Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum

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J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld,and Ted Robert Gurr

Peace and conflict 2008

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y


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Te Center or International Developmentand Conict Management (CIDCM) is aninterdisciplinary research center at the Universityo Maryland. CIDCM seeks to prevent andtransorm conict, to understand the interplaybetween conict and development, and to help

societies create sustainable utures or themselves.Using the insights o researchers, practitioners, andpolicy makers, CIDCM devises eective tools andculturally appropriate pathways to constructivechange.

For more than twenty years, scholars andpractitioners at the Center have sought ways tounderstand and address conicts over security,identity, and distributive justice. CIDCMsprograms are based on the belie that peacebuilding and development-with-justice are twosides o the same coin (Edward Azar, CIDCM

ounding director). CIDCMs accomplishedscholars, its expertise in data collection andanalysis, and its direct involvement in regionalconict management eorts make the Center aunique resource or discovering enduring solutionsto the worlds most intractable conicts.

Research Data Collections

CIDCM collects, analyzes and links data relevantto the study o the dynamics o societal conicts.Te aim is to expand data capabilities to acilitatecross-disciplinary research among scholars andpolicy analysts concerned with aspects o societalconict, state ailure, and minority rights. TeCenter hosts several major international databaseson societal conict, including Minorities at Risk,Polity, and International Crisis Behavior.

Training and Education

Te Center provides on-the-ground training orparties to specic conicts, as well as programsthat eature conict resolution training orstudents and government ofcials. Te Partnersin Conict program has provided training in

citizens diplomacy and conict resolution in morethan 15 countries, and the ICONS Project createsinteractive tools or teaching and training innegotiation, leadership, and conict managementtechniques. CIDCM also oers an undergraduateMinor in International Development and Conict

Management.

Policy Analysis

Strategically located at the nexus o theory andpractice, CIDCM seeks to oster a conversationamong scholars and policy makers, and to use globalanalyses as a basis or concrete recommendations orthe policy community. Extensive eld experience,subject matter expertise, and command o bothquantitative and qualitative methods provideCIDCM researchers with a strong oundationor advancing cutting edge policy analysis. In thisregard, its biennial publication Peace and Confict

reports major global and regional trends in societalconict, development, and governance issues.Other recent examples o analyses oered by thecenters researchers include assessments o policyregarding the use o inormation technology indevelopment, democratization, strategies orconict mitigation and resolution, and approachesor sustainable development and peace.

In addition, two CIDCM endowed chairs, theAnwar Sadat Chair or Peace and Development andthe Bahai Chair or World Peace, seek to bridgethe gap between the academic and policy worldsand develop alternatives to violent conict.

Jonathan WilkeneldDirector

Paul HuthResearch Director

J. Joseph HewittDirector o Government Relations

About CIDCM

0145 ydings HallUniversity o MarylandCollege Park, MD 20742

(301) [email protected]


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P e a c e a n d c o n f l i c t 2 0 0 8

e x e c u t i v e s ummar y

J. Joseph Hewitt

Jonathan Wilkeneld

ed Robert Gurr

Center or International Development and Conict Management

Us M


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c o n t e n t s

1 I 1ed Robert Gurr, J. Joseph Hewitt, and Jonathan Wilkeneld

Regular Features

2 T P C Isb Lg: Rkg Ss F Rsks 4J. Joseph Hewitt

3 s Gb C, 19465 12J. Joseph Hewitt

4 s Dz: A Fs Isb As 13Amy Pate

5 S-D Ms T Os 14

David Quinn

Challenges to the Stability of States

6 Gb s F Ss 15Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, and Susan Fahey

7 Ehp V s h M Es 16Victor Asal, Carter Johnson, and Jonathan Wilkeneld

8 Usb Ss I Css 17Jonathan Wilkeneld

9 Mss Kg Cs W, 1945 18Paul Huth and Benjamin Valentino

10 I Pkpg: T UN ss Rg Ogzs 19Peter Wallensteen and Birger Heldt

In Focus

11 Upkg Gb s V C, 19465 20J. Joseph Hewitt


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E x ec u t i v e Su m m a ry

Te modern age demands that we think in terms o human securitya concept that acknowledges the inherentlinkages between economic and social development, respect or human rights, and peace.Until we understandand act accordingly, we will not have either national or international security.

Mohamed ElBaradei, October 24, 2006Sadat Lecture or Peace, University o Maryland

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P ea c e a nd C o n l i c t 2008

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A conict syndromeposes the gravest danger.High-risk states are simultaneously politically

unstable, challenged by rebels and terrorists, tempted to resort to mass killings o civilians, andenmeshed in international crises. Tere are predictable pathways into these syndromes but noclearly marked exits.

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Fig. 2.1: Risk of Future Instability, 2007

Moderate RiskHigh Risk Low Risk


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Table 2.1: Top 25 Highest Risk for Instability

Rank Country Risk Ratio

1 Afghanistan 39.3

2 Iraq 29.9

3 Niger 29.7

4 Ethiopia 25.7

5 Liberia 21.1

6 Sierra Leone 20.9

7 Mali 20.7

8 Tanzania 18.9

9 Central African Republic 18.4

10 Djibouti 17.1

11 Ivory Coast 17.0

12 Zambia 14.8

13 Somalia 13.7

14 Nigeria 13.4

15 Bangladesh 13.1

16 Malawi 13.1

17 Benin 13.0

18 Kenya 12.9

19 Mozambique 12.7

20 Lebanon 12.1

21 Haiti 11.7

22 Chad 11.2

23 Burundi 11.1

24 India 10.7

25 Angola 10.5


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Table 2.2: Top 10 Highest Risk Countries in 2003 and 2007

