THE GLOBAL RACE FORTALENT: EUROPE'SMIGRATION CHALLENGE

bruegelpolicybriefISSUE 2014/02MARCH 2014

by Rainer Münz Non-resident Fellow at BruegelHead of Research, Erste Group

rainer.muenz@bruegel.org

POLICY CHALLENGE

In the short run, Europe needs more labour mobility between EU memberstates given excessively high unemployment reported in some regions,while others face a shortage of skills. In the long run this will not be suffi-cient to close gaps in European labour markets. But many Europeans arenot ready to accept more international migrants, and give their support topolitical parties with restrictive agendas. This creates at least three chal-lenges. First: organising political majorities in favour of more proactive

migration policies. Second:making Europe more attrac-tive for mobile people withtalent and skills. Third:moving away from unilateralmigration policies towardsnegotiated win-win solu-tions aiming at reducing thecosts of, and enhancing thewelfare gains from, migra-tion and remittances.

Future labour market demand? Working-agepopulation change 2010-50 (%), selected regions

THE ISSUE In an ageing world with demographic and economic imbalances,the number of international migrants is likely to rise during the twenty-firstcentury. The geography of migration flows is changing, however. Mobilepeople will be increasingly attracted by faster-growing economies. There-fore, some traditional destinations in western Europe will face strongercompetition for skilled labour – not least from countries like China wherethe working-age population will shrink after 2020. At the same time, thesentiment in many European receiving societies is turning against migra-tion and intra-European Union mobility.

Source: Bruegel based on UN. Note: working-age population = 20-64. See Figure 1 on page 4.

-25

0

25

50

75

100177.3

China

India

Europe

US/Canada

LatinAmerica

NorthAfrica

Sub-Sah.Africa

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THE GLOBAL RACE FOR TALENT: EUROPE'S MIGRATION CHALLENGE

1. ‘Popular initiative:against mass immigra-

tion’, seehttp://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/vi/vis413t.html.

THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONALMIGRATION is changing. Europe(including Russia) remains themost significant destination formigrants, hosting almost a third(31 percent) of all internationalmigrants (72 million out of a totalof 232 million; see Table 2 on thenext page). But more economieswill soon enter the global race fortalent and skills. China, for exam-ple, is already actively searchingfor highly qualified experts fromabroad, although numbers arestill relatively small.

At the same time, economicgrowth has shifted from theadvanced economies to middle-income and low-income countries,making many traditionally immi-grant-receiving countries lessattractive for migrant workers andtheir families. The momentum ofglobal ageing is also set to shift totoday's emerging markets –namely China and Latin America.Europe faces a situation in which,in the short term, it will have toaddress high unemployment insome parts of the continent, and ashortage of labour and skills inothers, while in the medium andlong terms, because of ageingsocieties and stagnating ordeclining working age popula-

tions, it will need to invest more insound, forward-looking migrationpolicies. Current policies are oftenuncoordinated with little coopera-tion among EU member states orbetween migrant-sending andmigrant-receiving countries.

Furthermore, anti-immigrationsentiment is growing in someEuropean countries. Populist par-ties throughout Europe gainground by focusing on the issue.The February 2014 referendum inSwitzerland1 showed that free-dom of movement within Europeis no longer backed by a majorityof Swiss voters. The same is mostlikely true for the United Kingdomand maybe a few other EU states.

This Policy Brief provides anoverview of global migrationtrends and how the dynamics ofinternational migration are chang-ing. It then considers how Europeneeds to respond – both in termsof making the internal labourmarket more efficient, and interms of managing the shifts ininternational migration.

GLOBAL MIGRATION TRENDS

There are 7.2 billion people livingon our planet, mainly in the

middle- and low-income countriesof the global South. Less than 20percent live in high-income coun-tries of the global North (see Table1 for definitions). An estimated232 million people, or 3 percent ofthe global population, are interna-tional migrants – defined aspeople living outside their coun-try of birth (see UN DESA, 2012).Of these 232 million internationalmigrants, an estimated 164 mil-lion, or 71 percent, were born inmiddle- and low-income countriesthe global South; about half ofthese, 82 million, have moved toother countries in the globalSouth. The other 82 million havemoved to rich countries of theglobal North (Table 1).

Another 63 million internationalmigrants (29 percent) have theirroots in rich countries of theglobal North. Most of them, 53million, have moved to anotherrich country. As a result there arenow an estimated 135 millioninternational migrants (58 per-cent of all international migrants)living in richer countries of thenorthern hemisphere (Table 1).

