UNIVERSITY OF LONDONPIERCING THEBAMBOOCURTAIN:TENTATIVE BRIDGEBUILDING TOCHINADURING THE JOHNSON YEARSA THESISSUBMITTED TO THEGRADUATESCHOOL INCANDIDACYFORTHEDEGREEOF DOCTOR OFPHILOSOPHYDEPARTMENTOF INTERNATIONALHISTORY LONDONSCHOOLOF ECONOMICS ANDPOLITICALSCIENCEBYMICHAELCLARK LUMBERSNOVEMBER 2005UMINumber:U210370AllrightsreservedINFORMATION TO ALLUSERS Thequality of thisreproductionisdependent upon thequality of thecopy submitted.In theunlikely event that the author didnot senda completemanuscript and therearemissingpages,these willbenoted.Also,if materialhad toberemoved,anote willindicate thedeletion.Dissertation PublishingUMIU210370PublishedbyProQuest LLC2014.Copyright in theDissertationheldby the Author.MicroformEdition ProQuest LLC.Allrightsreserved.This workisprotectedagainst unauthorizedcopyingunder Title17,UnitedStatesCode.ProQuest LLC 789East EisenhowerParkway P.O.Box1346 Ann Arbor,Ml48106-1346luesesr.95\6LibraryBritishLibraryof Political andEconomicSci en ceThe undersigneddeclares that the work presented in this thesisis his own. MichaelLumbers2AbstractWhileasmallfloodofliteraturehasablydemonstratedthattheSino-American rapprochementof theearly1970swasrootedinpartintheevolutionof U.S.attitudesand perceptionsduringtheprecedingdecade,ithasprovidedonlyasketchyoverviewandhasnot adequately linked these critical developments to events which historians have hitherto taken to be a cause of deadlock between Washington and Beijing, namely the Vietnam War and the Cultural Revolution.Drawingonawidearrayof recentlydeclassifiedAmericanarchivalsources,this study, the firstfull-length account of Lyndon Johnsons China record, traces the shifts in context at home and abroad that prompted tentative bridge building to the Peoples Republic. In assessing Johnsonsroleinthepolicymakingprocess,italsobuildsonrecentworksthatofferanew perspectiveon hisforeignpolicyleadershipbylookingbeyondVietnam.Johnsonscautious reading of domesticsentiment andsuspicionsof Beijings role in Vietnam certainly discouraged the administration from initiating any grand departures from the inherited line of containment and isolation, much to the dismay of several mid-level China hands pressing for new approaches. Yet Vietnam ironically created pressures for an accommodation of sorts between the two adversaries andencouragedAmericandecision-makerswhomightnototherwisehavebeeninclinedto reassesslong-standingstrategytowardthemainland.Johnsonsfearof Chineseinterventionin theconflictandhisattemptstomobilizepublicsupportforVietnambyburnishinghispeace credentials yielded symbolic and substantive alterations in China policy:a relaxation of the travel ban, the promotion of expanded contacts, and a shift toward conciliatory rhetoric.Theoutbreakof theCulturalRevolutionin1966ledtothedefermentof further bridge buildingefforts.Johnson andhissenior aidesexpressed persistent uncertainty over thedirection ofthemainlandsturmoilandwereincreasinglydistractedbyVietnam.Overthelongterm, however, Chinas internal upheavalset in motion a reappraisal of the countrys political dynamic and threat potential.By late1967,mostChina watchersconcluded thatrevolutionary fervor had peakedonthemainlandandthattheregimesmoderateelements,possiblyinclinedtoward reconciliation with the outside world, had outmaneuvered hard-line Maoists.As officialattitudes thawed,theattentionof policymakersfocusedonwhatorientationapost-Maoregimemight assumeandwhetherornottheU.S.couldfacilitatethistransitionbyfurther policyreform.In short,thisperiodwitnessedtheestablishmentof manyof theperceptualpreconditionsforthe Sino-American rapprochement that unfolded during the Nixon years.3ContentsAcknowledgements5Abbreviations1Introduction81 Staying Firm: John F.Kennedys China Policy,1961-1963152Holes in