2003 Forecast 2007 Forecast

Rank Country RiskRatio Country

RiskRatio

1 Ethiopia 26.6 Afghanistan** 39.3

2 Niger 23.0 Iraq** 29.9

3 Tanzania 18.8 Niger 29.7

4 Central African Rep. 17.6 Ethiopia 25.7

5 Sierra Leone 16.4 Liberia** 21.1

6 Iran* 16.3 Sierra Leone 20.9

7 Djibouti 15.8 Mali** 20.7

8 Mozambique* 15.3 Tanzania 18.9

9 Peru* 14.9 Central African Rep. 18.4

10 Guinea-Bissau* 14.8 Djibouti 17.1

* Falls out of top 10 in 2007, ** New to top 10 in 2007


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The Peace and Conict Instability Ledger

T P C Isb Lg ks ss g h s sk sb. S s pp. 111

sp h s h s p h g ( 1).

Recen

tInstability

Country Regim

eConsistency

InfantMortality

Econo

micOpenness

Milita

rization

Neigh

borhoodWar

RiskCategory

Risk

Score Confdence Range

Africa

Niger l l l l l l 29.7 17.7 44.4

Ethiopia l l l l l l 25.7 16.1 39.5

Liberia l l l l l l 21.1 11.4 36.9

Sierra Leone l l l l l l 20.9 11.5 35.2

Mali l l l l l l 20.7 11.8 32.5

Tanzania l l l l l l 18.9 12.3 27.9

Central African Rep. l l l l l l 18.4 10.4 29.1

Djibouti l l l l l l 17.1 8.4 31.3

n Ivory Coast l l l l l l 17.0 9.7 27.7

Zambia l l l l l l 14.8 9.1 23.1

n Somalia l l l l l l 13.7 8.6 21.6

Nigeria l l l l l l 13.4 7.6 21.5

Malawi l l l l l l 13.1 7.3 21.8

Benin l l l l l l 13.0 8.4 19.3

Kenya l l l l l l 12.9 7.4 20.7

Mozambique l l l l l l 12.7 7.3 20.9

Chad l l l l l l 11.2 5.4 20.7

Burundi l l l l l l 11.1 6.5 18.0

Angola l l l l l l 10.5 4.7 20.6

Guinea-Bissau l l l l l l 9.3 4.8 16.6

Botswana l l l l l l 9.1 4.7 15.1

Madagascar l l l l l l 9.1 5.3 14.6

Senegal l l l l l l 8.8 5.0 14.1

Burkina Faso l l l l l l 8.3 5.0 12.9

Guinea l l l l l l 8.1 4.6 12.8

Lesotho l l l l l l 7.7 3.7 14.2

Ghana l l l l l l 7.5 4.1 12.1

Rwanda l l l l l l 7.5 4.5 11.6

Namibia l l l l l l 7.3 4.4 11.3

n Dem. Rep. of Congo l l l l l l 6.9 3.7 11.8Cameroon l l l l l l 6.8 4.2 10.5

South Africa l l l l l l 6.5 3.8 10.3

Togo l l l l l l 5.9 3.3 9.9

Eritrea l l l l l l 5.2 2.3 9.9

Mauritania l l l l l l 5.1 3.1 7.5

n Uganda l l l l l l 4.9 2.8 8.1

Equatorial Guinea l l l l l l 4.5 3.0 6.6

Comoros l l l l l l 4.0 2.5 5.8

n Sudan l l l l l l 3.7 2.2 5.6

Gambia l l l l l l 2.8 1.6 4.5

Congo l l l l l l 2.7 1.5 4.5

Zimbabwe l l l l l l 2.5 1.6 3.9

Gabon l l l l l l 2.3 1.3 3.8

Swaziland l l l l l l 2.2 1.0 4.3

Cape Verde l l l l l l 1.4 0.7 2.5

Mauritius l l l l l l 0.8 0.4 1.5


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RecentInstability

Country RegimeConsistency

InfantMortality

EconomicOpenness

Militarization

NeighborhoodWar

RiskCategory

Risk


Asia

n Afghanistan l l l l l l 39.3 26.5 56.3

Bangladesh l l l l l l 13.1 9.1 18.7

n India l l l l l l 10.7 6.5 16.5

Cambodia l l l l l l 7.9 3.8 14.0

Tajikistan l l l l l l 7.3 3.6 13.4

North Korea l l l l l l 7.2 2.6 16.0

n Nepal l l l l l l 6.4 3.8 10.0

n Myanmar (Burma) l l l l l l 6.2 3.9 9.3

n Pakistan l l l l l l 5.2 3.3 7.9

Papua New Guinea l l l l l l 5.1 2.5 9.3

Indonesia l l l l l l 4.4 2.7 6.8

Sri Lanka l l l l l l 4.4 2.3 7.8

Fiji l l l l l l 3.6 1.9 6.0

n Philippines l l l l l l 3.5 2.0 5.7

Kyrgyzstan l l l l l l 3.5 1.7 6.2

Kazakhstan l l l l l l 3.2 1.8 5.3

Laos l l l l l l 3.2 1.9 4.8

Malaysia l l l l l l 3.1 1.3 6.2Turkmenistan l l l l l l 2.8 1.5 4.9

Bhutan l l l l l l 2.8 1.6 4.6

Mongolia l l l l l l 2.7 1.2 5.2

n Thailand l l l l l l 2.4 1.2 4.0

Vietnam l l l l l l 2.3 0.6 5.8

Uzbekistan l l l l l l 2.2 1.3 3.8

China l l l l l l 1.5 0.8 2.8

South Korea l l l l l l 1.3 0.5 2.5

Singapore l l l l l l 0.9 0.3 2.6

Taiwan l l l l l l 0.6 0.3 1.2

Japan l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.1

New Zealand l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.0

Australia l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.0

Eastern Europe

Armenia l l l l l l 9.4 5.7 15.3

Georgia l l l l l l 8.2 4.7 12.9n Russia l l l l l l 5.0 2.8 8.1

Yugoslavia l l l l l l 4.5 2.4 8.0

Albania l l l l l l 4.5 2.6 7.3

Moldova l l l l l l 4.3 2.3 7.5

Romania l l l l l l 3.8 2.2 6.1

Ukraine l l l l l l 3.7 1.8 6.5

