A review of America’s post-Soviet strategy to-ward Russia is long overdue. The illusions that onceguided policy are now at an end. What is needed isa dispassionate approach to Russia, whereinAmericans would neither magnify nor excuse thevirtues and vices of the Russian Federation butwould accept the following realities:

• Russia is unlikely to become integrated intothe Euro-Atlantic community and is unwill-ing to adjust its foreign policy prioritiesaccordingly;

• There is broad-based support within Russiafor the direction in which Vladimir Putinhas taken the country;

• Russia has undergone a genuine—if limit-ed—recovery from the collapse of the 1990s;

• Washington lacks sufficient leverage tocompel Russian acquiescence to its policypreferences; and

• On a number of critical foreign policyissues, there is no clear community of inter-ests that allows for concepts of “selectivepartnership” to be effective.

Any approach to Russia must be based onrealistic expectations about the choices con-fronting Washington. The United States has twooptions. It can forgo the possibility of Russianassistance in achieving its key foreign policy pri-orities in an effort to retain complete freedom ofaction vis-à-vis Moscow. Or it can prioritize itsobjectives and negotiate a series of quid pro quoswith Russia. The latter choice, however, cannotbe indefinitely postponed.

Seeking an accommodation with Russia ismore likely to guarantee American success in pro-moting its core national interests while minimiz-ing costs—but will require U.S. policymakers toaccept limits on what can be demanded of Russia.

Parting with IllusionsDeveloping a Realistic Approach to Relations with Russia

by Nikolas Gvosdev

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Nikolas Gvosdev is editor in chief of The National Interest and a senior fellow in strategic studies at The NixonCenter. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of The National Interest or The NixonCenter.

Executive Summary

No. 611 February 29, 2008�������

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Introduction

Why does the United States find it so dif-ficult to establish and sustain a durable andbeneficial relationship with the RussianFederation?

The post-Soviet/post-Cold War U.S.-Russiarelationship has been one of the most studied,discussed, and analyzed topics in internation-al affairs. There is certainly no lack of adviceand guidance on the matter. Many of thereports that have been written take a “rationalactor” approach—that is to say, by laying outcommon interests and threats, these reportspresume that a blueprint for joint action canbe created that will serve as the foundation fora renewed relationship.

In contrast, this analysis seeks to examinethe factors that have inhibited policymakersfrom solidifying the U.S.-Russia relationship.

Whereas all bilateral relationships involvea measure of give and take, this report doesnot seek to provide advice to Russia on whatMoscow must do in order to improve therelationship. This is not to suggest that theRussians somehow are faultless. Indeed, onecan easily amass a long litany of Moscow’smissteps, ill-conceived policy initiatives andneedless provocations, ranging from theKremlin’s inability to denounce the 1939Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to its clumsy andham-fisted efforts to use its energy resourcesto extract concessions from neighboring gov-ernments such as Ukraine or foreign compa-nies working on Russian soil.

But U.S. policy toward Russia—or any oth-er major power—should not be solely reactiveto events; it must also be based on an honestassessment of U.S. needs, interests, and capa-bilities. And there are always risks whenembarking on such a venture; policies can failand new approaches do not always ensuresuccess. There is never a guarantee that theother side will accept any U.S. offer; this doesnot mean that the effort was worthless orthat the strategic assessments that served asthe foundation for the policy should be dis-carded outright. Indeed, it is far easier to fine-

tune a policy or to discover a new tacticalapproach if there is clarity about not onlyAmerica’s ultimate goals but also America’swillingness to absorb costs.

Regretfully, over the last 15 years, manyhave clung to illusions that the United Statescan achieve most of its objectives at little costand without having to make much accommo-dation to the interests of others. That point ofview was particularly prevalent with respect toRussia, which, having emerged from thewreckage of the Soviet Union, seemed at timesto be in no position to thwart U.S. preferencesbut instead to have to accept any relationshipon American terms. Increasingly, that is nolonger the case, because of Russia’s own recov-ery from its mid-1990s nadir as well as clearsigns of “superpower fatigue” affecting Amer-ica’s ability to sustain power and influence ona variety of issues around the world.

The goal of this report is not to insist onany one particular policy blueprint but insteadto focus attention on the need to make choic-es and to be prepared to live with the out-comes. Any U.S. policy toward Russia is goingto require trade-offs. Russia’s own economicrecovery in recent years, coupled with theemergence of alternate international networksthat give other states the ability to bypass theUnited States altogether, has reduced Wash-ington’s maneuvering room. The followingpiece of advice, by three respected analysts,and meant to apply to U.S. policy in general,perfectly sums up what this report hopes toachieve: “We must face head-on and lean into,rather than away from, the real choices that weconfront. Some are gut-wrenching in the sensethat they will force us to make truly hard com-promises among sets of values, preferences,and expectations that we don’t want to tradeoff. That is no excuse to ignore or hide fromthose choices.”1

The Failure to Consummate

Many Americans are tempted to look backwith nostalgia at a supposed “better time”whenever there are difficulties in the U.S.-Russia

2

U.S. policytoward Russiamust be based

on an honestassessment

of U.S. needs,interests, and

capabilities.

relationship. In his memoir, Strobe Talbott, for-mer deputy secretary of state in the Clintonadministration, recorded two such instances inPresident Clinton’s conduct of policy towardRussia. The first, in late 1993, was Clinton’slament, in confronting the complexities of deal-ing with Boris Yeltsin (as well as the ongoingimpact of the Soviet collapse), “Boy, do I evermiss the Cold War.” Seven years later, after a par-ticularly grueling session with Yeltsin’s successorVladimir Putin—someone prepared to be far lessaccommodating to American proposals—Clin-ton told Talbott, “Let’s get this thing over withso we can go see Ol’ Boris.”2 Today, as relationsbetween Moscow and Washington continue todeteriorate, and as pundits ominously intonethat a new Cold War is looming between theUnited States and Russia, even Republicans whowere extremely critical of the Yeltsin administra-tion during the 1990s look back at that time aspreferable to the situation today.3

Despite the promise of a new and improvedrelationship between Russia and the UnitedStates in the immediate aftermath of 9/11—when Robert Legvold of Columbia Universitycould write that “Russia and the United Statesboth stand on the verge of fundamental for-eign policy choices likely to change dramatical-ly their mutual relationship” with an eye tocrafting a true alliance between the twostates4—the old patterns have reasserted them-selves. Today, Legvold declares, “Gone is thetalk of ‘strategic partnership,’ not to mentionthe fanciful vision of a genuine Russo-American alliance held by some . . . not so longago.”5

Has Russia—or the rest of the former SovietUnion, for that matter—changed so dramati-cally between 2001 and 2008 that an entirelynew approach is required? It’s true that theRussian economy has begun a dramatic recov-ery from the aftermath of the collapse of theUSSR and the 1998 financial crash and thathigh energy prices have engendered whatsome call confidence and others “petro-arro-gance” within the Kremlin,6 but over the lastseven years, there has been no whole-scalechange in Russia’s strategic orientation thatwould justify a major shift in U.S. policy.

Either the opportunities were overstated orthe differences are not so dire.

This narrative of past opportunities lost inU.S.-Russian relations is compounded bymajor and dramatic disagreements within theAmerican foreign policy establishment overhow to view Russia. Indeed, one cannot helpbut wonder whether leading U.S. political fig-ures are looking at the same country whenthey make pronouncements. In July 2007, fol-lowing his meeting with President Putin, U.S.President George W. Bush declared, “Russia isa good, solid partner,” citing in particularcooperation on a number of strategic issues.7

Senator Barack Obama, a leading Democraticcandidate for president, had a much less posi-tive assessment, telling the Chicago Councilon Global Affairs earlier that spring that“Russia is neither our enemy nor close allyright now.”8 But the chairman of the SenateForeign Relations Committee, Joseph Biden(D-DE), went even further, identifying Russiaunder the Putin administration as one of thethree principal threats to the United States.9

Although the United States may have con-tentious and difficult relations with otherimportant countries—such as China, Pakistan,and Saudi Arabia—it is quite a sign of disso-nance for a country like Russia to be describedby senior officials and policymakers as both astrategic partner and an adversary at the sametime. And such divergent positions make fash-ioning a coherent policy extremely difficult.Take, for instance, the question of preventingthe proliferation of nuclear material. If theUnited States government is so divided overwhether Russia is friend or foe, how can therebe meaningful intelligence cooperation be-tween the two countries? In a climate of suspi-cion, how can either side agree to grant access tosensitive facilities? It would be almost impossi-ble, for example, for the United States to “helpRussia obtain and maintain an effective, eco-nomic, and reliable space-based early-warningsystem” if a substantial segment of the U.S. for-eign policy establishment was to decry the shar-ing of sensitive and advanced American tech-nologies with an “enemy” state.10 Meanwhile,hostile rhetoric has surely stirred Russian suspi-

3

Despite thepromise of a newand improvedrelationshipbetween Russiaand the UnitedStates in theimmediate aftermath of9/11—the old patterns havereasserted themselves.

cions about American intentions, furtherundermining the prospects for rapprochement.In such an environment of uncertainty, there-fore, any policy that emerges is unlikely to bebased on a dispassionate analysis of U.S. inter-ests—and certainly not from a genuine strategicdialogue with Moscow.

