Perceptions of Group Identity and Recent Political Behavior in Northern Ireland

Perceptions of Group Identity and Recent Political Behavior in Northern IrelandAuthor(s): Lee E. DutterSource: Political Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Mar., 1985), pp. 47-60Published by: International Society of Political PsychologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791270 .

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Political Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1985

Perceptions of Group Identity and Recent Political Behavior in Northern Ireland' Lee E. Dutter2

Societal cleavages based on cultural, ethnic, or tribal divisions are, it can be argued, qualitatively different from those based on other factors (e.g., economic ideology). In this context, "ethnicity" can be conceptualized as a set of ascribed and acquired characteristics which derive principally from an individual's birth and upbringing. While physical appearance may be relevant, ethnicity is composed primarily of psychological elements which can not be shed or significantly changed, even if an individual wishes to do so, as easily as can purely acquired characteristics such as economic ideology (e.g., capitalism, socialism, communism). In other words, an individual is forever "stigmatized" by his group of origin and, in those societies with politically relevant ethnic divisions, the switching of political identities is a very rare occurrence. In this article, the principal psychological elements related to the political cleavage between Northern Irish Protestants and Catholics are briefly reviewed. Second, the main political manifestations of this cleavage since the 1960s are summarized, especially the behavior of politicians and voters in the October 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly election.

KEY WORDS: ethnicity; plural society; Northern Ireland; single-transferable-vote method of proportional representation; October 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly election; multiple regression analysis.

'This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the July 1983 meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology. 2Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Chicago, Box 4348, Chicago, Illinois 60680.

47

0162-895X/85/0300-0047$04.50/1 ? 1985 International Society of Political Psychology



48 Dutter

INTRODUCTION

Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) have provided theoretical guidance for this author's studies of politics in "plural" societies (Dutter, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1983; Seliktar and Dutter, 1983). Space prohibits restatement of their major points, or those of competing theoretical approaches, other than to note that they (pp. 8-10, 21) define a plural society as one which "... is cul- turally diverse and.. .its cultural sections are organized into cohesive political sections." With this definition and attendant assumptions, they develop a theory which makes pessimistic predictions regarding the prospects for political stability and social peace in such societies.

In this context, cultural diversity or "ethnicity" can be conceptualized as a set of ascribed and acquired characteristics which derive principally from an individual's birth and upbringing. While physical appearance may be relevant, ethnicity is, in essence, composed of psychological elements which are not only self-perceptions, but also perceptions of others in society. These cannot be shed or significantly changed, even if an individual strongly desires to do so, as easily as can purely acquired characteristics such as economic ideology. Thus, the individual is forever "stigmatized" by his group of origin and, in those societies with politically relevant ethnic divisions, the switching of political identities is a rare occurrence.

The Northern Irish conflict is a political struggle over who will govern and, most important, over the basic constitutional organization of the poli- ty, as well as the related issue of the means to be used to preserve or to alter that organization (Buckland, 1981; Darby, 1983). "Unionists" or "loyalists," an overwhelming majority of whom are Protestants, believe that Northern Ireland should remain within the United Kingdom or, at a minimum, outside a united Ireland (Bell, 1976). "Nonunionists" or "nationalists" or "republicans," an overwhelming majority of whom are Cathol- ics, believe that Northern Ireland should leave the United Kingdom and join a united Ireland (O'Brien, 1972). Exacerbating the conflict is the fact that these ethnopolitical aspirations cannot be simultaneously satisfied (Barritt, 1982; Birrell, 1981). Also, many individuals and some organizations in both groups consistently express support for violence as a first or last resort in order to maintain or to change the constitutional status quo (Carroll, 1980, 1981).

