Person 110414

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999

SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS, petitioners,vs.REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS andTEODORA AYSON, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint fordamages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the Regional TrialCourt of Iloilo City, Branch 25, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 19504. In said complaint,petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land, in the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz,as shown by OCT No. 0-2124, issued pursuant to the decision of the Intermediate. Appellate Court, datedApril 12, 1984, which modified the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, dated January 23, 1975,in a land registration case 1filed by private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros; that petitioners were deprivedof income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case; that such income consisted of

rentals from tenants of the land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from 1968 to 1987, and P595,000.00per year thereafter; and that private respondents filed the land registration case and withheld possession ofthe land from petitioners in bad faith.2

In their answer, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that private respondentHontiveros was a widower while private respondent Ayson was single. They denied that they had deprivedpetitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, they alleged that possession of theproperty in question had already been transferred to petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a writ ofpossession, dated July 18, 1985, issued by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Capiz,Mambusao, the return thereof having been received by petitioners' counsel; that since then, petitionershave been directly receiving rentals from the tenants of the land, that the complaint failed to state a causeof action since it did not allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made, considering thatpetitioner Augusto Hontiveros and private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros are brothers; that the decision ofthe Intermediate Appellate Court in Land Registration Case No. N-581-25 was null and void since it wasbased upon a ground which was not passed upon by the trial court; that petitioners' claim for damages wasbarred by prescription with respect to claims before 1984; that there were no rentals due since privaterespondent Hontiveros was a possessor in good faith and for value; and that private respondent Ayson hadnothing to do with the case as she was not married to private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros and did not

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have any proprietary interest in the subject property. Private respondents prayed for the dismissal of thecomplaint and for an order against petitioners to pay damages to private respondents by way ofcounterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the subject land to private respondents. 3

On May 16, 1991, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint to insert therein an allegation that "earnest

efforts towards a compromise have been made between the parties but the same were unsuccessful."

In due time, private respondents filed an Answer to Amended Complaint with Counterclaim, in which theydenied, among other things, that earnest efforts had been made to reach a compromise but the parties wasunsuccessful.

On July 19, 1995, petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that privaterespondents' answer did not tender an issue or that it otherwise admitted the material allegations of thecomplaint. 4Private respondents opposed the motion alleging that they had denied petitioners' claims andthus tendered certain issues of fact which could only be resolved aftertrial.5

On November 23, 1995, the trial court denied petitioners' motion. At the same time, however, it dismissedthe case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as required by Art. 151 of the Family Code and,therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise. The order of thetrial court reads:6

The Court, after an assessment of the diverging views and arguments presented by bothparties, is of the opinion and so holds that judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate notonly for the fact that the defendants in their answer, particularly in its paragraph 3 to theamended complaint, specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but alsobecause of the ruling in De Cruz vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 27759, April 17, 1970 (32 SCRA

307),citing

Rili vs. Chunaco, 98 Phil. 505, which ruled that the party claiming damagesmust satisfactorily prove the amount thereof and that though the rule is that failure tospecifically deny the allegations in the complaint or counter-claim is deemed an admissionof said allegations, there is however an exception to it, that is, that when the allegationsrefer to the amount of damages, the allegations must still be proved. This ruling is inaccord with the provision of Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

That while the plaintiffs in their amended complaint alleged that earnest efforts towards acompromise with the defendants were made, the fact is that their complaint was notverified as provided in Article 151 of the Family Code. Besides, it is not believed that therewere indeed earnest efforts made to patch up and/or reconcile the two feuding brothers,Gregorio and Augusto, both surnamed Hontiveros.

The submission of the plaintiffs that, assuming no such earnest efforts were made, thesame is not necessary or jurisdictional in the light of the ruling in Rufino Magbaleta, et al.,petitioner, vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Ganong, et al., respondents, No. L-44903, April 22, 1977,is, to the mind of this Court, not applicable to the case at bar for the fact is the rationale inthat case is not present in the instant case considering these salient points:

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a) Teodora Ayson, the alleged wife of defendant Gregorio Hontiveros and allegedly not amember of the Hontiveros Family, is not shown to be really the wife of Gregorio alsodenied in their verified answer to the amended complaint.

b) Teodora Ayson has not been shown to have acquired any proprietary right or interest in

the land that was litigated by Gregorio and Augusto, unlike the cited case of Magbaletawhere it was shown that a stranger to the family acquired certain right;

c) In the decision rendered by the appellate court no mention was made at all of the nameof Teodora Ayson as part-awardee of Lot 37 that was adjudged to Gregorio other thanhimself who was therein described as a widower. Moreover, Teodora was nevermentioned in said decision, nor in the amended complaint and in the amended motion forjudgment on the pleadings that she ever took any part in the act of transaction that gaverise to the damages allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs for which they now claim somecompensation.

