumestha t t rade-off choices are always focused on the a l location of increments from the base, we must allow forthe possibi l i ty tha t decision makers may occasionallycut into the base of one category to finance the increment received by the other84
After considering a number of al ternat ives for measur-
ing the sp l i t between two categories, they se t t l e on two
methods. The f i r s t method i s based on a ra t io between A and
B. This proportional measure i s calculated as follows:
PROP(A:Bl= (3)[AMT(Al-AMT(B)]/[AMT(A}+AMT(Bl], i f INCREM(A+Bl>O; or[AMT(Bl-AMT(A)]/[AMT(A)+AMT(Bl], i f INCREM(A+B)<085
A second measure i s based on the differences between
the c urren t year 's expenditures and expenditures the year
84 Ibid, 684.
85 Ibid, 685.
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before. Noting that the absolute d if fe rences a re extremely
large, they adjust thei r measure by use of square roots,
thus:
DIFF(A:B)= (4)~ A M T ( A ) - ~ A M T ( B ) , i f AMT(A»O and AMT(B»O, orIAMT(A) I - IAMT(B) I, i f AMT(A)<O and AMT(B)<O, or
~ A M T ( A ) + ~ IAMT(B) I, i f AMT(A»O and AMT(B)<O, or- [ IAMT(A) I + ~ A M T ( B ) ] , i f AMT(A)<O and AMT(B) >0 86
These calculat ions resu l t in measures of t rade-offs
that are in te l l ig ible in terms of both direction and magni-
tude. Instead of conceptualizing t rade-offs as hypotheses,
these theoret ical cons truc ts p resen t t rade-offs as measur-
able ent i t i es . With such a conceptualization, i t i s possi-
ble to t es t hypotheses about the direction of the t rade-off .
This kind of t es t is simply not possible using the conven-
t ional method of analysis where one category i s regressed on
another.
The General Hypothesis
The gen eral h ypothesis o f th is study is tha t American
par t ies affec t budget allocations , and thereby, t rade-offs
between categories of expendi tu re s. I hypothesize tha t
par t ies further to the l e f t favor social spending more than
par t ies further to the l e f t and tha t part ies further to the
r ight favor defense spending more than part ies to the l e f t .
r es ultin g in distr ibut ions that ref lec t the power of the
par t ies .
86 Ibid, 686.
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H1 : Trade-offs f avor defense spending more as the strengthof the r ight increases.
For reasons explained below, sufficient ly precise data
for trade-off measures based on the Lowery-Berry formula
could not be constructed for cross-nat ional analysis .
Difficul t ies in compiling data sufficient ly precise for
use in the calculat ions of small margins required tha t the
measurement of trade-offs be modified f or c ro ss -n at iona l
analysis . The following sections deal with the way tha t thedata were compiled and transformed into variables sui table
for analysis . Following the descript ion of the sources and
methods of measurement, an inspection of the variables i s
presented. Based on the findings of these inspections,
modifications to the in t ia l formulation are presented.
Data Collect ion and Measurement
To t es t the hypothesis presented in th i s study a number
of data sources were consulted. A complete l i s t of sources
i s reported in Appendix A. This sect ion describes the
calculat ions by which the principal concepts were opera-
t ional ized.
Two separate sets of data were constructed. One set
contains cross-national data for 18 advanced indust r ia l
countries. The second data se t contains more detai led and
precise data on United States.
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In construct ing the data se t for the cross-national
analysis, a number of obstacles were encountered. The f i r s t
problem i s comparability. Definit ions of categories di f fe r
from one country to another, thus there is some conceptual
ambiguity in taking data from national yearbooks. By com-
parison, data reported by in ternat ional organizat ions such
as the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation
(OECD), or for that matter the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) are gathered with a special eye t o c ro ss -nat iona l
comparison.
Highly disaggregated, such as welfare paYments to
select groups of people, are frequently incomplete and not
directly comparable to that of o ther coun tr ie s. Moreover,
expenditures on welfare programs and other cash t ransfer
programs do not appear to be comparable in terms of the
requirements of e l ig ib i l i ty . Considerable differences
between welfare programs (some of which are means-tested
while others are not) in different countries seemed to
s t re tch the comparabi li ty o f expendi tu res in th i s policy
area. On the other hand, functional expenditures for educa
t ion and health appear to be more comparable. For th is
reason, I re ly on aggregate data on expenditures for educa
t ion and health .
Unfortunately, the precision (and re l iabi l i ty) of
cross-nat ional data i s not very high. As i t stands, I have
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ra ther good data on 18 countries of a theoret ical universe
of approximately 24 to 25 countries (depending on how one
views the level of development and comparative democratiza-
t ion of countries in Southern Europe, e.g. Greece, Turkey,
Spain and Portugal, which were deleted from this study).
Also, I have excluded very small countries, such as Liech-
tenstein and Iceland, which, for reasons of comparability,
did not seem appropr ia te subject s of th is a na ly sis .
The principal source for data on expenditures for
health and education expendi tures is the OECD publication
Social Expenditures, published in 1985. 87 Series fo r most
member countries a re a va ila ble for the 1960 to 1981 time
frame, though a good many points are missing (e.g. Denmark,
Switzerland, and of course France). Additional data were
taken from the OECD publication National Accounts, Volume I I
(various years) . The definit ion of health and education
expenditures were roughly comparable between these two
sources. Thus, the ear l ie r series were spliced to the
l a t t e r ser ies . The spl ic ing technique was based on percent-
age increases or decreases in constant units . 88 A few
87 In personal conversat ions wi th the s taf f of theOECD in Paris , I have been to ld th at an update of th is datawil l be available from the OECD in 1992 or 1993.
88 There i s some error in this method, owing to thefac t that the ear l ie r series had been harmonized, while thel a t t e r ser ies was based on f i sca l years, which dif fer fromcountry to country . .
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missing data were averaged from exist ing points, where that
seemed reasonable. Otherwise, missing data were simply
coded as m issin g. Percentages of government expenditures
were then calculated for each category.
Two separate sources for defense expenditures data were
consulted. The f i r s t source was taken are taken from a data
se t of IMP s ta t i s t ics provided by Professor Marina Arbetman.
This data i s reported in per centage s o f Gross National
Product (GDP) and converted to per cent ag es o f government
spending using OECD data.
Another source of data for mili tary spending was con-
sul ted, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
(various years) published by the United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) provided a second source of
data. ACDA figures were reported in percentages of Gross
National Product (GNP) for the years between 1963 and 1988,
and defense expendi tu res as a percentage of Central Govern-
ment Expenditures (CGE) for the years between 1967 and 1988.
Earl ier edit ions in cluded per centage s o f GNP, but not
percentages of central government expenditures. Data from
the OECD on the l a t t e r were used to back-f i l l estimates to
1964, based on the ra tes of increase of both indicators in
constant units . This procedure did not reso lv e th e discrep-
ancy between ACDA est imates and the est imates based on IMF
figures. Selecting a rel iable data source for defense
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spend ing posed serious problems. Considerable differences
between dat a r epor ted in subsequent issues of the ACDA
publication were encountered. The l a t es t f igures were
20btained from each issue, as they reputedly contained the
bes t a va ila ble information. These d if fe renc es a re examined
in more deta i l at the end of this chapter.
For c ros s-nat ional analys is , c a lcu la tions of t rade-offs
between defense expenditures and other expenditures on other
expenditures were based, in i t i a l ly , on a modification of the
formula p roposed Ber ry and Lowery using percentage t erms . 89
These measures are posi t ive when the sp l i t in the pool
favors defense and negative when the sp l i t favors domestic
or social expenditures. The in terval of th e d if fe renc e
measure has no boundary except for the zero point, where the
sp l i t i s even. Dependent var ia bles a re constructed for
t rade-offs between defense expenditures and health and
education expendi tu res .
89 Obviously, measures based on monetary units wouldhave created a severe problem in t he c ros s-nat ional analys i s . Conversions to common units would not have solved theproblem of comparing budgets that di f fe r a great deal ins ize . While there are s t i l l problems associated with di f -ference in bases (denominators) from one country to another,
percentage terms provide the best al ternat ive to a currencybased approach. In selecting an appropriate indicator, Ichose the difference-based model.
The proport ion based measure generates more extremeerrors than the simple difference based measure. Moreover,the proport ion based measure i s more sensi t ive to the basethan th e d if fe renc e measure, which would further complicatecross-national analysis comparisons. This matter is dis-cussed in more deta i l in Chapter IV.
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Measures of partisan ideology were taken from a data
set developed with the assistance of several country
specia l is ts .gO The measurement of t he i deologi ca l composi-
t ion of governments are based on the placement of a l l pol i t
ica l part ies holding parliamentary seats on a five point
l e f t - r igh t continuum. A series of revisions to an i n i t i a l
collection were made for the f inal computations used in th is
study. The scale position of pol i t ical part ies were based,
in i t i a l ly , on a comparison of descriptions found in Vincent
McHale's Pol i t ica l Part ies of Europe, Keesing's Contemporary
Archives, Facts on File and Mackie and Rose's The Interna-
t ional Almanac of Electoral History. As mentioned, a number
of country special is ts , contributed revisions to the or igi -
nal placements. In revising the original placements, con-
t r ibutors were allowed to move the placements of part ies
over time to account for some degree of ideological dr i f t .
These placements were used to calculate ideological scores
gO I would l ike to acknowledge the advice and ass is tance of a number of contributors to th is port ion of the
data se t . The collect ion is part of a jo int project amongseve ra l scho la rs including Professors Marina Arbetman,Francis G. Castles, Robert Cox, Eric Einhorn, ConstantineDanopolous, M. Donald Hancock, John Logue, John williams,and Barclay and Joan Ward and David wilsford. ProfessorCharles F. Delzelle , though not a con tr ibutor t o the broaderproject , a ss is te d in the collect ion of data on I ta l ianpar t ies . These data are to be used in country-specificstudies of the influence of part ies on budget outcomes.
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based on the dist r ibut ion of seats in the lower chamber of
parl iament. 91
The number of seats held by each party were also ob-
tained from the sources above. The occurrence of mid-year
elections posed some problems for the annualized ser ies . To
provide consistency, distr ibut ions of seats resul t ing from
elect ions held af te r June 1, are credited to the next year.
Changes due t o e le ct io ns held before June 1 are credited to
the year in which the elect ion was held. Lags are based on
these estimates.
These dist r ibut ions were used to construct two indica-
tors of part isan influence. There i s no general ly agreed
upon coding scheme for analyzing th e in flu en ce of par t ies ,
but most measures depend on aggregating the ideological
posi t ions, weighted by the proportion of seats held by
par t ies . Some schemes base calculations on cabinet seats ,
while others base calculations on the dist r ibut ion within
the lower chamber, reg ardless o f cabin et representa t ion.
Posit ive empirical resul t s have been obtained using both
kinds of indicators. Without an expl ic i t basis for asser t -
ing the super ior i ty of one method or another, I constructed
two measures. One measure is based on a s imple averaging
91 See Appendix B for a sample o f th e q ue st io nn airesent t o con tr ibutor s.
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83
technique and the other is anchored in the posi t ion of the
category that has a plura l i ty of seats .
The f i r s t indicator, i s based on a weighted, or
geometric mean. To calculate this score, each of the posi-
t ions was assigned a numerical value ranging from 1 to 100,
with radical l e f t occupying 1, moderate l e f t a t 25, center
at 50, moderate r ight a t 75 and radical r ight a t 100. The
number of seats held by part ies at each posi t ion i s mult i
plied by the assigned value of that posi t ion and summed. 92
This sum is then divided by the number of seats to provide a
weighted mean. The formula for these calculations i s as
follows:
= (5)[(RL X l)+(ML X 25)+(CTR X 50)+(MR X 75)+(RR X 100)]
SEATS
Where:RL=ML=
Number of seats held by radical l e f t part ies
Number of seats held by moderate l e f t par t ies
92 This method corresponds with the procedure used byMichael John Morgan, "The Modelling of Governmental Coalit ion Formation: A Policy Based Approach with Interval Mea-surement" (Ph.D. Diss. , Univers it y o f Michigan, 1976); Seealso Francis G. Castles, and Peter Mair, "Left-Right Pol i t i -cal Scales: Some 'Expert ' Judgements," European Journal ofPol i t ica l Research 12 (1984): 73 -88. The method i s employedby Palmer, "Alliance Poli t ics and Issue Areas," 203-205.Palmer notes tha t "there i s no account o f bargaini ng power.
This may be especially troublesome in s ta tes where minorpart ies a re p ivot al, that i s , they can determine which ofthe major part ies i s a member of the rul ing coal i t ion . . . . Atechnique was experimented with that weighted the par t ies byhow many cabinet seats they held, or al ternat ively, how many' pres t ige ' positions they held (e .g. , foreign ministry,defense ministry). Such weighting systems provided l i t t l ed iffe re nc e in the value of the coali t ion mean and was dis-carded." [Ibid, 204].
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CTR = Number of seats held by center part iesMR = Number of seats held by moderate r ight part iesRR = Number of seats held by radical r ight part iesSEATS = Total number o f par li amentary seats
A second scale, AMEAN, was constructed, which anchored
the sca le in the s ca le po si ti on having a plura l i ty of par-
liamentary seats . This scale was calculated as follows:
AMEAN = ANCHOR +/ - COMP (6 )
Where:
ANCHORWhere:
COMP =
Where:Where:
= The position containing a plura l i ty of seats
The weighted value of the scale position (B)containing a plura l i ty of remaining seats ,calculated as:[POS X (XPER), i f POS > ANCHOR; or
-[POS X (XPER), i f POS < ANCHORXPER = Percentage seats in sca le pos it ion BB<A, and B>C, and B>D, and B>E; and C, D, and Eare the remaining s ca le po si ti on s
For the sake of consistency in cross-nat ional analysis,
these measure were applied to a l l countries in the sample.
However, the comparative lack of party discipl ine in the
United States, l imits the appl icabi l i ty of using percentages
of seats as a measure of part isan s t rength.
For a more p rec is e ana ly si s of t rade-offs in federal
outlays, a surrogate measure of partisan ideology was de-
vised. Following the work of Keith Poole and R. Steven
Daniels , I used measures of party unity voting to est imate
the ideological effec t of part ies . 93 Poole has argued tha t
93 Other researchers have analyzed part isan cleavageswith similar resu l t s . See Schneider, Ideo log ical Coal it ionsin Congress; W illiam R. S ha ffe r, P arty and Ideology in the
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85
a l iberal-conservative dimension in Congressional voting
approximates party unity voting. 94 Using this conceptual-
izat ion of the ideological strength of American part ies ,
unity data were taken from Norman J . Ornstein, Thomas E.
Mann, and Michael J . Malbin's Vital Sta t is t ics on Congress.
I pos tu la te th at the higher the percent of ro l l -ca l l
votes where a l l the members of one party voted tog eth er, the
higher the degree of ideological consistency within that
par ty. 95 Thus, the effect of the ideological tendency of a
United States Congress (Washington, D.C.: University Pressof America, 1980); Poole and Stevens' argument tha t congressional voting is highly unidimensional has been challengedby Kenne th Korford, "Dimensions in Congressional Voting,"American Pol i t ica l Science Review 83 (1989): 949-62, whoargues that the lef t - r ight dimension accounts for much l essthan Poole and Stevens' analysis repor ts . He argues thatth ere are at leas t three major dimensions to congressionalvoting.
94 See Keith Poole and R. Steven Daniels, "Ideology ,Party and Voting," 380.
95 This i s a ten ta t ive proposit ion. Some evidencesuggests that exogenous factors influence levels of par t i sanship, especial ly in the House. Cf. David Brady, JosephCooper, and Patr icia Hurley, "The Decline of Party in theU.S. House of Representa tives, 1887 - 1968," in Congress:Structure and Policy, eds. Matthew D. McCubbins and TerrySullivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 250257; Samuel C. Patterson and Gregory A. Caldeira, "partyVoting in the United States Congress," Brit ish Journal of
Pol i t ica l Science 18 ( January 1988) : 117-29.Data on par ty unity are taken from Norman J . Ornstein,Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J . Malbin, Vital Stat i s t ics onCongress 1989-1990 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc. , 1991); see Tables 8-3,8-4; 208-209.
The measures are defined: "Party Uni ty Votes in Congress, 1953-1988; (percentage of a l l votes)": "Data indicatethe percentage of a l l recorded votes on which a majo rity o fvoting Democrats opposed a majo rity o f voting Republicans."
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86
party should be more pronounced when it votes en bloc.
Holding tha t Democrats are to the l e f t of Republicans,
re la t ive ly speaking, I hypothesize that the more tha t Demo-
crats vote together, the more t ha t t ra de -o ff s should move
away from a defense and favor various kinds of domestic
expenditures.
A very l imited analysis of the re la t ionship between
evaluations by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and
par ty unity suggests that p ar ty unity votin g ta ps into the
ideological dispositions of the part ies . Average ADA scores
for House Democrats and Republicans for the years 1965 to
1976 were taken from William R. Shaffer 's study of dif fer -
ences between congressional party members. 96 The resul ts
[Ibid, 208]; "Party Unity Sco re s in Congressional Voting,1954-1988; (percent)": "Data show percentage of membersvoting with a majority of the i r party on par ty uni ty vote s.Party unity votes are those ro l l calls on which a majorityof a party votes on one side of the issue and a majority ofthe o th er p arty votes on the other side. The percentagesare normalized to eliminate the effects of absences, asfollows: par ty unity=(unity)/(unity + opposit ion)." [Ibid,209].
96 See Shaffer, Party and Ideology in the united
States Congress, 49. For a description of the l imitat ionand cri t icisms of ADA scores, see Congressional Ouarterly'sGuide to Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional QuarterlyInc. , 1985) and Ornstein, Vital Stat i s t ics on Congress.This index of congressional voting tendencies has beencr i t ic ized for i t s lack o f conceptual clar i ty , but remainsone of the leading sources o f s yst ematic data on members ofcongress. Repeated effor ts to obtain annual data direct lyfrom the ADA were f rui t less .
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87
of a l imited analysis are reported in the next section,
where measurements are inspected more closely.
Data on federal expenditures are taken from Histor ical
Tables, Budget of the United States Government, for f i sca l
years 1987, 1990 and 1992. These data are organized by the
superfunc tion , func tion and subfunction. All data were
converted to constant 1'982 dollars prior t o c alc ul ati ng
t rade-off measures. The spec if ic t rade-of fs analyzed using
th is data are discussed in deta i l in Chapter IV where t rade
offs in the United States are examined.
Inspect ing the Pol i t ica l Variables
The use of a l e f t - r igh t continuum is fam iliar to jour-
nal is t s , historians and pol i t ical sc ient is ts . Moreover,
empi ri ca l r esearch suggests tha t the public understands the
terminology of an ideological continuum arrayed from l e f t to
r ight . The practice of using a Left-Right terminology to
describe the p olicy orientat ions of pol i t ic ians i s quite
old, dating from the French Revolution.