the Dam:French Recognition and the Chinese Nuclear Test,451963-19643In VietnamsShadow:The Reaffirmation of U.S.China Policy,1964-1965734The Irony of Vietnam:The Emergence of a Two-Pronged China114Policy,1965-19665Bridge Building in Limbo:The Impact of the Cultural Revolution,1966-19671486Testing the Waters: An Aborted Policy Review and Closing Moves,1968-1969178Conclusion201Notes218SourcesConsulted2684AcknowledgementsEventhoughanacknowledgementspageoftenappearsatthe beginningof abook,itis written only at the very endof a long,gruelling process.It is for this reason why I thought many times I would never get to write one.Fewdays have passed over the last four years when I have notcringedover somethingin these pages,maybe a word or asentence,sometimesa paragraph, andmadewhatIfelttobethenecessarycorrection.Thenextweek,Idfindthisaswelltobe unsatisfactory.A perfectionistisnever happywithhiswork.Icould probablyspendtherestof my life revising this project, but then I would never receive my degree. With this in mind,I have finally decided to submit my thesis, warts and all.Thisworkwaswrittenunder thesupervision of Odd ArneWestad.Dr.Westadread the entiremanuscript,offeringencouragementandhelpfulsuggestionsthroughout.Healsoshares creditfor thetitleof my thesis,adistinction,Iamsure,whichwillalways beasourceof great pride. Dr. Westad, of course, has done his fair share of editing, and I profited from his experience. Perhapsmostimportantly,heeventuallyinstilled in me an acuteaversion to paragraphsthatare three pages long. The reader will most likely still grimace at the length of my paragraphs,yet one needonly compare the present volume toa certain article published in a 2004 edition of Journal of Cold War Studies to see that I have at least started to heed his wise counsel.IamalsoindebtedtoNigelAshton,StevenCasey,andJussiHanhimaki.These individualskindlyreadportionsof myworkandtookouttimefromtheirtaxingschedulesto discuss various ideas or provide other assistance.MygreatestacademicinfluenceisRobertAccinelli.Hehasenduredcountless self-pitying monologues,engaged me in conversation about American politics,readeverything I haveeversent,andhelpedmetodevelopandrefineideas.Hehasspentevenmorehours encouraging,reassuring,inspiring,pushing,andguidingme.Ihaveneveraskedhimwhyheis willingtoinvestsomuchtimeinsomeonehetaughtonlyonceasanundergraduateatthe Universityof Torontoalmosttenyearsago.Isupposeitisinpartameasureof thefaithand confidence he hasinme.Comingfromsomeone Isodeeply respect,thisistrulyhumblingand meansmore to me than he could imagine.If I had the money,I wouldsend the Accinellifamily on a long trip to Hawaii, if only so they could get away from me. Robert Accinelli has not written themostbooks,publishedthemostarticles,editedthemostvolumes,spokenatthemost conferences,or visited every archivalcollection on the planet,although anyone in the profession would be proud to have a CV like his. If the true measure of a great professor is instead the ability totransfer hisown passionfor learning ontoothers,todescendfrom anacademicsivory tower5andactually interact with,andcarefor,hisstudents,then he isunquestionably inaclassof his own. No one is better: past, present, or future. Heres to you, Bob. Thank you.Thisprojectcouldneverhavebeencompleted(orattempted)withouttheinvaluable financial assistance provided by Mom and Dad, the London Goodenough Association of Canada, theLyndonBainesJohnsonFoundation,theJohnFitzgeraldKennedyFoundation,Universities UK(OverseasResearchStudentAward),and(withouttheir knowingit)InterconSecurity.The bulkof theresearchwasundertakenatanumberof Americanarchives.Imustsingleoutfor praiseandgratitudetheLyndonBainesJohnsonLibraryinAustin,Texas.MytripstoAustin wereproductiveandquiteenjoyable,asidefromtheonenightIwaspeltedwithaneggbyan