A final ingredient to throw into the mix isan assumption shared by many that thedefault setting in any bilateral relationshipbetween the United States and another coun-try must be friendship. Richard Pipes provoc-atively titled his 1997 Foreign Affairs essay “IsRussia Still an Enemy?” but nonethelessbegan by noting that Russia’s pre-Soviet rela-tions with the United States “were exception-ally friendly” and that “seven decades of U.S.-Russia hostility that followed the Bolshevikcoup d’état were the result not of a conflict ofinterests but of the particular needs ofRussia’s conquerors, the Soviet ruling elite.”11

But what happens if the condition describedby Senator Obama—a Russia fated to be nei-ther a close ally nor an outright adversary tothe United States—is the best outcome for theUnited States in terms of fulfilling most of itsforeign policy objectives?

The many discussions, commissions, andcommittees that have advanced meaningfulproposals for structuring U.S.-Russia relationssince 1991 are remarkably consistent in theirrecommendations for a durable, “interest-based” relationship—one predicated on stem-ming nuclear proliferation, combating inter-national terrorism, strengthening the UnitedNations as a more effective international actor,deepening Russian integration into the globaleconomy, and promoting energy security.12

Moreover, presidents Bush and Putin havepublicly discussed these proposals at theirsummit meetings—in Moscow; Bratislava; and,most recently, Kennebunkport.

The problem is not the lack of an agen-da—it is in getting Moscow and Washingtonto move to the execution stage, to make com-mitments and in so doing be prepared toforeclose other options. Both sides are atfault, but as former secretary of state HenryKissinger noted in February 2001, it should

be possible to manage a relationship betweenRussia and the United States even when their“national interests sometimes are paralleland sometimes do not coincide.” However,Kissinger went on to say, this “requires of theUnited States that it have a clear sense of itsown priorities.”13

The Crucial Questions

On December 31, 1991, the United Nationsapproved the request tendered by Yuli M.Vorontsov, the Soviet Ambassador to theUnited Nations, for the Russian Federation tobe recognized as the sole successor to theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics, in accor-dance with the protocol that had been negoti-ated among the republics of the Soviet Unionin Alma-Ata (Almaty), Kazakhstan, three daysearlier.

Had the collapse of the USSR fulfilled theconditions laid out by the administration ofHarry S. Truman in NSC-68—the first formalattempt to define an official U.S. strategy forthe Cold War? That document directedAmerican policy “by all means short of war to(1) block further expansion of Soviet power,(2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions,(3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin’s con-trol and influence, and (4) in general, so fosterthe seeds of destruction within the Soviet sys-tem that the Kremlin is brought at least to thepoint of modifying its behavior to conform togenerally accepted international standards.”14

To the extent that all of these things occurredover the course of the Cold War, it is not clearhow much was attributable to U.S. actions. Inany case, a new set of questions must beapplied to U.S.-Russian policy since the end ofthe Cold War, although these questions drawon lessons learned during the Cold War andeven before.

No U.S. administration can hope to craft asustainable, enduring policy toward Russia ifit cannot provide definitive answers to threequestions. Were the forces that drove theSoviet Union to expand its influence and led itinto conflict with the Atlantic powers a prod-

4

The problem isnot the lack of an

agenda—it is ingetting Moscow

and Washingtonto make commit-

ments and in so doing be prepared to

foreclose otheroptions.

uct largely of its Marxist-Leninist ideology, orwere they rooted primarily in earlier, pre-Soviet Russian imperial tendencies? If the lat-ter, does that mean that Russia’s nationalinterests will always set it at odds with funda-mental U.S. security objectives whether tsar,commissar or democratically elected presidentsits in the Kremlin? Second, are Americaninterests better served by promoting separatisttendencies across the Eurasian plain, or is themaintenance of a unified Russian state con-ducive to overall U.S. foreign policy goals?Finally, is the existence of Russia—in its cur-rent configuration—necessary for the func-tioning not only of a regional Eurasian politi-cal and economic order but also for a globalinternational system that supports overallU.S. national interests?

Americans have often hedged their bets onthese questions. Public Law 86-90, passed in1959 and still on the books, identified“Russian communism” and its “imperialisticand aggressive policies” as a “dire threat to thesecurity of the United States and of all the freepeoples of the world,” without clarifying whatwas particularly Russian and what was partic-ularly communist about the threat. In addi-tion, a number of the “Captive Nations”whose liberation that legislation calls for arestill constituent parts of the post-SovietRussian Federation. An influential text of theearly 1960s—Victor S. Mamatey’s Soviet RussianImperialism—described imperial expansion aspart and parcel of Russia’s historic aims and“expressed the aspirations of the great Russianpeople accurately enough.”15 George Kennan’sfamous “Long Telegram” of 1946 was morenuanced; while identifying pre-Soviet Russianexpansionism as a problem, for Kennan it wasin the “new guise of international Marxism,with its honeyed promises to a desperate andwar torn outside world” that the threat posedby Moscow was “more dangerous and insidi-ous than ever before.”16

American expectations have changed overtime. When, in 1990, Alexander Solzhenitsynsuggested that Moscow, in addition to relin-quishing control over the “outer empire” thatwas the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, should

also allow the Soviet republics of the BalticStates, the Caucasus and Central Asia to charttheir own destinies, this was considered to be aradical declaration far in excess of stated U.S.objectives at the time.17 By 2004, the proposalfor the creation of a common market (the“Single Economic Space”) that would encom-pass the territories Solzhenitsyn had identi-fied in 1990 as part of a proposed “RussianUnion”—Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan andRussia—was denounced in the West as anunacceptable manifestation of Russia’s “impe-rial ambitions” and a plot to bring about a“reconstituted empire.”18

Dissonance in the U.S. approach to Russiacould be managed during the 1990s when aweak Russia was significantly dependent onWestern aid and when the Russian leadershipwas prepared to make major concessions toWashington in the hopes of acceleratingRussian integration into the West. In turn, theUnited States was able to use a series of delay-ing measures and vague promises to postponethe inevitable day of reckoning—for example,using the “Partnership for Peace” as a hedgeon the question of NATO expansion—withthe hope being that the states of the formerSoviet bloc and the former Soviet Unionwould never qualify for actual membership orthat somehow the “Russia problem” would besolved. But sooner or later, this maneuveringroom would run out, as NATO has expandednot simply to encompass the former Sovietsatellites of Central Europe but states directlyon Russia’s own borders, and as countriessuch as Ukraine and Georgia continue to pressfor inclusion. Russia’s recovery from the trau-ma of the 1990s has not only lessenedAmerican influence over Moscow but hasallowed Russia to raise the costs of Americanindecision.

Russia will never be a perfect partner tothe United States; but very few nations are—not even America’s close allies among theadvanced post-industrial democracies. Eitherthe strategic advantages Russia brings to thetable make it worth overlooking Russia’sobvious faults or the cost of Russia’s help istoo high in relation to the benefits.

5

Russia’s recoveryfrom the traumaof the 1990s has lessenedAmerican influence overMoscow andallowed Russia toraise the costs of American indecision.

Washington would much prefer to avoidthese hard choices. For example, the U.S.Congress is unwilling to graduate Russia fromthe provisions of the Jackson-Vanik legisla-tion, which prevents permanent normal trad-ing relations with a state that restricts emigra-tion rights—even though Russia had beenfound to be in compliance with its require-ments since 1994.19 Meanwhile, the Bush ad-ministration continues to express its desire fora closer relationship with Russia, but it is clear-ly ambivalent about the prospects and notsure about the price it is willing to pay to try towork with the Kremlin. That uncertainty willbe passed to the next administration, whichwill have no better luck in crafting and main-taining an effective, coherent, and credibleapproach toward Russia unless it is willing toanswer basic questions about Russia and todispense with any remaining illusions thatcurrently inhibit the formulation of a realisticpolicy.

Dangerous Illusions

Too often, outside observers have first cre-ated their image of Russia, and then locatedthe appropriate facts and personalities to sup-port their construction. Too often, hopes andaspirations have been substituted for factswhen shaping policy.

Dispensing with the illusions that haveguided policy toward Russia is a necessaryprecondition for moving forward—even if itrequires abandoning cherished dreams of the“Russia that might have been.”