As is typical for plural societies, the primary factors in the main- tenance of group identity and political cohesion are collective memories and interpretations of ethnohistorical events. These memories are a mixture of "old" and "new" elements. Old elements, originating in earlier generations, provide a psychological backdrop against which new elements, those within the living memory and experience of the present generation, are absorbed



Perceptions of Group Identity and Recent Political Behavior in Northern Ireland 49

into the collective memory and interpreted as guides for current and future political action. In what follows, these elements are briefly reviewed for Northern Ireland, and their main political manifestations since the 1960s are summarized, especially the behavior of politicians and voters in the Oc- tober 1982 Assembly election.

THE PROTESTANT COMMUNITY

Protestants trace their origin as a distinct group in Ireland to the 17th century (Terchek, 1977). English monarchs, frustrated by generations of Irish resistance, decided to build a loyal (to the Crown) community in Ireland which, it was thought, would facilitate control of the native population. Thus, Protestants from Britain entered a cauldron which seethes to this day and many see a united Ireland as a threat not only to their group identity but also to their physical survival. Moreover, faced with continuing hostility and periodically by murderous violence from the much larger Catholic Irish population, they gradually came to see themselves as the only reliable guarantors of their survival and security.

Unable to block creation of the Irish Free State in 1921, Protestants, by displaying intense opposition to one Ireland, obtained their own statelet in Ulster, where most of them lived. This entity contained a two-thirds Pro- testant majority and collective memories have been perpetuated by a variety of mechanisms. The most important of these are the annual summer marches of the Orange Order and the Apprentice Boys of Derry, which commemorate the 1690 victory of William of Orange, Protestant king of England, over James II, deposed in 1688, and his Catholic Irish supporters.

From 1921 to 1972, this "Protestant" entity was governed by the Un- ionist Party, the main political organization of that community (Kelly, 1972). Relations with the British Government had more in common with American or Canadian federalism than with the unitary-state pattern typical of 20th-century Europe. With control of the police and courts and dominance of the economic and political systems, Protestants felt secure, if not always safe. Thus, maximum expression was given to their desire for self-reliance.

Despite a continuing sense of grievance, Catholics did not initiate the fatal challenge to this status quo. Ironically, its spark came from Terence O'Neill, leader of the Unionist Party, who became prime minister of the Northern Irish government in 1963. He proposed economic, legal, and political reforms that he and his supporters thought would win the active consent of many, if not most, Catholics to Northern Ireland's constitutional



50 Dutter

position. Taking O'Neill at his word, some Catholics responded by forming a civil-rights movement, patterned on the American model. Concurrently, the Unionist Party split into pro- and anti-O'Neill factions and eventually separate, anti-O'Neill, anti-change organizations appeared (e.g., the present Democratic Unionist Party, led by Ian Paisley).

Finally, a new spiral of violence began, involving not only civil-rights demonstrators, counter-demonstrators, and police, but also terrorist-style incidents. The first of the latter were, ironically, conducted by the Ulster Volunteer Force, a Protestant paramilitary organization, formed to protest O'Neill's policies of "appeasement." This escalating violence led to the sus- pension of the Northern Irish parliament by the British Government in 1972 and the imposition of "direct rule" by a British-appointed Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Since then, the worst Protestant nightmare has been realized; not only is the constitutional status of Northern Ireland under violent attack, but also control of counter-measures, as well as the political future of the province, has been taken from their hands.

For many, their worst fears were realized in a 1973 British political initiative that resulted in formation of an intercommunal coalition government, which fell in 1974. A second initiative in 1975, designed to produce a new provincial constitution, failed in 1976. Both failed for basically the same reason; significant opposition in the Protestant community to the in- clusion of Catholics in a provincial government and, more important, to any cross-Border institutions or organizations that might lead to a united Ireland (Dutter, 1980; Rose, 1976). These events have bolstered Protestant confidence that they can at least veto their ultimate fate, if not wholly deter- mine it.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, political fragmentation in the Protestant community has continued (McAllister and Nelson, 1979). Two parties now compete for the bulk of Protestant votes, the old "Official" Unionist party and the newer Democratic Unionist Party. The small Alli- ance Party also wins some Protestant support, mainly from the political descendants of "O'Neill Unionists." However, the Protestant community re- mains united on the desirability of the links to Britain. Disagreement ap- pears on the best means to preserve these links, the form of a future provincial government, political relations with Catholics, and the personali- ties of party leaders (Moxon-Browne, 1983).

