Invoking Islamic Rights Islamic Rights In British India: Mawlana Ashraf ‘ Ali Thanawi’s H uq u q al-Islam Ali Altaf Mian Duke University Durham, North Carolina and Nancy Nyquist

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

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Invoking Islamic Rights In British India: Mawlana Ashraf

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Ali Thanawi’s

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uq

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Ali Altaf Mian

Duke UniversityDurham, North Carolina

and

Nancy Nyquist Potter

University of LouisvilleLouisville, Kentucky

They say that it’s a man’s world,but you can’t prove that by me.— Aretha Franklin, “Do right woman, do right man” (1967).

T

he year 1857 is of immense significance in Indian history, specifically in the history of South Asian Islam. This year marked the end of six centuries of North India’s Muslim sovereignty and the official beginnings

of British colonization of the Indian Subcontinent. The loss of Muslim rule heightened Indian Muslims’ concerns for preserving their religion and culture. Moreover, the failure of the Mutiny of 1857 forced them to turn to other options for safeguarding their spiritual and religious tradition(s). Traditional theologians and modern reformers alike turned to educational institutions. Schools founded in the late nineteenth-century include Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s

Mohammadan-Anglo College

, Mu

h

ammad Mongiri’s

Nadwat al-

“

Ulama

, and Mu

h

ammad Qasim Nanotwi’s

Dar al-

“

Ulum Deoband

. The two latter institutions in particular attempted to foster traditional religious imaginaries.

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These institutions produced traditional theologians (

“

ulama

), some of whom were quite vociferous in emphasizing continuity and devaluing change. Perhaps the most prolific of these

“

ulama

was the mystic-theologian Mawlana Ashraf

‘

Ali Thanawi (1863–1943), a graduate of Dar al-

‘

Ulum Deoband. In this article, we analyze how Thanawi invoked morality and ethics to design an Islamic system of rights (

h

uq

u

q

) and moral boundaries (

hudud

).

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Thanawi imagined a particular form of religious subjectivity and sociality centered on the

shar

i

“

at

. His thoughts on ethics and morality form an integral part of this form of subjectivity and sociality. He argued that “upright” moral behavior and fulfilling the rights of the Creator (

h

uq

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q al-Khaliq

), the rights of creation (

h

uq

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q al-khalq

), and rights of the individual (

h

uq

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q al-nafs

) were major constituents of a Muslim’s personal and social identities. If a Muslim embodied this system of rights, Thanawi argued, he or she would preserve Muslim social decorum in colonial India. Thanawi’s system of rights is therefore deeply intertwined with social manners. After setting out his general views on rights and social manners, we specifically analyze passages from his

H

uq

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q al-Islam

to illustrate how traditional Muslim theologians (

“

ulama

) articulated detailed moral guidelines.

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At the same time, we unearth the assumptions undergirding

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q al-Islam

that are worrisome insofar as they reinstate asymmetrical power structures, especially when it comes to gender, the colonial state apparatus, and class. A translation of

H

uq

u

q al-Islam

is provided as an Appendix to this article; we suggest readers consider the text before reading our analyses.

The Deobandi Social Imaginary

Social manners are an important feature of any social imaginary. For the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, a social imaginary refers to the “ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations.”

4

Our examination of Thanawi’s

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uq

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q al-Islam

identifies the “normative notions” and individual and social expectations featured in the social imaginary invoked by Deobandi

“

ulama. The particular social mannerisms emphasized by Thanawi were not only derivative from the Qur’an, hadiths, and normative schools of Sunni jurisprudence, but also reflective of his particular socio-historical religious aura.

Born in 1863 in the northeastern Indian city of Thana Bhawan, Thanawi’s spiritual and intellectual milieu buzzed with reverence for God’s friends (awliya” Allah) and Sufi masters (shuyukh-e-tasawwuf ). Graduating from the Islamic seminary of Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband in 1884, Thanawi settled in the nearby Cawnpore and taught texts from the dars-e-nizami curriculum for

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the next fourteen years. By the turn of the century, his biographers report he had received authorization (ijazat) to initiate others into his spiritual mentor Haji Imdad Allah’s Chishti-Sabiri Sufi order. It is noteworthy that Thanawi adopted a stricter attitude toward Sufism that was only partially informed by his shaykh’s teachings. Nonetheless, he pursued his reformist Sufi efforts from his shaykh’s spiritual center (khanaqah), the Khanaqah Imdadiyya Ashrafiyya in Thana Bhawan.5

Thanawi’s religious aura placed most emphasis on not only fulfilling the rights of others, but also on respect (ihtiram) for the elderly, kindness (shafqat) toward the youth, and reverence (ta “zim) for the religious elite. Politeness in speech (bat mey narmi), cleanliness in external appearance (kapro ki safai), and exchange of proper greetings (salam du“a ka dhang) were not options, but requirements. Traditional religious settings attempted to instill these moral mores in the subject. Though many of Thanawi’s works on social mannerisms are pastiches of the works of earlier Muslim theologians, his uniqueness is his insistence on the significance of moral rights and social decorum. This is evidenced by the following quote from his lecture, “Ulum al-“ ibad min “ulum al-rashad:

Not only must you protect the wealth of Muslims, but you must also protect their lives and respect. All of these things are included in the ‘rights of God’s slaves’ (huquq al-“ ibad ) . . . In some aspects, social mannerism (mu“asharat) is even more important than daily prayer (namaz) and fasting (roza). This is so because shortcoming in these worships only amounts to the loss of the individual, whereas shortcoming in social mannerism leads to the loss of others.6

According to Thanawi, Muslims living in colonial India were in an unfortunate position not only in terms of their meager political representation, but also because of a void in spiritual tutelage or disciplining (tarbiyat) that had traditionally nurtured the above-mentioned morals in the human subject. For Thanawi, ideal moral subjectivity was cultivated best through the combination of the madrasa and the khanaqah. In large part, he addressed this lack of spiritual and moral tutelage through his prolific writings, which ranged over a vast variety of Islamic topics, including rights and social mannerisms. His task in pamphlets and books such as Huquq al-Islam (Islamic Rights), Adab al-mu“asharat (Social Mannerisms), Huquq al-walidayn (The Rights of Parents), and Al-Hilat al-najizah li’l-halilat al-“ajiza (The Consummate Stratagem for the Powerless Wife) was to illustrate the theological bases for his formulation of an Islamic system of rights. Thus, he attempted to ground his reformation in the Qur’an, hadith compilations, and selected writings of past “ulama. It is in these and other writings of Thanawi where we find textual delineation of the social imaginary invoked by the thousands of “ulama identified as Deobandi.