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing premises, the Court orders, as it herebyorders, the dismissal of this case with cost against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but their motion was denied. 7Hence, thispetition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contend:

I. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED IN DISMISSINGTHE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND THAT IT DOES NOT ALLEGEUNDER OATH THAT EARNEST EFFORTS TOWARD A COMPROMISE

WERE MADE PRIOR TO THE FILING THEREOF AS REQUIRED BYARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED IN NOTDENYING THE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ANDORDERING A TRIAL ON THE MERITS.

Private respondents raise a preliminary question. They argue that petitioners should have brought this caseon appeal to the Court of Appeals since the order of the trial court judge was actually a decision on themerits. On the other hand, even if petition for certiorariwere the proper remedy, they contend that thepetition is defective because the judge of the trial court has not been impleaded as a respondent.8

Private respondents' contention is without merit. The petition in this case was filed pursuant to Rule 45 ofthe Rules of Court. As explained inAtlas Consolidated Mining Development Corporation v. Court ofAppeals:9

Under Section 5, subparagraph (2)(e), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the SupremeCourt is vested with the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal

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or certiorarias the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders oflower courts in all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. A similarprovision is contained in Section 17, fourth paragraph, subparagraph (4) of the JudiciaryAct of 1948, as amended by Republic Act No. 5440. And, in such cases where onlyquestions of law are involved, Section 25 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines

implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in conjunction with Section 3 of Republic Act No.5440, provides that the appeal to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petitionfor certiorariwhich shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The rule, therefore, is that direct appeals to this Court from the trial court on questions oflaw have to be through the filing of a petition for review on certiorari. It has been held that:

. . . when a CFI (RTC) adjudicates a case in the exercise of its originaljurisdiction, the correct mode of elevating the judgment to the Court ofAppeals is by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of error, involving merelythe filing of a notice of appeal except only if the appeal is taken in

special proceedings and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowedunder the law, in which even the filing of a record on appeal is additionallyrequired. Of course, when the appeal would involve purely questions oflaw or any of the other cases (except criminal cases as stated hereunder)specified in Section 5(2), Article X of the Constitution, it should be taken tothe Supreme Court by petition for review oncertiorariin accordance withRules 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court.

By way of implementation of the aforestated provisions of law, this Court issued on March9, 1930 Circular No. 2-90, paragraph 2 of which provides:

2. Appeals from Regional Courts to the Supreme Court. Except incriminal cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusionperpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to theSupreme Court only by petition for review on certiorariin accordance withRule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Actof 1948, as amended, this being the clear intendment of the provision ofthe Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken bypetition forcertiorariwhich shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules ofCourt.

Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that hereinpetitioner adopted the correct mode of appeal in G.R. No. 88354 by filing with this Courtpetition to review oncertiorarithe decision of the Regional Trail Court of Pasig in Civil CaseNo. 25528 and raising therein purely questions of law.

In Meneses v. Court of Appeals, it was held: 10

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It must also be stressed that the trial court's order of 5 June 1992 dismissing thepetitioner's complaint was, whether it was right or wrong, a final order because it had putan end to the particular matter resolved, or settled definitely the matter therein disposed ofand left nothing more to be done by the trial court except the execution of the order. It is afirmly settled rule that the remedy against such order is the remedy of appeal and

not certiorari. That appeal may be solely on questions of law, in which case it may betaken only to this Court; or on questions of fact and law, in which case the appeal shouldbe brought to the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Murillo v. Consul, the appeal to this Courtshould be by petition for review on certiorariin accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules ofCourt.

As private respondents themselves admit, the order of November 23, 1995 is a final order from which anappeal can be taken. It is final in the sense that it disposes of the pending action before the court and putsan end to the litigation so that nothing more was left for the trial court to do. 11Furthermore, as thequestions raised as the questions of law, petition for review on certiorariis the proper mode of appeal.These questions are: (1) whether after denying petitioners' motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial

court could dismiss their complaint motu propriofor failure to comply with Art. 151 of the Family Code whichprovides that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it appears from thecomplaint, which must be verified, that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but thesame have failed; and (2) whether Art. 151 applies to this case. These questions do not require anexamination of the probative value of evidence presented and the truth or falsehood of facts asserted whichquestions of fact would entail. 12

On the other hand, petitioners contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint when no motionto that effect was made by any of the parties. They point out that, in opposing the motion for judgment onthe pleadings, private respondents did not seek the dismissal of the case but only the denial of petitioners'motion. Indeed, what private respondents asked was that trial be held on the merits.

Of course, there are instances when the trial court may order the dismissal of the case even without amotion to that effect filed by any of the parties. In Baja v. Macandog, 13this Court mentioned these cases,to wit:

The court cannot dismiss a case motu propriowithout violating the plaintiff's right to beheard, except in the following instances: if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial;if he fails to prosecute his action for unreasonable length of time; or if he fails to complywith the rules or any order of the court; or if the court finds that it has no jurisdiction overthe subject matter of the suit.

