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7/22/2019 (PDF) Yury Chemerkin Balccon 2013
1/50
(IN
-
)EFFICIENCY OF SECURITY F
ON MOBILE SECURITY AND COM
YU
Balkan Computer Congre
7/22/2019 (PDF) Yury Chemerkin Balccon 2013
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EXPERIENCED IN :
REVERSE ENGINEERING & AV
SOFTWARE PROGRAMMING & DOCUMENTATION
MOBILE SECURITY AND MDM
CYBER SECURITY & CLOUD SECURITY
COMPLIANCE & TRANSPARENCY
FORENSICS AND SECURITY WRITING
HAKIN9 / PENTEST / EFORENSICS MAGAZINE, GROTECK BUSINESS MEDIA
PARTICIPATION AT CONFERENCES
INFOSECURITYRUSSIA, NULLCON, ATHCON, CONFIDENCE, PHDAYS,
DEFCONMOSCOW, HACTIVITY, HACKFEST
CYBERCRIME FORUM, CYBER INTELLIGENCE EUROPE/INTELLIGENCE-SEC, DEEPINTEL
ICITST, CTICON (CYBERTIMES), ITA, I-SOCIETY
[ YURY CHEMERKIN ]
www.linkedin.com/in/yurychemerkin
http://sto
-
strategy.com yury.s@che
http://www.linkedin.com/in/yurychemerkinhttp://www.linkedin.com/in/yurychemerkinhttp://sto-strategy.com/http://sto-strategy.com/http://sto-strategy.com/mailto:[email protected]://sto-strategy.com/mailto:[email protected]://www.linkedin.com/in/yurychemerkinhttp://eforensicsmag.com/http://pentestmag.com/http://hakin9.org/mailto:[email protected]://sto-strategy.com/http://www.linkedin.com/in/yurychemerkin7/22/2019 (PDF) Yury Chemerkin Balccon 2013
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APPLES CENTRALIZED POINT OF DISTRIBUTIONIS PROVIDING WITH CONFIDENCE THROUGH THEVALIDATION BY APPLE, EXCEPT
THE SUBMISSION OF SUSPICIOUS APP BY
Ch. MILLER THAT HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY
APPROVED BY APPLE INSTALLING CYDIA &THE REST APPS AFTER
THAT
MICROSOFT (WINDOWS PHONE) HAS ACENTRALIZED MARKET WITH DEEPER TESTINGAND VALIDATION LIKE APPLE
GOOGLE PROVIDES A CENTRALTOO, HOWEVER PROVIDES ABILAPPS FROM 3RD-PARTY SOURCEAMAZON.
ANY OTHER ARE ORIGINA
MALWARE HOTSPOTS ANY ALTERNATIVE MARKE
CALLED CRACKED DISTR
REPACKAGES
BLACKBERRY
IS
THE
SAFEST
THE
MOST
MANAGEABLE
AND
AS
IT
IS
ON
AN
ENTERPRISE
WA
[ OPINIONS ]
BLACKBERRY IS SAFER THAN WINDOWS THAT IS SAFER THAN
iOS
THAT IS SAFER THAN AN
7/22/2019 (PDF) Yury Chemerkin Balccon 2013
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[ Vulnerabilities of OS and apps ]
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2004
2005
2007
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2013
2013
2013
2 0 1 3
Score - iOS Score - Android Score - BB
7/22/2019 (PDF) Yury Chemerkin Balccon 2013
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[ Vulnerabilities of OS and apps ]
iOS Average; 6,3
Android Average; 8,2
BB-Average; 6,3
iOS Min; 1,2
Android Min; 1,9
BB Min
Min & Average Score
MIN & AVERAGE SCORE
7/22/2019 (PDF) Yury Chemerkin Balccon 2013
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HOW MANY THE TOOLS ARE (approx):
iOS 10
ANDROID 50
WINDOWS PHONE 40
BLACKBERRY - 10
QUANTITY OF BUGS / SECURITY FLAWS AVERAGE 50
MIN 20
MAX INFINITY WARINING :: ADS
VERACODE THE MOST USEFUL
BUGS TYPE (OBVIOUS | LIKELY)
MISSED CONSTRUCTIONSDOUBLE/TRIPLE FREE ()
DEBUG PATHS, KEY, AND E
PLAINTEXT & HARD-CODETOKENS, MASTER-KEYS, E
NON-SECURE FLAWS, COETC.