Bosnia l l l l l l 3.6 1.6 6.9

Azerbaijan l l l l l l 3.4 1.9 5.7

Bulgaria l l l l l l 2.8 1.5 4.8

Latvia l l l l l l 2.3 1.1 4.2

Croatia l l l l l l 1.9 0.8 3.7

Estonia l l l l l l 1.8 0.7 3.6

Slovakia l l l l l l 1.4 0.6 2.8

Lithuania l l l l l l 0.8 0.4 1.6

Poland l l l l l l 0.7 0.4 1.4

Belarus l l l l l l 0.7 0.3 1.6Hungary l l l l l l 0.7 0.3 1.4

Slovenia l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.0

Czech Republic l l l l l l 0.4 0.2 0.9


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RecentInstability


InfantMortality

EconomicOpenness

Militarization

NeighborhoodWar

RiskCategory

Risk


Latin America and the Caribbean

Haiti l l l l l l 11.7 6.7 18.3

Bolivia l l l l l l 7.6 4.5 12.1

Brazil l l l l l l 7.5 5.1 10.9

Guatemala l l l l l l 7.3 4.8 11.0

Honduras l l l l l l 6.6 3.9 10.1

Ecuador l l l l l l 6.3 3.8 10.0

Guyana l l l l l l 6.0 2.9 10.4

Nicaragua l l l l l l 5.9 3.4 9.5

El Salvador l l l l l l 5.5 3.2 8.8

Peru l l l l l l 5.5 3.4 8.4

Mexico l l l l l l 4.9 3.0 7.9

Venezuela l l l l l l 4.6 2.6 7.8

Dominican Republic l l l l l l 3.8 2.3 6.2

n Colombia l l l l l l 3.6 2.2 5.8

Paraguay l l l l l l 3.2 1.9 5.1

Argentina l l l l l l 2.9 1.6 4.9

Jamaica l l l l l l 2.2 1.2 3.9

Panama l l l l l l 1.6 0.8 2.8Chile l l l l l l 1.4 0.7 2.7

Uruguay l l l l l l 1.1 0.6 1.8

Costa Rica l l l l l l 1.0 0.4 1.8

Trinidad and Tobago l l l l l l 1.0 0.5 1.6

Cuba l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.2

Middle East and North Africa

n Iraq l l l l l l 29.9 20.0 43.2

Lebanon l l l l l l 12.1 6.4 21.4

n Turkey l l l l l l 7.2 4.6 11.0

n Yemen l l l l l l 7.2 4.2 11.5

Jordan l l l l l l 4.0 1.9 7.2

Algeria l l l l l l 3.7 2.2 6.1

Tunisia l l l l l l 2.8 1.4 5.1

Morocco l l l l l l 2.4 1.3 4.0

Iran l l l l l l 2.1 1.1 3.5

Egypt l l l l l l 2.0 1.0 3.4Syria l l l l l l 1.4 0.7 2.5

Libya l l l l l l 1.4 0.7 2.5

Saudi Arabia l l l l l l 1.0 0.5 1.8

Kuwait l l l l l l 0.7 0.3 1.6

Bahrain l l l l l l 0.7 0.3 1.4

Qatar l l l l l l 0.7 0.4 1.1

Oman l l l l l l 0.6 0.3 1.1

n Israel l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.1

UAE l l l l l l 0.3 0.1 0.7

North Atlantic

Macedonia l l l l l l 2.9 1.5 5.0

United States l l l l l l 1.0 0.4 1.9

Cyprus l l l l l l 0.7 0.3 1.4

Greece l l l l l l 0.7 0.3 1.3

United Kingdom l l l l l l 0.7 0.3 1.3

France l l l l l l 0.6 0.2 1.4Canada l l l l l l 0.6 0.3 1.2

Italy l l l l l l 0.6 0.2 1.2

Portugal l l l l l l 0.6 0.2 1.1

Denmark l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.1

Germany l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.1

Netherlands l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.1

Austria l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.0


16/28

0 P ea c e a nd C o n l i c t 2008

RecentInstability


InfantMortality

EconomicOpenness

Militarization

NeighborhoodWar

RiskCategory

Risk


North Atlantic (cont.)

Ireland l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.0

Switzerland l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.0

Spain l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.0

Norway l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.0

Belgium l l l l l l 0.4 0.2 0.9

Sweden l l l l l l 0.4 0.1 0.9

Finland l l l l l l 0.4 0.1 0.9

Notes and Explanations for the Ledger

The ledger is based on a model that estimates the statistical relationship between the future likelihood of instability and each of the

ve factors in the chapter. We estimated the model based on data for the period 19502003 and found that each of the ve factors

were strongly related to the future risk of instability. Using the model estimates for the causal weight assigned to each factor, we

used data from 2004, the last year for which complete data are available for all ve of our factors, to produce a three-year forecastindicating the risk of instability in 2007. The color codes used in the ledger to present a countrys standing on each of the ve factors

are based on the values in 2004. The notes below explain the various color codings.