Illusion No. 1: By Cooperating with theUnited States, Russia Will Join the West

The first illusion is that Russia is destinedto become a full member of the West andassume a position of leadership within theEuro-Atlantic community. That was a dreamshared not only by many in the United Statesbut in post-Soviet Russia as well. AlexeyPushkov, a leading Russian commentator whowas part of Mikhail Gorbachev’s foreign poli-cy team, recalled this:

Many of us thought the way forward asthe Cold War ended would be the emer-gence of a new Europe, one not definedby blocs, and where the old confronta-tions and antagonisms would be gone. .. . In the beginning of the 1990s, the ideaof a close partnership with the UnitedStates, even an alliance, was popular inMoscow. Although the Cold War endedin the fall of the Warsaw Pact and thecollapse of the Soviet Union, the newRussian elites were operating from thepresumption that democratic Russiashould not be treated as a defeatedcountry. On the contrary, we thought, itshould be included in the Western com-munity as a new state that had decided-ly parted with communism.”20

Even at the beginning of the Putin adminis-tration, then–foreign minister Igor Ivanov wasstill touting the “development of a constructivepartnership between my country, Europe andthe United States” that is “united by a commonresponsibility for maintaining peace and stabil-ity in the vast Euro-Atlantic area” and declaredthat a goal of Russian foreign policy would bethe “preservation of a unified Euro-Atlanticcommunity, with Russia now part of it.”21

But were such expectations ever realistic?The likelihood that Russia was going to followa path of internal development that wouldbring its domestic institutions into closer con-formity with Euro-Atlantic standards wasextremely low to begin with. Even if that hadoccurred, Russia, as a Eurasian-continentalpower, was going to have different interestsand priorities than either the United States orWestern Europe. Therefore, there could be noexpectations that Russia would automaticallysupport the general Western consensus on anygiven issue. How to secure Russian coopera-tion with Western initiatives without givingRussia a share of the decisionmaking authori-ty was the dilemma the United States faced inconsidering Russian integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.22

So the compromise position was to giveRussia a “voice but no veto” in the deliberations

6

The next administration

will have no better luck in

crafting andmaintaining an effective,

coherent, andcredible approach

toward Russiaunless it is willing

to dispense withany remaining

illusions.

of the West. This was reflected in the negotia-tions that led to the Founding Act on MutualRelations, Cooperation and Security betweenthe North Atlantic Treaty Organization and theRussian Federation, signed on May 27, 1997.Washington hoped that, by giving Russia a for-mal association with NATO, the path could becleared for enlarging the alliance by includingformer Soviet bloc states.23

That compromise didn’t work. If Russiawas not going to join the alliance, Moscow’snext preference was for an arrangement thatwould essentially create a system of joint deci-sion making between Russia and NATO onmajor issues of European and Eurasian securi-ty. Moscow was especially insistent that anymilitary operations outside the territory of themember-states of NATO would require eitherUN or OSCE sanction. The United States, incontrast, wanted to keep a good deal ofEuropean security matters designated as mat-ters “internal” to NATO and not subject to thepurview of the NATO-Russia Council.

In analyzing the effectiveness of the Perm-anent Joint Council, which was supposed to bethe principal organ of the NATO-Russia part-nership, Peter Trenin-Straussov, in an assess-ment prepared for the Berlin InformationCenter for Transatlantic Security, concluded:

The [two] sides . . . failed to agree onwhat the PJC would do and—as a result—they got a ‘disabled child.’ The councillacked a ‘home’ and a permanent secre-tariat. It was also hugely asymmetrical inoperation—Russia was presented with ajoint position of the NATO members,and could deal with NATO only en bloc.If the Russians made a bid, its NATOpartners needed to go in retreat to dis-cuss it and then present Russia withtheir joint reply. This was cumbersome,but ‘safe’, from the NATO point of view.The Russians, for their part, soon dis-covered that dealing with individualNATO member states outside the PJCwas more effective and satisfying. ThePJC quickly turned itself into a talkingshop for rather stale dialogue.24

The creation of the NATO-Russia Councilin 2002 to replace the PJC created a systemwhere Russia could sit at the table with all oth-er NATO members for discussion, but neverresolved the fundamental dilemma of whatweight Russia’s “voice” should have in alliancedeliberations. This has meant that Moscow isnot really a stakeholder in the alliance, whilemaking the partnership more effective has notbeen a major priority for NATO members.Major General Peter Williams, who headed thefirst NATO Military Liaison Mission inMoscow, made this assessment of the first 10years of Russia’s partnership with NATO:“Political will, structures and projects meanlittle without resources. . . . The resources com-mitted for the execution of NATO-RussiaCouncil policies and plans have been far belowthose suggested by the political rhetoric.”25

Meanwhile, the question of Russian mem-bership in the European Union is also off thetable as Russia and the Union attempt to devel-op their set of “common spaces.” That hasproved difficult. For example, at an EU-Russiasummit meeting in Samara in May 2007, thepresident of the European Commission JoseManuel Barroso explained that “Russia is aEuropean country that is close to us [theEuropean Union],” while Putin characterizedthe Russia-EU summit as a forum for “coordi-nating our cooperation.”26 Russia may be asso-ciated with Europe, but both sides have clearlycome to the conclusion that Russia, for theforeseeable future, will remain outside theUnion.

All of this should lead U.S. policymakersto the conclusion reached by Cliff Kupchanof the Eurasia Group: “The reality of today’sinternational system is that Russia is rapidlybecoming a major non-aligned power morealong the lines of China or India than ajunior partner or disciple of the West.”27

Illusion No. 2: A Democratic Russia is aPro-American Russia

The second illusion casts the Russian mass-es as anxious to support a U.S. global agenda,but for the authoritarian tyrants who suppressthe will of the people. Those who embrace the

7

The question of Russianmembership in

the EuropeanUnion is off thetable as Russiaand the Unionattempt to develop their setof “commonspaces.”

“democratic peace” theory maintained that asRussia moved further away from its authori-tarian Soviet past, its interests would necessar-ily converge with those of the United States.Congressman Robert Wexler (D-FL) declaredat a 2003 hearing on the U.S.-Russia relation-ship that “the success of Russia’s democratictransformation will largely determine andshape the present and future possibilities ofcooperation and engagement” with theUnited States.28

It is a common assertion now in Washing-ton that how Russia governs itself shapes itsforeign policy and that continued disagree-ments between the United States and theRussian Federation over foreign policy issuescan be attributed to a growing authoritariantrend in Russia.29 The implication is that amore democratic Russian government wouldmake fundamentally different choices. It mightdecide not to object to its neighbors joining theNATO alliance or drop its efforts to export itsenergy resources directly to Germany and otherWestern European markets, bypassing the tran-sit countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Although such views are commonly held,they are badly mistaken. First, it is importantto stress the wide support Putin receivesamong Russians for his policies—somethingthe results of the December 2007 Duma elec-tions confirm.30 In recent polls, 72 percent ofRussians agree with the assessment thatPutin has moved Russia “in the right direc-tion” and identify with his call for a resurgentRussia capable of playing a major role inworld affairs. While some might dismissPutin’s strong ratings as the product of a slickpropaganda campaign, his popularity isbased rather in the public’s assessment thathis government has improved the quality oflife for most ordinary Russians. Some 66 per-cent believe that Russians in 2007 live betterthan in the Soviet Union of 1991 (immediate-ly before the economic collapses of the1990s).31 And among 18- to 24-year-olds—thedemographic that supplied the foot soldiersfor the democratic “color revolutions” inGeorgia and Ukraine—the Putin administra-tion has a 57 percent approval rating.32

Second, one cannot find a strong reservoirof support for U.S. foreign policy amongRussians. Some 73 percent of Russians agreewith the statement that “the United Statescannot be trusted,” and 66 percent believe that“U.S. foreign policy does not take Russianinterests into account.” More than 60 percentof Russians see the United States as having anegative influence in the world; more thanhalf believe that the United States is unfriend-ly to Russia.33 Those sentiments are especiallytrue among young Russians aged 16 to 29—the post-Soviet generation. In a 2007 survey,almost 70 percent disagreed with the notionthat the United States “does more good thanharm”; 64 percent saw the United States eitheras an “enemy” or at least a “rival” to Russia.(China, in contrast, was viewed by only 27 per-cent of respondents in the same way.)34

Even if President Putin had been inclinedin the early years of his relationship withPresident Bush to join the “coalition of thewilling,” he would have had to defy the over-whelming majority of Russians to do so,since 89 percent opposed any participationof Russian forces in an American-led coali-tion in Iraq. With regard to Iran, a 2007 pollindicates that 45 percent of Russians consid-er Iran a friendly country; only 20 percentagreed that a military strike would be justi-fied if sanctions failed to stop Iran’s uraniumenrichment.35 A 2006 poll conducted by thePew Research Center showed that by a two-to-one margin Russians were more likely toview the U.S. presence in Iraq as a greaterthreat to global peace than Iran’s uraniumenrichment program.36

Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of anyPutin foreign policy decision of the last sev-eral years that would have been reversed by amore democratically accountable Russiangovernment.