This approach to c la ss if yi ng pol i t ical part ies has been
widely used and empirical studies indicate that the continu
um has meaning to a large p ropo rtio n o f th e populatio n. 97
97 See Hans Daalder, liThe Dutch Party System: FromSegmentation to Polarization- And Then?1I chap. in PartySystems in Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlandsand Belgium, ed. Hans Daalder (London: Frances Pinter, 1987)where cross-national survey resu l t s are reported th at in dicate an underlying s c al ar p ri nc ip le in voter self-placements
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88
Moreover, the concept of a l e f t - r igh t continuum appears to
have val id i ty across cul tu ra l and pol i t ica l boundaries. As
Sani and Sar tor i point out:
As it stands, our evidence only says tha t , in a l l thecountr ies under consideration, samples of respondentsa re w illin g and apparen tly able to locate themselves ona l e f t - r igh t continuum in sat isfactory percentages(67.6 i s the lowest percentage of responses in theEight-nat ion Study, and a surprisingly high one considering tha t it i s th e U .S .). The important underlyingquestions are, f i r s t , what is the c ro s s- cu lt ur al t rav el l ing capacity of the l e f t - r igh t imagery; and, second,
how do we reckon with the i r inevi table, context-basedre la t ivi ty? Cross-cultural equivalence i s a generalproblem of a l l comparative analyses; yet we seem to bebe t te r off -on t ravel l ing grounds - with ' l e f t - r igh t 'than w ith ' l i bera l - conservat ive ' . As to the i ssue ofre la t iv i ty - how r ight i s ' r i gh t ' - it should be c leartha t in our analysis the problem i s minimized by thefac t tha t the primary concern i s the comparison ofgroups of part isans within the i r respect ive countries.Thus, no assumption needs to be made about equivalenceof the l e f t - r ight scale in different countries. 98
Sani and Sartor i succinct ly s ta te the essent ia l prob-
lem of using the l e f t r ight continuum to make generaliza-
t ion s c ro s s- na ti ona ll y. The fundamental question i s whether
r ight in country A i s equivalent to r ight in country B.
The way tha t the continuum i s being used in th is analysis
r0quires th is kind of comparison. More extensive collec-
t ions of th is kind of data have resul ted in very high levels
on a l e f t - r igh t continuum.
98 Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartor i , "Polar izat ion,Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies,"Western European Party Systems, ed. Hans Daalder and PeterMair (Beverly Hil l s : Sage, 1983), 309.
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89
of re l i ab i l i ty , but some kind of independent t es t seems
warranted by the comparat ively smal l number of contr ibutors
to the data collect ion. 99
Some anecdotal evidence suggests tha t the placements of
part ies on the continuum used here are cross-nat ional ly
val id . Placements of European part ies on the continuum
correspond closely to the par t ies ' pre fe rr ed seat ing ar
rangements the European Parliament. This indicates some
symmetry between the values ass igned to part ies in terms of
thei r selections of coali t ion partners .100 Comparisons
with the s trength of labor unions a lso d isp la y a pat tern.
Labor unions are considered the natural constituency of
l e f t i s t par t ies . 101 Where labor unions are strong, l e f t i s t
part ies should also be strong. Regression analyses o f labor
organization strength display a fair ly consistent pat tern in
99 Cf. Francis G. Castles and Peter Mair. "Left-RightPol i t ica l Scales."
100 See Stanley Henig, ed. Pol i t ica l P arties in theEuropean Community (London: George Allen & Unwin Limited,1978), 276-277; Francis Jacobs, Richard Corbett, and MichaelShackleton, The European Parliament (Boulder: Westview Press1990), 54-83.
101 See Hibbs, "Poli t ical Part ies and MacroeconomicPol ic y; " Tuft e, Pol i t ica l Control, 83-7. In fact , i t i scommon to find high col l ineari ty in models tha t include bothle f t -par ty control and measures of unionization or unionstrength. Cf. Michael R. Alvarez, Geoffrey Garrett , andPeter Lange. "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization,and Macroeconomic Performance," American Pol i t ica l ScienceReview 85 (June 1991): 539-556.
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90
the categor ical components of the indices WMEAN and AMEAN,
as well as th e in dice s themselves. Using th e p er cent of
moderate l e f t seats averaged over the 1960-1988 period as
the dependent var iable and union organization strength102
as the independent variable, a pos it iv e r e la ti onsh ip i s ob-
ta ined. For moderate r ight par t ies , the relat ionship i s
weaker, but n eg ativ e as expected. Both aggregate measures,
AMEAN and WMEAN, produced s ignif icant resul t s as well , with
coeff icients in the direct ion implied by the l i t e ra ture (See
Figures 1-4) :
A-SqulII'8 =.59, SiGnificant at p < .000.
50 50...,cIIII
-L
II IC L_ lD
D. 30~ ~ lD L
1i;1 20LO
-8 ....02:...,
10Iii
0L..
0 0 0
1.21.41.61.8 2.22.42.62.8 3.23.43.6lSIar IfI!eXLabor Strength and Percent Moderate Left
FIGURE 1
102 Ibid, 553.
.
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91
•
•
•
o
•
•
•
•
•
•
so
A U U ~ U U ~ U D U ~ l 8 b a r ~ . Index
Strength and Percent Moderate Right
FIGURE 2
R-Sql8'e =.G , S:lQniftClnt at p < .001
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92
~ =.31, --.flCIftt lit P < .01
70
I 60 00
~ 0
•0
at0
0 0i ....,0
-I...
3D
The question of whether party unity in the U.S. House
of Representatives i s indicative of a par tis an b ia s is more
complex. I postulated that part y unity is indicative of a
kind of coalescence of members around core values. I t seems
reasonable to believe that when a party is united in i t s
voting patterns i t i s displaying unity, or agreement about
i t s values.
The fact that a party varies in i t s cohesiveness, by
i t se l f , says nothing about the d ir ec tion o r i nte ntion of the
bias. I am not aware of any use of party unity to measure
party ideology. However, several p iece s of evidence suggest
tha t part isan unity i s related to ideology. The most sug-
gest ive piece of evidence i s found in an ar t ic le by Keith
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93
Poole and R. Steven Daniels on party voting in the u.S.
Congress .103
In the i r analysis of rol l -ca l l voting, Poole and Dan
ie ls as sert th at there is a high degree of unidimensionality
in congressional voting. Using factor analysis, they argue
tha t , on average, a l iberal-conservative dimension accounts
fo r 81 percent of the variance in the in teres t group rat ings
of congressmen. 104 Moreover, they note that :
[T]here are dis t inctions between part ies : the Democratic party i s much less homogeneous than the Republicanpar ty. The Republicans are concentrated a t centerrigh t to far r ight . The bulk of the Democratic partyi s concentrated a t center l e f t to fa r le f t , but subs tant ia l numbers of Democrats are located a t centerr igh t and far r ight .
Party unity scores increase with movement along theparty dimension . . . 105
Basing thei r assessment of an ideological dimension in
congress ional voting on th e r atin gs of in teres ts groups,
ing. "
103 See Poole and Daniels, "Ideology, Party and Vot-
104 Ibid, 379. For a cri t ique of the Poole and Danielsar t i c l e , see Kenneth Korford, "Dimensions in CongressionalVoting." Korford issues a methodological c ri ti ci sm tha t thetechnique used by Poole and Daniels overstates the dimen
sional i ty in voting.
105 See Poole and Daniels, "Ideology, Party and Voting," 380-1, for a visual i l lus t ra t ion of the s pa tia l r el at ionship of par ty unity and the l ibera l conservative dimension. In thei r i l lus t ra t ion, the spat ia l relat ionship i snot presented as para l le l dimensions, but d ispla yed as twol ines, crossing at a 20 to 30 degree angle at an zero point[Ibid, 380].
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94
Poole and Dani el s' fi nd ings f i t well with the work of other
scholars who find that differences between par t ies on in ter -
est group ra t ings.
The most widely used in teres t group ra t ing i s reported
by the in teres t group, Americans for Democratic Action
(ADA). In ADA rat ings, members are scored in accordance
with the percen tage o f votes where th ey vot ed in favor of
b i l l s supported by the ADA. ADA scores may be interpreted
as a measure of l iberal ism, though there i s some scholarly
skepticism regarding the content of ADA evaluations. 1oG
High scores indicate agreement with l ibera l values, w h i l ~low scores indicate relat ive conservatism.
William Shafer has conducted an extensive study of the
difference in ADA scores between Democrats and Republicans.
He has found tha t average scores for both par t ies indicate
tha t there i s a difference between the Democra tic and Repub-
l ican par t ies . Shaffer found tha t Democrats tend to be more
l ibera l as measured by ADA scores, while Republicans tend to
be comparatively more conservat ive. While regional dif fer -
ences between scores are apparent, within each region Demo-
crats are s t i l l more l ibera l , on average, than Republicans.-
lOG See Sha ffer, Party and Ideology, 31-36 for a discussion of ADA scores general ly and as a measure of ideologyin par t icu lar . Cf. Schneider, Ideological Coalit ions inCongre ss , 102.
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95
107 Shaffer 's study is based on ADA scores from 1965 to
1976. Shafer reports average scores for each party in each
chamber of Congress (and regional breakdowns by region) for
each year . Using th is data, I t es t the simple hypothesis,
implied by Poole and Daniels, that par ty unity is associated
with ideology. The hypothesis i s twofold. I f unity is
associated with ideology in the way that I suspect, Demo-
cra t ic party unity should be pos i t ively associated with ADA
scores, and Republican par ty unity should be negatively
associated with ADA scores.
With only twelve years of data, test ing the re la t ion-
ship between part isan unity and ADA scores stretches the
val idi ty of s t a t i s t i ca l analysis , so resu l t s are very ten ta-
t ive . Nevertheless, bivar ia te r eg ress ion analys is of the
relat ionship between the average ADA scores for House Demo-
cra ts , and the p ercen t o f ro l l ca l l votes where party unity
obtained, yields a s ta t i s t i ca l ly s ignif icant , posi t ive
coefficient . This f inding supports the hypothesis that
par ty unity i s indicat ive of an ideological push toward more
l ibera l posi t ions when Democrats vote in unison. D isunity,
on the other hand, i s associated with lower levels of ADA
scores, indicat ing that party members, on average, are not
voting in favor of positions endorsed by the ADA. The f i t
of this bivariate model i s shown in Figure 5.
107 See Shaffer, Party and Ideology.
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96
80
• 75
64.1
•
•
•
•
•
Lr-----r------,r-----y---.,-. 70
80
.... DlIIar:NtIRelationship Between ADA SCores and party U'1i.ty
>-..§>0
-\ICL
I.7!i
>
'5
I.
-!CL
FIGURE 5
A structural ly identical model for Republican House
members is tested. This analysis yields a weaker, but
s ta t i s t ica l ly significant , negative relat ionship (Adjusted
R2=.35, significant a t p<.02). That i s , the more that
Republicans House members are united in the i r voting, the
lower the i r average ADA scores, while the more united Demo-
crats are, th e hig he r the i r ADA scores. This supports the
hypothesis that party unity is associated with the ideologi-
cal leanings of Republican House members (See Figure 6).
These findings are encouraging. Both par t ies move in
the directions that I hypothesized as they become more
united in the i r voting.
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97
85
I'Ii --
I
80
7!1
••
•
• ••
7Q 10L . w - - - - _ - - - - . , . - - - ~ r _ _ - - - ~
"
IS a tHue- AlpubltClllll"
Relationsh1p Between ADA" Scens Rt P8"ty lkI1ty
FIGURE 6
These fi n d i n g s s u g g e s t t h a t changes in u n i t y v o t i n g a re
i n d eed i n d i c a t i v e o f movement toward, o r away from, c e r t a i n
k i n d s o f v al u e s . The d i r e c t i o n o f th e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between
u n i t y v o t i n g by b o t h p a r t i e s and ADA s co res a r e a s I had
p r e d i c t e d . In t h e co n t ex t o f American pol i t ics , Democrats
a r e more l ibera l , i n a manner o f speaking lito th e le f t" as
compared t o Republicans. In sum, t h e p o s t u l a t e o f th e
i d e o l o g i c a l d i m en s i o n al i t y o f p a r t y u n i t y i s supported by
comparison to t h e interest group r a t i n g s o f th e ADA. As
Democrats become more u n i t e d i n the i r v o t i n g b eh av i o r, t h e
more l i k e l y they a r e to s u p p o rt t h e l ibera l p o s i t i o n s o f t h e
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98
ADA, while the more united Republicans are, the less l ikely
they are to support those same positions.
Inspecting the Dependent Variables
The re l i ab i l i ty of cross-national data posed a serious
problem in construct ing the t rade -o f f va riable . The formula
proposed Berry and Lowery is quite sensi t ive to year to year
change. Modifying the t rade-off formula to employ percent-
age terms magnifies error in year to year changes.
Seemingly small errors in reports of percent expendi-
tures generate large errors in the es timates o f the t rade-
off . Inconsistencies in the data reported by the U.S. Arms
and Disarmament Agency raises serious doubts about the
ac cu racy o f that data. Corrections to prev iously report ed
figures varied widely from one issues of World Mili tary
Expenditures and Arms Transfers to the next . Figures on
West Germany provide the best example of how much "correc-
t ion" was necessary in some issue. Estimates of the per-
centage of central government expendi tu res spen t on the
mili tary differed from between 10 to 15 percent!
On the other hand, IMF f igures appeared to be less
vola t i le in thei r correct ions to ear l ie r reports . Checking
raw figures, I noticed very l i t t l e change from one volume to
the next . Generally, corrections were confined to a two-
year span prior to publication in IMP publ ica t ions . By
comparison, ACDA f igures are continually re-based, and
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99
est imates of current dol lar expenditures vary over ent ire
ten-year spans from one issue to the next with no explana-
t ion other than the blanket asser t ion that est imates are
based on the most accurate data available. Suspecting that
th is data might contain an unacceptable amount of error , I
designed a t es t to confirm or re jec t my suspicion that IMF
data are superior to ACDA data.
To do th is , I f i r s t converted U.S. budget data to
percentages in order to repl icate the procedure employed in
calculat ing the modified t rade-off measures to be used in
the cross-national analysis . U.S. budget data are much more
precise, less l iable to revision, and subject to consider-
ably more public scrutiny than the data reported by ei ther
the IMF or the ACDA. For these reasons, I believe that the
data source which f i t s be t te r with calculations based on
U.S. budget data i s the more re l iab le source.
Measures of defense versus health and education t rade-
offs were repl icated appeared to be the most t ractable
t rade-offs to repl icate. I compared measures using a l l
three data sources for these two t rade-offs . I also com-
pared modified and un-modified calculations using only U.S.
budget data to see whether the effect of modifying the
Berry-lowery formula to adapt i t to percentage calculations
warrants concern.
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100
The correla t ion between the modified t rade-off measure
the unmodified t rade-off measure i s .85 fo r the education
t rade-off , and .87 for the heal th t rade-off . Comparisons of
the series for the heal th t rade-off are shown in Figure 7:
o Unmodified Calculation A Modified calculation
1960 1970 1980
U.S. Health Trade-off
Comparison of Trade-off MeasuresFIGURE 7
c: c:.<1
00
.. ....
IU ofJ.... 10: I ....
U :::J
.... UID 0
....
tJ 10U
'D"CIII
004 CD.... ........ ....'D ....
Q "C
! ! 0
c: :E::>
Both ser ies appear to move in the same direct ion, but
there are some points tha t diverge. Similar resul ts were
obtained fo r the education t rade-off . The re la t ively high
correla t ion between the ser ies does not indicate tha t there
i s cause for much concern in using the modified formula,
provided tha t the data are of suff ic ient precis ion. Howev-
er, data reported by the IMF and ACDA produced considerable
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101
d i f f e r e n c e s i n th e e sti m a t e s o f t h e t r a d e - o f f s . A compar-
i s o n o f e s t i m a t e s f o r t h e h e a l t h t r a d e - o f f u s i n g each s o u r c e
i s p r e s e n t e d i n F i g u re 8 .
o ACDA·'DataD U.s. Budget Data
II. DF Data
o
1960 1970 1980 1990
yearComparison of Data Sets for the Health Trade-off
FIGURE 8
In comparing t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between d a t a drawn from
t h e IMP an d d a t a from th e ACDA, t h e s u p e r i o r i t y o f IMF d a t a
i s a p p a r e n t . However, n e i t h e r measure f i t s p e r f e c t l y w i t h
u.s. budget d a t a , c o rr el at io n s i n di ca t e t h a t t h e IMF d a t a
a r e c onsi de r a bl y c l o s e r t o t h e mark t h an ACDA d a t a . Table 3
p r e s e n t s t h e Pearson product moment c o r r e l a t i o n s between t h e
t r a d e - o f f measures c a l c u l a t e d u s i n g u.s. budget d a t a and
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102
t rade-off measures calculated using the other two sources.
TABLE 3
Correlations with U.S. Budget Data
Heal th Trade-of f
Education Trade-off
ACDA Data
- .13
- .25
IMP Data
.73
.51
My suspicion of the comparatively low comparabil ity of
ACDA data i s supported by these correlat ions . Even using
the IMF data, a direct ana ly sis o f trade-offs using cross
nat ional data under the Berry-Lowery formulation i s doomed.
Measurement error i s amplified by the formula, which re l ies
on very small increments.
A somewhat less p re ci se solut ion to the problem i s to
use a sl ightly different conceptualization that i s l ess
sensit ive to very small changes: the difference between the
percentage spent on each category. In constructing th is
kind of measure, the base has changed from the budget incre
ment to the budget as a whole. While such a measure i s
conceptually less precise, i t i s an elegant solut ion to
using less precise data. Moreover, i t is s t i l l superior to
regressing one category on another because i t provides a
directional measure of the distr ibut ion among categories
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103
instead of presentin g the dist r ibut ion as a hypothesis.
Interpretat ion of th is measure i s quite simple.
I f we subtract th e p ercen t of defense expenditures from
the percent of health expenditures, the result may be posi
t ive , negative or zero, depending on which category is
larger or i f they are equal. I f the resul t ing value of the
next observat ion i s h igher h ighe r, health has fared bet ter
( relat ive to defense) than i t did in the l as t observat ion.
I f i t i s smaller , health fared worse than i t did in the l as t
observation. In some ways this measure i s superior to the
Berry-Lowery formula in tha t i t i s a more substantive indi-
cator of the change in the structure of the budget.
Their measure is adequate for analysis of marginal
changes over time, but does not p rovi de a basis for making
cross-nat ional comparisons concerning the st ructure of
government spending. By basing the t rade-off calcuations on
percentages of the total budget, one can see very clear ly
how dist r ibut ions between two categories dif fer between
countries. S plits in incremental increases and decreases
from one year to the next might hide larger diferences
between countries. Using th is procedure, new t rade-off
measures were const ruct ed . C ross -nat iona l comparisons of
these calculations are shown in Figures 9 and 10.
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104
Percentage Health minus Defense Expenditures
Difference between Budget SharesFIGURE 9
Percentage Education minus Defense Expenditures
Difference between BUdget SharesFIGURE 10
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105
What is in terest ing is tha t both measures display a
high degree of s tab i l i ty in most countries. The series for
the United States i s one of the most volat i le . Indeed the
United States i s one of the most dev iant c as es in the sarn-
pIe, which makes i t an especial ly in terest ing case for
analysis .
With t hese prel im inar ie s out of the way, I turn to the
s ta t i s t i ca l tes ts of the hypothesis tha t par t ies influence
t rade-offs . Chapter I I I examines the generali ty of the
theory across countr ies . Chapter IV t es t s the th eo ry u si ng
a wider range of tr ad e- off s in the United States , with more
precise budget data .
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CHAPTER I I I
CROSS-NATIONAL PATTERNS: TRADE-OFFS
IN EIGHTEEN DEMOCRACIES
Introduction
This chapter presents a br ief s t a t i s t i ca l analysis of
t he hypothesi s that party ideologies effect t rade-off out-comes. Two trade-offs are examined: the t rade-off between
spending on defense and health, and the t rade-off between
defense and education. Following t he d is cu ss ion of the
measurement problems presented in Chapter I I , t rade-offs are
defined in terms of th e d if fe rences between the percentage
of outlays for each category.
