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PERSONALANDPROFESSIONALENCOUNTERSWITHHAZARDSINCONTEXT:THECHALLENGEOFAMBIGUITY1JamesK.MitchellEmeritusProfessorofGeographyRutgersUniversity

Abstract Changesintheproblemsaddressedandthemodesofinterpretationemployedbyonehazardresearcherduringalengthyprofessionalcareerareidentifiedandanalyzed.Theseillustrateanongoingdialoguebetweenpersonalexperienceandprofessionalengagementthatmovestowardsbroaderframingofproblemsandincreasedsynthesisoffindingsovertime.Thistrendparallelsthegeneralevolutionofinterdisciplinaryhazardresearchinrecentdecades.Theemergenceofambiguityasastudyproblemthatrequiresurgentattentionisdiscussedagainstabackgroundofburgeoninghazardsandinadequateprogresstowardsthereductionoflosses,aswellasanincreasinglypermeableboundarybetweentheknowledgeofexpertsandlaypersons.Conceptsofencounterandcontextareidentifiedaspromisingrubricsunderwhichresearchersmightundertakeanexpandedengagementwithhazardsandexamplesoftopicsontheauthor’scurrentinquiryagendaareprovided.KeyWords:Disaster;Decision-making,Knowledge;Experience;Interpretation;Chance;Synthesis;Geography

1Basedonapresentationatthe9thMagrannSymposium,DepartmentofGeography,RutgersUniversity,March2,2016.Thispaperdrawsheavilyonmypersonalexperiencesofhazard,butIammindfulofthemajorintellectualdebtsowedtoagreatmanycolleaguesandstudentswhoshapedmyunderstandingofhazards.InadditiontothefoundationalcontributionsofGilbertWhite,BobKatesandIanBurtonIhavebeeninspiredby,andborrowedfrom,awiderangeofotherresearchers.Theyinclude(inalphabeticalorder):DavidAlexander;RogerBalm;GregBankoff;KentBarnes;StephenBender;JornBirkmann;KarlButzer;MonalisaChatterjee;ArthurChiu;ChipClarke;CraigColten;LouiseComfort;SusanCutter;IanDavis;MarlaEmery;KenFoote;MaureenFordham;MickeyGlantz;JohnHandmer;JeanneHerb;KenHewitt;JimJeffers;TerryJeggle;RogerKasperson;CharlesKelly;KevinKenan;JimKendra;HowardKunreuther;AllanLavell;MarianaLeckner;RobinLeichenko;RagnarLofstedt;AndrewMaskrey;RobMason;MarkMauriello;MelanieMcDermott;JohnMiller;TomMitchell;MarkMonmonier;JoanneNigg;TonyOliver-Smith;LauraOlson;KarenO’Neill;RisaPalm;ChristianPfister;RogerPilkeJr.;RutherfordH.Platt;FrankPopper;DavidRobinson;ClaireRubin;BillSolecki;RichardSylves;JohnTiefenbacher;JuhaUitto;PeterWacker;MarvinWaterstone;JimWescoat;TomWilbanks;BenWisner;YuanchangZheng; andDoracieZoleta-Nantes.

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Introduction DuringahalfcenturyofstudyIhaveassessedthehumandimensionsofnaturalhazardsanddisastersfrombothpersonalandprofessionalperspectives.Thispapercastslightontheinterplaybetweenthesedifferentrealmsofexperience.Itisorganizedaroundtheconceptsofencounterandcontext,twotermswidelyemployedbyhazardresearchersandmanagersbutrarelysubjecttoanalysis.Bothoftheseexpansiveconceptsdeservegreaterattentionbecausetheyencourageself-awarenessamonginvestigatorsandilluminatethehighdegreetowhichhazardsaremultifacetedproblems.Bysodoingtheyopenupthediscursivespacetoalargerco-constituencyofexpertsandlaypersons,whichisanecessarypreconditionfordevisingsuccessfulwaysoflivingwithworseningevents.(Mitchell2017)Herein,examplesofmypersonalencounterswithcontextualizedhazardsareprovidedandlinkedtobroaderscholarlydiscourse.Thenatureofintellectualinquiryissuchthatthereisahighprobabilityaresearcher’soutlookwillchangeovertime,hopefullyinthedirectionofgreaterunderstandingandwiserdecisionmaking,thoughneitherisaguaranteedoutcome.Itisimportantforthoseofuswhoareinvolvedintheenterpriseofhazardreductiontorecognizesuchshiftsandtoexplainwhytheymayhaveoccurred.EncountersandContexts Encountersareunexpectedengagementsamongpeopleandriskyenvironmentsthatarepotentiallydestabilizingforboth.Inthispaperthefocusisonhumanconfrontationswithextrememeteorological,hydrologicalandgeologicalevents,thoughotherkindsofconfrontationsarealsoimplied.Encounterswithsucheventsaresociallymediatedanddeeplyinfluencedbythecontextsinwhichtheyoccur.Contextsareframesofreferencethataccommodateandexplaintheinterrelationsofpartsandwholes.Amongothers,contextualfactorsoftime,space,placeandculturestronglytemperuniversalizingtheoriesofhazardandmodifyprescriptionsforaction. Whilethispaperdoesnotpretendtobeanexhaustivetreatmentofencounterasanintellectualconstruct,useofthetermisintendedtounderscoretheprovisionalandoftenreflexivenatureofresponsestohazardsthatarepromptedbythedynamiccontextsinwhichtheyoccur.Mixesofnewexperiencesandunfamiliarchallengesaretypicalofencounterswithhazardsanddisasters,especiallyinthepresentincreasinglymobileanddisruptedworld.Togainamorecompletepictureofhumanresponsestohazarditisnecessarytounderstandbothencounterswithextremeeventsandthecontextsthatframethoseencounters;neitherisofsovereignimportance. Theconceptofencounterhasreceivedlittleanalyticscrutinyfromhazardsresearchersthoughitissometimesemployedforpurposesofexposition(Aleschetal2001;Dasgupta,SirinerandSarathi2010;McCosker2013;GibbsandWarren2014;Reser,BradleyandUllul2014)Incontrast,historiansandothersocial