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From Thanawi’s writings, we can identify the structure of the Deobandi social imaginary, for his thoughts on what constitutes a Muslim’s subjectivity and sociality flourished among the Deobandis. This is not to say that all Deobandi “ulama followed Thanawi. In fact, there were huge differences between Thanawi’s passive political stances and the political activism of “ulama such as Sayyid Husayn Ahmad Madani (1879–1957). However, no Deobandi “alim disagreed with Thanawi’s moral teachings. Thanawi laid overwhelming emphasis on shari “at, relegating everything else Islamic under its aegis. By shari “at, which he interchangeably used with the word islam, he meant a comprehensive body of beliefs and practices. He divided shari “at into five parts:

1. Belief (iman)2. Worship (“ibadat)3. Social Mannerisms (mu“asharat)4. Social/Business Transactions (mu“amalat)5. Character (akhlaq)

We can view these five categories of Islam as the five essential constituents of the Deobandi social imaginary. Though other historical and particular Muslim social imaginaries also emphasized these elements, we can distinguish the Deobandi social imaginary by what it emphasized within these categories. For example, iman implies adherence to such texts of Ash‘arite theology as al-“Aqidat al-Tahawiyya. “Ibadat means the details of Hanafi jurisprudence. Such a view of “ibadat is evident in Thanawi’s Bihishti zewar (Heavenly Ornaments). Social mannerism or mu“asharat, which we discuss at length in this article, refers to a hierarchical system of rights. Social transactions or mu“amalat are basically Hanafi rules pertaining to business transactions. Character or akhlaq refers to pursuing a spiritual relationship with a qualified Deobandi Sufi master. In this way, these five discourses are not necessarily the five departments of Islam, as Thanawi emphasized, but rather five sources of the self for Deobandis. Though Deobandis may resist such a strong characterization (some of them do not like to be labeled Deobandi), the specific meanings we attach to these five categories are evident in their self-defining texts. For instance, Qari Muhammad Tayyib (d. 1983), a disciple of Thanawi, outlines what it means to be a Deobandi in “Ulama-e Deoband ka dini rukh awr maslaki mizaj.7 Thanawi’s thought on social mannerisms and rights therefore form an integral part of the Deobandi social imaginary.

Some Implications of “Islamic Rights”In contemporary discourses on ethics, scholars and policy-makers usually

postulate basic rights as “human rights.” However, Thanawi avoids using the



term “human rights” when deciphering his Islamic articulation of rights. For him, Islamic rights include those of non-humans as well, such as the rights of God, the rights of angels, and the rights of animals. Situating rights in Muslim legal traditions, or schools of fiqh, Thanawi emphasized the full protection of rights, whether they are the rights of one’s spouse or those of one’s neighbor. Thanawi was unique in emphasizing the details of “upright” social living and interpersonal ethics as mandated by the Qur’an and the Prophet.8 Through his prolific writings and eloquent lectures, Thanawi aimed at imparting a comprehensive system of rights to his Muslim audience. He criticized ordinary Muslims for considering their religion a mere set of beliefs and worships.

Insofar as social mannerisms and rights, Thanawi had problems with both scripturalists and mystics. Though both groups emphasize beliefs and worships, he argued that the scripturalists highlight correctness in social and business transactions and the Sufis stress internal purification. However, for him, both groups had ignored social mannerisms and civil morality (mu“asharat). “The Qur’an, hadiths, and the statements of Muslim sages, refute the claim that this branch of Islam [i.e., social mannerisms] has no relationship with religion,” emphasized Thanawi. He held that social mannerisms are deeply rooted in the Islamic tradition and thus these issues deserved the theoretical and practical attention of Muslims. He pointed out that the lack of sincere goodwill and unity among Muslims was due to the corruption of their social behavior. Social vices were therefore an impediment in the construction of an ideal moral subject. Explaining the consequences of this depravity of social mannerisms, he said, “This state of affairs impedes and eliminates tranquility of the heart, which is of pivotal importance for mutual love among the members of a society.”

In Thanawi’s view, Islamic teachings offer pristine rules for social and interpersonal existence. The Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings not only emphasize rituals such as the daily prayers and fasting, but also social character traits such as politeness, courtesy, and respect for others. In Adab al-mu“asharat, Thanawi mentions the following two Qur’anic verses to support his claim that social mannerisms are an established theme of the Qur’an:

O believers! When you are told to make room in the assemblies, (spread out and) make room. God will give you (ample) room (from God’s Mercy). And when you are told to rise up, rise up. God will exalt in degree those of you who believe, and those who have been granted knowledge. And God is Well-Acquainted with what you do. (Qur’an, 58: 11)

This verse links the spaciousness of character to making space for the other. In other words, this edict enjoins social inclusiveness. God rewards these acts



of inclusiveness by making room in divine mercy for the one who accommodates others. In another passage, the Qur’an says:

O believers! Enter not houses other than your own, until you have asked permission and greeted those in them; that is better for you, in order that you may remember. And if you find no one therein, still, enter not until permission has been given. And if you are asked to go back, go back, for it is purer for you. And God is All-Knower of what you do. (Qur’an, 24: 27)

For Thanawi, this verse establishes the sanctity of the private sphere. One has to seek permission to enter spaces in which people are not held accountable by the standard norms of their public spheres. In other words, the right to individual privacy is a mandate of the Qur’an. After citing these two Qur’anic passages, Thanawi writes, “These two verses command consideration for others, for those who happen to be present in a gathering and for the inmates of the house.” Such statements indicate that Thanawi paid close attention to the ethics of sociality and the need to protect the rights of the other.

