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Phalanx: WithstandingMultimillion-Node
BotnetsColin Dixon Arvind Krishnamurthy Tom
Anderson
University of WashingtonNSDI 2008
Why isn’t this a solved problem? Solved for static content
Replicate everywhere Large CDNs (Akamai, CoDeeN, Coral)
Potentially solved if we can replace all routers Promising “clean slate” academic research .
. . . . . but, pervasive bots require universal
deployment Unsolved for dynamic content on the
Internet today VoIP, e-govt, e-commerce, AJAX web apps,
etc. Can we use a pervasive set of machines
(i.e., a CDN) to solve the problem? Without changing every router?
Key Ideas
Tie fate of a server to a large part of the Internet
Goals Deployable – without changing all ISPs or all
routers Scalable – to terabit attacks w/millions of
attackers Mechanisms
Packet Mailboxes Secure Random Multipathing Filtering Ring
Let’s go design it!
Simple Proxy
Use nodes as proxies
They can make filtering decisions
Forward remaining traffic to server
How do they make filtering decisions?
Do we trust them?
How does the network know we trust them?
Mailbox
Use nodes as mailboxes
Hold each packet for an explicit request
Policy at destination
Don’t trust mailboxes
Explicitly express trust to the network
Still, any single node is vulnerable to attack
Secure Random Multipathing
Send traffic randomly among mailboxes
According to shared secret sequence
Secure Random Multipathing
Send traffic randomly among mailboxes
According to shared secret sequence
Botnet can take down one mailbox
Secure Random Multipathing
Send traffic randomly among mailboxes
According to shared secret sequence
Botnet can take down one mailbox
But communication continues
Secure Random Multipathing
Send traffic randomly among mailboxes
According to shared secret sequence
Botnet can take down one mailbox
But communication continues
Diluted attacks against all mailboxes fail
Secure Random Multipathing Sequence of mailboxes
Negotiate secret X at connection setup Construct a secret sequence based on X
x0 = h(X,X), xi = h(xi-1,X)
Use xi to name that packet and select mailbox
Also a lightweight authenticator Need a multipath congestion control
algorithm
Filtering Ring
Attackers can ignore the mailboxes and just attack the server
Need to drop unrequested traffic in the network
request/response framework signals the network
blacklist
whitelist
blacklist
whitelist
xi xi
blacklist
whitelist
xi
Filtering Ring
req: xi
data: xi
req: xi
data: xi
data: xi
req: xi
Connection Setup
So far, we protect established connections
How do clients initiate connections? Server issues “first packet” requests Mediate access to these requests
Computational puzzles (Portcullis-style) Per-computation fair queueing
Authentication tokens For small deployments w/known principals
Example
Get static content and applet from CDN (1)
Connection setup Get/solve puzzle
(2) Server issues first
packet request (3) First packet &
request paired and sent (4,5)
Server returns mailbox list and secret X (6)
Protected comm. (7)
Example
Get static content and applet from CDN (1)
Connection setup Get/solve puzzle
(2) Server issues first
packet request (3) First packet &
request paired and sent (4,5)
Server returns mailbox list and secret X (6)
Protected comm. (7)
Example
Get static content and applet from CDN (1)
Connection setup Get/solve puzzle
(2) Server issues first
packet request (3) First packet &
request paired and sent (4,5)
Server returns mailbox list and secret X (6)
Protected comm. (7)
Example
Get static content and applet from CDN (1)
Connection setup Get/solve puzzle
(2) Server issues first
packet request (3) First packet &
request paired and sent (4,5)
Server returns mailbox list and secret X (6)
Protected comm. (7)
Example
Get static content and applet from CDN (1)
Connection setup Get/solve puzzle
(2) Server issues first
packet request (3) First packet &
request paired and sent (4,5)
Server returns mailbox list and secret X (6)
Protected comm. (7)
Example
Get static content and applet from CDN (1)
Connection setup Get/solve puzzle
(2) Server issues first
packet request (3) First packet &
request paired and sent (4,5)
Server returns mailbox list and secret X (6)
Protected comm. (7)
Evaluation
Microbenchmarks on PlanetLab (see paper)
Simulation Based on gathered topology data PlanetLab node serve as stand in for server 7200 Akamai nodes as mailboxes Attacker bandwidth from BT measurements
(avg 3Mb)
Protection vs. Deployment
All mailboxes see less than 30% “goodput”
60% of mailboxes see no loss
20% of mailboxes see high loss
Even a moderate deployment (7200 10 Mb mailboxes and only the victim AS filtering) has huge benefit against large botnets (100k nodes)
Scalability
40% of mailboxes see no loss even vs. 4 mil. attackers w/36k mbxes
. . . but, a more significant deployment can deal with botnets an order of magnitude larger than those of today. 36,000 100 Mbit mailboxes.
Related Work
CDNs (Akamai, Coral, CoDeeN)
Capabilities (SIFF, TVA) Overlays (SOS, MayDay, Spread
Spectrum) Resource Proofs (Speak Up, Portcullis) Architecture (Secure-i3, Off By Default) Filtering (AITF, dFence, CenterTrack,
Pushback)
Wireless Frequency Hopping
Conclusions
Ties one server’s fate to the fate of the Internet
Scales to deal with attacks of today and tomorrow
Deployable Use CDN for mailboxes Use upstream ISP to install filtering ring
Server is in control Explicitly asks for each packet Implements it’s own policies locally Is not required to trust any given mailbox