CHECK IT OUT THE SQL-INJECTION I
THERE IS NO HTTPS H
[ SOURCE & BINARY ANALYSIS TOO
HEY DUDE, WHY IS IT VULNERABLE AGAIN? SORRY, BIG BOSS, ID JUST BEEN COMMITED
7/22/2019 (PDF) Yury Chemerkin Balccon 2013
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SECURE BOOTLOADER
SYSTEM SOFTWARE SECURITY (UPDATES)
APPLICATION CODE SIGNING
RUNTIME PROCESS SECURITY
SANDBOX
APIs
HARDWARE SECURITY FEATURES
FILE DATA PROTECTION
SSL, TLS, VPN
PASSCODE PROTECTION
SETTINGS
PERMISSIONS/ RESTRICTIONS
CONFIGURATIONS
REMOTE MAGAGEMENT
MDM
REMOTE WIPE
[ MOBILE SECURITY CAPABILITIES
THE SAME CAPABILITIES AMONG MOBILE OPERATION SYSTEMS
7/22/2019 (PDF) Yury Chemerkin Balccon 2013
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MDM SERVICES HELPS MANAGE AND PROTECT BLACKBERRY, IOS, WINDOWS, AND ANDROID
MDM SERVICES PROVIDE UNIFIED COMMUNICATION AND COLLABORATION SOFTWARE AND
EACH OS IS DESIGNED TO PROTECT DATA IN TRANSIT, IN MEMORY AND STORAGE AT ALL PO
MDM SERVICES ENHANCED BY MANAGING THE BEHAVIOR OF THE DEVICE
OS PROVIDES A CAPABILITY TO PROTECT ANY APPLICATION DATA USING SANDBOXING
OS PROVIDES A CAPABILITY TO MANAGE PERMISSIONS TO ACCESS ITS CAPABILITIES
OS EVALUATES ALL REQUEST MADE BY APP ... BUT LEADS AWAY FROM ANY DETAILS AND
[ SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ]
EACH OS EVALUATESEVERY REQUEST THAT AN APPLICATION MAKES TO ACCES
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ALL CONTROLLED OBJECTS ARE LIMITED BY
SANDBOX
PERMISSIONS
SECURITY FEATURES ON DEVICEs & MDMs
ADDITIONAL FEATURES ARENT ACCESSIBLE ON
DEVICE
USER-MODE MALWARE
SPYWARE, ROOTKITS
EXPLOTS & ATTACKS
REVERSING NETWORK LAYER
RECOVERING DATA VS. SANBOX&MEMORY
EXPLOITING TO GET SUPER PRIVILIGIES
MDM vs. COMPLIANCE
COMMON RECOMMENDATI
SET IS LESSER THAN SET OF M
QUITE BETTER TO MANAGE
THAN DEVICE AT ALL
TOO FAR FROM DETAILS
YOUNG STANDARDS
FIRST REVISIONS, DRA
MOBILE SECURITY SOFWARE
READ-ONLY MODE / INFORM
APPLICATION FIREWALL (CAL
NETWORK FIREWALL REQUIR
NO REAL SECURITY IF YOU BR
[ KNOWN ISSUES ]
THREATS BOUNDS BECOME UNCLEAR MDM& COMPLIANCE BRINGS COM
RECOMMENDATIONS
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BYPASS MDM SOLUTIONS
iOS, ANDROID
EXPLOITS, DUMP /MEM TO GET EMAILS
BLACKHAT EU13 http://goo.gl/HN829p
BLACKBERRY PLAYBOOK
EXPLOITS, MITM, DUMP .ALL FILES SECTO11R, INFILTRATE12, SOURCE
BOSTON13 http://goo.gl/KaTtFG
GAIN ROOT ACCESS
ANDROID
APP SIGNATURE EXPLOITATION
APP MODIFICATION
BLACKHAT USA13 http://goo.gl/p5FhWG
TIME-FRAME TO FIX
7+ MONTH or WAIT FOR
WAIT FOR A VENDORS I ANALYSIS OF APPS DATA IN THE
BLACKBERRY, iOS
DATA LEAKAGE REVEAL PASSWORDS,
BLACKHAT EU12 http
ANDROID
DATA LEAKAGE
WEAKNESS OF CRYPT
PHDAY III 13 http://g
[ KNOWN ISSUES. Examples ]
http://goo.gl/HN829phttp://goo.gl/HN829phttp://goo.gl/KaTtFGhttp://goo.gl/p5FhWGhttp://goo.gl/p5FhWGhttp://goo.gl/STpSllhttp://goo.gl/x1PPGKhttp://goo.gl/x1PPGKhttp://goo.gl/x1PPGKhttp://goo.gl/STpSllhttp://goo.gl/p5FhWGhttp://goo.gl/KaTtFGhttp://goo.gl/HN829p7/22/2019 (PDF) Yury Chemerkin Balccon 2013
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PLAYBOOK ARTIFACTS (see the previous slide)
BROWSERS HISTORY
NETWORKING IDs, FLAGS, MACs
VIDEO CALLS DETAILS
ACCESS TO INTERNAL NETWORK
KERNEL BLACKBERRY Z10
DUMP MICROKERNEL
EVEN DEVELOPERS CREDENTIALS
(FACEBOOK, MOBILE, EMAILS) BLACKHAT
DEFCON MOSCOW http://goo.gl/R74leX
GUI FAILS
BLACKBERRY OS
DATA LEAKAGE
REVEAL PASSWORDS, A
NO PERMISSIONS REQUE
BORROW PERMISSIONS
NullCon13, CONFIDENC
http://goo.gl/phMey2
[ KNOWN ISSUES. Examples ]
http://goo.gl/R74leXhttp://goo.gl/R74leXhttp://goo.gl/phMey2http://goo.gl/phMey2http://goo.gl/phMey2http://goo.gl/phMey2http://goo.gl/R74leX7/22/2019 (PDF) Yury Chemerkin Balccon 2013
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Account
country code, phone number
Device Hardware Key
login / tokens of Twitter & Facebook
Calls history
Name + internal ID
Duration + date and time
Address book
Quantity of contacts / viber-contacts
Full name / Email / phone numbers
Messages
Conversations
Quantity of message
per conversations
Additional participan
phone)
Messages Date & Time
content of message
ID
[ APPLICATION EXAMINATION ]
ONLY THOSE I HAVE TO USE EVERY DAY FORENSICS EXAMINATION
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Account
country code, phone number
login / tokens Facebook wasnt revealed
Buy me for.$$$
Avatars :: [email protected] (jfif)
Address book No records of address book were revealed
Check log-file and find these records (!)