Since 1990, the number of inter-national migrants has increasedby 76 million (+49 percent).

Table 1: International migrants by origin and destination, global North/South, 2013

Origin North Origin South Total by destinationImmigrants in % of

population ofreceiving region

Destination North 54 million (22%) 82 million (36%) 136 million (58%) 11.3%

Destination South 14 million (6%) 82 million (36%) 96 million (42%) 1.5%

Total by origin 68 million (28%) 164 million (72%) 232 million (=100%) 3.0%

Emigrants in % of populationof sending region

5.2% 2.5% 3.0%

Source: UN DESA 2012, 2013a. Note: International migrants are defined as people not residing in their country of birth irrespective of their citi-zenship. In line with definitions used by the United Nations, the term ‘North’ refers to countries and regions traditionally classified for statisticalpurposes as ‘developed’ or ‘high income’. The developed regions include Europe, Japan, North America (Canada, US), Australia, New Zealand. Theterm ‘South’ first of all refers to those countries classified as ‘developing’ or ‘middle- and low-income’. The South, however, also includes a fewhigh-income countries: the Gulf States, Israel and Singapore.

THE GLOBAL RACE FOR TALENT: EUROPE'S MIGRATION CHALLENGE

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2. Another 2.7 millioninternational migrants

live in EU-associatedcountries: Iceland,

Liechtenstein, Norway,Switzerland (=EEA +

EFTA).

3. Calculation based onUN DESA (2012), OECD

(2013), and Eurostat(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Migr

ation_and_migrant_population_statistics).

Europe (including Russia) is themost important migrantdestination. Only 52 percent of its72 million migrants come fromother European countries. Almostthe same number of internationalmigrants resides in Asia (70.8million), with a large majoritycoming from other Asiancountries. North America (53million) is home to about a fifth ofall migrants (Table 2). WithinEurope 49 million internationalmigrants reside in the memberstates of the European Union2, ofwhich less than a third havemoved from another EU country,while two thirds have come fromthird countries3.

GLOBAL POPULATION TRENDS

Since 2000, the world populationhas increased by 77 millionpeople (or about 1.1 percent) peryear (UN DESA, 2013b). Thegrowth rate will decline during thenext few decades, though globalpopulation is projected to grow foranother 50-70 years, reaching9.6 billion in 2050 (see UN DESA,2013b). Most population growthwill be concentrated in South Asia,the Middle East and sub-Saharan

Africa (UN DESA, 2013b; UNFPA,2013). At the same time, in someregions and countries, especiallyin the global North, populationgrowth has already ended, and anincreasing number of countrieswill experience stagnating or evendeclining populations.

The main reason for the decliningrate of global population growth isthe shrinking number of childrenper family (see UNFPA, 2013). Atfirst this translates into fewerbirths and smaller cohorts of pre-school and school children.Eventually, the size of the work-ing-age population also starts toshrink.

In Japan, Russia and South Koreathe domestic labour force isalready contracting. Europe willexperience the same within tenyears, and China will begin to seeits working-age populationdecline after 2020. In Latin Amer-ica the working-age populationwill start declining after the year2045. Meanwhile, working-agepopulations will continue to growin South Asia, the Middle East andAfrica (Figure 1 on the next page).

Table 2: International migrants by macro region of origin and destination, 2013

Origin, absolutenum

ber(m

illions)

As % of all inter-national

emigrants

Emigrants

remaining in the

same m

acroregion, %

Destination,absolutenum

ber,m

illions

As % of allinternationalim

migrants

Imm

igrantscom

ing from the

same m

acroregion, %

Africa 31.3 13.5 49 18.6 8.0 82Asia 92.5 40.0 58 70.8 30.6 76Europe 58.4 25.2 65 72.4 31.3 52Latin America 36.7 15.9 15 8.5 3.7 64North America 4.3 1.9 28 53.1 22.9 2Oceania 1.9 0.8 58 7.9 3.5 42N/A 6.4 2.7Total 231.5 100 100Source: UN DESA, 2012, 2013a. Note: Europe includes Russia and other successor states of the former Soviet Union.

During this period, the number ofinternational migrants born in theSouth and residing in the Northincreased from 40 to 82 million(+105 percent) while the migrantpopulation originating in theglobal South and living in othercountries of the South grew from59 million to 82 million (+41 per-cent). The number of internationalmigrants born in the North andresiding in other rich countries ofthe North only grew from 41 to 54million (+32 per cent) (UN DESA,2013a).

