Phobias and Phobias and Luther CasesLuther CasesAthena Athena HiotisHiotis, Devin McKnight, Jon , Devin McKnight, Jon Hinkle, Gary Hersey, Chelsea Hinkle, Gary Hersey, Chelsea Stewart, Stewart, KalebKaleb AmdeAmde

The ability to ActThe ability to Act

The ability to act (Davidson): (pg 89) The ability to act (Davidson): (pg 89) ““AA can do can do XX intentionally means that if intentionally means that if AA has desires and has desires and beliefs that rationalize beliefs that rationalize XX, then , then AA does does XX..””Question: What situations can you think of Question: What situations can you think of where one would not be capable of succeeding where one would not be capable of succeeding in X according to this definition?in X according to this definition?

Will and PowerWill and Power

““One fundamental contrast marked by One fundamental contrast marked by this basic concept is a distinction this basic concept is a distinction between will and power; it is one thing to between will and power; it is one thing to be unwilling to do something, quite be unwilling to do something, quite another to be unableanother to be unable”” (p.90).(p.90).

Weakness of willWeakness of will

An agent acting against her better judgmentAn agent acting against her better judgmentSituation: Going to classSituation: Going to class-- Clara has 9am classClara has 9am classCozy Clara: In bed, but is really comfortable. She Cozy Clara: In bed, but is really comfortable. She wants to stay in bed but there are also reasons wants to stay in bed but there are also reasons for her to want to go to class. She is physically for her to want to go to class. She is physically able to go, yet her comfort outweighs her desire able to go, yet her comfort outweighs her desire to go to class.to go to class.

Question: Does Clara lack of interest in leaving her Question: Does Clara lack of interest in leaving her comfortable environment render her impotent??comfortable environment render her impotent??

Inability to ActInability to Act

Agent cannot do X intentionally due to forces Agent cannot do X intentionally due to forces independent of her will.independent of her will.Paralyzed Clara: In bed, not Paralyzed Clara: In bed, not ““chainedchained”” to bed to bed but has no way of getting out. Wants to go to but has no way of getting out. Wants to go to class but is unable to do so. class but is unable to do so.

Disabilities of the WillDisabilities of the Will

Volitional impairment, where the agent does Volitional impairment, where the agent does not have the capacity to willnot have the capacity to willExamples include pathological disturbances Examples include pathological disturbances (i.e. depression, anxiety, phobias, etc.)(i.e. depression, anxiety, phobias, etc.)Agoraphobic Clara: She wants to get an Agoraphobic Clara: She wants to get an education, yet she cannot bring herself to leave education, yet she cannot bring herself to leave her room due to her overwhelming fear of large her room due to her overwhelming fear of large crowds and the outdoors.crowds and the outdoors.

Conditions of the will in Conditions of the will in actionaction

Enabling ConditionsEnabling Conditions-- necessary necessary conditions allowing Clara to act (i.e. Cozy conditions allowing Clara to act (i.e. Cozy Clara), i.e. making her Clara), i.e. making her ableable to actto actPerformance ConditionsPerformance Conditions-- ““the intention, the intention, will, reasons, concerns, etc., that would will, reasons, concerns, etc., that would actually actually getget her to act.her to act.””

Cozy ClaraCozy Clara

Physically and psychologically able to go Physically and psychologically able to go to classto classChooses comfort over responsibility to Chooses comfort over responsibility to get to class.get to class.

Paralyzed ClaraParalyzed Clara

Physically unablePhysically unableCannot fulfill intention to go to class even Cannot fulfill intention to go to class even if she wanted toif she wanted to

Agoraphobic ClaraAgoraphobic Clara

Physically able to go to classPhysically able to go to classMentally incapable of willing herself to get out Mentally incapable of willing herself to get out of bed. of bed. ““Fear is an obstacle to [the agoraphobic Fear is an obstacle to [the agoraphobic agentagent’’s] efforts to carry out his intentionss] efforts to carry out his intentions”” (see (see rest of quote p. 94)rest of quote p. 94)

----Discussion question: What is the difference Discussion question: What is the difference between agoraphobic and paralyzed Clara?between agoraphobic and paralyzed Clara?