THE CATHOLIC COMMUNITY

Northern Irish Catholics are descendants of the original inhabitants of the island, who have consistently resisted, periodically by violence, the En-




glish/British presence since the late 12th century. In the 20th century, they have displayed far more political fragmentation than Protestants, not on the issue of an independent, united Ireland, but on the means to achieve that goal (Gallagher, 1982). These means can be identified as the political approach, generally accepted by a large majority, and the physical-force approach, actively practiced by a small minority. However, both exist in the minds of many Catholics, a form of political schizophrenia that leads to os- cillations in sympathy and support for the approaches, often depending upon the circumstances of the moment (Moxon-Browne, 1983).

In 1921, partition not only created the separate Northern Irish state but also divided Catholics in the new Irish Free State. A short, but intense civil war ensued, which was won by the acceptors, albeit reluctant, of partition and, by implication, of the political approach. By the 1930s, most of the physical-force advocates had joined the new state, while the remaining few went underground. Support for the physical-force approach also faded in Northern Ireland, epitomized by an abortive Irish Republican Army (IRA) campaign in the late 1950s.

By the 1960s, a new generation of Catholics perceived not only the bankruptcy of the physical-force approach, but also the sterility of previous Catholic political activity characterized by boycott and abstention (e.g., elected candidates refusing to take their seats in governmental bodies). Unity was seen as a long-term goal to be achieved by the persuasion of Pro- testants that their best interests lay in a united Ireland. Meanwhile, the short-term goal became the improvement of the economic and political positions of Catholics within Northern Ireland. Thus, when O'Neill began his talk of reform, their main responses were the above-mentioned civil-rights movement and then the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) which emerged in the 1970s as the sole political voice of the Catholic community.

After intercommunal violence erupted in 1969 and thousands of Brit- ish soldiers arrived to police the province, the physical-force approach re- emerged in the form of the Provisional IRA. Arguing the "sterility" of institutional political activity and claiming the historical legacy of violent resistance to British rule, this new IRA asserted that the goals should be defense of Catholics against the British Army and Northern Irish police and driving out the British. By 1980, this latter objective had not been achieved and seemed increasingly remote. Also, sympathy and support were declin- ing on all fronts - Northern Irish Catholics, the Irish Republic, the United States.

A two-pronged shift in strategy then developed. First, consistent with a 2-century-old tradition of martyrdom in resistance to Britain, IRA prisoners in Northern Irish jails went on hunger strike in 1981 for special- category status, i.e., to be treated as "prisoners of war" rather than ordinary



52 Dutter

criminals. This was not conceded, but before it ended, 10 strikers died. On the other hand, sympathy and material support from the IRA's three principal sources were largely regained. Second, Sinn Fein, the political arm of the IRA, entered electoral politics and contested the October 1982 Assembly election, but indicated that successful candidates would not take their seats. The objectives were to demonstrate support for the IRA and to challenge SDLP's position as the main political voice of the Catholic community. In an effort to "outbid" Sinn Fein and to protest Protestant refusal to accept Catholics in a provincial government, as well as British hesitance to broaden and to institutionalize relations with Dublin, SDLP also adopted an absten- tionist position.