(1) Recent Instability -This column indicates (with a red square)

whether the country has been coded by the Political Instability

Task Force (PITF) as being involved in an instability event as of the

end of 2005. The countrys risk score (see column 9) provides an

assessment of the likelihood of the countrys experiencing future

instabili ty. One might interpret the risk score for countries currently

experiencing instability as the risk of continued instability, but we

caution readers that the causal factors that drive the continuation

of instability are likely not the same as the factors that drive the

onset of instability.

(2) Country - The ledger examines only those countries with

populations greater than 500,000 in 2004.

(3) Regime Consistency The risk of future instability is

strongly related to the extent to which the institutions comprising

a countrys political system are uniformly and consistently

autocratic or democratic. Political institutions with a mix of

democratic and autocratic features are deemed inconsistent,

a common attribute of polities in the midst of a democratic

transition (or a reversal from democratic rule to more autocratic

governance). We expect regimes with inconsistent institutions

to be more likely to experience political instability. In the ledger,

highly consistent democracies (Polity score greater than or

equal to 6) and autocracies (Polity score less than or equal to

-6) receive a green marker. A red marker has been assigned

to regimes with inconsistent characteristics that also qualifyas partial democracies according to PITF. Regimes with these

characteristics have been found to have the highest risk for

instability. We assign a yellow marker to partial autocracies

because the propensity for instability in these regimes is

somewhat less than in partial democracies.

(4) Infant Mortality Infant mortality rates serve as a proxy

for overall governmental effectiveness in executing policies and

delivering services that improve social welfare in a country. High

infant mortality rates are associated with an increased likelihood

of future instability. The states with the best records are indicated

with a green marker (scoring in the bottom 25th percentile of

global infant mortality rates). States with the worst record

(scoring in the highest 25th percentile) are indicated with a red

marker. States in the middle 50th percentile are indicated with a

yellow marker.

(5) Economic Openness Closer integration with global

markets reduces the potential likelihood of armed civil conict

and political instability. Policies that integrate global and domestic

markets can produce higher growth rates and sometimes reduce

inequality. To that extent, economic openness can remove or

weaken common drivers for civil unrest related to economic

grievances. We focus on the proportion of a countrys GDP

accounted for by the value of all trade (exports plus imports)

as a measure for economic openness. The countries with the

lowest score for economic openness are considered to be at

the highest risk for instability. We designate these states with

a red marker. The highest 25th percentile of states receive a

green marker in the ledger. The middle 50th percentile receives

a yellow marker.

(6) Militarization - Instability is most likely in countries where

the opportunities for armed conict are greatest. In societies

where the infrastructure and capital for organized armed conictare more plentiful and accessible, the likelihood for civil conict

increases. The ledger measures militarization as the number of

individuals in a countrys active armed forces as a percentage

of the countrys total population. Countries with militarization

scores in the bottom 25th percentile are indicated with a green

marker. Countries in the top 25th percentile are presented with a

red marker. The middle 50th percentile is indicated with a yellow

marker.


17/28


(7) Neighborhood War The presence of an armed conict in

a neighboring state (internal or interstate) increases the risk of

state instability. The contagion effects of regional armed conict

can heighten the risk of state instability, especially when ethnic

or other communal groups span across borders. We use conict

data from the Uppsala Conict Data Project at the International

Peace Research Institute (Gleditsch et al. 2002) to determine the

conict status of states in 2004. For a neighbor to be considered

involved in armed conict, we further require that the conictproduces 25 or more battle-related fatalities per year. A red

marker indicates when two or more neighbors are involved in

armed conict. A yellow marker indicates the presence of armed

conict in only one neighboring state. A green marker indicates

the absence of armed conict in all neighboring states.

(8) Risk Category - States have been placed in one of three

categories corresponding to their risk score. Any state with a

risk ratio in the top 25th percentile of all states qualies for high

risk (denoted with a red marker). A risk ratio greater than 7.3

places a state in the top 25th percentile. Any state with a risk

ratio less than the global median (3.56) qualies for the low-risk

category (denoted with a green marker). Any state with a ratio

between 3.56 and 7.3 qualies for moderate risk (denoted with

a yellow marker).

(9) Risk Score - The risk score gives a three-year forecast of

the relative risk (compared to an average member of the OECD)

of experiencing instability. The score is computed based on the

results of estimating a statistical model using global data from

the period 1950-2003. Then, using the model estimates, data

from 2004 were used to obtain the three-year forecasts for each

country for 2007.

(10) Condence Range - The condence range provides

information about the degree of uncertainty corresponding to acountrys estimated risk score. Statistically speaking, the true

risk of instability lies within this range with a 95 percent probability.

The width of the condence range is drawn to scale. The widest

condence range observed in the data has been set to the

width of the full column with all other condence ranges drawn

accordingly. When the bar is one color, the condence range is

conned to a single risk category. In cases where the condence

range spans multiple risk categories, the different colors of the

bar reect the extent of the overlap with those categories. Using

a sample country (Ghana), the key below illustrates how to

read the information contained in the graphic for each countrys

condence range. The color green indicates the low-risk range,

yellow indicates the moderate-risk range, and red indicates the

high-risk range.

4.1 12.1

Low value of

condence rangeHigh value of

condence range

The location of the risk score estimate (from Column 9) within

the condence range is depicted with a vertical white line.

In this example, the estimate is approximately 7.5. Note, the

location of the risk score estimate does not necessarily fall inthe midpoint of the condence range.

Portion of the condence rangein the high-risk category

Portion of the condence rangein the medium-risk category


18/28


3 . t r e n d s i n g l o b a l c o n f l i c t , 1 9 4 6 2 0 0 5

Ths hp ps b w s . Hws ss s bg gsh sggs s p ss h ww h bg h w h ps-C W .