Possible answerPossible answer

If her dorm were on fire Agoraphobic as well as If her dorm were on fire Agoraphobic as well as Cozy Clara can reasonably fulfill the desire to Cozy Clara can reasonably fulfill the desire to get out of dorm.get out of dorm.

[However, Watson still thinks that Agoraphobic [However, Watson still thinks that Agoraphobic Clara under the present circumstances is Clara under the present circumstances is genuinely incapable of acting on the desire.genuinely incapable of acting on the desire.In the situation where she can get out of the In the situation where she can get out of the dorm fear serves to give her a new motive.] dorm fear serves to give her a new motive.]

Williams and FrankfurtWilliams and Frankfurt

Luther Cases: Luther Cases: ““I can do no otherI can do no other…”…”““Genuine Incapacity that in no way Genuine Incapacity that in no way compromises onecompromises one’’s agency or selfs agency or self--controlcontrol””(100)(100)WilliamsWilliams-- ““A moral incapacity with which the A moral incapacity with which the agent is identified.agent is identified.””FrankfurtFrankfurt-- ““Volitional necessity is not the same Volitional necessity is not the same thing as simply being overwhelmingly aversething as simply being overwhelmingly averse……In addition the aversion has his endorsement; In addition the aversion has his endorsement; and it constrains his conduct so effectively and it constrains his conduct so effectively precisely because of thisprecisely because of this”” (101).(101).

ContCont’’dd

““For both philosophers, necessity is For both philosophers, necessity is somehow dependent on the agentsomehow dependent on the agent’’s s identifications or sense of what is identifications or sense of what is importantimportant”” (101).(101).

KaneKane’’s Proposals ProposalLuther was responsible because of the past actions Luther was responsible because of the past actions and decisions which made him into the kind of man and decisions which made him into the kind of man he was at that the time of that statementhe was at that the time of that statementAccording to Watson, this account does not hold up According to Watson, this account does not hold up because Luther is supposed to be acting freely, because Luther is supposed to be acting freely, whereas this rationale would apply to the case of an whereas this rationale would apply to the case of an addict. We hold an addict responsible for becoming addict. We hold an addict responsible for becoming addicted, but we still consider him/her unfree once addicted, but we still consider him/her unfree once addicted. addicted. ““This proposal fails to capture the way in which Luther This proposal fails to capture the way in which Luther cases appear to involve a form of necessitation that is cases appear to involve a form of necessitation that is in itself fully voluntaryin itself fully voluntary”” (102). (102).

Discussion QuestionDiscussion Question

LetLet’’s say we have an crack addict, and s say we have an crack addict, and he approaches his doctor after being he approaches his doctor after being diagnosed with a clinical addiction to diagnosed with a clinical addiction to crackcrack--cocaine and says:cocaine and says:““I can do no otherI can do no other……than smoke crack all than smoke crack all day every day!day every day!””Is there a sense in which we could Is there a sense in which we could consider him free in the manner of Luther consider him free in the manner of Luther on Williamson Williams’’s and Frankfurts and Frankfurt’’s account?s account?

Normative NecessityNormative Necessity

““Normative necessity asserts not a real Normative necessity asserts not a real incapacity but a relation among normsincapacity but a relation among norms”” (103)(103)Example: Example: I canI can’’t sleep with you. I have to look t sleep with you. I have to look after my seven children.after my seven children.““According to Williams and Frankfurt, the According to Williams and Frankfurt, the ‘‘I I cancan’’tt’’ in Luther cases is not merely a judgment in Luther cases is not merely a judgment about normative prioritiesabout normative priorities……but a conclusion but a conclusion about about oneselfoneself”” and oneand one’’s capacities (103).s capacities (103).

ContCont’’dd

““Statements of normative necessity assert not Statements of normative necessity assert not only an inconsistency between certain courses only an inconsistency between certain courses of action certain considerations but also of action certain considerations but also express a commitment to certain normative express a commitment to certain normative prioritiespriorities”” (103).(103).