THE OCTOBER 1982 NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY ELECTION

The 1982 British political initiative contains two stages. First, in Oc- tober, a 78-member assembly was elected by the single-transferable-vote (STV) method of proportional representation. Second, its members are to gain decision-making power and administrative authority when the Assem- bly parties can (1) agree which powers they want and (2) convince the Secretary of State that their agreement commands sufficient "cross-community" support to warrant its presentation to the British Parliament for approval and implementation. This latter provision has been called "rolling devolution," and its main implication is that Catholics must be in- volved in all facets of provincial government. However, this may eventually prove moot. Except for some members of the Alliance Party, no Catholics sit in the Assembly. Both Sinn Fein and SDLP have maintained their boycott, joined by the Official Unionists in December 1983. Nevertheless, the Assembly continues to sit and to carry out its oversight functions.

Northern Ireland's 14 previous provincial-level elections (1921-1975) were dominated by the constitutional issue. Socioeconomic issues have never been paramount. Even during the 1930s, electoral politics was viewed through the psychological prism of the constitutional issue. Unionists argued that the best way to solve the unprecedented economic problems of that decade was for Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom. Nonunionists argued that a united Ireland was the best way to solve these problems. More recently, Rose (1971:235), in a 1968 survey, found that only 5% of Catholics identified with the Unionist Party and less than 1% of Protestants with the Nationalists, the principal nonunionist party at that time. Other major forms of political behavior (e.g., organizational mem- berships) have also followed sectarian lines (Rose, 1976:35).




Table I. Agregate Results of the October 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly Election"

Party First preferences Seats

Official Unionist 188,277 (29.7%) 26 (33.3%) Democratic Unionist 145,528 (23.0%) 21 (26.9%) Social Democratic

and Labour 118,891 (18.8%) 14 (18.0%) Sinn Fein 64,191 (10.1%) 5 (6.4%) Alliance 58,851 (9.3%) 10 (12.8%) Other Unionist 24,418 (3.9%) 2 (2.6%) Workers 17,216 (2.7%) 0 (0.0%) United Ulster Unionist 11,550 (1.8%) 0 (0.0%) Others 4,198 (0.7%) 0 (0.0%)

633,120 (100.0%) 78 (100.0%)

"Source: Fortnight, An Independent Review for Northern Ireland, #189, December 1982, p. 19.

The 1982 election was consistent with this past, but with two notewor- thy variations. First, as seen in Table I, competition between the Official and Democratic Unionists has crystallized. Second, the results were a quali- fied success for Sinn Fein. While its voters were predominantly former ab- stainers and first-time voters, its five seats came largely at SDLP's expense, i.e., the latter won 14, down from 17 in 1975 and 19 in 1973. More enlight- ening are the patterns revealed by the STV method, which followed five basic steps.

First, each voter was given a ballot paper listing the constituency's candidates alphabetically, including each's party affiliation. Second, a voter indicated his/her preference ordering for candidates by writing the appropriate integer to the left of each name, 1 for first preference, 2 for second etc., up to the total number of candidates, if the voter so desired. In- differences, the same integer assigned to two or more candidates, were not allowed. Such papers were declared invalid and not counted. These were only 3.1% of the total.

Third, on the first "count" of the ballots, candidates were listed ac- cording to each's first preferences. If a candidate exceeded the constituency's "quota," she/he was declared elected and his/her excess or "surplus" votes distributed among the remaining candidates. The quota was based on the total valid votes cast in the constituency and the number of seats assigned to it (Dutter, 1980:628). The number of votes "transferred" to an un- elected candidate depended upon his/her proportion of next preferences on all of the ballot papers of the elected candidate (Dutter, 1980:628-9). Fourth, if no one reached quota on a given count, the candidate with the fewest votes was eliminated and all of his/her votes were transferred. Last,



54 Dutter

this process of transferring the surplus votes of elected or the total votes of eliminated candidates continued until all of a constituency's seats were filled.

Although the raw ballot papers are not available, the totality of voters preferences and the depth of the ethnopolitical divide in this election can be discerned by examining the published record (1982 Northern Ireland As- sembly Election, Results Record, Belfast: Chief Electoral Officer for Northern Ireland) of who received transfer votes after a given candidate was elected or eliminated. On each count, the patterns of interest are (1) the proportion of votes which were not transferable, i.e., because no next preference was indicated on some of the ballot papers of the elected or eliminated candidate; and (2) the proportion of the transferable votes received by a given candidate. These are our dependent variables.

