Philo's Veneration for True Religion

8/7/2019 Philo's Veneration for True Religion

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Justin Vacula

M/C Philosophy

Dr. Reitsma

May 2, 2011

Philo's Veneration for True Religion and Abhorrence of Vulgar Superstition

In David Hume'sDialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the character of Philo, throughout the

text, levies powerful objections to belief in a god and responds with various rebuttals to theistic claims

seemingly taking the role of the philosophical skeptic who doubts the existence of any gods. Toward

the end of the text, Philo appears to take a cognitive shift and says that he has so little respect for this

suspension of judgment about the existence of God because be believes that proofs do appear on the

whole face of nature although he seemed to have been suspending or withholding belief in God

throughout the text (Bennett 55). To Philo, 'true religion' is belief in a God without making specific

claims about such god and 'true religion' is not common superstition, absurdity and impiety, and

degenerate morality. I think that some of Philo's views concerning morality and commonly practiced

religion are attractive, but I don't find his reasons displayed toward the end of the text (the enormous

display of planning in nature) (54) convincing enough to warrant belief in any sort of god and I don't

feel the need to evoke the terms 'God' or 'true religion' because Philo's conclusion, minus any sort of

belief in the supernatural, can be accounted for in non-theistic humanistic terms.

Throughout the text and more noticeably in the final part of the text, Philo mentions his disdain

toward 'common superstition' that many religious people embody that is not a part of 'true religion.'

One aspect of 'common superstition,' Philo notes, is seeing divine agency in everything, The most

careless, the most stupid, thinker sees everywhere a purpose, an intention, a design (54). 'Common

superstition,' Philo reasons, can't be good for society because history is so full of accounts of its

pernicious effects on public affairs while those embracing true religion, Philo notes, are silent, No


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period of time can be happier or more prosperous than those in which the religious spirit is never

honoured or heard of (57).

Philo regards absurdity and impiety as characteristics that are not present in 'true religion.' Philo

says that he his veneration for true religion is matched by [his] abhorrence of common superstitions

and that he gets a special pleasure out of pushing superstitions sometimes into absurdity, sometimes

into impiety. All bigots hate impiety more than they do absurdity, but they are often equally guilty of

both (57). Philo does not consider communing with God in order to gain favor as a characteristic of

'true religion,' Pleas for God's favour are generally understood to be either frivolous observances, or

rapturous ecstasies, or a bigoted credulity, and therefore not to reflect or to encourage moral

seriousness (58). Instead of adhering to what Philo has previously called 'vulgar superstition,' he

apparently embraces a philosophical and rational kind of religion (58) and says that worship that

goes beyond expressing one's knowledge that God exists is indeed absurd, superstitious, and even

impious (61).

Philo believes that morality can be accounted for without appealing to a divine entity and is

opposed to moral degeneracy that has no place in 'true religion.' Philo believes that the smallest grain

of natural honesty and benevolence has more effect on men's conduct than the most grandly inflated

views suggested by theological theories and systems (58). The chief restraints on mankind, Philo

says, are the solemnity and importance of the occasion, a concern for one's reputation, and reflection

on the general interests of society (60). This appraisal of reasons for moral behavior is in stark contrast

to what proponents of 'vulgar superstition' may endorse when they might say that a holy book and

God's commands are required for moral action and without such, one has no good reason to behave

morally. Philo notes that philosophers, who cultivate reason and reflection, have less need of such

religious motives to keep them under the restraint of morals (58).

Philo believes that theists who are not either fanatical or superstitious can still be plagued by


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religion, greatly weakening men's attachment to the natural motives of justice and humanity (59). If

religion becomes the focus of morality, instead of other concerns, Philo reasons, religionists' attention

would be diverted away from morality and raise up a new and frivolous sort of supposed merit, and

the preposterous way in which it distributes praise and blame (59). Philo notes that we needn't go

back in ancient times, or wander to remote places, to find instances of this degeneracy of religion

divorced from morality (58-59).