Messages
Messages
Date & Time
content of message
ID :: [email protected]
[ APPLICATION EXAMINATION ]
ONLY THOSE I HAVE TO USE EVERY DAY FORENSICS EXAMINATION
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Account
Phone number
Password, secret code werent revealed
Trace app, find the methods use it
Repack app and have a fun
No masking of data typed Information
Amount
Full info in history section (incl. info about
who receive money)
Connected cards
Encryption?
No
Bank cards
Masked card number
Qiwi Bank cards
Full & masked numbe
Cvv/cvc
All other card info
[ APPLICATION EXAMINATION ]
ONLY THOSE I HAVE TO USE EVERY DAY FORENSICS EXAMINATION
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Account
ID , email, password
Information
Loyalty (bonus) of your membership
all you ever type
Date of birth Passport details
Book/order history
Routes,
Date and time,
Bonus earning
Full info per each order
Connected cards
Encryption?
AES
256 bit
On password
anywayanydayanywa Store in plaintext
Sizeof(anywayanyday
192 bit
[ APPLICATION EXAMINATION ]
ONLY THOSE I HAVE TO USE EVERY DAY FORENSICS EXAMINATION
7/22/2019 (PDF) Yury Chemerkin Balccon 2013
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Account
ID ,bonus card number, password not revealed
Other id & tokens
Information
Date of birth
Passport details History (airlines, city, flight number only)
Flights tickets, logins credentials
Repack app and grab it
[ APPLICATION EXAMINATION ]
ONLY THOSE I HAVE TO USE EVERY DAY FORENSICS EXAMINATION
7/22/2019 (PDF) Yury Chemerkin Balccon 2013
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Account
ID , password
Loyalty (bonus) card number
Information
Not revealed (tickets, history or else)
Repack app
[ APPLICATION EXAMINATION ]
ONLY THOSE I HAVE TO USE EVERY DAY FORENSICS EXAMINATION
7/22/2019 (PDF) Yury Chemerkin Balccon 2013
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Account
ID , email, password
Other id & tokens
Information
Loyalty (bonus) of your membership
all you ever type Date of birth
Passport details
All PASSPORT INFO (not only travel data)
Your work data (address, job, etc.) you have never typed!
Flights tickets
Repack app and grab it
[ APPLICATION EXAMINATION ]
ONLY THOSE I HAVE TO USE EVERY DAY FORENSICS EXAMINATION
7/22/2019 (PDF) Yury Chemerkin Balccon 2013
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GOALS - MOBILE RESOURCES / AIM OF ATTACK
DEVICE RESOURCES
OUTSIDE-OF-DEVICE RESOURCES
ATTACKS SET OF ACTIOSN UNDER THE THREAT
APIs - RESOURCES WIDELY AVAILABLE TO CODERS
SECURITY FEATURES
KERNEL PROTECTION , NON-APP FEATURES
PERMISSIONS - EXPLICITLY CONFIGURED
3RD PARTY
AV, FIREWALL, VPN, MDM
COMPLIANCE - RULES TO DESIGN A MOBILE SECURITY
IN ALIGNMENT WITH COMPLIANCE TO
[ DEVICE MANAGEMENT ]
APPLICATION LEVEL ATTACKS VECTOR
AV, MDM,
DLP, VPN
Attacks
APIs
MDM feature
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= , , ,
set of OS permissions, set of device permissions, set
of MDM permissions, set of missed permissions (lack of
controls), set of rules are explicitly should be applied to gain
a compliance
= + ,
set of APIs ,
set of APIs that interact with sensitive data, set of APIs that do not interact with sensitive data
To get a mobile security designed with full granularity the set
should be empty set to get instead of , so
the matter how is it closer to empty. On another hand it should
find out whether assumptions , are true and if it is
possible to get .