A ss h b s

ww (s Fg 3.1) shws ww h b s. T ww ,whh hs b ps s P C, bgs s h C W s w.Hw, s h gph s, h b s h s p (5) sshp h ps 4, sbg h s h p s s sps.

A s k wh hpp 5 s hh h w h w hs s h h sg ps s. F s, 5 bk S Lk, pg s- g bw h g h Lb gs E (LE).I Azbj, sp shs bk hsp g Ng-Kbkh, sghss h h b q b

s. S ws M (B) I. T sg hs ssss p hs b h h w. I g , s h s h b gg s s.

Hw bs hs bss b psg

s w ss h h h ww s h s p w s. Rh, h ww s h s s s h h b gg s s.Fg 3. ss wh hs s h s. O hs h ps-C W p, h b s h h b gg pss ps sbs. O h s p, hs sb h b sh w w h . I, hps 6 s, h whh w s

g h hs b ss hg.O p hs ss s h s p h bk g bh s s sg s. T g s hp b pks shs p b hqs -wg p.

0

10

20

30

40

200520001995199019851980197519701965196019551950

Number of Conflicts

Fig. 3.1: Global Trends in Violent Conict, 19462005

Internal ConflictTotal Conflict Interstate Conflict

0

10

0

30

40

200520001995199019851980197519701965196019551950

Number of Conflicts

Fig. 3.2: Trends in Ongoing and New Conict, 1946-2005

New OnsetsOngoing Conflict


19/28


4 . t r e n d s i n d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n :

a f o c u s o n i n s t a b i l i t y i n a n o c r a c i e s

I 195, h w ws s q g s, s ( hb gs), s. I h wg w s,

h p pws A Ass ps h b ps. Wh w p s ws s k p ss sh ss, h s s b p pg pws s s s , q -p, . B 1977, h whh h b gs pk, h w 9 s,16 s 35 s. T, bgg h 197s g hgh h 19s, w z k p. I 1991, sh h C W , h w s(66) h h s (47) s (44). Tsp hgh h 199s, b 6, h w 77 s, 49s, 34 s h w.

As P shws Fg 4.1, s h h w-s . Hw, h j s g, hg h ss ss h g. Rg, phps, k s hs g s, h g P s s h ps-C W s g hgh s sg w h h g gh C W . S, wh h sp s g ws h , h swp s g s b . As s h g b s h ss g gs hg h

s s.

Mp ss shp bw p sb g p. D h P Isbsk F, p hgh 5, shw h s g s k hgh h 1955 p h p sb. Ps ss shw h s w h w s k pg/p s w h s s k p s g hg.

T k p sb g g ps s . Ds h s p s ss sb. Ts s sp h h h b g s s hgh. Ts sg ws. Ashgh s sspb sb h h s sh s

gs ss sb h ps-C W . Ts s s g ws. Hw, h hgs h s h s p s ss wh s g ps s s.

0

20

40

60

80

100

20052000199519901985198019751970196519601955

Number of Countries

Fig. 4.1: Global Regimes by Type, 19502006

DemocraciesAutocracies Anocracies

Anocracies were more than twice as likely to experience genocide/politicide events and nearlytwo and a hal times as likely to experience adverse regime change.


20/28


5 . s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n m o v e m e n t s a n d t h e i r o u t c o m e s

Th qs gs pps s-g hs shp h p sp ss s g s. S ss s gs wh ss h b s s sh s. S h ws h ss h s 5 s h b ss wh

h sggs bw h gps ss h g sph s sg.

Q s h s 6, 6 s- s w gg, g hAsss, Ksh Mss, Khss/Js, Ms,ps, Sh bs I; h Ch/Zs Ks, K, Sh M; hPss Is; h Os Ss Ehp; h Css F, h Chhs Rss. Dsp ss g w, h sw s h wss ps p: s h 199s h hsb ss h b s- s g sh

w s (s Fg 5.1).

F 1 6, s s-s w s 15 w .Ss w h h ghg As Djb; Abs M; Ess,Nb, -Ms Bk As shS. I , s w 56 . Pps Is Bsqs

Sp ss 6 b h gg , g p gs. Ahs Is Cbs Ag g s p ps s p h sss hss.

S s g ss pgss ps ,

, g, s, ss, p sh. M , hw, s h ss pgss, s h b hw b pss ps, -z b gsss, h s b w shp, s spss s, s.A s h h b , s, s.

T s s- s sss s bw g gppss; ss gp gs b ss g s-kg g . S- s s s wg bs, b h pw wg bs wh sg ss.

Wh h ww h b w gg s- s s h hC W s gg, w ps-W W II s- s b s. I h bs gs h 15 s p w. I hs ss,p s s pkpg s sh b b kp hg ps g w g ( qk s) w hss. Sh s spsb g h s s- ws, wh h ss s.

While the downward trend in the number o new and ongoing armed sel-determinationconicts since the end o the Cold War is encouraging, relatively ew post-World War II sel-determination conicts can be confdently considered ended.

Fig. 5.1: Trends in Conicts for Self-Determination, 1956-2006

Number of Wars Ongoing

at End of Period

Change in the Number of Wars:

New Armed Conflicts


Conflicts Contained


Conflicts Settled or Won

0

12

24

36

48

0

5

10

15

20

2001-2006

1996-2000

1991-1995

1986-1990

1981-1985

1976-1980

1971-1975

1966-1970

1961-1965

1956-1960

before 1956

Number of Ongoing Wars Changes in the Number of Wars


21/28


6 . g l o b a l t e r r o r i s m a n d f a i l e d s t at e s

As b s hs gw, shs pks h sg sgh ss b kg h s, , p

hss s. LF, Dg, Fh s bw w b s s ks

h Gb s Dbs (GD) g h p bw197 1997 s , b h P Isbsk F s g s, p ss, ssh ghs s h p ss wh sbkw.