So, would a more democratic Russia bemore inclined to accommodate U.S. prefer-ences? Would it agree to implement punitivesanctions against Iran? Or to restructure itsenergy industry to meet our needs?

In a word, no. A more democratic Russiawould still not see eye to eye with the United

8

It is difficult toconceive of any

Putin foreign policy decision of

the last severalyears that would

have beenreversed by

a more democrati-cally accountable

Russian government.

States on a number of pressing issues—for thesame reasons that the United States and France,despite both being democracies, have funda-mental disagreements over foreign policy.

None of this is to deny that a more democ-ratic Russia would benefit the United States insome ways. Governments that are open andtransparent, and subject to scrutiny and criti-cism, are generally more constrained thanauthoritarian regimes and, in some ways,more predictable. But we should not fall intothe trap of believing that if Russia were tobecome more liberal, have genuinely free andcompetitive elections and strengthened rule oflaw, that would automatically translate into aforeign policy more aligned with U.S. priori-ties. The two countries have different objec-tives.

Illusion No. 3: Russia Is about toCollapse

The third illusion that must be dispensedwith is the assertion that Russia is near collapseand that its recovery is but a house of cards—andthat, therefore, there is no need for the UnitedStates to take Russia’s interests or preferencesinto account when shaping policy. While suchsentiments have receded in the last several years,they were quite pronounced when the Bushadministration first took office. Perhaps themost famous example of this thinking was aMay 2001 essay in the Atlantic Monthly provoca-tively entitled “Russia is Finished.” Written byJeffrey Tayler, an American journalist who hadlived and worked in Russia during the 1990s, thearticle chronicled the “unstoppable descent of aonce great power into social catastrophe andstrategic irrelevance.” Tayler described post-Soviet Russia as “Zaire with permafrost.”37

Conservative analyst General William Odom,who headed the National Security Agency dur-ing the Reagan administration, picked up thisassessment when he characterized Russia as“weak, poor and ambling along [its] own pathsheaded nowhere in particular” and a “marginalpower.”38

Russia continues to face massive prob-lems—notably in its health care system and incoping with an aging infrastructure. Its great-

est challenge is a very low life expectancy for itsmale population that portends a labor short-age and deprives the economy of decades ofpotential productivity from the prematuredemise of its citizens. But the Russia of 2007 isfar more capable than the Russia of 1997 incoping with these challenges.

Russia has experienced robust economicgrowth for the past several years, an averageof 6.8 percent per year. Russia is displayingmany signs of economic health. The govern-ment no longer runs a budget deficit (and forthe last two years the federal budget surplushas exceeded 7 percent of GDP), while thestate’s foreign debt has shrunk dramatically;it was 100 percent of Russia’s GDP in 1999,today it stands around 8 percent. By July2007, Russia had accumulated gold and for-eign exchange reserves of $413.1 billion—thelargest in its history. On August 1, 2007, theFinance Ministry announced that there was$127 billion in its Stabilization Fund—and itset up that same month a reserve fund that,over time, would be expected to total 10 per-cent of Russia’s GDP and would exist solelyfor the purpose of cushioning the federalbudget in the event of an oil price plunge.39

One cannot rule out the possibility of somemajor disaster that could reverse Russia’srecovery—but American policy seems based onthe belief that Russia will forever remain in thedebilitating condition of the 1990s and willhave no choice but to accept Washington’sdiktat. Any policy that assumes that Russiawill accept a status quo in Eurasia and theworld, or that is predicated on an assumptionof perpetual Russian weakness, is foolhardyand dangerous.

Russia will never return as a superpower torival the United States. And Lehigh Univer-sity’s professor Rajan Menon, a leading experton Eurasian affairs, is absolutely correct tocounsel Americans not to overreact to Russia’srecovery.40 But Russia is resuming its positionas a major regional power with some ability toinfluence the overall global agenda—especiallyto raise costs for the United States to act. Thatis multiplied if Russia can act in concert withother major powers, especially China.

9

Any policy that is predicated onan assumption of perpetualRussian weaknessis foolhardy anddangerous.

Illusion No. 4: The U.S. (and Europe)Can Fundamentally Transform Eurasiaat Little Cost

The fourth illusion is that the UnitedStates, in partnership with the EuropeanUnion, is capable of fundamentally trans-forming the geopolitical and geoeconomicrealities of Eurasia. A related conceit is ofbuilding a network of stable, prosperous,pro-Western states all along Russia’s periph-ery that will give Moscow no choice but toaccept these new realities.41

For starters, the pace of European Unionand NATO expansion has slowed consider-ably. Absorbing Central and Eastern Europeplaced great strains on both the Atlanticalliance and the EU; continuing with furtherexpansion is highly unlikely, especially in thenear term. Romano Prodi, when he was pres-ident of the European Commission, madethis perfectly clear at the close of 2002, whenhe declared, “The integration of the Balkansinto the European Union will complete theunification of the continent.” While Prodiconceded that the process of EU enlargement“has worked very well,” he went on: “We can-not go on enlarging forever. We cannot waterdown the European political project andturn the European Union into just a freetrade area on a continental scale.”42

Expansion fatigue contributed to the rejec-tion of the European constitution in Franceand the Netherlands and led then-GermanChancellor Gerhard Schroeder to vehementlyoppose any increases in the EU budget (and inGermany’s contributions) for 2007–2013. Andthere is no sign that new leadership in Europeis prepared to resume eastward expansion ofthe European Union.43

But even if full membership in Euro-Atlantic organizations is not forthcoming,what about extending a number of the privi-leges of membership, including free-tradeagreements, visa-free travel, and rights to liveand work in Western countries? The EuropeanUnion has been willing to consider the exten-sion of free-trade agreements, but with excep-tions in place for agricultural products andsome industrial goods (such as steel), which

would nullify the benefits of access to Euro-pean markets for countries such as Ukraine.The U.S. government, meanwhile, has beenreluctant to take any such steps, other thansupport for Ukraine’s inclusion into the WorldTrade Organization.

The bottom line is that neither the UnitedStates nor Europe is prepared to undertakethe massive effort that would be required todisplace Russia as Eurasia’s economic andpolitical center of gravity. Fifteen years afterthe collapse of the Soviet Union, more than75 percent of the GDP of the states of the for-mer Soviet Union is generated by Russia.Russia remains Ukraine’s and Kazakhstan’slargest trading partner. The InternationalMonetary Fund estimated that guest workersfrom post-Soviet states living in Russia sendhome $12 billion annually. Official remit-tances from workers in Russia, as recorded bythe IMF, make up approximately 16 percentof Moldova’s GDP.44 Grandiose schemes fora new Black Sea Commonwealth that bypass-es Russia look wonderful on paper but don’tcorrespond to realities on the ground.

Illusion No. 5: The U.S. Version of“Selective Partnership” Is a Viable PolicyOption

In theory, selective partnership is not a badconcept. It was the basis of the “GrandAlliance” in World War II, as well as the anti-Taliban coalition that emerged in the weeksafter 9/11 between a disparate group ofnations. Indeed, most relationships betweenstates—even those who consider themselvesclose allies—are often in reality “selective part-nerships”; it is extremely rare that interestsand priorities between two different countriesare aligned 100 percent of the time.

Given the disillusionment of many in bothRussia and the United States over the failureto build an effective working relationship asallies or close strategic partners, selective part-nership, on paper, seems to be the most feasi-ble alternative. In this vein, the 2006 Councilon Foreign Relations task force report onRussia tries to lay out a strategy for “how tomake selective cooperation—and in some cas-

10

Neither theUnited States nor Europe is

prepared toundertake themassive effortthat would be

required to displace Russia

as Eurasia’s economic and

political center ofgravity.

es selective opposition—serve important inter-national goals.”45

Unfortunately, “selective partnership” hasbeen interpreted—both by some in theCongress as well as in the current adminis-tration—as meaning that Washington canexpect and will receive full Russian coopera-tion on a whole host of important matters toU.S. national security while being free toignore Russian concerns that conflict withAmerican preferences.46

For selective partnership to work, both sidesmust have similar perceptions of threats, andof the benefits of cooperation. As we are seeingwith Iran, however, this is not the case. U.S. sec-retary of state Condoleezza Rice staked out theU.S. position, “that Iran constitutes the singlemost important single-country strategic chal-lenge to the United States and to the kind ofMiddle East that we want to see.”47 That is cer-tainly not Moscow’s perspective. Russia is notin favor of additional countries gaining nuclearweapons, but those in the United States whorepeat the mantra that an “Islamist” Iran withnuclear weapons would fundamentally jeopar-dize Russian security are seemingly unawarethat, from Moscow’s perspective, Iran has, onthe whole, behaved as a “responsible citizen” inRussia’s neighborhood—not extending sup-port to Islamist rebels in the North Caucasus,working to achieve a peace settlement inTajikistan, and cooperating with Russia in aid-ing the Northern Alliance against the Taliban.Indeed, Russia’s attitude toward Iran is notunlike that of India toward Iran—this despitethe fact that India is the world’s largest democ-racy and an emerging strategic partner of theUnited States.