However, none of these exceptions appears in this case.

Moreover, the trial court itself found that "judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate not only for the factthat [private respondents] in their answer . . . specifically denied the claim of damages against them, butalso because of the [rule] . . . that the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof.. . . " Necessarily, a trial must be held.

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Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides: 14

Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, orotherwise admits the material allegation of the adverse party's pleadings, the court may, onmotion of the party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of

marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always beproved.

Under the rules, if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed, the trial courthas the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party. 15When thereare actual issues raised in the answer, such as one involving damages, which require thepresentation of evidence and assessment thereof by the trial court, it is improper for the judge torender judgment based on the pleadings alone. 16In this case, aside from the amount of damages,the following factual issues have to be resolved, namely, (1) private respondent Teodora Ayson'sparticipation and/or liability, if any to petitioners and (2) the nature, extent, and duration of privaterespondents' possession of the subject property. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied

petitioners' motion for judgment on the pleadings.

However, the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint on the ground that, although it alleged thatearnest efforts had been made toward the settlement of the case but they proved futile, the complaint wasnot verified for which reason the trial court could not believe the veracity of the allegation.

The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over thesubject matter of the complaint. The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure anassurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct. If the court doubted the veracity of theallegations regarding efforts made to settle the case among members of the same family, it could simplyhave ordered petitioners to verify them. As this Court has already ruled, the court may simply order thecorrection of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that theends of justice may be served. 17Otherwise, mere suspicion or doubt on the part of the trial court as to thetruth of the allegation that earnest efforts had been made toward a compromise but the parties' effortsproved unsuccessful is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Only if it is later shown that such effortshad not really been exerted would the court be justified in dismissing the action. Thus, Art. 151 provides:

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear fromthe verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have beenmade, but that the same have failed. It if is shown that no such efforts were in fact made,the case must be dismissed.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under theCivil Code.

Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit isnot exclusively among the family members. Citing several cases 18decided by this Court, petitioners claimthat whenever a stranger is a party in the case involving the family members, the requisite showing theearnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory. They argue that since private respondent Ayson is

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admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the requirements of Art. 151 ofthe Family Code.

We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner MariaHontiveros as plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision,

the phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendantsand descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. 19As this Court held in Guerrero v.RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI: 20

As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayonthat the enumeration of"brothers and sisters" as member of the same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law."In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also"brother-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of thesame family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumerationof "members of the family," we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the mater.Consequently, the court a quoerred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-

law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards acompromise before filing the present suit.

Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in thisjurisdiction. 21Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as thespouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse ofpetitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes ofArt. 151.

Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of Art. 151 of the Family Code on the ground that it in effectamends the Rules of Court. This, according to them, cannot be done since the Constitution reserves infavor of the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules of pleadings and procedure. Considering theconclusion we have reached in this case, however, it is unnecessary for present purposes to pass upon thisquestion. Courts do not pass upon constitutional questions unless they are the very lis motaof the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order, dated November 23, 1995 of the Regional TrialCourt of Iloilo City, Branch 25 is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to the trial court for furtherproceedings not inconsistent with this decision.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Puno, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

Hontiveros vs RTCHontiveros vs. RTCGR No. 125465, June 29, 1999

FACTS:

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Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against privaterespondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are the owners ofa parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the fi ling of theland registration case. In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged thatGregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of

and income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of theproperty in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trialcourt denied petitioners motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged that earnest effortstowards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.

ISSUE: WON the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards acompromise as stated in Article 151.

HELD:

SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as

petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under this provision, the phrase members of thesame family refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, andbrothers and sisters whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are notgiven any legal effects in this jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros are regardedas strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.

APRIL MARTINEZ, FRITZ DANIEL MARTINEZ and MARIA OLIVIA MARTINEZ,petitioners, vs.RODOLFO G. MARTINEZ, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorariof the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SPNo. 59420 setting aside and reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30,in Civil Case No. 00-96962 affirming, on appeal, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) ofManila in Civil Case No. 164761 (CV) for ejectment.

The Antecedents

The spouses Daniel P. Martinez, Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcelof land identified as Lot 18-B-2 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 54334, as well as thehouse constructed thereon.[2]On March 6, 1993, Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will and Testament[3]directingthe subdivision of the property into three lots, namely, Lots 18-B-2-A, 18-B-2-B and 18-B-2-C. He thenbequeathed the three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr.; Manolo wasdesignated as the administrator of the estate.

