Waqf and Ottoman Welfare Policy. The Poor Kitchen of Hasseki Sultan in Eighteenth-CenturyJerusalemAuthor(s): Oded PeriReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1992), pp.167-186Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3632408 .Accessed: 04/12/2011 09:32

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Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. XXXV

WAQF AND OTTOMAN WELFARE POLICY

The poor kitchen of Hasseki Sultan in eighteenth-century Jerusalem*)

BY

ODED PERI

U(Jerusalem)

The use of waqf as an instrument of public policy has already won the attention of those engaged in the study of Ottoman social and economic history. Given the central role played by the Muslim waqf institution in the social and economic life of Ottoman pre-modern cities this can hardly be surprising. As no such thing as municipal authorities had ever existed in those cities, the waqf proved the most

important (if not the only) means by which Ottoman sultans and senior state officials could provide their citizens with the most basic and essential public services. In the religious sphere, for example, the

waqf was made responsible for the building and maintenance of mos-

ques and other centers of worship, as well as for the upkeep of their clerical staff. In the field of education the waqf contributed much to the founding and operation of various types of cultural establishments and institutions of learning. Institutions of social welfare and poor- relief, such as hospitals, soup kitchens and diverse charity funds, were

mainly financed by the waqf. Moreover, several important public works, such as the paving of roads, the building of bridges, the digg- ing of wells and the organization of water supply to the cities, were also carried out with the assistance of the waqf. The waqf also encour-

aged the economic development of those cities, thanks to the fact that

*) This article is a revised and more comprehensive version of a paper read at the Fifth International Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey, held at the Marmara University of Istanbul, August 21-25, 1989

168 ODED PERI

road-inns, caravanserais, roofed-in markets, storehouses and other facilities for commerce and light industry became current among the urban assets usually set up and dedicated to support and finance the above-mentioned services, which were granted by the Ottoman rul-

ing class through its public waqf endowments. 1) The present article focuses upon one sector of these services-that

of poor-relief and social welfare. It tries to look at the role played by the waqf in that specific area through the study of the nature and

operation manner of a typically Ottoman semi-formal institution known by the term imaret (fig. "prosperity" or "well-being"). 2) This

usually waqf-supported institution was basically a kind of an hostelry which offered free board and lodging, as well as daily small pensions, to Muslim students of religious learning. But it also assumed other fields of activity, which were more characteristic of a social welfare

agency, functioning at one and the same time as a soup kitchen for the poor and charity fund for the needy. The first institution of this kind is said to have been founded in 1336, by Sultan Orhan I, in

Iznik, Anatolia. Ever since, such zmarets became an inseparable part of the urban landscape in most of the Muslim cities of the Ottoman

1) For a brief survey on the waqf in general, its origins, history and significance, see W Heffening, "Wakf", EP, IV (1932), pp. 1096-1103 See also H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, Vol. I, Pt. 2, London, 1958, pp. 165-178; G. Baer, A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt, 1800-1950, London, 1962, pp. 154-163; J R. Barnes, An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire, Leiden, 1986, pp. 5-20. The Muslim waqf institution was not, of course, an Ottoman innovation, nor were its public utility applications. However, it was especially under Ottoman rule that the waqf, as well as other semi-formal institu- tions, were strengthened, perfected and made best fitted to cope with the "con- tradiction that existed between the apparent underadministration of the [Muslim] towns and the necessity of fulfilling the fundamental needs of their inhabitants" (A. Raymond, The Great Arab Cities in the 16th-18th Centuries, New York, 1984, p. 19).

2) The root imar implies "improvement by cultivating, building or peopling." Hence, imaret is often defined as (a public government) complex of buildings. It is more narrowly defined as (an imperial) soup kitchen. Note that although etymologically derived from Arabic, this conspicuously Ottoman-Turkish term, as well as others appeanng in this article, are generally transliterated to their modern Turkish form.

WAQF AND OTTOMAN WELFARE POLICY 169

empire. 3) One of them, the imaret of Hasseki Sultan in Jerusalem, is the subject of the present study.

The imaret of Hasseki Sultan, like many of the other foundations of its kind, was established during the heyday of Ottoman power. It is in this favorable context, being functionally and administratively at their best position, that these public service institutions are mostly referred to in recent literature. Moreover, the mere establishment of such institutions has generally been dealt with and cited to substan- tiate the current theories concerning the waqf as an instrument of

public policy. 4) One is less informed, however, about the way these institutions were practically operating long after their inception, in

totally different circumstances. Depicting, therefore, the case of the zmaret of Hasseki Sultan in late eighteenth-century Jerusalem, the

present article looks for the first time at one of these imperial tools of social and economic welfare in the context of Ottoman decline.5)

The Waqf of Hasseki Sultan in Jerusalem

The waqf of Hasseki Sultan in Jerusalem was founded in 1552 by Hasseki Hurrem (Roxelana), the beloved wife of Sultan Siileyman I,

3) Cl. Hurat, "Imaret", Isldm Ansiklopedisi, V (1950), p. 985; M. Z. Pakalin, Osmanli Tarih Deyzmlert ve Terimleri Sizliigui, Vol. II, Istanbul, 1951, pp. 61-63