Our first independent variable is the perceived spatial distance on the constitutional issue between the elected or eliminated candidate and a recipient. Construction of its measure followed three steps. First, through a content analysis of published candidate/party statements in thirteen (1921-1973) Northern Irish elections, a set of seven positions on this issue was developed. These positions are (1) A united Ireland should be achieved by any means necessary; (2) there should be a united Ireland; (3) a united Ireland should be achieved through the consent of the people of Northern Ireland; (4) the Border is not an issue; (5) the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom should be maintained as long as this is the desire of its people; (6) the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom should be maintained; (7) the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as part of the United King- dom should be maintained by any means necessary.

Second, each party was assigned to the position which best reflected its "true" position, and each candidate based on his/her party affiliation. Specifically, Sinn Fein candidates were assigned to position 1; SDLP and Workers to 3; Alliance to 5; and Official Unionists, Democratic Unionists, and various Loyalists to 6. Third, spatial distance was then measured by the absolute value of the difference between candidate positions.

This variable is only relevant to the proportion of transfers received by a candidate and should be negatively related to it. At the individual level, if a voter gave first or high preferences to, for instance, candidates at position 6, then, the greater the spatial distance between that position and a recipient's position, the smaller the probability that that recipient would receive the next preference. Thus, at the aggregate level, the greater the spatial distance, the smaller the proportion of the total transfers a recipient should have received.




Our second independent variable is a dummy variable scored 1 if a recipient was from the same party as the elected or eliminated candidate and 0 otherwise. For the proportion of votes not transferable, we expect a negative relationship. If a recipient of the same party were available, a smaller proportion of votes should have been nontransferable. For the proportion of transfers received, we expect a positive relationship, i.e., a recipient of the same party should have received a greater proportion of transfers than one who was not.

A related variable is the number of recipients from the same party. For nontransferable votes, we again expect a negative relationship, i.e., the more recipients available from the same party, the smaller the proportion of nontransferable votes. However, preliminary investigation revealed that this variable must be treated as nonlinear and combined with the preceding one into a single dummy variable scored 1 if at least one recipient of the same party was available and 0 otherwise. For transfers received, we expect a negative relationship, i.e., the more recipients from the same party, the smaller the proportion of transfers each of them should have received.

Our third principal independent variable is a dummy variable scored 1 if a recipient has the same assigned position as the elected or eliminated candidate and 0 otherwise. Here, a related variable is the number of recipients at the same position. The expected relationships are the same as for the party variables and again the preceding nonlinear transformation must be employed in the analysis of nontransferable votes.

Our fourth major independent variable, relevant only to the proportion of transfers received, is a dummy variable employed in the analysis of transfers from positions 3 and 6. Its values depend upon the relative positions of the elected or eliminiated candidate and a recipient. For transfers from 3, it is scored 1 for all recipients at position 1, and 0 otherwise. For transfers from 5, it is scored 1 for all at 6, and 0 otherwise.

To illustrate its expected relationship to transfers received, consider a candidate at 3. Other things being equal, his/her transfers might have gone to recipients at 1 and 5 in roughly equal proportions. However, if (Catholic) voters who gave 1st or high preferences to candidates at 3 felt intensely about their views on the constitutional issue and, thus, would not support a unionist party under any circumstances, then it is more reasonable to expect that recipients at I would get their next preferences and, as a conse- quence, a significantly larger proportion of transfers than recipients at 5. An analogous argument holds for transfers from position 5. Hence, we expect positive parameter estimates for these "extremist support" variables.