[However, normative necessity still isn[However, normative necessity still isn’’t t enough to capture the genuine element of enough to capture the genuine element of incapacity that Luther cases involve, since incapacity that Luther cases involve, since normally you can change your commitments.] normally you can change your commitments.]

DennettDennett’’s Proposals Proposal

““When I say I cannot do otherwise I When I say I cannot do otherwise I mean I cannot because I see so clearly mean I cannot because I see so clearly what the situation is and because my what the situation is and because my rational control faculty is rational control faculty is notnotimpairedimpaired……reason dictates; I would have reason dictates; I would have to be mad to do otherwise, and since I to be mad to do otherwise, and since I happen not to be mad, I cannot do happen not to be mad, I cannot do otherwiseotherwise”” (104).(104).

Dennett contDennett cont’’dd

““This proposal attempts to interpret judgments of moral This proposal attempts to interpret judgments of moral impossibility from a nonimpossibility from a non--deliberative point of viewdeliberative point of view””(105).(105).[A problem with it is that it would seem to make all acts [A problem with it is that it would seem to make all acts that we arenthat we aren’’t motivated to do acts that wet motivated to do acts that we’’re incapable re incapable of doing, as in the following syllogism:]of doing, as in the following syllogism:]

1) To do otherwise I would have to have a reason or incentive1) To do otherwise I would have to have a reason or incentive2) I don2) I don’’t have such a reasont have such a reason3) Therefore, I can3) Therefore, I can’’t do otherwiset do otherwiseOur deliberative conclusion here should be #2, not #3. For it tOur deliberative conclusion here should be #2, not #3. For it to o be a Luther case the deliberative conclusion must assert be a Luther case the deliberative conclusion must assert necessity, as #3 does but #2 does not.necessity, as #3 does but #2 does not.

Cozy Clara Returns!Cozy Clara Returns!

Cozy Clara deliberates as follows:Cozy Clara deliberates as follows:1) To get out of bed I would need a reason 1) To get out of bed I would need a reason or incentive to do so.or incentive to do so.2) I do not have such a reason.2) I do not have such a reason.3) Therefore I stay in bed.3) Therefore I stay in bed.

DennettDennett’’s proposal does not successfully s proposal does not successfully differentiate between Luther and Cozy differentiate between Luther and Cozy Clara.Clara.

Question!Question!

What (if any) is the difference between What (if any) is the difference between normative necessity and Dennettnormative necessity and Dennett’’s s proposal?proposal?

UnthinkabilityUnthinkability and and Deliberative NecessityDeliberative Necessity

UnthinkabilityUnthinkability-- ““The quality of being The quality of being ‘‘out of the out of the question,question,’’ in its being altogether off the deliberative in its being altogether off the deliberative screenscreen”” given the agentgiven the agent’’s ideals and principles (107).s ideals and principles (107).Deliberative NecessityDeliberative Necessity-- ““[[J]udgmentsJ]udgments of of impossibilityimpossibility……are often deliberative starting points are often deliberative starting points rather than conclusions; they indicate the boundaries of rather than conclusions; they indicate the boundaries of the space of reasons in which deliberation takes the space of reasons in which deliberation takes place.place.””These boundaries (established by principles and These boundaries (established by principles and ideals) ideals) ““determine what is eligible for deliberationdetermine what is eligible for deliberation””[This is what Watson thinks is the right interpretation of [This is what Watson thinks is the right interpretation of volitional necessity.]volitional necessity.]

UnthinkabilityUnthinkability contcont’’dd

Jane Austen example from Jane Austen example from Pride and PrejudicePride and PrejudiceBecause of the kind of a person she is, or her ideals, Because of the kind of a person she is, or her ideals, Elizabeth deliberates that she cannot marry Collins.Elizabeth deliberates that she cannot marry Collins.““Contrast Elizabeth with Cozy Clara. For Clara, getting Contrast Elizabeth with Cozy Clara. For Clara, getting out of bed is an option in both senses. It is not out of out of bed is an option in both senses. It is not out of the question; it just doesnthe question; it just doesn’’t come upt come up……,,”” [whereas for [whereas for Elizabeth accepting CollinsElizabeth accepting Collins’’s proposal is unthinkable, s proposal is unthinkable, something she couldnsomething she couldn’’t possibly consider (109). t possibly consider (109). In WatsonIn Watson’’s terms, its terms, it’’s an option but not a s an option but not a deliberative deliberative option.]option.]