4) See e.g. O L. Barkan, "Les fondations pieuses comme methode de peuple- ment et de colonisation", Vakiflar Dergisi, II (1942), pp. 59-65; idem and E. H. Ayverdi, Istanbul Vakiflart Tahrzr Defteri, 953 (1546) Tarihli, Istanbul, 1970, pp. xvi-

xlx; H. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: the Classical Age 1300-1600, London, 1973, p. 148; I. Metin Kunt, "The Vakif as Instrument of Public Policy- Notes on the K6pruilii Family Vakifs", in G Baer and G. Gilbar (eds.), Soczal and Economic Aspects of the Muslim Waqf (forthcoming). Cf. R. D McChesney, "Waqf and Public Policy- the Waqfs of Sh.h CAbbas 1011-1023/1602-1614", AAS, 15 (1981), pp. 165-1901

5) The information available on this foundation in that specific era is mainly based on Ottoman administrative orders (fermans) and other official documents recorded in the registers (syjill) of the Muslim shari-ca court m Jerusalem. I owe my gratitude to Shaykh SaCd ad-Din al-CAlami, Mufti of Jerusalem and Head of the Muslim Supreme Council, who had kindly granted me his permission to see and study this invaluable source material.

170 ODED PERI

after having received his consent and authority to devote several assets from the state domains to this particular purpose. 6) Under the terms of the endowment deed (waqfiyya), a new building complex was erected in Jerusalem. It included a mosque, a dwelling house with 55 rooms for the use of Muslim pilgrims and others who had come to live near the Holy Places (mujalwinrn), and a khan for wayfarers. At the center of this complex was the imaret-a huge soup kitchen which was to provide daily food and bread for the poor and the needy among the Muslim population of Jerusalem. 7)

For those purposes, many assets consisting for the most part of extensive landed properties were endowed in perpetuity as waqf. In Palestine these properties included no less than twenty-five villages. The greater part of these-sixteen in number-centered in the sancak of Gaza and Ramle, mainly around the towns of Ramle and Lydda. 8) Another eight villages were located in the sancak of Jerusalem,9) and another one-in the sancak of Nablus. 10) In addition, the waqf was to

6) See: St. H. Stephan, "An Endowment Deed of Khasseki Sultfin, Dated the 24th May 1552", The Quarterly of the Department of Antzquittes in Palestine, X (1944), pp. 170-194. It is very likely that the document referred to and translated by Stephan was actually one of the earlier drafts of Hasseki Sultan's waqfiyya, for the final version of it was not formulated until five years later, in the month of Shacbin, 964 (June, 1557). The version on which the data below are based is an exact copy of this final text, which for some reason was re-entered into the Jerusalem syiill registers (Vol. 270, pp. 18-24), on 20 Shacbin 1203 (15 May 1789).

7) The complex, though partially derelict, is still discernible at the heart of the Muslim quarter of old Jerusalem, close to the north-western corner of the Temple Mount wall. Until recently it has been used as a Muslim orphanage. In these days, however, the Muslim Waqf Authorities of East Jerusalem are said to study the possibility of reconstructing the site and restoring its original functions.

8) These villages were: Kafr Jinis, Kafr CAna, al-Kanisa, Bir Mcicn, Subtdra, CAniba, SAfiriyya, Jindis, Yi.ziir, Yahfidiyya, Bayt Dajan, Nilin, Harbati, Bayt Shinni, Rantiyya, and Ludd (Lydda). It should be noted that in the late eighteenth century Lydda was no longer a village, but already a small town which served as an administrative center (kasaba) to the group of the above-mentioned villages.

9) Bayt Iksa, al-Jib, Bayt Liqyi, Buqi Cad-Din, Bethlehem, Bayt Jal, al-Jadira, and CIsawiyya. The latter two are not mentioned in the original waqfiyya but were probably added later For lists of the waqf's villages surveyed m the years 1200 (1785-6) and 1214 (1799-1800), see syjill 267, pp. 78-80; 281, pp. 98-101.

10) Qaqiin.

WAQF AND OTTOMAN WELFARE POLICY 171

benefit from six plots of arable land (mazracas), which extended to the surroundings of some of the above-mentioned villages. Outside Palestine, the village Amyuin and the mazraCa near it, in the district of Tripoli in today's northern Lebanon, were made waqf in favor of the same foundation. Shortly before his death in 1566, Sultan Siileyman added to the above estates the village Har and three other mazraCas, all situated in the nahzye of Sidon. ") In Palestine the built-up property of the waqf of Hasseki Sultan consisted of two public bath houses in Jerusalem. In Tripoli, on the other hand, the waqf pos- sessed two khdns, several shops, a roofed-in market, two soap fac- tories, and eleven flourmills. The supposedly considerable revenues accrued annually to the imaret of Hasseki Sultan from all those real estate properties were to serve permanently as the main financial

backing for the various acts of benevolence and charity which the Ottomans wished to bestow, through this particular institution, on the Muslim population of Jerusalem. 12)