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scientistsmakeextensiveuseofencounterasapointofentrytoexplanationsofhowcertaingroupslegitimateandprivilegetheirworldviewsoverthoseofcompetingothers.(Livingston1994;Withers1999;Douglas2014;Barua2015;Beneito-Montagut2015;Wilson2015;ValentineandHarris2016)Thishasmajorimplicationsforhazardsresearchersbecausecontrolofpublicdiscoursein,andabout,situationsofhazardisamajordeterminantofsubsequentactions.2Afewhazardsscholarswithinterestsintheapplicationofscientificknowledgetopublicpolicyhaveprobedtheroleofcontextindecision-makingbutthatliterature,too,isscanty3.(Mitchell,DevineandJagger1989;Mitchell1999;Palm1990;Cutter1996;Collins2008;Druckers,FrerksandBirkmann2015).Incontrast,encounterandcontextarewidelyacceptedtaken-for-grantedconceptsthatroutinelyinformtheworkofemergencymanagementprofessionals.(U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity2013;Governor’sHurricaneConference2017) Victims,helpersandbystanderstospecificeventsencounterhazardsdirectly,whereasresearchersusuallyencounterthemindirectlyasobjectsofstudy.Forsomehumansasingleencounterwithanextremeeventmaydominatebutindividualsandgroupstypicallytakepartinasequenceofencounterswithdifferenteventsatdifferenttimesthattogetherinformanevolvingtrajectoryofexperiences.4(Mitchell2010)Individualandserialencountershaveapowerfulformativeeffectonexpertandlayinterpretationsofhazardthat,inturn,playimportantrolesinshapingpublicpolicies. Amongsocialscientistsitiscustomarytoregardhazardsasaclassofrelatedevents,varyinginmagnitudeandfrequencybutsufficientlysimilartopermitgeneralizationsthatareusefulguidestoaction.Conversely,thereisalsovaluetotreatingeachmajorhazardeventasauniqueoccurrence,which–forsomeaffectedpopulations–itis.Thehistoryofnaturalhazardsanddisastersispepperedwithreferencestospecificeventsthatbecamepivotsofchangeforconceptualizingandpolicy-making.(e.g.theNorthSeafloodofFebruary1953;theIsewantyphoon,1959;hurricaneKatrina,2005;SuperstormSandy,2012)(Bos,Ullbergandt’Hart2005;Birkland2006)Perhapsbecausegreatdisastersarerelativelyinfrequent,themostrecentoneoftenbecomesthestandardforplanningresponsestothenext.(WachtendorfandKendra2006;EwingandSynolakis2011)Yetthemultiplicityoffactorsthataffectrisk,vulnerability,andresiliencemoreorlessensuresthatnotwohazardseventswillbethesame,especiallyasexperiencedinhumanencounters.

2Anextensivebodyofliteratureonriskcommunicationsprovidesvaluableinsightsaboutmechanismsthatsteerpublicdiscoursebutusuallydoesnotaddressissuesofprivilegeandlegitimation.(KaspersonandKasperson2005)3Anappreciationofcontextisfundamentaltobeingagoodgeographeroragoodhistorian,somethingthatisparticularlyvisibleintheworkofecologically,historicallyandculturally-orientedscholarsandthosewhoareinterestedintheprocessofsynthesis.(Butzer1982;NationalResearchCouncil1997;Atkins,SimmonsandRobert1998;Gober2000;Janku,SchenkandMauelshagen2012)4Processesof“improvisation”and“emergence”arerelatedphenomenathatsignaltheappearanceofnewresponses.(WachtendorfandKendra2006;Provitolo,Dubos-PalliardandMuller,2011)

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Differingexperiencesandinterpretationsbyexpertsandlaypeoplegreatlycomplicatethetaskofcreatingeffectivepublicpoliciesformanaginghazards.Thoughforensicresearchintheaftermathofdisastersmayhelptosortoutthevaryinginterpretationsitisusuallytoolittleandtoolatetomakeadifferencetodecisionsaboutrecoveryandmitigationthatotherwisetendtobestronglydrivenbyexpediencyandalreadyvestedinterests.(Burton2010) Itisworthwhilenotingthattheconjunctionofencounterandcontextraisesquestionsthatgobeyondthescopeofthispaperbutarenonethelessimportanttosignalforfutureinquiry.Chiefamongtheseistheroleofexperienceindecision-makingabouthazard.(Lindell2013)Experiencesareinscribedinhumansbydirectexposuretoextremeeventsandindirectlybyinformationacquiredthroughformaleducationaswellasfolkwisdom,massmediareportsandtheaccountsofothers.Ithasalsobeenconjecturedthatexperiencesmaybeacquiredbyexposuretosimulationsofrealworldevents(e.g.virtualreality)(Mitchell1997)Thoughoftendebated,theprecisewaysinwhichmentalinscriptiontakesplaceandtheeffectsofwhatisrememberedondifferentkindsofdecisionsandactionsarestillunclear.(Kates,1976;LowenthalandPrince1976;Ittelson,FranckandO’Hanlon1976;Mitchell2000;Bos,Ullbergandt’Hart2005;Tidballetal.,2010;Bohensky2015)Findingsbygeographersanddecisionscientistssuggestthathumans,whenrecallingfrommemory,assessextremenaturaleventsdifferentlythanatthetimeoftheiroccurrence.(Slovic2007;Kahneman2011;Kunreuther,SloviandOlsen2014)Moreover,thecontextsinwhichdecisionsaremadearenotnecessarilythesameasthoseinwhicheventsareexperiencedorwhentheyarecommittedtomemory.Forexample,duringdisasterrecovery,actors,assumptionsandtimingaredifferentfordecisionsaboutgrandstrategycomparedwithdecisionsaboutimmediateoperationsorlongtermplanning(Berger,KouskyandZeckhauser2008;DonovanandOppenheimer2014;Platt2015)Inotherwords,bothforindividualsandgroups,encounterisamulti-phaseandmultifacetedprocess.Bearingthesemattersinmind,letusturntospecificexamplesofencounterdrawnfromtheexperienceofthishazardsresearcher.Youthfulencounterswithhazards Apartfromoccasionalmildsnowstorms,mychildhoodinNorthernIrelandwaslargelyfreeofdamagingeventstriggeredbynaturalextremes.Theearliestrememberedsuchencounterwasasafouryearold,inJuly1947,viewingawar-surplusmilitaryassaultbridgethatservedasatemporaryreplacementforanancientstonestructurewashedawaybyrecentfloods.(MeteorologicalOffice1949.p.31)Parentsexplainedthecircumstancesoftheoldbridge’sdemiseandthesubsequentpublicresponse,alsoconveyingtheexpectationthatmatterswouldeventuallyreturnto“normal”,whenapermanentreplacementwasconstructed.Foralongtimethereafterwecheckedonprogresstowardsthathoped-forstate.Although,notrecognizedassuchatthetime,wewereineffectmakingsenseoftheexperiencebyapplyingaprimitiveEvent-Effects-Consequencesmodelofhazard.(Rossietal1983;Katesetal.1985;KaspersonandPijawka1985)