In th is chapter, the dependent variables are on an
interval , bounded by zero. Budget dist r ibut ions (al locat ive
trade-offs) increasingly favor the c ate go rie s o f health or
education as values of the dependent variables become larg-
er. Positive values indicate tha t the health or education
percentage of the budget is larger than the defense share of
the budget. Negative values indicate tha t defense takes a
larger share.
Eighteen members states of the OECD were selected to
t es t the generality of the hypothesis tha t party ideology
affects budget allocations for health and education. These
106
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107
countries included: Austral ia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Ireland, I ta ly ,
Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, the United Kingdom and the United States .
Cross-National Patterns
No general pattern of part isan i nf luence across a l l
countries in the sample was found, but part isan influences
were detected in some countries. In fact , the evidence
suggests tha t the impact of part ies , or whether part ies
influence budgets, varies from one country to another, b ut
not always in the di rec tion an ti cipated by the hypothesis.
In i t i a l ly , the data were examined using simple ordinary
l eas t squares regression (OLS). While th is approach i s
generally not advised in pooled t ime-series analysis, closer
inspection of resu l t s , by country, do not indicate tha t
using the much more complex procedures required for General-
ized Least Squares (GLS) regression i s warranted.
The appeal of GLS i s that it provides more robust
estimates in face of violat ions of the assumptions of re-
gression analysis . 108 I t i s widely recognized tha t analy
s is of pooled t ime-ser ie s , e spec ia lly of cross-national
data, i s plagued by the twin devils of autocorrelation and
108 See Jan Kmenta, Elements of Econometrics, 2d ed. (NewYork: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1985), 607-757.
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108
heteroskedast ic i ty. Most researchers resort to the use of
GLS to r es olv e th es e problems. Unfortunately, computer
programmed GLS routines are in tolerant of missing data .109
Gathering a seamless data set , without any missing
observations for a l l variables (including appropriate con-
t ro l variables) on a l l cross-sections proved impossible.
Even with exis t ing sources, construction o f expendi tu re s
d ata r equire d a considerable amount of spl ic ing. Attempting
the same procedure with variables that are more vola t i le
than government spending (e.g. unemploYment) would stretch
th e a lre ady s trained comparability to unacceptable extremes.
Nevertheless, enough data of fair ly good quali ty and
consis tency110 on health and education and defense spending
were avai lable to construct a complete series for 17 of the
18 countr ie s se lec ted for the years 1960 to 1985. 111 For
109 See Eichenberg and Stol l , II Straightjacket: Supportfor Defense Spending, II for a good discussion of these problemsand a simple, non-technica l explana tion of how to deal withthem in analyzing data with missing cel ls .
110 Published longitudinal series are r i fe with adjustments, re-basing and redefini t ions . Perhaps the most severecase of redefining var iables i s the data on unemploYment. Thebest source, the International Labour Organization, based inGeneva, Switzerland, does a f ine job of gathering emplOYment
data . However, each country defines unemploYment i n d i ff er en tways. Allegedly more re l iab le survey data a re a va ila ble formore recent years, but are not comparable to earl ier datareported by government agencies. [See Year Book of LabourSta t i s t i cs , (ILO: Geneva, various years)]
111 Some data could be imputed from s imilar ly definedseries found in other sou rces, b ut using multiple sources isnot generally advised.
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109
some countries data on the dependent variable were available
to 1988. Complete expenditures data f or Ir eland, however,
were available up to , but not beyond 1981.
Using OLS as an exploratory method f or const ructi ng the
most l ike ly specif icat ions for models of t rade-offs between
health and education, I experimented with several specif ica-
t ions . One and two-year lag st ructures produced confounding
resul ts in the cross-nat ional as well as the single country
analysis presented in the next chapter. 112 A moving aver-
age t ransformation of the pol i t i ca l variable seemed to
remedy the problems of seasonali ty, and accounted for the
theore t ica l postulate that the pol i t i c s of the budget i s a
continuous, not discrete process. Such a t ransformation i s
also theoret ical ly consistent with the notion of policy
shepherding discussed in Chapter I I . A three-year moving
average of WMEAN was used as the principal independent
variable .
A s ta t i s t i ca l ly signif icant model, with apparently
signif icant coeffic ients , was constructed using the weighed
mean score (WMEAN). No s ta t i s t i ca l ly signif icant resul ts
were obtained in cross-nat ional analysis using the anchored
score (AMEAN). The multivar iate model presented below
includes the most common control variables.
112 See Chapter 4 for a more thorough discussion ofspecifying the lag st ructures .
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110
Following the findings of those who have found empiri-
cal regulari t ies between government spending on social
programs and economic dependence on exports, in f la t ion ,
populat ion size, aging and even time, I use these variables
as co ntro ls in a mult ivaria te equation. 113 The signi f i -
cance of the coeff icients reported in Table 3 i s probably
(almost definitely) over st at ed a s a resu l t o f autoco rr e
l a t ion . No global t es t of autocorrelation in pooled time
series i s curren tly avai lab le and Durbin-Watson s ta t i s t ics
are not applicable to a pooled design. These resu l t s are
interest ing only insofar as they display what appears to be
a signif icant ly negative relationship between the dependent
variables and the weighted ideological score. This con-
forms to the theorized relat ionship. That i s , as the mean
ideological score of the parliament moves to the r ight ( i ts
value increases), the difference between health or education
and defense decreases. Tabel 4 displays the resul ts of the
i n i t i a l analysis:
113 See Cameron, "Expansion of the Public Economy;" Beck,"Public Sector Growth;" Clayton, "A Comparison of Defense andWelfare Spending;" Swank, "The Poli t ical Economy of GovernmentDomestic Expenditures." Time i s a very crude control forsecular t rends, see Rose, Do Part ies Make a Difference.
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Table 4
Cross-National Regression
Results
111
Variable
Constant
WMEAN
% Population 65+ l t - 1 )
% Population 15 ( t - l l
Government Spending/GDP
Exports/GDP
Inf lat ion
Log of Population
Time
HealthTrade-off
30.51**(10.427)
-0.25**(-6.32)
-0.17**(-3.30)
-0.18**(-2.18)
0.03(0.57)
0.12
(3.00)
-0.32(-6.55)
0.58(11.95)
EducationTrade-off
26.7**( ... )
-0.31**(-6.31)
0.08(1.45)
-0.53(-8.86)
0.19(3.14 )
0.18
(4.06)
-0.20(-3.54)
0.42(7.37)
Adjusted R2
N
=
=
.45
427
.35
427
Standardized regression coeff ic ients are reported.T-scores are reported in parentheses.* Signif icant a t the .05 level** Significant a t the .01 level
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112
This would indicate that the r ight has the effect of
reducing t he d if fe renc e between the categories. This could
occur i f the r ight depressed social spending down, or in
creasing defense spending vis-a-vis health o r education.
This supports the hypoth esis , but longitudinal , per country
analyses casts doubt on these resu l ts .
Examining the coeff icients for each country, a very
d if fe re n t p ic tu re emerges. Of the 18 countries, only five
had signif icant coeff icients for the relat ionship between
WMEAN and the health t rade-off . Of these, three were posi
t ive and two were negative. For the education t rade-off the
picture is even more murky. Regression results for only s ix
countries produced s ig ni fi ca nt c oe ff ic ie nt s f or WMEAN, and
five of these were posi t ive. For both equations, only a
third, or less of the sample produced signif icant results
and most of those were in the "wrong" direct ion.
Clearly, the hypothesis of a general part isan influence
holding across countries, in the direct ion hypothesized,
must be rejected.
The one country where a negative coeffic ient obtained,
in both equations, was Japan--which is l imited by i t s con
s t i tut ion in i t s defense spending. The only other country
which had signif icant (but posit ive) resul ts in both equa
t ions was the Netherlands.
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113
Summary and Conclusion
The s t a t i s t i ca l tes ts of th e gener al hypoth es is fa i led
to provide consistent support for the theory. In fact ,
there i s more support for the view tha t the r ight increases
social spending in health and education. Obviously, the
theory does not have strong generali ty, a t leas t not with
the indicators used here to measure ideology.
Many of the problems encountered in determining the
proper placement of part ies , especially those that sp l in t -
ered, or merged with other part ies (especially in I ta ly and
France) may have contributed a substant ial amount of impre
cision in the measure.
Numerous r e- spec if ica tions to the i n i t i a l model, in
cluding the addit ion of the ideological positions of the
party holding the presidency or prime ministry, fa i led to
improve upon the resul ts in i t i a l ly obtained. C alcu la tin g
year- to-year changes did not improve the f i t of the model,
or of the resu l t s by country. Analysis using components of
th e i deol og ic al scores, l ikewise, fai led to yie ld s ign i f i -
cant resul ts .
I am also confident that the fa i lure of the hypothesis
is not the resul t of inadequate specif icat ion of the func
t ional form of the equations. Residuals were examined ad
nauseam. No non-linear patterns appeared to be present .
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114
A more di f f i cu l t problem to address is whether a single
method of aggregation i s applicable across countries having
a larger or smaller number of par t ies . Two-party and multi-
party systems are in the sample. Some have experienced
h ighly uns tabl e coali t ion governments, while others have
been dominated for long periods of time by one party or
another.
A more fundamental question is whether some of these
countries have so inst i tut ional ized thei r patterns of spend-
ing tha t to change might be pol i t ical ly unthinkable. Re
viewing the pat terns described a t the end of Chapter I I , the
majo rity o f coun tries experienced very l i t t l e change over
the la s t two decades.
Some of t he countr ie s in the sample appeared to be
almost s ta t ic in thei r dist r ibut ion of allocations. I t may
be that the ins t i tut ional strength of the parliament to make
the kinds of changes hypothesized is not very great . Much
more research needs to be done on th e n atu re of budget
processes in advanced industr ia l democracies.
Comparative research on th e s ub je ct has not y ie ld ed th e
kind of conceptual tools needed to specify, i n qual it at iv e,
much less quanti tat ive terms, differences between the pro
cesses of f iscal control. Research in th is area might focus
on the relat ive strength of the bureaucracy and parliamenta
ry bodies in set t ing budget pr ior i t i es , or the number of
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115
"veto points" tha t a policy must t raverse before implementa-
t ion, etc .114
The weakness of results obtained in the cross-national
analysis requires a re-evaluation of the approach, as well
as th e th eory . In the next chapter I examine t he in fl uence
of part ies in the United States using more subt le measures.
Results obtained in an analysis of fe de ra l out la ys in the
United States using a re-conceptualization of the measure-
ment of part isan strength suggest that more precise measures
are needed in this type of analysis .
Turning to an examina tion of trade-offs in federal
outlays, Chapter IV presents an analysis of the impact of
par t isan unity on budget al locat ions in the United States .
114 Robert Cox suggests that the budget process in theNetherlands i s dominated by the bureaucracy and tha t theparliament has l i t t l e control over allocations, [Robert Cox,"Do Part ies Matter? Lessions from the Low Countries," in eds.Joe Adams, Marina Arbetman, and M. Donald Hancock, Pol i t ica lPart ies and the Ideology of the Welfare State, (Forthcoming),14. ]
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CHAPTER :tV
TRADE-OFFS :IN THE tJN:ITED STATES
Introduction
This chapter p re sents s ever al t es t s of the hypothesis
that the part isan i deologi es o f the Democratic and Repub
l ican par t ies have an impact on the direction of t rade-offs
in federal outlays. This hypothesis i s applied to several
kinds of t rade-offs in federal outlays.
The principal explanatory variables used in this chap
te r are based on a re-conceptualizat ion of part isan influ-
ences, using party unity in voting as a surrogate measure
for the ideological i nf luence o f par t ies .
Three separate sets of dependent v ari ab le s a re exam-
ined. Each se t of dependent variables deals with a dif fer-
ent level of aggregation. I begin with the highest level of
aggregation and descend to more disaggregated t rade-offs
between narrower components of federal spending.
The f i r s t se t of dependent variables include t rade-offs
between highly aggregated program categories. Following the
c en tr al th ru st of the l i te ra ture , a measure of th e tr ad e-o ff
between outlays for d iscret ionary domestic programs and
defense i s constructed. This variable serves a dual pur
pose, as a thing to be explained in i t se l f , and as a basis
116
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117
for establ ishing the fonnal structure of a general model.
Many essent ia l parameters are unknown from the outset .
For example, the exact nature of the lag s tr uc tu re fo r a
po ten ti al pa rt is an impact, cannot be established a priori .
Based on my reading of the l i te ra ture on policy development,
I speculate that the impact of part isan influences might be
expected during a span of about two years . In analyzing the
aggregate t rade-off between defense spending and discret ion
ary domestic spending, th is parameter, and others are iden
t i f ied through a ser ies of experiments. These experiments
culminate in the specification of a general model.
Once ident i f ied, the generali ty of the model is tested
by subst i tut ing the in i t i a l dependent variable (the aggre
gate t rade-off between defense and discretionary domestic
spending) with other dependent variables. Appropriate
control variables are added to assess the robustness of the
principal components under al ternat ive specif icat ions.
Continuing to use th is framework, t rade-offs between
outlays for defense and health and education programs are
introduced. A second set of dependent var ia ble s a re con
structed using more disaggregated data. Trade-offs between
components of defense and domes ti c outlays, with functional
s imilar i t ies , are examined. Two specif ic kinds of outlays
are examined. The f i r s t deals with outlays affect ing em-
ployment. The second deals with outlays for research.
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118
Following the cri t icisms of several economists and
policy special is t , who argue that defense spending drains
the economy of ta lent and expertise, I also examine t rade-
offs between outlays for defense research and development
and civi l ian research. ll S Spending for mili tary research
has been cr i t ic ized for creating a "brain drain" on the
civi l ian economy. Add iti onal ly , t he scholarly consensus i s
tha t posit ive economic spi l l -over effects are less l ikely
for mil i tary research than civil ian research. 1l6
Federal spending on mili tary research is d i f f i cu l t to
separate from civi l ian research. Federal outlays for re-
search purposes are itemized under a number of functions,
i nc luding ou tl ays in the areas of health and education as
well as in the catego ry o f science, which also includes
expenditures for the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
11S The t radeoff between defense expendi tures and researchand development i s discussed in Russett, "Who Pays forDefense?" 421; Szymanski, "Military Spending;" and Mintz, "A
Disaggregated Analysis."
116 A more general view i s tha t , in addit ion to thesenegative effec ts , mil i tary expenditures do not producemul t ip l i e r effec ts as large as those obtained through domesticspending. For a review of these arguments, see R.P. Smith,
"Mili tary Expenditures and Capitalism." Cambridge Jo urn al ofEconomics 1 (1977): 61-76; Friedland and Sanders, "The PublicEconomy and Economic Growth," 434; Whiteley, Pol i t ica l Controlof the Macroeconomv; Marion Anderson, "The Soft Spot: How toAttack the Pentagon." Journ al o f Sociology and Social Welfare4 (1977): 597-610; Chan, liThe Impact of Defense Spending,"415-22.
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119
t ra t ion (NASA). However, the persis tent bureaucratic st rug
gles between the mili tary and civi l ian administrators within
NASA, and the number of secret space missions conducted on
behalf of the military, suggest that some outlays for space
f l ight serve mili tary in teres ts . Expenditures for space
f l ight have, therefore, been excluded from th e fig ures used
in calculating the t rade-off between science and defense
spending. In other areas, such as health and education,
spending i s more clearly divided between mili tary and c iv i l -
ian research.
Three categories of civi l ian research are c o n s t r u c t ~ d .Each category represents a different level of aggrega ti on .
The f i r s t category includes aggregate outlays for the func
t ion of science (minus space f l ight outlays). The second
category i s composed of outlays for the subcategory of
general science and basic research, and a th i rd category i s
constructed which includes expenditures for research in the
areas of heal th, education and the catego ry o f general
science and basic research previous ly mentioned.
In the f inal se t of hypotheses, t rade-offs within the
military budget are examined. Following the work of Mintz,
who suggests tha t trade-offs within the mili tary budget have
occurred during the l as t decade, I examine the distr ibut ion
of expenditures for pe rsonnel a s opposed to outlays for
procurement. Mintz argues that very spec if ic t rade-of fs
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118
120
have occurred during the 1980s, under the Reagan administra
t ion. His finding raises the question o f whether such
t rade-offs follow a consi st en t , p r ed ict ab le pat tern.
The impact of part isan pol i t ics on allocations within
the mili tary budget has not been widely discussed in the
l i t e ra ture . Mintz' f inding of a trend toward h ighe r outlays
for procurement i s sugge st iv e. In cre as ed expendi tu re s on
mili tary procurement and research and development may repre-
sent a kind of "capi ta l izat ion" of the defense port ion of
the public sector . Private business in teres ts are heavily
involved in procurement programs, and many large corporate
benefi t from gaining defense contracts. 117 Republicans are
widely perceived as favoring large business in teres ts , while
Democrats are perc ei ved a s having more concern for labor
in teres ts (which may be posi ti v ely a ff ec ted by outlays for
personnel) .118
The hypothe sis o f a part isan influence on changes
within the defense port ion of the budget seems to be sup-
ported, prima facie, by r ecen t tr ends in defense spending as
reported by Mintz. Given the apparent sh i f t within mili tary
117 See Larry J . Griff in, Joel Devine and MichaelWallace, "Monopoly Capital , Organized Labor, and MilitaryExpenditures in the United States , 1946-1976," AmericanJournal of Sociology, 88 (1982): 113-53.
See Baran and Sweezy, Monopoly Capital; Larry J .Griff in, Joel Devine and Michael Wallace, "Monopoly Capital ,Organized Labor, and Military Expenditures i " Chan, "Impact ofDefense Spending," 419-20.
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121
outlays, an examina tion of ear l ie r periods for seems war-
ranted. 119
20
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Both Mintz and Russet noted that there have been wide-
spread shi f t s in federal expenditures during the past decade
tha t cannot be explained by the use of exist ing theories of
budgeting. I f party ideo logy has an impact on these chang-
es, how has i t worked? Examining government st ructures and
processes may provide answers to th is question.
Ideology, Structure and Process
The quest ion of whether ideology plays a par t in con-
119 See Mintz, "A Disaggregated Analysis."
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122
gressional voting has been a subject of spir i ted debate
among students of legis la t ive behavior. Much of the debate
concerns the existence of a l e f t - r igh t dimension in ro l l -
cal l votes . Several scholars claim that congressional
voting follows part isan- ideological pat terns. 120 In teres t
group rat ings based on key congressional votes indicate tha t
the congressional part ies dif fer on sa l ien t issues. 121
Addit ionally, several studies of federal spending support
the hypothesis tha t the Democra tic and Republican part ies
effect outlays according to the i r proc l ivi t ies to support
welfare programs and other public services .122 This study
tentat ively accepts the th esis th at the Democratic Party
represents "the le f t" in American pol i t i c s and tha t Republi-
can Party represents "the r ight ."
As discussed in Chapter I I , i deo log ica l d i ffe rences in
the United S tates are confined to debates within th e l ibera l
t rad i t ion . By comparison to the par t ies of European democ-
120 See Patterson and Caldeira, "Party Voting ;" Schne ider ,Ideological Coali t ions; Poole and Daniels, "Ideology, Partyand Voting." For a cri t ique of the claims of Poole andDaniels, see Korford, "Dimensions in Congressional voting."