The Undue Increase of the Waqf's Beneficiaries

As a financially self-sustaining institution, whose main business was charity, the waqf of Hasseki Sultan was to deal with the proper distribution of benefits and allowances from its revenues, with due consideration of the latter's volume and sources. This waqf was made of large real estate properties, both in land and in buildings, and its

11) For the additions (ilhdq) made by Sultan Siileyman to the waqf of Hasseki Sultan, see another waqfiyya of his own, dated 29 Shawwil 967 (23 July 1567), in

sjill 270, pp. 24-26. 12) Unfortunately, neither the waqfiyya nor the sijill documents pertaining to the

late eighteenth century provide for sufficiently concrete or workable quantitative data so as to enable one to assess the overall amount of revenues regularly expected and collected from these waqf properties, the total amount of expenses generally distributed on social aid and charity, the exact number of the waqf's beneficiaries etc. Consequently, the following discussion of the imaret's financial and administrative problems will have to make do with the narrative, or rather cir- cumstancial, evidence furnished in this matter by the fermans and other court deci- sions recorded in the Jerusalem sijill registers.

172 ODED PERI

management was constantly faced with the problem of how to divide the income from these assets among the beneficiaries in accordance with the terms laid down in the waqfiyya. However, in this very matter the formulations of some of the terms of the waqfiyya were far from

clear, and this was probably one of the factors that subsequently led to the disorganization of the waqf's system of favor distribution and to the loss of control over the number and classification of its beneficiaries.

The waqfiyya provided, for example, no clear-cut criteria for deter-

mining who was, after all, eligible to become a beneficiary of the

zmaret. 13) All that it said was that the waqf was founded to support "the poor and the humble, the weak and the needy ... the true

believers and the righteous who live near the holy places ... who hold on to the shari-a and strictly observe the commandments of the sunna". 14) Even if it was not the original intention of the donor, this definition could be easily manipulated so as to apply to wider ranks of the Muslim population of Jerusalem. It seems that in the course of time it was practically interpreted in this vein. A legal document issued in the beginning of 1773 explicitly states that the waqf of Hasseki Sultan was founded "to distribute bread and soup daily, mornings and evenings, to the people and residents of Jerusalem including the ulema, the sdddt, the poor, and the pilgrims who remain in Jerusalem."15) Since people of all socio-economic strata might have fallen into each of the first two or the last thus specified social

categories, the result was that along with the "real" weak and the

13) The only distinction made in this matter refers to the waqf's administrators and workers. Under the terms of the endowment deed the imaret was to be operated by a staff of 49 functionaries, whose salaries, drawn from the waqf's resources, amounted to a total of 251 akce per day In addition, they were also ex officto included among the waqf's beneficiaries. As such, they were entitled to certain food allocations from the imaret. Note that either the allocations from the zmaret and the salaried posts in its service are termed vazaf inm the Ottoman official documents dealing with the waqf of Hasseki Sultan in eighteenth-century Jerusalem.

14) Waqfiyya of Hasseki Sultan (sji1ll 270, pp. 18-24). 15) Sijill 253, pp. 81-82.

WAQF AND OTTOMAN WELFARE POLICY 173

needy, who literally leaned on charity as their principal staff of life, 6)

also members of prominent, established, and perhaps even the richest families of Jerusalem were equally supported by the imaret. More-

over, as the pillars of social, economic, religious, and public life in

eighteenth-century Jerusalem, such notable families as the Husaynis, the CAlamis, the Khalidis, the Dajjanis, the Jarallahs, and many others had the honour of being listed among the "distinguished beneficiaries" (viicuh-z miirtezike) of the waqf of Hasseki Sultan. 17) But that was not all. An additional legal document from mid-1782 men- tions the name of one of the mercenary army commanders of Ahmed Cezzar Pasa, the notorious vali of Sidon, as someone entitled to 48 loaves of bread daily from the imaret, in addition to the soup (forba) that was supplied there every morning and evening. 18) Another docu- ment of 1795 confirms the right of a certain Kasim Bey-none other than the Ottoman governor of Jerusalem at that time!-to similar benefits from the same source. 19) Whatever the basis for their

16) Syill 256, p. 35

17) Seefermans and various legal documents issued betwen 1778 and 1798 in sj'ill 259, p. 97, 266, pp. 96-97, 267, pp. 78-80; 277, p. 3, 281, p. 27 On Jerusalem's families of notables in the eighteenth century see: Hasan b. CAbd al-Latif al-

Husayni, Tardjim Ahl al-Qudsfil-Qarn ath- Thadn CAshar, n.d., photocopy of MS at the Rockefeller Museum Library, Jerusalem. From this collection of biographies, which was compiled at about the same time as that under study, it clearly emerges that most of Jerusalem's families of notables belonged at that time to the ranks of the ulema. Hence the alleged basis for their wholesale admissibility as beneficiaries of the waqf of Hasseki Sultan. On the basis of al-Husayni's work one may further assess that the number of these notables amounted in the late eighteenth century to about 1000-1500 persons, which may have accounted for about 20-30 percent of the 5000 souls estimated in the early nineteenth century as the Muslim popula- tion of Jerusalem (see: Y Ben-Aneh, "The Population of the Large Towns in Palestine During the First Eighty Years of the Nineteenth Century According to Western Sources", in M. Macoz (ed.), Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Perzod, Jerusalem, 1975, pp. 50-53). This rather high proportion may well support the

above-implied impression that in the late eighteenth century such distinguished and

privileged personages may indeed have constituted a considerable part of the beneficiaries of the Hasseki Sultan waqf in Jerusalem.