QuestionQuestion

In cases such as LutherIn cases such as Luther’’s and s and ElizabethElizabeth’’s, are there alternatives to s, are there alternatives to accepting their claim that they accepting their claim that they ““can can do no otherdo no other””??How else might one account for their How else might one account for their claim?claim?

Williams and Frankfurt : Williams and Frankfurt : A ComparisonA Comparison

Thus far Watson has been using Williams and Thus far Watson has been using Williams and Frankfurt in this discussion interchangeably. Frankfurt in this discussion interchangeably. However, now he wishes to However, now he wishes to ““distinguish the distinguish the kind of necessity involved in what Frankfurt kind of necessity involved in what Frankfurt and Williams (respectively) call volitional or and Williams (respectively) call volitional or moral impossibilitymoral impossibility”” (110).(110).Differences come to light based if we ask how Differences come to light based if we ask how we should understand that which is we should understand that which is necessitated, or the relevant notion of volition necessitated, or the relevant notion of volition (Frankfurt).(Frankfurt).

Distinguishing between Distinguishing between Williams and FrankfurtWilliams and Frankfurt

Williams: Luther Cases are deliberative conclusions Williams: Luther Cases are deliberative conclusions e.g. conclusions about what ite.g. conclusions about what it’’s best to do.s best to do.Frankfurt: Luther Cases, are not necessarily Frankfurt: Luther Cases, are not necessarily conclusions about whatconclusions about what’’s best but may instead be s best but may instead be expressions of the agentexpressions of the agent’’s deep attachments. s deep attachments. FrankfurtFrankfurt’’s example: A mother has to make the s example: A mother has to make the decision whether to keep her newborn child or to put it decision whether to keep her newborn child or to put it up for adoption. She might think it best to put the child up for adoption. She might think it best to put the child up for adoption, but her emotional attachment will not up for adoption, but her emotional attachment will not permit her to do so.permit her to do so.

Evaluation and VolitionEvaluation and Volition

““To be a person entails evaluative attitudes To be a person entails evaluative attitudes (not necessarily based on moral (not necessarily based on moral considerations) toward oneself. A person is a considerations) toward oneself. A person is a creature prepared to endorse or repudiate the creature prepared to endorse or repudiate the motives from which he acts and to organize the motives from which he acts and to organize the preferences and priorities by which his choices preferences and priorities by which his choices are ordered. He is disposed to consider are ordered. He is disposed to consider whether what attracts him is actually important whether what attracts him is actually important to him.to him.””In FrankfurtIn Frankfurt’’s terms, being a person (as s terms, being a person (as opposed to wanton) means having second opposed to wanton) means having second order volitions.order volitions.

Endorsement Endorsement

To endorse= to evaluate as bestTo endorse= to evaluate as bestThis is the same as what is most choiceThis is the same as what is most choice--worthy to an agent. worthy to an agent. Endorsement is not just a matter of Endorsement is not just a matter of emotional attachment, then.emotional attachment, then.

ContCont’’dd

Williams says that, Williams says that, ““moral incapacities moral incapacities depend upon, and express, the agentdepend upon, and express, the agent’’s s ethical conception of the alternatives.ethical conception of the alternatives.””For Frankfurt, however, volitional For Frankfurt, however, volitional necessities donnecessities don’’t necessarily have to be t necessarily have to be ethical. What is choiceethical. What is choice--worthy may even worthy may even be be ““less than rationalless than rational”” and and ““need not be need not be reasonreason--sensitive.sensitive.”” (113)(113)

Other Examples?Other Examples?