121 See Sha ff er , P ar ty and Ideology. Shaffer also f indstha t r eg iona l a s well as part isan differences account for somevaria t ion in ADA rat ings, but the pattern of Democraticmembers having higher average rat ings than Republican membersi s consistent across regions.
122 See Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky, "Toward a Predict ive Theory," 431, Browning, "U. S. Social Welfare Expenditures,"206-7.
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123
racies , ideo log ica l d i fferences in the United S tates are
more narrow and less systematic. The lack of coherence in
l iberal ism makes i t possible for opponents on one policy to
be a l l ies on another. Moreover, the two part ies have a
strong tendency to converge on many issues. Nevertheless,
broad differences between the two part ies are evident.
The Republican and Democratic part ies are known to have
di fferen t views of the proper role of government. Defense
is seen as a necessary governmental function by Republicans,
while other kinds of programs must be jus t i f ied more r igor-
ously by thei r impact on the principle of minimal govern-
ment. In g eneral, Republicans take a class ica l l ibera l view
tha t government should be minimized as much as possible . 123
While t hey d isag ree, in principle, with the use of govern-
ment to re gu late the economy, the l i terature suggests tha tfor Republicans national defense i s a legitimate, even
fundamental, governmental function. Nat iona l defen se and a
strong mili tary, is one of the principal ideological con
cerns of Republicans. According to Schneider, Republicans
are more l ikely to perceive danger in international affai rs ,
while Democrats are less l ikely to perceive a ho st il e i nt er -
nat ional environment.124 By comparison, Democrats view
123 See Schneider, Ideo log ical Coa li ti ons , 159-90; cf .Keefe, P ar ti es , P o li ti cs and Pub li c Pol icy, 211-9.
124 See Schneider, Ideo log ica l Coal it ions , 59-80.
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124
government more posi t ively, as a legitimate instrument for
social and economic change. In short , for Republicans,
domestic programs must pass the tes t of whether the program
fa l ls into the legitimate domain of governmental ac t iv i ty .
For Democrats the issues are different . With respect to
international affa i rs , there i s a general bias toward dis-
counting the importance of defense. Democrats tend to be
less incl ined to accept the domino theory, and perceive less
threat from international opponents. 125 Democrats are more
l ikely to see domes tic needs and more readily accept govern-
ment actio n to remedy socia l problems. These procl ivi t ies
should affect the way each par ty effects the distr ibut ion of
federal outlays.
Of course, nei ther party completely con tr ol s pub lic
expenditures. As intended by the framers of the consti tu-
t ion, ins t i tut ional and pol i t i ca l divisions can frustrate
policy making. In the United States, budgetary power is
shared among three ins t i tut ions , the U.S. House of Represen-
ta t ives, the U.S. Senate and the presidency, with r ival r ies
develop ing a long ins t i tut ional as well as par ty l ines .
While part ies , and the differences between them, are the
p ro ducts of his tor ica l developments, grounded more in custom
and t radi t ion, ins t i tut ional divisions are firmly estab-
lish ed in the formal s tructure of the federal government
125 Ibid.
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125
i t se l f .
The United States Consti tut ion provides the House of
Representatives with the l ion 's share of power in the area
of f isca l policy, as the source for policy making in the
area of taxat ion. 126 The Senate has long claimed an equal
prerogative in the in i t ia t ion of appropriations bi l l s , but
has t rad i t ional ly followed the lead of the House in financ-
ing new programs .127 with the ascendance of president ial
leadership in th e twent ie th century, the ch ief executive has
become a major source of policy in i t ia t ives and program
proposals. Presidents also exercise the formal power to
veto appropria tion and tax b i l l s , but these are not thei r
only means of budgetary control. Aside from the recommenda-
t ions and requests for funding that presidents rout inely
send to Congress, presidents have also exercised more direct
control over expenditures. As Louis Fisher notes, pres i -
dents have t radi t ional ly exercised some degree of discre-
t ionary spending power, especial ly in the area of de
fense .128 And, unt i l 1974, presidents could influence ex-
126 Article I , section 7, par t 1, of the United StatesConsti tut ion reads, "All Bil ls for rais ing Revenues shall
or iginate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate maypropose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills ."
127 See Fenno, Power of the Purse,
128 Much of pres ident ia l spending power i s de facto incharacter . Fisher makes pointed reference to TheodoreRoosevelt 's "daring" Congress not to fund the return of thef lee t on i t s circumnavigation of the globe. As commander-in-
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126
penditures through impoundment. This power was check by the
Congress in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of
1974. With the passage of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, the t ide
seems to have reversed to an extent. Determination of
conditions fo r seques tr at ion has the potent ia l to become the
fu nc tio nal equiv alen t o f impoundment. 129
Budgetary power in Congress i s dominated by committees.
The Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Budge t Committees in
the House, which are the key committees on the budget, are
also among the most conf l ic tual of the congressional commit-
tees , which ref lec ts the salience of the issues th ey h andle ,
many of which deal with budget al locat ions .130 Confl ic t
over the budget is not ult imately se t t led in committees, but
spi l l s onto the f loor i t s e l f . Budget votes ten d to be quite
close. As Gary W. Copeland explains,
The part isan nature of budgeting in the House i s unusua l for Congress. Throughout the twentieth century
chief of the armed forces, t he p re si dent has typical ly had astrategic advantage in promoting defense expenditures. Thistoo has changed with the passage of the War Powers Resolution.See Louis Fisher, Presidential Spending Power (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1975).
129 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and theCongressional Budget Office (CBO) issu e rep orts regardingexpenditu re s, but executive orders implement t he s eque ste r.President Bush exempted outlays for mil i tary personnel fromsequestrat ion, as he is allowed to do by law [See StevePhil l ips , "Budget Negotiations and the Sequester ," World ofPoli t ics (October 1990): 6].
130 See Smith and Deering, Committees in Congress, 70.
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127
partisanship in Congress has declined, and issues thatclearly and neatly divide the part ies on a continual
basis are rare . But vast majorities of Democrats haveopposed vast majorit ies of Republicans on every resolut ion to date . . . That voting on House budget resolut ions is highly partisan is incontrovertible, but i t isless c lear why those votes divide the part ies so clearly and consistently (par t icular ly in l igh t of thebipart isan nature of budgeting in the Senate).
Budget debates have every reason to be part isan;they involve the issues that are fundamentally import an t to the part ies . . . The budget includes both adream of where our country should be headed and ablueprint for getting there-- i f anything wil l dividethe part ies , that should. 131
Copeland continues to note that ideological extremes
have played an import an t part in the budget process in
recent years. Part isan div isions with in the Congress are
reinforced a t times by partisan divisions between the execu-
t ive and l eg is la t ive branches.
Since World War II , Republicans have had a majori ty in
the U.s. House of Representatives for only 4 years, from
1949 to 1950 and from 1953 to 1955 or rather , the 80th and
83d Congresses. Since then, Democrats have enjoyed a major-
i ty . Republicans have con trol led the Senate for ten years
between 1940 and 1990. Only three of the five terms of
Republican control of the Senate have been consecutive.
These in clude th e 80th, 83d, 97th, 98th and 99th Congresses,
131 Gary W. Copeland, "Changes in the House ofRepresentat ives Af te r the Passage of the Budget Act of 1974,"in Congressional Budgeting: Poli t ics, Process and Power. W.
Thomas Wander, F. Ted Hebert and Gary W. Copeland, eds.(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 70-71.
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128
or ra ther , from 1981 to 1987. This sh i f t plays an important
part in explaining budget behavior during the 1980s.
While Republicans have held the White House for 26
years between 1940 and 1990, just over half of the ent i re
period, they have rarely shared power with a Congress also
having a Republican majori ty. I t is widely recognized that
confl ic t between the two branches tends to increase when
control i s divided. 132 With the election of 1980, Republi-
cans gained a majori ty in the Senate.
As mentioned, this is the f i r s t time since World War I I
tha t the Republicans have been able to maintain control of a
chamber of Congress for consecu tive terms. This sh i f t in
control of Congress marked a fundamental sh i f t in the bal-
ance of power between Democrats and Republicans.
I t has also been noted that exploit ing th is opportunity
was well orchestrated. Some scholars have pointed to the
way tha t the Reagan administration's implemented control .
As Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour note:
In many respects Ronald Reagan i s unique among recentpresidents . His agenda i s highly select ive and wasestablished before he was inaugurated. His goal i s toreverse the federal government's direct ion by cutt ingdomestic programs and spending, reducing taxes, andl imiting federal regulations. To gain control of the
132 Republican presidents have a s ta t i s t i ca l ly s igni f i -cant lower success ra te than the i r Democratic counterpartsbetween 1953 and 1988. In a regression analysis o f p re si dent i a l success ra tes , I also found that the number of times apresident takes a posit ion on a b i l l i s negatively correlatedwith his success ra te .
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129
vast federal establishment and harness i t to h ispurposes, he has had to devise a new approach and a
radical ly different organization strategy .133
Reagan's strategy depended on congressional assistance.
This was provided by an unusually sympathetic Senate. 134
Reagan clearly enjoyed more support in the Senate than his
l as t two Republican predecessors. In fact , h is success rate
approached that of Democratic presidents who had a Democrat-
ic majority in the Senate. Available data on the success
ra tes of presidents in Senate voting indicate tha t , on
average, President Reagan had a higher success ra te than
Dwight D. Eisenhower. Table 5 shows the percentage of
votes, on which th e p re sid en t has taken a posi t ion, that
resul ted in a president ia l v i cto ry . A pa rt is an pa tt ern is
evident.
Democratic presidents have had much higher success
ra tes than Republican presidents during the l as t few de
cades. This supports the common perception tha t shared
party af f i l i a t ions are an important factor in securing
legis la t ive success.
133 Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour, Pol i t ics , Posit ionand Power: From the Positive to the Regulatory State . 4th ed.(Oxford: Oxford Unive rs it y P re ss , 1986), 127.
134 The Senate voted to extend president ia l veto power toalmost a l l agency regulations in 1982. This was l a t t e r ruledunconstitutional by the Supreme Court. [Ibid. , 129].
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130
TABLE 5
Average Presidential Success Ratesin the Senate
President Percent of Votes Won
Mean Std. Dev. Freg.
------------+------------------------------------tEisenhower I 73 12.9 7
Kennedy I 83 3.5 2Johnson I 81 10.5 6
Nixon I 63 10.6 6
Ford I 68 4.8 2
Carter I 79 5.2 4Reagan I
7711.6
8------------+------------------------------------Total I 75 11.7 35
Source: Vital Sta t is t ics on Congresst Data on Eisenhower's f i r s t year in office are not
reported. Republican presidents are in i t a l i cs .
In fac t, his success rate in the Senate during his
f i r s t year (88.3 percent) is the h igher than any other
president for which data a re ava il ab le , even higher than
President Johnson's success ra te in his f i r s t year in o ffice
(87.5 percent) . This pattern began early and i s even more
clearly evident when his success rates during the s ix-year
dominance by Republicans are compared to the l as t two years
of th is administration, when Democrats regained control of
the Senate. Reagan's success ra te dropped precipitously
during th is period. For the l as t two years of his adminis-
t rat ion, h is success rate was more than 20 percent lower
than it had been during h is f i r s t year .
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131
TABLE 6
Reagan's Success Ratein the Senate
Year
198119821983198419851986
19871988
Success Rate RepublicanHeld Seats
88.3 5383.2 5385.9 5585.7 5571.6 5381.2 53
56.4 4564.8 45
Source: Vita l Stat i s t ics onCongress.Democratic control i s in i t a l i c s .
The unusually h igh succes s rates during the f i r s t s ix
years of the Reagan presidency supports the th esis th at the
s t ruc ture of the pol i t i ca l arena is quite different during
th is period than it had been when the Democrats controlled
both chambers. Thus, th is period should have a sl ightly
di fferent effec t on budget outcomes.
The fact tha t Republicans have been a minority party
during the bulk of the years under examination in th is study
ra i ses the q ue stio n of whether one should expect Republican
party unity to have an effec t on budget outcomes. However,
par ty unity becomes a l l the more important in the pol i t i c s
of budgeting when one recognizes that disunity in one party
might be exploited by the unity of the opposition.
Consider t he hypo the ti ca l case where, on a part icu lar
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132
vote, Republicans are completely united, but Democrats are
divided. Republicans stand a much bet ter chance of winning.
When Republican House members align themselves with re la-
t ively conservative Democrats, usually Southern Democrats,
the probabi l i ty of gaining a voting majority, or preventing
an overrid e o f a (Republican) presidential veto, should also
increase. Such circumstances are not precisely measurable
using aggregate par ty unity data, but are not precluded by a
Democratic majori ty. 135
Most scholars use a single indicator or two indicators ,
one for Congress and one for the president , to measure
part isan influences. 136 The measures of par ty ideology
used in the previous chapter, as those used in most analyses
of American party influences, lack the capacity to d is cr im i-
nate between countries where party unity i s almost assured
and those c O Q ~ t r i e s where party unity varies over time.
By comparison to the disciplined part ies of European
parliamentary systems, the relat ively low level of party
discipline in congress ional voting raises doubts about the
potent ia l for systematic part isan influences. However,
several studies support the thesis that Democratic and
135 See Shaffer , Party and Ideology, 135-69; Keefe,Part ies , Poli t ics and Pub li c Poli cy , 218-9.
136 See Russett , "Defense Expenditures," 772; Berry andLowery, "An Alternative Approach," 689-90; c f . Browning, "u.S.social Welfare," 205.
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133
Republican congressmen are dis t inc t ly different in thei r
ideological commitments and that th i s aggregate difference
i s re la t ive ly s table over tim e. 137 Additionally, there i s
evidence to suggest tha t the ideological differences between
the part ies have an impact on budgetary outcomes.
In a recent study, Ian Budge and Richard I . Hofferbert
argue tha t Democratic party platforms a re clo se ly associated
with federal expenditures. Their f indings support s the
hypothesis tha t American part ies abide by the i r stated
objectives, with consequences for federal outlays.l38 Ear-
l i e r studies have also found that Democrats tend to spend
more on welfare and social programs than Republicans. 139
Similar pat terns have also been found in the budgetary pat-
terns of municipal governments. 140 At the s ta te level ,
137 See Schneider, Ideological Coali t ions: Shaffer,Party and Ideology; William J . Keefe Part ies , Pol i t ics andPublic Policy in America. Fifth Edition (Washington,D.C.:Congressional Quarterly Inc, 1988), 211-230, c f . Budge,Robertson and Hearl Ideology, Strategy and Party Change, 3940, 44-5, 69, 392-7
138 See Ian Budge and Richard I . Hofferbert . "Mandatesand Policy Outputs: U.S. Party Platforms and Federal Expenditures ." American Pol i t ica l Science Review 84 no.1 (March1990): 111-31.
139 See Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky, "Toward a Predict ive Theory," and Robert X. Browning "U.S. Social WelfareExpenditures, 1949-1977" American Journal of Pol i t ica lScience Vol. 29, no. 1, 197-216, 1985 .
140 See Richard Koven, Ideological Budgeting: TheInf luence of Pol i t ica l Philosophy on Public Policy (New York:Praeger, 1988).
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134
however, t he i nf lu ence of part ies on budgetary behavior has
not been clearly established. 141
Despite the relat ively undisciplined behavior of Ameri-
can par t ies , party aff i l ia t ion continues to provide the
principal basis for organization in the United States Con-
gress. The level of pa rt is ansh ip , however, has varied over
time. In general the level of partisanship has de
clined. 142 Much of th is decline has been at t r ibuted to
ins t i tut ional and electora l changes. Even with the general
decline in party discipline, the best s ing le p red ic to r of
voting behavior i s s t i l l party aff i l ia t ion. 143
The use of party unity as a measure of part isan values
may a t f i r s t seem strange, but i t clearly indicates the
strength of the party to mobilize and discipline i t s mem-
bers, which is essent ial for the legislat ive success of the
par ty. To the extent that unity is achieved, the members of
the party must be in some kind of agreement. In Chapter I I ,
I posi ted that the object of this agreement i s a se t of core
141 Cf. Sharkansky, Spending in the American States;Thomas R. Dye, "Taxing, Spending and Economic Growth in theAmerican States," Journal of Poli t ics 42, no. 4 (November1980): 1085-1107 i idem, "Party and Policy in the States ."
Nathan and Dooli t t le , Reagan and the States , 355-63; DavidMayhew Placing Part ies in American Poli t ics (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 1986), 257-307.
142 See Brady, Cooper and Hurley, "The Decline of Party i ..
Patterson and Caldeira, "Party Voting."
219.
143 See Keefe, Parties, Poli t ics and Public Policy, 211-
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135
bel ie fs t ha t c on st it ute the party ' s ideology. Where unity
i s low, the impact of a par ty ' s ideology on budgetary t rade
offs should be less than when i t s unity i s high.
Of the pol i t i ca l influences on the budget, the party
dominating the House should have the most impact on outlays,
with the par ty af f i l i a t ion of the president having a s ignif -
icant , but weaker effec t on outlays.
Hypotheses
Following the discussion of ideology presented in
Chapter I I I hypothesize tha t increased unity voting among
Democrats will in cre as e th e budget shares of domes ti c spend-
ing re la t ive to defense expenditures. Given the Democratic
dominance of the House, I expect to find tha t Republican
party unity to have a comparatively weaker effec t on budget-
ary t rade-offs . The following hypotheses apply to the f i r s t
two sets of t rade-offs , where defense versus civi l ian out-
lays are concerned, but are generalized to other t rade-offs
in s imilar fashion:
H1 : As Democratic party unity increases the defense shareof the t rade-off pool decreases.
H2 : As Republican party unity increases the defense share
of the t rade-off pool increases.
With respect to the in flu en ce o f president ial pol i t ics ,
I expect to f ind tha t Republican presidents would decrease
spending on domestic programs re la t ive to defense expendi-
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136
tures. This hypothesis is stated as follows:
H3 : Domestic shares of trade-off pools increase under Demo-
cra t ic presidents and decrease under Republicanpresidents .
Hypotheses regarding trade-offs within the mili tary
budget follow the same form:
H4 : As Democratic party unity increases the procurementshare decreases and the personnel share increases.
Hs : As Republican party unity increases the procurementshare increases more than the personnel share.
And,
H6 : Domestic shares increase under Democratic presidentsand decrease under Republican presidents.
Using both of the formulas described in Chapter I I , I
constructed measures of t rade-offs . These interval- level
measures o f con tain both positive and negative values. All
independent v ar ia ble s a re p os it iv e intervals , bounded by
zero.
Trade-offs favoring defense were arbi t rar i ly assigned
posi t ive values and those favoring domestic categories are
ass igned negat ive values. Accordingly, a posi t ive re la-
t ionship between an independent variable and a dependent
variable indicates a pro-defense relat ionship between two
variables . Conversely, a negative coeffic ient indicates
that the variable is associ at ed wi th decreasing defense
shares, or rather , an increase in the re la t ive share of
domestic outlays. Put different ly, posi t ive s ta t i s t i ca l
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137
coeff icients indicate "more" defense and less domestic
spending.
In analyzing trade-offs between components of mili tary
spending, the same s tructure i s used, but o the r c at ego ri es
are substi tuted in the calculat ions.
Control Variables
Discontinuities in spending are observed during periods
of warfare. For this reason, the annual number of combat
deaths (soldiers kil led in action) i s introduced as a con-
t ro l variable.