18) Si'ill 256, p. 20.

19) Sjiill 277, pp. 51-52.

174 ODED PERI

eligibility, it is still difficult to apply phrases like "the poor and the

humble, the weak and the needy" to beneficiaries like these. Yet the inclusion of beneficiaries like these was not entirely incon-

sistent with the more pragmatic purposes underlying the ideals of the

public welfare policy which the Ottomans were anxious to conduct in the provincial centers of their empire. As has already been men-

tioned, in the application of this policy the waqf was charged with a

major role: through the waqf the Ottoman rulers supplied religious, cultural, welfare and other necessary public services to their subjects. On the other hand, precisely because of this it was possible for the authorities to use the waqf in order to enhance their influence and hold on the local population, far beyond what they could achieve

through the formal frameworks of power that were under their hand. 20) It may be assumed that this was the case in Jerusalem as

well, wherein which the Ottomans had introduced the imperial waqf of Hasseki Sultan for the service of this same policy. It is in this light that one is called to see the eventual grant of allocations and benefits from this charity fund also to the most important and influential families of Jerusalem, as well as to other distinguished elements. Local elites had traditionally been among the favourite targets of Ottoman governing policy, and in the course of the eighteenth cen-

tury this trend became even more explicit due to the rapid decline of Ottoman power and the rise of the ayan in the provinces. In

Jerusalem, as in other towns of the Arab provinces, the Ottoman authorities increasingly needed the co-operation of this class of people and heavily leaned on it in striving to retain their influence and hold on the local population.21) The benefits lavished on the city notables

20) See the references mentioned in note 4. 21) See, for further details, Gibb & Bowen, op. cit., pp. 81-113; A. Hourani, A

Vision of History, Beirut, 1961, pp. 37-50; idem, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables", in W R. Polk and R. L. Chambers (eds.), Beginnings ofModernmzatzon in the Middle East-the Nineteenth Century, Chicago, 1968, pp. 41-68; B. Abu- Manneh, "The Husaynis: the Rise of a Notable Family in 18th-Century Palestine", in D Kushner (ed.), Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period, Jersualem, 1986, pp. 93-108.

WAQF AND OTTOMAN WELFARE POLICY 175

from the revenues of such important and prestigious waqf as that of Hasseki Sultan may therefore be regarded as part of the payment rendered to them by the Ottoman government for the good services

they were supplying in this context.22) Nevertheless, the informal convention that the waqf of Hasseki

Sultan was no longer just another poor-relief institution, but also a

special fund used for granting benefits to certain favourite people, had inevitably exposed it to some degree of abuse and mismanage- ment. To begin with, it practically encouraged those in charge of the

waqf's affairs in Jerusalem to widen this loophole even more and to

lavish, without distinction, further rights and benefits on an ever

growing number of people, irrespective of the needs of the waqf or the capacity of its resources. This again was generally the case in the context of Ottoman decline and the ensuing drop in the power of the central government to control efficiently the affairs of the waqf and the practices of its administrators. This therefore was not a

phenomenon restricted to the Hasseki Sultan waqf alone. Aferman of

1211 (1797) severely castigates some of the trustees (miitevellis) in

charge of the other royal zmarets spread throughout the Ottoman

empire for habitually granting illegal benefits to their connections and supporters (kendi miiteallikat ve tarafdarlarzna), thereby increasing excessively the expenses of the waqfs. As a result, the ferman con-

cludes, "most of these waqfs are now in debt and on the verge of

collapse. " 23)

The confusion surrounding the procedure of selecting the waqf's beneficiaries was further aggravated by the fact that the waqfiyya also did not specify who was authorized to determine those qualified to benefit from the waqf's resources. It would be logical to assume that the miitevelli, as the official responsible for the implementation of the

22) Cf. G. Baer, "Jerusalem's Families of Notables and the Wakf in the Early 19th Century", in D Kushner, op. cit., pp. 111-113, 119

23) Ferman of 17 Ramazan 1211 (17 April 1797), In sjyill 279, pp. 36-37

176 ODED PERI

endowment deed,24) was authorized to decide who might enjoy its fruits. The miitevelli would indeed issue "signed tickets" (memhur tezkere or temessiik) which entitled the holder to receive a specified allocation from the zmaret. 25) It appears, however, that by the late

eighteenth century at least five additional functionaries customarily granted rights to benefits drawn from the revenues of the waqf of

Hasseky Sultan. These functionaries were: 26)

1. The "Army Judge" (kazzasker) of Anatolia, who would grant such

rights or re-affirm them in official letters of appointment (askeri berati) that were sent by his office to the applicants.