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Afewotherextremenaturaleventsoccurredduringthesubsequentdecadeincludingaseverestormin1953thatinflictedwidespreaddamagearoundtheNorthSeaanddrowned133peopleonaferryboatcrossingfromScotlandtoIreland.(Hall2013)Thoughthestormproducedrecord-breakingdamageelsewhereandeventuallyledtothemassiveDeltaProjectthatclosedoffmouthsoftheRiverRhine,Iwasmostengagedbyitsconsequencesforthepeopleofmyhometown.OnthedayitoccurredIwasamongthestadiumcrowdwatchingaprofessionalsoccermatchandwasgreatlyimpressedbytheflurryofactivitythatfollowedapublicaddressmessagedirectingmilitaryandemergencyservicespersonnelamongthespectatorstoreturntotheirbasesfordeploymentinanattemptedrescueofpassengersontheferry.InlateryearsIwastolearnthatmassmediareportingofdisastershasalsotendedtoamplifytheimportanceoflocaleventsoverdistantonesofsimilar(orgreater)magnitude.(KaspersonandKasperson2005)However,theadventofwidelyavailablenewelectroniccommunicationstechnologiesappearstobediminishingthiseffect(YanandBissell2015) Gradually,thereaccumulatedabasiclayerofpersonalhazardexperiencesbuttheyweredisconnectedfromanylargerexplanatorysystem.TothelimitedextentthatIpossessedprinciplesforunderstandinghumanresponsestonaturalhazardstheywereculledfromgeneraleducation,includingfoundationaltextsaboutlanguage,history,religionandsocialscience.Forexample,highschoollessonsaboutancientGreekculturesuppliedanumberofhelpfulideas,whoseimplicationswereonlypartiallyrecognizedandabsorbedatthetime.Amongothers,theseincluded:(1)theinevitabilityofchangeinsocietiesandenvironments(cf:HeraclitusofEphesus);(2)theinherentimperfectionsofhumanknowledgeabouttheexternalworld(cf:Plato’scave);and(3)thetemptationtodownplayevidencethatisatvariancewithwidelyacceptedtheories.(cf:theProcrusteanbed).(Roochnik2004)Fromtheseandothersourcesitgraduallybecameclearthathumansexistinthefaceofenvironmentaluncertaintiesthatoftenelicithubrisaboutourcapacitiesforunderstandingandacting. DuringundergraduateyearsinNorthernIreland,myacquaintancewithfloods,storms,droughtsandthelikewaslargelyconfinedtotextbooksandlectures;therewerefewdirectencounterswithnaturalhazardevents.InUniversitycoursework,hazardswereapproachedobliquelyasmarginaltopicsinthestudyofearthprocessesandasvenuesthatdisplayedsocioculturalpractices.Forexample,underthetutelageoffacultygeomorphologistsIwitnessedtheresultsofanunusualbogburstthatchokedtheGlendunvalleywithdebrisandlearnedtorecognizethescarsofoldlandslidesonacoastalhighway.(Colhoun,CommonandCruickshank1965;Stephens1997;Stewart2014.)Amongthemanycontributionsofmymajorprofessor,EstynEvans,toculturalgeography,wastheobservationthatfolkhousingincoastalareasofIrelandincludedtiedownmeasurestoprotectroofsagainsthighwinds.(Evans1957;Nolan,O’ReillyandCarthaigh2015,p.7)Inthehandsofadifferentkindofscholarthisfindingmighthaveopenedthedoortosystematic

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analysisofhumanadjustmentstonaturalrisksbutEvans’primaryinterestslayelsewhere. DespiteapaucityofextremenaturaleventsinIreland(Mitchell2011),encounterswithotherkindsofdisruptions,mostlysocialortechnological,werereadilyavailabletoserveasabasisforassessingenvironmentalrisksandhazards.Forexample,asateenagercyclingthroughthecountryside,Icameuponatraincollisionwithinminutesofitsoccurrence.(IrishTimes1959)Theimpactdemolishedanautomobilethathadbeenparkedacrossthetrack,derailedseveralcoachesandtrappedtheseverelyinjuredlocomotivedriverinhiswreckedcab.Walkingamongthetrainpassengersprovidedthefirstofseveralsubsequentopportunitiestowitnessthemixtureofshock,disbeliefandpurposiveactionbyvictimsthataretypicalofimmediatehumanresponsestorapidlyoccurringdisasters.Lookingbackonsuchexperiences,Inowconcludethatitismisleadingtoidentifyemergencyservicespersonnelas“firstresponders”;inmostcasesthattitlerightlybelongstothosedirectlyimpactedbydisasters,whoaretheinitialagentsoftheirownsalvation. Insummary,earlychildhoodinterpretationofhazardsinvolvedgradualremovaloftheselffromthecenteroftheexplanationtotheperipheryandtheintroductionofcompetingperspectivesthatreflectedincreasingawarenessofmoreremoteeventsrepresentedinthemassmediaandtheeducationalcurriculum.Later,directandindirectexperienceofahandfulofextremenaturalevents,buildingfires,episodesofviolenceassociatedwithacampaignmountedbypoliticaldissidentsintheIrishRepublicanArmy(1956-62),andtransportationaccidents,allprovidedgristforthemillandservedastemplatesforunderstandingthreateningdeparturesfromnormality.Thislaidthegroundworkformyadultacceptancethathumanagencyisnotconfinedto“man-made”hazardsbutmightcontributetoapparently“natural”onesaswell.AdultencountersintheUSAandbeyond In1965IcametotheUnitedStatesasagraduatestudentintendingtostudyurbangeographyandplanning.Whileembarkedonthatcourse,hazardskeptpoppingupinunexpectedcontexts.Thefirstwasachanceencounterdaysafterarrivinginthecountry.AfellowpassengeronthetraintakingmeintotheU.S.interiorwasonhiswaybacktoaGulfCoasthomethathebelievedhadbeendamagedbyhurricaneBetsy(September1965).Hepassedthetimenotjustbyexpressinganxietyaboutthedestructionhemightfindbutalsobyofferingapessimisticassessmentofhisprospectsforreceivingreliefaid.HeallegedthatpoorAfrican-Americanvictimswouldgetpreferentialtreatmentoverpeoplelikehim,awhiteman,therebysignalinghisperceptionofaninvidiousrelationshipbetweenracialidentityandlosssusceptibility.Itwouldbeseveraldecadesmore,notuntiltheadventofHurricaneKatrina(2005),beforeformalsocialandrace-centeredexplanationsofdisasterfullyemergedintheprofessionalliterature.(Cutter2006;HartmanandSquires2008;Cannon2011).