In May 1995, Daniel, Sr. suffered a stroke which resulted in the paralysis of the right side of his body.Natividad died on October 26, 1996.[4]Daniel, Sr. passed away on October 6, 1997.[5]
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On September 16, 1998, Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September15, 1996, where the latter appears to have sold Lot 18-B-2 to Manolo and his wife Lucila .[6]He alsodiscovered that TCT No. 237936 was issued to the vendees based on the said deed of sale. [7]

Rodolfo filed a complaint[8]for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT No. 237936 againsthis brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC. He also filed a criminal complaint

for estafa through falsification of a public document in the Office of the City Prosecutor against Manolo,which was elevated to the Department of Justice.[9]

On motion of the defendants, the RTC issued an Order[10]on March 29, 1999, dismissing thecomplaint for annulment of deed of sale on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the actionsince there was no allegation in the complaint that the last will of Daniel Martinez, Sr. had been admitted toprobate. Rodolfo appealed the order to the CA.[11]

On October 4, 1999, Rodolfo filed a Petition with the RTC of Manila for the probate of the last will ofthe deceased Daniel Martinez, Sr.[12]

In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate

the property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file acomplaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They alleged that they were theowners of the property covered by TCT No. 237936, and that pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.1508, the matter was referred to the barangayfor conciliation and settlement, but none was reached. Theyappended the certification to file action executed by the barangaychairman to the complaint.

In his Answer[13]to the complaint filed on October 11, 1999, Rodolfo alleged, inter alia, that thecomplaint failed to state a condition precedent, namely, that earnest efforts for an amicable settlement ofthe matter between the parties had been exerted, but that none was reached. He also pointed out that thedispute had not been referred to the barangaybefore the complaint was filed.

On October 20, 1999, the spouses Martinez filed an Amended Complaint in which they alleged that

earnest efforts toward a settlement had been made, but that the same proved futile. Rodolfo filed hisopposition thereto, on the ground that there was no motion for the admission of the amended complaint.The trial court failed to act on the matter.

The spouses Martinez alleged in their position paper that earnest efforts toward a compromise hadbeen made and/or exerted by them, but that the same proved futile.[14]No amicable settlement was,likewise, reached by the parties during the preliminary conference because of irreconcilable differences.The MTC was, thus, impelled to terminate the conference.[15]

On February 21, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the spouses Martinez. The falloofthe decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff. The defendant, includingany person claiming right under him, is ordered:

1) To vacate the subject premises;2) To pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 a month starting July 17, 1999, the date of

last demand until he vacates the same;3) To pay the sum of P10,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and
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4) Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[16]

The trial court declared that the spouses Martinez had substantially complied with Article 151 of the

Family Code of the Philippines[17]

based on the allegations of the complaint and the appended certificationto file action issued by the barangaycaptain.

Rodolfo appealed the decision to the RTC. On May 31, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment affirmingthe appealed decision. He then filed a petition for review of the decision with the CA, alleging that:

1. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND WITHOUTMERIT THE DEFENSE OF PETITIONER THAT THERE IS NO ALLEGATION IN THECOMPLAINT THAT PETITIONER HAS UNLAWFULLY WITHHELD POSSESSION OF THEPROPERTY FROM RESPONDENTS A REQUIREMENT IN [AN] UNLAWFUL DETAINERSUIT.

2. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT

PETITIONERS POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IS BY MERE TOLERANCE OFRESPONDENTS.

3. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT THERESPONDENTS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION.

4. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH DID NOTRESOLVE THE SIXTH ISSUE, TO WIT, Whether or not this Court has jurisdiction over this caseconsidering that the allegations in the complaint makes out a case of accion publiciana.

5. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH HAS NOJURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.

6. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT THEMANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF CONCILIATION HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH.

7. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THATTHERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAYLAW.

8. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH FOUND THAT THEPENDENCY OF CIVIL CASE NO. 98-91147 AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 99-95281,INVOLVING THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS AND INVOLVING THE SAMEPROPERTY DID NOT DIVEST THE MTC OF AUTHORITY TO DECIDE THE CASE.

9. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC WHICH GRANTED THERELIEF PRAYED FOR BY THE RESPONDENTS.

10. THE RTC ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MTC.[18]

On November 27, 2003, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and reversing the decision ofthe RTC. The appellate court ruled that the spouses Martinez had failed to comply with Article 151 of the
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Family code. The CA also held that the defect in their complaint before the MTC was not cured by the filingof an amended complaint because the latter pleading was not admitted by the trial court.

Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration of the said decision, the spouses Martinez filed thepresent petition for review on certiorari, in which they raise the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATION TO FILE ACTION AND THE ALLEGATIONS IN THECOMPLAINT THAT THE CASE PASSED [THROUGH] THE BARANGAY BUT NO SETTLEMENT WASREACHED, ARE SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE TO PROVE THAT, INDEED, EARNEST EFFORTS WERE,IN FACT, MADE BUT THE SAME HAVE FAILED PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDINGTHAT THERE WAS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENT PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE

151 OF THE FAMILY CODE, CONSIDERING THAT ONE OF THE PARTIES TO A SUIT IN THIS CASE ISNOT A MEMBER OF THE SAME FAMILY.[19]