2. The provincial governor (vali) of Damascus, who could issue a decree (vali buyuruldusu) ordering the acting miitevelli (see below) to

grant specific benefits to a certain person. 3. The local judge (kazi) of Jerusalem, and, 4. His deputy (naib) could also submit a letter of recommendation

(arz) or a missive (miirasele) to grant allowances or salaried jobs. 5. The deputy (kazmakam) of the miitevelli or his agent (vekil) had in

these matters the same authority as the miitevelli himself.

These five officials-in addition to the miitevelli-thus issued vari- ous documents entitling people to aid from the funds of the imaret.

Every one of the afore-mentioned certificates issued by them-askeri

beratz, vali buyuruldusu, kazz ve naib arzlarz, and miitevelli vekili

24) The miitevelli of the waqf of Hasseki Sultan was in most cases a high-ranking Ottoman official picked up for this post from the inner administration of the Sultan's Palace in Istanbul. As such, he was directly nominated by and ultimately responsible to the Ottoman central government. Since he had to spend a great deal of his time in Istanbul, the miitevelli was usually assisted by a locally-positioned deputy, whom he would nominate from among the Ottoman junior officials serving in the district administration ofJerusalem (see, for that matter, vanousfermans and letters of appointment issued between 1777 and 1791 in sjill 258, pp. 94-95; 259, p. 97, 260, p. 28; 261, pp. 85-86; 269, pp. 4-7, 270, p. 16; 272, p. 44, 273, p. 24).

25) See copies of such documents recorded between 1778 and 1795 in sijill 259, p. 97, 274, p. 100; 277, pp 52-52.

26) Seefermans, issued between 1777 and 1797, in sijill 258, pp. 94-95; 270, pp. 13-16; 279, pp. 36-37

WAQF AND OTTOMAN WELFARE POLICY 177

temessiikii-served as a valid document entitling its holder to an alloca- tion from or a paid job in the pertinent waqf. This fact alone was suf- ficient to disrupt the administration of the waqf and to render the distribution of its revenues, and the control thereof, even more dif- ficult. It should also be kept in mind that each of these officials, like the miitevelli himself, was no doubt surrounded by friends and pro- teges, who may have expected to join through him the privileged cir- cle of beneficiaries of the waqf of Hasseki Sultan. If one also takes into account that these officials were from time to time replaced by others who may have had their own priorities and preferences, one is hardly surprised to learn that in the course of time the waqf in question was

totally overrun by an evergrowing number of beneficiaries. Another typically eighteenth-century innovation, which greatly

affected the waqf administration, and made the control over the distribution of benefits extremely difficult, was that the rights to allowances from its revenues could be transferred in any possible way: they could be inherited, bequeathed by will, given away, or even sold. 27) This made it, of course, entirely impossible to apply clear and well-defined criteria to determine who, and how many people, were entitled to these rights. The only criterion left for paying an allocation from the zmaret to any person was his ability to produce one of the above-mentioned certificates. And under the cir- cumstances of the time almost everyone could obtain such a docu- ment. In this context it is worthwhile to note that a wide-spread trade in these certificates developed. Dozens of such documents changed hands every year, as if they were negotiable bills that could be kept

27) See e.g. records of such transactions (made between 1775 and 1795) in si'ill 256, p. 20; 259, p. 69; 262, p. 25; 277, pp. 51-52. The same applied to the minor salaried posts in the service of the waqf: sjiill 256, p. 120; 273, p. 27, 281, p. 81. Note that the same practice, identified in itself as one of the apparent symptoms of Ottoman decline, was common among holders of various official positions in the religious establishment (ilm~ye) of the Ottoman empire at large (cf. Abu-Manneh, op. cat., p. 93).

178 ODED PERI

in portfolio and converted at any possible time. 28) When a person came to cash in on these rights, it simply did not matter to whom the document had originally been issued or whose hands it had finally reached. The miitevelli or his aide just paid the allowance "to the bearer. '

Attempts at Reducing Expenses

Under these circumstances the administration of the waqf lost all control over the beneficiaries. Their number grew consistently out of all proportions, and became a heavy burden on the waqf's resources. This had, of course, immediate consequences for the functioning of the zmaret. As one of the sijill documents shows, it was evident at a rather early stage (i.e. for some time before the period under study) that the waqf could no longer stand the pressure of the excessive

expenses and the effort of preparing and distributing food to so many beneficiaries. In an attempt to find a solution which would alleviate the burden of the waqf without substantially affecting the rights of its

beneficiaries, it had been decided to supply thenceforth in the imaret

only the raw materials needed for their daily portions. Thus, someone entitled to a certain quantity of bread could thereafter receive the

equivalent quantity of wheat or flour, on the basis of an annual calculation. 29)

28) See e.g. syill 256, p. 20, which deals with the purchase of a deed entitling the holder to 48 loaves of bread daily from the imaret for a lump sum of 300 gunru esedi. See also syjill 277, pp. 51-52, which deals with the sale of a right to 49 loaves for 310 gurus esedi. See further sijill 256, p. 120, which deals with handing over a post with a yearly salary of 10 zolota (7.5 gurus) In exchange for 80 zolotas (60 gurus) paid in advance, etc. See, in particular, the canonical opinion (fetva) in sijill 281, p. 81, which allows the holder of a title deed for an allowance or a salaried post to even let it to another person. Whichever the case, it should be noted here that besides their economic (nominal or market) value, these certificates were also socially attractive, as they paradoxically came to denote one of the distinguished status symbols of the upper classes in eighteenth-century Jerusalem.