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Chancehasbeenanimportantconceptinstatisticalstudiesofhazardevents,andvarioussystemsfor“taming”chance,especiallybymeansofprobabilitystatisticalprocedures,havecontributedtothedevelopmentofhazardpredictionsystemsandinsuranceasariskspreadingmechanism.(Hacking1990;Bernstein1998)Buthazardsscholarshavealsoacknowledgedthatentirelyunpredictableevents(i.e.surprises)alsooccur,introducingunforeseenconsiderationsintodecisionmakingandoftenconfoundingexistingsystemsformanaginghazard.(KatesandClark1996)Theconceptionsofhazardsasestimablerepeateventsandhazardsasuniqueunrepeatableonesareantithetical;theymaybebestthoughtofasparalleltrackstowardunderstanding.Atleasttwosurpriseshaveinfluencedmypersonalandprofessionaldevelopment. First,inJanuary1967,myplansfordoctoraleducationwereradicallyreorientedwhenanunexpectedblizzardshutdownChicagoonthedayIhadstoppedofftoscoutthepossibilityofenrollingattheUniversityofChicagoasageographyPh.D.student.TheonlyfacultymemberwhomadeitintothedeeplysnowboundDepartmentofGeographythatmorningwasGilbertWhite,thediscipline’smajorexponentofhazardsstudies.(Hinshaw2006)Wehadalengthyconversationthatreinvigoratedmynascentinterestinhazardsandleftmethoroughlyconvincedthatherewasafieldwithanunbeatablesuiteofmerits–intellectualchallenge,socialusefulness,andemotionalengagement-overseenbyaremarkablementor.IhadnotarrivedinChicagowiththeintentionofembracinghazardsresearchasacareerbutdepartedfirmlycommittedtothatplan. ThesecondnotablechanceencounteroccurredadecadelaterwhenthecommercialaircraftonwhichIwastravelingtoattenda(hazards-focused)conferencecrashedduringtakeoffinDenver.(NationalTransportationSafetyBoard1977)Notonlydidthiseventprovideaveryintimatewindowintohumanthoughtandbehaviorunderconditionsofextremestress,italsoilluminatedtheexistenceofgapsbetweenplannedresponsestohazardandactualbehaviorasreflectedbyvariousshortfallsintheemergencymanagementsystem.Whentheopportunityarose,Ibecameanenthusiasticparticipantinquick-responsestudyteamsestablishedundertheaegisoftheNationalAcademyofSciences,CommitteeonNaturalDisasters.Thesefieldinvestigationsrevealedthevalueofdirectparticipantobservationofongoinghazards,underscoredthepotentialforabruptdisjunctiveevents,andincreasedmyawarenessofcognitivedissonanceasanimportantconsiderationintheinterpretationofhazardevents.5(Dzialek2013;Beasley2016)

5Cognitivedissonancetheoryarguesthathumanstypicallychangetheirassessmentsofconflictedsituationsbyvariousmentalroutines,inordertomanagetensionsthatmightotherwiseparalyzedecision-making.Butthepresenceofenduringcontradictions,likefearofdestructionandwillingnesstoresideinplacesthatarerecognizedasbothhighlyriskyandhighlydesirable,showsthatmanypeopleaccommodatethesetensionsratherthanresolvingthem.