Demographic and economic changes are also widely cred-
i ted with effecting budgetary outcomes. Other control
variables include: the percentage of Americans under the
poverty level , the percentage of peop le ove r the age of 65,
the percent of the population aged 1-14, the ra te of inf la-
t ion, percent change in gross national product, population,
th e p erc en t of the population under the poverty level and
the percent unemployed. 144 Following the work of Mintz,
Russett and others, I include a dummy variable for the
144 •Percentages under the poverty level are from Sta t ls -t i ca l Abstracts of the United States (various years) .Estimates pr ior to 1959 are based on income distr ibut ions.Percent unemployed were taken from the ILO, which are ident i cal to Bureau of Labor Stat i s t ics data. These data were backf i l led to 1950 [See Donald J . Bogue, populations of the UnitedStates . (New York: The Free Press, 1985), 582-600.
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138
period 1981-1988. 145 This variable i s explained in more
deta i l below. Control variables are included in those
models where the l i terature sugges ts re levance.
Specifying the appropriate lag s tr uc tu re to t es t the
theory i s a b it more complicated. I expect tra de -o ffs to be
influenced by long-term pol i t ical commitments. Legislat ive
outcomes take time to develop and implement. I t i s expected
that t rade-offs between outlays for defense and public ser-
vices should occur in the implementation phase, one or two
years af te r the l eg is la t ive in i t i a t ives . This reasoning is
based on the idea of shepherding discussed in Chapter I I ,
where policy makers involve t h a ~ e l v e s in protect ing poli-
cies throughout the l i fe of a program.
I assume tha t t ra de -o ffs a re simultaneous. Assuming a
common lag between the dependent variables and the compo-
nents of a t rade-off i s a strong assumption, given the
pos si bi li ty t hat some programs may be implemented more
quickly than others . For example, changes in t ransfer
programs can be implemented almost overnight. Other pro-
grams are l ikely to take longer to implement and to produce
measurable outlays. In assuming a common lag, I am assuming
tha t the processes tha t generate defense outlays are identi-
cal in duration to those producing domestic outlays.
145 See Russett, "Defense Expenditures and National WellBeing," 776; Mintz, "Guns Versus Butter ."
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139
Prel iminary Observations
This section brief ly descr ibes t rends in federal out-
lays since 1940, with a special emphasis on mili tary spend-
ing since 1960. The focus of th is study is the distr ibut ion
of al locat ions among programs. For th is reason, percentages
outlays are used to describe trends.
There are disadvantages to using percen tage terms to
describe expenditures. As the federal government has taken
on more functions, the denominator of to ta l expenditures has
changed in two ways. Tota l expend itures have increased in
real and nomina l terms, but the number of budget items
funded by th e fed eral government has also increased. I f
expenditures for exist ing items were to remain co ns tan t, th e
addit ion new items wil l necessari ly decrease the percentage
of outlays allocated for existing i tems. For t he se r ea sons ,
percentage terms can also mislead and should be read w ith
caution.
To begin, I show that most large increases in defense
outlays are re la ted to wartime needs. One of the best
indicators of the presence o f mili tary confl ic t i s b at t le
deaths. This v ar ia ble in dic ate s th e intensi ty of confl ic t
and the needs of the mili tary f or add it iona l resources.
As bat t le deaths in crease, th e percentage of the budget
going for defense increases as well . This pat tern i s clear-
ly evident in Figure 12 below:
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o Defense OUtlays..
'. A Killed in Action
140
UI::0-
III-r- I..:::to
Q)
tI'Ic:......111C
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980year
Defense Outlays and Battle Deaths
FIGURE 12
150000
140000
130000
120000
110000 c:
1 ס ס o o 0 0.....
90000()
<
80000 c:....
7 ס ס o o "0
60000Q)r -Ir -I
50000....
40000
30000
2 ס ס o o10000
0
1990
..
The effect of the shocks of World War I I , the Korean
War, and the Vietnam war on military expenditures are easily
ident if ied. However, increases in percentage defense expen-
di tures during the 1980s is not explicable by reference to
combat deaths.
Taking a closer look at the las t three decades, the
impact of the Vietnam War is clearly visible, but the trend
in defense expendi tures does not uniformly decrease, as i t
did in the wake of the two previous large military con
f l i c t s .
The nadir of defense expenditures as a percent age of
federal outlays occurs in 1979. The trend then swings
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141
upward. In fact , increases in the percentages of the feder-
a1 budget going to defense during the 1980s were almost as
large as the increases during the Vietnam War, but the
United States was not engaged in any large-scale combat
act ivi t ies (see Figure 12).
A large body of research on arms races has developed
tha t suggests defense expenditures respond to changes in the
mili tary expenditures of the Soviet Union. Much of the
evidence on th is question indicates that , i f a relat ionship
exis t s a t a l l , i s negative. 146 Nevertheless, enough ernpha-
s is has been placed on the influence of Soviet expenditure
to take th is fac to r in to consideration in analyzing poten-
t i a l t rade-offs in f eder al outlays .
With the exception of the past decade, the s ingle most
useful var iable in predict ing large percentage increases in
146 See Ostrom and Marra, "U.S. Defense Spend ing and theSov iet E stimate." Ostrom and Marra mistakenly suggest aposit ive relationship exis ts between Soviet expenditures andU. S. defense spending. Despite thei r verbiage, reporteds ta t i s t i ca l results show a s ignif icant negative relat ionship.I have taken a look a t this , with similar resul ts .
Using changes in percent ages o f U.S. defense spending,my resu l t s for the 1963-1988 period, using OLS and control l ingfor bat t le deaths, produced a negative coeff ic ient , s igni f i -cant a t p< .0000 (R2 =.65) . Some co ll in ea ri ty ex is ts between
bat t le deaths and changes in Soviet mili tary expenditures.When using CORC adjus ted regress ion , t he s ign if ic ance of thecoeff icient for soviet expenditures i s p < .18 (R2 =.54) withbat t le deaths s t i l l s ignif icant a t p <.0000) .
Paradoxically, Berry and Lowery, "An Alternative Approach," 694, however, find that Sov ie t defen se spending hasan effect on the domestic tradeoff . I also find tha t it i sre la ted to larger defense share.
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142
defense expenditures has been armed confl ict .
o Defense outlays ' : l . , ' to Killed in Action
100
90
BO
70
60
50
40
30
20
191963-1990
Defense Outlays and Battle Deaths
FIGURE 13
2 ס ס o o
15000c:0........
uc (
1 ס ס o o c
-CCD....
....
....
SOOO
1000
As in the area of defense, trends in domestic spending
have also reversed in r ec en t yea rs . The most closely
watched categories are health and education expenditures.
Education outlays have f luctuated more than health expendi-
tures , which tend to be relat ively stable from one year to
the next. Percentage outlays on education and health de-
clined sharply a t the beginning of the 1980s. Both catego-
r ies d eclined, but education received the hardest hi t .
In much of the work on trade-offs between domestic and
defense spending, education is singled out as being one of
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143
the most sensi t ive categories to changes in defense spend-
ing. This pattern seems to be evident during the 1980s.
201918
..17
>- 16CD
15-... 14::J
013
- 12D....
11
10.... 90
8....c 7GJ
6L
5D
a.4
3
2
1
0
1960 1970 1980 1990yeaI'
Education as a Percentage of Total Federal Outlays
FIGURE 14
A preliminary examination of the data on federal
spending indicates that outlays for defense and out lays for
domestic programs do not respond equally to increases and
decreases in the size of the to ta l budget increment. In
analyzing the expansion and contract ion of the budget, I
have found that defense outlays tend to grow more than most
other kinds of outlays during periods of expansion. De
fense outlays also tend to absorb most of the decrease in
when the budget shr inks.
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144
This pat tern, however, is c lose ly a ssoci at ed with
combat act ivi ty . Large increases in budget increments
generally occur a t the beginning of combat act ivi ty and
large decreases at the end of such act ivi ty .
I t i s often assumed that discretionary categories of
spending are squeezed between military spending and large
enti t lement programs, but th is is not necessarily the case.
Enti t lement programs are quite res i l i en t to changes in
to ta l spending. When the to ta l budget increment shrinks,
both defense and discretionary domestic outlays tend to
decrease, but when the to ta l budget increment increases,
defense expenditures appear to take the larger share. Thus,
increases in the size of the to ta l budge t increment is
s igni f icant ly re la ted trade-offs between defense and the
categories of heal th and education dur ing times of war, when
the budget increases the most.
The overal l trend in federal spending contradicts th is
assessment. Non-defense outlays have generally increased
re la t ive to defense spending, except for the 1980s.
Mili tary confl ic ts , which tend to inf la te the to ta l
budget and decrease the share spent on domestic programs, do
not necessar i ly decrease domestic spending in real terms.
Many of the Great Society programs were implemented during
the Vietnam War. In real terms defense spending increased
on top o f increased domestic spending. This "piling on,"
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145
may create a misleading impression about how defense spend
ing effec ts domestic spending.
As Russe tt observes, the growth in ou tlays fo r social
programs occurred during a period of mili tary confl ict . At
the same time that the programs of the Great Society were
f i r s t being implemented, the country was also escalating i t s
involvement in the Vietnam War. In Russet t ' s seminal study
on the effects of defense spending, he f inds that , "In the
aggregate, there is no very strong impact on civ i l public
expenditures. ,,147 However, some components of domestic
expenditures, however, fared bet te r than others when defense
spending increased.
Russet t and others have noted that inst i tut ional ized
programs such as farm subsidies and other well-entrenched
enti t lement programs appear to be relat ively insula ted from
the effec t of mili tary spending, but tha t education, health
and welfare programs tend to be the comparatively more
sensi t ive to f lu ct ua ti on s i n defense spending.
My prel iminary review of the data supports Russet t ' s
generalization, but also indicates tha t the overal l growth
or decline in to ta l budge t increments has an impact on
t rade-offs . Large budget increases a re u su ally associated
wit h i nc re ased defense spending during times of war when a
greater share of the budget i s devoted to wartime needs.
147 See Russet t , "Who Pays for Defense?" 419.
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146
War, then, is a central factor in determining the direction
of t rade-offs .
Defining the Variables
A number of problems were encountered in tes t ing the
hypotheses presented. The f i r s t problem is that data are
not uniformly ava ila ble fo r a l l the variables of in terest .
Well def in ed dat a on aggregate (superfunction) budget
items are available beginning in 1940. Data on important
subfunctions, however, are not generally available before
1963. In fact , many of the components of domest ic spending
did not e xis t p rio r to the 1960s.
Party unity data a re a va ila bl e for the years between
1953 and 1988. 148 Consistent annual demographic data are
available from 1960, while data on Soviet mili tary expen-
148 A few missing points in th e in te rim (e. g . , 1961) areimputed from exis t ing data. This procedure was executed withStata software, using the "impute" command. Missing pointsthus generated were substi tuted for missing points within theexis t ing range (1953-1988).
The variables used in imputing the data includ ed theperc en tage o f seats held by each party in both the House andSenate, the number of to ta l unity votes in each chamber, par tyuni ty votes for each party in both chambers, the party unityvotes for Southern Democrats in each chamber, the pres ident ' s
party, the success ra te of th e p re sid en t in each chamber, inCongress, and the number of b i l l s on which he took a posit ion(omitting the dependent variable) . See Stata ReferenceManual, Vol. 2, 347-51.
This procedure produced resu l t s t ha t d if fe red very l i t t l efrom averaging between contiguous data in the ser ies , butprovided a more objective procedure for handling the problemthan mean, "best-guess" estimates. No data were imputed outside the span of years for which data were available.
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149
.
147
di tures a re a va ila ble beginning in 1963.
The select ion of the best e stimate o f the dependent
var ia ble (s ) a ls o presented a challenge. Two al ternat ive
indicators for trade-offs are proposed by Berry and Lowery.
The two measures do not behave in the same way, which would
produce different resul ts depending on which calculat ion is
used. To avoid ad hoc specification, a decision had to be
made between proportional and difference based calculations
of the dependent variable(s) .
In the i r discussion of the i r measures, Berry and Lowery
make the following observation:
We believe that the modified difference measure, DIFF(A:B), i s superior to the pure proport ional measure,PROP(A:B), for several reasons . Firs t , t he p ropor ti on al measu re can yield an extremely high value when thepool i s very small. For example, i f the pool i s $1 ,where AMT(A) = 100 and AMT(B) = -99, the indicatorPROP(A:B) takes on the value 199. But jus t a s l ight
change in the outcome to (102, -97) r es ult in g in a hugedrop in the score on PROP(A:B) to 39.8. Consequently,empirical analyses relying on PROP(A:B) for measuringt rade-off outcomes have the potent ia l to be seriouslydistorted by a few extreme, and perhaps misleading,out l ie rs on the dependent variable . 149
In l ight of the i r comments, I constructed measures
based on both formulae for comparison. 150 In a l l , nine
t rade-offs were examined, which yielded 18 pairs of ser ies .
I found tha t the proportion based measure did produced
Berry and Lowery, "An Alternative Approach," 687.
150 To provide longitudinal comparability, a l l outlaysare converted to 1982 constant dollars before any furthercalculat ions are made.
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148
extreme outl iers in several instances.
For example, in the tra de -o ff in education values for
proport ion t rade-offs for defense ver su s educa ti on exploded
between 1986 and 1988. This measure seems to exaggerate the
t rade-offs between the two categories.
The following i l lus t ra t ions show how the component ele-
ments of the education t rade-off are related as percentages
of the federal budget and are transformed into measures of
t rade-offs using both the formulae.
o Education Total o National Defense: Total.
80 CD
>-m
70 -...:::J
0
60
-o
....
500.......
40 0
....
c:30 CD
Co)
t-
20CD
Q.
10
0
100
90
I I I I I I
--
-• -
-
- T r e
-- '": '"
- f-
1 9 ~ 1 O 1950 1960 1';'0 1980 1990
100
90
GJ 80>-lU- 70...:::J
0
-
60m....0 50......0 ~ ....II
30:U
t-Il20.
10
0
yearDefense Versus Education OUtlays
FIGl.TP£ 15
The t rade-off measures calculated for the these two
categories i l lus t ra te the problem with t he p ropo rt ion mea-
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149
sure. Values for both measures are shown in Figure 16
below. At f i r s t glance, i t appears tha t the proport ion
based measure does not real ly vary unt i l 1986-87. This
appearance i s misleading. Values for the pre-1986 period
are compressed for presentat ion on a common axis w ith the
difference based measure , which has extremely high values in
the l a t t e r port ion of the ser ies (See Figure 16). Closer
s imi lar i t ies in the variance of both measures during the
ea r l ie r per iod is hidden by these extreme out l ie rs .
347.145
o Difference Meastre to ProporUon Mea5U'e
-197.546
1960 19 0 1980 1990
Defense versus Education
Difference ancI Proportion Measures
FIGURE 16
When the l a s t four years are removed, and both vert ica l
axes are rescaled, values for the previous period are more
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150
clear ly discernible . As in the case of the heal th expendi-
tures , the proportion based measure varies much less than
the difference based measure. Wnen the two measures for the
t rade-off pr io r to 1986 are examined, th e v aria nc e of the
proportion based measure is more vis ib le . Both measures
resemble one another more closely during th i s period, but
the p res en ce o f extreme out l ie rs for the l a t t e r period has
the potent ia l for " se rio us ly d is to rt in g " th e analysis .
Similar dis tor t ions might be expected in measures of other
t rade-offs as w ell.
o Difference '" Proportion
0
GJCD
L '-j
::J
II ICD
lUlU
CDCD
:z
lUc:
U 0
c: 0 -..,lIJ L'- 0lIJ C.- 0-... L
0 0..
1 1960 1 0 1980 1 0Defense versus Education: 1940-1986
Oifference and Proportion Measures
FIGURE 17
The implications of choosing one indicator ra ther than
another, for the subsequent analysis , a re obvious. I agree
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151
with Berry and Lowery concerning the superiority of the
difference based measure. Comparing the two indicators, the
difference based measure appeared to be a more rel iable
indicator . For th is reason, th e d if fe rence based measure i s
used throughout the following analysis .
With th is matter set t led, I turned to the thornier
problem of defining the t rade-off between defense and domes-
t i c expenditures. The concept of "domestic" spending i s
widely used but infrequently defined. 151
Two definit ions of discretionary domestic spending are
examined. Following work by Russet and Peterson, a t rade-
off measure was constructed that aggregates several subfunc
t ions . 152 These categories include the subfunctions of
energy, commerce and housing credi t , health research, educa-
t ion & t raining of health care workers, education, general
government, veterans benefi ts , science, and t ranspor ta t ion.
Data on most of these subcategories are available beginning
in 1963 (Data for the independent pol i t ica l varia ble s a re
avai lable beginning in 1953).
Using th is highly disaggregated def ini t ion of domestic
151 Berry and Lowery do not define th e term by referenceto any par t icu lar items, but leave simply refer to CITIBASEdata used in the analysis . See Berry and Lowery, "An Alternat ive Approach," 694.
152 See Russett , "Who Pays?" 419; cf. Paul E. Peterson,"The Rise and Fall of Special Interest Poli t ics ," Poli t ica lScience Quarterly. 105 (Winter 1990-91): 548; Berry andLowery, "An Alternative Approach," 694-5.
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152
spending would enta i l losing a decade of observations. For
th is reason a second def in i t ion i s used to provide a longer
ser ies . The second def in i t ion re l ies on a s l ight ly higher
level of aggregation. To construct a longer ser ies for
domestic spending, I use the superfunction for the above
items instead of component subfunctions. Data on a l l re le
vant superfunct ions are avai lable beginning in 1940 as are
data on to ta l defense outlays. Using each of the defin i -
t ions of domestic spending, two measures of t rade-offs were
const ruct ed for comparison (see Figure 18) .
o
A Aggregated Data
1960
yearComparison of Domestic Trade-off Measures
FIGURE 18
o
I use the second definit ion of domestic spending be-
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153
cause i t provides a longer series and th e emp iri ca l dif fer
ence between the two indicators i s negligible. 153
Specifying the Basic Model
This section explains how I arrive at the specif icat ion
of a basic t rade-off model. I use the aggregate domestic
t rade-off as the dependent var iable . Several preliminary
analyses are s cr ut in iz ed to construct the most parsimonious
model possible. The model constructed is the building block
for analyzing t rade-offs between defense and heal th and
education, between functionally s imilar programs in defense
and civ i l ian programs, and trade-offs between components of
defense budget.
The s tructure of the equations tes ted i s quite simple.
Linear models taking the following the following form are
constructed:
Y = a + Xl + X2 + X3 + Zl + Z2 + Z3 + e (7 )
Where y is a t rade-off , X i s a pol i t i ca l variable and Z i s a
demographic or economic var iable .
I began my analysis with an examination of bivariate
re la t ionships with simple (t-1) lag s tructures . No s igni f i -
153 Sta t is t ica l ly , the two measures are almost ident ical .The Pearson product moment co rr el at ion coef fi ci en t obtainedbetween the two measures i s .99, and an R2 of .98, s ignif icanta t p < .0000 was obtained using ordinary leas t square regression.
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154
cant bivariate associat ions were found for any of the pol i t -
ica l variables, but some of the demographic variables ap-
peared to be s ignif icant . 1s4 Bivariate analysis , however,
does not adequately address the relat ionships that I have
hypothesized.
The interaction of part ies competing for control of
government p o l i ~ requires a more complex form of analysis .