Finally, we include some controls. First are the count number and the number of distributions at each count. Second are dummy variables for as-



56 Dutter

signed positions. Since four positions are occupied, three dummies are included. Third, a set of dummy variables for constituencies is included in order to control for geographic variations due to unknown or unmeasurable factors (e.g., personation). Since there were 12 constituencies, 11 dummies are used. However, for the sake of brevity, we only report those parameter estimates for the position and constituency dummies that are significant on a one-tailed test (critical value, t = ? 1.645).

Table II displays results for the proportion of votes not transferable. For transfers from 3, the recipients of same party and at same position variables were highly colinear. Since it displayed a higher correlation with the dependent variable, only the latter is retained. As expected, all parameter estimates for these two variables are negative and three are significant. For the position dummies, all three are negative and two are significant, the third marginally so. This means that, other things being equal, transfers from position 1 (Sinn Fein candidates), represented by the constant, had the highest proportion of nontransferable votes at each count.

The main conclusion to be drawn from this table is that voters were engaged in the systematic nonranking of candidates, which reflected the un- derlying psychological polarization on the constitutional issue. Significant numbers of voters gave preferences only to candidates close to their most-

Table II. Regression Results on the Proportion of Votes Not Transferable at Each Counta

Transfers from

Independent All cases Position 3 Position 6 variables (N = 130) (N = 33) (N = 77)

Constant 0.457 0.359 0.433 Recipient of - 0.040 - -0.044

same party (- 1.154) (- 1.263) Recipient at -0.218 -0.173 -0.342

same position (-4.801) (-3.552) (-5.069) Count number 0.003 - 0.002 0.005

(0.870) (- 0.425) (1.227) Number of distributions - 0.007 -0.012 - 0.003

at count (-2.138) (- 1.745) (-0.832) Position 3 -0.137

(-2.417) Position 5 -0.156

(-2.401) Position 6 - 0.093 - -

(- 1.623) R2,R-2 0.447, 0.415 0.450, 0.393 0.415, 0.382

"The table is read vertically. The number in parentheses under each parameter estimate is its associated t value.




preferred position. For instance, consider transfers from 6. If no recipient of the same party or at the same position was available, then, other things being equal, an expected 43.3%7o of the votes would be nontransferable. On the other hand, if at least one such recipient was available, then an expected 43.3 - 4.4 - 34.2 + 4.7% of the votes would be nontransferable.

Table III displays results for the proportion of transfer votes received by a candidate. For spatial distance and party label, all parameter estimates have the expected sign and are significant. For the number of recipients of the same party, three have the expected sign and are significant, while the lone positive estimate is not. For position, one estimate has the expected sign and the other does not, but both are significant. The negative estimate means that SDLP and Workers supporters were not as generous to each other's can-

Table III. Regression Results on the Proportion of Transfers to a Candidate"

Transfers from

Independent Position 1 Position 3 Position 5 Position 6 variables (N = 68) (N = 280) (N = 89) (N = 649)

Constant 0.162 0.518 0.141 0.094 Spatial distance -0.051 -0.172 -0.056 -0.023

(-7.026) (-8.962) (-2.222) (-3.411) Party label 0.639 0.391 0.376 0.267

(11.893) (12.827) (5.418) (17.404) Number of recipients 0.024 - 0.047 - 0.087 -0.015

of same party (0.412) (- 1.994) (-3.156) (-3.265) Position - -0.375 - 0.046

(-6.491) (2.239) Number of recipients - 0.013 - - 0.007

at same position (0.525) (-1.275) Extremist support - - 0.087 - 0.105

(-3.081) (-2.608) Count number 0.021 0.009 0.025 0.003

(2.004) (2.834) (2.955) (0.913) Number of distributions - 0.007 0.001 0.003 - 0.002

at count (-0.133) (0.391) (0.891) (- 1.455) Armagh -0.093 - - 0.045

(- 1.692) (1.777) Fermanagh and South - - - 0.072

Tyrone (1.896) Mid-Ulster - -0.090 0.071

(-1.746) (2.262) South Antrim - -0.117 -0.252

(-3.285) (-1.900) R2,R-2 0.861, 0.843 0.681, 0.662 0.762, 0.723 0.522, 0.508

aThe table is read vertically. The number in parentheses under each parameter estimate is its associated t value.



