The Food Supply Context of the

1918 Land Distribution

The Case of Penza Province

Peter Fraunholtz

For presentation at the

ASEEES Annual Convention

San Antonio, TX

November 23, 2014

Not for citation without author’s permission

Introduction

The great land redistribution of 1917-18 in the Volga region began in the context

of a general breakdown of central authority and emergence of local survival strategies.

The poor 1917 harvest in the region transformed Penza Province into a grain-consuming

province, a status which lasted until late July 1918. The breakdown in the national grain

market beginning in fall 1916 increasingly left localities without options other than

locally produced resources. Hence land distribution took place in the context of a

national and local emphasis on leaving no cropland un-utilized, in essence making sure it

was planted with food crops. Over the course of 1917 caution turned to bold initiative as

the state and grain market collapse left volosts and communes in survival mode,

determined to take control of local resources. Indeed there appeared to be considerable

overlapping authority over the course of 1917-1918 as food supply committees had

responsibility for increasing sown area, which clearly impacted land redistribution.

During 1918, the state reemerged in rural Russia in the context of land redistribution, the

food supply crisis, and civil war.

During the spring and early summer of 1918, a redistribution of land took

place in 28 provinces in the central, northwest, and northeastern provinces of

European Russia and the Volga basin where Soviet authority was established.1 The

goals of the land redistribution or equalization as it was called in Penza was to implement

a land norm throughout the province. Given preexisting variation in peasant and estate

landholding across the province as well as the chaotic results of the 1917 land seizures,

1 Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, p. 46.

the redistribution effort revealed the widespread existence of land-surplus communes and

volosts as well as land-deficit ones, specically those with landholding that fell below the

established norms. The ultimate goal of the project was to address the cases of maximum

land-shortage and to reduce those as much as possible. Because Soviet control in Penza

was not interrupted by the advances of anti-Soviet forces into the Volga region,

provincial and district soviet land committees remained intact throughout 1918. Given

the experience accumulated during the April and July rounds of land equalization, the

process of Soviet land redistribution in Penza became much more orderly and efficient

with each successive stage.

This paper will first summarize the land and food context that emerged in 1917

and then examine the three stages of land redistribution in 1918 under evolving food

supply conditions. Finally, it will evaluate the emerging role of the Soviet state in rural

Penza and contrast this with those neighboring Volga provinces directly impacted by

military activity at the outset of the Russian Civil War. Over the course of 1918 many

poorly –off rural localities saw their productive capacity improve for the 1918 and 1919

harvests. Perhaps most significantly, the Soviet state became a more coherent institution,

evidenced by a stronger district –volost chain of command, and thus a more active rather

than reactive force in rural areas.

Prelude: Land, Peasants, and the Food Crisis of 1917 (March-September)

After the February Revolution, the Provisional Government decided that the long-

awaited land reform would be postponed until the creation of a Constituent Assembly.

During spring 1917, in order to remedy chronic food supply problems that had

contributed to the revolution in Petrograd, the new government moved to prevent the

decline in the amount of cropland sown with the major food grains.2 Given the labor

intensive nature of large-scale farming estate production, fixed prices for grain, and

increasing rural labor costs, many large landowners reduced the amount of land they

planned to cultivate. The Provisional Government sought to ensure that all available

cropland was fully utilized.3 To that end, a central decree of April 11, 1917 gave local

food committees the authority to take temporary control of land left unsown by owners

and arrange its cultivation either by agricultural workers or by renting it out to local

peasants.4

Local officials interpreted their mandate under the April 11 decree broadly and

used it as a pretext for distribution of estate land among local peasants.5 At the village

level, peasants “kept the question of unsown land at the forefront … to justify their

claims against particular landlords.”6 The democratization of local committees resulted

in peasant control, as peasants replaced the “rural intelligentsia” with their own