GD pss 7, s s, s b s h s s s p-s ss. I s s s h h s g p, , gs, s g hgh , , . Nh h U.S.S Dp h FBI s s hs

. Y s B H ps , s s s hb h h s h s.

T hp s h ps p ps h, g s s s h h, gs, ps ks wps s, g sbs , h p 5 s k s, p 5 sgps b .

Fg 6.1 pss s g s . Tgph ss hw h ggph s s hs sh . I h s h p, s ws g Ep pb. B h 197s, s ks L A

spss h s h gb gs. M , L A hs , wh ks As h sg.

N spsg, h ss h bh sks h ks s g hs p.L A s h gs bh s ks s. Wh Sb-Sh A As hz b s h s, h s hs Ep Nh A.

LF . gwg shp bw s s (Fg 6.). M, h s sg hhs shp hgs . Dg h 197s, ss h h

p h hgh s ks s;s h, ss h h s h h hgh s s ks. Ds sp g wh sp bs s. s sk pps b h s s h s ss.

* T s p ss hs hp h b p s pb. F b h s s, ps h hs h SAR C (s@s..) s http://www.start.umd.edu.

Number of Attacks

0

500

1000

1500

2000

199519901985198019751970

Fig. 6.1: Regional Terrorist Activity, 1970-1997

Asia

Europe

Latin America

Mideast/N. Africa

North America

Sub-Saharan Africa

0

50

100

150

200

250

199519901985198019751970

Average Fatalities per Country

In Failure Out of Failure

Average Attacks per Country

0

20

40

60

80

100

199519901985198019751970

Fig. 6.2: State Failure and Terrorism, 19701997


22/28


7 . e t h n o P o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e a n d t e r r o r i s m i n t h e m i d d l e e a s t

I hs hp, As, Jhs, Wk s h hs s h s bs h s b

z, s gzs, s ps ps

s. Fsg hM Es, h Ms Rsk OgzBh (MAROB) pj ps h hss hs hp gps gzs s k p s h ps h p gs wh , , hss.

Ts pj hs 1 gzspsg h ss 9 hpgps h M Es Nh A, pg

bw 19 4. Wh h j hsgzs ss psg hgs, -h p s s sg s g hs p.

T p h ps h M Es hss sg hgs g hs p (194). Isg, h pp gzssg s p h p hs p w ws (s Fg 7.1), wh h s pkg 196 wh 5. p gzs s, wh g hgh 199 (1.6p s ), w b s w h

pk 1 (.6 p s ), wb h 1.4 p. Ts hb gzs sg hs h s h b gzs (39 19; 96 4). I sh b, hw, h hs , whh 4, p h ps Iqs h U.S. s.

T ss s shws sh g :wh h b gzs -

gh p hs sb, h b gzs breligion (.., h

ps h p g pb ), nationalism ( s sg h p gp pp), democracyhs s (s Fg 7.). T b M Es gzs hsk p g pb hs s 19 3 4. Ts p gs shw spp shp bw gs s.

P hp hs b h p s gzs h spp , wh s 17 19 6 4. Wh s gzs h s s s sg, h sg ss k s h hs h b .

Percent of Organizations

Using Strategy

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

20001995199019851980

Fig. 7.1: Strategies of Ethnopolitical Organizations, 19802004

Electoral PoliticsViolent Politics Domestic Protest Politics

0

20

40

60

80

100

20001995199019851980

Number of Organizations

Fig. 7.2: Shifts in Ideological Motivation, 19802004

Total

Democratic

Nationalist

Religious

Leftist

Rightist


23/28


8 . u n s t a b l e s t at e s a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s e s

A-sk ss w ph,b h ps h ps-C W s hs sh ss

h h h b h s. Wk ps h p s

s sb gb ss gsbss s.

S sb s s bks h w, s g hg, g. T hsp sp ph wks hss whh h sh, b s ks hg gb sss s. Wk sb ss gh gg s s s h pp g s h, wh s, b h sp

pps, gps wh h gss h h, h s skg sgg b , gh gs ss . T hs s s hs sb ss p b ss .

S-s p ss h ps-C W (1995) sss s sb, g, h h ss, p p h bp wg WW II, 56 p h p p (1963-199). Ts s h hs ss p sbzg s , b h s pssss pps b sbzg s, .., ss.

Ts s h gs sb h s h s g hs

h ss, h bs s s. A ps p h p sbshgsb wh ss, s h h p hs sg ss wh h s s sh h g ss s h.

T hp ps s s g whh jgs b b ss sb h sqs h ss sb, ., w hs sb g ss h h ss p s ss. Ts Crisis Vulnerability Indexs ss ps p wh p sb ss. T ps ss gs pg whh h sp sb / ss p g h 5 p (s Fg .1).

F, h j bs h 17 66 p h bh sbs ss. Sp ss gs h gb, hsss s h bss h sb h ss s g sbsss. T ghbhs sbh Ep h Ws Hsphwh s gs s wh p g wh b h h .

B h w w b s h sb ss, kg h s wh s, bs p h ss.

Fig. 8.1: Crisis Vulnerability Index, Geographic Distribution

Unstable and recent

crisis or PC

Unstable and no

recent crisis or PC

Stable and recent

crisis or PC

Seventy-seven percent o all international crises in the post-Cold War era (19902005)include one o more actors classifed as unstable, ragile, or ailed at the time o the crisis.