Set of permissions < Set of activities ef
typical case < 100%,
ability to control each API = 100%
More than 1 permission per APIs >10
lack of knowledge about possi
improper granularity
[ DEVICE MANAGEMENT ]
Concurrency over native& additional security features The situation is very serio
MDM features
P
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[ BLACKBERRY. PERMISSIONS ]
BB 10 Cascades SDK BB 10 AIR SDK PB (ND
Background processing + +
BlackBerry Messenger -
Calendar, Contacts + via invo
Camera + +
Device identifying information + +
Email and PIN messages + via invo
GPS location + +
Internet + +
Location +
Microphone + +
Narrow swipe up - +Notebooks +
Notifications + +
Player - +
Phone +
Push +
Shared files + +
Text messages +
Volume - +
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[ BLACKBERRY. Significant APIs ]
Feature Q. APIs Q. sign. APIs % (sign .APIs)
BlackBerry Messenger 77 70 90,91
Calendar 443 126 28,44
Camera 47 41 87,23
Contacts 316 150 47,47
Device identifying info 15 14 93,33
Email & PIN messages 347 211 60,81
Internet 161 145 90,06
Microphone 21 15 71,43
Notebooks 123 86 69,92
Notifications 32 24 75,00
Phone 27 22 81,48Push 25 22 88,00
Shared files 78 70 89,74
Text messages 10 6 60,00
Account 66 21 31,82
MediaPlayer 66 63 95,45
NFC 24 11 45,83
Radio & SIM 68 51 75,00
Clipboard 6 4 66,67
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[ BLACKBERRY. Common activities
6
21
5
34
7
18
63
17
3 4 24 4
8
14 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 10
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Q. of m.+a. activity Q. of m.+a. permission
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[ BLACKBERRY. Derived activities ]
6
116
24
59
7
89
1623
47
311
3
19
46
9
1 4 3 3 1 3 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 10
20
40
60
80
100
120
Q. of derived activities Q. of derived perm
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[ BLACKBERRY. Efficiency (%) ]
16,67 19,05
60,00
5,88 14,29 5,5616,67
66,67
11,76
66,67
25,0050,00
25,00 25,00
50,0
16,67
3,45
12,50
5,08
14,29
3,37 6,25
8,704,26
66,67
9,09
66,67
5,262,17
88
0,00
50,00
100,00
150,00
200,00
250,00
% m+a activity vs perm % m+a derived activity vs perm
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[ iOS. Info.plist (app capabilities) ]
Key Description
auto-focus-camera handle a utofocus c apabilities i n the devices still camera in case of a macro photography or im
bluetooth-le handle the p resence of Bluetooth low-energy hardware on the device.
camera-flash handle a camera flash for taking pictures or shooting video.
front-facing-camera handlea forward-facingcamerasuch as capturing video from the devices camera.
gamekit handle a Game Center.
gps handle a GPS (or AGPS) hardware to track a locations in case of need the higher accuracy more
location-services retrieve the devices current location using the Core Location framework though Cellular/Wi-F
microphone handle the built-in microphone and its accessories
peer-peer handle peer-to-peer connectivity over a Bluetooth network.
sms handle the presence of the Messages application such as opening URLs with the sms scheme.
still-camera handle the p resence of a camera on the device such as c apturing images from the devices stil
telephony handle the p resence of the Phone application such as opening URLs with t he telephony schem
video-camera handle t he presence o fa camerawith video capabilitieso n d evice such ascapturing v ideo fro
wifi access to the networking features of the device.
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[ iOS. Settings ]
Component Unit
Restrictions :: Native application
Safari
Camera, FaceTime
iTunes Store, iBookstore
Siri
Manage applications*
Restrictions :: 3rd application
Manage applications*Explicit Language (Siri)
Privacy*, Accounts*
Content Type Restrictions*
Unit subcomponents
Privacy :: LocationPer each 3rd party app
For system services
Privacy :: Private Info
Contacts, Calendar, Reminders, P
Bluetooth Sharing
Twitter, Facebook
Accounts
Disables changes to Mail, Contacts, Calendars, iClou
Find My Friends
Volume limit
Content Type Restrictions
Ratings per country and regio
Music and podcasts
Movies, Books, Apps, TV show
In-app purchasesRequire Passwords (in-app purch
Game CenterMultiplayer Games
Adding Friends (Game Center
Manage applicationsInstalling Apps
Removing Apps
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[ iOS. Common activities ]
5
12
3 3
8
13
2
10
2
6
10
3
0
2
0 0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
3
1 0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
02468
1012141618
20
Q. of m.+a. activity Q. of m.+a. permission Q. of m.+a. perm plus parenta
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[ iOS. Derived activities ]
9
20
13
13
918 12
10 2 10 10 6
0 2
0
0
0
1
0
0
1 10
1
3
1
00
1
0
0 11
0
010
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Q. of derived activities Q. of derived perm Q. of derived perm + plus paren
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[ iOS. Efficiency (%) ]
0,00
16,67
0,00 0,00
0,007,69
0,000,00
50,0016,67 0,00
0,0,00
10,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
5,560,00
0,00
50,00 10,00
0,00
0
20,00
25,00
33,33
0,00
0,00
7,69
0,00
0,00
50,00 16,67
0,0033
11,1115,00 7,69
0,000,00
5,56
0,000,00
50,00 10,00
0,00
16
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%70%
80%
90%
100%
% m+a activity vs perm % m+a derived activity vs perm Q. of m.+a. perm plus parental perm Q. of derive
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[ Windows. Permissions ]
Permission Description
General use capabilities
musicLibrary provides access to the user's Music library, allowing the app to enumerate and access all fipicturesLibrary provides access to the user's Pictures library, allowing to enumerate and access all files
videosLibrary provides access to the user's Videos library, allowing the app to enumerate and access al
removableStorage provides access to files on removable storage, such as USB keys and external hard drives,
microphone provides access to the microphones audio feed, which allows to record audio from conn
webcam provides access to the webcams video feed, which allows to capture snapshots, movies fro
location provides access to location functionality like a GPS sensor or derived from availab
proximityenables multiple devices in close proximity to communicate with one another via poss
Bluetooth, WiFi, and the internet.internetClient,
internetClientServerprovides outbound (inbound is for server only) access to the Internet, public networ
privateNetworkClientServerprovides inbound and outbound access to home and work networks through the firew
applications that share data across local devices.Special use capabilities
enterpriseAuthenticationenable a user to log into remote resources using their credentials, and act as if a user provid
password.