Islamic rights, Thanawi argued, are not only mandated by the Qur’an and integral to fiqh but are also rational. He explained their rationality by invoking a unique argument. For him, each right is based on a favor, which may pertain to religious or worldly matters. A Muslim ought to fulfill God’s rights because of God’s favors upon her or him. Religious favors of God include: the angels, who acted as divine messengers to God’s prophets; books of God that outline laws for humans; and messengers and prophets, who embodied God’s law. Thanawi included the family and companions of the Prophet along with Muslim theologians in the category of religious favors. Other divine favors include the ability to engage in the remembrance of God (dhikr) and incantations, ease in religion, the capacity of insight, and the virtuous qualities of the heart, such as contentment. Worldly favors from God include our parents, water, food, sun, day, night, and medicines. Because we are given so much, Thanawi argued, we are required by Islamic law to express gratitude. The best way to show one’s gratefulness to God, he said, was by fulfilling the rights of God.

Thanawi’s articulation of rights is also amenable to the oft-invoked binary of civil rights and moral rights. Civil rights are those that a particular governing body grants its citizens. They vary from one nation-state to another. Moral rights, on the other hand, are often viewed as universal; they are rights we have just by virtue of being human. For example, we might say that everyone has the right to be treated with respect regardless of skin color or ethnicity. The binary of civil and moral rights works hand-in-hand with the notion of



duty. If one has the right to freedom of assembly, then others have the duty not to interfere with that right. When everyone in a society shares the freedom of religion, then all members of the society also have a duty not to interfere with that freedom. When a member’s rights are violated, the governing body has the duty to restore the imbalance by penalizing the violators. Hence, the existence of rights imposes duties on those who enjoy these rights; furthermore, for mutual rights to be respected and honored, all members of society must honor a fundamental obligation, i.e., not to interfere unjustifiably with the rights of others. Thanawi also connected rights with duties. Accounts of Thanawi’s life illustrate that he recognized the significance of civil rights and his duties as a civil subject. The following anecdote supplies evidence.

Once during a journey by train, Thanawi approached the luggage counter. The cashier recognized him and said, “Why do you trouble yourself to weigh the luggage? Board the train and no one will ask you regarding this or demand penalty for carrying excess luggage, for I will inform the guard on this train.” Thanawi asked him how far that guard would accompany him. He replied, “Until the next station.” Thanawi said, “What will happen after that?” He said, “The guard will instruct the next guard to let you travel with the excess luggage.” Thanawi asked, “How far will that guard see me through?” “He will accompany you to the end of the journey,” said the guard. Thanawi replied, “But, I have to travel further.” The cashier said, “How much further?” Thanawi replied, “I have to go beyond that to God Most Exalted, which guard will accompany me there and help me get through the reckoning [on the Day of Judgment]?” After that, Thanawi reminded the cashier that he was just an employee who was not authorized to allow anyone to carry extra luggage without paying the fare. He further said to the cashier, “I may get through the authorities in this world because of your abatement, but the little unlawful money I save thereby will become part of my wealth. I will be questioned by God about my unlawful savings and I do not know of any guard who will save me there.” The cashier realized his mistake and Thanawi paid for the excess luggage and then boarded the train.9 Thus, Thanawi realized that it was his right, along with all citizens of colonial India, to be able to ride the train. Along with this right was attached the duty of paying for one’s ride and excess luggage. That Thanawi did not consider himself an exception shows that he deeply respected the notions of right and duty.

Thanawi devoted many of his writings to the topic of moral rights. He enumerated moral rights into many categories: the rights of God, those of prophets and messengers, those of the angels, those of one’s parents, those of one’s spouse, those of one’s children, and so on. As stated earlier, his description of rights can thus be seen at three levels: the rights of God (huquq Allah), the rights of the creation (huquq al-khalq), and the rights of



one’s own self (huquq al-nafs). Among the rights of the creation, the most important are those of human beings. They are termed huquq al-“ibad, which literally means the rights of [God’s] slaves, because the condition of being a slave of God implies that one’s responsibilities and the agency to fulfill them are determined by God. “Slave of God” also implies that rights (huquq) operate concomitantly with moral boundaries (hudud ). Although the rights of God are greater than the rights of all others, Thanawi pointed out that God is not in need of the fulfillment of God’s rights, and foregoing the rights of God cannot harm God, but will hurt only the forgoer. On the other hand, neglecting human rights will hurt both the forgoer and the person whose rights were ignored, and thus more emphasis is laid on fulfilling human rights. Thanawi argued that humans need each other, and that their social life is contingent upon mutual fulfillment of rights. If these rights are neglected, then society will fall into mayhem. In fact, a central feature of Thanawi’s Huquq al-Islam is the preservation of the social order, albeit at the cost of reinstating a classical and medieval hierarchical cosmology, classism, and the hegemony of male figures (the father, husband, brother, and son) in the domestic sphere.

Thanawi’s Huquq al-IslamIn categorizing “Islamic rights,” Thanawi sets up a cosmological hierarchy

with God at the top.10 Thanawi argued that “the rights of God” form the basis for all other rights; he deduced this point from the following Qur’anic verse:

O humankind! Show reverence to your Guardian-Lord, who created you from a single person, created, of like nature, his mate, and from them scattered (like seeds) countless men and women; fear God, through Whom you demand your mutual (rights), and (reverence) the wombs (that bore you): for God ever watches over you. (Qur’an, 4: 1).

According to this Qur’anic verse, God watches over both the fulfillment of the “rights of God” and “human rights.” The rights of God, therefore, are the foundations upon which all other rights rest. “The foremost right entrusted to the human being,” writes Thanawi, “is the right of God the Glorious.” It may be useful to ask what assumptions underpinned Thanawi’s conception of “God.” For Thanawi, God entrusted to human beings the responsibility of honoring God’s rights. Given the Qur’an’s emphasis on the self-sufficiency of God, what does it add to God for human beings to honor God’s rights when such rights include, as Thanawi wrote, “Believing in the essence (dhat) and qualities (sifat) of God as they appear in the Qur’an and the Hadith?” It is clear how human beings benefit from entertaining such an enterprise with God, but how would a self-sufficient God benefit from these beliefs? It may be interesting to point out that in trusting someone with a task, one places in



another’s care something that one values, perhaps highly, while doing so always runs the risk that the one entrusted might fail, betray, or is indifferent to this trust. Does this not leave the trusting one in a state of vulnerability?11 In other words, is God also vulnerable? At this juncture, we are not concerned with how one answers these questions. These rhetorical questions are raised to highlight the significance of a dialogical relationship between a human being and God. Perhaps the notion of God’s rights can be mobilized to argue that the subject of Deobandi social imaginary can engage God by her or his moral transactions. Though Deobandi theologians do not admit it, this point opens the way for a theology of negotiation and dialogue.