anonymous hooligan. There is obviously no better place to indulge ones interest in surely one of themostfascinatingandformidablepoliticalpersonalitiesinAmericanhistory.LBJ,whose competitivestreakwaslegendary,canresteasythathislibraryhasmorethanearnedits reputation as the nations leading depository for presidentialpapers.The library has performeda greatservice in making most of its holdingsavailable to the public in a timely manner.Thestaff are knowledgeable, courteous, and efficient. Moreover, they all seem to be genuinely interested in their jobs.MikeParrishandShannonJarrettwereespecially helpful.Myresearchalsoprofited from interviews withformer Johnson officialsWalt Rostowand James Thomson,bothof whom were very generous with their time.Iwouldbetrulyremissif I didnotacknowledge thefour mostimportant peoplein my action-packedlife.Buffy isasweetlittlesoulwho manages tomake mesmile (even if itsonly on the inside)every time Isee her.A rare featindeed. Ken never thanked me in hishighschool yearbook,butIamwillingtobethebiggerboy.Heistheonlypersononthisplanetwho understands my sense of humor. Yes, I do have one.Despite being a brother, he isa tremendous friendwhoisdearlyloved.If subjectedtopainfulinterrogation,hewouldprobablyadmitthe same of me. Your the best, he might say. Neither one of us will ever leave the house.AndthenthereisMomand Dad.Iwontevenattempttosetdownon paper whatthey meantome,becausemerewordswouldnotdothem justice.Itissurelyoneof naturesgreat riddlesthatthemostbeautiful,wonderful,loving,andselflesspeopleendedupwithsomeone whohassuchabadhaircut.Ireallyamtheluckiestguyintheworld.HubertHumphreyonce remarkedthatoneof Johnsonsmoreendearing character traitswas thathiseyeswouldwell up every time he started talking about his mama.I know very well where Lyndon was coming from. My mother andfather are my bestfriendsand,alongside Franklin Roosevelt,myheroes.Ilove you both,even though I havea bizarre way of showing it.This work is dedicated to them.Not only is it the last show of the tour, but its the last show that well ever do. Thank you.6AbbreviationsCCNEChinese Communist Nuclear ExplosionCCPChinese Communist PartyChiComChinese CommunistsCIACentral Intelligence AgencyCINCPACCommander in Chief, Pacific CRGCultural Revolution GroupCWIHPCold War International History Project (Washington, D.C.)DRVDemocratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)DSBDepartment of State BulletinEABureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State(from November 1966)FEBureauof Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State(1949-October 1966)FOForeign OfficeFRUSForeign Relations of theUnited StatesGRCGovernment of the Republic of China (Taiwan)INRBureauof Intelligence and Research, Department of StateISABureau of International Security Affairs, Department of DefenseJCT PapersJames C. Thomson Papers (JFKL)JFKJohn Fitzgerald KennedyJFKLJohn Fitzgerald Kennedy Library (Boston, Massachusetts)LBJLyndonBaines JohnsonLBJLLyndon Baines Johnson Library (Austin, Texas)NANational Archives (College Park, Maryland)NIENational Intelligence EstimateNLFNational Liberation FrontNSCNational Security CouncilNSCMNational Security Council MeetingsNSFNationalSecurity FileOHOral HistoryPKIIndonesian Communist PartyPLAPeoples Liberation Army (PRC)PPCPolicy Planning Council, Department of StatePPP.LBJPublic Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. JohnsonPRCPeoples Republic of ChinaPROPublicRecord Office (Kew, London)RGRecordGroupSNIESpecialNational Intelligence EstimateUNUnitedNationsWPB PapersWilliam P. Bundy Papers (LBJL)NOTE ON TRANSLITERATIONChinese names and places are rendered throughout the text in the Pinyin system of