Besides the case of the mother and her Besides the case of the mother and her child can you think of any other examples child can you think of any other examples that represent Frankfurtthat represent Frankfurt’’s view??s view??

IdentificationIdentification

For Williams, For Williams, ““to oppose oneto oppose one’’s own moral s own moral incapacities is to cease to have them.incapacities is to cease to have them.””But for Frankfurt, an agent can change But for Frankfurt, an agent can change his incapacities by altering what he his incapacities by altering what he identifies with: identifies with: ““The fact that a person The fact that a person cannot bring himself to perform an action cannot bring himself to perform an action does not entail that he cannot bring does not entail that he cannot bring himself to act with the intention of himself to act with the intention of changing that factchanging that fact””

Question Time!Question Time!

If you have the ability to change your If you have the ability to change your moral incapacities, as Frankfurt asserts, moral incapacities, as Frankfurt asserts, do you really have moral incapacities at do you really have moral incapacities at all?all?Williams would say no. Which Williams would say no. Which philosopher would you side with?philosopher would you side with?

Endorsement, Endorsement, Identification, and CaringIdentification, and Caring

Frankfurt argues that volitional necessity Frankfurt argues that volitional necessity ““delineates delineates the province of the will.the province of the will.”” (114)(114)When an agent is constrained by volitional When an agent is constrained by volitional necessities, there are things he cannecessities, there are things he can’’t help willing or t help willing or cannot bring himself to will. These volitional cannot bring himself to will. These volitional boundaries shape and define his very nature as a boundaries shape and define his very nature as a person.person.If an agent works against the limits of his own will in If an agent works against the limits of his own will in effort to overcome a volitional necessity, he seems to effort to overcome a volitional necessity, he seems to be exhibiting a source of agency be exhibiting a source of agency independentindependent of the of the will. will.

The Unfortunate Mother The Unfortunate Mother ReturnsReturns

A mother has to make the decision to either keep her newly A mother has to make the decision to either keep her newly born child or put it up for adoption. She sincerely thinks it isborn child or put it up for adoption. She sincerely thinks it isbest to put the child up for adoption, but her will wonbest to put the child up for adoption, but her will won’’t let t let her give up the child.her give up the child.Through the motherThrough the mother’’s unsuccessful attempts to overcome s unsuccessful attempts to overcome her deep attachment to the child, she discovers the her deep attachment to the child, she discovers the limitslimits of of what she can will.what she can will.““A person is active when it is by his own will that he does A person is active when it is by his own will that he does what he does, even when his will is not itself within the what he does, even when his will is not itself within the scope of his voluntary control.scope of his voluntary control.”” (115)(115)The mother is not just a passive witness but rather is active The mother is not just a passive witness but rather is active on behalf of her sense of what is best. [Where she on behalf of her sense of what is best. [Where she isissuccessful in overcoming a volitional necessities, shesuccessful in overcoming a volitional necessities, she’’s s using her will to alter its own boundaries.]using her will to alter its own boundaries.]

Volitional Necessity vs. Volitional Necessity vs. Other Kinds of IncapacityOther Kinds of IncapacityFrankfurt helps to clarify volitional necessity Frankfurt helps to clarify volitional necessity (on the basis of either endorsement or (on the basis of either endorsement or caring) by contrasting it with psychological caring) by contrasting it with psychological aversion. aversion. Aversion affects motivation, but itAversion affects motivation, but it’’s not s not dependent on the agentdependent on the agent’’s sense of whats sense of what’’s s important to him.important to him.Volitional necessity Volitional necessity is is dependent on the dependent on the agentagent’’s sense of whats sense of what’’s important or of s important or of whatwhat’’s important to him.s important to him.

Endorsement vs. CaringEndorsement vs. Caring

Endorsement is dependent upon what an Endorsement is dependent upon what an agent is committed to or stands behind.agent is committed to or stands behind.[This can be distinct from what the agent [This can be distinct from what the agent cares most about, as in the case of the cares most about, as in the case of the mother.]mother.]What one cares about can also be What one cares about can also be changed if the agent takes steps to changed if the agent takes steps to extinguish his incapacity.extinguish his incapacity.