29) Protocol of a law suit, recorded in early 1773, in sijill 253, pp. 81-82.

WAQF AND OTTOMAN WELFARE POLICY 179

This was, of course, a too-superficial solution which did not go to the roots of the real problem. It did not check the continuing growth of the number of beneficiaries, nor did it release the pressure on the sources of income. So toward the beginning of the 1770s the waqf of Hasseki Sultan was again nearing the verge of collapse. This time there was obviously no way to solve the problem but by taking more drastic measures-that is, by reducing the number of beneficiaries. But since at this stage it was still up to the local public leaders in

Jerusalem to take the initiative, and they made a strenuous effort not to impair their own interests and those of the population under their

protection. It was probably in this context that the city elders

appealed, in early 1773, to the local kazi urging him to warn the

miitevelli to avoid granting any benefits from the imaret to persons who were not permanent residents of Jerusalem.30) Claiming that this

practice contradicted the stipulations of the endowment deed, they asked the kazi to see to it that the "illegal" benefits already granted to persons living outside Jerusalem be gradually nullified and returned to the depleted funds of the waqf in question.31) Thus the notables of Jerusalem evidently tried not only to meet the urgent necessity to cut down and restrict the waqf's beneficiaries and

expenses, but also, and at the same time, to secure and consolidate their own rights and benefits.

But the financial distress to which the waqf of Hasseki Sultan had been reduced was not relieved, and was even enhanced under the influence of factors prompted by the general decline of the Ottoman

empire and the crumbling of its rule in Palestine. Taking advantage of this trend, I•.hir al-cUmar, a local potentate of beduin prov-

30) Ibid. 31) The claimants apparently relied here on one of the provisions of the waqfiyya

which states that no food will be distributed to "supplicants from the outside." However, upon reviewing the general context from which this phrase was drawn, it becomes clear that an "outsider" was any person who did not belong to the group of the waqf's beneficiaries. This does not necessarily mean people living outside Jerusalem.

180 ODED PERI

enance, who started his career as an ordinary tax-farmer in the district of Tiberias and Safad, had managed in the early 1770s to extend his virtually autonomous rule over most of Palestine. He then

openly revolted against the Sublime Porte, alternately aided by or

fighting against the Mamluk forces from Egypt whose leaders, CAlI Bey and Muhammad Bey Ab5i Dhahab, also took this favorable

opportunity to rise up against the Ottoman sultan and to invade Palestine with their own armies. A full-scale struggle for power imbued with continuous acts of violence developed between these rebellious elements, as well as between them and the local Ottoman forces. 32) It so happened that the area of Lydda and Ramle was one of the main arenas of hostilities. It will be recalled that precisely in this area most of the landed properties of the Hasseki Sultan waqf in Palestine were concentrated. Not only were the villages of the waqf and their harvests severely damaged in the course of these stormy events, but the vekil, who attended to the affairs of the waqf in this

region on behalf of the miitevelli, met his death in the process. The miitevelli himself, staying at the time in Istanbul, was unable to send another vekil to replace him. The isolated villages of the waqf, left

unattended, fell prey to the intruders from the Galilee and Egypt, who did not hesitate to seize their fields and to confiscate their

crops. 33) But even this was not the end of the waqf's troubles. Unfor-

tunately, the seal (miihiir) of the murdered vekil, which he had used to confirm or issue certificates for waqf allowances, fell on his death into unauthorized hands. As a result, the imaret was flooded by a stream of new applicants who produced counterfeit certificates bear-

ing the seal of the dead vekil. The pressure on the sources of income-which were already poor enough-became insupportable. The miitevelli in Istanbul bitterly complained to the imperial divan that

32) See, for more details on these events, A. Cohen, Palestine in the 18th Century, Jerusalem, 1973, pp. 30-53

33) See records of the evidences, collected in this matter by the kazz ofJerusalem in early 1776, m sijill 257, pp. 54-55, 55-56.

WAQF AND OTTOMAN WELFARE POLICY 181

under these circumstances it became "absolutely impossible to cope with the situation" which "leads in any case to his own and the

waqf's total privation. "34) The Ottoman government was therefore called to take the initiative

in this matter. But this initiative had to wait for a better political set-

ting. It was only in 1777, after having finally succeeded in bringing about DIhir's definite downfall and the retreat of the Mamluk corps back to Egypt, that the central government in Istanbul was free and

ready to deal with the plight of the Hasseki Sultan waqf in Jerusalem. In that same year aferman was issued containing new regulations for

applying stricter centralized supervision on the waqf's expenses, and for putting an end to the chaotic situation with regard to the issue of certificates for allowances. Under these regulations, the certificates that had been obtained "through some machination" (bir takrib ile) or "fraudulently" (hildf-i znha) by people who "did not belong lawfully to the family of the waqf's beneficiaries" were declared null and void. Consequently the certificates that had been issued in the