transliteration, exceptwheretheyoccurindifferentforminquotations,orwherefamiliarnamesmightbe confused if changed.IntroductionAfewyearsfollowinghisvoluntarydeparturefromgovernment,JamesThomson,a frustratedmid-levelChinahandwhohadservedinboththeKennedyandJohnson administrations,speculatedthatthe1960swouldberememberedasaperiodofdrearily sustained deadlockbetween Washington and Beijing. Notwithstanding his own misgivings over the priorities and leanings of his superiors, Thomson noted with bittersweet pride that some of the seeds of the thaw that unfolded during the Nixon years had been planted in the preceding decade, thuswarrantingthisperiodachapter,oratleastanextendedfootnote,inthehistoryof the Sino-Americanrelationship. 1 OfthevoluminousliteratureonAmericasencounterwiththe PeoplesRepublicof China(PRC)producedintheinterim,theKennedy-Johnsonyearshave receivedbyfartheleastattention.Thisapparentoversighthasbeeninpartafunctionof the obstaclesthathistoriansof U.S.foreign relationsmustendure inwaitingfor thedeclassification of relevantarchivalsources.As recordsfrom the Truman andEisenhower presidenciesemerged inthe1970sand1980s,scholarsfocusedtheirattentiononexploringtheoriginsof Sino-American tension, the question of whether or not there existed a lost chancefor an early reconciliation,theKoreanWar,and theTaiwanStraitcrises.2 Implicitin therelativeneglectof the1960s, however, is the sense that nothing happened;both the incentives and opportunities for a breakthrough appeared to be few as Democratic administrations, acutely sensitive to charges of softnessonAsiancommunism,endeavoredtocontainChineseexpansionisminVietnam andbecameconfusedonlookerstothecataclysmicCulturalRevolution.Generalsurveys documenting the American opening toChinaignore this periodand continue to take 21January 1969 as the logical starting point for discussion, much like the fall of the Berlin Wall signifies for most the end of the Cold War.3Some historians havequestionedthe tendency toattribute theshiftin U.S.attitudesand policiesalmostsolelytothe politicalandgeostrategiccalculationsof RichardNixonandHenry8Kissinger.Such an approach, the pioneering Rosemary Foot writes, leads to a focus on relatively short-termeventsandobscuresbroadercurrentsof change thatweretakingplaceintheperiod after1949. 4 JustasTrumanand Eisenhowerspapersofferedafresh perspectiveandforceda rethinkingof conventionalwisdomaboutbothadministrationsdealingswiththemainland,the massivefloodof documentationfrom the1960shashadsomethingof thesameeffect.Indeed, perusal of John F.KennedysChina recordhasyieldedvaluablefindings.Buildingonareserve of existingscholarshipandincorporating newprimary materials,Noam Kochavisaptly titled A ConflictPerpetuated,thefirstandonlyfull-lengthaccountof thesubject,revealsaPresident pronetoalarmistinterpretationsof Beijingsmotivesandhostiletopolicyreform.Beneaththe surface,however,anagendathatforeshadowedthesweepingchangesoftheNixonerawas articulatedbyagrowingchorusof U.Sofficialslobbyingforareappraisalof existingpolicies, particularly those efforts aimed at ostracizing the PRC.5LyndonJohnsonsChinapolicyawaitsasimilarlycomprehensivetreatment.Early assessments, written without the benefit of archival research, invariably painted a decidedly bleak portrait,focusingontheillwillthatVietnamengenderedamongU.S.decision-makerstoward theirChinesecounterparts.6 NancyBemkopfTucker,aleadingauthorityonSino-American relations and one of the first historians to utilize sources from the Johnson Library, confirmed the primacy of the war in determining the administrations attitudes toward Beijing and cited it as the chiefimpedimenttofreshthinking.ChargingtheJohnsonteamwithalackofenergyand imagination,she concludedthatWashingtonsfixation with Vietnamandits misunderstanding of