FrankfurtFrankfurt’’s Caring Criterion s Caring Criterion of Volitional Necessityof Volitional Necessity

Caring is measured by how much one is Caring is measured by how much one is ““investedinvested”” in or bound up with something, by in or bound up with something, by oneone’’s sense of loss upon not achieving the s sense of loss upon not achieving the object of oneobject of one’’s care.s care.A person exhibiting volitional necessity A person exhibiting volitional necessity ““may may care about something even though he wishes care about something even though he wishes that he didnthat he didn’’t, and despite strenuous efforts to t, and despite strenuous efforts to stopstop”” (117).(117).

Question Time!Question Time!

Consider two people in a failed Consider two people in a failed relationship who relationship who nonthelessnontheless stay together. stay together. Sexpert Chelsea Stewart asks: Sexpert Chelsea Stewart asks:

WhatWhat’’s more important to agency, s more important to agency, endorsement or caring? endorsement or caring? Can you think of an example where what Can you think of an example where what someone endorses conflicts with what he someone endorses conflicts with what he cares about?cares about?

The Unfortunate Mother: The Unfortunate Mother: Remix!Remix!Recall the example of the unfortunate mother, Recall the example of the unfortunate mother, and imagine that the woman, despite her and imagine that the woman, despite her attachment (care), manages to give up her attachment (care), manages to give up her child for adoption (what she endorses as most child for adoption (what she endorses as most choiceworthychoiceworthy).).Here her effort to overcome her attachment Here her effort to overcome her attachment ““manifests an identification with the standpoint manifests an identification with the standpoint of what is best.of what is best.”” (119)(119)

Unfortunate Mother Unfortunate Mother ScenariosScenarios

ScenarioScenario Harm to herselfHarm to herself Success / Failure Success / Failure of Agencyof Agency

Gives Up Baby Gives Up Baby (endorsement)(endorsement)

Injury to herself:Injury to herself:““Feels emptyFeels empty””, ,

““going through the going through the motionsmotions””

Agency has not Agency has not been damaged or been damaged or

defeateddefeated

Keeps BabyKeeps Baby(caring)(caring)

May or may not feel May or may not feel guilty; not so guilty; not so personally personally devastatingdevastating

Easier for her to Easier for her to live with, but fails as live with, but fails as

an agentan agent

ConclusionConclusionVolitional necessities are based on the Volitional necessities are based on the interaction of three motivational structures:interaction of three motivational structures:1) influences independent of either one1) influences independent of either one’’s s

endorsement (i.e. oneendorsement (i.e. one’’s values) or what one cares s values) or what one cares about (e.g. phobias, addiction).about (e.g. phobias, addiction).

2) what one cares about (e.g. keeping child)2) what one cares about (e.g. keeping child)3) what one endorses as an end, project or principle 3) what one endorses as an end, project or principle

(e.g. giving child up)(e.g. giving child up)These levels of volitional necessity can and These levels of volitional necessity can and often do overlapoften do overlap

Phobias and �Luther CasesThe ability to ActWill and PowerWeakness of willInability to ActDisabilities of the WillConditions of the will in actionCozy ClaraParalyzed ClaraAgoraphobic ClaraPossible answerWilliams and FrankfurtCont’dKane’s ProposalDiscussion QuestionNormative NecessityCont’dDennett’s ProposalDennett cont’dCozy Clara Returns!Question!Unthinkability and Deliberative NecessityUnthinkability cont’dQuestionWilliams and Frankfurt : �A ComparisonDistinguishing between Williams and FrankfurtEvaluation and VolitionEndorsement Cont’dOther Examples?IdentificationQuestion Time!Endorsement, Identification, and CaringThe Unfortunate Mother ReturnsVolitional Necessity vs. Other Kinds of IncapacityEndorsement vs. CaringFrankfurt’s Caring Criterion of Volitional NecessityQuestion Time!The Unfortunate Mother: Remix!Unfortunate Mother ScenariosConclusion