2 Lih, Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914-1921, p. 91. See Figes, Peasant Russia, Civil War, on the food crisis in the region in 1917, pp. 85-110. 3 On March 31, 1917, Agriculture Minister Shingarev informed provincial committees that soldiers

from reserve units and rear garrisons should be made available for spring field work . Ekonomicheskoe poluzhenie Rossii nakanune Velikoi Oktiabr, p. 67. 4 Gill, Peasants and the Russian Revolution, p. 59; Lih, p. 91. 5 Keep, The Russian Revolution: A Study in Mass Mobilization, p. 163. 6 Lih, pp. 93-94. Indeed, the food supply committees had been established to favor the interests of the urban population. Gill, p. 57.

representatives. 7 The Provisional Government’s postponement of land reform, its

insistence on complete utilization of arable land, and the provincial committees’ lack of

material incentives and coercive force, allowed volost committees, now in peasant hands,

to utilize the ambiguities of the new food and land legislation for their own ends. 8 Ever

mindful of past repression (1906-07), peasants moved cautiously at first, sending

delegates to district and then provincial peasant congresses to work out basic guidelines

for local land use. As we see in the case of the Insar district peasant congress (April 4-5)

for example as well as the provincial peasant congress (April 7-8), peasants were willing

to delay the final resolution of the land question until a Constituent Assembly could be

convened.9 Still, they sought to grant the temporary right to sow unused land to those

who typically worked the land. In the context of a national and local food supply crisis,

the taking of estate land by peasants was seen as necessary for the good of the nation’s

food supply in April of 1917.10

By the end of spring 1917, food supply conditions grew even more grave. In

parts of Penza district no rain fell from May 12 until July 3, leaving rye yields on less-

fertile peasant lands 40% less than the yields on nearby estate land. 11 Drought conditions

across the Middle Volga region resulted in a grain harvest 55% below than the 1909-1913

7 Figes, pp. 32-34; Lih, 61 8 Gill, pp. 52, 60, 69. 9Izvestiia Penzenskogo Sovieta Soldatskykh, Rabochykh, I Krest’ianskykh Deputatov no. 16, 1917. Hereafter IZVP. 10 IZVP no.9, 1917 cited in Podgotovka i pobeda Velikoi Oktiabr’skoi Sotsialisticheskoi Revolutsii v

Penzenskoi gubernii: sbornik dokumentov (Penza, 1957), no. 21, pp. 57-61. Food supply crisis here will refer to the vast problems in moving grain across the wide expanse of Russia from grain-rich peripheries and the center to the North and West. 11 IZVP no 8, 1917 (July 27). Climactic conditions in Penza decreased in severity from east and south (more productive lands) to north and west (less productive lands). IZVP no, 16, 1917.

average.12 In Lunin volost, Mokshan district officials estimated that the rye harvest on

peasant lands would yield food enough to last 2-3 months. 13 On July 5, central

authorities included Penza in the official list of provinces impacted by a bad harvest, thus

freeing the province completely from the requirement of exporting grain to the front.14

Provincial officials took measures to initiate food rationing to deal with the immediate

food supply crisis.15

As concerns about the future 1918 rye harvest emerged, the question of maximum

sown area urgently hinged on the issue of controlling estate fallow and rye fields. On

July 18, the Food Supply Ministry instructed local committees to assume responsibility

for sowing any winter fields that landowners were unable or unwilling to cultivate

themselves.16 In Penza, provincial authorities urged peasants to consider that lower rye

sowings would mean a smaller 1918 harvest and a rye shortfall well into 1919. 17 After

the second provincial peasant congress in early July, fallow estate fields were taken over

by local committees and parceled out among the peasants, many of whom previously

possessed little or no land of their own. Given the poor rye harvest, these peasants found

themselves with land but insufficient seeds for planting what would be the 1918 rye

12 Figes, p 85 13 IZVP no 81, 1917 14 GAPO f. r-9, op. 1, ll. 105-109. 15 Narodnoe Prodovol’stie no. 4 1917 (July 13) 16 The Food Supply Ministry instructed the local committees that they should not allow peasants to

prevent estate owners from cultivating their winter cropland, not should reluctant landowners fail to harvest their crops or plant the winter fields. Gill, p. 83. 17 Narodnoe Prodovol’stie no. 5, 1917.

harvest. 18 With low crop yields on peasant lands threatening rye sowings and a

prolonged food crisis, peasants and local officials increasingly turned to the grain

reserves of local estates.

The few estates located in the central and northern districts, for example, had

higher harvest yields than local peasant land. In Insar district for example, rye yields on

estate land ranged from 29-43 puds per desiatina while peasant lands yielded only 15-25

puds per desiatina. 19 Faced with local seed shortages and admonitions from higher

authorities to maintain rye sowings at a high level, volost committees in hard hit areas

increasingly defied provincial and district limits on the use of estate assets and took

control of estate rye fields, the threshing of grain, and then the grain itself.20 Over the

course of 1917 caution turned to bold initiative as the collapse of the state and the wider

grain market left volosts and communes in survival mode, determined to take control of

local resources for local needs. Where there had been significant agreement between

districts and volosts on maximizing sown are in April, enhanced insecurity resulting from

the poor 1917 harvest contributed to a rupture in the district-volost chain of command by

late summer. The Bolsehviks’ October Land Decree reinforced the authority of volost

officials in handling land matters across rural Russia.21

18 August 18 was the traditional deadline for winter sowing in order to protect the newly planted

seeds from the harmful effects of freezing temperatures that were not uncommon in Penza in late summer. 19 Narodnoe Prodovol’stie no. 9 1917. In parts of Nizhnilomov district rye yields on peasant land fell

to 20 puds per desiatina. Narodnoe Prodovol’stie no 8 1917. 20 Narodnoe Prodovol’stie no. 20 and 24, 1917. 21 Hickey, “Peasant Autonomy, Soviet Power and Land Redistribution in Smolensk Province, November-May 1918,” in Revolutionary Russia, Vol 9, No. 1, June 1996, p. 19.

Land and Food Supply in Penza, Spring 1918

During the spring and early summer of 1918, Penza officials adopted a land

equalization plan to rectify the unequal access to cropland among peasants, exacerbated

by the 1917 takeover of estate land.22 Furthermore, land equalization began at a time

when Penza was classified as a grain-consuming province (owing to the poor 1917

harvest) with Narkomprod-ordered grain shipments arriving in inadequate quantities.

Given the food supply difficulties experienced in the city of Penza and many villages and

volosts throughout the province, provincial officials were acutely concerned, as in April

1917, to ensure that the maximum amount of spring land be sown by those that had the

means to do so.23

The Soviet law “On the Socialization of Land” of February 1918 was left vague

on so many points that local interpretation played a major role in determining how land

distribution was applied. Throughout the land-hungry central and Volga provinces, land

was distributed on the basis of the number of people or “eaters” in each family, as

opposed to the number of family members of working age. 24 The Penza Provincial

Congress of Soviets held in late March, 1918, set the provincial norm for allotting

cropland at 0.5 desiatina per person in each of three fields (1.5 desiatinas in total). Given

the state’s still inadequate ability to transfer grain from producing regions to consuming

22 On the myriad of practical problems involved in land equalization, see Figes, p. 116. 23 Local soviets in the Volga region tried to organize their own procurements from Siberia. Figes, p.

94. 24 According to Carr, distribution of land in 1918 on the basis of labor capacity was utilized in the less densely populated provinces of northern Russia and in the Siberian steppes. Carr, p. 47.

ones in April 1918, per capita distribution of land was likely to reduce the number of

households, villages, and volosts entitled to receive grain under the grain monopoly.25

Nevertheless, confusion marred the beginning of land redistribution efforts in

Penza province. District land officials were unable to start the process because they did

not receive copies of the provincial congress’ resolutions and instructions. As a result,

district officials were confused and inquired: “is the norm set at 1.5 desiatinas for all

three fields, or 1.5 desiatinas in each field, which would mean 4.5 desiatinas per

person?”26 In addition, provincial authorities did not offer clear guidance on the thorny

issue of norm application in cases where villages had to divide land of different qualities.

The Elan volost soviet expressed some confusion about instructions that the norm of 1.5

desiatinas per person consist of average quality land, when each of the three fields in the

province were divided into sections of good, average and poor soil. 27 Having to direct a

process set in motion by the provincial congress of soviets without receiving clear

instructions, district officials were ill-equipped to ensure an orderly process.

The main criterion for eligibility to receive land during the 1918 distribution was

previous involvement in farming by one’s own labor in the particular locality. Peasants

who rented land and worked it with their own labor could claim the land they worked,

25 Of the 11 districts in Penza, 5 were often grain-consuming even in good years and many volosts inhabited by former state peasants on poor soil in net grain-producing districts were grain consuming as well. Hickey and Kovalev also comment on the relationship between the food crisis and the pressure to redistribute land in Smolensk and Moscow province respectively. Hickey, p. 27. Kovalev, “The Socialization of the Land and Peasant Land Use (Moscow Region)”, in Russian Studies in History, Vol. 52, No. 3, Winter 2013-14, p. 82. 26 Gosudarstvennya Arkhiv Penzenskoi Oblasti (Hereafter GAPO) f. r-309, op. 1, d. 216, 1. 126. 27 GAPO f. r-136, op. 1, d. 216, 1.98.

whether they rented another peasant’s a llotment or private estate land. 28 These

guidelines, however, had unintended consequences that wreaked havoc with early land

redistribution efforts. Land seizures by villages and communes became a successful

strategy for peasants desiring more or better land to plant for the 1918 harvest. 29 In these

cases, peasants gambled that district authorities would not take land away from those who

worked it. Volost soviets, confronted with preemptive acts of land-grabbing by villages

and the complaints that followed, did not possess the power to prevent or rectify illegal

land seizures. For example, local land authorities allotted the entire 560 desiatinas of

spring cropland on the Miller estate in Penza District to the Bezsonovka peasant

commune. However, the neighboring Blokhinskoe commune ignored this decision, seized

170 desiatinas from the Miller estate, and quickly sowed it with spring grains. The

peasants of Blokhinskoe commune had been allotted cropland in neighboring Durasov

volost, but refused to accept this land, opting to move quickly to seize the better quality

estate land before the Bezsonovka peasants began their spring field work.30 Ensuring the

best possible harvest in 1918 for the commune or village required expansion of the

quantity and/or quality of sown land. Upper level officials would certainly order the

offending village to compensate the one that lost out, usually in the form of other fields,

but this was something that could be negotiated later after the seized fields were already

plowed and planted for the upcoming 1918 harvest.

28 Provincial authorities recognized that non-farming families and outsiders also needed land, but

such persons were to be given land only after all the local working peasants had received allotments. These guidelines applied generally throughout the Volga region. Figes, p. 113. 29On the minimal role played by Soviets in early redistribution in Smolensk see Hickey, p. 22. 30 GAPO f. r-2, op. 1, d. 7, 1. 57.

Neighboring volosts were prone to engage in land conflicts as well during the

spring of 1918. In fact, 13% of all volosts soviets in Penza in 1918 reported land disputes

with other volosts.31 In the process of dividing up the Barablin and Nemtsov estates to

equalize landholding and implement the 0.5 desiatina per person land norm among

adjacent volosts, Novo-Troitsko volost (Saransk District) had to cede 120 desiatinas of its

land to Lemdiaisko-Maidansk volost (Insar district). However, Lemdiaisko-Maidansk

volost took more than the 120 desiatinas allotted the volost. On the insistence of

provincial land authorities, the two volost soviets reached a negotiated settlement.

Lemdiaisko-Maidansk volost agreed to five up tracts of meadow land and cropland that

bordered Novo-Troitsk volost, but only after harvesting the grain sown on that parcel.32

Despite a settlement, Lemdiaisko-Maidansk volost took short-term advantage of a

political climate in which land was not taken away from those who worked it, even if

they had seized it illegally. The combination of a weak state in rural areas and local

initiative born of dire necessity seen in the late summer of 1917 continued into the spring

of 1918.

Left to rely almost entirely on local resources, provincial and local officials tried

to maximize the amount of cropland under cultivation for the 1918 harvest. These two

official priorities gave peasants and their village and volost officials legal cover to seize

adjacent lands, which, if quickly cultivated, would remain theirs for the duration of the

agricultural cycle. A similar confluence of economic disruption, official policies, and

local needs had sparked the agrarian revolution in the spring of 1917. Given the official

31 Figes, pp. 115-116. 32 GAPO f. r-309, op. 1, d. 218, 1. 13.

attention paid to reliance on local resources (referring specifically to sowing all land) in

order to reduce the impact of the food supply crisis, the haphazard, decentralized nature

of the first phase of Soviet land redistribution encouraged local communities to take

control of their own destiny, and negotiate with Soviet authorities about compensation

after the fact.

Land Equalization, Stage II (July 1918): From Confusion to Order

During the first phase of land equalization in April, 1918, local soviet officials

sought to maximize the area sown during spring planting as a means to resolve the local

food crisis. Concerned about increased sowing, local officials were unable to prevent

spontaneous land seizures. During the summer of 1918, however, Soviet land officials

began to initiate land equalization by bringing volost and peasant commune officials

together to implement norms in a more orderly fashion. In early July, 1918,

representatives of volost land committees and their constituent communes met with

district soviet land committee officials in redistribution conferences throughout the

province. These conferences focused on the division of fallow land, a process that would

determine how much rye would be planted per commune for harvesting in 1919. 33

Redistribution conferences had to deal with variations in population density and the

33 How much is 0.5 desiatina per person in real terms? The average rye harvest from one desiatina in

Penza during 1909-1911 was 53.1 puds per desiatina. Obzor sel’skogo khoziaistva v Penzensko gubernii, p. 105. Of this amount, ten puds had to be set aside for seed, l eaving 43.1 puds of rye for consumption. Half of this, or 21.55 puds, would feed one person for twelve months at a rate of 1.8 puds per month, almost twice the consumption norms established in the spring of 1918 as the basis of both food assistance and requisitioning. By contemporary standards, an average harvest of 0.5 destiatina of rye could feed one person for twelve months at the government-established norms and leave a surplus of 9.5 puds.

amount of land available for redistribution. 34 For the most part, the goals of the

redistribution process were limited to addressing the needs of the volosts with the

smallest per capita land holding.

The land equalization policy which guided the redistribution conferences in Penza

province stipulated that the use rights to certain parcels of land would be transferred from

land-surplus volosts to adjacent land-deficit volosts on a temporary basis. Complete

equalization was achieved in few cases since the land transfers required would have

resulted in great confusion and conflicts among volosts. Soviet officials, however, tried

to increase the landholding of volosts with the largest deficits, specifically those with the

lowest per capita landholding, thus improving these volosts’ chances of increasing local

grain production.

For example, six of the nine volosts in the Fourth Okrug of Penza District

possessed land surpluses totaling 1,915 desiatinas and three volosts claimed land deficits

of 2001.5 desiatinas. The land equalization process there focused on the rather large

1,679 desiatina deficit of Pokrovo-Archadinsk volost and resulted in several volosts being

required to transfer land on a temporary basis to Pokrovsko-Archadinsk in order to

reduce its land deficit. The transfer process was complex as neighboring volosts which

ceded land to Pokrovsko-Archadinsk were not necessarily those with the largest land

34 Participants typically included the chairmen of the Volost Land Committee Executive Board and

other board members. Occasionally the chairman of the Volost Soviet Executive committee, a member of the District Land Committee Board and a district surveyor were included, as well as representatives from some of the communes in the volosts taking part in the Redistribution Conference. Communal representatives and their volost officials seemed, in some cases, to influence conference decisions on their landholding status.

“surplus.” These neighboring volosts were compensated for land lost to Pokrovsko-

Archadinsk volost with parcels of land in volosts possessing higher landholdings per

capita or from yet another intermediary volost which in turn received compensation from

still another.35 Soviet officials managed to transfer enough land to Pokrovo-Archadinsk

volost to reduce its 1,679 desiatina deficit by half (by 854 desiatinas). Per capita

landholdings in this volost’s winter cropland increased in 1918 from 0.25 to 0.37

desiatina per person. Though still well below the 0.5 desiatina provincial norm, Pokrovo-

Archadinsk peasants would be able to sow 50% more land with rye and could hope to

expect a similar increase in local food supplies in 1919-1920.

Some local officials falsified population and landholding data to prevent villages

in their domain from losing land.36 Yet in many cases this strategy was rejected because

so many volosts possessed amounts of cropland close to the established land norms and

no one wanted to lose land if they could help it. The 1918 population and land data

provided by the representative of Lipiagov volost was rejected by the Fourth Okrug

redistribution conference as fraudulent. Instead, the conference decided to use statistical

data on Lipiagov volost gathered in 1917.37 Population and sown area data for Kazano-

Archadink volost was also considered suspect. The volost representative was ordered to

35As a result of land transfers to Pokrovsko-Archadinsk volost, five other volosts which possess

slightly more than the provincial norm lost their surplus land. On the leveling aspect of land redistribution in Moscow province see Kovalev, p. 84-85. 36 Figes, p.115. 37 Lipiagov officials claimed per capita landholding of 0.31 desiatina per person in the fallow field, well below the provincial norm of 0.5 desiatina and below the per capita holdings of most of the other volosts represented. 1917 data, however, put the per capita landholding here at 0.47 desiatina per person. The higher per capita landholding reduced the 1918 land deficit in the volost by 1,688 desiatinas, and the total deficit of the three volosts from 3,589 to 2001.5 desiatinas.

provide more accurate data or risk arrest. 38 The risk felt by many volost land

representatives in being so close to the margins and potentially required to reduce their

landholding even further ensured that inaccurate data on population and landholdings

would be questioned by conference participants and presiding district land committee

officials.

Compared with April, land redistribution proceeded in a more orderly fashion.

Meetings with local stakeholders took into account data on local conditions, rejected

clearly suspect data on population and landholding, and came to an open decision on how

to address needs of the worst-off volosts. Some semblance of state presence emerged in

the process, but this did not entail rejection of local conditions and concerns about

landholding. While the process appeared complicated at times, the goals seem to have

been reasonable and limited.

Redistribution of the 1918 Rye Fields: An Emerging State in Rural Penza

(September 1918)

After winter rye was sown and spring grains harvested and carted in from the

fields in late August, attention turned to division of fields for sowing in spring 1919.

These strips, sown with rye in the late summer of 1917, had been left in the hands of

peasants who had worked them with their own labor. In 1917-1918, no claims to land

other than by the fact of having worked the land carried much weight, as local officials

38 GAPO f. r-526, op. 1, d. 10, l. unmarked.

and peasants were concerned to maximize sown area for the 1918 harvest. After the 1918

harvest, implementing the 0.5 desiatina per person norm for the 1919 spring cropland of

Penza villages and volosts became the next concern of district land officials and peasants

alike. To these ends, another round of redistribution conferences began in early

September, 1918.