Chinasroleintheconflict,asmuchasthedisruptionandchaosprovidedbytheCultural Revolution, precluded movement toward normalization.7Withoutdisputing thecentrality of Vietnam or the marginaladvancementin U.S.China policy,anembryonicrevisionistschoolofthoughthasrecentlyofferedamorenuanced perspectiveof theJohnsonyears.ChampionedbyFootandcorroboratedbysubsequentworks, thisviewholdsthatsignificantalterationsinthedomesticandstrategiccontextof American9diplomacyinthemid-tolate1960screatedamoreauspicioussettingfor theNixonopening. Images of an expansionist Chinese menace were gradually superseded by the example of Chinese caution in Vietnam and the implosion wrought by Mao Zedongs Cultural Revolution. The steady depoliticizationof theChinaissueathome,coupledwithintermittentoutburstsof popularand congressional pressurefor amoreflexiblestance toward thePRC,provided a politicianeven as deliberateasJohnsonwithboththeleewayandmotiveforextendingmodestfeelerstothe mainland.8ThisworkaffirmsthattheJohnson presidencydidnotrepresentaperiodof stagnation, andthatseniorofficialscontemplatedsignificantdeparturesfromlong-standingChinapolicy more than was recognized at the time. Yet it differs from all previous efforts in four notable ways. First,astheonlyfull-lengthanalysisof the JohnsonadministrationsChina record,it makesthe mostextensive use of the considerable documentation andoffers the only detailed policymaking study,carefullytracingthepersonalities,ideas,andeventsthatshapedapproachestothePRC duringtheseyears.Existingliteratureonthissubjecthasappearedeitherintheformofshort essays or portions of projects with alonger time frame.A concentrated focus on the Johnsonera provides much neededcontext to the Nixon opening and allows us toconsider questionscritical toour understandingof Sino-American relationsinthe1960sandonwhichstillverylittlehas beenwritten.HowdidU.S.policyevolve?WhydidtheJohnsonteamapprove bridge building efforts?Whataccountedfor their modestnature?Whowere the keydecision-makers?Towhat extentweretheiractionsguidedbystrategic,ideological,or politicalconsiderations?Howdid U.S.officials view the intensifiedSino-Soviet schism, and what were the ramifications for China policy?9How did the administration interpret and respond to the Cultural Revolution?Second, thisstudy explores the Chinesedimension of Americasexperience in Vietnam, whichhasnotreceivedproperattentionfromU.S.historiansoftheconflict.Indeed,careful examinationofprimarysourcesrevealsnotonlytheprofoundimpactthatVietnamhadon Johnson policymakersviews of the PRC, butalso howperceptionsof the mainlandsintentions10in turn shaped the administrationsdecision tocommitforces toaground war inSoutheastAsia and its subsequent conduct of the fighting. More than recent literature has stressed or recognized, Washington devoted considerable effort to anticipating Beijings response to U.S. military moves against its North Vietnamese ally. Johnsonsfear of Chinese intervention accounted in large part fortheprocessoftentativebridgebuildingthatpeakedin1966.Asthemainlandbecame enveloped in revolutionary fervor, China watchers wondered if this made it more or less likely to come totheaidof Hanoi;thiswasanimportantconsideration astheadministrationdebatedthe meritsofexpandingthewarinthespringof1967.TheJohnsonteamsdowngradingof the strategic threat posed by China likely madeiteasier for them to ponder de-escalation of the war effortin1968.Inshort,theChinafactorbroadensour understandingof manyof thepivotal U.S. decisions in Vietnam.Third,whilethefocusof thisprojectisoverwhelminglyonAmericanperceptionsand actions,itseekstofleshoutthediscussionbyincorporatingthesteadilygrowingvolumeof secondaryliteratureonChineseforeignpolicy.FewareasofColdWarhistoryoverthepast