In contrast to its role in globaldemographic growth, the globalNorth still plays an important rolein the dynamics of internationalmigration. People born in richercountries are more likely to live inanother country (5.2 percent)than people born in the globalSouth (2.5 percent). In absoluteterms as well as relative to theirpopulations, the richer countriesof the North attract more interna-tional migrants. In the richercountries of the Northern hemi-sphere, 11 percent of people areforeign-born, compared to only1.5 percent in the global South(Table 1).

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THE GLOBAL RACE FOR TALENT: EUROPE'S MIGRATION CHALLENGE

Japan and the countries of west-ern Europe currently have theoldest populations, followed byNorth America, Australia, centralEurope and Russia. But soon themomentum of global aging willshift to today’s emerging markets– namely to China and LatinAmerica. These developments arehighly predictable, but manycountries are not well prepared forrapidly ageing societies anddeclining working-age popula-tions. A number of expertsassume that this will have a nega-tive impact on economic growth,citing Japan as the most promi-nent example. At the same timedeclining working-age popula-tions might create additionaldemand for migrant labour andskills4.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTUREGEOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONALMIGRATION

What does this changing patternmean for international migrationand mobility in the next fewdecades?

• The global race for talent andskills will get tougher as morecountries actively search forhighly qualified experts fromabroad. China has started to dothis, although migration intoChina is still relatively limited.China’s declining working-agepopulation might also create ademand for semi-skilled andlow-skilled labour, effectivelyturning it from a migrant-send-ing into an immigrant-receivingcountry, competing withEurope, North America andAustralia for workers and skills.

• Economic growth has shiftedfrom the advanced economies

to middle-income and low-income countries. In case thisshift persists, the narrowing ofexisting income gaps will havepractical implications for themigration patterns of thefuture.

• Empirical analysis for the firstdecade of the twenty-first cen-tury shows that on averageonly countries with a grossnational income (GNI) percapita below US$ 9,000 had anegative migration balance(average annual net flows; seeFigure 2)5. As GNI in many

middle- and low-income coun-tries increases, sendingcountries will be turned intodestination countries.

• In countries where GNI percapita exceeds US$ 15,000,net migration balances onaverage are positive (Figure2)6. However, many immigrant-receiving countries of theNorth are encountering sloweconomic growth or evenrecession, and unemploymentrates are well above historicalaverages. This makes themless attractive for migrant

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

India

Sub-Saharan Africa

China

EuropeLatin America

USA/CanadaNorthern Africa

Working-age population (ages 20-64, millons)

Source: Bruegel based on UN World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.

Figure 1: Change in working-age population, 1950-2050

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

Net m

igra

tion

0-3,000 3,000-6,000 6,000-9,000 9,000-15,000 15,000-30,000

30,000-45,000

45,000+

Source: Bruegel based on United Nations and World Bank data (N = 170 countries).Note: Average annual net migration rates for 2005-10 per 1,000 inhabitants groupedby average annual GNI per capita (2005-10) of respective countries.

Figure 2: Average net migration balances (net flows) by averageannual GNI per capita (US$), 2005-10

4. It should be noted,however, that in Japan,

which has the world’soldest population and

reports a shrinkingworking age population

since the 1990s, thishas not been the case

so far.

5. Of the countries withGNI per capita below

US$3,000 and thecountries with GNI per

capita betweenUS$3,000 and

US$9,000, 83 percentand 68 percent respec-

tively had a negativemigration balance

(2005-10).

6. Among the countrieswith GNI per capita

between US$9,000 andUS$15,000, only 30

percent had a negativemigration balance, and

among the countrieswith GNI per capita

above US$15,000, onlyone had a negative

migration balance(2005-10). A more

complex model of therelationship can be

found in Hatton andWilliamson (2005).

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7. The UN PopulationProjection even

assumes that interna-tional migration (at

least in net terms) willgradually disappear by

the end of the twenty-first century.

THE GLOBAL RACE FOR TALENT: EUROPE'S MIGRATION CHALLENGE

pled with high unemployment.For citizens of these countries,emigration to neighbouringcountries and oversees desti-nations will continue to be awelfare-enhancing alternativefor quite some time.

THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ONWELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT

Many migrants manage toimprove their incomes, theiraccess to education or their per-sonal security. This is particularlytrue for people moving within or tothe Northern hemisphere. As aresult, international migration andinternal mobility in many casesare quick ways to increase wel-fare and opportunities for mobilepeople. As a part migrants’income is typically sent backhome, migration also has the

potential to directly improve livingconditions in migrant-sendingregions and countries. This, how-ever, is only the second-bestchoice for development, becauseremittances increase the pur-chasing power of localhouseholds with a relativeabroad, but do not necessarilygenerate local investment or jobs.