Like India, Russia may be prepared to paya price to accommodate U.S. concerns, evenat the expense of valuable economic ties withTehran—but achieving a non-nuclear Iran ona U.S. timetable and leaving Washington freeto frustrate Russian interests elsewhere in theworld is an insufficient reward. This reticenceto cooperate grows stronger when, as someU.S. foreign policy commentators haveadvised, ending the nuclear stand-off withIran would open up its vast energy reserves to

U.S. investment, allow for new energy trans-port routes to bypass Russia, and enableAmerica to further counter Russia’s overallenergy ambitions.48

Yet many in Washington continue to usethe rubric of “selective partnership” to arguethat Russian concerns about the expansion ofNATO or the increased American presence inCentral Asia are unjustified or at leastoverblown. They further maintain that thesecurity challenges that threaten the UnitedStates, including nuclear proliferation andviolent Islamic extremism, are also such athreat to Russia that Moscow will have nochoice but to cooperate with Washington, andtherefore there is no need to accommodate theKremlin’s preferences.49 But there is a big dif-ference between token cooperation and thesort of active, engaged effort (including moreeffective intelligence sharing or closer workingrelationships between armed forces) thatcould lead to major breakthroughs. GeneralPeter Williams points out, “It will take courageto change this political and military culture ofnoncooperation,” between Russia and theWest, but this cannot occur if neither side feelsthat partnership serves their interests.50 At pre-sent, breaking the diplomatic logjam requiresthe United States to offer much more if itwants Russian help. In discussing Russianreluctance to embrace the U.S. position onIran, Graham Allison and Dimitri Simes madethis point clear: “Getting what the UnitedStates needs . . . will require not only penaltiesbut incentives.”51

There is still hope for a partnership withoutillusions in some key areas where both sideshave common interests, such as nonprolifera-tion or combating nuclear terrorism. Neitherthe United States nor Russia, for example, isinterested in a nuclear-armed Iran or witness-ing a nuclear exchange between India andPakistan. Russian analyst Alexey Pushkov con-tends that “Putin has not dropped the idea ofpartnership with the United States altogether,but he has definitely moved away from some ofthe more grandiose proposals in favor of amuch more limited arrangement.”52 But forRussia this means obtaining clear and tangible

11

There is still hopefor a partnershipwithout illusionsin some key areaswhere both sideshave commoninterests, such asnonproliferationor combatingnuclear terrorism.

benefits, not vague assurances of future good-will.

Making Choices

When we strip away these five illusions, wediscover a series of “inconvenient truths”—the “democracy paradox” of Putin’s regimeenjoys broad-based public support; Russia,especially now that it is in the midst of amajor recovery, remains the dominant Eur-asian power; and the United States is nolonger in a position to assume or compelRussian acquiescence to its policy prefer-ences. Recognizing these facts forces us into along-overdue discussion about U.S. foreign-policy priorities and where Russia fits in, tak-ing us away from “having our cake and eatingit too” scenarios in favor of assessing whetherthe costs of partnership with Moscow areworth the benefits.

Reasonable people can disagree in terms oftheir assessments of Russia and how to bestachieve U.S. interests. For example, manyAmericans are displeased that Russia underVladimir Putin has moved in an authoritariandirection and is in no way a “reliable” partnerfor Washington on a variety of issues. ManyU.S. interest groups are not happy with therestricted zone of civil and political liberties inPutin’s Russia. In the end, the question weneed to ask is not whether the Russia that hasemerged is a Russia we like—it isn’t. The moreimportant question is whether it is a Russia wecan do business with, and more importantly,whether or not the United States can achievesome of its most pressing objectives withoutRussian help.

For the last several years, the Bush admin-istration has tried to compartmentalize therelationship, hoping to preserve cooperationon issues that are central to the United States(such as counterterrorism and nonprolifera-tion) while maintaining that acrimoniousexchanges on other matters (such as questionsof democracy promotion or Russia’s relationswith its Eurasian neighbors) need not damageU.S.-Russian relations. But at some point the

two countries have to move beyond symbolicdeclarations and “agreements in principle” ifthere is to be real progress on any shared U.S.-Russia agenda. President Bush, as well as allthe leading candidates who would succeedhim in January 2009, have identified the samethree foreign policy priorities: protecting theUnited States from further mass-casualty ter-rorist attacks; preventing “rogue” states fromacquiring nuclear weapons; and stopping thespiraling costs of energy from destabilizingnot only the United States but the entire glob-al economy. The record as of February 2008shows that much work remains to be done:Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiriremain at large; Afghanistan and Iraq are inserious trouble; Iran is on the path to becom-ing a nuclear power; and energy prices are atrecord levels.

U.S. policymakers have to decide whethera resurgent Russia, the growing authoritari-an trend of the Putin administration, andRussia’s expanding leverage over energy mar-kets—namely its ability to restrict flows ofnatural gas to other former Soviet states andto EU members—prevents the United Statesfrom achieving its principal foreign policypriorities or otherwise directly threatens coreU.S. interests. We may already have one clearanswer: Vice President Cheney’s Vilniusspeech in 2006 implied that he believed, asRussian political analyst and Putin adviserGleb Pavlovsky concluded, that it was time toeliminate “the vestiges of strategic partner-ship between Russia and the United States”and that as long as Russia remained under itspresent government it would be nearlyimpossible for the two countries to find com-mon ground on key international issues.53

If the Bush administration has been com-mitted to a policy of confrontation withRussia, however, then U.S. policy has beenextremely deficient in making the arrange-ments that would be needed for the U.S tomove ahead with its international agendaagainst more active Russian opposition. Onewould expect, for instance, a much greatereffort to expand NATO eastward coupled withmuch more generous amounts of aid to con-

12

The question weneed to ask is not

whether theRussia that has

emerged is aRussia we like—

it isn’t. The moreimportant

question iswhether it is a

Russia we can dobusiness with.

struct a true cordon sanitaire against a revivingRussia, certainly much more than the paltrysteps undertaken so far to encourage the emer-gence of an alternative to a Russian-led Eurasiavia the creation of the GUAM Organization forDemocracy and Economic Development.54

On the foreign policy issue of greatest con-cern to Washington—Iran—moving into a posi-tion of greater hostility to Russia would alsoseverely complicate matters. Not only would iteffectively torpedo any remaining diplomaticefforts to resolve the problem (including beingable to threaten genuinely effective sanctions),it would mean American policymakers will beleft with only one real option: a massive mili-tary strike. Such an attack would be likely toprecipitate a wider war that would requiremajor spending to overhaul and expand thearmed forces already severely weakened by theIraq war.55

Finally, a more aggressive posture towardRussia would require the United States toreassess its relationship with China—not onlyfor the financial support Washington wouldneed to gear up for these new challenges butalso to impede the development of any sortof Sino-Russian axis designed to counter theU.S. position in the world.56

Those who argue that Russia has little ofvalue to offer the United States in copingwith its most serious challenges might reachsimilar conclusions. If the United States wereto assume the burden of stabilizing whatBrzezinski has called the “Global Balkans”—a geographical “swathe of Eurasia betweenEurope and the Far East,” encompassing pri-marily the Middle East and Central Asia57—and if it were to attempt to do so withoutRussian support, then Washington has beenremiss in taking the necessary steps to ensureit has the necessary resources and capabilitiesat its disposal.

The reality is that, simply put, Americansare understandably unprepared and unwillingto shoulder the costs that moving to a moreconfrontational stance with Russia wouldentail. Meanwhile, many policymakers wouldagree with the proposition that the UnitedStates has bigger problems in the world than

focusing on Russia’s faults—notably protect-ing itself against a major mass-casualty attackand safeguarding the economic health of thecountry. And finally, Russia is indeed in a posi-tion to assist the United States in achieving itsprincipal foreign policy objectives. For all ofthese reasons, a confrontational policy shouldbe rejected.

The problem, however, is that meaningfulcooperation is not possible if Russia is seenprimarily as an enemy who just happens to be,at this particular time, a less immediate threat.If Senator Biden was sincere in his assessmentsof threats to the United States, it is difficult tounderstand why Russia would cooperateclosely with Washington in dealing with Iraq,Iran, and North Korea—in essence to removethem as challenges to the United States—sothat Russia itself could then become the pri-mary focus of U.S. attention.