decadehavebenefitedmorefromtheopeningofarchives.WhileaccesstoChinesepapers remains regrettably limited, much light has nevertheless been shed on a host of issues with which Johnson officials grappled: Beijings reaction to American intervention in Vietnam, the prospects ofitsownmilitaryinvolvementinthewar,itsevolvingrelationshipwithbothMoscowand Hanoi,andtheeffectof theCulturalRevolutiononitsdiplomacy.10 ArmedwiththisChinese perspective, judgementcan nowbe passedonthe accuracyof U.S.decision-makersreadingof theaforementioned,aswellason thesuccessof their effortstoavertaSino-Americanclashin Vietnam and of their bridge building to the mainland.Fourth,thisworkexaminesLyndonJohnsonsroleinthedecision-makingprocessand draws wider conclusions on his foreign policy leadership. LBJ retired from office in January1969 withhisreputationinruins,leavinginhiswakeastalematedAsianconflictthathadcostthe nation dearly in blood and treasure, the worst domestic unrest since the Civil War, and a fracturedDemocraticPartythatstillhasnotrecovereditsfooting.Hisfirstbiographersmercilessly portrayedhimasashadywheeler-dealerwhoseonlyguidingprincipleappearedtobethe acquisition of power for its own sake. Johnson hardly fared better in samplings of public opinion throughoutthe1970sand1980s,consistentlyrankingnearthebottominabroadrangeof categories that are typically used to grade Presidents.11The passage of time and the proliferation ofreleasedmaterialfromAustin,Texas,particularlytheendlesslyfascinatingrecordingsof telephoneconversationsthatJohnsonpersonallyauthorized,haveofferedadifferent perspective.12 LBJisnowrightfullyrememberednotonlyasthemanwholedhisnationinto Vietnam,butasapoliticianofuncommondriveandvision,thearchitectofafar-reaching programof domesticreform-theGreatSociety-thatwassurpassedperhapsonlybyFranklin Roosevelts New Deal,and a leader who played as large a role as any in extending civil rights to millionsof disenfranchisedAfricanAmericans.13 Asareflectionof thisreversalinfortunes,a pollof90historiansconductedbyC-SPANin2000rankedJohnsonaveryrespectabletenth overall among U.S. Presidents, placing first in the category of Congressional relations and second in the pursuit of equal justice.14WhileJohnsonsstandingasadomesticleaderandpoliticaloperatorhassoared,his foreign policy recordremainsanissue of pointedcontroversy.15The massivedeclassificationof Johnson-era documents in the early 1990s inspired an outpouring of scholarly volumes dedicated to his diplomacy. Much of this literature confirmed long-standing criticisms of his statesmanship, concludingthatthosesamequalitiesenablingJohnsontoexcelasalegislator-theabilityto bridge differences and find common ground -were particularly illsuited for the fine art of foreign relations.Hisassertivenessandeffectivenessathomewereunfavorablycontrastedwithhis passiveness and ineptness abroad.Johnson emerged from this research as an unimaginative Cold Warrior with little knowledge of, or interest in, the outside world, and whose overriding objective wastosimplyexecutethecommitmentsundertakenbyhispredecessorsandespousedbyhis seasonedadvisers.16TheTexansappreciation of foreignrelationswasshallow,circumstantial,12and dominated by the personalities of heads of state he had met,Waldo Heinrichs noted rather condescendingly.Lacking adetached critical perspective,he was culture-boundand vulnerable to cliches and stereotypes about world affairs. 