In total, international remittancesby migrant workers in 2013amounted to an estimatedUS$549 billion (World Bank,2013). The greatest part of theseremittances went to developingcountries – some US$414 billion:about 2.5 times the amount thatrich countries transfer as over-sees development assistance.The largest flows come frommigrants working in rich countriesof the global North sending

workers and has alreadychanged the direction of migra-tion flows. For example, theEuropean countries mostaffected by the financial andeconomic crisis, in particularIreland, Greece, Portugal andSpain, have recorded moreemigration than immigrationsince 2010 (Figure 3).

• The improving economic situa-tion in capital cities and otherurban agglomerations of manytraditional migrant-sendingcountries has created domes-tic alternatives to internationalmigration. Usually this has todo with declining populationgrowth and industrialisationand the emergence of urbanservice sectors absorbing ruralmigrants. The impact on inter-national migration is clearlyvisible: for example, Mexicoand Turkey were for decadesboth prominent sources ofimmigration to the UnitedStates and the EU, respec-tively, but no longer play thatrole. Internal mobility towardsquickly developing urbanagglomerations in these coun-tries has become an attractivealternative to emigration7.

• Similarly, several emergingeconomies – including Angola,Brazil, Chile, Ivory Coast,Malaysia and South Africa –are attracting migrants fromneighbouring countries, open-ing up regional alternatives formobile people who might oth-erwise have looked furtherafield (IOM, 2011). Neverthe-less, many middle- andlow-income countries – suchas Bangladesh, Egypt, India,Pakistan and the Philippines –will continue to have youthfuland growing populations cou-

-5 or lower -5 to -2 -2 to 0 0 to +2 +2 to +5 +5 or more

Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat, UN DESA, national statistics. Note: Per 1000inhabitants. Countries with a recent change from net immigration to net emigration(Bosnia, Croatia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) or from net emigration tonet immigration (Turkey) are outlined with a heavy black border.

Figure 3: Annual average net migration balances (net flows), %, 2010-12

money to households and com-munities in the global South.

The top receiving countries of offi-cially recorded remittances in2012 were India (US$71 billion),China (US$60 billion), the Philip-pines (US$26 billion), Mexico(US$22 billion) and Nigeria(US$21 billion). Other majorrecipients included Egypt, Pak-istan, Bangladesh, Vietnam andUkraine.

Within Europe, remit-tances are alsoimportant for coun-tries with a smallGDP and a consider-able diaspora, inparticular Albania,Bosnia, Kosovo andMoldova.

By giving people access to coun-tries and regions with betteropportunities and by enablingremittances, migration can con-tribute to poverty reduction, butalso to increased access to edu-cation, health services and foodsecurity.

In addition, over time, migrantscan become agents of change intheir home regions and countries.Some create trade relationships;others bring back new technolo-gies or start to invest in theirhome countries. In a number ofcountries, returning migrantshave played a significant role inpromoting democracy or even infacilitating regime change8.

With a growing demand formigrant labour and skills in high-income countries with ageingpopulations, the welfare-enhancing effects of international

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THE GLOBAL RACE FOR TALENT: EUROPE'S MIGRATION CHALLENGE

migration are likely to increase.The same is true for growingformal and informal labourmarkets in urban agglomerationsof middle- and low-incomecountries.

There are, however, a number ofnegative aspects. Migrants are atrisk of being exploited individu-ally or discriminated againststructurally9. Individual exploita-tion can be experienced at the

hands of employers,agents or traffickers.Migrants sometimesare charged exces-sive commissionsfor recruitment serv-ices, when changingmoney or whensending money backhome (World Bank,

2013). Structural discriminationis linked to labour laws of destina-tion countries, recruitment andpromotion practices of employersor tax and social security sys-tems collecting contributionsfrom migrants, but excludingthem from certain public servicesor social transfers10. At the sametime, under certain conditions,newly-arrived migrants can havenegative effects on wages andlabour force participation of low-skilled native workers, though theoverall economic impact of thethese migrants for the receivingcountry is positive.

International migration and mobil-ity potentially cause brain drainsfrom rural peripheries to urbancentres and from low-incomecountries to emerging and devel-oped economies. This negativelyaffects economic output andwages in migrant-sendingregions. Additionally, discrimina-

tion against migrants in labourmarkets of destination countriesclearly leads to brain waste andover time to de-qualification.