sharedUserCertificates enables an access to software and hardware certificates like smart card
documentsLibrary provides access to the user's Documents library, filtered to the file type asso
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[ Windows. Significant APIs ]
Feature Q. APIs Q. sign. APIs % (sign. APIs) Co
General use capabilities
Notifications 68 4 5,88 +Music library 1300 138 10,62 +Pictures library 1157 133 11,50 +Videos library 1300 138 10,62 +Removablestorage 1045 109 10,43 +Microphone 274 33 12,04 +Webcam 409 91 22,25 +Location 37 5 13,51 +Proximity 54 19 35,19 +Internet and public networks 488 134 27,46 +Home and work networks 488 134 27,46 +
Special use capabilities
Enterprise authentication 8 4 50,00 +Shared User Certificates 20 5 25,00 +Documentslibrary 1045 126 12,06 +
Non-controlled capabilities
Clipboard 132 20 15,15 -Phone 18 6 33,33 -SMS 122 25 20,49 -Contacts 97 31 31,96 -Device Info 221 30 13,57 -
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[ Windows. Common Activities ]
1 1
3
1 1
3
5
3
6
14
43
4
2
1 1 1 1 1
3
6
1 12
5
12 2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Q. of m.+a. activity Q. of m.+a. permission
[ d d ]
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[ Windows. Derived Activities ]
1
810
8
5
11
14
3
7
21
16
6
12 12
12 2 2
13
6
1 12
5
12 2
0
5
10
15
20
25
Q. of derived activities Q. of derived perm
[ d ff ( ) ]
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[ Windows. Efficiency (%) ]
100,00 100,00
33,33
100,00100,00
100,00
120,00
33,33
16,6714,29
125,00
33,33
50,00
100,00
0,
100,00
25,00
20,00
25,0020,00
27,2742,8633,33
14,29
9,52
31,25
16,67 16,6716,67
0,00
20,00
40,00
60,00
80,00
100,00
120,00
% m+a activity vs perm % m+a derived activity vs perm
[ A d id P i i ]
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ACCESS_CHECKIN_PROPERTIES,ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION,
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION,ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMM
ANDS,ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION,ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE,
ACCESS_SURFACE_FLINGER,ACCESS_WIFI_STATE,ACCOUNT_
MANAGER,ADD_VOICEMAIL,AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS,BAT
TERY_STATS,BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE,BIND_APPWIDGET
,BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN,BIND_INPUT_METHOD,BIND_REMOTE
VIEWS,BIND_TEXT_SERVICE,BIND_VPN_SERVICE,BIND_WALL
PAPER,BLUETOOTH,BLUETOOTH_ADMIN,BRICK,BROADCAST_
PACKAGE_REMOVED,BROADCAST_SMS,BROADCAST_STICKY,
BROADCAST_WAP_PUSH,CALL_PHONE,CALL_PRIVILEGED,CA
MERA,CHANGE_COMPONENT_ENABLED_STATE,CHANGE_CO
NFIGURATION,CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE,CHANGE_WIFI_M
ULTICAST_STATE,CHANGE_WIFI_STATE,CLEAR_APP_CACHE,C
LEAR_APP_USER_DATA,CONTROL_LOCATION_UPDATES,DELE
TE_CACHE_FILES,DELETE_PACKAGES,DEVICE_POWER,DIAGN
OSTIC,DISABLE_KEYGUARD,DUMP,EXPAND_STATUS_BAR,FAC
TORY_TEST,FLASHLIGHT,FORCE_BACK,GET_ACCOUNTS,GET_
PACKAGE_SIZE,GET_TASKS,GLOBAL_SEARCH,HARDWARE_TE
ST,INJECT_EVENTS,INSTALL_LOCATION_PROVIDER,INSTALL_P
ACKAGES,INTERNAL_SYSTEM_WINDOW,INTERNET,KILL_BACK
GROUND_PROCESSES,MANAGE_ACCOUNTS,MANAGE_APP_T
OKENS,MASTER_CLEAR,MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS,MODIFY_
PHONE_STATE,MOUNT_FORMAT_FILESYSTEMS,MOUNT_UN
MOUNT_FILESYSTEMS,NFC,PERSISTENT_ACTIVITY,PROCESS_
OUTGOING_CALLS,READ_CALENDAR,READ_CALL_LOG,READ_
CONTACTS,READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE,READ_FRAME_BUFFE
R,READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS,READ_INPUT_STATE,READ_L