24/28


9 . m a s s k i l l i n g o f c i v i l i a n s i n t i m e o f W a r , 1 9 4 5 2 0 0 0

Th kg s s sq . Hh V s h bw 1 5 s h , ,

ws s 1945 (s b 9.1 s ws wh h hghss). T g h q hs g w

js h s g b p b p gg b pps. Wh s ws s h ss, kg pps?

T hs s h sg s gg s b s b. T g h h kg s g w s sgsg pw g sgs. Uk bs, gs h pp gs spp. D g g, w-gz g b f bs gs hss s sk s ggs wh

ppsg s. As s, sg s hs g h gs bs spp h pp, whh h kg ss bs s.

T s s 1 ss h h g-s gsgs bw 1945 , g 7 ss ss kgs. Ass h ss s p, hss sg spp h hs h g w ss kg. G w p h hgh sg pw s h kh ss kg. Eps bh hss g ws w s sg spp. Tg h spp s w hgh sg s j sbs s h pbb

ss kg sgs h ss. Rg p s psg, sppg h g b h p g g h sks ss kg.

Ss k sp g sgs whss wh h gs ps j h h g. Mss kg sg w s g sg sp g s h spp wk h pp.

T ss sks ss kg, g s p pk g pps, spps, wh ps h , wgh s s sg sg. Mss kg kp gs b, b s sf s ss-bs sgs.

I hs s s, wh ss p hs k sg g ws? T hs b h ss gpw pp g pps h s ss kg bs ss sgs sg h p q s p . Rgs g w-gz g ppswh sg spp h w ps g hs h. Fw gs pssss h ss p sgps h s s s zs. F s wg k j p sss h pps, ss kg sp pp h s h g s hgh ps.

Table 9.1: Mass Killing in Wars, 19452000

GuerrillaWar Civil Wars

StartYear

EndYear

l China-Communists 1946 1949

l Colombia 1948 1962

l China-Tibet 1956 1959

l Vietnam, Rep. of 1960 1975

l Iraq-Kurds 1961 1975

l Sudan 1963 1971

Nigeria-Biafra 1967 1969

China-Cultural Revolution 1967 1969

l Cambodia 1970 1975

l Pakistan-Bangladesh 1971 1971

Burundi 1972 1973

l Guatemala 1974 1984

l Ethiopia (Eritrea) 1974 1991

l Ethiopia (Tigre-Ideology) 1974 1991

l Angola 1975 1991

l Indonesia-East Timor 1975 1982

l Ethiopia (Ogaden) 1977 1982

l Afghanistan 1978 1992

l El Salvador 1979 1991

l Uganda 1981 1986

l Sudan 1983 1999

l Iraq-Kurds 1985 1988

lSomalia (Barre vs. SNM

Isaaqs and others)1988 1991

Rwanda 1990 1994

l Burundi 1991 1999

Yugoslavia-Bosnia 1992 1995

l Russia-Chechnya 1994 1996

GuerrillaWar Extra-systemic Wars

StartYear

EndYear

l Franco-Indochinese of 1945 1945 1954

l Franco-Algerian of 1954 1954 1962

GuerrillaWar International Wars

StartYear

EndYear

Korean War 1950 1953


25/28


1 0 . i n t e r n a t i o n a l P e a c e k e e P i n g :

t h e u n v e r s u s r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s

Whh p gz s bs s pkpg ps? Ws H p h

p sp hs qs, pgs ps g pkpg ps b h UN hs b ggzs h s ss. T s szs b sss s s s ss h sg hgz wk .

Gb pkpg gzs g hsg sg w, ss gbss (s, ps, gss), p,wg h -h s--s h g ps s

h w. Ts, gb gz s p p, p wkg s.

Rg gzs h s h kwg hs pb g wh s, h qp p s, qk h ss p, s h s bp qk h h UN.

G h sp gs, s ph h b pkpg ps s

h p gz wks: 194 5 -UN s 67ps, wh h UN h spgb s 59. As Db 5, h w 13gg -UN ps wh h UNws g 15 ps. (S Fgs 1.1 1.)

O h p, bh ps sss h s bs sg, b g s s ss h s s pkpg sss s

s, whs h UN hs b p s ps wh s s. Rg sss h b p phss , wh p s. H, h h g bg b hh UN, p wh s s ss sg. UN sss, hw, bs sgs , wh h fs g h s qs hgh. Csg hUNs g p pkps s w s ss, sh s b pps b sb. E s,h sss s bw h gz wks.

0

2

4

6

8

200520001995199019851980197519701965196019551950

Number of Peacekeeping Operations

Fig. 10.1: Peacekeeping Operations-Interstate, 19482005

Non-UN PeacekeepingOperations

UN PeacekeepingOperations

0

5

10

15

20

200520001995199019851980197519701965196019551950

Number of Peacekeeping Operations

Fig. 10.2: Peacekeeping Operations-Intrastate, 19482005

Non-UN Peacekeeping

Operations

UN Peacekeeping

Operations


26/28

0 P ea c e a nd C o n l i c t 2008

1 1 . u n P a c k i n g g l o b a l t r e n d s i n v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t, 1 9 4 6 2 0 0 5

I hs hp, Hw s s . T hp s ss hpph h ssss s s psps.

w s h spp h sg g hs kg.

T sh s wh s hss sw s h W W II (s Fg 11.1). I ,h h s g h hghs pg ss w h C W . T ss s p h s sg g,s ps s b bs sh s hUN NAO (.g., Ks Aghs). Ag, h s sb p sss h s s wsg gb . Hw, Hw s sgs hs. T bz ps g s sws wgh . T h ss

s , h p sks s wh s ps b, wh h s s p.