The outward show of good personal chem-istry between presidents Bush and Putin andtheir willingness to let this camaraderie definetheir joint public appearances has counteract-ed some of the voices in both countries that arearguing against closer relations. An assistantsecretary of state or deputy foreign ministerwho might be inclined toward confrontationdoes not want to publicly contradict his or herrespective chief executives. But there is no guar-antee that Bush and Putin’s successors willhave a similarly cordial relationship. Moreover,forging a climate of mutual comfort—if notreal trust—that will allow for greater U.S. accessto Russia’s sensitive intelligence informationand its military and nuclear sites (not to men-tion closer working relations with Russia’sdiplomatic and business establishments) can-not be accomplished overnight. Moreover, it isnot something Russia can be bullied into forthe long haul. So any sort of grandstandingthat blocks real cooperation without measur-ably improving U.S. security could be very cost-ly—and that is not a price worth paying.

But what price is worth paying in exchangefor better relations with Russia? Is it worth giv-ing Moscow something beyond vague assur-ances of goodwill? In particular, what aboutRussia’s demands that its paramount position

13

Americans areunderstandablyunprepared andunwilling toshoulder thecosts that movingto a more confrontationalstance withRussia wouldentail.

in the lands of the former Soviet Union be rec-ognized by the United States and that Washing-ton cease what Moscow perceives as attempts tointerfere in Russia’s domestic affairs?

Russia has consistently maintained thatits primary interest is to ensure that no otherEurasian state can obstruct Russian engage-ment with the outside world and that no for-eign troops are based anywhere in Eurasiawithout Russia’s blessing (for example, tocombat international terrorism). As a result,Moscow maintains that no Eurasian stateshould belong to a military bloc or alliance ofwhich Russia is not also a member. Russiahas also expressed continued interest in cre-ating a single economic zone so that Russiancapital and goods can move more efficientlyacross borders. Within limits, Russia has noobjection to other Eurasian states developingsupplemental political and economic ties toother states, as long as Russian vital interestsare respected. But Russia wants to create aEurasian economic and political zone whereMoscow sets the overall agenda.

Is acceding to such a vision somethingWashington should consider? There is broadagreement about what the United States is notprepared to concede. No one argues thatRussia should have a blank check to use forceagainst its neighbors or to forcibly incorporatethem into a new version of the Soviet Unionand still have a “business as usual” relation-ship with Washington. Russia should be heldaccountable for all obligations (whether intreaties, conventions or contracts) it has vol-untarily assumed—especially when Russianinterests are being safeguarded by reciprocalarrangements. Nor is the United Statesinclined to give Moscow a veto if a core U.S.interest is at stake—such as maintaining mili-tary bases in Central Asia to sustain the ongo-ing efforts in Afghanistan. Finally, Washing-ton is under no obligation to pretend thatRussia is a democracy (in the Western under-standing of the term) or to refrain from criti-cism of the Russian government’s slide towardauthoritarianism.58

Between Russia’s stated preferences andthese bedrock American priorities remains a

great deal of room for finding consensus posi-tions. Unfortunately, however, such a discus-sion is not taking place. Consider this: InMarch 2007, the U.S. Congress decided, bylarge margins in both houses, that NATOmembership was the way for the post-Sovietstates to safeguard their independence, whenit approved legislation providing support forUkraine and Georgia’s bid to join the Westernalliance.

What was amazing was the near-total lackof debate in the United States over what wasto be gained by including Ukraine or Georgiain NATO. Few dared to ask whether the con-tinual expansions of the alliance have weak-ened its ability to function as a collectivesecurity organ. Likewise, what the inclusionof those states would contribute to solvingthe major challenges to U.S. and Westernsecurity posed by Iran, Afghanistan, NorthKorea, and international terrorism was neveraddressed, nor was the likely impact on U.S.-Russia relations.

A zero-sum mentality for Eurasia—wherethe United States is confronted by a binarychoice that only permits one of two out-comes (Ukraine in NATO or Ukraine “lost”to the West altogether)—flies in the face ofAmerica’s ability to successfully balance mul-tiple and sometimes conflicting priorities inother parts of the world. In a number of com-plicated bilateral relationships, Washingtonhas been able to avoid embracing the maxi-malist positions of either side in order to findacceptable, if imperfect, compromises.

Early last year, Anatol Lieven, a long-stand-ing critic of U.S. policy toward Russia, proposedan arrangement whereby the United Stateswould agree to “abandoning NATO enlarge-ment to [include] Ukraine and Georgia infavour of mutually agreed restraints on westernand Russian behaviour on the territory of theformer Soviet Union.”59 In practical terms, thismight lead to a situation where the UnitedStates would drop its opposition to Russian-ledmultilateral institutions in which otherEurasian countries participate on a voluntarybasis (such as the Common Economic Space orthe Collective Security Treaty Organization)—

14

Washington is under no

obligation to pre-tend that Russia

is a democracy (inthe Western

understanding ofthe term) or to

refrain from criticism of the Russian

government’sslide toward

authoritarianism.

in return for Russian guarantees that anyEurasian state is free to seek membership in theEuropean Union. (This would also then put theonus on Brussels to decide when and where tohalt EU expansion.)

These sorts of compromises do not satisfypoliticians in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova,who would like nothing better than for theUnited States to put its full political, military,and economic might into changing theirgeopolitical position. It is equally unsettlingfor a number of American politicians who areunprepared to recognize that the unipolarmoment has passed. But such an approachseems to have the greatest chance of satisfyingthe greatest number of U.S. objectives—acquir-ing some security guarantees for Russia’sneighbors, keeping the door in Eurasia at leastpartly open, and paving the way for closercooperation with Russia on other issues.

Is There a Way Forward?

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice hasoften stressed the “excellent relationship”between Presidents Bush and Putin, notingthat the two leaders “feel that they can dis-cuss anything.”60 However, this personal rela-tionship has not been translated into effec-tive cooperation between the bureaucraciesof the two countries. It is unlikely that presi-dents Bush and Putin will bequeath a lastinglegacy of cooperation to their successors.

On the Russian side, in fact, officials justone level below Putin have shown little enthu-siasm for making the case for renewed cooper-ation with the United States. The July 2007 res-ignation of Igor Ivanov, the former foreignminister who then became the secretary of theSecurity Council, marked the departure of thelast high-level Yeltsin-era foreign policymakeras well as someone who was still an advocatefor closer ties with the United States.61

Skepticism toward U.S. intentions is now thenorm in the Russian foreign policy establish-ment. While this view may not be accurate orfair, it nonetheless exists, and it hampers fur-ther cooperation. It also suggests that the alter-

native to a difficult partnership with Putin isnot a better relationship with someone else.

On the U.S. side, the Bush administration,from the beginning, found little support forits efforts to engage Russia either in Congressor within the U.S. foreign policy community.There were constant irritants—some of whichwere caused by the Kremlin’s own actions, tobe sure—which made it difficult to argue thecase that a closer and more cooperative rela-tionship with Russia outweighed the con-cerns.

By contrast, the United States has managedto design a sound policy toward China, a coun-try which is much less free and could pose amuch greater challenge than Putin’s Russia toU.S. interests not only in East Asia but aroundthe globe. Serious concerns—about humanrights, the environment, Taiwan, and so on—arenonetheless balanced within a cohesive, andwhat we hope will remain a durable bi-partisan,framework of engagement. The same could besaid of U.S. policies toward other undemocrat-ic, yet strategically important, states such asSaudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan.

Moscow isn’t waiting for Washington to rec-oncile these inconsistencies. As the U.S.–Russiarelationship has stumbled along, Russia, espe-cially in the last five years, has begun to evolveinto a “post-American” country. There are stillseveral critical issues where Moscow and Wash-ington continue to interact—control of nucleararms, negotiations in the Security Council, andso on—but in terms of many of the day-to-daymatters that underwrite any bilateral relation-ship, including trade, tourism, and other peo-ple-to-people exchanges, the Russia-Europeand specifically the Russia-Germany relation-ships are much more important. Moreover, anincreasing percentage of Russia’s trade—andnot only in weapons systems—is with the largestand richest countries of the developing world,especially China and India. Moscow has alsobegun to accelerate the development of newinternational institutions that bypass theUnited States, such as the Shanghai Cooper-ation Organization.62

The sense that Russia is increasingly mov-ing outside of an American-led system has

15

It is unlikely thatpresidents Bushand Putin willbequeath a last-ing legacy ofcooperation totheir successors.

contributed to a new feeling of self-sufficien-cy in Moscow. In fact, Russia is now muchmore likely to see itself evolving into an inde-pendent center of global power.

What that means, therefore, is that, at pre-sent, there is simply no basis for an alliance ormajor partnership between Russia and theUnited States, no matter how many reportsstress common interests. In the absence ofmajor linkages—particularly in terms of con-necting the two countries’ business, military,and intelligence establishments—the U.S.-Russia relationship lacks the ballast to navi-gate through the tempests that arise overtheir differences.