The petitioners alleged that they substantially complied with Article 151 of the Family Code, since theyalleged the following in their original complaint:

2. In compliance with P.D. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay,this casepassed [through] the Barangay and no settlement was forged between plaintiffs and defendant as a resultof which Certification to File Action was issued by Barangay 97, Zone 8, District I, Tondo, Manila. xxx(Underscoring supplied)[20]

Further, the petitioners averred, they alleged in their position paper that they had exerted earnestefforts towards a compromise which proved futile. They also point out that the MTC resolved to terminatethe preliminary conference due to irreconcilable difference between the parties. Besides, even before theyfiled their original complaint, animosity already existed between them and the respondent due to the lattersfiling of civil and criminal cases against them; hence, the objective of an amicable settlement could nothave been attained. Moreover, under Article 150 of the Family Code, petitioner Lucila Martinez had nofamilial relations with the respondent, being a mere sister-in-law. She was a stranger to the respondent;hence, there was no need for the petitioners[21]to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code.

The petition is meritorious.

Article 151 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from theverified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the samehave failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were, in fact, made, the case must be dismissed.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.

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The phrase members of the family must be construed in relation to Article 150 of the Family Code, towit:

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;(2) Between parents and children;(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.

Article 151 of the Family code must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule.Hence, a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration.[22]

As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectaclethan a litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be madetoward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family and it is knownthat a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers.[23]

Thus, a partys failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a complaint against afamily member would render such complaint premature.

In this case, the decision of the CA that the petitioners were mandated to comply with Article 151 ofthe Family code and that they failed to do so is erroneous.

First. Petitioner Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law, was one of the plaintiffs in the MTC.The petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the respondent:

As regards plaintiffs failure to seek a compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case, Art. 222 ofour Civil Code provides:

No suit shall be filed ormaintained between members of the same family unless it should appear thatearnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to thelimitations in Article 2035.

It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this provision applies to suits filed or maintainedbetween members of the same family. This phrase, members of the same family, should, however, beconstrued in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which:

Family relations shall include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parent and child;(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;(4) Among brothers and sisters.

Mrs. Gayon is plaintiffs sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch asnone of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217which should be construed strictly,
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it being an exception to the general ruleand Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party inthe case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiffs failureto seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.[24]

Second. The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 of the Family Code

because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent forunlawful detainer in the Katarungang Pambarangay, in compliance with P.D. No. 1508; and that, after dueproceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at, resulting in the barangaychairmans issuance of acertificate to file action.[25]The Court rules that such allegation in the complaint, as well as the certificationto file action by the barangaychairman, is sufficient compliance with article 151 of the Family Code. It bearsstressing that under Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, no complaint involving any matter within theauthority of the Luponshall be instituted or filed directly in court for adjudication unless there has been aconfrontation between the parties and no settlement was reached.[26]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59420 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan TrialCourt of Manila, as affirmed on appeal by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30, in Civil Case No.

164761(CV) is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Martinez vs MartinezMartinez vs MartinezGR No. 162084, June 28, 2005

FACTS:

Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land. The formerexecuted a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3 lots bequeathed to each of

his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of the estate), and Daniel Jr. In October1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September1996 where it appears that the land was sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila and was also issued to them.Rodolfo filed a complaint against his brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila for the annulment of the deedof sale and cancellation of the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him to vacate the property whichthe latter ignored and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detaineragainst Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the barangay for conciliation and settlement but none wasreached. It was alleged in the position paper of the spouses that earnest efforts toward a compromise hadbeen made but the same proved futile.

ISSUE: WON spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code.

HELD:

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verifiedcomplaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the same have failed.

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Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar. The petitioner isnot a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the respondent. Her relationshipwith the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article 150. It should also be noted that thepetitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 because they alleged in their complaintthat they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for unlawful detainer in the katarungan

Pambarangay in compliance with PD1508 and that after due proceedings, no amicable settlement wasarrived at resulting in the barangay chairmans issuance of a certificate to file action.

Martinez vs. Martinez G.R. No. 162084 June 28, 2005

Facts: The spouses Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land as well as the house constructed thereon.Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will and Testament directing the subdivision of the property into three lots. Hethen bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr. Manolo wasdesignated as the administrator of the estate.

Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father, where the latter appears to have sold toManolo and his wife Lucila. Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT

against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC. RTC dismissed the complaint forannulment of deed of sale on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action since therewas no allegation in the complaint that the last will of Daniel Martinez, Sr. had been admitted to probate.Rodolfo appealed the order to the CA.

In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate theproperty. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file acomplaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They alleged that they were theowners of the property. The spouses Martinez alleged in their position paper that earnest efforts toward acompromise had been made and/or exerted by them, but that the same proved futile. No amicablesettlement was, likewise, reached by the parties during the preliminary conference because of

irreconcilable differences.

Issue: Whether or not the certification to file action and the allegations in the complaint that the casepassed through the barangay are sufficient compliance to prove that earnest efforts were made.