T w gphs ps Fg 11. hp s h s g h hp. T pp gph shws h s gg w. A s b hsh b g s s h W W II. Hw, s p h h ww b hs s b h p p h spsg js p h s h h s 1946. Ts s : h Chs C W (19461949),h K W (1951953), h V W (19551975), h

Agh C W (197), h IIq W (1919).As s h w gph, h h 9 p h s,h s sb pw ww .

T gs s h f kg q sssb - s bs h p w ss. Ts s s pbs sggss h h p h s hsw ps: h pps j ws h h pps ss s, b , s.

Hws ps s s h ss, sw. Ts ss g s s,

ss ps ss ps , ss hgs h g s p .

T gs ps hs hp sggs s pg s h hws pp bgg sg pks shs h ggh ss sqs sh p.

0

10

20

30

40

200520001995199019851980197519701965196019551950

% of Countries

Involved in Conflict

Fig. 11.1: Percentage of Countries Involved

in Conict, 1946-2005

% Countries Involved in

ConflictEstimated Trend

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

200520001995199019851980197519701965196019551950

Fatalities (in 10,000s)

Fatalities (in 10,000s) Estimated Trend

Fatalities (in 10,000s)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

200520001995199019851980197519701965196019551950

Fig. 11.2: Battle Death Totals, 19462005


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Peace and Confict Editorial Advisory Board

ed Robert Gurr, ChairDistinguished University Proessor Emeritus

University o Maryland

Mary CaprioliAssistant Proessor

Department o Political ScienceUniversity o Minnesota at Duluth

Nils Petter GleditschEditor, Journal o Peace Research

International Peace Research Institute (PRIO)Oslo, Norway

Krishna KumarSenior Social Scientist

U.S. Agency or International Development

Mark Irving LichbachProessor and Chair

Department o Government and PoliticsUniversity o Maryland

Will H. MooreProessor and Director o Graduate Studies

Department o Political ScienceFlorida State University

Alex Peter SchmidDirector, Center or the Study o Terrorism and

Political ViolenceSt. Andrews University, Scotland

Monica Duy otAssociate Proessor o Government

Kennedy School o GovernmentHarvard University

Contributors

Victor Asal

University at Albany,State University o New York

Laura DuganUniversity o Maryland

Susan FaheyUniversity o Maryland

ed Robert GurrUniversity o Maryland

Birger HeldtFolke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

J. Joseph HewittUniversity o Maryland

Paul HuthUniversity o Maryland

Carter Johnson

University o Maryland

Gary LaFreeUniversity o Maryland

Amy PateUniversity o Maryland

David QuinnUniversity o Maryland

Benjamin ValentinoDartmouth University

Peter WalensteenUppsala University, Sweden

Jonathan WilkeneldUniversity o Maryland


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P E A C E A n d C o n f l I C T 2 0 0 8

J. Jseph Hewitt, Jatha Wikee, a Te Rbert Gurr

Peace and Conflict 2008 is an essential tool for scholars and policymakers seeking the facts behind theheadlines about the nature and extent of conflict around the world. It provides a systematic, empiricallygrounded, and highly nuanced assessment of the darker aspects of human nature and underscores, yetagain, the inescapable truth of our interconnected world and intertwined fate.

Vartan Gregorian, President, Carnegie Corporation of New York

Across the globe governments are now trying to make sense of, and cope with, breakdowns in globalorder of unprecedented complexity. Widening gaps between rich and poor; multiplying failed states;spreading threats from non-state actors using more deadly forms of terrorism as tools against settledsocieties; and storm clouds labeled ideological and religious war all challenge scholars and policy mak-ers alike with many questions, and few answers. Peace and Conflict 2008 provides crucial clues aboutthis uncertain future, and points governments as well as international and nongovernmental organizationstoward better intervention strategies. Its excellent introduction highlights the main conclusions for thepolicy community. In short, Peace and Conflict 2008 is a tour dforce!

The Honorable Samuel Lewis, Past President, United States Institute of Peace

The most authoritative source of information on violent conflicts around the world, Peace and Conflict2008 is a biennial publication of the University of Marylands Center for International Development andConflict Management in partnership with Paradigm Publishers.

Features the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger, ranking the status and progress of 160 countriesbased on their forecasted risk of future instability.

Presents a global survey of all international and domestic terror events since 1970. Focuses on the 2008 special theme of Challenges to the Stability of States. Dedicated to the use of open source data to further research and replication. Linked to a suite of data analysis tools appropriate for students and policy analysts:

www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc Includes large format, full-color graphs, tables, maps, and appendices throughout.

J. Joseph Hewitt is Director of Government Relations at the Center for International Development andConflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, where he specializes in quantitative analysis ofinternational conflict.

Jonathan Wilkenfeld is Director of CIDCM and one of the principals of the Maryland Center for the Studyof Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. He also directs the International Crisis Behavior Project (withMichael Brecher) and the Minorities at Risk Project. His most recent publication is Mediating InternationalCrises (Routledge 2005).

Ted Robert Gurr is founder of the Minorities at Risk and Polity Projects and Distinguished University Pro-fessor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland (Emeritus). He is authorof numerous books and articles, including the award-winning Why Men Rebeland, most recently, Peoplesvs. States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century(U.S. Institute of Peace Press 2000).

Center for International Development and

Conict Management

University of Maryland

www.cidcm.umd.edu

Peace and Conflict 2008 is available in hardcoverand paperback editions from Paradigm Publishers(www.paradigmpublishers.com).

144 pages 710

ISBN 978-1-59451-400-5 (hc) $75ISBN 978-1-59541-401-2 (pb) $19.95

An electronic copy of this executive summary is available at www cidcm umd edu/pc

Documents

Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum