PEOPLE vs QUEBRAL

DECISIONABAD, J.:

This case is about the requirement of authentication of seized prohibited drugs and the conduct of warrantless search of a suspect by the roadside based on probable cause. The Facts and the CaseThe provincial prosecutor of Bulacan charged the accused Zenaida Quebral, Eusebio Quebral, Fernando Lopez, and Michael Salvador before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case 3331-M-2002 with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. At the trial of this case, the prosecution presented PO3 Cecilio Galvez of the police force of Balagtas, Bulacan, who testified that at 7:00 p.m. on September 7, 2002, the Chief of the Drug Enforcement Unit called him and other police officers to a briefing regarding a police informers report that two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep with a specific plate number would deliver shabu, a prohibited drug, on the following day at a Petron Gasoline Station in Balagtas to Michael Salvador, a drug pusher in the police watch list.[1] After a short briefing on the morning of September 8, 2002, PO3 Galvez and six other police officers went to the North Luzon Expressway Balagtas Exit at Burol 2nd, watching out for the owner type jeep mentioned. They got there at around 7:45 a.m. Since the informer did not give the exact time of the delivery of shabu, the police officers staked out the expressway exit until late afternoon. At around 4:00 p.m., such a jeep, bearing the reported plate number and with two men and a woman on board, came out of the Balagtas Exit. Galvez identified the two men as accused Eusebio Quebral, who drove the jeep, and accused-appellant Fernando Lopez and the woman as accused-appellant Zenaida Quebral. The police trailed the jeep as it proceeded to the town proper of Balagtas and entered a Petron gas station along the McArthur Highway. After a few minutes, a Tamaraw FX arrived from which accused- appellant Michael Salvador alighted. He walked towards the jeep and talked to accused Zenaida Quebral, who then handed a white envelope to him. On seeing this, PO3 Galvez, who was watching from about 15 meters in a tinted car, signaled his back-up team to move. The police officers alighted from their vehicles and surrounded the jeep. Galvez took the envelope from Michael, opened it, and saw five plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance which he believed was shabu. The Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office later examined the substance and submitted a chemistry report,[2] stating that it was shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a prohibited drug. Appellants denied having committed the crime, claiming only that PO3 Galvez and his fellow police officers merely framed them up. On March 18, 2004 the RTC found all four accused guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P5 million. On May 20, 2005, while the Court of Appeals (CA) was reviewing the case on appeal in CA-G.R. CR-HC 01997, accused Eusebio Quebral died, prompting it to dismiss the case against him. On February 13, 2008, the CA rendered judgment,[3] entirely affirming the decision of the RTC. The remaining accused appealed to this Court.The Issues Presented Appellants basically raise two issues for this Courts resolution:1. Whether or not the CA erred in not excluding the evidence of the seized shabu on the ground that, having illegally arrested the accused, the police officers subsequent search of their persons incident to such arrest was also illegal; and2. Whether or not the prosecution presented ample proof of appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Rulings of the CourtOne. The accused claim that since the police did not have valid ground to arrest them, their subsequent search of them was illegal and the evidence of the seized shabu cannot be admitted in evidence against them. With the exclusion of the seized drugs, there would not be proof that they were passing them.The accused-appellants invoke the rule that a person may be arrested even without a warrant only a) if he is caught in the act of committing a crime, b) if he has just committed a crime and the arresting officer pursued him, or c) if he escaped from a legal confinement.[4] But in the first two instances, the officer must have personal knowledge of the facts underlying the arrest. The target persons observable acts must clearly spell a crime. If no crime is evident from those acts, no valid arrest can be made. An informant whispering to the police officers ear that the person walking or standing on the street has committed or is committing a crime will not do. The arresting officer must himself perceive the manifestations of a crime.[5]The accused-appellants point out that in this case the police officers cannot say that what they saw from a distance constituted a crime. Two men and a woman arrived on board a jeep at the gas station. A third man approached the jeep, spoke to the woman and she handed him a folded white envelope that appeared to contain something. These acts do not constitute a crime per se. Consequently, their arrest at this point was illegal. The subsequent search of their persons, not being based on a valid arrest, was itself illegal.But, actually, it was more of a search preceding an arrest. The police officers had information that two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep would arrive in Balagtas and hand over a consignment of shabu at a gas station in town to a known drug dealer whose name was on the police watch list. When these things unfolded before their eyes as they watched from a distance, the police came down on those persons and searched them, resulting in the discovery and seizure of a quantity of shabu in their possession. In such a case, the search is a valid search justifying the arrest that came after it. This Court held in People v. Bagista[6] that the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet, in view of the confidential information they received from their regular informant that a woman fitting the description of the accused would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search her belongings since she fitted the given description. In such a case, the warrantless search was valid and, consequently, any evidence obtained from it is admissible against the accused. As the lower court aptly put it in this case, the law enforcers already had an inkling of the personal circumstances of the persons they were looking for and the criminal act they were about to commit. That these circumstances played out in their presence supplied probable cause for the search. The police acted on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.[7] Since the seized shabu resulted from a valid search, it is admissible in evidence against the accused.It would have been impractical for the police to apply with the appropriate court for a search warrant since their suspicion found factual support only at the moment accused Eusebio Quebral, Fernando Lopez, and Zenaida Quebral rendezvoused with Michael Salvador at the Petron gas station for the hand over of the drugs. An immediate search was warranted since they would have gone away by the time the police could apply for a search warrant.[8] The drugs could be easily transported and concealed with impunity.[9] The case of People v. Aminnudin[10] cannot apply to this case. In Aminnudin, the informant gave the police the name and description of the person who would be coming down from a ship the following day carrying a shipment of drugs. In such a case, the Court held that the police had ample time to seek a search warrant against the named person so they could validly search his luggage. In the present case, all the information the police had about the persons in possession of the prohibited drugs was that they were two men and a woman on board an owner type jeep. A search warrant issued against such persons could be used by the police to harass practically anyone.Two. The accused-appellants point out that the testimony of PO3 Galvez cannot support their conviction since it does not bear the corroboration of the other officers involved in the police operation against them. But the failure of these other officers did not weaken the prosecution evidence. The lone declaration of an eyewitness is sufficient to convict if, as in this case, the court finds the same credible.[11] Credibility goes into a persons integrity, to the fact that he is worthy of belief,[12] and does not come with the number of witnesses.[13]The accused-appellants also point out that, since the chemist who examined the seized substance did not testify in court, the prosecution was unable to establish the indispensable element of corpus delicti. But this claim is unmeritorious. This Court has held that the non-presentation of the forensic chemist in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal.[14] The corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the dangerous drug itself. This means that proof beyond doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential.[15] Besides, corpus delicti has nothing to do with the testimony of the laboratory analyst. In fact, this Court has ruled that the report of an official forensic chemist regarding a recovered prohibited drug enjoys the presumption of regularity in its preparation. Corollarily, under Section 44 of Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, entries in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the facts they state.[16] Therefore, the report of Forensic Chemical Officer Sta. Maria that the five plastic sachets PO3 Galvez gave to her for examination contained shabu is conclusive in the absence of evidence proving the contrary. At any rate, as the CA pointed out, the defense agreed during trial to dispense with the testimony of the chemist and stipulated on his findings.[17]Parenthetically, the accused-appellants raised their objection to the police chemists report only on appeal when such objection should have been made when the prosecution offered the same in evidence. They may, thus, be considered to have waived their objection to such report.[18] The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is that the inadmissibility of certain documents, if not urged before the court below, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[19] The accused-appellants take advantage of PO3 Galvezs testimony that they conducted their operation on September 2, 2002, the date that the informant gave them, and that the following day was September 8, 2002[20] to attack his credibility. But inconsistency is trivial and appears to be a pure mistake. Lapses like this even enhance the truthfulness of the testimony of a witness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed declaration.[21] Besides, PO3 Galvez corrected this mistake on cross-examination. He said that their informant gave them his tip at 7:00 p.m. of September 7, 2002.[22]Finally, the accused-appellants contend that the prosecution evidence failed to show compliance with the requirements of law for handling evidence. But, as has been held in a recent case,[23] failure to comply strictly with those requirements will not render the seizure of the prohibited drugs invalid for so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers. Besides, the accused-appellants did not raise it before the trial court, hence, they cannot raise it for the first time on appeal.[24] The CA and the RTC gave credence to the testimony of PO3 Galvez and this Court finds no reason for disagreement. His narration was clear and candid. On the other hand, the accused-appellants claim of a frame-up was easy to concoct and so has been the common line of defense in most cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[25] Such defense requires strong and convincing evidence which the accused-appellants failed to satisfy. As the trial court correctly observed, the accused-appellants failed to provide any reason why of all the people plying through the roads they had taken, the police chose to frame them up for the crime. They also failed to explain why the police would plant such huge amount of shabu if a small quantity would be sufficient to send them to jail.[26] No arresting officer would plant such quantity of shabu solely to incriminate the accused who have not been shown to be of good financial standing.[27] WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the appeal and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 13, 2008 and of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos dated March 18, 2004. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182555 February 8, 2011LENIDO LUMANOG and AUGUSTO SANTOS, Petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O NVILLARAMA, JR., J.:This resolves the motions for reconsideration separately filed by Lenido Lumanog and Augusto Santos, Cesar Fortuna and Rameses de Jesus assailing our Decision dated September 7, 2010 convicting them of the crime of murder, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions and appeal are hereby DISMISSED. The Decision dated April 1, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00667 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the civil indemnity for the death of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla is hereby increased to P75,000.00, and the amounts of moral and exemplary damages awarded to his heirs are reduced to P75,000.00 and P30,000.00, respectively.With costs against the accused-appellants.SO ORDERED.1Lumanog and Augusto Santos seek the reversal of their conviction on the following grounds:The Honorable Supreme Court erred in:I. Setting out in the facts of the case and the contents of inadmissible extrajudicial confessions;II. Not including the extrajudicial confession of Lorenzo delos Santos as excluded evidence;III. Applying the ruling in People v. Rivera "that the testimony of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court";IV. According finality to the evaluation made by the lower court of the testimony of Freddie Alejo;V. Ruling that there was positive identification;VI. Finding "none of the danger signals enumerated by Patrick M. Wall" when 3, 7, 10, 11, 12 in said enumeration are present;VII. Dismissing the mismatch between the prior description given by the witness and the actual appearances of the accused;VIII. Relying on the ocular inspection conducted at a time when a material condition is significantly altered;IX. Ruling that the inconsistencies in Alejos earlier statement and his in-court testimony have been explained;X. Not discrediting Alejos testimony despite acceptance of benefits from the Abadilla family;XI. Holding that the acquittal of Lorenzo delos Santos does not necessarily benefit the appellants;XII. Ruling that the ballistic and fingerprint examination results are inconclusive and not indispensable;XIII. Not considering the totality of evidence presented by the defense as against the alleged "positive identification" of the accused.XIV. Allowing Justice Jose Catral Mendoza to take part in the deliberation and the voting;XV. Dismissing the evidence presented by Augusto Santos;XVI. Ruling that the silence of accused Lumanog amounts to a quasi-confession;XVII. Holding that the delay of (4) four years during which the case remained pending with the CA and this Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive.2Rameses de Jesus raised the following grounds in his motion:I.THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HEAVILY RELYING ON THE LONE ALLEGED EYEWITNESS SECURITY GUARD (SG) FREDDIE ALEJOS TESTIMONY, WHICH WAS CHARACTERIZED BY MATERIAL OMISSIONS, PATENT INCREDIBILITY, CONTRADICTIONS AND DISCREPANCIES.II.THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE FIRST SWORN STATEMENT GIVEN BY SG FREDDIE ALEJO, WHEREIN HE STATED THAT THERE WERE FOUR (4) SUSPECTS WHO PERPETRATED THE CRIME CONTRARY TO HIS SUBSEQUENT TESTIMONY IN OPEN COURT.III.THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS, WHICH WOULD SHOW AS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THEIR ALLEGED COLLECTIVE GUILT AND CONSPIRACY.IV.THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO GIVE WEIGHT TO PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, PARTICULARLY THE EXCULPATORY BALLISTICS AND DACTYLOSCOPY EVIDENCE, AND EXPERT TESTIMONY PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE.3On his part, Cesar Fortuna argues that:THE LONE, CONTRADICTED AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF S/G ALEJO IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT4At the inception, let it be emphasized that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not impose on us the obligation to discuss and rule again on the grounds relied upon by the movant which are mere reiteration of the issues previously raised and thoroughly determined and evaluated in our Decision being questioned.5 In particular, the Court need not dwell again on the extrajudicial confessions of Joel de Jesus and Lorenzo delos Santos which we have held inadmissible, the delay in the resolution of the appeals before the CA and this Court which under the circumstances cannot be deemed unreasonable or arbitrary, the inconclusive ballistic and fingerprint examination results, and the effect of Lorenzo delos Santos acquittal to the rest of appellants. These matters have been passed upon and adequately discussed in our Decision.In fine, the accused-movants strongly assail the weight and credence accorded to the identification of the accused by the lone eyewitness presented by the prosecution, security guard Freddie Alejo. It was pointed out, among others, that: (1) in his statement given to the police investigators immediately after the incident, Alejo mentioned only four suspects, contrary to his subsequent testimony in court; it was impossible for him not to mention the two men he had seen walking back and forth before the shooting; (2) Alejo accepted financial support and benefits from the Abadilla family which could have colored his testimony against the accused; (3) his in-court identification of the six accused is questionable and unreliable considering that it referred to them only by numbers and he had given prior description of only two suspects; and (4) the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court to confirm Alejos observations was likewise unreliable because it was made at a time when a material condition is significantly altered, i.e., it was held from 10:00 a.m. onwards whereas the incident occurred between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. when the glare of the morning sun directly hits the guard post where Alejo was stationed.Fortuna submitted an Affidavit dated November 12, 2009 executed by a certain Orencio G. Jurado, Jr. who claims to be one of the police officers initially assigned to investigate the case. Fortuna contends that said belated statement would certainly cast doubt on the procedures undertaken by the police authorities in the apprehension of the likely perpetrators.We find the motions bereft of merit.While it is true that Alejo mentioned only four and not six suspects in his June 13, 1996 sworn statement, this did not impair his testimony as an eyewitness. Alejo was simply responding to specific questions as to what he had witnessed during the shooting incident. Herein quoted is an excerpt from the questioning by SPO1 Edilberto S. Nicanor of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) at Camp Karingal (PNP-NCR) and Alejos answers thereto:08. T - Habang ikaw ay naka-duty bilang guwardiya sa 211 Katipunan Road, Quezon City, itong araw na ito, may napansin ka bang hindi pangkaraniwang pangyayari?S - Mayroon, Sir.09. T Ano iyon?S - May binaril na sakay ng kotse sa harap ng puwesto ko sir.10. T - Anong oras ito nangyari?S - 8:40 ng umaga kanina sir, more or less (13 June 1996)11. Tanong : Sino ba itong binaril na tinutukoy mo, kung kilala mo?Sagot : Isang hindi ko kilala na lalaki sir.12. T - Sino naman ang bumaril sa biktima na ito, kung kilala mo?S - Apat na hindi kilalang lalaki sir na armado ng baril.x x x x6 (Emphasis supplied.)The foregoing shows that Alejo merely gave the responsive answer to the question as to those persons whom he saw actually shoot the victim who was in his car. As the question was phrased, Alejo was not being asked about the persons who had participation or involvement in the crime, but only those who actually fired at the victim. Hence, he replied that there were four (4) armed men who suddenly fired shots at the victim. What followed was Alejos narration of what the gunmen further did to the already wounded victim, to those people within the vicinity -- including himself who was ordered at gunpoint to lie down and not interfere -- and until the firing stopped as the suspects ran away. Clearly, it was not a fatal omission on the part of Alejo not to include in his first affidavit the two other suspects who were acting as lookouts. During his testimony in court, Alejo was able to fully recount the details and state that there were two men walking back and forth before the shooting. It is settled that contradictions between the contents of an affiants affidavit and his testimony in the witness stand do not always militate against the witness credibility. This is so because affidavits, which are usually taken ex parte, are often incomplete and inaccurate.7There is likewise nothing irregular in Alejos manner of testifying in court, initially referring to the accused by numbers, to indicate their relative positions as he remembered them, and the individual participation of each in the violent ambush of Abadilla. As already explained in our decision, Alejos elevated position from the guardhouse gave him such a clear and unobstructed view of the incident that he was able to recognize the faces and physical features of the accused at the time. When two of the accused actually poked a gun at him, it gave him more opportunity to see the faces of the accused who had briefly turned their eyes on him. Furthermore, experience dictates, precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right before witnesses eyes, that they remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals.8 Indeed, Alejos recollection is not of "superhuman" level as accused now make it appear, considering that he was a trained security guard, whose job demands extra perceptiveness and vigilance at all times especially during emergency or critical situations. Keen scrutiny of the physical appearance and behavior of persons is a routine part of a security guards work duties.Movants likewise fault this Court for giving considerable weight to the observations made by the trial judge during the ocular inspection, arguing that the timing of said ocular inspection did not coincide with the precise hour in the morning when the shooting incident happened. Because the shooting took place between 8:30 to 9:00 when the glare of the morning sun directly hits the guard post of Alejo, the latter supposedly cannot be said to have had such clear vantage point as found by the trial judge when he positioned himself at the said guard post at a later time, which is already past 10:00 in the morning.We are not persuaded.Movants are raising the issue for the first time before this Court and long after trial and rendition of judgment. We have perused the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court on September 26, 1996, and found no objection or comment made by the defense counsel regarding the timing of the inspection and its relevance to the evaluation of Alejos testimony. Neither did the accused complain of any irregularity in the conduct of the said ocular inspection before the appellate court. If indeed, the accused found the timing of the ocular inspection crucial to their defense that Alejo was not really an eyewitness as he could not have clearly seen the faces of all the accused from his guard post, they could have made a proper manifestation or objection before the trial judge. They could have even staged a reenactment to demonstrate to the trial court the alleged glare of the morning sun at the time of the commission of the crime, which could have affected Alejos perception of the incident. But they did not. It is now too late in the day for the accused to assail as irregular the ocular inspection which was done with the conformity and in the presence of their counsel.It is an admitted fact that Alejo and his family were sheltered and given financial support by the victims family, presumably out of gratitude and sympathy considering that Alejo lost his job after the incident. Such benevolence of the Abadilla family, however, is not sufficient basis for the conclusion that Alejo would falsely accuse movants as the perpetrators of the crime. As we have stressed, Alejo did not waver in his identification of the accused despite a grueling cross-examination by the defense lawyers. Both the trial and appellate courts found Alejos testimony as credible, categorical and straightforward. After a painstaking review of the records, we find no cogent reason to deviate from their findings on the issue of credibility of the prosecutions lone eyewitness.As to the affidavit of Orencio G. Jurado, Jr. submitted by Fortuna, the said affiant claimed that he had a heated argument with Inspector Roger Castillo during one of the hearings before the trial court because Inspector Castillo was urging him (Jurado) "to confirm that those arrested by the joint team of CID and PARAK-DILG were exactly the same people/suspects described by the guards to which [he] firmly declined". Jurado alleged that he was surprised to see the faces of the suspects flashed on TV several days after Herbas and Alejo gave their statements at Camp Karingal because they did not fit the description given by witnesses Herbas and Alejo. Jurado was also allegedly prevented earlier by an unidentified policeman -- as per instruction of then DILG Secretary Robert Barbers -- from interviewing the suspects arrested by the operatives of the CID and PARAK-DILG.9Evidently, Fortuna seeks the introduction of additional evidence to support the defense argument that there was no positive identification of Abadillas killers. To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be shown that the evidence was "newly discovered" pursuant to Section 2,10 Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.1avvphi1Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the court below.11 Movant failed to show that the defense exerted efforts during the trial to secure testimonies from police officers like Jurado, or other persons involved in the investigation, who questioned or objected to the apprehension of the accused in this case. Hence, the belatedly executed affidavit of Jurado does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that will justify re-opening of the trial and/or vacating the judgment. In any case, we have ruled that whatever flaw that may have initially attended the out-of-court identification of the accused, the same was cured when all the accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitness during the trial.Finally, we must make it clear that Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, who, as then presiding judge at the trial court, heard the prosecution and defense witnesses, never took part in the deliberations and voting by the Court in this case. The absence of notation in the ponencia that Justice Mendoza had "no part" in the deliberations and voting in this case was purely an oversight and inadvertent omission. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Enriqueta Esguerra-Vidal, had already rectified such error in the Revised Page 75 of our Decision dated September 7, 2010.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the motions for reconsideration filed by Lenido Lumanog and Augusto Santos, Rameses de Jesus and Cesar Fortuna are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY.Let entry of judgment be made in due course.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191064 October 20, 2010PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.ROLANDO ARANETA y ABELLA @ BOTONG and MARILOU SANTOS y TANTAY @ MALOU, Accused-Appellants.D E C I S I O NMENDOZA, J.:This is an appeal from the August 29, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02308, which affirmed the March 12, 2004 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, Pasig City (RTC), finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5 and Section 11 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002." Criminal informations were filed in the RTC against Rolando Araneta y Abella a.k.a. "Botong" for Violation of Section 8 and Section 16 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, in addition to the Information filed against him and co-accused Marilou Santos y Tantay a.k.a. "Malou" for Violation of Section 15, Article III in relation to Section 21, Article IV of R.A. 6425, as amended. In view of the enactment of R.A. No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002), the original informations were amended accordingly. The said Informations read:Criminal Case No. 11491-DPeople vs. Araneta & Santos(For Violation of Sec. 5 in relation to Sec. 26, Art. II, R.A. 9165)On or about July 5, 2002 in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized to sell, dispense, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO2 Danilo S. Damasco, a police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance weighing of (sic) eight (8) centigrams (0.08 gram), which was found positive to the test for metamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of said law.Contrary to Law.Criminal Case No. 11492-DPeople vs. Araneta (For Violation of Sec. 11, Art. II, R.A. 9165)On or about July 5, 2002, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to use or possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 1.22 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was found positive to the test for marijuana, a dangerous drug, and eight (8) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with the following recorded net weight, to wit:1) Exh. B1 RAA/070502 0.07 gram;2) Exh. B2 RAA/070502 0.10 gram;3) Exh. B3 RAA/070502 0.08 gram;4) Exh. B4 RAA/070502 0.07 gram;5) Exh. B5 RAA/070502 0.08 gram;6) Exh. B6 RAA/070502 0.04 gram;7) Exh. B7 RAA/070502 0.06 gram;8) Exh. B8 RAA/070502 0.09 gramor having a total weight of 0.59 gram, which were found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.Contrary to Law. The prosecutions evidence was summarized in the CA decision as follows:On July 5, 2002, between 3:00 and 3:30 oclock in the morning, a confidential informant arrived at the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU) of the Pasig City Police Station to report to Officer-In-Charge SP04 Numeriano de Lara the alleged peddling of illegal drugs of live-in couple Botong and Malou, later identified as appellants Rolando Araneta y Abella and Marilou Santos y Tantay, at Barangay Putol, Rosario, Pasig City. SPO4 de Lara immediately formed a team composed of SPO2 Dante Zigapan who acted as the team leader, PO2 Danilo Damasco, PO1 Orig, and PO1 Bede Montefalcon, to confirm the veracity of the informants report and conduct a buy-bust operation. Before dispatching the team, SPO4 de Lara briefed them as to the alleged illegal activities of the couple and gave their description.SPO2 Zigapan designated PO2 Damasco as the poseur-buyer giving him a marked P100 bill to be used in the entrapment. The team proceeded to the target area on board two vehicles. SPO2 Zigapan, Montefalcon and the informant were in one vehicle while PO2 Damasco and PO1 Orig were together in the other vehicle.The team arrived at the target place around 4:10 in the morning. They positioned themselves some 20-30 meters from the alley where appellants were allegedly staying. SPO2 Zigapan gave instructions to the informant to locate the appellants. After several minutes, the informant came back and confirmed the presence of appellants at ROTC Street, Putol, Bgy. Rosario, Pasig City. Thereafter, the team proceeded to the said location.PO2 Damasco and the informant went near the appellants who were standing just outside their house. The informant and appellants exchanged greetings. After a short conversation, Botong went inside their house. The informant introduced PO2 Damasco to Malou by saying, "I-score itong kaibigan ko. Baka meron ka dyan." Malou then asked PO2 Damasco, "I-score ka na ba." After Malou asked PO2 Damasco, "Magkano," the latter immediately gave her the marked P100 bill.Malou called Botong and when the latter came out, Malou handed to him the marked money. Botong then gave Malou a plastic sachet which she handed to PO2 Damasco.After examining the plastic sachet, PO2 Damasco immediately gave the pre-arranged signal to the other members of the team who thereafter rushed to the scene. PO2 Damasco arrested Malou while SPO2 Zigapan arrested Botong.SPO2 Zigapan recovered from Botong the marked P100 bill and after frisking him, the police officer found in Botongs pocket one plastic sachet of what looked like marijuana and eight plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Damasco immediately placed "RAA" and the date July 5, 2002 on the plastic sachet he brought from Malou and the plastic sachets confiscated by SPO2 Zigapan from Botong.At the police station, PO2 Damasco prepared the written request for a laboratory examination of the confiscated plastic sachets. Together with the request, the plastic sachets were brought by PO1 Orig to the crime laboratory. The laboratory tests gave a positive result of the presence of methampethamine hydrochloride or what is locally known as shabu on the contents of nine (9) sachets and marijuana on one (1) sachet.The evidence for the accused was summarized by the CA as follows:Between 3:30 to 4:30 oclock in the morning of July 5, 2006, accused Rolando Araneta together with his live-in partner and co-accused Marilou Santos were sleeping on the ground floor of their rented apartment, when they were suddenly awakened by a loud noise coming from the upstairs. Rolando immediately stood up and tried to go up the stairs. That was when he met a man who introduced himself as a policeman. The man likewise pointed a gun to him and told him not to move. He was then instructed to sit down, to which he acceded. Thereafter, the man went near the door of his house and opened the same. Suddenly, four (4) other policemen went inside. One of the policemen went inside the comfort room and looked for somebody. Later, he heard the said policeman utter, "Nobody is here." One of the policemen then approached Rolando and asked him the whereabouts of a certain Teng. Rolando answered that he did not know Teng and that there was no other person inside the house except for him and his wife Marilou.The police operatives searched his house. They however found nothing illegal inside his house. After the search, the police operatives invited Rolando and Marilou to come with them to the precinct to answer some questions. Thereat, the police operatives informed them that they are being charged for their involvement in illegal drug activities, which they vehemently denied. PO2 Damasco, however, told them that if they wanted to be released, Rolando and Marilou must pay P20,000.00 each. When Rolando declined to give said amount, the police operatives filed the instant cases against them. (TSN, June 23, 2003, pp. 2-8)In the early morning of July 5, 2003, accused-appellant Marilou Santos and her live-in partner Rolando were sleeping when they were awakened by a noise coming from the second floor of their house. Rolando tried to go upstairs to find out what happened, but he met a man who instantly poked a gun at him. Marilou tried to stand up but the policeman told her, "Stay there, dont move." Thereafter the police shoved them near the chair. He also asked Rolando the whereabouts of Teng but the former answered that nobody by the name of Teng lived there. While still poking the gun on them, the policeman opened the door of their house. Five (5) policemen then entered and conducted a search.After the search, the policemen brought them to the police station. Thereat, PO2 Damasco asked them several questions. Moments later, the policeman got something from the drawer and told them that those articles belong to them. Marilou denied that the said articles belong to them since the policemen did not recover anything from them during the search. Despite her denial, they were still charged with Violations of Sections 15, 16 and 8 of Republic Act 9165. After a while, PO2 Damasco demanded P20,000.00 from them in exchange for their release. As they were innocent, Marilou refused to give said amount, prompting the police operatives to formally charge them. (TSN, July 23, 2003, p. 3)In the early morning of July 5, 2002, Marian Rodriguez was outside the alley in ROTC, Rosario, Pasig City when she saw both accused going out of the alley accompanied by five (5) men. The accused and the five (5) men passed in front of Marian. She hesitated to follow the group. Since then Marian never saw the accused again. (TSN, September 10, 2003, pp. 3-4).In its March 12, 2004 Decision, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced them accordingly, as follows:WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment, as follows:1) In Criminal Case No. 11491-D, the Court finds accused Rolando Araneta y Abella @ Botong and accused Marilou Santos y Tantay A Malou GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 5 in relation to Sec. 26, Art. II of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and imposes upon them the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine P500, 000.00 each; and 2) In Criminal Case No. 11492-D (which absorbed Criminal Case No. 11490-D), the Court finds accused Rolando Araneta y Abella @Botong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment of from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day to Twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of P300, 000.00. Considering that the accused is a detention prisoner, he shall be credited with the period of his detention during his preventive imprisonment.x x x x x x x x xSO ORDERED.The RTC ruled that all the elements for the prosecution of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs were present during the buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers. These were: 1) the identity of the buyer and the seller; 2) the object of the sale and the consideration; and 3) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. Furthermore, the RTC held that the defense of denial, frame-up, forcible entry, and extortion could not prevail over the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses. It noted that accused Rolando Araneta was not candid enough to inform the court that no less than eight (8) criminal cases were previously filed against him in different courts for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Nevertheless, out of eight (8) criminal cases filed against him, he admitted that one resulted in a conviction and two other cases were dismissed. The other cases were then still pending trial. Aggrieved, the accused appealed to the CA arguing that: 1) the RTC erred in not finding that they were illegally arrested and, as such, the sachets of shabu allegedly recovered from them were inadmissible in evidence; and 2) the RTC erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were replete with inconsistencies and contradictions.On August 29, 2008, the CA rendered the subject decision affirming the decision of the RTC. In arriving at said determination, the CA applied the "objective test" in buy-bust operations laid down in the case of People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 698-699.3 The CA ruled that the prosecution evidence met the standard for the "objective test" through the testimony of its witness, PO2 Danilo Damasco, who acted as poseur-buyer and who related how the informant introduced him to the accused; how the transaction was consummated through the exchange of marked money and the sachet of shabu; and how the accused was arrested by the entrapment team.The CA noted that the accused were arrested in flagrante delicto and that other contraband materials were recovered from them during the ensuing search. It concluded that the corpus delicti was duly established.Finally, the CA stated that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers were minor or inconsequential. The accused failed to adduce evidence to overthrow the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty in favor of the police officers. The accused likewise failed to show proof that the police officers did not properly perform their jobs or had ill motives against them. Moreover, their defense of denial and frame-up for extortion purposes was self-serving, negative evidence that was not entitled to be given greater weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. In due time, the accused filed a motion for reconsideration stressing the inadmissibility of evidence due to their illegal arrest, and the inconsistency in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses. They also pointed out that the apprehending officers failed to establish that the corpus delicti (sachets of shabu or marijuana) were the very same ones sold by and seized from them. Additionally, they claimed that the apprehending team, who had initial custody over the confiscated drug items, failed to make an inventory and to photograph the same in their presence.On August 24, 2009, the CA issued a resolution4 denying their motion for reconsideration. The CA ruled, among others, that the issues on the corpus delicti and the alleged failure of the apprehending team to make an inventory and to photograph the shabu and marijuana in the presence of the accused were new issues not raised in their appeal brief.In their recourse to this Court, the accused presented only one ISSUEWHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATING SECTIONS 5 AND 11 OF ARTICLE II OF R.A. No. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "COMPREHENSIVE DRUGS ACT OF 2002.The accused argue that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was not able to establish without a doubt, that the dangerous drugs presented in court were the very same ones allegedly sold by them. They insist that the police officers failed to strictly abide by the requirements of the law as regards the proper custody of dangerous drugs seized in the course of the alleged buy-bust operation.The prosecution stands firm by its position that the arrest of the accused and seizure of the shabu and marijuana were lawful and that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were truthful. In the absence of any credible evidence to the contrary, the police officers are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty. More importantly, all the elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are present, to wit: 1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration; and 2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.The prosecution asserts that the accused cannot raise for the first time on appeal the issue on the alleged failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. At any rate, the prosecution believes that it has shown that the chain of custody of the seized items was not broken. THE COURTS RULING:After due consideration, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient enough to sustain the verdict of conviction. It is morally convinced that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged against them. The rule is that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight are given high respect if not conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case.5 In this case, the CA found no such inculpatory facts and circumstances and this Court has not stumbled upon any either. Doubtless, the prosecution was able to establish all the necessary elements required in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, namely: 1) the identity of the buyer and seller; 2) the identity of the object of the sale and the consideration; and 3) the delivery of the thing sold upon payment. PO2 Danilo Damasco, (PO2 Damasco) the poseur-buyer, clearly and convincingly narrated in detail the entrapment operation they had conducted that led to the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the dangerous drugs. He related on the witness stand that upon receiving information from a confidential informant about the illegal sale of dangerous drugs by the accused, they immediately formed an entrapment team to conduct a buy-bust operation. Upon reaching the area in the early morning of July 5, 2002, he and the confidential informant approached the accused. After a brief introduction and short conversation, accused Botong went inside their house while accused Malou received the marked money from the poseur-buyer. Malou then called Botong who thereafter came out of the house. Malou gave the marked money to Botong who, in turn, gave Malou a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. The plastic sachet was then handed over to PO2 Damasco who examined it and immediately gave the pre-arranged signal to arrest the accused. During the arrest, the marked money was recovered from Rolando and so were several other plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances together with a plastic sachet containing marijuana. Subsequently, the accused were brought to the police station and the seized items were later brought to the Police Crime Laboratory Office for examination. The testimony of PO2 Damasco was corroborated by SPO2 Zipagan, the entrapment team leader, and SPO4 Numeriano De Lara, the entrapment team organizer.Contrary to the posture of the accused, the testimony of PO2 Damasco was clear, consistent and convincing. As correctly assessed by the CA, his testimony passed the "objective test" in buy-bust operations.We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accuseds predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.6 [Emphasis supplied]The Court looked into the accuseds defense of denial and accusations of frame-up, planting of evidence, forcible entry and extortion by the police officers but found them inherently weak. Aside from their bare allegations, the accused had nothing more to show that the apprehending police officers did not properly perform their duties or that they had ill motives against them. They failed to substantiate their argument that they were framed-up for extortion purposes.Absent any convincing countervailing evidence, the presumption is that the members of the buy-bust team performed their duties in a regular manner. It was certainly a job well done. Hence, the Court gives full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.The Court also holds that the seized items were admissible. A search warrant or warrant of arrest was not needed because it was a buy-bust operation and the accused were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of, and selling, dangerous drugs to the poseur-buyer. It was definitely legal for the buy-bust team to arrest, and search, them on the spot because a buy-bust operation is a justifiable mode of apprehending drug pushers. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proven to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.7 In People v. Villamin, involving an accused arrested after he sold drugs during a buy-bust operation, the Court ruled that it was a circumstance where a warrantless arrest is justified under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Court. The same ruling applies to the instant case. When carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, it is a judicially sanctioned method of apprehending those involved in illegal drug activities. It is a valid form of entrapment, as the idea to commit a crime comes not from the police officers but from the accused himself. The accused is caught in the act and must be apprehended on the spot. From the very nature of a buy-bust operation, the absence of a warrant does not make the arrest illegal. The illegal drugs seized were not the "fruit of the poisonous tree" as the defense would like this Court to believe. The seizure made by the buy-bust team falls under a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Rule 126, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides:A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.Since the buy-bust operation was established as legitimate, it follows that the search was also valid, and a warrant was likewise not needed to conduct it.81avvphi1It should also be noted that after the RTC rendered a guilty verdict, the accused filed a motion for reconsideration based on two (2) grounds, to wit: 1) inadmissibility of the seized items; and 2) credibility of the prosecution witnesses. In the CA, they reiterated said grounds. After an unfavorable decision and ruling, the accused added two (2) new arguments in their motion for reconsideration, to wit: 1) the apprehending officers failed to establish that the corpus delicti (sachets of shabu or marijuana) were the very same ones sold by and seized from them; and 2) the apprehending team who had initial custody over the confiscated drug items failed to make an inventory and to photograph the same in their presence.The Court totally agrees with the ruling of the CA that the issues on the corpus delicti and the compliance with Section 21 of RA No. 9165 were issues that were not raised by the accused in their appellants brief, and were only presented in their motion for reconsideration from the decision of the CA. Hence, the Court cannot act, much less, rule on said new points. To do so would violate basic rules on fair play and due process. Thus:We point out the defenses failure to contest the admissibility of the seized items as evidence during trial as this was the initial point in objecting to illegally seized evidence. At the trial, the seized shabu was duly marked, made the subject of examination and cross-examination, and eventually offered as evidence, yet at no instance did the appellant manifest or even hint that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their admissibility, integrity and evidentiary value. In People v. Hernandez, we held that objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.9 WHEREFORE, the August 29, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02308, is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 175604 April 10, 2008THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.SALVADOR PEAFLORIDA, JR., Y CLIDORO, appellant.D E C I S I O NTINGA, J.:Subject of this appeal is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01219, dated 31 July 2006, affirming in toto the judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur, Branch 30, in Criminal Case No. T-1476. The trial court found appellant Salvador Peaflorida y Clidoro guilty of transporting marijuana and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of one million pesos. The Information against appellant reads:That on or about the 7th day of June, 1994, in the afternoon thereat, at Barangay Huyon-huyon, Municipality of Tigaon, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to sell, possess and to deliver with the use of a bicycle, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody, [o]ne bundle estimated to be one (1) kilo more or less, of dried marijuana leaves (Indian Hemp) without the necessary license, permit or authority to sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug from a competent officer as required by law.ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.3Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.Two police officers and one forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. SPO3 Vicente Competente (Competente) narrated that in his capacity as chief of the Investigation and Operation Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) station in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, that he received a tip from an asset that a bundle of marijuana was being transported by appellant to Huyon-huyon from another barangay in Tigaon, Camarines Sur.4 Major Domingo Agravante (Agravante), chief of police of Tigaon, then organized a team composed of Competente as team leader, SPO2 Ricardo Callo (Callo), SPO1 Portugal, PO3 Pillos and PO2 Edgar Latam. The team boarded the police mobile car and proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-huyon.5 They overtook appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers flagged appellant down and found marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper together with other grocery items. The amount of P1550.00 was also found in appellant's possession. The police officers confiscated these items and took photographs thereof. Appellant was then brought to the headquarters where he was booked. 6 Callo, who was the chief intelligence officer of Tigaon PNP, recounted that at around 1:00 p.m. on 7 June 1994, he was called by Competente and was briefed about the operation. While they were in Nasulan, the members of the police team caught a man riding a bicycle who turned out to be appellant. Callo saw the marijuana wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper in the bicycle of appellant so the latter was brought to the police headquarters and turned over to the desk officer. 7 Major Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), a forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory Regional Office No. V, was presented as an expert witness to identify the subject marijuana leaves. She related that after taking a representative sample from the 928-gram confiscated dried leaves, the same was tested positive of marijuana. The findings were reflected in Chemistry Report No. D-26-94 dated 9 June 1994.8 Appellant denied the accusations against him. Appellant, who is a resident of Huyon-huyon, Tigaon, Camarines Sur, testified that in the morning of 7 June 1994, he first went to the house of Igmidio Miranda (Miranda) in Sagnay, Camarines Sur. The latter accompanied appellant to the house of Arnel Dadis in San Francisco, Tigaon to buy a dog. They, however, failed to get the dog; prompting them to leave. On their way home, they met Boyet Obias (Obias) who requested appellant to bring a package wrapped in a newspaper to Jimmy Gonzales (Gonzales).9 Appellant placed it in the basket in front of his bicycle and Gonzales proceeded to the Tiagon town proper. He and Miranda parted ways when they reached the place. Appellant dropped by the grocery store and the blacksmith to get his scythe. On his way home, he was flagged down by the police and was invited to go with them to the headquarters. Upon inspection of the package in his bicycle, the police discovered the subject marijuana. Appellant tried to explain that the package was owned by Obias but the police did not believe him. He was sent to jail.10 Miranda corroborated the testimony of appellant that the two of them went to San Francisco, Tigaon, Camarines Sur in the morning of 7 June 1994 to buy a dog. On their way back to the town proper of Tigaon, they met Obias who requested appellant to bring a package, which Miranda thought contained cookies, to Gonzales. Upon reaching the town proper, they parted ways.11On 26 October 1998, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of transporting a prohibited drug, a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, the accused Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr.] is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with law, in case of insolvency for the fine and for him to pay the costs.The accused Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr.] shall be entitled to full credit of his preventive imprisonment if he agreed to abide with the rules imposed upon convicted person, otherwise, he shall be entitled to four-fifth (4/5) credit thereof.The subject marijuana consisting of 928 grams, possession thereof being mala prohibita, the court hereby orders its confiscation in favor of the Government to be destroyed in accordance with law.This court, however, hereby recommends to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, through the Honorable Secretary of Justice to commute the above penalty herein imposed, being too harsh; accordingly, the said penalty imposed to accused Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr] shall be six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. SO ORDERED.12In convicting appellant, the trial court lent credence to the testimonies of the police officers, thus:Now going over the evidence adduced, the court is convinced that the accused Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr.] committed the offense of illegal possession of 928 grams of marijuana, if not, of transporting it, as charged. This is so, because it appears undisputed that on June 7, 1994, at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon police officers Vicente Competente and his four (4) other co-police officers apprehended the accused Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr.] on the roadside at Nasulan, Huyon-huyon, Tigaon, Camarines Sur [,] then riding on his bicycle and placed on the still structure at its front, a thing wrapped in a newspaper and found to be 928 grams of marijuana. No ill-motive has been presented by the defense against the police officers Vicente Competente and companions by falsely testifying against the accused Salvador Peaflorida, Jr. So, the conclusion is inevitable that the presumption that the police officers were in the regular performance of their duties apply. The confiscation of the marijuana subject of the instant case and the arrest of the accused Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr.] by the said police officers being lawful, having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is no need for the warrant for the seizure of the fruit of the crime, the same being incidental to the lawful arrest. Rightly so, because a person caught illegally possessing or transporting drugs is subject to the warrantless search. Besides, object in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.13In view of the penalty imposed, the case was directly appealed to this Court on automatic review. Pursuant to our decision in People v. Mateo,14 however, this case was referred to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed appellant's conviction on 31 July 2006. In a Resolution15 dated 14 February 2007, the parties were given to file their supplemental briefs, if they so desire. Both parties manifested their intention not to file any supplemental brief since all the issues and arguments have already been raised in their respective briefs.16Hence, the instant case is now before this Court on automatic review. In assailing his conviction, appellant submits that there is doubt that he had freely and consciously possessed marijuana. First, he claims that the alleged asset did not name the person who would transport the marijuana to Huyon-huyon. In view of the "vague" information supplied by the asset, the latter should have been presented in court. Second, upon receipt of the information from the asset, the police officers should have first investigated and tried to obtain a warrant of arrest against appellant, instead of arbitrarily arresting him. Third, appellant maintains that he is not aware of the contents of the package. Fourth, upon arrival at the headquarters, the police did not determine the contents and weight of the package. Fifth, appellant argues that the findings of the forensic expert are questionable because there is doubt as to the identity of the package examined.17Prefatorily, factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witness' credibility are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the Court of Appeals affirm the findings.18 Indeed, the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses since it has observed firsthand their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.19 After a review of the records of this case, we find no cogent reason to disregard this time-honored principle. We shall retrace the series of events leading to the arrest of appellant and resolve the issues raised by him.Acting on an asset's tip, a police team was organized to apprehend appellant who was allegedly about to transport the subject marijuana. Appellant is wrong in concluding that the asset did not name appellant. As early as 16 November 1996, appellant through counsel had already conceded in his Memorandum20 filed with the trial court that based on the tip, he was about to transport the contraband. It further cited excerpts from the result of the preliminary investigation conducted by the judge on Competente, and we quote:Q: Did your [a]sset tell you the place and the person or persons involved?A: Yes[,]sir.Q: Where and who?A: He said that marijuana is being transported from Tigaon town to Bgy. Huyon-huyon by Salvador Peaflorida, Jr.21Moreover, on cross-examination, the defense counsel even assumed that according to the asset's tip it was appellant who was assigned to deliver the contraband. And the witness under cross-examination affirmed it was indeed appellant who would be making the delivery according to the tip: Q: Will you inform this Honorable Court who has given you the tip that the accused was going to deliver that marijuana[?] [W]ho is [this] person?A: It was a confidential tip.Q: Now, but [sic] on June 1 you were in your office?A: Yes[,] sir[.] I was in the office.Q: Since your office is just near the Municipal Trial Court of Tigaon and you were given a tip that Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr.] will be delivering marijuana, why did you not get a [w]arrant of [a]rrest?x x x Q: The tip that was given to you that it was Salvador Peaflorida [who] will be dealing marijuana on that date and according to you Salvador was to travel from a certain town to Tigaon, is that the tip?A: Yes[,] sir[.] That he would deliver marijuana.Q: So, at the time that you form[ed] a team, Salvador was nowhere to be seen, you have not seen the shadow of Salvador?A: When the tip was given to us[,] I have not seen him[.] [B]ut the tip is he will deliver from Tigaon to Huyon-huyon, that is why we chased him.22 [Emphasis supplied]Prescinding from the above argument, appellant insists that the asset should have been presented in court. He invoked the court ruling in People v. Libag,23 wherein the non-presentation of the informant was fatal to the case of the prosecution. Libag cannot find application in this case. In that case, the crime charged was the sale of shabu where the informant himself was a poseur-buyer and a witness to the transaction. His testimony as a poseur-buyer was indispensable because it could have helped the trial court in determining whether or not the appellant had knowledge that the bag contained marijuana, such knowledge being an essential ingredient of the offense for which he was convicted.24 In this case, however, the asset was not present in the police operation. The rule is that the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would merely be corroborative and cumulative. Informants are generally not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police.25 Competente testified that his team caught up with appellant who was riding a bicycle. He saw the marijuana in a package which appellant was carrying inside his basket, thus:Q: And so as the team leader x x x and in connection with the instruction of Chief Domingo Agravante, what did you do?A: We used the mobile and proceeded to the place, to the route where the marijuana was being transported.Q: When you said we to whom are you referring to?A: The team.Q: Were you able to go to the place as you said?A: Yes, sir.Q: So, upon reaching the place, [sic] what place was that?A: Sitio Nasulan, Barangay Huyon-huyon, Tigaon, Camarines Sur.Q: And upon reaching the place together with the other member of the team, what did you find if you found any?A: We overtook our suspect while riding in a bicycle and we stopped him.Q: And did the suspect stop?A: Yes[,] sir.Q: Tell us the name of your suspect?A: Salvador Peaflorida[,] Jr. y Clidoro.Q: And after stopping the accused in this case, what else did you do[,] if any[,] together with the team?A: When we saw the marijuana and other groceries in his bicycle we invited him to the headquarters.26 Callo also confirmed that he saw appellant transporting and in possession of the subject marijuana:Q: When you reached there[,] what happened next?A: We have not reached yet [sic] the Huyon-huyon proper. [W]e are in Nasulan when we met the man who had with him the marijuana.x x x Q: After you talked with the person with marijuana[,] what happened next?A: We saw on his bicycle a wrap[ped] marijuana.Q: Who was in possession of that?A: Salvador Peaflorida[,] Jr.Q: How is that person related to the accused in this case now?A: He is the one, sir.Q: Kindly describe to us the marijuana that you are able to tell that it was marijuana?A: It was wrapped on [cellophane] and newspaper. We saw the edges of the marijuana.Q: For the [record], kindly describe to us the edges of the marijuana[;] its appearance and color.A: It was like a shape of ream of coupon bond and the color is green.27These positive and categorical declarations of two police officers deserve weight and credence in light of the presumption of regularity accorded to them and the lack of motive on their part to falsely testify against appellant. Appellant resorts to a challenge on the validity of his arrest predicated on lack of a warrant of arrest. The OSG correctly justifies the failure to apply for an arrest warrant because at that point, time was of the essence in appellant's apprehension, noting in the same breath that there is no law requiring investigation and surveillance upon receipt of tips from assets before conducting police operations.28 The police officers succinctly testified on this point when cross-examined, viz:Q: Will you inform this Honorable Court who has given you the tip that the accused was going to deliver that marijuana, who is that person?A: It was a confidential tip.Q: Now, but [sic] on June 1 you were in your office?A: Yes[,] sir[.] I was in the office.Q: Since your office is just near the Municipal Trial Court of Tigaon and you were given a tip that Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr.] will be delivering marijuana, why did you not get a [w]arrant of [a]rrest from the court?A: There was no time to apply for a search warrant because just after the information was received, we proceeded.x x x Q: If that is true, Mr. Competente that you were given a tip, the most that you will do is first see the Judge of Tigaon in as much as you have not seen yet [sic] the said person carrying marijuana?A: There was no time for us to apply, because the marijuana is being delivered so we have no more time to see the Judge.x x x Q: Are you aware of the law that illegally confiscated marijuana cannot be used in court?FISCAL SOLANO: Conclusion of law.A: Yes, sir[.] [I]f it is illegally confiscated it cannot be used in court.ATTY. CLEDERA: Despite that prohibition under the rules[,] you insisted in apprehending Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr.] without warrant of arrest inspite of the fact that you know that restriction?A: Our apprehension was in plain view.Q: How can you see that it was in open view when according to you the house of Salvador is 120 meters[?] [H]ow can you see that distance?A: I could see that because the marijuana was carried in his bicycle, we have seen it.Q: In what street?A: Huyon-huyon[,] Sitio Nasulan, Tigaon, Camarines Sur.Q: About what time did you see him?A: 1:00 o'clock sir.x x x29The police was tipped off at around 1:00 p.m. that appellant was transporting marijuana to Huyon-huyon. Certainly, they had no time to secure an arrest warrant as appellant was already in transit and already committing a crime. The arrest was effected after appellant was caught in flagrante delicto. He was seen riding his bicycle and carrying with him the contraband, hence, demonstrating that a crime was then already being committed. Under the circumstances, the police had probable cause to believe that appellant was committing a crime. Thus, the warrantless arrest is justified. Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, states:SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as broker in any of such transactions. x x x.Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or convey from one place to another."30 In the instant case, appellant was riding his bicycle when he was caught by the police. He admitted that he was about to convey the package, which contained marijuana, to a certain Jimmy Gonzales. Appellant, however, denies any knowledge that the package in his possession contained marijuana. But the trial court rejected his contention, noting that it was impossible for appellant not to be aware of the contents of the package because "marijuana has a distinct sweet and unmistakable aroma x x x which would have alarmed him."31Taking one step further, the appellate court went on to declare that being mala prohibita, one commits the crime under R.A. No. 6425 by mere possession of a prohibited drug without legal authority. Intent, motive or knowledge thereof is not necessary.32Appellant, in the main, asserts that he did not freely and consciously possess marijuana.33 In criminal cases involving prohibited drugs, there can be no conviction unless the prosecution shows that the accused knowingly possessed the prohibited articles in his person, or that animus possidendi is shown to be present together with his possession or control of such article. Animus possidendi is only prima facie. It is subject to contrary proof and may be rebutted by evidence that the accused did not in fact exercise power and control over the thing in question, and did not intend to do so. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus possidendi.34Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular case.35Appellant failed to satisfactorily establish his lack of knowledge of possession in the instant case. First, the marijuana was found in the bicycle he himself was driving. Second, the police officers first readily saw in plain view the edges of the marijuana leaves jutting out of the package. Third, it is incredulous that appellant did not ask Obias what the package contained when the latter requested him to do the delivery errand since the package was wrapped in a newspaper and weighed almost one kilogram. The same observation was reached by the trial court:Finally, it is very hard for the court to accept the claim of the accused Salvador Peaflorida[,Jr.] that he does not know that the thing wrapped in a newspaper which Boyet Obias, now dead, requested the accused Peaflorida[,Jr.] would deliver to a certain Jimmy Gonzales whose present whereabouts is not known, was a marijuana. Its odor is different especially from tobacco. This was observed by the court during the trial of the case, everytime the wrapper containing the subject marijuana with a volume of 928 grams is brought to court its odor is noticeable. For the accused Peaflorida[,Jr.], not to notice it is hard to believe. Rightly so, because marijuana has a distinct sweet and unmistakable aroma very different from (and not nauseating) unlike tobacco. This aroma would have alarmed him.36Furthermore, it appeared from the cross-examination of appellant that Obias was an acquaintance. In the ordinary course of things, one is expected to inquire about the contents of a wrapped package especially when it is a mere acquaintance who requests the delivery and, more so, when delivery is to a place some distance away.Anent appellant's claim that the package examined by Arroyo was not the one confiscated from him, the appellate court had this to say:SPO3 Competente testified that marijuana was confiscated from appellant. The pictures of appellant, together with the items seized from him, depict a package containing dry leaves suspected to be marijuana. On the other hand, Forensic Chemist Arroyo testified that the specimen she examined was delivered to her by Major Agravante on June 9, 1994 or two days after the apprehension. From these series of events, it can be inferred that the package confiscated from appellant and the specimen delivered to Forensic Chemist Arroyo for laboratory examination were one and the same.37Despite intense grilling from the defense counsel, Arroyo never faltered and was in fact consistent in declaring that she received the specimen from Agravante on 9 June 1994 and immediately conducted the laboratory test. Finally, the lower courts correctly sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of one million pesos by virtue of the amendment to Section 4, R.A. No. 6425 by R.A. No. 7659.38 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 30 in Criminal Case No. T-1476, finding appellant Salvador Peaflorida y Clidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act) as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), is AFFIRMED in toto.SO ORDERED.PEOPLE vs SEMBRANOAccused-appellant MICHAEL SEMBRANO y CASTRO (appellant) is before this Court appealing from the 18 June 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No. 02762 captioned People of the Philippines v. Michael Sembrano y Castro. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction[2] by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC, QC) for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous drug, in violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.[3] The antecedent factsOn 26 July 2004, the operatives of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs (SAID) of the Novaliches Police Station arrested appellant in broad daylight, in the course of a buy-bust operation and after a follow-up search on him.On 28 July 2004, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City in the National Capital Region (QC-NCR) filed two separate Informations against him for (1) illegal sale and (2) illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous drug. The two cases were raffled to Branch 82 of the RTC, QC and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-04-128370 and Q-04-128371, imputing the following acts against him:Criminal Case No. Q-04-128370 That on or about the 26th day of July 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, zero point twelve (0.12) gram of white crystalline substance containing of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[4]

Criminal Case No. Q-04-128371 That on or about the 26th day of July 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her/their possession and control, zero point twenty seven (0.27) gram of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[5] Sembrano was arraigned on 19 April 2005 and with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges.[6] Pre-trial proceedings having been terminated, trial on the merits ensued. During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses: (1) Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jomar Manaol; and (2) Police Officer 1 (PO1) Kingly James Bagay. The combined testimonies of PO1 Manaol and PO1 Bagay sought to establish that at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of 26 July 2004, an informant of the police arrived at the SAID of the Novaliches Police Station. The confidential informant relayed information regarding illicit drugs trade operations conducted by a certain Michael Sembrano alias Takol in the area of Gulod in Novaliches, Quezon City. Superintendent (Supt.) Ramon Perez, head of SAID, formed a buy-bust team composed of PO1 Jomar Manaol, SPO1 Cesar Futol, PO1 Kingly James Bagay, PO1 Neil John Dumlao, and PO1 Fernando Salonga. SPO1 Futol prepared the pre-operation report for the team. The group then proceeded to Ignacio Street corner Villareal Street in Gulod, Novaliches, Quezon City for the entrapment operation. The group arrived at the designated area at around 3:30 oclock in the afternoon. PO1 Manaol was designated poseur-buyer. He was handed two (2) One Hundred Peso bills which he marked with his initials JAM on the lower right side thereof, right below the image of the Philippine Flag. PO1 Manaol, together with the confidential informant, then proceeded to the target site. The other members of the team, including witness PO1 Bagay, acted as back-up and positioned themselves about twenty-five meters away from where PO1 Manaol and the confidential informant were. They waited until appellant arrived at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon. Upon appellants arrival, the confidential informant introduced PO1 Manaol to him as an interested buyer of shabu. PO1 Manaol handed the two marked One Hundred Peso bills to appellant, who, in turn, handed one (1) plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance to him. The transaction having been consummated, PO1 Manaol executed their pre-arranged signal and scratched his head. When the other members of the team saw PO1 Manaol execute the pre-arranged signal, they immediately proceeded to their location and arrested appellant. PO1 Manaol recovered the suspected shabu subject of the sale from appellant and placed his initials JAM thereon. PO1 Bagay was also able to retrieve the buy-bust money from appellants right hand. A follow-up frisk on appellant resulted in the confiscation of two other plastic sachets of white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu, from the right hand pocket of his shorts. Immediately after retrieving the evidence, PO1 Bagay marked the confiscated sachets with his initials KJB. After his arrest, the police officers took appellant to the police station where he was turned over to the desk officer and to the on-duty investigator. PO1 Bagay, who had custody of the confiscated evidence, turned over the seized three (3) plastic sachets of white crystalline substance to the investigator. PO1 Manaol and PO1 Bagay executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest and signed the Inventory of Seized Drugs/Item prepared by SPO1 Cesar Futol. The confiscated items were transmitted on the same day by the investigator on-duty, through PO1 Salonga, PO1 Manaol and PO1 Bagay to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. A forensic examination of the contents of the seized sachets as conducted by Police Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Leonard T. Arban, Forensic Chemical Officer yielded the following results in Chemistry Report No. D-698-04: SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, each containing white crystalline substance with the following markings and recorded net weights: A (JAM - MCS) = 0.12 gram B (KJB MCS1) = 0.10 gram C (KJB MCS2) = 0.17 gram FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave POSITIVE result to the tests for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[7] Expectedly, the defense had an entirely different version, with Sembrano testifying on the witness stand. He narrated that at around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of 26 July 2004; he was buying lumber somewhere along Quirino Highway in Novaliches, Quezon City, when a maroon Tamaraw FX stopped in front of him. The occupants thereof, PO1 Bagay and PO1 Manaol, alighted from the vehicle and arrested him. After being arrested, the police officers took him to Station 4 whereupon he was required to sign a document. Sembrano learned later on that the police officers filed a case against him for violation of Republic Act No. 9165. When asked on the witness stand if he knew the two police officers, Sembrano answered in the affirmative, having met the two since he had been their police asset since 23 April 2003. In support of his claim, Sembrano presented a copy of an Oath of Loyalty and Agents Agreement to prove he was indeed a police asset. On cross examination, however, he testified that the police officers he mentioned were not signatories to the Oath of Loyalty and Agents Agreement he presented in court. The RTC found accused-appellant guilty as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-04-128370 and Q-04-128371. Weighing the body of evidence submitted by both parties, the trial court gave little credence to appellants unsubstantiated claim that he was a police asset and ascertained that the prosecution established all the elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of a dangerous or prohibited drug. Thus, in its Decision dated 14 February 2007, the trial court rendered judgment disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:a) Re: Criminal Case No. Q-0-4128370, accused MICHAEL SEMBRANO is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt a (sic) of a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) PESOS;b) Re: Criminal Case No. Q-04-128371, said accused is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of the same Act and, accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and one (1) DAY as MINIMUM to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS as MAXIMUM and to pay a fine in the amount of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS.[8] Seeking recourse from his conviction by the trial court, the appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Notice of Appeal. Insisting on his innocence, the defense questioned the admissibility of the confiscated evidence on the ground of illegality of appellants arrest. The defense also attacked the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, claiming their stories are unbelievable and should have led to the dismissal of the charges. According credence to the evidence of the prosecution, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on 18 June 2008, where the appellate court affirmed the findings and conclusions of the trial court, but reduced the penalty imposed in the illegal possession case to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.[9] Appellant is now appealing his conviction to this Court, as a final recourse, praying that he be absolved of the charges. Instead of filing supplemental briefs, the defense and the prosecution adopted the arguments in their respective appellate briefs submitted before the Court of Appeals. Thus, this Court is tasked to resolve the following assignment of errors:I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND AS SUCH, THE SACHETS OF SHABU ALLEGEDLY RECOVERED FROM HIM WERE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. The defense challenges the RTC and Court of Appeals rulings, anchored on its claim that the warrantless arrest against appellant was unlawful. Consequently, applying the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, any evidence allegedly obtained during such unlawful warrantless arrest cannot be used as evidence. The defense proffers that the illegal drugs allegedly seized from appellant during the buy-bust operation should have been declared inadmissible. Alleging he is a victim of frame-up by the police officers, appellant attacks the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. In sum, appellant seeks acquittal on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Coming from an entirely different perspective, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the prosecution, disagrees with the aforementioned contentions from the defense side. It counters that the sachets of shabu were seized from appellant during a buy-bust operation. Thus, any opposition thereto with respect to its admissibility on the ground that said sachets were seized during an illegal arrest is unfounded. As for the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the testimony of the poseur-buyer, in particular, was corroborated by the police operatives on material points. We find no merit in the appeal.Conviction is proper in prosecutions