Ruling: The petition was granted. As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is difficult to imagine a sadderand more tragic spectacle than litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that everyeffort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in thefamily and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than betweenstrangers

Thus, a partys failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a complaint against afamily member would render such complaint premature.

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Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010

JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ALMA RAMOS WORAK, MANUEL T. RAMOS, JOSEFINA R. ROTHMAN,SONIA R. POST, ELVIRA P. MUNAR, and OFELIA R. LIM,Petitioners,vs.DANILO PANGILINAN, RODOLFO SUMANG, LUCRECIO BAUTISTA and ROLANDOANTENOR,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint1for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a companyowned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners. By Decision2of April 15, 2005,the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered Ramos and the company to pay the aggregateamount ofP1,661,490.30 representing their backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentiveleave pay.

The Decision having become final and executory and no settlement having been forged by the parties, theLabor Arbiter issued on September 8, 2005 a writ of execution3which the Deputy Sheriff of the NationalLabor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos name covered by TCT

No. 38978, situated in Pandacan, Manila (Pandacan property).

Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy thejudgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution.4Respondents, however,averred that the Pandacan property is not the Ramos family home, as it has another in Antipolo, and thePandacan property in fact served as the companys business address as borne by the companysletterhead. Respondents added that, assuming that the Pandacan property was indeed the family home,only the value equivalent to P300,000 was exempt from execution.

By Order5of August 2, 2006, the Labor Arbiter denied the motion to quash, hence, Ramos and thecompany appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiters Order.

Ramos and the company appealed to the Court of Appeals during the pendency of which Ramos died andwas substituted by herein petitioners. Petitioners also filed before the NLRC, as third-party claimants, aManifestation questioning the Notice to Vacate issued by the Sheriff, alleging that assuming that thePandacan property may be levied upon, the family home straddled two (2) lots, including the lot covered byTCT No. 38978, hence, they cannot be asked to vacate the house. The Labor Arbiter was later to deny, byDecision of May 7, 2009, the third-party claim, holding
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that Ramos death and petitioners substitution as his compulsory heirs would not nullify the sale at auctionof the Pandacan property. And the NLRC6would later affirm the Labor Arbiters ruling, noting thatpetitioners failed to exercise their right to redeem the Pandacan property within the one 1 year period oruntil January 16, 2009. The NLRC brushed aside petitioners contention that they should have been given afresh period of 1 year from the time of Ramos death on July 29, 2008 or until July 30, 2009 to redeem the

property, holding that to do so would give petitioners, as mere heirs, a better right than the Ramos.

As to petitioners claim that the property was covered by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains and assuch only Ramos share can be levied upon, the NLRC ruled that petitioners failed to substantiate suchclaim and that the phrase in the TCT indicating the registered owner as "Ernesto Ramos, married to JuanitaTrinidad, Filipinos," did not mean that both owned the property, the phrase having merely describedRamos civil status.

Before the appellate court, petitioners alleged that the NLRC erred in ruling that the market value of theproperty was P2,177,000 as assessed by the City Assessor of Manila and appearing in the documentssubmitted before the Labor Arbiter, claiming that at the time the Pandacan property was constituted as the

family home in 1944, its value was way below P300,000; and that Art. 153 of the Family Code wasapplicable, hence, they no longer had to resort to judicial or extrajudicial constitution.

In the assailed Decision7of September 24, 2008, the appellate court, in denying petitioners appeal, heldthat the Pandacan property was not exempted from execution, for while "Article 1538of the Family Codeprovides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as afamily residence, [it] did not mean that the article has a retroactive effect such that all existing familyresidences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior tothe effectivity of the Family Code."

The appellate court went on to hold that what was applicable law were Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code,hence, there was still a need to either judicially or extrajudicially constitute the Pandacan property aspetitioners family home before it can be exempted; and as petitioners failed to comply therewith, there wasno error in denying the motion to quash the writ of execution.

The only question raised in the present petition for review on certiorari is the propriety of the Court ofAppeals Decision holding that the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free fromattachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon aparticular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and hisheirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.9

Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc.10lays down the rules relative to the levy on execution over the familyhome, viz:
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No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such.There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by anunmarried head of a family. It must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot onwhich it is situated. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or theconjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latters consent, or on the

property of the unmarried head of the family. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at thetime of its constitution, the amount ofP300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas.

Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All familyhomes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such byoperation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and areprospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long asany of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family home is madeanswerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to

August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially orextrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code. (emphasis supplied)

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies basedon when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or hissuccessors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.

If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, thenit must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231and 233 of the Civil Code.11Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petitionbefore the courts and the registration of the courts order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where theproperty is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 24212of the CivilCode and involves the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry ofProperty. Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtorfrom availing of the privilege.