Leaving these questions aside, we can safely assert that Thanawi began with the “Rights of God” both to instill theological authority in his text and to point out to his readers that although they may be the victims of imperialism in colonial India, it was their religious relationship with a sovereign God that should encourage them to become optimistic and look toward their “positive” subject position in a greater cosmos. For Thanawi, the best form of resistance to subjugation at the hands of European imperial powers was not political action, but pacifist spiritual self-reformation. In their attempts to purify their souls and hearts, Thanawi expected Muslims to rely on and learn from “God-fearing” theologians. By enumerating the rights of the Prophet Muhammad, the angels, Muhammad’s Companions, and religious theologians and sages, he also reasserted the authority of the tradition in which this articulation of rights carries religious currency. It is interesting to note that Thanawi aimed to liberate colonial Muslims from British oppression, while at the same time to conserve the traditional norms of patriarchal Islamic authority. Consider, for example, the categories of rights after the “Rights of God”: the rights of Muhammad, the Companions, the angels, the theologians, and the sages. Traditionally, those in these categories have been conceptualized as either sexless (as in the case of the angels) or males (as in the case of the prophets, theologians, and sages).

Interestingly, when it comes to the rights of the angels, Thanawi not only highlighted issues of belief (i.e., believing in the angels), but also matters of bodily performance and social mannerism. He connected the “rights of angels” to the bodily performance of a human being because his audience supposedly would be more serious in listening to his advice if they saw their “immoral” actions as offending God’s angels, whom they may regard as their protectors. He wrote:

The angels are discomforted when a person does the following: going to the mosque after consuming odorous foods or substances (such as tobacco), passing gas in the mosque, to keep a picture of animate objects, to pet a dog without religious permission, to speak a lie, to stay



in a seminal defiled state ( janaba) and missing prayer (salah) due to it, and to remain naked without a religious or personal necessity even in solitude, etc.

These advices on correct moral behavior, which he includes in such categories as “rights of angels,” suggest that Thanawi employed the traditional binary of mind-body. The expectation was that the mind ought to have control over the body because the mind is superior. The inferiority of the body vis-à-vis the mind is not unique to his thinking; it permeates much philosophical and theological writing. This view, called dualism, holds that our ability to reason is what separates us from the animals and hence ought to be the governing part of us. The rational self should govern the bodily self. The body is suspect not only in Thanawi’s view, but also in many other religious discourses: the body is the site of fluids, odors, blood, and illness; it is the source of lust, sensuality, appetites, and drives for physical pleasures. It is not to be trusted. As a parent guides a child, so must reason guide passion and the mind guide the bodily needs and pleasures.

Historically, the mind-body dichotomy has been associated with gender. From the time of the ancients, mind has been associated with maleness and body with femaleness. Aristotle, for example, cites the Pythagorean “table of opposites,” where male-good-light contrasts with female-bad-dark, and extends these opposites to include reason with the former and emotion with the latter.12 These associations continued over time to include the following:

Male FemaleMind BodyParent ChildLight DarkReason EmotionObjectivity SubjectivityCulture Nature

Thanawi inherited and inadvertently perpetuated these dichotomies through his teachings, especially when it came to women’s rights. Thanawi privileged a patriarchal domestic sphere. For example, the lack of parallels between the rights of the husband and those of the wife is clearly visible in Huquq al-Islam. Consider one of the rights of the husband: “The wife should try her best to obey, respect, serve, and please her husband.” Thanawi remained silent when it came to such reciprocal rights of the wife. In conjunction with traditional patriarchal cultures, he advised the husband to provide for the basic necessities of his wife and impart an Islamic education to his wife while encouraging her to practice these teachings.13 Note how notions of “basic necessities” remain unspecified and vague, and are therefore left to the



goodwill of the husband. Also deserving attention is how the husband was the authority on Islamic teaching and the wife had no acknowledged qualifications to teach him. What if the wife also had knowledge of traditional Islam? According to Thanawi, she could rely on her knowledge to ascertain the religious authenticity of his demands, and if she found him to be disobeying Islamic law at any point, Thanawi suggested that she should not obey him. This created a limited space of agency for wives within traditional Islamic households. However, the wife was not expected to teach him even if she had the qualifications to do so. In this light, the husband was seen as the mind of the family, while the wife was the body of the family.

Thanawi, however, was not misogynist. As a well-qualified jurist of the legal tradition of the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence, he implemented certain changes within canonical Hanafi law that gave Muslim women rights such as the right to divorce their husband under certain conditions. Thanawi therefore realized the social constructedness of traditional Hanafi edicts. If orthodox legal theories did not shed light on matters contemporary, Thanawi exercised an Islamic jurist’s right to modify the details of such theories. He writes in Al-Hillat al-najizah li”l-halilat al-“ajizah, “It is likely that the Hanafi School may be questioned on the ground of adequacy. The answer to this criticism would be that this school does allow, with certain conditions, subscription to the views of other mujtahids [Islamic jurists] in the event of some dire need.”14 As Furqan Ahmad points out, “Some of the Indian legislative measures enacted in the area of Islamic law in the early twentieth century were based on his [Thanawi’s] juristic recommendations.”15 The U. P. Muslim Wakf Act of 1936, the Shari “at Act of 1936, and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939 were all triggered or influenced by Thanawi’s juristic opinions and efforts. The historian of Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband notes that Thanawi “presented the legal ways of deliverance of forlorn and helpless wives from their oppressive husbands” in his book Al-Hilat al-najizah li”l-halilat al-“ajiza.16

Thus, Thanawi’s aim of liberation for Indian Muslims was complex; his attitudes were sometimes progressive for his times and sometimes confirmed past gender asymmetries. We see this not only in his views on women’s roles and responsibilities in nineteenth century India, but also in his instructions to “the ruled” (mahkum) in Huquq al-Islam. On the one hand, he warned rulers not to “issue severe and arduous rules” and to forgive the ruled who disrespected them. On the other hand, the ruled must not complain about being oppressed. Furthermore, the ruled must be soft-hearted toward the ruler. Given the context of colonial India, the identification of the rulers is ambiguous. Clearly, Thanawi means to advise the Muslim underclass that they should be subordinate. But it cannot be ignored that the ultimate rulers of the



time were the British. Hence, Thanawi, by instructing the ruled to take their complaints to God rather than to their rulers, appears to caution Muslims not to rebel politically against their colonizers.