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Intheinterim,onceembarkedongraduatestudyinChicago,thenumberandvarietyofencounterswithhazardeventsandenvironmentsquicklymountedup.6Amongotherstheyincluded:studytripstoplacesthatexperiencedhighlevelsofnaturalriskandtheresearcherswhostudiedthem(e.g.SouthernLouisiana);asummerspentinterviewingwatersystemmanagersaboutfloodinganddroughtissuesinmunicipalitiesscatteredaroundthecountry(e.g.Atlanta,Omaha,Waterloo,Muskegon);andlastbutnotleast,adoctoraldissertationthatinvolvedinterviewswithresidentsoffiveeastcoastUSAcommunitiesaffectedbyshoreandbeacherosion.(Mitchell1974) Theseandotherencounterswereapproachedwiththedistinctivesetofquestionsandinvestigativetoolsthathascometobeidentifiedwiththe“Chicagoschool”ofhazardresearch.(Penning-Rowsell1999)UnderGilbertWhite,studentswereencouragedtoselectpracticalproblemsfacedbyhazardmanagersaspointsofdeparturefortheirinquiriesratherthangroundingtheminideasprimarilydrawnfromacademictheory.Theperceptions,actionsandexperienceofordinarylaypeopleatriskprovidedmuchoftheevidenceemployedtoanswertwomainstrategicquestionsthatguidedinquiry:“Howdohumansmakechoicesamongavailableresponsestotheperceivedrisksandhazardsofuncertainenvironments?”and“howcanbetterinformationaboutrisksandresponsesimprovedecision-makinginsupportofreducinglosses?”(Burton,KatesandWhite1974)Workinthisparadigmwashighlyproductiveandfindingshadagooddealtodowiththecreationandimprovementofvariouspolicymeasuresincluding,amongothers,theNationalFloodInsuranceProgram7andtheeventualfoundingofascienceofsustainability.(Cohen2006)Later,attheurgingofscholarswithinterestsintheareaofdisastersanddevelopment,twoadditionalquestionswereaddedtothebroadhazardsresearchagenda:“Whyarehazardousplacesdisproportionatelyoccupiedbymarginalgroupswithlimitedaccesstoresourcesforprotection?Howdosocietalinstitutionsreproduceconditionsofhazard?”(Hewitt1983;Wisneretal1994)MostofmyearlyinvestigationsfittedcomfortablyintothisextendedresearchtraditionandWhite’semphasisonexpandingtherangeofchoiceavailabletohumanshasbeenenduringlyinfluential.(Mitchell2008b) Oncegraduatedandhiredasanewlyminteduniversityprofessor,myopportunitiesforencounterswithhazardsmultipliedfurther.Insucceedingdecadesthegreatmajorityofencounterswerewithcoastalstormsandriverinefloodsbuttherewereimportantexceptionsforotherkindsofeventsincludingtechnologicalrisks(e.g.nuclearradiation)andsocialhazards(e.g.terrorism).6Thisunderscoresanimportantdifferencebetweentheinformationperspectivesofexpertsandlaypeople.Experts(e.g.researchers)deliberatelyemployfocusedsearchesforselectiveevidencewhereaslaypersonsdrawonheterogeneousbodiesof(theirown)unbiddenexperience.7InthecaseoftheNFIP,Whiteandhisco-workerseventuallycametoquestionthewayinwhichsomeoftheseresearchfindingsandrecommendationswereimplemented.Failuretotiefloodinsurancepremiumstorisklevelswasoneprominentexample,thatappearstohaveencouraged-ratherthandissuaded,increasedoccupationofhazardousfloodplains.RecenteffortstoreformtheNFIP,halfacenturyafteritscreation,maybemovingtocorrectthisdeficiency.

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(Cutter,Brosius,BarnesandMitchell1979;Mitchell1979;Mitchell1983;Mitchelletal2001;Mitchell2003aand2003b)MembershiponstudycommitteesoftheNationalAcademyofSciencesexposedmetootherdisciplinaryperspectivesonhazardandfacilitatedfieldinvestigationsthatgaveinsightsintothemanagementofmudflowhazardsontheedgeofmetropolitanLosAngelesaswellasnationwideissuesofmulti-hazardmanagement.(Campbelletal1982;Mitchelletal1983)TheAcademyalsoencouragedthenotionthatproperlyexecutedsciencemightprovidesoundguidanceonthemakingofpublicpolicythatisindependentofpolitical,economic,judicialandbureaucraticinfluences.(Jasanoff1990)Workwith“quickresponse”studyteamsprovidedrareaccesstostrickencommunitiesintheimmediateaftermathofspecificdamagingevents.Amongothers,wereplacesaffectedbythreePacificandAtlantichurricanes(Iwa,Iniki,Diane)andoneextra-tropicalstormofrecord-breakingproportionsintheUnitedKingdom.(Mitchell,DevineandJagger1989;Mitchell1994)Lessonslearnedincludedthemanywaysinwhichbuildingsandstructurescanfailduringextremeeventsandthevalueofsecuringperishableinformationabouthumanresponsesbeforeitbecomescontaminatedbypost-disasterexperience.Thesearemattersaboutwhichthefirsthandknowledgeoflaypersonswhoundergodisasterscanbeinvaluableasacounterweightto–overlytruncatedandreductionist-expertconceptionsaroundwhichpublicpoliciesarefrequentlyconstructed.(Mitchell,O’Neill,McDermottandLeckner2016) Studiesinnon-USAcommunitiesaffectedbyotherkindsofhazardsaddedfurtherbreadth(Minamata,Japan;Tangshan,China)bydemonstratingthatscientificknowledgeisnotafrictionlesscommodity,especiallywhenthetransferofexperienceamongplaceswithdifferentvernacularandscientificculturesisbeingundertaken.(Mitchell1996;Mitchell2008a)Althoughthereismuchtobegainedbyexchangingknowledgeabouthazardreductionpracticesthathaveworkedwellinsomecontexts,scholarsshouldbeundernoillusionsthatthisisaneasyprocessthatwillproducesimilarresultsinnewsettings.(Sorensen2000;Bijker2007)Toaddgreatertemporaldepth,Ibeganacontinuingprogramofvisitingthesitesofhistoricdisasterstoinvestigateresiduallong-termeffects.(e.g.Johnstown,Centralia,Galveston,TexasCity,BarHarbor,SanFrancisco,SantaBarbara,Pueblo,Hilo,Napier,Florence,Lisbon)Thesereexaminationsshowthat,althoughnaturaldisastersmaybeinstrumentalineffectinglarge-scalephysicaltransformationsofimpactedcommunitiesandlandscapes,thoseexperiencesare–atbest-onlyselectivelyandincompletelycelebrated,memorializedorotherwiseknowntosubsequentgenerations.(Foote2003)Moreover,localexperiencesandadjustmentsthatmighthavebroadapplicabilityarenotpassedontopopulationselsewherethatmighthavemadeuseofthem.(Mitchell2008a)Failuretoteachsucceedingpopulationsaboutexperiencesofrecoveryandregenerationdeprivessocietyofpositivehistoricallessonsandsapsconfidenceinthehumanpotentialtosuccessfullyconfrontfuturechallenges.(Mitchell2016a)Historicalstudieshaveofferedoneotheradvantage;theyoftenilluminatetheprocessoflong-termrecovery(i.e.yearstodecades),oneoftheleastexploredaspectsofresearchondisasters.Therebyattentionisdirectedtoshiftsinriskassessmentandtransformationsintheframingofhazardproblems