past by the kaziasker, the vali, the local kazi, and the vekil-z miitevelli became practically meaningless, and the miitevelli was instructed to

pay nothing to whomever produced them. The authority to issue cer- tificates for allowances was from then on made the exclusive faculty of the Ottoman treasury. This body, with its professional means of financial control, was considered at the time to be the most adequate authority to supervise effectively the waqf's beneficiaries, and to

regulate their number in accordance with the waqf's resources and

budgetary needs. It was accordingly decided that only persons who could produce valid certificates issued by the Treasury (maliye berati) would henceforth be entitled to their specified allowances. All other

persons who held different certificates were by virtue of these regula- tions excluded from the group of beneficiaries of the waqf of Hasseki Sultan in Jerusalem. 35)

34) Ferman of 1 Muharrem 1191 (19 February 1777), in sy'ill 258, pp. 94-95 35) Ibid.

182 ODED PERI

When those in charge of the affairs of the waqf, however, began to implement these new regulations, it soon appeared that they may have been too harsh. Many of those who had regularly received allowances from the imaret suddenly found themselves deprived. Alarmed at this substantial breach of their rights and benefits the notables of Jerusalem sent an urgent appeal to Istanbul, complaining about the great injustice done to them. In this appeal-which was

supported by the kazi of Jerusalem and the vali of Damascus-the local notables called on the central government to have mercy and restore the previous system of distribution, "in view of the fact that most of those who received allowances and wheat and soup were old, helpless people, women and children." 36)

Regardless of the questionable authenticity of this heart-rending cry, the matter underlying it shows again, and in a striking way, the crucial dilemma in which the Ottoman government found itself while

trying to cope with what had become of its "charity for all" policy, in view of its budgetary implications. Dealing with the waqf of Hasseki Sultan as one of the main instruments of this public policy, the Ottoman government became constantly concerned with the acute problem of how to find the delicate balance between the need to cut down and restrict the number of the waqf's beneficiaries, and the wish to collect the maximum political gain by granting benefits to the greatest possible number of people (and it did not necessarily have "the poor and the humble" in mind!). It seems in this context that the Ottoman authorities may have finally been convinced that their latest regulations perhaps tipped the scales too much in favor of

decreasing the number of beneficiaries. They therefore instructed the officials in charge of the waqf affairs and the Treasury in Istanbul to consider the whole matter again, and to submit their conclusions and recommendations in a spirit of empathy towards the people of

Jesuralem. 37)

36) Ferman of 19 Safer 1203 (19 November 1788), in sijill 270, pp. 13-16. 37) Ibtd.

WAQF AND OTTOMAN WELFARE POLICY 183

And indeed, the recommendations which these officials subse-

quently made, proposed to keep on certain conditions the allowances of certain veteran beneficiaries "even if they are not entitled under the observed rules to any allowance or to soup in any quantity as long as these allocations have not been properly approved by an exalted berat from the Treasury." 38) These recommendations, however, did not nullify the existing regulations prohibiting the distribution of allocations to persons who could not produce an "exalted berat" from the Treasury. They rather suggested a more liberal interpretation which would make it possible to effect their purpose in a more gradual and moderate manner. Under these recommendations, the kazzasker, the vali, the local kazi, his naib, and the vekil-z miitevelli were once again denied of the right to issue certificates to new beneficiaries. They were likewise forbidden to confirm automatically the transfer of

existing certificates from person to person. Whoever obtained a

newly-issued or reconfirmed certificate in one of these two ways could not claim the right to any benefit whatsoever from the zmaret. Legal heirs of deceased beneficiaries could however claim the benefits left to them as part of the inheritance. But this right too was not to be confirmed automatically. In the latter case the miitevelli or his vekil would send the legal heir's application to receive the rights and allowances of his deceased relative to the Sublime Porte. The latter would decide, in consultation with the kapz agasz,39) whether to allow or to reject it. If the decision was affirmative, a new berat issued by the Treasury would be sent to the applicant, and only this document would entitle him to an allowance from the imaret. As to all the others who still held the old-and legally invalid-certificates issued by the

38) Ibid. 39) The kapi agasi, head of the caucasian eunuchs at the Sultan's Palace in Istan-

bul, also held supervisory powers (nezaret) over the Hasseki Sultan waqf, as well as over some other imperial endowments established In about the same period. See the waqftyya of Hasseki Sultan (sj'ill 270, pp. 18-24). Cf. Gibb & Bowen, op. cit., Vol. I, Pt. 1, pp. 76, 78, 332; M. d'Ohsson, Tableau gindral de l'empire Ottoman, Vol. I, Paris, 1820, pp. 307-308.

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kaziasker, the vali, etc., they would be allowed to receive their former

benefits, but only on the following two conditions:

1. Their certificates must bear a date earlier than that on which the above-mentioned recommendations were declared law by aferman from Istanbul.

2. These certificates must bear the names of their genuine holders, for no allowances would henceforth be paid "to the bearer" or, for that matter, to anyone whose name is not exactly the same as

appears on the certificate he holds.