As in the summer, the major concern of these conferences was improving

landholding in areas with the largest land shortage. The September 16 land equalization

conference held at Pokrovo-Archadinsk was reminiscent of that held in July. The

villages in Pokrovo-Archadinsk were mostly composed of former state peasants who had

little chance to augment the low per capita landholdings. 39 As at the earlier meetings, the

conference decided to transfer 910 desiatinas from three volosts to Pokrovo-Archadinsk,

eliminating nearly all of that volost’s land deficit.40

In cases where there was no net land surplus among the adjacent volosts efforts

were still made to address the worst-off peasants. At the land equalization conference in

Borisovka, Penza District the three participating volosts in the Second Okrug did not

possess enough land to address the large deficit of Ternov volost (1, 458 desiatinas).41 In

addition, the representatives of four communes in Kamensk volost succeeded in

demonstrating that, although they possessed a surplus of land on paper, the quality of the

39 Predvaritel’nye itogi Vserossiiskoi sel’sko-khoziastvennoi I pozemel’noi perepisi 1917 goda (v tselakh

prodovol’stviia) vyp. 7 Penzenskoi uezd, pp. 14-15, 102. 40 GAPO f. r-526, op. 1, d. 10, 1. 42. 41 The land equalization conference in Borisovka, Penza District, on September 10, 1918, was

attended by representatives of only three of the five volosts which comprised the Second Okrug, Ternov, Borisov, and Kamensk

soil in Kamensk volost was so poor that peasants there had no real advantage over those

in other volosts. Kamensk was able to retain 252 desiatinas in excess of the land norm.

Instead, the 499.5 desiatina surplus held by Borisov volost was transferred to the

temporary use of Ternov volost.42 While Ternov’s per capita landholding was still only

0.25 desiatina per person, half of the provincial norm, its landholding in the spring field

was more than doubled by the transfer of land from Borisov volost. From a food supply

standpoint, Ternov peasants would be much better able to provide for themselves after

the 1919 harvest.

Yet, peasants in the villages of Penza did not have to wait until 1919 to feel the

impact of the September land equalization conferences. The solid rye harvest and the

outbreak of the Civil War made Penza a prime target for Soviet grain procurement.43 By

mid-September, procurement brigades numbering 1,562 members had arrived from

central and northern Russia and provincial officials were ordered to impose quickly

procurement quotas on their volosts and communes.44 Dating back to April of 1917, local

land and food supply committees had exerted overlapping authority in rural areas. The

process of Soviet land redistribution in Penza became more orderly and efficient with

each successive phase each involving the repeated review of data concerning local

landholding. Consequently, by September 1918, the emergence of a more durable state

presence had a significant impact on the process of allotting grain procurement targets.

42 This transfer was to take place by September 23, and the Ternov volost land board was obligated

to divide the land among needy communes by October 1 or forfeit the right to use the land. GAPO f. r-2, op. 1, d. 7, 1. 4. 43 Sumerin, Kombedy v Penzenskoi gubernii , p. 33; Figes, p. 249; Morozov, “Perepiska V.I. Lenina s

Penzenskimi Bolshevikami v 1918 g.” in Istorii SSSR, . 102. 44 Strizhkov, Prodovol’stvennye otriady v gody grazhdanskoi voiny I inostrannoi interventsii, 1917-1921 , p. 141.

On September 17, the volosts of Penza district were subjected to grain levy due

September 25. Eighteen volosts in Penza district were given a quota of grain to deliver,

and for eleven of these data exists on population and per capita landholding in the

recently harvested rye fields. On what basis were gain quotas for volosts determined?

There is strong indication that the officials who established the levies in Penza had a

greater awareness of the relative ability of various volosts to provide grain than did their

counterparts in other parts of the Volga region. 45 The September rye levies appear to be

related to the amount of land planted in rye in the volosts of Penza district in 1917. The

volosts assessed the largest rye levy was the one possessing the largest amount of winter

cropland as well as the highest per capita landholding in the district. Durasov volost,

which possessed 0.75 desiatina per person, 50% more than the provincial norm, was

required to turn in 144,000 puds (or 16% of the district total of 912, 450 puds).46 Among

the other volosts for which data exists, Chetkov volost had the second largest amount of

winter cropland and received the second largest rye levy (9% of the district total).