Mult ivar ia te analys is , however, was confounded by the exis -
tence of autocorrelat ion (serial correlat ion) ,
mult icoll ineari ty and the unavailabil i ty of data for impor-
tant control v ar ia ble s fo r certain time periods.
The presence of ser ia l correla t ion tends to inf la te the
significance of coeff icients . Stat i s t ical ly s ignif icant
ser ia l correlation was detected in almost every model es t i -
mated, as indicated by Durbin-Watson s ta t i s t i c s . OLS re -
gression models were re-estimated using a Cochrane-Orcutt
(CORC) regression procedure, a common general ized regression
technique f or adj us ting for ser ia l correlat ion. 1ss The
CORC adjus ted regress ion routine i s not applicable when the
series i s broken because th e ro utin e requires contiguously
154 Unity among Southern Democrats was s ignif icant a t t ,but was not s ignif icant when lagged one year , or when used inmoving averages (MA) models discussed below.
155 The method i te ra tes t he reg ress ion unt i l rho converges(to a tolerance of .0005) or 99 i t e ra t ions , whichever occursf i r s t . This procedure was executed with Stata 3 .0 . SeeComputing Resource Center, Stata Reference Manual Vol. 2(Santa Monica: Computing Resource Center, 1992), 200-3.
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155
ordered data for the calculation of rho.
Preliminary analyses of the data produced confounding
resu l t s , which i s not uncommon in models have some degree of
seasonal i ty. Noting tha t almost every model estimated
contained s ignif icant levels of autocorrelation I returned
to the problem o f spe cif yi ng the lag s tructure of the model.
McDowall, McCleary, Meidinger and Hay provide a useful
comment on the problem in the i r work on interrupted time
series analysis :
Trend and seasonali ty, which are quite common in socialscience time series , and random error tend to o b s c u ~ eany intervention. I f the model does not account forthese types of noise, the analysis will be confounded. 156
To f i l t e r noise without over-complicat ing the analysis ,
I smoothed the pol i t ica l variables by means of three-year
moving averages. 157 Converting the dependent var iable in
the same way produced superior s ta t i s t ica l resu l t s , but made
in terpretat ion more di f f icu l t and causal tes ts more tenuous.
The three-year average i s used for the e st imat ion o f the
156 See David, McDowall, e t ale Interrupted Time Series
Analysis, Quanti tat ive Applications in the Social SciencesSeries . (Beverly Hills : Sage Publications, 1980), 14.
157 The formula used was the sum of the two l as t yearsand th e cu rren t year ' s values divided by three . This procedure may seem odd, but I believe tha t pol i t ical control i s notwrested away in the year that the outlay i s made. Thus, somedegree of unity in tha t year should, theoret ical ly , bere la ted .
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156
basic t rade-off model. This procedure also proved to be a
parsimonious so lu tio n to the theoret ica l problem of model
l ing the impact of pol i t i ca l unity on subsequent outlays.
The three-year moving average i s based on a theory of how
policy makers are involved in program development and imple
mentation.
As mentioned in Chapter I I , some policy makers act as
"f ixers ," or what I have termed "shepherds," involving
themselves throughout the l i fe of a policy. Such people
follow a policy through i t s development, enactment as law,
and implementatio n. For th is reason I expected part isan
in flu ence s t o span a number of years. I had original ly
postulated that , af te r l eg is la t ive passage, shepherding
should be fe l t after a two-yea r span. This approach incor
po rates the level of par ty unity during that p erio d as well
as the year in which the outlay is made, because the success
of policy shepherds should depend on the i r abi l i ty to mobi
l ize support of the i r favored policies.
This procedure seemed to eliminate some of the noise in
the models. No seasonality in the measures of party unity
was detected; however, there appeared to be some seasonal i ty
in the percentage of ro l l -ca l l votes in the House where
pa rty ma jori ti es opposed one another ( to ta l unity votes) .
Stat i s t ical ly s ignif icant differences in to ta l unity votes
were found in elect ion years, perhaps as part of an underly-
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ing effect of electora l cycles .158 Despite the elimina-
157
t ion o f su sp ec ted seasonality in the independent var iables ,
autocorrelation remained a problem, but was corrected
through the use of the CORC regression procedure.
Another problem encountered, was to control for major
changes in the party dominance of Congress. For two, non-
consecutive Congresses in the la te 1940s and 1950s Republi-
cans enjoyed a majority in both the Senate and House. Each
period las ted only two years. However, as previously dis-
cussed, a more last ing sh i f t occurred in the 1980s, when
Republicans controlled the Senate from 1981 to 1986 (with a
Republican president) . For analysis of the ent i re series
(1955-1988), a dummy var iable was used to "control for" the
change in context. For the sake of consistency, th is vari -
able was also converted to a three-year moving average. 159
A second problem, with theoretical significance, was
the presence of multicoll ineari ty among some of the indepen-
dent var iables . Party unity measures for Democratic and
158 ANOVA models showed s ignif icant differences betweenelection year to ta l unity votes and non-election year votes.A pseudo R2 of .11, s ignif icant a t p<.02, was obtained in a
bivariate model. President ia l election years, however, didnot appear to be re la ted to the differences.
159 Results were also tested using a four-variable modelthat part i t ions the variance for each var iable according totime period ( i .e . Democratic unity before 1981, Democraticunity af te r 1980, Republican unity before 1981, Republicanunity af te r 1980). Results of th is procedure are robust andconsistent with the basic model .
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158
Republican House members a re cor re la ted, which tends to
inf la te the "explained variance" as indicated by the R2 , and
makes assessing th e d ire cti on of the coeff icients di f f icu l t .
Despite these problems, th ere are compelling theoret ical
reason for u sing bo th variables together in the same model.
Theoretically, the two variables are inextricably
l inked. I f Republicans are not able to produce discipl ine
among thei r members, they are le ss lik ely to exploi t dis-
unity among Democrats and v ic e v ers a. The presence of
col l inear i ty between measure of Democratic and Republican
p arty u nity might confuse the signs of the coeff icients , but
subsequent analysis assured that the signs reported in the
models are in proper order.
Multicoll ineari ty was ident i f ied between several con-
t ro l var iables . Col linea ri ty ex is ted between the var iables
related to foreign affa i rs and domestic pol i t i ca l variables ,
and between demographic variables . The re la t ionship between
the two demographic variables i s not surpr is ing. The per-
cent of the population aged 65 and over and the p ercent of
t he populat ion aged 15 and younger , were highly correlated
(negatively). This correla t ion confirms common demographic
t rends in the distr ibut ion of the populations in developed
countr ies . The re la t ionships between domestic pol i t ical
variables and measures pertaining t o in te rn at io na l r el at io n s
is more complex.
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159
Changes in Soviet spending and bat t le deaths were both
significant during the Vietnam war. For the series spanning
1942 to 1988, bat t le deaths have a significant ly posit ive
relat ionship with on domestic t rade-off . Conforming to the
findings of other studies, large spikes in the series for
both var iables account for this finding. 160
The relat ive effects of war (bat t le deaths) and changes
in Soviet mil i tary spending on t rade-offs are di f f i cu l t to
assess, given the data avai lable . Unfortunately, data on
Soviet mili tary expenditures prior to 1963 are not reported
by the ACDA. A direct comparison of the effects of bat t le
deaths and changes in Soviet mili tary spending during the
1950s is , therefore, not possible using these data .
Regression resul ts based on different periods obscure,
ra ther than i l luminate important differences between his to r -
ica l periods. During the Vietnam War, changes in Soviet
mili tary spending peaked a t the same time American bat t le
deaths peaked. One might suspect tha t a similar pattern
would be found during the Korean War i f data were avai lable .
I t i s also very l ikely tha t Soviet mil i tary expenditures
were increasing a t a high ra te during World War I I , as
American bat t le deaths also increased. What is troublesome
about such patterns is that the pol i t ical significance of an
160 See Russett , "Defense Expenditures," 775; cf . Berryand Lowery, "An Alternative Approach," 694.
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160
increase in Soviet mili tary spending may also be t ied to the
context of his tor ica l periods.
Obviously, the United States would have preferred that
the Soviets spend more on the i r mili tary during World War
II , and less thereafter . The peak in the percent change in
Soviet mili tary spending during the Vietnam War hardly needs
comment, except to note tha t i t resu l t s in col l ineari ty with
American bat t le death during that period. The two var iables
are both measuring aspects of the Vietnam War and are not
independent of one ano ther dur ing that period. After the
Vietnam War, American bat t le deaths are pract ica l ly non
exis tent , while Sov ie t spending continues to vary. I t i s
not surprising that the effect of bat t le death on t rade-offs
washes out when Soviet spending is introduced to the equa
t ion, because the period in which bat t le deaths are most
closely associated with t rade-offs is the 1941-1975 period.
Most of this period is dropped (due to missing data) when
Sovie t expendi tu res are included in the model. However,
when the post-1975 period is examined separately, changes in
Soviet defense spending are not significant ly associated
with trade-offs in federal outlays.
Significant bivariate coeff icients were obtained for
only three in terval-level var iables: changes in GNP, percent
of the population over age 65, under 15 (and thei r lags) ,
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161
and unemployment were s ignif icant .161 No other bivariate
relat ionships were found to be s ignif icant .162 However,
none of the variables having s ign if ic ant b iva r ia te re la t ion-
sh ip s cont ri bu ted very much to th e o ve ra ll f i t or the s ig-
nificance of other variables in multivariate models.
Moreover, there is an unexpected posi ti ve r el at ionsh ip
between the percent of the population aged 65 and the domes
t i c t rade-off . Put different ly , as the percentage of the
population aged 65 and over grew, the more tha t the t rade
offs favored defense. Closer examination revealed that the
two var iables moved closely in the same direct ion during a
shor t period during the la te 1970s and ear ly 1980s. Unless
one i s will ing argue that there is a causal reason for a
posi t ive re la t ionship between the variables, which seems
unlikely, the re la t ionship must be spurious. For th is
reason, the var iable was dropped from consideration in the
development of a basic model. The percent of the population
aged 15 and younger had no s ignif icant impact in
multivariate analysis .
161 This re la t ionship will be examined further in ChapterV. I bel ieve that including unemployment as an independent
variable is a misspecification. The poss ib i l i ty that unem-ployment i s a dependent var iable i s considered in subsequentanalyses.
162 Signif icant differences between tradeoffs weredetected using categor ical , nominal-level variables for warand the Reagan presidency. In ANOVA models con ta in ing bothvariables , the Reagan presidency accounts for more of thevariance in domestic tradeoffs than war.
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162
Changes in GNP contributed very l i t t l e to o vera ll f i t
of the models tested and washed out completely when the
Reagan administrat ion i s in cluded a s a variable .
Extreme out l ie rs , or "influent ia l observa ti on s, " a re
responsible for producing signif icant regression coeffi
cients between percent changes in GNP and the aggregate
domestic t rade-off . Extreme values for both variables oc
curred during World War I I and the Korean War. Changes in
GNP were dramatical ly affected by the dynamics of the war
time economy and subsequent reconversions. Thus, a huge
port ion of the variance in both the t rade -o ff v a ri ab le and
the change in GNP i s at t r ibutable to the shocks of war.
Jus t four or five observations account for th e o ve ra ll
significance of the associat ion. Figure 19, below, shows
how the two variables have varied over time. The large
"ou tl ie rs " a re obvious. Analysis of the period af te r 1955
did not produce signif icant coeff icients for changes in GNP.
In fact , changes in GNP washed out completely in multiple
regression models c orr ec te d f or autocorrelat ion. Alterna
t ive est imators fared no bet ter . Lags of f i r s t and second
order, moving averages, and logarithmic transformations also
fai led to survive CORC r eg ress ion analysi s a t signif icant
levels . Moreover, I detected no signif icant effec ts with
other variables in multivariate models.
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163
25.477618.066
Q.
...
z...
(,!)
a cICD -D •1J a tCo C.... eu....
u
...III.. c:
EQ)()a c-o •.
1960 1970year
Domestic Trade-off and GNP
-13.8283
FIGURE 19
The occur rence o f large trade-offs during wartime, and
s hif ts a fte r wars also obscures the p o t ~ n t i a l effect of the
partisan aff i l ia t ion of presidents.
Presidential party aff i l ia t ion was not s ign if ic an t i n
any model specified. In part , the differences between Demo-
cratic and Republican presidents i s confounded by the coin-
cidence with war.
Franklin Roosevelt, Harry S Truman, and Lyndon Baines
Johnson a l l presided over wartime periods, as measured by
bat t le deaths. Republican presidents held office during the
post-Korean and Vietnam confl ic ts , when spending shif ted
away from defense. Thus the presence of war seriously
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164
contaminates any analysis of president ia l influences.
Table 7 below descr ib es t he pattern. War i s defined as
any year where u.s. bat t le deaths occurred as reported by
the Department of Defense. 163
TABLE 7
President ia l Party and War1940-1990
President ia l PartyDem. Rep. Total
-------+----------------------+----------Peace I 12 21 I 33. War I 13 5 I 18-------+----------------------+----------Total I 25 26 I 51
In any case, no s ta t i s t ical ly s ignif icant direct re la-
t ionship was detected between president ia l party and the
domestic t rade-off . Table 8 i l lus t ra tes that domestic
t rade-offs do not correspond to the part isan control of the
presidency in the way that I had hypothesized. This also
163 Data on bat t le deaths was compiled from Sta t i s t i ca l
Abstract of the United States, Meid, Pat and James M.Yingling. Operations in West Korea: U.S. Mar ine Operations inKorea 1950-1953, Vol. V, (Washington, D.C.: HistoricalDivision Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1972), 757; and"Army Batt le Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War I I :Final Report," Prepared by Sta t is t ica l and Accounting Branchof the Adjunct General, (Program Review and Analysis Division,Office of the Comptroller of the Army, C.C.S., June 1953,mimeo) .
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166
Causation is not clear . House Democrats deferred to
pres ident ia l l eade rship i n. escalating the war, with the
infamous Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. But resistance and
discord ensued as the war dragged on. Defections in ro l l
ca l l votes among Democrats 'increased during th is period.
Figure 20 shows the relationship between Democratic
unity and the domestic t rade-off during th is period. Data
points are labelled by year. . The change in Democratic unity
seems to confirm what has been in tui t ive ly understood about
the effec t of the war in Vietnam on pol i t ical ins t i tut ions
and po li cy d ir ec ti on s of the par t ies .
Years N i Reported Battle Deaths
...- ...
0 0
• •J II I' 0 ' 0
to IVt . t .to- t -
U U.... 0 0
......ft IS)
U 41)-
e e0 0c 0
DeID. tJn1ty: Mov1ng Average
Democratic lJnity During the Vietnam War
FIGURE 20
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167
I feel that the data a ccur ate ly por tr ay th e indecisive-
ness and d isco rd within the Democratic party toward the end
of the war, and a certain aimlessness af ter the war. What
i s worth noting about these pat terns in the data i s that
these t hr ee va ri ab le s: Democratic party unity, bat t le
deaths, and changes in Soviet mili tary expenditures are a l l
closely correlated between 1965 and 1975. While Democratic
p arty u nity i s negatively associated with changes in Soviet
mili tary spending, Republican party unity is posit ively
associated with Soviet mili tary spending.
With these underlying re la t ionships in mind, I estilttat-
ed a multivariate model containing only the pol i t ical var i -
ables. Data for th is portion of the analysis a re a va il ab le
from 1955 to 1988. The data were analyzed f i r s t with OLS,
then sub je ct ed to the more rigorous CORC procedure to con-
t ro l for ser ia l correlat ions .
The most inf luent ia l var iable in the model i s the dummy
variable for the Reagan administration, which, i f l e f t out,
destroys the model. This might seem to put the model i t se l f
in doubt.
However, i f th e p erio d before 1981 i s examined, s imilar
resul t s obtain, but w ith a substantial reduction in the
expla ined variance and robu st nes s o f th e e stima te s. I take
this to mean that the pol i t ic iza t ion of budget allocations
reached a new plane under the Reagan administrat ion.
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168
The resul ts of a regression analysis of the effects off
part isan unity, using only the po l i t i ca l var iables , on the
t rade-off between defense and domestic outlays a re re po rte d
in Table 9 below.
TABLE 9
Explaining the Domestic Tradeoff
(Poli t ics Alone)
1955-1988 1956-1988
Variable t OLS CORCRegression Regression
Constant -309.71 -317.38(260.64) (259.64)
Democratic Unity -11. 01*** -10.91***(2.77 ) (2.77 )
Republican Unity 14.82*** 14.82***
(4.44) (4.38)
Reagan Shif t 193.82*** 192.85***(0 = 1955-81) (22.30) (22.18)(1 = 1981-88)
Adjusted R2= .71 .72
Durbin-Watson = 2.17
N = 33 32
Unstandardized regression coeff icients a re r epor ted.
Standard errors are in parentheses.t All variables a re th re e- ye ar moving averages (MA).* Signif icant at the .05 level** Significant at the .01 level*** Signif icant a t the .001 level
Upon closer examination, the s tructure of the relat ion-
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169
ships i s clearer , the relationship between the party unity
variables and the domestic t rade-off i s apparently stronger
than i t had been during the previous period. Table 10 show
nearly ident ical relat ionships when th e v aria nce i s par t i -
t ioned between the two periods --before and af te r the st ruc
tura l shi f t , or what I have labelled the "Reagan Period."
Spli t t ing each of the p ar ty unity variables into two
separate variables broken down by period, I subst i tuted
zeros for al ternat ive periods. This "revised model" was re-
est ima ted using the procedures employed above.
The direct ion of the par ty unity coeffic ients b e f o r ~and af te r the 1980 elect ion are similar, and in hypothesized
direct ions, I graphed the effect of Democratic party unity
on the domestic t rade-off to show tha t the sh i f t i s upward
in the in tercept for t rade-offs during th e 1980's when
Republicans take the Senate. The resu l t s of th e rev ise d
regression model are reported in Table 10.
The extent of the effect of the s t ructura l sh i f t on the
domestic t rade-off i s evident in Figure 21 , where Democra tic
party uni ty ( th re e-ye ar moving average) i s graphed against
the domestic t rade-off . Regression l ines have been placed
in the graph to show the relat ionsh ips between the var iables
during each period.
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Table 10
The Domestic Trade-off(Using Part i t ioned Variance)
1955-1988 1956-1988
Variable tOLS CORC
Regression Regression
Constant -308.22 -313.57(267.42) (267.42)
Dem.Unity (before 1981) -11. 04** -10.69*(4.24 ) (4.25)
Dem. Unity (af ter 1980) -10.85** -10.95**(3.85 ) (3.81 )
Rep. Unity (before 1981) 14.82** 14.56*(5.75) (5.67)
Rep. Unity (af ter 1980) 17.09** 17.27**(5.13) (5.08)
Adjusted R2= .70 .71
Durbin-Watson = 2.17
N = 33 32
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.t Unity var iables a re t hr ee -y ea r moving averages (MA).* Signif icant a t the .05 level** Signif icant a t the .01 level
170
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171
1955-1980 aM 1982-1988
...."t -
oICD
' 0«tr.....
U...c
+ 'CD
CDIi ;
ocolI63
1110· t----
10571-
i_
t969 i_877
1970 :lSl7a
o
...
...
oI..'0tar.....
u
+ 'en
..