OGS,READ_PHONE_STATE,READ_PROFILE,READ_SMS,READ_
SOCIAL_STREAM,READ_SYNC_SETTINGS,READ_SYNC_STATS,
READ_USER_DICTIONARY,REBOOT,RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLET
ED,RECEIVE_MMS,RECEIVE_SMS,RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH,RECO
RD_AUDIO,REORDER_TASKS
,SET_ACTIVITY_WATCHER,SE
SET_ANIMATION_SCALE,SET
,SET_POINTER_SPEED,SET_P
ROCESS_LIMIT,SET_TIME,SET
ET_WALLPAPER_HINTS,SIGN
TUS_BAR,SUBSCRIBED_FEED
ITE,SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
REDENTIALS,USE_SIP,VIBRAT
TINGS,WRITE_CALENDAR,W
TS,WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORA
STORY_BOOKMARKS,WRITE_
GS,WRITE_SETTINGS,WRITE_
RITE_SYNC_SETTINGS,WRITE
[ A droid. Permissions ]
List contains ~150 permissions I have ever seen that on old BlackBerry
[ A d id P i i G ]
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ACCOUNTS
AFFECTS_BATTERY
APP_INFO
AUDIO_SETTINGS
BLUETOOTH_NETWORK
BOOKMARKS
CALENDAR
CAMERA
COST_MONEY
DEVELOPMENT_TOOLS
DEVICE_ALARMS
DISPLAY
HARDWARE_CONTROLS
LOCATION
MESSAGES
MICROPHONE
NETWORK
PERSONAL_INFO
PHONE_CALLS
SCREENLOCK
SOCIAL_INFO
STATUS_BAR
STORAGE
SYNC_SETTINGS
SYSTEM_CLOCK
SYSTEM_TOOLS
USER_DICTIONA
VOICEMAIL
WALLPAPER
WRITE_USER_D
[ A droid. Permission Groups ]
But there only 30 permissions groups Ihave ever seen that on old BlackBerry
[ A d id Effi i (%) ]
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[ A droid. Efficiency (%) ]
20,00
15,38
28,57
9,52
33,33
25,00
2,00
20,00
8,33 7,14
20,00
15,38
0,00 0,00
10,71
0,00
2,91
0,00
4,557,14
0,00
5,00
10,00
15,00
20,00
25,00
30,00
35,00
40,00
45,00
50,00
% m+a activity vs perm % m+a derived activity vs perm
[ A i i i di ]
7/22/2019 (PDF) Yury Chemerkin Balccon 2013
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[ Average quantitative indicators ]
394,8667,48
9,2332,48 2,01 2,19
38,427,6
435,95
62,37 3,849,68
1,47 1,63 54 20,97
119,31
60,38
7,43 17,07
0,64 0,69
9,06
5,94
102,74
60,638,86 29,26 1,89 2,32
42,0430,48
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Q. APIs Q. sign APIs Q. of m.+a.
activities
Q. of derived
activities
Q. of m.+a.
permissions
Q. of derived
permissions
% m+a activities
vs perm
%m+a derived vs
perm
Android Windows iOS BlackBerry
MDM
E d
d i i
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CAMERA AND VIDEO
HIDE THE DEFAULT CAMERA APPLICATION
PASSWORD
DEFINE PASSWORD PROPERTIES
REQUIRE LETTERS (incl. case)
REQUIRE NUMBERS
REQUIRE SPECIAL CHARACTERS DELETE DATA AND APPLICATIONS FROM THE
DEVICE AFTER
INCORRECT PASSWORD ATTEMPTS
DEVICE PASSWORD
ENABLE AUTO-LOCK
LIMIT PASSWORD AGE
LIMIT PASSWORD HISTORY
RESTRICT PASSWORD LENG
MINIMUM LENGTH FOR TPASSWORD THAT IS ALLOW
ENCRYPTION
APPLY ENCRYPTION RULES
ENCRYPT INTERNAL DEVIC
TOUCHDOWN SUPPORT
MICROSOFT EXCHANGE SY
EMAIL PROFILES
ACTIVESYNC
MDM . Extendyour device security capa
Android CONTROLLEDFOUR GROU
MDM E t d d i it
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BROWSER
DEFAULT APP,
AUTOFILL, COOKIES, JAVASCRIPT, POPUPS
CAMERA, VIDEO, VIDEO CONF
OUTPUT, SCREEN CAPTURE, DEFAULT APP
CERTIFICATES (UNTRUSTED CERTs)
CLOUD SERVICES
BACKUP / DOCUMENT / PICTURE / SHARING
CONNECTIVITY
NETWORK, WIRELESS, ROAMING
DATA, VOICE WHEN ROAMING
CONTENT
CONTENT (incl. EXPLICIT)
RATING FOR APPS/ MOVIES / TV SHOWS / REGIONS
DIAGNOSTICS AND USAGE (SUBMISSION LOGS)
MESSAGING (DEFAULT APP)
BACKUP / DOCUMENT PICTURE / SHA
ONLINE STORE
ONLINE STORES , PURCHASES, PASSW
DEFAULT STORE / BOOK / MUSIC APP
MESSAGING (DEFAULT APP)
PASSWORD (THE SAME WITH ANDROID, NEW BLA
PHONE AND MESSAGING (VOICE DIALING)
PROFILE & CERTs (INTERACTIVE INSTALLATION)
SOCIAL (DEFAULT APP)