Philo notes that 'true religion' does not have the pernicious consequences that the 'common

religion' has and that the 'true religion' is rational and on solid philosophical ground much unlike

'vulgar superstitions.' Those who assent to the belief that the cause of the universe probably bears

resemblance to some intelligence that is like a human's, Philo believes, will find solace in this thought

and will naturally feel somewhat unnerved by the greatness of the object, that is, by the thought of the

cause of the universe (62). Philo believes that God revealed the truth of divine intelligence in nature

and that the realization of this is the first and most essential step toward being a sound, believing

Christian (62).

Philo believes that the foundation of true religion, how one comes to know that a divine

intelligence exists, is found through examination of nature; he states that a scientist today must indeed

be stubbornly obstinate if he can doubt that there is a supreme intellect (55). This can be met with

various objections, some of which that Philo raised earlier in the text, that may perhaps be defeaters to

acquiring knowledge of God through looking at the complexity of nature. The fact that something in

nature seems to be intricate and indicative of some sort of crafter does not entail that it indeed was.

Even if such complexity can't be explained, one is not warranted in believing that an intelligent being

must have designed it; lack of explanation does not entail that one is justified in believing that an

intelligent being had to have designed it this is an argument from ignorance.

Philo notes that 'true religion' can be rational and grounded on philosophy. This sounds


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appealing, but arguments for 'true religion,' besides a version of an argument from design, are not put

forth by Philo in the final part of this text. If we are to use philosophy to arrive at a justified true belief,

we should need more reason that a version of an argument from design that is rather weak. One can,

instead of buying into 'true religion,' be an apatheist, a person who isn't concerned with whether or not

any gods exist, much like people are not concerned or never look into issues such as fatalism, free will,

and causation or come to the conclusion that whether god exists or not has no effect on his/her behavior

(like Philo believes in regards to morality) and ground beliefs on a rational philosophy; belief in a god

is not necessary for one to be a rational individual or come to philosophical conclusions.

Thinkers can draw on philosophy to establish a rational basis for morality, like Philo mentioned,

and live a moral life without belief in any gods, so what makes 'true religion' attractive in this regard?

Theists should want their beliefs to be justified and rational, but they can't possibly adhere to 'true

religion' because, as Philo said, worship that goes beyond just knowing that God exists is superstitious

(61). Atheists, by definition, would not be attracted to 'true religion' because they don't believe in any

gods [unless Philo's version of god really isn't a supernatural being, but rather is something else].

Theists typically believe that God is necessary to account for an objective morality or to give one

reason to be moral at all, but if they can't make claims about the God of 'true religion,' there may be no

attraction.

People may be attracted to true religion' to distance themselves from fundamentalists and those

with 'vulgar superstitions.' A move like this is quite common because various well-known religious

personalities utter abominable phrases, act in an immoral fashion, and have skewed moral priorities that

a person may detest. A layperson of a particular faith may believe in a god, but will disagree with

others about specifics of the god, conclusions drawn from a holy book, and what actions should be

taken in the public square. When preachers such as Jerry Falwell announced that pagans, and the

abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays, and the lesbians... were to blame for September 11, 2001,


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for example, Christians may want to believe that he's not a 'true Christian and assert that their because

his beliefs are different than those of other believers, he's to be excluded from the 'group' (Falwell 1).

Pernicious comments and theological claims are not only limited to those who are quickly

written off as fundamentalists; noted and well-respected contemporary apologists such as William Lane

Craig argue that God has the authority to take away life and his commands to the Israelites to kill other

tribes in the Old Testament were perfectly moral. One of Craig's comments in a recent response to his

readers was, So whom does God wrong in commanding the destruction of the Canaanites? Not the

Canaanite adults, for they were corrupt and deserving of judgement. Not the children, for they inherit

eternal life. So who is wronged? (Craig 4). Religious persons may want to distance themselves from

Craig, but it's difficult to write off people like Craig because he's published various books, is generally

well-respected by theists, and frequently debates atheists. Can 'true religion' redeem a person?