..oD
so 85 90DetL Unity: MoV1ng Average
Comparison of the Reagan Years with EarHer Period
FIGURE 21
The re la t ionship between Democrat ic unity and the
domestic t rade-off is obv ious ly not as strong prior to 1981
than it i s a f t e r 1981. I in terpre t the pattern a f te r 1981
as a Democratic counter-offensive a ga in st th e gains made by
the Republicans.
These resu l t s are fa i r ly robust against al ternat ive
specif icat ions . Adding changes in Soviet mili tary spending
and ba t t l e deaths, I obtain a sl ight ly higher coeff icient of
multiple det ermina ti on , but I suspect that col l inear i ty i s
in f la t ing model estimates.
The var iable "bat t le deaths," though not s ignif icant
i t s e l f , might conceivably be par t of the explanation of
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172
certa in other disaggregated t rade-offs , or act as an in te r -
vening variable. For theoret ical reasons i t is worth keep
ing for the sake of controlling for the br ief wartime period
at the beginning of the ser ies , to e lim in at e th e poss ibi l i ty
that wartime distort ions might be responsible for the re-
su l t s . Demographic and economic variables contributed noth
ing, or spurious cor re la tio ns , t o the model and were dropped
from the basic model.
The elimination of so many of the convent ional exp lana
t ions for changes in government spending, because of the i r
lack o f exp lana to ry power, merits further comment. As noted
in Chapter I , characterizations of the budget have long been
dominated by the school of thought that budgets change in
smal l increments .
Budget changes are usually minor, and typical ly associ
ated with long-term trends. The pat tern among t rade-offs ,
as conceptualized here , shows l i t t l e evidence of the kind of
s tab i l i ty suggested by the notion of incremental budget ing.
Admittedly, t he d if fe rences found in th is ana ly sis a re
bui l t upon the idea that changes occur at the margins, but
the variance i s much wider than what an incremental model
would imply. The percentage changes during the 1980s are
not indicat ive of marginal adjustments. Changes during th is
period were widespread and comprehensive, which i s not the
sor t of behavior that can be predicted according to a theory
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173
of incrementalism.
Moreover, these resul ts support the hypothesis tha t a
po l i t i ca l par t ies do influence the way budgets are al locat-
ed. Turning to the analysis of the other t rade-offs , I
employ the basic model (Table 11) to t es t the hypotheses.
Table 11
Explaining the Domestic Trade-off(The Basic Model)
1964-1988 1965-1988
Variable OLS CORCRegression Regression
Constant -2210.29*** -2397.60***(578.95) (522.27)
Democratic Unity -10.04* -8.79*(4.52) (3 .94)
Republican Unity 25.26*** 25.98***
(5.55) (4. 65)
Reagan Period 198.99*** 183.93***(39.24) (35.75)
ASoviet Spending1t _1l 953.01** 992.56***(280.12 ) (253.10)
Batt le Deaths -0.00 -0.00(O.OO) (O.OO)
Adjusted R2 = .75 .82Durbin-Watson = 2.75
N = 24 23
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.* Significant a t the .05 level** Significant a t the .01 level*** Significant at the .001 level
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174
Explaining Trade-offs
Following the same explanation, the t rade-offs between
defense and outlays fo r h ealth and education are substi tuted
in the models below. Tables 12 and 13 re po rt th e reg re ssion
resul t s fo r the 1964-1988 period:
Table 12
Explaining the Health Trade-off
1964-1988 1965-1988
Variable OLS CORC
Regression Regression
Constant -1984.02* -2538.66***(834.26) (673.74)
Democratic Unity -20.83** -15.56**(6.51) (5.33)
Republican Unity 44.90*** 49.82***(8.00) (6.43)
Reagan Period 214.00*** 131.34*(56.54) (50.29)
ASoviet Spending ( t - l l 33.62 -143.20(403.65) (320.73)
Batt le Deaths 0.00 -0.00(0.00) (0.00)
Adjusted R2= .66 .79
Durbin-Watson = 1.59
N = 24 23
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.* Signif icant a t the .05 level** Signif icant a t the .01 level*** Signif icant a t the .001 level
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175
Table 13
Explaining the Education Trade-off
1964-1988 1965-1988
Variable OLS CORC
Regression Regression
Constant -1513.26* -2157.65**(636.00) (532.75)
Democratic Unity -9.92 -6.56(4.96) (4.00)
Republican Unity 21.17** 24.37***(6.10) (4.71)
Reagan Period 178.81** 139.74**(43.10) (36.18)
ASoviet Spending 1t_11
591.28 738.77**(307.72) (258.53)
Batt le Deaths -0.00 -0.00(0.00) (0.00)
Adjusted R2 = .61 .76
Durbin-Watson = 2.34
N = 24 23
Standard erro rs are reported in parentheses.* Signif icant at the .05 level** Signif icant at the .01 level*** Signif icant at the .001 level
Results for the health t rade-off are consistent with
the results for the domestic t rade-off . However, the educa-
t io n t rade -o ff model does not produce s ignif icant coeff i -
cien ts for democratic unity.
In analyzing the resu l t s by means of the par t i t ioned
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176
variance model constructed along the l ines of the domestic
model ( i .e . , divided before and af te r the Reagan period),
none of the variables was significant . Co ll in ea ri ty i n this
model made resul ts almost un-interpretable. The signs of
the coef fi ci en ts i n the CORC ad jus ted regres sion analysis
a re c on sis te nt with the theory, bu t the signif icance of each
variable cannot be determined . Standardized regression
coeff ic ients for the variables are reported in Table 14:
Table 14
The Education Trade-off(Using Part i t ioned Variance)
1964-1988
Variable t
Constant
Dem. Unity (be fo re 1981)
Dem. Unity (after 1980)
Rep. Unity (before 1981)
Rep. Unity (af ter 1980)
Adjusted R2 =CORC Adjusted R2 =Durbin-Watson =N =
OLSRegression
-332.91(0.329)
-6.19(0.187)-2.20(0.417)6.73(0.205)3.63(0.471)
.52*
.442.34
24
Standardized regression coeff icients are reported.T-scores are in parentheses.t Unity varia ble s a re th re e-y ea r moving averages (MA).; The model is s ignif icant at the .003 level using OLS,
and a t the .013 level using CORC regression.
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177
Jointly, the variables appear to be significant . This
is an ar t i fac t of the shif t in context, or what I have
termed the "Reagan Period." The variables are not s ign i f i -
cant precisely because they are not s ignif icant . When the
period between 1955 and 1980 i s examined separately, no
significant coeff ic ients are obtained.
What is s ignif icant is the sh i f t in context. Analysis
of variance indicates that the part isan sh i f t in control of
government during the Reagan period accounts for over 50
percent of the variance in the education t rade-off between
1964 and 1988 (ANOVA Adjusted R2 = .54, Significant a t
.0003, with 22 degrees of freedom for the three-year moving
average, i . e . , 0, .5, 1). Put dif ferent ly , the sh i f t toward
Republican dominance during this period is what accounts for
the model's significance. Part i t ioning the variance by
breaking the un ity var iabl es in two, according to period,
makes th i s clear .
This pat tern i s so consistent that an analysis of
variance of the difference between the periods for a l l of
the dependent variables is warranted. Table 15 reports
resu l t s of the analysis of each dependent var iable .
There are problems in using analysis of variance mod-
els , with time series, since the procedure offers no remedy,
or t es t for autocorrelat ion. Moreover, the la t te r port ion
of the series contains only eight observations i f both
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178
admini st ra ti ons a re counted, six i f only the sh i f t in the
Senate i s counted. For these reasons, the following resu l t s
are extremely tenuous. I have coded the years 1982 to 1988
as 1, and 1964 to 1981 as zero to match the period in the
above analyses as closely as possible without using a moving
average.
TABLE 15
Differences in Trade-offs
Before and After 1981
Dependent Variable
Defense versus:
ANOVA R2 SignificanceLevel
Domestic Trade-off
Heal th Trade-o f f
Education Trade-off
Defense:(Functional Trade-offs)
Personnel vs. Training*
.40
.15
.40
.21
0.0005
0.03
0.0005
0.01
R & D vs. Total Science**
R & D vs. Basic Research t
R & D vs. Civil ian Research;
Mili tary Trade-off:
Procurement vs. Personnel
N = 24
.006 0.3
.23 0.01
.28 0.004
.04 0.7
* Employment t raining and education** Total Science minus space f l ight and related outlays.; Subcategory of science for basic research.t Health and education research.
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179
Overall there is a signif icant change in the way that
outlays were divided between categories. These patterns are
apparent in the multivariate analyses as well .
The resul ts of t he f unct iona l trade-off between outlays
for mili tary personnel and emploYment t raining does not
indicate Democratic unity played a part in determining how
th is part icular division occurred. Under more scrutiny,
using part i t ioned variance, Democratic uni ty and Republican
unity before 1981 appeared to be signif icant . Analyzing
th is period separately ( i . e . , excluding observa tions before
and af ter 1964 and 1981), only changes in Soviet spending
and bat t le deaths were signif icant . Again, the resul t s for
the parti t ioned variance model were driven by the shi f t in
1981. A similar pat tern was found in the science t rade-offs
in non-space science outlays and basic research.
However, in the t rade-off between outlays for defense
research and development and research in he alth and educa-
t ion, the findings a re con si st en t. Democratic unity and
Republican unity are signif icant even during the period
before Reagan.
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Table 16
Explaining the Civil ian Research Trade-off
1964-1988 1965-1988
Variable OLS CORC
Regression Regression
Constant -485.77 -520.90(270.16) (272.29)
Democratic Unity -7.22** -6.89**
(2.11 ) (2.10)
Republican Unity 11.11*** 11.32***(2.59) (2.51 )
Reagan Period 91. 44*** 87.50***(18.31) (19.42)
ASoviet Spending 1t _1l 142.53* 139.15(130.71) (130.91)
Batt le Deaths -0.00 -0.00(0.00) (0.00)
Adjusted R2 = .64 .67Durbin-Watson = 2.15
N = 24 23
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.* Signif icant a t the .05 level** Signif icant at the .01 level*** Signif icant a t the .001 level
In the t rade-off between cat egor ie s o f defense spend
ing, the model has no explanatory power a t a l l . Neither the
e ntir e s er ie s, nor th e p erio d before the sh i f t produced
s ignif icant resu l t s .
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181
Summary
This study has p roduced three important findings.
Firs t , I have found some evidence of a part isan influence on
budget allocations , though the predict ive capacity of the
model does not apply to a l l of the t rade-offs examined.
Pa rt is an un it y has proven to be a useful means of measuring
the s trength of the par ty and i t s abi l i ty to implement
programs, though more precise measure could be constructed.
Second, the effect of presidents is not clear because
of the coincidence between Democratic presidents and war. I
bel ieve tha t th is fact has been overlooked in previous
research and may account for the fai lure to find a relat ion
ship between party and budget outcomes. 165 Nevertheless, I
must re jec t the hypothesis tha t presidential party has an
effec t on allocations .
Third, the effect of a s t ruc tura l change in the domi-
nance of a par ty can have a large impact on budget alloca-
t ions. Granted, I only have one such change, but the ensu-
ing sh i f t s in al locat ions are in accordance with a general
pat tern of part isan pol i t ics occurring prior to the shi f t ,
and i s exaggerated afterwards.
I also find evidence of an organized pol i t i ca l counter-
offensive on the part of the House Democrats in the wake of
165 See Russett , "Defense Expenditures and National Well being;" and Berry and Lowery, "An Alternative Approach."
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182
a s t ruc tura l shi f t in power toward Republican dominance.
Democrats a re i nc reas ingly united in the i r voting
during the 1980s. Given th e d ef ea ts tha t they suffered in
electoral and policy matters, the upswing in party unity i s
consis tent with a poli cy o ri en ted interpreta t ion of that
measure. 166
To conclude, the findings presented in th is chapter,
using a re-designed measure of part isan influences, support
the theory tha t ideology has an important influence on the
way that budget allocations are determined. In the next
chapter, I summarize these findings, discuss the theore t ica l
s ignif icance of the findings and offe r conclusions regarding
the potent ia l for a peace dividend in the United States .
166 Cf. Brady , David , Joseph Cooper, and Pat r ic ia Hurley.liThe Decline of Party in the U.S. House of Representat ives,1887-1968."
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
principal Findings
Using the most common method of measuring part isan
influences, based on the number of seats and ideological
posi t ions of part ies to the l e f t and r ight , the hypothesis
that part isan in flu en ces are responsible for trade-off
outcomes i s not generally supported. However, when party
i nf luences a re operat ional iz ed in terms of party unity in
the United States, part isan influences are apparent and the
hypothesis that part ies effect trade-offs is supported.
In the case of the United S tate s th er e is evidence of
part isan influences on t rade-off behavior. These influences
are manifest a t two levels . At a st ructural level, the
model I have presented re l ies on the dominance of inst i tu-
t ions. When control of the major ins t i tu t ional players,
House, Senate and Presidency, shif ts from one party to
another, as i t did during the 1980s, budget trade-offs also
sh i f t toward the favored c at egor ie s o f the newly dominant
party . In th is case, Republican gained the upper hand and
t rade-offs shif ted sharply toward defense.
At another level , that is within a pa rt icu la r s tr uc -
tu ra l arrangement, the unity of part ies takes over. The
183
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184
more united a party i s in voting, the more t rade-offs wi l l
move, ceteris paribus, in the direction of i t s favored
categories. The model i s essent ia l ly a unity driven model,
with ins t i tut ional dominance playing'an important role.
The part isan unity model succeeds in explaining aggre
gate t rade-offs in federal outlays, but i s not generalizable
to more narrowly defined t rade-offs . I t works best in
explaining the defense versus domestic t rade-offs , but does
not fare as well in explaining the spending mixture for de
fense programs or more narrow constructions of the defense
versus domestic spending t rade-off .
Given the relat ive success of the revised conceptual
izat ion and operationalization of part isan influences used
in th e a na ly sis of American federal outlays, a similar
approach may yield bet te r resul ts when applied cross-nation
al ly . Such an operationalization might re ly on very subtle
changes discernible to scholars who deal intimately with the
ins t i tu t iona l and procedural in t r icac ies of a given country.
The unity of part ies, or party so l idar i ty , might be
measured by the s tabi l i ty of cabinet posts , party membership
and candidacies, o r th e l ike . According to my theory of the
influence of part isan ideologies on budgetary t rade-offs ,
dissention with in th e ranks of a party should constrain i t s
achievement o f id eo lo gical g oals. I f members are not w ell
organized (or lack the majorities needed to p rev ail in
l eg is l at ive ba t tl e s) , the par ty ' s impact on budget outcomes
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185
should be less than when members are well organized. 167
Conclusion: A Peace Dividend?
I have found that the unity of American part ies makes a
difference in the direct ion of budgetary t rade-offs . While
I have found a part isan influence on t rade-offs in the
United States, I do not f ind that president ia l party a f f i l i -
ation helps to explain t rade-offs . In f ac t, p re sid en tia l
party af f i l i a t ion , as a variable, i s severely contaminated
with the coinc idence o f warfare. Nor does the Reagan admin-
i s t ra t ion, by i t se l f e xp lain th e shi f t s in outlays during
the 1980s. I f my thesis is correct, i t was not Reagan, the
man, or even Reagan the president tha t produced these chang-
es. Instead, i t was the general bias of the Republican
party tha t changed the direct ion of the t rade-offs .
Firs t of a l l , Reagan was not alone. Noting the coming
proposals for increased defense spending, Russet t closes his
1982 ar t ic le stat ing that :
None of the other variables in our model account forthese sh i f t s . There i s no shooting war, and the otherv aria ble s a re n eith er very vola t i le nor, in our equat ions, very powerful anyway. Most important, the data
167 In parliamentary systems one might look a t thes tab i l i ty of membership in the party, the number of resignat ions or other signs of discord for clues as to how th is couldbe measured. I n cou ntrie s where party voting varies in thesame way as i t does in the United States, voting s ta t i s t icsmight be equally useful.
For a discussion of how executive party aff i l ia t ion mightalso be reconceptualized, see Appendix c.
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186
show that i t i s not merely the pres ence o f a Republicanin the White House which made the difference; the
Reagan presidency i s different . 168
What Russet t does not notice that Reagan is also pre-
siding over a peacetime ascendance in the Republican party
(not associated with the end of a war) with the Senate being
controlled by the Republicans. By comparison, Dwight Eisen-
hower presided over the end of a war, when t rade-offs gener-
al ly turn away from defense. He enjoyed a Republican major
i ty in Congress for only two yea rs c oin cid ing w ith demobili-
zation. In fairness to Russett , no one knew in 1982 tha t
Republican dominance of the Senate would l a s t s ix years.
But the large sh i f t in budgetary t rade-offs occurred in
con junct ion wi th a partisan sh i f t in the party control l ing
the Senate, which las ted for most of President Reagan's
term. This sh i f t in the control of the Senate is crucial .
While the Senate is typically not viewed as the centra l
actor in the budget process, the "correlat ion o f forces"
during the 1980s favored Republicans via control of two of
the three major ins t i tut ions involved in the budget process.
Had the domestic trade-off moved in the direct ion of
domest ic spending when this occurred, the whole enterprise
of using an part isan explanation would be in serious doubt.
Moreover, as predicted, the t rade-off moves back toward
168
original) .Russet t , "Defense Spending," 776, ( i ta l ics in
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187
domest ic spending as the unity of Democrats in the House
increases. I t seems that House Democrats mounted a counter
offensive during the 1980s, with unity increasing as the
t rade-off returns to "normal" levels . This is entirely
consistent with theoret ical expectat ions.
Thus, the con junc tion o f these events lends more, not
less , credence to the th esis th at Republicans produce de
fense-favoring trade-offs and, more general ly, that part isan
ideology i s a factor in t rade-off outcomes.
To the extent that th is assessment is valid , we should
expect that i f the Republicans win control of a t leas t two
of the three ins t i tut ional ent i t ies involved in the budget
process during peacetime, we should see another sh i f t toward
defense spending and away from domestic spending.
After such a shi f t , the abi l i ty of the part ies to
produce int ra-party consensus wil l determines the direction
of the defense ver sus domestic t rade-off within a modal
pattern of t rade-offs . I f one party i s unable to generate
such a consensus, a united opposi t ion could win, with a
resul t ing increase in expenditures for i t s favored catego
r i es of spending relat ive spending on i t s opponent's favored
categories. This is a competitive model. This f inding runs
counter to the idea that budge ta ry choice is merely an i l lu -
sion, the resul t of incrementalism or economic determinism.
I f part ies make the kinds of changes I have found, then the
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188
electorate has a ra ther clear choice between policy al terna
t ives , but only i f the part ies themselves are united.
Pol i t ica l hegemony by major coali t ions of par t ies , or by
bureaucracies in other countries might explain why t rade
offs in those count rie s a re relat ively stable.
Finally, one of the most important implications of the
fin dings p re sen ted here is that the defense versus domestic
spending t rade-off appears to be driven much more by domes
t ic pol i t ics than by the arms race. Changes in Soviet mili
tary spending do not add very much (around three to five
percent) to the explained varian ce o f the models I tes ted.
This model does not suggest that the collapse of the Soviet
Union wil l produce changes in the t rade-off as large as
those produced by changes party unity. Thus, the collapse
of the Soviet Union should not have a large direc t impact on
the direction of t rade-offs in f eder al out la ys .
In c lo sin g, return to th e que stio n I posed a t the
beg inning o f the study. Should we expect a "peace divi
dend?" Can I answer this question? For the United States,
I believe that I can.