On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it wasconstituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 15413actually resides therein. Moreover,the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by onespouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certainamounts depending upon the area where it is

located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 15514forwhich the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988.1avvphi1

And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family Code, it is not sufficient that the personclaiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must beset up and proved.15
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In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, oras early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutelyno proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos family home,the laws protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners. Parenthetically, the records show that thesheriff exhausted all means to execute the judgment but failed because Ramos bank accounts 16were

already closed while other properties in his or the companys name had a lready been transferred,17

and theonly property left was the Pandacan property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS vs. DANILO PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010

Facts:

Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company

owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the

company to pay the respondents back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave

pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of

the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos name

situated in Pandacan.

Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from execution to satisfy

the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution. Respondents argued

that it is not the family home there being another one in Antipolo and that the Pandacan address is actually

the business address. The motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC.

Issue:

Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.

Ruling:

Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law

applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgmentdebtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable. If the family home

was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been

constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil

Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242 governs extrajudicial constitution.
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On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,

1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time

it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually reside therein.

Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or ifexclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not

exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which

the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable

must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved.

In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3,

1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being

absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted as the Ramos

family home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan

property valid.


Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990

JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner,vs.HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER ABELLAN-SALINAS, JUANITOCULAN-CULAN and DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA respondents.

Josefina Brandares-Almazan for petitioner.

ABC Law Offices for private respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue in this petition is whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damagesmay be satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.

The facts are undisputed.

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On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09218entitled"Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.,"the dispositive part of which read as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal should be, as it is hereby, reversed and setaside. Judgment is hereby rendered finding the defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and

Benito Malubay jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants as hereinbelow set forth.Accordingly, defendants-appellees are ordered to pay jointly and severally to:

1. Plaintiffs-appellants, the Salinas spouses:

a. the amount of P30,000.00 by way of compensation for the death of their son AudieSalinas;

b. P10,000.00 for the loss of earnings by reason of the death of said Audie Salinas;

c. the sum of P5,000.00 as burial expenses of Audie Salinas; and

d. the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.

2. Plaintiffs-appellants Culan-Culan:

a. the sum of P5,000.00 for hospitalization expenses of Renato Culan- Culan; and

b. P5,000.00 for moral damages.

3. Both plaintiff-appellants Salinas and Culan-Culan, P7,000.00 for attorney's fees andlitigation expenses.

All counterclaims and other claims are hereby dismissed. 1

The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional TrialCourt of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants JoseModequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag, Davao del Sur.

On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao delSur containing an area of 600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value ofP7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office ofthe Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan,

Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value of P24,130.00 and assessedvalue of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-08-01848 registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in theoffice of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. 2

A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo allegingtherein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment

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under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, andthat the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of thoseenumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the agricultural land although it is declared in thename of defendant it is alleged to be still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the originalpossessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority was not approved by the proper

government agency. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.

In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration thereofwas filed by defendant and this was denied for lack of merit on September 2, 1988.

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorariwherein it is alleged that the trial court erred and acted inexcess of its jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion to quash and/or to set aside levy on the propertiesand in denying petitioner' motion for reconsideration of the order dated August 26, 1988. Petitionercontends that only a question of law is involved in this petition. He asserts that the residential house and lotwas first occupied as his family residence in 1969 and was duly constituted as a family home under theFamily Code which took effect on August 4, 1988. Thus, petitioner argues that the said residential house

and lot is exempt from payment of the obligation enumerated in Article 155 of the Family Code; and that thedecision in this case pertaining to damages arising from a vehicular accident took place on March 16, 1976and which became final in 1988 is not one of those instances enumerated under Article 155 of the FamilyCode when the family home may be levied upon and sold on execution. It is further alleged that the trialcourt erred in holding that the said house and lot became a family home only on August 4, 1988 when theFamily Code became effective, and that the Family Code cannot be interpreted in such a way that all familyresidences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupancy prior to theeffectivity of the said Code and that they are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurredbefore the effectivity of said Code; and that it also erred when it declared that Article 162 of the FamilyCode does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:

Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by anunmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, andthe land on which it is situated.

Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it isoccupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of itsbeneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exemptfrom execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extentof the value allowed by law.

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it isoccupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially asrequired in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home ascontemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interestbefore extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.

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Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:

Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachmentexcept:

(1) For non-payment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and otherswho have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home assuch, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.

In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family homewhether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law onlyunder Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of theFamily Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle onAugust 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).

The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied bypetitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that"the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions areapplicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all

existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of theiroccupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment ofobligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existingfamily residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and areprospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 doesnot state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited No. The debt orliability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident onMarch 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall underthe exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.

As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made bythe sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

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SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Medialdea, JJ., concur. Grio-Aquino, J., is on leave.

OSE MODEQUILLO vs. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS,

G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990

Facts:

The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July

1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong

Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur also registered in the latters name. A motion to quash was filed by the

petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the

commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Article

152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to beenforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is

alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and

applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a

family home by operation of law under Article 153.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

Ruling:The petitioners contention that petitioner and his family should consider it a family home from the

time it was occupied in 1969 is not well taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the

provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.