This method of thinking that certain people are not 'really believers' because they disagree with

other believers is not rational because vulgar statements do not disqualify a person from being a

believer in God. 'True religion' can only successfully place one in a different category than others if one

were to say, I only believe in a god which I can make no claims about, but one can't honestly

masquerade as a theist under the guise of 'true religion' as espoused by Philo. I would wager that few

people like this exist today, and if they did, they would be nothing more than deists.

'True religion' may be attractive if one feels that belief in a god is warranted or wants to believe

in a god, but does not want to commit oneself to a specific religion. I'm not interested, though, in what

I'd like to believe to be true, but rather am only concerned in that which is justified through reason,

argument, and evidence, so I wouldn't just 'decide' to believe in Philo's version of God. If one were to

believe in a god but think that no claims can be made about it, 'true religion' would be a perfect fit.

Such a person, if dissatisfied with 'vulgar superstition' much like Philo is, can abhor the common

superstitions and venerate in true religion...but what is there really to venerate in other than 'I believe


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that a god exists, I can't make claims about said god, and commonly practiced religion is vulgar

superstition?'

Those who venerate philosophy and rationality, rather than any sort of belief in a supernatural

entity, can reach the same conclusions that Philo reaches about commonly practiced religion and

morality without supposing anything supernatural in the process and can, instead, subscribe to

philosophical naturalism. Such a person can agree with Philo's well-formed arguments against gods

throughout the majority of the text and feel philosophically liberated. If people don't need to believe in

god to be moral, find a community, fit into society, or have a sound philosophy, what is the point of

belief in any gods (and what is the purpose of 'true religion')? Atheists can look at Philo's views,

subtract the supernatural element, and be satisfied. Theists, though, may have a more difficult time

accepting Philo's conclusions.

Authors of other texts have rejected 'vulgar superstition' and have proposed their own version of

religion, or rather have used religion as a catch-all phrase to espouse a worldview (yet one that has no

supernatural element). Mark Mathabane in his book Kaffir Boy in America writes, The best religion, I

concluded, is one that helps people become more loving of their brethren, more understanding, more

tolerant, more caring, more helpful. It manifests itself in deeds, in earnest attempts to lead a virtuous

life, and not in hypocrisy, moral expediency, and power struggles. It certainly is not a prescription

given out each Sunday morning to solve uneasy consciences (Mathabane 254). Mathabane understood

the 'vulgar superstitions' that were elements of Christianity and various religious people and rejected

belief in the supernatural, yet he still persisted in using the phrase religion. Perhaps Philo, even if he

still believed in a supernatural entity, used the term 'true religion' similar to how Mathabane did when

he mentioned 'the best religion.'

I find Philo's arguments in earlier parts of the text, his naturalistic account of morality, and his

abhorrence of commonly practiced religion to be quite attractive because I agree with many of his


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accounts, but I don't espouse his supernaturalistic view. I find no major quarrel, other than a simple

disagreement about whether a supernatural entity exists with those who would hold Philo's ideas

concerning 'true religion,' but do find much quarrel, as Philo does, with those of 'vulgar superstitions,

especially those who causes harm to society. If all religious persons were of the 'true religion,' the

world would indeed be a much better place, although certainly not a utopia, one would think, because

religious fervor would not guide one to commit abominable acts, divert one from important moral

priorities, and create unimportant moral priorities.


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Works C i ted

Cr a i g , Wi l li am Lane . "S ub j ec t : S l augh t e r o f t he Canaan i t e s . " Reasonable Fai th

wi t h Wi l l iam Lane Cr a i g . Reas onab l e F a i t h . Web .

"F a l we l l Apo l og i zes t o Gay s , F emi n i s t s , Les b i ans . " Cnn .com, 14 S ep 2001 .

Web.

Hume, Dav i d . "Di a l ogues Conc er n i ng Na t u r a l Re l i g i on . " Nov 20 07 . Web .

.

Mat habane , Mar k . Kaf f i r Boy i n Amer i ca . New Yor k : Macmi l l an , 1989 . P r i n t .

Documents

Philo's Veneration for True Religion