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asnewissuesarisewiththepassageoftimeanddifferentinterestgroupsdeveloparoundthem.(Mitchell2006;Mitchell2010;Mitchell,O’Neill,McDermottandLeckner2016) Notallencounteredhazardsoccurinconfrontationswithnaturalextremes.Astheprofessionalexperienceofscholarsaccumulatesweareoftenaskedtoundertakethedelicateandriskytaskofadvisingothersaboutappropriatepublicpoliciesandpractices.Onesuchencounterhadamajorimpactonmythinkingabouthazardduringthe1980sand1990s,andespeciallyabout,theappropriatenessofscientificresearchinstitutionsaslaunchingplatformsforthereductionofsocietalproblems.InthepresenterawhenwehavebecomeaccustomedtotheleadershipoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)insupportofenlightenedpolicymakingforthealleviationofclimatechangerisks,itissalutarytorecallthemuchlesseffectiveefforttomountaglobalprogramforthereductionofnaturaldisasterlossesthatwaseventuallyundertakenbetween1990and1999. TheUSNationalAcademyofSciencespreparedthegroundworkforanInternationalDecadeofDisasterReduction(IDNDR)bycreatinganAdHoccommitteetoexplorethefeasibilityofsuchaventureandtoscopeitsinitiallineaments.IwasprivilegedtoserveasChairofthatcommitteeandtooverseepreparationofadraftreporttotheAcademyleadership.Ourreportmaderecommendationsforacollaborativeprogramthatwouldfocusonmakingbetteruseofexistingavailablescientificinformationbyinterestgroupsthatwereinapositiontoeffectchange.ThereportwasneverpublishedanditsrecommendationswereignoredinfavorofadifferentsetofrecommendationsfromaformallycreatedAcademyCommittee.Thatgroupproposedamoreconventionalprogramofbasicandappliedscientificresearchaimedatcreatingnewhazardknowledgeandnewhazard-monitoringandresearchtechnologies.Mypublishedcritiqueoftheformalreportwasnotoptimisticaboutitsprospectsforsuccess.(Mitchell1988) Nonetheless,theproposedDecade(1990-1999)wentaheadunderthesponsorshipoftheUnitedNationsbutranintoseriousdifficultiesandhadtoberadicallyrestructuredin1994,largelyalonglinesadvocated,orimpliedby,theinitialdraftreport.(Hannigan2012)Whilemakingsomeprogress,theDecadeneverliveduptoitsinitialpromise.Thisexperienceunderlinedthedangersofrelyingtooheavilyontheguidanceoftheproducersofscientificknowledgetoachievehazardreductiongoalsandnotenoughoninputsfromthosewhouse,ormightuse,suchknowledgeinrealworldapplications.Theimportanceofpartnershipsbetweenknowledgeproducersandknowledgeusersisnowmorewidelyaccepted(Mitchell2006),thoughlaterdevelopmentssuggestthattherelationshipbetweenexpertknowledgeandlayknowledgeisundergoingtransformationsthatmayrequireevenmoredramaticreformulationsoffuturehazardreductioninitiatives.(Mitchell,O’Neill,McDermottandLeckner2016)

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AnEpiphany AbouthalfwaythroughmytenureatRutgersUniversity–in1991-92tobeexact–IspentayearasaFacultyFellowatwhatwasthencalledtheCenterfortheCriticalAnalysisofContemporaryCulture,nowtheCenterforCulturalAnalysis.<http://cca.rutgers.edu>Itwasastimulatingexperience,thoughnotonethatIwasverycomfortablewithatthetime.Butitdidallowmetobuildonaseriesof“whatif”experimentsthatIhademployedinEnglandwhileinvestigatingthegreat1987windstorm(Mitchell,DevineandJagger1989)anditgavelicensetodevelopadifferentapproachtostudyinghazards,anapproachthataddedideasfromthehumanitiestomytraininginthenaturalandsocialsciences. AfewyearslaterthisapproachcrystallizedwhilemywifeandIweredrivingonInterstate5insouthernCaliforniaheadingtowardsthecityofTijuana,Mexico.Justaswecameuponayellowandblackwarningsignthatportrayedagroupofadultsandchildreninflight8wewerelisteningtoaradioreportaboutthedeathsofillegalmigrantscaughtinthedesertfurthereastduringanunexpectedsnowstorm.(SeeLosAngelesTimes2002foraretrospectivesummaryofsimilarevents.)Thejuxtapositionofthetwostreamsofinformationwasstriking.Herewereagroupofvictimsofanextremeeventthatwereatthesametimealsobeingportrayedashazardstomotorists.Switchingbackandforthbetweenthetwonotionswasafeatofmentalgymnasticsbecauseitshiftedtheframesofreference,theassumptionsthatwentthemandtheprescriptionsforaction.Bothwerevalidviewsofreality,thoughquitedifferentintheirimplications.ItwasanillustrationofF.ScottFitzgerald’scommentaboutintelligenceas“…theabilitytoholdtwoopposedideasinmindatthesametimeandstillretaintheabilitytofunction”andareaffirmationofWaltWhitman’sobservationaboutacceptanceofcontradictions.9 AcoupleofdayslatertheinitialnotionwasreinforcedandextendedattheSanDiegoHistoryCenterinBalboaPark.Wehadgonetoseeanexhibitontheroleofdroughtsandfloodsinthecity’shistoryandnoticedatonepointthatthebuildingwasdistinctlyvibrating.ItwassituatedmoreorlessunderthelandingapproachtoLindbergfieldandtheapparentcauseofthevibrationswasnotanearthquake,asfirstfeared,butalowflyingpassengerjet.TheapproachintoLindbergfieldisoneofthemoredifficultintheUnitedStatesinpartbecausethelandsurfacedropsawayunevenlyunderthedescendingaircraftandtherearehighbuildingsneartheendofthemainrunway.Furthermore,theHistoryCenterwasvibratinginpartbecauseofitsconstructionasatemporaryexhibitatamajor1915ExpositionheldtocelebratetheopeningofthePanamaCanal.Theoriginalwood,stuccoandchickenwireframewassubsequentlypatchedupwhenlocalleaderstookafancytoitsSpanish-inspiredarchitectureandwantedtokeepit,butthepresentdaybuildingstillshowsevidence8Knownsimplyas“TheImmigrationSign”<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immigration_sign>ithasnowbecomeaniconic,frequentlyparodied,image.9“DoIcontradictmyself?Verywell,thenIcontradictmyself.Iamlarge.Icontainmultitudes”(LeavesofGrass1891-92)