I f we define a peace dividend as a t rade-off which
favors domest ic spending, I believe that there should be a
dividend ar ising from the loss of the Senate by the Republi-
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189
cans .169 After Republicans lost control of the Senate,
t rade-offs immediately moved back toward domestic spending.
Meanwhile, Democrats have been increasing the i r unity in
voting. I f th is trend continues, there i s a good chance of
real iz ing a dividend. However, the Gulf War may have wiped
out a dividend for 1991. War does play an important role.
Peace dividends do exis t . But during peacetime the use of
the term seems anachronist ic. My model indicates that the
unity of pol i t i ca l par t ies i s a more powerful influence than
the dynamics of arms races in determining trade-offs, thus
the concept of a "peace dividend" i s less accura te t han what
might be cal led a "domestic pol i t i ca l dividend."
In For a discussion of the potent ia l spi l l -over effectsor consequences of a peace dividend for the economy, seeAppendix D.
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APPENDIX A
Data Sources
Cross National Data:
Part isan placement are based on the opinions of the following
specia l is ts :
Joe Adams United StatesFrancis G. Castles Austral iaRobert Cox BelgiumConstantine Danopoulos (not used) GreeceDavid Wilsford FranceEric Einhorn NorwayEric Einhorn SwedenEric Einhorn DenmarkEric Einhorn FinlandM. Donald Hancock Federal Republic of GermanyJohn Logue SwedenJohn Logue NorwayJohn Logue .DenmarkJohn Logue FinlandRafael Banon Martinez (not used) SpainJohn Wil liams CanadaBarclay and Joan Ward ............•......... United KingdomBirol Yeshilada (not used) Turkey
Data on the distr ibut ion of seats held by each party
place on a five point , l e f t - r igh t continuum are and placements
for countries where specia l is ts were not ut i l ized were based
on th e o rd er and descriptions found in the following sources.
Comparisons between sources indicate tha t the convention in
presenting tables showing elect ion resul ts are arranged in
l e f t to r ight pat terns. These pat terns are consistent with
more detailed descriptions found in many of the sources below:
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191
1. McHale, Vincent McHale. Pol i t ica l Part ies of Europe
2. Mackie, Thomas T., and Richard Rose. The Internat ionalAlmanac of Electoral History.
3. Banks, Arthur S. ed. Pol i t ica l Handbook of the World. New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1988.
3. Facts on File (various issues)
4 Keesing's Contemporary Archives (various issues)
Demographic and economic data were obtained from the following
sources:1. World Tables (various editions)
2. Alvarez, Michael R., Geoffrey Garrett , and Peter Lange."Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, andMacroeconomic Performance." American Pol i t ica l ScienceReview 85, no. 2 (June 1991): 539-56 .
3. U.N. Demographic Yearbook (various edit ions)
4. Summer, Robert. , and Alan Heston. "A New Set of Internat ional Comparison of Real Product and Price for 130Countries, 1950-1985." Income and Weal th 34 (1988): 1-25.
5. Internat ional Labour Organization, Year Book of LabourSta t is t ics (various years) .
Cross-national budget data are taken from:
1. OECD Social Expenditures 1960-1990: Problems of Growthand Control. Paris : Organization for Economic Cooperationand Development, 1985.
2. u. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World MilitaryExpenditures and Arms Trans fe rs (va riou s years) .
3. Arbetman, Marina. WESTUP (data se t based on IMP es t i -mates) .
4. Internat ional Monetary Fund, Government Finance Sta t i s -
t i c s (various years) .
u.S. Data:
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192
Pol i t ica l data on the United States were obtained from:
1. Ornstein, Norman J . , Thomas E. Mann, and M ichael J .Malbin. Vita l Stat i s t ics on Congress, 1987-1988 .
2. Congressional Quarterly 's Guide to Congress.
3. Davidson, Roger H., and Walter J . Oleszek. Congress andI t s Members.
4. Shaffer , William R. Partv and Ideology in the UnitedStates Congress.
U.S. Budget data are taken from:
1 .Budget of the United States Government: Fisca l Year 1991.
2. Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal Year 1992.
Demographic and economic data are taken from:
1 . Bogue, Donald J . Populations of the United States .
2. Sta t i s t i ca l Abstracts of the United States (variousyears) .
Data on ba t t le deaths were taken from:
1. Sta t i s t i ca l Abstracts of the United States (various
years) .
2. "Army Batt le Casualt ies and Nonbattle Deaths in World WarI I : Final Report."
3. Meid, Pat and James M. Yingling . Operat ions in West Korea:U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953.
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APPENDIX B
Questionnaire Construction
In collaboration with Pro fe ssor s Marina Arbetman and M.
Donald Hancock, th e ques tio nn aires were send to country
specia l is t . The questionnaires l i s ted the par t ies and i n i t i a l
placements, corrections to these placements were requested.
The following example i s for Canada.
Belou ar e th e i deo log ica l pos lt lons selec ted (i n boldchar ac te rs ) f or each party during th e period 1955-1985. ~ l e a s ereview th is i n f o r ~ a t i o n fo r your c o u n ~ r y .KeY:RL Radical LeftHL Hoderate Lef:cor C e n ~ e rHR Hoderate RightRR Radical Right
~ l e a s e note any revisions in the existing data by circling th eposition uhich better approximates th e ideological character of theparty .To expedite data ent ry . r et u rn th e completed form on orbefore June 15. 1991.
CANADA
Neu Democratic 1955 RL HL CT HR RR( N D ~ ) 1960 RL ilL CT IIR RR
1965 RL ilL CT IIR RR1970 RL ilL CT IIR RR1975 RL ilL CT IIR RR1980 RL ilL CT IIR RR1985 RL ilL CT IIR RR1990 RL ilL CT IIR RR
Liberal ~ a r t y 1955 RL ilL CT IlR RR(LI?) 1960 RL ilL CT IIR RR
1965 RL ilL CT IlR RR1970 RL ilL CT IIR RR1975 RL ilL CT IIR RR1980 RL ilL CT IIR RR1985 RL ilL CT IIR RR1990 RL ilL CT IIR RR
~ r o g r e s s i v e Conservative 1955 RL ilL CT HR RR(I?CI?) 1960 RL ilL CT HR RR
1965 RL ilL CT IIR RR1970 RL ilL CT IlR RR1975 RL HL CT IlR RR1980 RL ilL CT IlR RR1985 RL ilL CT IlR RR1990 RL ilL CT IlR RR
Ralli:!ent de s 1965 RL HL CT Hit RRCredit is tes
Social Credit 1960 RL ilL CT IIR RR( S C ~ ) 1965 RL HL CT Hit RR
1970 RL ilL CT HIl RR1975 RL HL CT HR RR
193
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APPENDIX C
Measurements: An Agenda for Research
The common perception that the Reagan's presidency was
somehow d if fe rent r ai se s questions about the nature of
president ia l partisanship and ideology. Reagan has been
associated with the r ight wing of the Republican party as
opposed to party moderates. This assessment of his posi t ion
suggests that gradations of l iberalism and conservatism
within each of the part ies might be re fle cte d in presiden-
t i a l leadership. Impressionistic comparisons of Eisenhower,
Nixon and Reagan suggest that the ideological posit ions of
presidents might be measured by the i r public speeches.
As a war hero, whose professional career in the mili-
tary was marked by the experience of pull ing together Allied
generals, Eisenhower was not renowned for his outspoken
opinions. While his vice president, Richard Nixon, bated
the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, and Ronald Reagan aided
in the efforts of McCarthy-era demagogues in black-balling
members of the entertainment industry, Eisenhower might be
best remembered as the man who coined the expression "mili-
tary industr ial c0I:ClPlex," in his farewell address. Despite
the cornmon character izat ion of military men as bureaucrats
indoctrinated in the interests of the mili tary, Eisenhower
warned against mili tary expansion. Though surely a conser-
194
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195
vat ive, Eisenhower cannot be remembered as an ideologue.
Moreover, he was not a professional pol i t ic ian , which might
otherwise have contributed to more pronounced ideological
convictions.
By comparison, Richard Nixon part icipated in more
over t ly ideological debate. Meeting with Khrushchev in
celebrated public appearances, Nixon made himself known for
his anti-Communist views. But as president, Nixon opened
relat ions with China, and began the period of detente with
the Soviet Union. He seemed w illin g to modify his views
according to circumstance.
Reagan, on the other hand, seemed to be consistently
more provocative in his rhetor ic and less willing to modify
his posi t ion according to circumstance. By comparison to
ei ther Nixon, or his successor, President Bush, Reagan
seemed less apt to accep t Sov ie t overtures. In many ways,
Reagan might be the quintessent ia l "Cold Warrior." Using
phrases l ike "evil empire," Reagan seemed intent upon keep
ing superpower r ivalry alive. One wonders what Reagan might
have said as p resid en t, in the wake of the Tianamen Square
incident in 1989. Would he have been as restrained as his
successor? Even Democrats in Congress complained tha t Bush
was too sof t on the Chinese. Would Reagan have been so
docile?
The problem of measuring pres ident ia l i nt en ti ons po in ts
to where th is kind of research should be aimed. Measurement
is the centra l problem. Perhaps a measure of the ideologi-
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196
c al p os itio n of a president could be developed using content
analysis of the i r public speeches. Coding schemes similar
to those employed in the work of Ian Budge and others might
allow us to compare presidents in ideological terms .170
Factor analysis of such data might y ie ld i n te rva l- leve l
measures of a l ibera l conservative dimension in presidential
rhetoric .
Jus t as congressional part ies vary in the i r unity,
presidents may be more or less con sis te nt in thei r rhetoric.
American part ies are not monoliths, and presidents of the
same par ty may be as dissimilar as members of the House or
Senate in thei r orientat ions. I f such measures could be
developed, the predictive u t i l i ty of the models might be
improved.
Based on the work of congressional scholars and survey
researchers, I postulated tha t Democrats are "to the left"
of Republicans. Perhaps Reagan represented the l imi t of
what the "Right" means in the United States . In a sense, he
may be a kind of baseline, or bench mark, by which other
pol i t i ca l actors may be posit ioned. Further research on
th is subject needs to be done before the posi t ions of pres i -
dents can be compared longi tudinal ly.
170 See Budge, Robertson and Hearl, Ideology, Strategy andParty Change, 456-67; Ian Budge and Richard I . Hofferbert ."Mandates and Policy Outputs."
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197
More innovative methods of measuring pol i t i ca l inten
t ions are desperately needed in th is area of research.
Counting parliamentary seats i s not sufficient . More dis-
criminating instruments are required to advance research in
th is area.
Measurement i s not the only problem encountered in
analyzing the in flu en ce o f part ies on budgets. Theories of
pol i t ical processes and ins t i tu t ions need to be conceptual
ized in such a way that systematic research of th is kind can
proceed in a cumulative manner. Unfortunately most ins t i tu -
t iona l studies do not deal with the problem of developing
measurements of structures or processes. Structural con
s t ra in t s are widely perceived, but rarely given operational
defini t ions. Of course, these things are di f f i cu l t to
operationalize, but many scholars have noted that there are
frequently sequential decisions that recur on a regular
basis . Formal theorist have developed a wide array of
analyt ical tools for solving sequential games, but fewer
deal with the empirical problem of operationalizing con
cepts.
Turning to the dependent variable, th is study has shown
the ut i l i ty of measuring trade-offs di rec t ly . I believe
that the measures used in th is study are the very best
available . The Berry-Lowery formula is a major contribution
to the f ie ld in providing a direct measure of a t rade-off .
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198
Hypothesizing about the exis tence o f t rade-offs simply gets
nowhere. The potential uses for this measure have not been
exhausted here. The instrument i s equally applicable to the
o th er sid e of the budge ta ry equation: revenues.
Preliminary analyses of the sources of taxes promise to
be as in terest ing as th e a na ly si s of expenditures. Both
benefi ts and burdens are rendered more t ractable to analysis
using th is instrument. Not only does the Berry-Lowery
conceptualization provide a good foundation for developing
theories about the determinants of t rade-offs , but i t also
provides an excellent foundation for analyzing the effects
of trade-offs in a more coherent way (See Appendix D) .
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APPENDIX D
Related Findings
In analyzing the models used in this study, I stumbled
upon a r at he r p ecul ia r problem. Confounding r es ults th re at
ened the leave me without any firm conclusions. Something
st range was going on, but I didn ' t know what. Solving th is
problem furnished a pleasant surpr ise.
War, Trade-offs and Unemployment
In examining the determinants of t rade-offs in the
federal budget I included, as a control variable , the ra te
of unemployment, in the b elie f th at the economic condit ion
of the country might impinge on the way tha t al locat ions are
made, especial ly with respect to cer ta in kinds of domestic
spending. Berry and Lowery include the percent of people
below the poverty l ine (as I do without resul ts ) . Seeing a
need to which a le f t - leaning pol i t ic ian might be sensi t ive ,
I tested models using unemployment as a control .
Unemployment seemed to have a s tr ong i nf luence on the
values of other parameters in many of the models I tested,
but i t s effec t varied from one p erio d to another in a con
fusing pat tern .
Reconsidering the relat ionship between unemployment and
t rade-offs , I examined the pattern di rec t ly . The t rends are
shown below.
199
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200
A oo.st1C Trade-off
10
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Returning to the l i terature on th e sub je ct of t rade
offs, I noted tha t Ron Smith had found a posi t ive correla
t ion with defense burdens and the unemployment level . l7 1
Smith's findings, however, did not hold in cross-national
s ta t i s t ica l tes ts .172 In fact, the United States, along
with the United Kingdom, is considered an out l ie r in being
one of the few countries where th is relat ionship holds.
As the domestic trade-off increases so does unemploy-
171 See Ron P. Smith, "Military Expenditures and Capitalism, "Cambridge Journal of Economics 1 (1977): 61-76.
172 See Chan, "Defense Spending and the Economy," 407.
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201
ment, or so i t seemed during some periods. Looking closer ,
I noticed that the relat ionship rever se s -during wars.
Following th is observat ion I constructed a model, with
unemployment as a dependent instead of independent variable .
Two independent variables were included in an i n i t i a l model:
the domestic t rade-off and a dummy variable for wartime
( i .e . , any year with bat t le deaths as reported by the
Department of Defense). Results o f exp lo ra to ry analyses
were very good.
Several specif icat ions to the in i t i a l model were
tes ted, i nc ludi ng l ag s of one and two years. Results are
much weaker under any specification other than a simulta-
neous model .
Following the advice o f P ro fes so r Jacek Kugler, I
part i t ioned the variance between wartime t rade-offs and
peacetime t rade-offs , coding the counter circumstance as
zero ( i .e , wartime t rade-offs equal zero i f no bat t le
deaths, peacetime t rade-offs equal zero i f bat t le deaths are
greater than zero). This procedure s epar at es t he t rade-offs
occurring during wartime from those occurring dur ing peace -
time for the purpose of ascertaining whether both wartime
and peacetime tra deoff s a re s igni f icant .
Table 17 reports the results of th is specification:
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202
TABLE 17
Explaining Unemployment
Model 1
1950-1989 1951-1989
Variable OLS COReRegression Regression
Constant 5.62*** 5.68***(0.1773) (0.2173)
Peacetime Trade-off 0.0118*** 0.0098***(0.0021) (0.0071)
Wartime Trade-off -0.0078*** -0.0076***(0.0018) (0.0019)
Adjusted R2 = .57 .48Durbin-Watson = 1.23
N = 40 39
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.Standardized coeff icients from OLS are .61 for peacetime
t rade-off and -.44 for wartime t rade-offs .* Signif icant a t the .05 level** Signif icant a t the .01 level*** Signif icant a t the .001 level
Given tha t the impact of the t rade-off between defense
and domestic spending on unemployment in one year may depend
on the level of unemployment during the previous yea r I
modified the model to in clude th e previous year ' s unemploy
ment. Adding the previous year 's unemployment rate to the
equation, the resu l t s are even be t te r . The results of th is
modification to the i n i t i a l model are reported in the
following Table:
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203
Table 18
Explaining Unemployment
Model 2
1950-1989 1951-1989
Variable OLS CORC
Regression Regression
Constant 3.11*** 5.68***(O.63) (26.16)
Peacetime Trade-off 0.0073*** 0.0098***(O.0020) (O.0021)
Wartime Trade-off -0.0057** -0.0056**(O.0016) (O.0022)
Unemployment It-l) 0.4519*** 0.4351***(O.109)
Adjusted R2 = .71 .66Durbin-Watson = n/a
N = 39 38
Standard e rro rs are reoorted in oarentheses.Standardized coeff ic ients from OLS are .38 for peacetimet rade-off and - .37 for wartime t rade-offs , and .45 forunemployment It-ll •
******
Signif icant a t the .05 levelSignif icant a t the .01 levelSignif icant a t the .001 level
The predict ion i s improved, with the t rade-off var i
ables continuing to be s igni f icant and in the direction
in i t i a l ly observed. Figure 23 shows the f i t of the model's
predict ion with actual ra tes of unemployment:
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204
10 10
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3 3
2 2
4 8Predicted Percent UneIIployed
Model. 2 Predictions of unemploymentFIGURE 23
With these resu lts in hand, I turned to th e que stion of
whether tr ad e- of fs in other countries also resulted in
unemployment. No general relationship could be found.
Recalling the patterns shown a t the end of Chapter I I ,
I suspect that there is no cross-national pattern because
most advanced industr ial countries simply do not vary in the
way they d is tr ib u te t he ir resources. In this l ight , Smith's
findings make sense. Fluctuations in defense vis-a-vis
domestic spending are pract ical ly n i l in most of the other
countries I examined.
In the cross-national data I did not find a re la t ion-
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205
ship between t rade-offs and unemployment, but then I do not
currently have data on comparable "discretionary domestic
spending." Gathering comparable data on th is var iable i s
the next step in th is l ine of research.
I f Iny" suspicions are correct, i t is not the "burden"
tha t "causes" unemployment. Instead, i t i s the change in
the distr ibut ion of resources.
At present , I can only speculate on the mechanisms
through which such re la t ionships might be produced. An
examination of the multipl ier effects of each kind of
expenditure might explain this f inding. Previous research
indicates that this may be the case .173
One thing worth noting i s that the relat ionship tha t I
have found is a re la t ionship between marginal changes in the
budget and the employment of people who are probably a t the
economic margins themselves. Rates of unemployment are
disproport ionate between people of different races and
levels of educat ional a ttainment. People who are a t lower
end of the socio-economic ladder are the ones most l ikely to
be affected by marginal changes in the econoIny".
Much more work needs to be done on th is matter. The
model i t s e l f might be refined by using more narrowly defined
t rade-offs . These findings are very encouraging for the
development of research in this area. This whole of area
173 See Chan, "Impact of Defense Spending."
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206
research i s great ly enhanced by the use of a measure of the
dist r ibut ion, or sp l i t among budget items.
Moreover, the implications of this f inding are very
powerful. I f American part ies are responsible for generat
ing tra de -o ffs in budget allocations, then they are also
responsible for producing the rate of unemployment. Further
research on th is matter is warranted.
Based soley on the f i t of this model, i f the t rade-off
during 1991 and 1992 i s toward defense, as I expect i t wil l
be when data on that period i s available, it should explain
the high ra te of unemployment th at e xis ts at the time th is
study i s being writ ten. While combat deaths tota led more
than 200 for the Gulf War, there was no draft in effect as
there had been during World War I I , and the Korean and
Vietnam Wars. For this reason, I would expect t rade-offs
during the Gulf War to act in the same way as a peacetime
t rade-off .
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