Conversely, the volosts with the smallest amount of winter cropland, Mastinov,

Malo Ramzai, and Ternov received the smallest quotas (15, 700, 14,000, and 7, 200 puds

of rye respectively), each less than 2% of the district total.47 With increased pressure

coming from Moscow for grain shipments and the arrival of ample armed force to spur

45 Figes discusses the heavy grain burdens levied due to poor statistics and methods across the Volga

region in 1918. Figes, pp. 249-250. 46 Rough figures from the 1917 agricultural census indicate that nearly 47% of the total arable land in the volost had been better quality estate land before 1918. Predvaritel’nye itogi Vserossiiskoi sel’sko-khoziastvennoi I pozemel’noi perepisi 1917 goda (v tselakh prodovol’stviia) xxxxI p. 12. (p. 403) 47 GAPO f. r-526, op. 1, d. 10, ll. 1, 4, 14, 42, 51-52.; GAPO f. r-136, op. 1, d. 14, ll. 109-110ob.

grain collection, district officials could not afford to wait on the time-consuming grain

registration process to locate grain surplus held by individual households.48 Instead they

established grain levies by using data compiled by land equalization conferences to

estimate the relative ability of volosts to produce rye. This was possible in a province

like Penza where Soviet land committees had worked continuously on land redistribution,

uninterrupted by military activity and Soviet collapse during the summer of 1918.

Conclusion: The State and Local Land and Food Conditions in 1918 - An Evolution

The collapse of the state and the national grain market resulted in a decent into

local survival mode across central Russia. From March to July 1917, the necessity of

marshalling local resources to address local needs shaped the early process of land

distribution. The role of local food supply committees was significant as the question of

maximizing sown area and access to adequate seed grain were key to future food supply

conditions across the region. This state of affairs persisted into spring 1918 as the Soviet

state was too weak to penetrate into rural areas, thus leaving locals to interpret decrees to

suit local needs. “Working the land” remained a key factor as sown area continued to be

essential for alleviating local food supply concerns. Other notable historians have

dismissed Soviet attempts at land equalization in the Volga region as “absurd,” a utopian

scheme doomed to fail. 49 Yet, from July to September 1918, two rounds of land

redistribution conferences and their limited goals increased the extent of measured state

involvement in village affairs and the level of detailed awareness of landholding

48 For more on the crucial role of grain registration see Melancon, “Trail Run for Soviet Food

Requisitioning: The Expedition to Orel Province, Fall 1918” in The Russian Review, Vol. 69, No. 3, July 2010, pp 412-437. 49 Figes, p.116

conditions in the communes and volosts of Penza. The active participation of volost and

communal officials ensured a grudging adherence to the letter and spirit of the process.

Data on population and per capita landholding became the idiom of peasant-state

negotiation.

While imperfect, this data allowed for an open discussion, if not consensus, on

which communes had ample good quality land and which, despite assistance, did not.

Wide variation persisted as indicated by the cases of Durasov and Ternov volosts

discussed earlier. By September 1918, the civil war had cut the Soviet state off from the

surplus-producing periphery and focused procurement efforts on Penza and a handful of

central and Volga provinces. In this urgent atmosphere, Bolshevik officials across the

Volga region were known to react violently and indiscriminately, extracting far more

grain than peasant households could bear, and setting in motion a dangerous hide and

seek dynamic with peasants that contributed to even more excessive procurements in

1919-1920. In contrast, local officials in Penza were more familiar with local conditions

because they had had the space to learn and evolve over the course of 1918, uninterrupted

by the White army invasion and Red Army occupation that characterized peasant-state

relations in general and the process of land distribution and grain procurement in

particular in neighboring province to the south and east.50

50 These would include Samara, Saratov and Simbirsk. See Figes, pp. 248-273.