What is striking in these admonishments toward obedience is, first of all, their unhappy cooperation with colonialism and, secondly, their parallel with the dichotomies of differential value between men and women, mind and body, and light and dark. In Huquq al-Islam, Thanawi stated that “a king, his viceroy, and a master are included in the category of the ruler.” The king referred to in this passage is, of course, the king of the United Kingdom. Thanawi not only required Muslims to recognize the king of the United Kingdom, but also to obey him as part of their religious obligations. By advising Indian Muslims to comply with British rule, he inadvertently closed off any possible space of political resistance to imperial subjugation. British rulers were to be obeyed and respected even under oppression — unless the rules went against divine law — and this assumption bears some investigating. Why should Thanawi’s audience accept their inferior subject position?

Thanawi was at heart a pragmatist, and he advised Muslims to accept the reality of British domination because he argued that political resistance would only lead to civil chaos. Much of Huquq al-Islam therefore urged a continuation of the existing social order. But this view can be found all the way back to Aristotle and earlier, as we discussed above. Aristotle held the view that men, women, and slaves had fundamentally different capacities for reasoning and hence the social world should be divided into those who are natural rulers (Greek male citizens) and the rest, who are by nature the ruled (women and slaves). The phallocentricity inherent in this ancient way of thinking was a legacy that continued to predicate the assumptions of Muslim theologians such as Thanawi. While Indian Muslims were not enslaved, they were subjects under colonial rule and few doubted their unequal status. Thanawi’s pacifist response to colonial rule added religious legitimacy to the view that the British should be obeyed. As he stated, “If the ruler does something against the temperament of the ruled, then the ruled should be patient. They should not complain and curse the ruler, but should beseech God the Most High to bestow their ruler with soft-heartedness.” God governs the oppressed and they should seek refuge in God to help them live with worldly oppression. Although he never said it, Thanawi’s views posited Indians as a metaphorical body that unconsciously accepted the superior reasoning capacity of the British. By invoking these persistent hierarchies of power and subordination, Thanawi unintentionally reinforced colonial relationships.

Huquq al-Islam also presumed hierarchies of class. Thanawi’s aphorisms tended to address members of the middle or upper classes among Indian



Muslims (i.e., the ashraf ). As Barbara Daly Metcalf notes, “Urdu publications had an audience among the Muslim upper class of the east and, most importantly, among much of the population of the north.”17 According to Thanawi, a Muslim should “fulfill the needs” of other Muslims. He or she should also “help them in transportation when they are unable to afford their own means of transportation.” The rights of the neighbor included “sending gifts to them occasionally, and if they were in need, making sure to send food to them regularly.” He also advised Muslims to “financially assist orphans.” For one’s guests, one should “provide for their needs and look after their particular requirements, so that they feel at home.” One should also “make some special meals for the guest at least for the first day.” At the same time, “the guest should keep in mind not to become a burden on the host by staying for a long period of time and by making extravagant requests.” These injunctions implied that Thanawi either addressed only the affluent members of his audience, or that he placed burdensome financial obligations on all Muslims. Those who were financially impoverished could not possibly have lived up to such obligations, and would have come to believe that they were not able to fulfill all Islamic rights, particularly with respect to financial duties. Although Thanawi attempted to guard the rights of impoverished Muslims through Huquq al-Islam, he nonetheless made the poor feel inadequate with regard to participating in the ideals of social mannerisms and Islamic rights.

ConclusionTheologians such as Thanawi did not write in a vacuum, as they attempted

to base the entirety of their individual and social existence in an “authentic” Islamic identity. The “ulama were also mobilized in the paradoxical “net-like organization” of British power that simultaneously facilitated subjectivation and subjection. Although Thanawi put his allegiance to traditional Islamic discourses at the center of his episteme, nonetheless the European peripheries of this center outlined the parameters of identity. In other words, relegating European modes of subjectivity to the peripheries of individual and social existence is concomitant with enabling these peripheries to determine what can or cannot become of the center.

Although Thanawi may have garnered moral authority by emphasizing rights, this authority rested on the usurpation that occurs when one assumes a collective voice. As Theodor Adorno says, “The collective language attractive to the writer who suspects his isolation of romanticism, is no less romantic: he usurps the voice of those for whom he cannot speak directly, as one of them, because his language, through reification, is as divorced from them as all are from each other; because the present form of the collective is in itself



speechless.”18 Thanawi employed a collective language that made religion the sole basis of subjectivity and collectivity, shunning other sources of the self and society. More severely, he deemphasized personal definitions of virtue and value at the expense of reinstating the Deobandi social imaginary. Most severely, however, was his emphasis of the relegation of women into inferior subject positions, a quietist attitude toward British colonialism, and framing social rights in a way that privileges the upper and middle classes over the lower and impoverished sectors of society.

Of course, Thanawi must be situated within his life-world. As discussed above, he took some positive steps toward the utilization of Islamic moral theories and jurisprudence for certain oppressed persons. Our critiques of Thanawi are therefore not critiques of the historicized Thanawi, but the imitative Thanawi who is often invoked in contemporary Deobandi settings as an ideal model of constructive Muslim theology. This alarming trend is visible not only in the Indian Subcontinent, but also in the South Asian Muslim diaspora, especially in world urban centers from Johannesburg to London to Chicago. We have argued that Thanawi’s invocation of rights, though important in many ways, has huge drawbacks and therefore cannot be invoked in its entirety for embodiment in contemporary settings. To do so would be to reinstate such evils as classism and sexism.

Appendix Translation of Ashraf {Ali Thanawi’s Huquq al-Islam By Ali Altaf Mian

IntroductionAfter praising God and sending salutations on His Messenger, it is clear in

the light of tradition and reason that the fulfillment of certain rights has been demanded from us. These rights include those pertaining to God the Most High and those pertaining to fellow human beings. From human rights, some rights pertain to their religious matters and some pertain to their worldly life, among these are the rights of relatives, rights reserved for particular individuals, rights of common Muslims, rights of the elderly, rights of the youth, and rights of peers, and likewise.

Many people are unaware of the Islamic system of rights because of their ignorance, while others, despite knowing them, are lackadaisical in fulfilling them because of their immorality. Thus, it was my heart’s desire to compile a short treatise on this subject. It is hoped that people will benefit from this, although, Qadi Thana’Ullah Panipati’s Haqiqat al-Islam, which has been cited in my book Furu“ al-Iman as well, was a sufficient guidebook in this subject. Thus, I deemed it sufficient to summarize his book, however, I have added



some additional points wherever necessary. Thus, I start this treatise by naming it Huquq al-Islam (Islamic Rights), which contains a few chapters, each enumerating rights.

The Rights of God the Most HighThe foremost right entrusted to the human being is the right of God the

Glorious, who bestows upon us life and sustains us with His countless bounties. He delivered us out of misguidance into guidance. He made us hopeful in attaining multiple favors and bounties when we act righteously. These are the rights of God upon His worshippers:

1. Believing in the essence (dhat) and qualities (sifat) of God as they appear in the Qur’an and the Hadith.

2. Adhering and following that which is liked by God the Most High and to abstain from that which is disliked by Him in terms of beliefs, actions, transactions, and character.

3. Giving the pleasure and love of God the Most High precedence over that of all others.

4. Loving and to despise, to give and to withhold, solely for the sake of God the Most High.

The Rights of Divine Messengers and AngelsWe were enlightened with the knowledge of God’s essence (dhat)

and His qualities (sifat), as well as His likings and dislikings, by way of divine prophets and messengers, and the angels of God the Most High brought revelation and guidance to them, thus after the rights of God the Most High, are the rights of the divine messengers and angels. The messengers of God conveyed to us many benefits pertaining to our worldly life, and warned us against many dangers as well. The angels of God are appointed by God the Most High to oversee many of our beneficial affairs, and thus, they perform these tasks. Thus, the rights of the angels fall under the rights of God the Most High. From all creation, the one who has done the most favors on us is the Prophet Muhammad, thus his rights on us supersedes the rights of any other creation. The following are the rights of the Prophet Muhammad:

1. Believing in his prophethood.2. Following him in all religious injunctions.3. Etching a permanent place in our hearts for his love and reverence.4. Sending salutations upon his noble person.

These are the rights of the angels:1. Believing in their existence.2. Believing that the angels are pure from sin.3. Saying “peace on him” (“alayhi as-alam) when the name of an angel is

mentioned.



4. The angels are discomforted when a person does the following: going to the mosque after consuming odorous foods or substances (such as tobacco), passing gas in the mosque, to keep a picture of animate objects, to pet a dog without religious permission, to speak a lie, to stay in a seminal defiled state ( janaba) and missing prayer (salah) due to it, and to remain naked without a religious or personal necessity even in solitude, etc.

The Rights of the Companions of the Family of the ProphetThe Companions and the family of the Prophet have a deep connection,

religious and worldly, with the Prophet, thus their rights fall under his rights as well. The rights of the Companions and the Family of the Prophet are as follows:

1. Following these blessed personages.2. Loving them.3. Believing that all of them were just and fair.4. Loving those who revere and love them, and to despise those who hold them

in contempt.

The Rights of God-Fearing Theologians and SagesThe God-fearing theologians and sages of Islam, because they are the

inheritors of prophetic knowledge and perform the duties he entrusted to them, their rights also fall under the rights of the Prophet:

1. Beseeching God to grant goodness to the experts of Islamic jurisprudence (fuqaha), scholars and teachers of hadith (muhaddithin), spiritual guides (masha”ikh al-tariqat), and religious writers (musamnifin).

2. Following them in religious matters (when they teach in accordance to the Qur’an and Sunna).

3. Treating them with kindness and respect, and not to hold enmity towards them.

4. Presenting monetary gifts to them whenever one can afford, according to his or her financial capacity.

The Rights of the ParentsThe aforementioned rights are due to those who have religious

favors on us, thus we are obliged to fulfill their rights. Some rights are due to those who have done worldly favors on us, and these are also established by Islamic law. The parents are foremost in the latter group, since they are the means of our existence and our nurturing. These are the rights of the parents:

1. Not harming them in any way, even if they are unjust.2. Respecting them verbally and by action.3. Remaining obedient to them in the limits of Islamic law.4. Assisting them monetarily, if they are in need of financial support, even if they

are not Muslims.



The Rights of Parents After Their Demise1. Beseeching God the Most High to have mercy on them and to pray for their

forgiveness.2. Treating their relatives and friends with respect, and to assist them with

financial or physical help.3. Paying off their debts.4. Visiting their graves occasionally.

The Rights of GrandparentsThe legal rights of grandparents in Islam are similar to the rights of parents.

Similarly, the maternal uncle and maternal aunt are to be given the same rights that one owes to his or her mother, and the paternal uncle and the paternal aunt have the same rights as one’s father. This is mentioned in a saying of the Prophet.

The Rights of ChildrenAs the children are obliged to fulfill the rights of their parents, so also are

the parents obliged to fulfill the rights of their children. The rights of children are as follow:

1. Marrying an upright and a pious spouse, so that their children are also upright and pious.

2. Raising them with love and affection, for the sayings of the Prophet have mentioned its merits, especially the daughters, one should not become stingy in raising up daughters, their nourishing carries special virtues. If the need arises for a wet-nurse, the parents should find a good and pious wet-nurse for their children, because the character of the wet-nurse will also pass on to the children.

3. Tutoring them in religious education and to impart good mannerism to the children.

4. When they reach the age of marriage, to marry them in a good family. If the first husband of the daughter dies or if she is divorced, to happily host her and to take care of her expenses.

The Rights of the Wet-NurseThe wet-nurse, because of feeding her own milk, has rights similar to the

mother, which are as follows:1. Treating her with respect and honor (throughout one’s life).2. If she requires some financial assistance and you can afford it, then do not

procrastinate in helping her.3. If it is within your financial capacity, hire a servant or a maid for your wet-nurse.4. Treating her husband with respect and do goodness to him as well.

The Rights of the Step-MotherThe step-mother also has rights, because she is related to one’s father and

one has to do good to the relatives of the father. What has been mentioned



under the section The Rights of Parents After Their Demise suffices the rights of the step-mother. (Similar is the case with the step-father).

The Rights of SiblingsIt is mentioned in a hadith that the elder brother is like the father. Thus,

the younger brother is like the children. Hence, their mutual rights are similar to the rights of parents and children. Similar is the case of the elder and the younger sister.

The Rights of the Kith and KinIslam has established the following rights of the kith and kin as well:1. If your relatives are in need and do not possess the ability to earn a livelihood

on their own, then taking care of their living costs and providing them food is almost as necessary as providing for your immediate family, i.e., your children, your spouse, etc.

2. Visiting them now and then.3. Not to sever relations with them, even if they harm you in some way, patience

is better than retribution.4. If a relative of yours comes in your possession, he or she immediately

becomes free.

The Rights of the Teacher and the Spiritual Guide

The Rights of Wife and HusbandThese are the rights of the wife:1. The husband should not be stingy or lazy in providing the basic necessities for

his wife.2. Teaching the wife the injunctions of Islam and encouraging her to practice

them.3. The wife has the right to meet her relatives. The husband should remain

patient with the shortcomings of his wife. Whenever the need arises to impart good mannerisms to the wife, the husband should adopt a balanced approach.

These are the rights of the husband:1. The wife should try her best to obey, respect, serve, and please her husband;

however, to obey him is not permissible when he demands the wife do to anything against Islamic law.

2. Not to ask him for more than what he can afford to provide for her.3. Not spending his wealth without his permission.4. Not to be harsh to the relatives of the husband so that he grieves. She should

respect and serve the parents of the husband.

The Rights of the Ruler and the RuledA king, his viceroy, and a master are included in the category of the ruler,

and the ruled include citizens or servants. This also includes the owner and the owned. These are the rights of the ruled:



1. The ruler should not issue severe and arduous rules on them.2. If there is a dispute between two parties among the ruled, the ruler should

judge between them in fairness and deliver justice.3. The ruler should be ever-engaged in providing security and comfort for the

ruled. The ruler should also give easy access to all those who want to present their problems to the government.

4. If someone disrespects the ruler, then this should be disregarded and forgiven.

These are the rights of the ruler1. The ruled should keep in mind the welfare of the ruled as well as obey the

ruler, however, the ruler cannot be obeyed against divine law.2. If the ruler does something against the temperament of the ruled, then the

ruled should be patient. They should not complain and curse the ruler, but should beseech God the Most High to bestow their ruler with soft-heartedness. The ruled should also obey God the Most High, so that God will soften the hearts of their rulers. This subject is evident in a hadith.

3. If the ruler does a favor, then proper gratitude should be expressed by the ruled.

4. The ruler should not be betrayed based on egotism of the ruled.If slavery is found somewhere, then the master is obliged to look after the basic needs of the slaves, and it is impermissible for the slave to run away. This system of rights of the ruler and the ruled are only for the boundaries of one government; if the free citizens leave an established government, then this system of rights does not apply to them.

The Rights of the In-LawsSince God the Most High points to their rights in the Qur’an, the rights of

the in-laws, as well as one’s step-children, should also be fulfilled. They should be dealt with kindness and good manners.

The Rights of Muslims in GeneralOther than the relatives, Muslims in general also have rights. In Al-Targhib

wa al-Tarhib, Al-Isfahani has narrated the following list of rights from ‘Ali:1. Forgiving the mistakes of fellow Muslims.2. Showing mercy upon the weeping of someone.3. Not disclosing their shortcomings.4. Accepting their excuses.5. Warding off their distress or source of pain.6. Always doing good to them and wishing good for them.7. Protecting them and loving them.8. Making concessions for fellow Muslims and their subordinates.9. Visiting them when they are ill.

10. Attending their funerals.11. Accepting their invitation (e.g., for dinner, etc.).12. Accepting their gifts.



13. Returning their favors.14. Thanking them for their favors.15. Assisting them in their [permissible] affairs.16. Protecting their families.17. Fulfilling their needs.18. Listening to their requests.19. Accepting their recommendations.20. Not to drive him or her to disparity in their [permissible] missions.21. When a fellow Muslim says, “All praise is for God” (al-hamdu li-Llah), the

reply should be “May God have mercy on you” (yarhamuk Allah).22. Delivering their lost item(s) to them.23. Returning their greeting.24. Conversing with them in a soft tone and with good manners.25. Doing good to them.26. If a Muslim takes on oath, and you can fulfill it, then fulfill it.27. If a Muslim is oppressed, then stop the oppressor. If a Muslim is the

oppressor, stop him or her from oppressing.28. Adoring them and not despising them.29. Not to dismiss them.30. Whatever you wish for your own self, wish that for your Muslim brother or

sister as well.The following rights are found in other hadiths:31. At the time of meeting, to greet the Muslim, and shaking his hand is

better.32. If two Muslims are in a conflict, they cannot avoid talking to each other for

more than three days.33. Not to distrust your Muslim brother or sister.34. Not being jealous or hating them.35. Encouraging them to do good and forbidding them from evil.36. Respecting their elderly and showing affection on the youth.37. If two Muslims dissent, to make peace between them.38. Not to backbite them.39. Never to physically, emotionally, or financially harm them.40. To help them in transportation when they are unable to afford their own

means of transportation.41. Not to remove them from their sitting places so you can sit there.42. When three persons are present, two should not carry on private

conversations.These were the rights of the Muslims in general, the rights that preceded these, those people are also entitled to these common rights.