Some of these risks can bemitigated through circular andreturn-migration. Other risks canonly be addressed throughsetting and enforcing minimumwage levels, social protectionlevels and labour and recruitmentstandards.

IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEANEMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATIONPOLICIES

The changing economic anddemographic realities of thecoming decades will have majorimplications for future employ-ment and migration policies inEurope:

• In the short term, high unem-ployment in some parts ofEurope and a shortage oflabour and skills in other partsshould be addressed byencouraging more mobilitybetween EU member statesleading to better allocation oflabour within the EuropeanUnion.

• In the medium and long termsEuropean countries withageing societies andstagnating or decliningworking-age populations willneed to invest more in sound,forward-looking migrationpolicies. Many EU memberstates accustomed to easilyfinding the labour and skillsthey require will need to thinkmore strategically about howto attract qualified workers.

• Tougher competition for skillswill put more focus on the

‘Changing economicand demographicrealities will havemajor implicationsfor Europe'smigration policies.’

8. Diasporas can play acrucial role in cases of

regime change becausethey might include

alternative elites readyto return.

9. See (as one of manyexamples) the discus-

sion about the livingand working conditions(including high risks of

fatal accidents) ofmigrant labour in Qatar:http://www.globalresear

ch.ca/the-world-cup-socker-in-qatar-2022-c

ontroversy-over-the-appalling-migrant-work

er-conditions/5353020.

10. Some of theseissues are addressed in

the InternationalLabour Organisation

conventions no. 143(Migrant Workers) and

no. 189 (DomesticWorkers). It should not

be overlooked thatmany sending coun-

tries are asking forbetter protection of

their nationals livingand working abroad

without being preparedto extend similar rights

to their citizens or third-country nationals

working in their owncountry.

employment of migrant labourto supply the needed humancapital to the European labourmarket. In this context, mutualrecognition of educationalattainments and acquiredskills based on comparablestandards would be extremelyhelpful. More emphasis shouldalso be given to makingacquired social and employerbenefits fully portable.

• More international migrationfrom third countries and agreater degree of mobilitybetween EU countries remainsonly one possible answer tofuture mismatches betweensupply and demand of labourand skills. EU member stateswith ageing populations mustalso consider other policies toprotect the capabilities of theirworkforces — such as increas-ing the retirement age and thelabour force participation ofwomen.

Bilateral or even EU-level coopera-tion offers policymakers at allpoints of the migration trajectory— sending, transitand receiving coun-tries — theopportunity to craftsmarter policiesthat will be mutu-ally beneficial andwill mitigate therisks of migration.However, whilemost sending countries haveadopted liberal migration policiesfacilitating travel and emigration,receiving countries in Europe seemigration control as a key ele-ment of their sovereignty. As aresult, EU member states gener-ally have ‘unilateral’ admissionpolicies that are aligned neither

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11. The EU regulateswhich country is

responsible forprocessing asylum

claims.

12. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ

/site/en/com/2007/com2007_0637en01.pdf.

13. The main exceptionsare the annual meetings

of the Global Forum onMigration andDevelopment

(http://www.gfmd.org/en)and the UN High LevelDialogue on Migration

and Development thattook place in October

2013.

14. See footnote 1.

THE GLOBAL RACE FOR TALENT: EUROPE'S MIGRATION CHALLENGE

with other receiving countries norwith the main sending countries.As a result, bilateral agreementsor mobility partnerships only playa minor role in most EU migrationpolicymaking.

This is in contrast to border man-agement (Schengen system), forwhich EU memberstates share jointresponsibility, sup-ported by aspecialised agency(Frontex). There isalso some coordina-tion in the field ofasylum11. Theadmission ofmigrant labour from third coun-tries, however, remains fullyunder the control of each EUmember state. As a consequence,a work permit for a particular EUcountry does not give access tothe common EU labour market.Even the so-called EU ‘Blue Card’providing access to all 28 nationallabour markets has to be issuedby a particular EU member state12.Most member states have never

issued such ‘BlueCards’.