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ofthisfantasybeginning,notleastadegreeoffragilityinthefaceofexternalshocks.(Amero2016)Soheretherewasaconvergenceofevidenceaboutplace-relatedhazardsofthepast(floods,droughts),thepresent(aircraftmishaps),thefuture(earthquake)andatimethathoveredsomewherebetweenthenandnow(buildingvulnerability);inshort,simultaneousmultiplecontextsofhazard.10 Theseandsimilarencounterswithcontradictionsofhazardthatconvergeintimeandspaceturnedmyattentiontoanewsetofquestionsthatstillpreoccupyme.Itbecameobviousthathumansreceivemanydifferentkindsofincommensurableinformationabouthazardsthatscientistshavetraditionallysegmentedandtreatedasspecializedtopicsinseparatesubfieldsofstudy.Whatifinsteadwefocusedonthemessybundlesofquestionsthatarefacedinreallife,theonesthatposethemostdifficulttestsofourexistingtheoriesandmethods?I’mreferringspecificallyheretosituationscharacterizedbyambiguity.Ambiguityinhazardassessmentandmanagement AmbiguityisawordthatcomesfromtheLatinambigeremeaning“towander”.Ambiguoussituationsarethosethathavemorethanonemeaningorhaveunstablemeanings.Someeconomistshaveemployedthetermnarrowlyinreferencetosituationswheredecision-makersareadversetouncertaintyborneofincompatibleinformationandtheyhavedevisedlogicalprocedurestogetaroundtheselimitations(HealandMillner2015);thispapertakesadifferenttackbyemphasizingthepervasivenessandfluidityofambiguityaswellastheunwillingnessofhumanstoforegobifurcatedthinking.InthisrespectitsharessimilaritieswithrecentproposalsbyAustralianinterdisciplinaryscientistsofclimatechangeforabroaderengagementwithpersistentambiguities.(FlemingandHowden2016) Therearemanykindsofambiguity;contradictionsandparadoxesamongthem.Ambiguitiesareembeddedinhumancultures,societies,institutionsandindividuals,whereintheyserveimportantfunctionsandareoftensignaledlinguistically.Forexample,humor,advertisingandtheconstructionofsymbolicidentitiesareallpremisedonnotionsofambiguity.Thus,allegoricaljokesabouthazard,suchas“theladyandthetiger,”arestaplesofacademicconferencesandgaintheirdiscursivepowerfrommultiplemeanings,unexpectedjuxtapositionsoftermsandsuddenshiftsinperspective11.(Johnson2015)Advertisingoftenturnsconventionalimagesofhazardontheirheadtoachievegoalsfardifferentfrom

10ForadiscussionthatsituatessimultaneitywithinthespatialdiscourseofGeographyandlinksittotheconceptofchance,seeMassey2005.11Althoughtherearemanyvariations,thebasicstoryhasrecentlybeensummarizedbyKeithJohnson(2015).Itscoreisadilemmaposedbyanabsoluterulertoacaptive.Thisinvolveschoosingtoopenoneoftwo(ormore)mysteriousdoorsbehindwhichcanbefoundeitheragreatreward(thelady)orsuddendeath(thetiger).Thestorycanbeadapted,fordifferentaudiences,toshowhowrationalchoiceprocessesmayleadtosurprisingoutcomes.

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thoseofhazardreduction;thereinhazardousphenomenaareemployedtosellluxurygoodstoconsumerswhoareencouragedtoassociatethemwithqualitiessuchasdynamism,grandeur,rarityandirresistiblepower,nottheconfused,destructiveanduntidycircumstancesthattypicallycharacterizerealworlddisasters.Artistsandliteraryfigurestoousehazardimageryforsymbolicpurposes,perhapstoencouragepeopletoquestionassumptionsandjudgmentsthatarenormallytaken-for-granted.Forexample,abrassplateembeddedinaliterarywalkoutsidetheSydneyOperaHousefeaturesDorotheaMackellar’sapprovinglinesaboutdroughts,famine,fire,floodingrains,terror(andbeauty)inapoetictributetoAustralia’snationalidentitythatmakesavirtueoutofwhat,formany,wouldbenegativeconnotations.(Mackellar1911) Ambiguitiesalsopermeatetheuniverseofhazardsmanagement;reportedfromfieldstudysitesandcommentedonbyhazardmanagersandhazardtheorists.Oneprominentexamplethathasgainedpublicattentionissociety’srelianceonclimatesciencetoprovidethemainbasisforclimatepoliciesatatimewhenpublictrustinscienceisincreasinglybeingcalledintoquestionbymanywhoinfluence,orareresponsiblefortaking,decisionstoreduceclimaterisks.(PewResearchCenter2016;Matthews2016)Halfadozenotherexamplesareillustrativeofthewiderangeofhazard-relatedambiguitiesthatexists.First,humansareoftendrawntoplaceswhereundesirableriskprocessesenhanceresidentialorrecreationaldesirability(e.g.crustalinstability;steepslopes;dynamiccoastsandotherwaterfrontsites).Second,protectiveregulationscanbeself-defeatingiftheyrobvulnerablepopulationsofthelearningexperiencesfromwhichknowledgeaboutriskisacquiredoriftheyencouragerisk-takingby(mistakenly)nurturinganillusionofcompletesafety(i.e.“moralhazard”).Third,privacyprotectionsthatareintendedtoshieldvulnerablepopulations(e.g.undocumentedmigrants)fromsurveillancebyofficialdomorthemassmediamayhinderthebuildingofinstitutionalmemoriesamonghelpingorganizations,therebydeprivingthemofdatathatareessentialtoeffectivelong-rangemitigationefforts.Fourth,organizationsthatpreserveandprotectheritagesitestypicallyshowcasestaticarchitectural,historicalandaestheticvalueswhileneglectingthejudiciousrisk-sensitivedecision-makingprocessesthatpermittedthoseplacestosurvive.(Mitchell2016a)Finally,wearetrainedtofocusonhowhumanslearnbutwealsoneedtotakeaccountofthepropensitytoforget(Mitchell2000),aprocessthatfrequentlyrenderswhathadoncebeencomprehensible,nowconfused.Inshort,wearesurroundedbyambiguitiesandcannotescapethem.PerhapsthemostprofoundambiguitythatbracketsourexistenceonEarthis:“Howcanimperfecthumansbestengageavariableplanetthatissimultaneouslylimiting,enablingandindifferent?”Whatistobedone? Togetherwithuncertaintyandcomplexity,ambiguityraisesverydifficultproblemsforhazardanalysts.(Renn,KlinkeandvanAsselt.2011)Butourunderstandingofambiguitylagswellbehindwhatweknowaboutuncertaintyandcomplexity.Itisnowtimetomountamorecomprehensiveinvestigationofhazard