What is far more feasible, given the cli-mate in both capitals, is to have a relation-ship characterized by a pragmatic approachto resolving issues and preventing disagree-ments from flaring up into full-scale crises.

That might not seem like much, especiallyin the aftermath of grandiose rhetoric aboutalliances, a world with no blocs, or the promiseof a new global order. And as memories of theCold War fade, it may not be apparent that thestate of affairs today is far preferable to whatpreceded it—when U.S. policy was focused ondealing with a Soviet state attempting to dom-inate both Western Europe and East Asia andtrying to make inroads in Africa and LatinAmerica with an eye not only to an encir-clement of the United States but the very de-struction of our way of life.

For the time being, the U.S. government,barring a profound transformation of theRussian state, should be concerned largelywith Russia’s behavior beyond its borders andbe prepared to deal with Moscow on a quidpro quo basis. That will require a change inattitude, away from a post-Cold War Ameri-can triumphalism back to a more realisticapproach. As former senator Gary Hart noted,“Until recent years, when U.S. foreign policyassumed a theological aura, we consistentlysought self-interested relations with disagree-able nations.” The same holds true today andinto the future. “A working relationship is nota favor to the Russians but an advantage tous.”63

It is difficult to conceive of a solution toany of the most pressing challenges facingthe United States where Russia does not havesome part to play. That may be galling tothose who reveled in the period of the imme-diate post-Soviet collapse when Russia was asupplicant nation and where the U.S. couldmove ahead with its own vision for how tostructure global affairs without much con-sideration for Moscow’s perspective. But thesituation has changed—and nothing makesthat clearer than Russia’s newfound positionas the third-largest holder of dollars in theworld (after Japan and China).

The United States has two options. It canforgo the possibility of Russian assistance inachieving its key foreign policy priorities inorder to retain complete freedom of action vis-à-vis Moscow. Or it can prioritize its objectivesand negotiate a series of quid pro quos withRussia. This choice, however, cannot be indef-initely postponed.

The latter is the better course. Seekingbroad accommodation with Russia is morelikely to guarantee American success in pro-moting its core national interests—especially ina changing international environment wherethe sources of power that sustain Americanglobal leadership are weakening—but it willrequire U.S. policymakers to accept limits notonly on what can be demanded of Russia butalso on the satisfaction of American prefer-ences. If we are willing to accept this compro-mise and part with our illusions, we can moveforward. If not, then U.S.-Russia relations willcontinue to deteriorate, and proposals forcooperation will languish.

Notes1. Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner, and Steven Weber,“A World without the West?” The National Interest,no. 90 (July/August 2007): 29.

2. Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand (New York:Random House, 2002), pp. 91, 397.

3. For example, Vice President Dick Cheney’s re-marks in Vilnius in 2006 called for a “return todemocratic reform” as the precondition for im-proved relations between Russia and the West.

16

It is difficult to conceive of a

solution to any ofthe most pressingchallenges facingthe United States

where Russia doesnot have some

part to play.

Dick Cheney, “Vice President’s Remarks at the2006 Vilnius Conference,” Vilnius, Lithuania, May4, 2006, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060504-1.html.

4. Robert Legvold, “All the Way: Crafting a U.S.-Russian Alliance,” The National Interest, no. 70(Winter 2002/03): 21.

5. Robert Legvold, “US-Russian Relations: AnAmerican Perspective,” Russia in Global Affairs, vol.4,no. 4 (October-December 2006), http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/docs/2006_english4.pdf.

6. Dimitri Simes described the Kremlin stance as“petro-arrogance.” Quoted in “Not a Cold War,but a Cold Tiff,” The Economist, February 17, 2007.

7. George W. Bush, Joint Press Conference, Kenne-bunkport, Maine, July 2, 2007, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070702-2.html.

8. Barack Obama, Speech delivered to the ChicagoCouncil on Global Affairs, April 23, 2007, http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/fpccga.

9. Joseph Biden, Comments made at the Demo-cratic primary debate in Orangeburg, South Caro-lina, April 26, 2007, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18351722/. North Korea and Iran were the other twothreats mentioned.

10. This proposal was put forward by GeoffreyForden, a senior research associate in the SecurityStudies Program at the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology, in the early days of the Bush adminis-tration. See Geoffrey Forden, “Reducing a CommonDanger: Improving Russia’s Early-Warning System,”Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 399, May 3, 2001.

11. Richard Pipes, “Is Russia Still an Enemy?”Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (September/October 1997):66–67.

12. See, for example, Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace and the (Russian) Council onForeign and Defense Policy, “U.S.-Russia Relationsat the Turn of the Century,” November 2000; NixonCenter, “U.S.-Russia Relations: A New StrategicPartnership,” The Nixon Center, January 2002; and“An Agenda for Renewal: U.S.-Russia Relations,”Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,December 2000. Even more recent and critical re-ports return to the same overall agenda. For exam-ple, Council on Foreign Relations, “Russia’s WrongDirection: What the United States Can and ShouldDo,” March 2006; and Hudson Institute “U.S.-Russia Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” June 2007.

13. Kissinger’s remarks constitute the foreword toa report released by a panel of the Nixon Center’s

board members and senior staff led by the cen-ter’s advisory council chairman James Schlesingerand offered as a guide for the then-incomingBush administration. Nixon Center, “What Is toBe Undone? A Russia Policy for the New Admin-istration,” February 2001, p. iii.

14. “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Pro-grams for National Security (April 14, 1950),” www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68-6.htm.

15. Victor S. Mamatey, Soviet Russian Imperialism(Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1964), p. 24.

16. “The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) tothe Secretary of State,” Telegram, February 22,1946, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm.

17. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Rebuilding Russia, trans.Alexis Klimoff (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,1991), p. 7. In terms of U.S. government policy at thetime, see, for example, General William Odom’sassessment that the United States did not seek thebreakup of the Soviet Union. Remarks made duringhis appearance on the Newshour with Jim Lehrer,August 19, 1991, www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/russia/1991/amer_8-19.html.

18. Mikhail Gorbachev defended the idea in “AUnited Europe Needs an Integrated Russia,” TheFinancial Times, April 30, 2004. Subsequent com-ments at the time of the Ukrainian “Orange Rev-olution” by former secretary of state MadeleineAlbright and former national security advisorBrzezinski, while not specifically mentioning the“Single Economic Space” by name, nonethelessopined against anything that would bring Ukraineinto a closer relationship with Russia. Jean-MarieChauvier, “Ukraine: A New Cold War,” Le MondeDiplomatique, January 2005.

19. Cf. White House, “Jackson-Vanik and RussiaFact Sheet,” press release, November 13, 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-16.html.

20. Alexey K. Pushkov, “Missed Connections,” TheNational Interest, no. 89 (May/June 2007): 54.

21. Quoted in Nikolas Gvosdev and Ray Takeyh,“Trans-Atlantic Putin,” Moscow Times, March 3,2003, p. 12. Emphasis added.

22. See, for example, the discussion of Russia’sexpectations toward NATO expansion in StanleyKober, “Cracks in the Foundation: NATO’s NewTroubles,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 608,January 15, 2008.

23. “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Coopera-

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tion and Security between the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization and the Russian Federation,” May 27,1997, www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a. htm.

24. Peter Trenin-Straussov, “The NATO-RussiaPermanent Joint Council in 1997–1999: Anatomyof a Failure,” BITS Research Note 99.1, July 1999.

25. Peter Williams, “Partnership Has a Price,” St.Petersburg Times, January 12, 2007, www.sptimesrussia.com/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=20014.

26. “Press Statement and Answers to Questionsduring the Joint Press Conference with President ofthe European Commission Jose Manuel Barrosoand German Chancellor Angela Merkel Followingthe Russia-European Union Summit Meeting inSamara,” May 18, 2007, www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/images/pText_pict/559/Transcript.doc.

27. Quoted in Neil Buckley, “Why the Kremlin IsMaking a Stand over Missile Defence,” FinancialTimes, June 7, 2007.

28. This hearing, “Russia’s Transition to Democ-racy and U.S.-Russia Relations: Unfinished Busi-ness,” held before the Subcommittee on Europe ofthe House International Relations Committee onSeptember 30, 2003, included Stanford University’sMichael McFaul detailed presentation on the rela-tionship between Russian democracy and U.S.national security. McFaul opined that some of theclashes between Moscow and Washington wouldnot have happened had a “fully consolidateddemocracy” been in place. See http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa89668.000/hfa89668_0f.htm.

29. See, for example, James Goldgeier and MichaelMcFaul, “Russia’s Not a Democracy. So What?”Washington Post, April 9, 2006.

30. Opposition parties within Russia occasionallycomplain about the accuracy of Russian publicopinion polling, but many surveys are conductedin conjunction with reputable internationalfirms. In the absence of credible and sustainedevidence showing widespread manipulation ofthe data—as well as consistent results—we shouldassume that opinion polls reflect accurate assess-ments of what people are thinking.