It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family

residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to

the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred

before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the

time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the

benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The debt and liability, which was the basis of

the judgment, was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions

from execution provided in the Family Code.


Manila

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THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97898 August 11, 1997

FLORANTE F. MANACOP, petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC., respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued beforethe effectivity of the Family Codebe executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of said Code?

State of the Case

This is the principal question posed by petitioner in assailing the Decision of Respondent Court ofAppeals1in CA-G.R. SP No. 18906 promulgated on February 21, 1990 and its Resolutionpromulgated on March 21, 1991, affirming the orders issued by the trial court commanding theissuance of various writs of execution to enforce the latter's decision in Civil Case No. 53271.

The Facts

Petitioner Florante F. Manacop2and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a 446-square-

meter residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00.3

The property, located inCommonwealth Village, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, is covered by Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. 174180.

On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Merchantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitionerand F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila tocollect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his companyentered into a compromise agreement with private respondent, the salient portion of whichprovides:

c. That defendants will undertake to pay the amount of P2,000,000.00 as and when their

means permit, but expeditiously as possible as their collectibles will be collected. (sic)

On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromiseagreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. On July 15, 1986,private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted on September 23,1986. However, execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on severalvehicles and other personal properties of petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt,

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these chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issuedby the sheriff.

On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of executionand to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not yet

executory. They alleged that the compromise agreement had not yet matured as there was noshowing that they had the means to pay the indebtedness or that their receivables had in fact beencollected. They buttressed their motion with supplements and other pleadings.

On August 11, 1989, private respondent opposed the motion on the following grounds: (a) it wastoo late to question the September 23, 1986 Order considering that more than two years hadelapsed; (b) the second alias writ of execution had been partially implemented; and (c) petitionerand his company were in bad faith in refusing to pay their indebtedness notwithstanding that fromFebruary 1984 to January 5, 1989, they had collected the total amount of P41,664,895.56. OnSeptember 21, 1989, private respondent filed an opposition to petitioner and his company'saddendum to the motion to quash the writ of execution. It alleged that the property covered by TCT

No. 174180 could not be considered a family home on the grounds that petitioner was alreadyliving abroad and that the property, having been acquired in 1972, should havebeenjudicially constituted as a family home to exempt it from execution.

On September 26, 1989, the lower court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution and theprayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner and his company. Finding that petitioner andhis company had not paid their indebtedness even though they collected receivables amounting toP57,224,319.75, the lower court held that the case had become final and executory. It also ruledthat petitioner's residence was not exempt from execution as it was not duly constituted as a familyhome, pursuant to the Civil Code.

Hence, petitioner and his company filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorariassailingthe lower court's Orders of September 23, 1986and September 26, 1989. On February 21, 1990,Respondent Court of Appeals rendered its now questioned Decision dismissing the petitionfor certiorari. The appellate court quoted with approval the findings of the lower court that: (a) thejudgment based on the compromise agreement had become final and executory, stressing thatpetitioner and his company had collected the total amount of P57,224,319.75 but still failed to paytheir indebtedness and (b) there was no showing that petitioner's residence had been dulyconstituted as a family home to exempt it from execution. On the second finding, the Court ofAppeals added that:

. . . . We agree with the respondent judge that there is no showing in evidence thatpetitioner Maacop's residence under TCT 174180 has been duly constituted as a familyhome in accordance with law. For one thing, it is the clear implication of Article 153 that thefamily home continues to be so deemed constituted so long as any of its beneficiariesenumerated in Article 154 actually resides therein. Conversely, it ceases to continue assuch family home if none of its beneficiaries actually occupies it. There is no showing inevidence that any of its beneficiaries is actually residing therein. On the other hand, theunrefuted assertion of private respondent is that petitioner Florante Maacop had already

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left the country and is now, together with all the members of his family, living in WestCovina, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

Petitioner and his company filed a motion for reconsideration of this Decision on the ground thatthe property covered by TCT No. 174180 was exempt from execution. On March 21, 1991, the

Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Resolution denying the motion. It anchored its rulingon Modequillo v.Breva,4which held that "all existing family residences at the time of the effectivityof the Family Code are considered family homes and areprospectivelyentitled to the benefitsaccorded to a family home under the Family Code."

Applying the foregoing pronouncements to this case, the Court of Appeals explained:

The record of the present case shows that petitioners incurred the debt of P3,468,000.00from private respondent corporation on February 18, 1982 (Annex "A", Petition). Thejudgment based upon the compromise agreement was rendered by the court on April 18,1986 (Annex "C", ibid). Paraphrasing the aforecited Modequillo case, both the debt and the

judgment preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Verily, the caseat bar does not fall under the exempti

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