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ambiguity.Inmyopinionthiswillbeaccomplishedbestbyopeningupthehazardsresearcharenatoawiderrangeofperspectives,assumptionsandinformationsourcesthanhavebeenemployedheretofore.Ambiguitiesareoftenabyproductofdifferencesofpositionalityandincompatibilitiesamongdifferentwaysofknowing.(IpandWu2015;Henderson2011)Successfullycopingwithhazardsinthefaceofsuchambiguitiesrequiresexplicitlyidentifyingthemanddevisingtoolstoaccommodatethemindecision-makingprocesses.Thiswillinvolveelevatingthesalienceofpresentlyneglectedtypesofknowledgethatresideintheartsandhumanitiesandamongvernacularpopulationsthatconfronthazardsdirectly.Notsimplyasinterestingadd-onstoexistingdecisionmakingsystemsbutasindependentandimportantdrivingforcesintheirownright.Thebenefitsofsodoingarenotrestrictedtoexpandingknowledgeinsupportofdecision-making.Givingstandingtoalternativeknowledgesystemscanalsocanhelptogreatlyexpandthepresentlyweakpublicconstituencyforhazardsmanagement,ataskthathasbeenpostponedfortoolongbyresearchers,educatorsandhazardsmanagers.(Mitchell2017) Theforegoingproposalwouldtakeresearchersintounchartedintellectualterritorysothereisaneedforrobustorientingconcepts.Inthesecircumstancesencounterandcontextarepromisingcandidatesforinclusion,notleastbecausetheyarerelationalconceptsthatarecompatiblewiththeprocessofknowledgesynthesisthathasbeensuchadistinguishingfeatureofcontemporaryresearchonmega-problemslikeglobalenvironmentalchangeandotherso-calledgrandchallenges.(IPCC2012;2014;NationalResearchCouncil2001;2005;2016)Itisalreadyclearthatthe21stcenturyisgeneratinghazardsthataremorenumerous,varied,damagingandunprecedentedthanheretoforeandthatthepaceofeffortstoreducethemisfallingbehind.(Mitchell2017)Withnoanticipatedletupinthespeedofenvironmentalandsocietalchanges,newhazardcontextswillcontinuetoemerge,settingthestageforaspateofnewencountersthatwilllikely,inturn,becomethedriversofnewpublicpolicies.Asthosewhohaveworkedinactivecircumstancesofhazardorongoingdisastersknow,encountersgenerateexperiencethatisanimportantcomponentofknowledgebutcontextusuallysetstheparametersofinterpretation.(Hyndman2001)Moreover,comparativecasestudiesareessentialtoprovideacheckagainstnaïveacceptanceoffieldevidencethatmaybeunrepresentativeorotherwisemisleading.(Brookfield1999) Myownresearchagendareflectstheseassumptions.Iamcurrentlyexploringthepotentialcontributionsofprofessionalgroupsthathaveeithernotplayedlargerolesintheformulationofhazardpolicies(e.g.historicpreservationists)orhaveworkedlargelyinisolationfromotherfieldsofexpertise(e.g.publichealthprofessionals).(Mitchell2016a)IamalsoseekingtoencouragetheuseofinnovativenewtoolslikeHealthImpactAssessmentthataredesignedtomergeknowledgecontributionsderivedfromhazard-focusedencountersbetweenlaypersonsandexperts.(Mitchell2016b)Iwouldliketoseetheextensionofhazardtheorybeyondideasaboutthevulnerabilityofpeopleandstructurestoincludethevulnerabilityofessentialsocietalfunctionslikelearning,performance,creativity

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andregulation–allofwhichcanbecompromisedorenhancedbyexposuretohazards,withunanticipatedconsequences.Iwouldalsoliketoseemoreattentiontoaestheticandemotionaldimensionsofhazardasrepresentedintheworkofartists,poetsandnovelistsandotherswhocreateandmodifynotionsofhazardthatpervadepopularculturewithunknownbutlikelyprofoundeffects.12Thepossibleagendaislongandwillevolvestillfurther. Environmentalhazardsareoneoftheworld’senduringproblems.Theyhavealwaysbeenpresent,documentedinthefootprintsofearlyhominidscrossingvolcanicashinEastAfrica,featuringinsomeofthefirstknownreligiousshrinesandatthecenterofepictalesofcreationanddestructionfromGilgameshtoAtlantis.Newhazardsemergeandoldoneswaneassocietiesintroducenewtechnologies,rearrangetheusesofenvironmentalresourcesanddiscoverdifferentwaysofbufferingourselvesagainstrisksandvulnerabilities.Butthecentralproblemremains:howtoachieveanacceptablefitbetweensocietyandenvironmentinthefaceofthreatsthatarisefromthejointactionsofrestlessHumanityandfluctuatingNature.Thereinventionofhazardresearchisacontinuingchallengeforusall.

12SomeinitialforaysinthisdirectionhaveappearedinthenewjournalGeohumanitiesbutmoreareneeded.(Tangney2015;Vickery2015;Kawanoetal2016;Philipps2016)

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