SOCIAL APPS / GAMING / ADDING FRI
DEFAULT SOCIAL-GAMING / SOCIAL-V
STORAGE AND BACKUP
DEVICE BACKUP AND ENCRYPTION
VOICE ASSISTANT (DEFAULT APP)
MDM . Extend your device security capa
iOS CONTROLLED16 GROUP
MDM E t d d i it
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GENERAL
MOBILE HOTSPOT AND TETHERING
PLANS APP, APPWORLD
PASSWORD (THE SAME WITH ANDROID, iOS)
BES MANAGEMENT (SMARTPHONES, TABLETS)
SOFTWARE
OPEN WORK EMAIL MESSAGES LINKS IN THE PERSONAL BROWSER
TRANSFER THOUGH WORK PERIMETER TO SAME/ANOTHER DEVICE
BBM VIDEO ACCESS TO WORK NETWORK
VIDEO CHAT APP USES ORGANIZATIONS WI-FI/VPN NETWORK
SECURITY
WIPE WORK SPACE WITHOUT NETWORK, RESTRICT DEV. MODE
VOICE CONTROL & DICTATION IN WORK & USER APPS
BACKUP AND RESTORE (WORK) & DESKTOP SOFTWARE
PC ACCESS TO WORK & PERSONAL SPACE (USB, BT)
PERSONAL SPACE DATA ENCRYPTION
NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL FOR WO
PERSONAL APPS ACCESS TO WORK CO
SHARE WORK DATA DURING BBM VID
WORK DOMAINS, WORK NETWORK U
EMAIL PROFILES
CERTIFICATES & CIPHERS & S/MIME
HASH & ENCRYPTION ALGS AND KEY P
TASK/MEMO/CALENDAR/CONTACT/D
WI-FI PROFILES
ACCESS POINT, DEFAULT GATEWAY, D
PROXY PASSWORD/PORT/SERVER/SU
VPN PROFILES
PROXY, SCEP, AUTH PROFILE PARAMS
TOKENS, IKE, IPSEC OTHER PARAMS
PROXY PORTS, USERNAME, OTHER PA
MDM . Extend your device security capa
BlackBerry (new, 10,qnx) CONTROLLED7 GROUPSONLY
MDM Extend yo r device sec rity capa
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THERE 55 GROUPS CONTROLLED IN ALL
EACH GROUP CONTAINS FROM 10 TO 30 UNITS
ARE CONTROLLED TOO
EACH UNIT IS UNDER A LOT OF FLEXIBLE PARAMs
INSTEAD OF A WAY DISABLE/ENABLED &HIDE/UNHIDE
EACH EVENT IS
CONTROLLED BY CERTAIN PERMISSION
ALLOWED TO CONTROL BY SIMILAR
PERMISSIONS TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE
DESCRIBED 360 PAGES IN ALL THAT IN FOUR TIME
MORE THAN OTHER DOCUMENTS
EACH UNIT CANT CONTROL ACTITSELF
CREATE, READ, WRITE/S
DELETE ACTIONS IN REG
MESSAGES LEAD TO SPO
REQUESTING A MESSAG
ONLY SOME PERMISSIONS ARE
DELETE ANY OTHER APP
SOME PERMISSIONS ARE
WHICH 3RD PARTY PLUGI
IN, INSTEAD OF THAT PLU
MDM . Extend your device security capa
Blackberry(old) Huge amountofpermissions are MD
ISSUES : USELESS SOLUTIONS
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MERGING PERMISSIONS INTO GROUPS, e.g.
SCREEN CAPTURE, CAMERA, VIDEO PERMISSIONS SEPARATED (BlackBerry old)
SCREEN CAPTURE, CAMERA, VIDEO PERMISSIONS MERGED INTO ONE UNIT (Black SCREEN CAPTURE
IS ALLOWED VIA HARDWARE BUTTONS ONLY
NO EMULATION OF HARDWARE BUTTONSAS IT WAS IN OLD BLACKBERRY DEVICES
LOCKS WHEN WORK PERIMITER HAS BECOME TO PREVENT SCREEN-CAPTURE LOGG
OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED SANDBOX
MALWARE IS STILL A PERSONAL APPLICATION SUBTYPE IN TERMS OF (IN-)SECURITY
SANDBOX PROTECTS ONLY APP DATA, WHILE USER DATA STORED IN SHARED FOLDE
INABILITY OF BACKUP MAKE DEVELOPERS TO STORE DATA IN SHARED FOLDERS
ISSUES : USELESS SOLUTIONS
USERFULL IDEAS AT FIRST GLANCE BUT INSTEAD MAKE NO SENSE
ISSUES : USELESS SOLUTIONS
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SECURE & INSECURE APP IN THE SAME TIME
HAS ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATION SESSIONS, AND MAY STORE CHAT COVERSATION WITHOUT E
STORE SENSITIVE DATA IN PLAINTEXT (PASSW, PASSPORT DETAILS, CARD INFO) AND BELIEVE IN PO
UPGRADE FEATURE AFFECT EVERYTHING
MAY UPDATE/REMOVE ANY OTHER APP - SURPRISE
REPACKAGES STILL HAVE AN ACCESS TO THE SAME DATA AS AN ORIGINAL APP
DEBUG/NOT ORIGINAL SIGNATURE PROBLEM THATS NOT A PROBLEM CLIPBOARD (SECURE CLIPBOARD HAS NEVER EXISTED ANYWHERE AND MIGHT HAVE EVER)