It was furthermore recommended that the officials in charge of the

waqf affairs in Jerusalem would make a yearly check of all the cer-

tificates, and gradually remove from the list of beneficiaries the names of those who should not be included. 40)

Although these recommendations were accepted by the central

government and passed into law by a special ferman, 41) it seems that in Jerusalem everything continued almost as usual. From several

legal documents entered in the registers of the local kazz, it is evident that certificates for allowances from the waqf of Hasseki Sultan were still occasionally issued to new beneficiaries and passed on from hand to hand by unauthorized elements or in ways that were contradictory to the ammended regulations published by the Sublime Porte. 42) The case of Jarallah bin CAbd ar-Raziq of Jerusalem, as described in the

stjill, is a typical example of getting round the rules. In the beginning of 1789 this man was appointed money-changer (sarraf) for the Hasseki Sultan waqf on a salary of 5 para per diem. He received his official appointment after the vekil-z miitevelli had managed to convince the kapz agasi that the "extensive financial turnover" of the waqf of Hasseki Sultan necessitated the employment of a full-time sarraf 43)

Ostensibly, the procedure seemed to be perfectly legal, but the point

40) Ferman of 19 Safer 1203 (19 November 1788), in sijill 270, pp. 13-16. 41) Ibid. 42) See e.g. sijill 273, p. 27, 277, pp. 51-52; 281, p. 81

WAQF AND OTTOMAN WELFARE POLICY 185

was that such a position was never included in the list of wage-earners specified in the waqfiyya. Thus the vekil-z miitevelli and the kapi agasi knowingly broke the rules of the Ottoman government which

explicitly forbade to grant allowances to new beneficiaries or to create new jobs whose salaries were paid from the funds of the waqf of Hasseki Sultan. When the miitevelli learned of this appointment, he demanded its immediate cancellation and the return of Jarallah's wages to the coffers of the imaret. The Ottoman authorities which

investigated the matter, had but to endorse this demand, and Jarallah was deprived of both his post and allocation. 44)

However, this same miitevelli, who so strongly objected to the

appointment of Jirallah because it was against the regulations, did not strictly abide by them himself. Contradictory to the regulations he kept on granting allowances from the imaret to persons who had not been included in the list of the waqf's beneficiaries.45) Questioned about this irregularity he claimed, rather strangely, that the latest rules did not apply to endowments whose revenues derived from landed property. 46) Upon investigating the whole matter, the central

government discovered that this same pretext was commonly used by the miitevellis of the other imperial zmarets, to lavish benefits on people who were not entitled to have them.47) Once again the Ottoman

government had to issue a ferman, forbidding in strong terms the administrators of all imperial endowments dedicated to charitable

purposes, to grant new allowances or to create new salaried posts under any circumstances. 48)

Conclusion

This last affair, as well as the others discussed in this article, may have demonstrated the problematics involved in the nature and

43) Ferman of 8 Ramazan 1205 (11 May 1791), in sijill 273, p. 24. 44) Ibid. 45) See e.g. sijill 274, p. 100; 277, pp. 51-52. 46) Ferman of 17 Ramazan 1211 (17 April 1797), in sijill 279, pp. 36-37 47) Ibid. 48) Ibid.

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operation manner of Ottoman public welfare projects of the kind of the Hasseki Sultan waqf in eighteenth-century Jerusalem. This institution of charity emerged also as an instrument of patronage, the

political objectives of which were exceeding by far what is usually implied by poor-relief and social welfare. It therefore had to operate on the widest scale possible, and in the most ostentatious manner.

Unfortunately, the economic resources placed at the disposal of this institution were not unlimited. The more so as these resources, affected by the symptoms of Ottoman decline, were constantly grow- ing poorer. Under these circumstances, an especially prudent budgetary policy was required to keep the waqf functioning without

being reduced to bankruptcy. But the overloaded activities and the multifaced objectives that became typical of this institution, together with the inherent impossibility to regulate and control the volume of its beneficiaries and expenses, had always hampered the full and effective execution of such a policy. The unavoidable results were the

alarming deterioration of the waqf's resources and the imminence of

danger to its very existence. The solutions designed to meet this situa- tion were in a way similar to those sometimes considered for a deficit- stricken economy. So was their effectiveness. The maneuvers initially resorted to, like decreasing the rations of the waqf's beneficiaries, were rather elusive answers trying only to evade the real problem. Finally there was no choice but to take sincerely drastic and "pain- ful" measures, that is, to cut down substantially the number of the beneficiaries. Yet the definite awareness of the indispensability of such a decisive move was not enough to change matters radically. The system was too strong to be beaten. Moreover, it may be the utmost unpopularity of such economy drive, liable in itself to under- mine the political raison d'etre of such a large-scale charity project, that deterred the Ottomans from going all the way with their restrain-

ing measures. As was the case with the rest of their state institutions, the most they could do now was to keep in some way the tmaret alive, though deficiently functioning. And this much, one should admit, was largely achieved throughout the remaining part of Ottoman rule

in Jerusalem.