58 Dutter

didates with their lower preferences as we initially hypothesized. For the number of recipients at the same position, one estimate has the expected sign and the other does not, but neither is significant.

Surprisingly, the estimates for extremist support are not only negative, but also significant. Thus, "extremists" were not helped and, in fact, were "penalized" in receiving transfers from candidates at positions 3 and 5. For instance, consider transfers from 3. Significant numbers of (Catholic) voters who gave high preferences to SDLP or Workers candidates were ac- tually favoring candidates to the "right" of 3, particularly those at 5 (Alli- ance), with their lower preferences. An analogous point holds for transfers from 5.

Overall, Tables II and III support these conclusions: (1) Supporters of Sinn Fein were ranking its candidates and few others; (2) SDLP supporters gave significant numbers of lower preferences to Workers and Alliance, few to Sinn Fein, and virtually none to Official or Democratic Unionists; (3) Workers supporters gave significant lower preferences to SDLP and Alli- ance, few to Sinn Fein, and virtually none to Official or Democratic Un- ionists; (4) Alliance supporters gave significant lower preferences to SDLP and Workers, some to Official and Democratic Unionists, and virtually none to Sinn Fein; and (5) Official and Democratic Unionist supporters gave significant lower preferences to each other, some to Alliance, and virtually none to SDLP, Workers, or Sinn Fein. These tables further indicate that the long-standing intercommunal political competition has now been aug- mented by two intracommunal competitions, Official versus Democratic Unionists and SDLP versus Sinn Fein. In other words, as is often the case in plural societies, Northern Ireland's political divisions are deeper and more complicated than one would conclude based solely on the examination of aggregate indicators such as the data of Table I.

CONCLUSION

This author is unaware of any individuals or organizations who openly advocate the expulsion, or even the voluntary emigration, of Protestants from (Northern) Ireland. If this option is rejected, then the issues become conciliation and the economic, political, and social institutions within which this might emerge. The success of any such institutions requires, of course, an appropriate psychological support structure. How this can be developed is far from apparent. On the contrary, as indicated by our analysis of the Oc- tober 1982 election, Northern Irish voters presently face each other across seemingly unbridgeable, psychopolitical chasms.




Overwhelming majorities of Protestants and Catholics are not engaged in violence and would do so only under extreme provocation. However, equally large majorities consistently vote for candidates who represent the traditional, ethnopolitical views of each group. If any candidates/parties stray from these positions, the extant theoretical and empirical literature predicts that they will be quickly replaced by others who are firmly wedded to the traditional positions. This does not augur well for the construction of political institutions which might facilitate conciliation.

In addition, as noted by Whyte (1981) and others, none of the principal political leaders in either community, as well as of the major parties in the Irish Republic, have taken steps that might stimulate the growth of conciliatory attitudes. In fact, the opposite has more often been the case. For instance, leaders of the Republic have said little in recent years to allay real or imagined Protestant fears that their individual and group identities would be destroyed in a "Catholic" Ireland. Most Protestant political leaders have done little to win at least passive Catholic acceptance of Northern Ireland's constitutional position. If anything, their actions (e.g., staunch opposition to power sharing) have had the opposite effect.

If conciliation is ever to emerge peacefully, the constitutional status quo will have to remain for many years, if not decades. The Irish Border is a symptom of an intense psychological division that has been generations in the making. Needless to say, its summary removal will not lead to a united Ireland. An artificial, territorial "unity" cannot be a substitute or a stimulus for a psychological unity which, if it existed, would render everything else moot.

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Documents

Perceptions of Group Identity and Recent Political Behavior in Northern Ireland