REVEAL THE DATA IN REAL TIME BY ONE API CALL
ACCESSIBLE BY APIs AS WELL AS FILE DATA (DEPENDS ON YOUR OS)
NATIVE WALLETS PROTECTS BY RETURNING NULL (ONLY OLD-BLACKBERRY)
WHILE THE ON TOP || JUST MINIMIZE OR CLOSE IT TO GET FULL ACCESS
EVERY USER MUST MINIMIZE APP TO PASTE A PASSWORD
ISSUES : USELESS SOLUTIONS
USERFULL IDEAS AT FIRST GLANCE BUT INSTEAD MAKE NO SENSE
ISSUES : USELESS SOLUTIONS
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GUI EXPLOITATION HAPPENS (OLD BLACKBERRY, ANDROID REPACKAGES)
REDRAWING THE SCREENS (OLD BB ONLY), GRABBING THE TEXT FROM ANY FIELDs (INCL. PASSWORD FIELD)
ADDING, REMOVING THE FIELD DATA
ORIGINAL DATA IS INACCESSIBLE BUT NOT AFFECTED
KASPERSKY MOBILE SECURITY PROVIDES AN INSECURITY,
NO PROTECTION FROM REMOVING.CODs & UNDER SIMULATOR
EXAMING THE TRAFFIC, BEHAVIOUR
JUST SHOULD CHECK API IS SIMULATOR ONLY SMS MANAGEMENT VIA QUITE SECRET SMS (NOT ENCRYPTED, HASH ONLY)
THE SAME SECRET AMONG OPERATING SYSTEMS (BB, ANDROID, WINDOWS,)
PASSWORD IS 416 DIGITS,AND MODIFIED IN REAL-TIME (OLD BLACKBERRY, OR ANDROID REPACKAGES)
SMS IS A HALF A HASH VALUE OF GOST R 34.11-94
HASH IMPLEMENTATION USES TEST CRYPTO VALUES AND NO SALT
TABLES (VALUEHASH) ARE EASY BUILT
OUTCOMING SMS CAN BE SPOOFED WITHOUT ANY NOTIFICATION, BECAUSE KMS DELETE THE SENT MESSAGES
OUTCOMING SMS COULD BLOCK/WIPE THE SAME/ANOTHER DEVICE
ISSUES : USELESS SOLUTIONS
USERFULL IDEAS AT FIRST GLANCE BUT INSTEAD MAKE NO SENSE
COMPLIANCE AND MDM
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Device diversity
Configuration management
Software Distribution
Device policy compliance & enforcement
Enterprise Activation
Logging
Security Settings
Security Wipe, LockIAM
Make you sure to start managing security under
uncertain terms without AI
Refers to NIST-800-53 and other
Sometimes missed requirem
locking device, however it i
A bit details than CSA
No statements on permission man
Make you sure to start managing
uncertain terms without AI
COMPLIANCE AND MDM
CSA Mobile Device Management: KeyComponents NIST-124
CONCLUSION
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DENIAL OF SERVICE
REPLACING/REMOVING FILES
DOSing EVENTs, GUI INTERCEPT INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
CLIPBOARD, SCREEN CAPTURE
GUI INTERCEPT
SHARED FOLDERS
DUMPING .COD/.BAR/APK FILES
MITM (INTERCEPTION / SPOOFI
MESSAGES
GUI INTERCEPT, THIRD PA
FAKE WINDOW/CLICKJAC
GENERAL PERMISSIONS
INSTEAD OF SPECIFIC SU
A FEW NOTIFICATION/EV
USER
BUILT PER APPLICATION
SCREENs
CONCLUSION
PRIVILEGED GENERAL PERMISSIONS OWNAPPs, NATIVE & 3RDPARTY APP
CONCLUSION
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SIMPLIFICATION AND REDUCING SECURITY CONTROLS
MANY GENERAL PERMISSIONS AND COMBINED INTO EACH OTHER
NO LOGs ACTIVITY FOR SUB-PERMISSIONS TO PROVE THE TRANSPARENCY
ANY SECURITY VULNERABILITY ARE ONLY FIXED BY ENTIRELY NEW AND DIFFERENT OS / KER
A FEW PERMISSIONs ARE CLOSED TO THE USER ACTIONS
THE SANDBOX PROTECT ONLY APPLICATION DATA
USERS HAVE TO STORE THEIR DATA INTO SHARED FOLDERS OR EXTERNAL STORAGE
APPLICATIONS CONTINUE STORE DATA IN PUBLIC FOLDERs BECAUSE GOVERNED BY CHANC MITM / INTERCEPTION ACTIONS ARE OFTEN SILENTLY
THE NATIVE SPOOFING AND INTERCEPTION FEATURES
COMPLIANCE DOES NOT EXTEND MDM CAPABILITIES JUST REPEATS IT THE MOST GRANULAR SECURITY (PERMISSIONS) RULED BY AMAZON WEB SERVICES
PERMISSIONS SHOULD RELY ON THE DIFFERENT USEFUL CASES SET INSTEAD OF SPECIFIC PE
CONCLUSION
THEVENDOR SECURITYVISION HAS NOTHING WITH REALITY AGGRAVATED BY S
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Q & A
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