31. Oleg Shchedrov, “Putin More Liberal thanMost Russians, Poll Shows,” Reuters, July 17,2007.

32. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Russian ‘Democracy’ Isn’tthe Problem,” Los Angeles Times, May 12, 2006. Seealso Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine is Not Russia: Compar-ing Youth Political Activism,” SAIS Review 26:2

(Summer-Fall 2006), pp. 67-83.

33. “World Publics Think China Will Catch Up withthe US—and That’s Okay,” World Public Opinion.org, www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/home_page/366.php?nid=&id=&pnt=366&lb=hmpg1. A 2003 poll, at the beginning of the Iraq war,had 71 percent of Russians saying America’s role inthe world was “mostly negative.” A. Petrova, “Ameri-ca’s Role in the Contemporary World,” PublicOpinion Foundation Poll, April 1, 2003, http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/international_relations/eof041208.

34. Sarah E. Mendelson and Theodore P. Gerber,“Young Russia’s Enemy No. 1,” Washington Post,August 3, 2007.

35. Public Opinion Foundation, “UN SecurityCouncil’s Resolution on Iran’s Nuclear Program,”April 5, 2007, http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/frontier/countries/Iran2/ed071420.

36. Brian Knowlton, “Image of U.S. Falls Again,”International Herald Tribune, June 14, 2006, www.iht.com/articles/2006/06/13/news/pew1.php.

37. Jeffrey Tayler, “Russia Is Finished,” AtlanticMonthly, May 2001, pp. 35–52.

38. William F. Odom, “Realism about Russia,” TheNational Interest, no. 65 (Fall 2001): 56.

39. See also AFX News, “Russian GDP to Grow atLeast 6 pct in 3 Yrs Says Acting First Deputy PM,”September 21, 2007, www.forbes.com/markets/feeds/afx/2007/09/21/afx4142532.html. The WorldBank estimates that the oil and gas sector accountsfor about 20 percent of Russia’s GDP but generatessome 60 percent of the country’s export revenues.Approximately 50 percent of the government’s rev-enue is derived from the energy sector. Given risingglobal demand for energy, plus continued unrest inthe Middle East and West Africa, energy prices arelikely to remain high for the foreseeable future. SeeWorld Bank, Moscow Office, “Russian EconomicReport,” no. 13, December 2006.

40. Rajan Menon, “Cool It, It’s Not a Cold War,”Los Angeles Times, June 6, 2007.

41. These views tend to be held more by politi-cians from the region. See, for instance, formerUkrainian prime minister Yuliya Tymoshenko’sessay, “Containing Russia,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 3(May/June 2007): pp. 69–82.

42. Romano Prodi, “A Wider Europe—A ProximityPolicy as the Key to Stability.” Speech delivered at“Peace, Security and Stability International Dia-logue and the role of the EU,” Sixth ECSA-World

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Conference, Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, Decem-ber 5, 2002.

43. See, for example, the comments of French pres-ident Nicolas Sarkozy, “Making France a Power forthe Future, Part I,” National Interest online, April 17,2007, www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=14044.

44. Unofficial estimates for remittances are far higher.For complete information on the flow of remittancesamong Russia and its neighboring country, see thedata compiled by the IMF’s “Balance of Payments andInternational Investment Position Statistics,” www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/remitt.htm.

45. Council on Foreign Relations.

46. Nikolas Gvosdev and Dimitri Simes, “AmericaCannot Have It Both Ways with Russia,” FinancialTimes, April 6, 2006, p. 19.

47. Quoted in Ewan MacAskill, “America OffersArms for Allies against Iran,” Guardian, July 31,2007, www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,2138736,00.html.

48. See, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s com-ments in “Hegemonic Quicksand,” The NationalInterest, no. 74 (Winter 2003/04): esp. p. 16.

49. See, for example, the discussion on NATOexpansion by former ambassador at large for theex-Soviet states Steven Sestanovich in testimonybefore the House International Relations Com-mittee, March 18, 2004, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa92612.000/hfa92612_0f.htm. See also his comments as broadcast on theVoice of America program “Focus,” February 17,2004, www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/02/mil-040216-35e7cc0d.htm.

50. Williams, “Partnership Has a Price.”

51. Graham Allison and Dimitri Simes, “Churchill,Not Quite,” The National Interest, no. 85 (Fall 2006): 7.Robert D. Blackwill, who served as deputy nationalsecurity advisor in the Bush Administration, pro-poses some possible incentives including a “timelineof U.S. ABM deployments to Eastern Europe; theissue of entry of new NATO members from the ex-Soviet space; the status of Kosovo; the contours ofthe CFE Treaty; the future of strategic-arms control;[and] Russia’s entry to the WTO.” See Robert D.Blackwill, “The Three R’s,” The National Interest, no.93 (January/February 2008): 72.

52. Pushkov, p. 52.

53. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “VPOTUS in Vilnius,”National Review online, May 8, 2006, http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ZmJlNjJiMTEzYWE0ZjQzMDNiMmMyZmU5NDEyMGQ4ODg=.

54. GUAM encompasses Georgia, Ukraine, Azer-baijan, and Moldova; Uzbekistan was affiliatedfrom 1999 to 2005. After a number of fits andstarts, the organization now has a headquarters inKiev and is moving to establish its first peace-keeping battalion.

55. See also Justin Logan, “The Bottom Line onIran: The Costs and Benefits of Preventive Warversus Deterrence,” Cato Institute Policy Analysisno. 583, December 4, 2006; and Justin Logan,“Grasping the Nettle: If Diplomacy Fails in Iran,”Foreign Service Journal, June 2007, pp. 32–40.

56. Many analysts and politicians are captivatedby the notion that the United States, in closealliance with Europe and other democracies,holds such a preponderance of global power thatit is possible for China and Russia both to be con-tained. Such an assumption is implicit in propos-als advanced by Senator John McCain and othersfor a “League of Democracies,” which ignores thefact that the Europeans have strong vested inter-ests in managing their relationship with Russia,especially, while democratic India has no desire toforce a confrontation with either China or Russia.

57. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domin-ation or Global Leadership (New York: Basic Books,2004), p. 42.

58. Allison and Simes summed up this consensus.

59. Anatol Lieven, “The West Must Set a Strategyfor a Resurgent Russia,” Financial Times, March 9,2007.

60. Quoted in Peter Baker, “Bush, Putin Put Ten-sions aside for Moscow Meeting,” The Seattle Times,May 9, 2005, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2002268288_bush09.html.

61. See Alexei Veneditkov, “Igor Ivanov’s ResignationReinforces Kremlin Isolationism,” New Times, no. 23,July 18, 2007, pp. 14–16; also “Ivanov Resigns asRussian Security Council Secretary,” Press Trust ofIndia, July 9, 2007.

62. These trends are discussed in greater detail inBarma, Ratner and Weber, pp. 23–30.

63. Gary Hart, “Don’t Lose Russia,” The NationalInterest, no. 88 (March-April 2007): 23.

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OTHER STUDIES IN THE POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES

610. Learning the Right Lessons from Iraq by Benjamin H. Friedman, Harvey M. Sapolsky, and Christopher Preble (February 13, 2008)

609. What to Do about Climate Change by Indur M. Goklany (February 5, 2008)

608. Cracks in the Foundation: NATO’s New Troubles by Stanley Kober (January 15, 2008)

607. The Connection between Wage Growth and Social Security’s FinancialCondition by Jagadeesh Gokhale (December 10, 2007)

606. The Planning Tax: The Case against Regional Growth-Management Planning by Randal O’Toole (December 6, 2007)

605. The Public Education Tax Credit by Adam B. Schaeffer (December 5, 2007)

604. A Gift of Life Deserves Compensation: How to Increase Living KidneyDonation with Realistic Incentives by Arthur J. Matas (November 7, 2007)

603. What Can the United States Learn from the Nordic Model? by Daniel J. Mitchell (November 5, 2007)

602. Do You Know the Way to L.A.? San Jose Shows How to Turn an UrbanArea into Los Angeles in Three Stressful Decades by Randal O’Toole (October 17, 2007)

601. The Freedom to Spend Your Own Money on Medical Care: A Common Casualty of Universal Coverage by Kent Masterson Brown (October 15, 2007)

600. Taiwan’s Defense Budget: How Taipei’s Free Riding Risks War by Justin Logan and Ted Galen Carpenter (September 13, 2007)

599. End It, Don’t Mend It: What to Do with No Child Left Behind by Neal McCluskey and Andrew J. Coulson (September 5, 2007)

598. Don’t Increase Federal Gasoline Taxes—Abolish Them by Jerry Taylor and Peter Van Doren (August 7, 2007)

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