The Rights of NeighborsAside from the common rights of the Muslim, whenever they have a

special connection to you in some way, then they have additional rights. Neighbors are an example of this kind, and these are their rights:



1. Treating them cordially and kindly.2. Safeguarding their life, property, and respect.3. Sending gifts to them occasionally, and if they are in need, making sure to

send food to them regularly.4. Not to harm them in the least, and not to quarrel with them over minute things.

Islamic law has safeguarded the rights of the neighbor, so that neighbors will not harm each other. Islamic theologians have also said that just as one has a neighbor while residing, similarly the companion in traveling, whether he or she sets off for the journey with you or whether a stranger becomes your companion in traveling on the way, in both conditions they also have rights similar to that of the neighbor. In a hadith, the Prophet has called the local neighbor, jar maqam, and the companion in travel, jar badia. One should give precedence to the comfort of the fellow traveler over personal comfort. Some people carry on a strange and rude behavior with fellow travelers while on a train, this is very bad.

The Rights of Orphans and the WeakThose in need of society, such as the orphans, the widows, the weak, the

sick, the traveler, and the beggars, all have additional rights as well.1. Financially assisting them.2. Performing their tasks by your hands.3. Comforting them.4. Not rejecting their requests and needs.

The Rights of GuestsThe guests also has the following additional rights:1. Expressing joy at their arrival, and walking them out at least your own main

door or gate, when they are departing.2. Providing for their needs and looking after their particular requirements, so

that they feel at home.3. Treating them with humility and serving them with your own hands.4. Make some special meals for the guest at least for the first day; however, do

not go out of your way to do this.The guest has the right to stay for three days without any hesitation, after that the host has the right to ask him or her to leave or to further their stay. However, the guest should keep in mind not to become a burden on the host by staying for a long period of time and by making extravagant requests. Also, the guest should not intervene in the domestic affairs of the host, or cooking, etc.

The Rights of FriendsThe Qur’an has listed your close friends next to the relatives. Their rights

are as follows:1. Before befriending a person, make sure that you take into account his or her

beliefs, actions, transactions, and character. If you find him or her upright in all



these aspects, then befriend them, otherwise stay away from them. Avoiding evil companionship has been stressed in Islam. Experience also yields that evil company has bad effects, and the most comforting thing in the world is friendship.

2. Never to withdraw your physical or financial help from your friends.3. If your friend does something against your temperament, just disregard them,

and if bitterness comes between the two of you, immediately seek to clarify this and restore your friendship without any delay. Bitterness is a part of friendship, but do not take it too serious.

4. Do not become negligent in doing all types of good to your friend.

Endnotes1. For further reference on these three religious movements, see David Lelyveld,

Aligarh’s First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India, 1860 –1900: Deoband (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); and Francis Robinson, The Ulama of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia (London: C. Hurst, 2001).

2. For a biography of Thanawi, see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Ashraf “Ali Thanawi: Islam in Modern South Asia (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008).

3. Huquq al-Islam is a small pamphlet; it is usually published as a chapter in Thanawi’s Adab-e-Zindagi. We have used the following edition of Adab-e-Zindagi: Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, Adab-e-Zindagi (Lahore: Suhail Publications, 1999).

4. Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 23.

5. The most authoritative biography of Thanawi in Deobandi circles is ‘Aziz al-Hasan Ghawri’s Ashraf al-sawanih, 4 vols. (Multan: Idara-e-Ta‘lifat-e-Ashrafiyya, 1995).

6. Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi, Khutbat-e-Hakim al-Ummat (Multan: Idara-e-Ta’lifat-e-Ashrafiyya, n.d.), 4: 127.

7. Qari Muhammad Tayyib Qasimi, “Ulama-e Deoband ka dini rukh awr maslaki mizaj (Lahore: Idara Islamiyyat, 1988).

8. Thanawi’s Huquq al-Islam is an example of Islamic moral literature, such as Abdullah ibn Mubarak’s Kitab al-Zuhd wa l-Raqa”iq, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s Ihya” “Ulum al-Din, and Qadi Sana-Ullah Panipati’s Huquq al-Islam.

9. Ghawri, Ashraf al-sawanih, 1: 92.10. The ancient Chinese texts, “The Mean-in-Action” and “The Great Learning,”

by Tzu Ssu, contain some ideas similar to that of Islamic teachings on social mannerism. Although the terms are different, it is clear that Confucianism also stresses the importance of duties to oneself and others. One similarity is the recognition that different types of relationships require different moral norms for interaction. In “The Mean-in-Action,” Tzu Ssu identifies five kinds of relationships: between sovereign and subject; father and son; husband and wife; between elder and younger brother; and equal relations in friendship. These five relationships concern everybody in the Great Society. Each type of relationship has its own rights and responsibilities.

11. Elsewhere, Potter has argued for a virtue theory of trustworthiness that takes into account the vulnerability of the trusting one and the particular responsibilities of the trusted.



See Nancy Nyquist Potter, How Can I Be Trusted: A Virtue Theory of Trust (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

12. See Reginald E. Allen, Greek Philosophy: Thales to Aristotle (New York: Free Press, 1991), 8.

13. In his personal life, Thanawi was much more egalitarian regarding such issues.14. Furqan Ahmad, “Contribution of Mawlana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi to the Protection

and Development of Islamic Law in the Indian Subcontinent.” Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly 71(1986): 71–79, 75.

15. Ibid, 71.16. Sayyid Mahboob Rizvi. History of the Dar al-“Ulum Deoband. 2 vols. Published by

Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband, India. 1980–1981, 1: 310.17. Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860 –1900

(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 200.18. Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N.

Jephcott (London: Verso, 2005), 220.

Documents

Invoking Islamic Rights Islamic Rights In British India: Mawlana Ashraf ‘ Ali Thanawi’s H uq u q al-Islam Ali Altaf Mian Duke University Durham, North Carolina and Nancy Nyquist