At internationallevel, there are fewoccasions for repre-sentatives of EUmember states toshare their views orto find common

ground with representatives ofsending countries13 — unlike theinternational dimension of policy-making on trade, energy orclimate change. Lack of coopera-tion between migrant-sendingand receiving countries increasesthe costs of migration anddecreases the positive effect on

socio-economic development.The direct (and sometimes exces-sive) costs relate to visas andpassports, recruitment and travelagencies, exchange commis-sions, money transfer fees andother fees. The indirect costsrelate to labour market discrimi-nation leading to lower incomes

compared to nativeworkers with similarskills, and toreduced portabilityof acquired socialrights and benefitsleading to lower (orno) pension pay-ments, lower healthinsurance coverage

and reduced (or no) access tounemployment benefits.

Within the EU28 there are also anumber of barriers, includinginsufficient linguistic skills,restricted access to certain labourmarket segments, even for citi-zens of other EU countries, andrestricted portability of socialbenefits. The outcome is evident.Europe still lacks a functioninginternal labour market with suffi-cient mobility between regionswith high and regions with lowunemployment. Furthermore, inmany European countries, thereis considerable popular scepti-cism or even resistance tointernational migration. In Febru-ary 2014, a referendum putforward by the conservative andpopulist Swiss People’s Party infavour of abolishing the freemovement of labour between theEU and Switzerland, while re-intro-ducing annual quotas formigrants and cross-border com-muters, was backed by 50.3percent of the voters14. This resultis a good example of how deeply

‘Migration is only onepossible answer tofuture EU mis-matches betweensupply and demandof labour and skills.’

‘Europe still lacks afunctioning labourmarket with enoughmobility betweenhigh and low unem-ployment regions.’

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THE GLOBAL RACE FOR TALENT: EUROPE'S MIGRATION CHALLENGE

negative sentiment against immi-gration is entrenched even in oneof the continent’s strongesteconomies.

Future migration and integrationpolicies should aim to reduce thedirect and indirect costs of migra-tion. They should also aim tomaximise the possible benefits ofmigration by both reducing wagediscrimination and deterring theemployment of migrants belowtheir skill levels. Better jobs formigrants will directly translateinto higher wages and eventuallyinto higher remittances.

We can assume that the globalcompetition for qualified and

therefore crucial for decision-makers to consider and invest inlong-term solutions that can beadapted to meet the changingneeds of their economies andsocieties.

The author thanks Zoltán Bakayand Bernadett Povazsai-Römhildfor their support in preparing thispaper, and Ramez Abbas, NataliaBanulescu-Bogdan, ThomasBuettner, Susan Fratzke, StephenGardner and Michelle Mittelstadtfor their helpful comments. Anearlier version of this paper wasprepared by MPI (Washington DC)for the UN High Level Dialogue onMigration and Development(October 2013).

skilled workers will become stifferin the next few decades. Europewill have to cope with this. Greatercompetition will in turn expandthe range of employment oppor-tunities for people emigratingfrom youthful and demographi-cally growing societies.Notwithstanding such opportuni-ties, demographically growingnations must continue theirefforts to create jobs at home.

Regardless of the route Europeangovernments choose, many poli-cies that address demographicchange and the subsequent fun-damental shifts in labour supplyrequire a time horizon wellbeyond an electoral cycle. It is

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Berlin Institute (2010) Europe’s Demographic Future, Berlin, available at www.berlin-insti-tut.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Europa/Kurz_Europa_e_Map.pdf

Hatton, Timothy and Jeffrey G. Williamson (2002) ‘What Fundamentals Drive World Migration?’ DiscussionPaper no. 3559, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (2013) World Migration Report 2013, Geneva: IOMOrganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2013) International Migration Outlook

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PEW Research Center (2012) Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero – and Perhaps Less, Washington DC,available at www.pewhispanic.org

UN DESA, Population Division (2012) Trends in international migrant stock: Migrants by destination andorigin, United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2012: New York: United Nations, Department ofEconomic and Social Affairs, available at http://esa.un.org/MigOrigin/

UN DESA, Population Division (2013a) ‘International Migration 2013: Migrants by origin and destination’,Population Facts No. 2013/3. New York: United Nations

UN DESA, Population Division (2013b) World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, Volume I: Compre-hensive Tables ST/ESA/SER.A/33, New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs

UNFPA (2013) The State of World Population 2012 – By Choice, Not By Chance: Family Planning, HumanRights and Development, New York: United Nations

World Bank (2013) ‘Migration and Remittance Flows: Recent Trends and Outlook, 2013-2016’, Migrationand Development Brief no. 21, Washington DC

© Bruegel 2014. All rights reserved. Short sections, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted in the original languagewithout explicit permission provided that the source is acknowledged. Opinions expressed in this publication are those ofthe author(s) alone.

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