17Vietnam, unsurprisingly, continues to dominate thehistoriography.RecentstudieshavefaultedJohnsonfortransforminghispredecessors limitedcommitmenttohelpingSaigondefenditselfagainstacommunistinsurgencyintoa full-scalewar,forreasonsowingtoinsecurity,vanity,machismo,impulsiveness,stubbornness, and a hawkish predilection for force.18Ahandfulofhistorianshavemountedavigorouscounter-defenseonbehalfofthe embattledLBJ.RobertDallek,Johnsonsmostprominentbiographer,contendsthathiselusive andinfinitelycomplex personality haslentitself toconstantmisinterpretationof,andconfusion over,hismotives.OnlybylookingbeyondVietnamcanamoredefinitive,balanced understandingof Johnson asaworldleader be attained.19In thisvein,ThomasAlanSchwartzs groundbreaking Lyndon Johnson and Europe portrays asubtle and savvy Presidentengaged with thedelicaciesof policy,deftly handling the prickly CharlesDe Gaulle,preserving thesolidarity of theAtlanticAllianceevenascentrifugalforcesthreatened to pullitapart,andadvancing the post-Cuba era of detente with the Soviet Union.20Anin-depthlookatJohnsonsdealingswithChinadoesnotplausiblyaffordthesame opportunity for asstarkly a revisionist interpretation;as has already been documented elsewhere, andasthisworkreiterates,bothAmericasmisadventureinVietnamandthemainlands preoccupationwithdomestictransformationfortheperiodunderconsiderationwerenot conducivetoconstructiverelationsbetweenthetwoadversaries.Still,evenastheevidence presentedhereconfirmssomeof theshortcomingstraditionallyassociatedwithour protagonist (susceptibilitytoColdWar-shapedthinking,warinessofforeignpolicyreform,distractedby Vietnam,undulyinfluencedbyparochialpoliticalconsiderations),italsohighlightsmany attributesthathave only justsurfaced:anattentive andwellinformed leader whodominated the foreignpolicyprocess,intellectuallyflexible,adaptabletochangingvariablesathomeandabroad, adept conflict manager, empathetic with the concerns of the other side, and mindful of the limits of Americas capacity to shape events to its liking.Thisstudyisorganizedchronologically.Chapter1 setsthestageforourdiscussionby providing a broad overview of Americas approach to the PRC prior to November1963,focusing primarilyontheKennedyyears.ThesecondchaptertakesalookathowChinafiguredin Johnsonsworldviewasheassumed the presidency,andtheeventsin1964Frenchrecognition andtheChinesenucleartest-thatsteadilyunderminedthepolicyheinherited.Thenexttwo chaptersanalyzehowtheJohnsonadministrationsentanglementinVietnamgovernedits relations with Beijing,first sharpening senior decision-makershostility to policy reform as they escalatedAmericasmilitaryrolein1964-65,thenprovidingtheimpetusfortentativebridge building in1966as they worked to head off the threat of Chinese intervention and disarm critics of the war by burnishing their peace credentials.Chapters5and 6examine how the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution influenced perceptionsof the PRC and the process of bridge building.A concludingsectionsummarizesthestudysfindingsandhighlightstheimplicationsforthe historiographyofbothSino-AmericanrelationsandLyndonJohnsonsroleinU.S.foreign policy.141Staying Firm: John F. Kennedys China Policy, 1961-1963Thelogicalstartingpointforanexaminationof LyndonJohnsonsencounterwiththe PRCisJanuary1961,whenJohnF.Kennedyassumedcontrolof theWhiteHouseaftereight yearsofRepublicanrule.Theoverlapinpersonnel,perceptions,andpoliciesbetweenthe Kennedy and Johnson administrations was truly unique, perhaps unparalleled in American history fortwosuccessivepresidencies,andhadconsiderableconsequencesforthedirectionof both domesticandforeignaffairsduringthe1960s.JFKinheritedaSino-Americanrelationship plaguedbymutualmistrustandantagonism,sealedinbloodbytheagonizingstalemateof the KoreanWar.TherewassomeanticipationthatanewPresidentwouldadvancenewinitiatives towardthemainland,ultimatelyamisreadingof Kennedyseagernesstotake politicalgambles andan underestimationof his profoundsuspicionsof the communistregime.The broadfeatures of the Truman-Eisenhower line of containmentandisolation infactremained unchangedduring the Kennedy years.Drawingonarchivalsourcesand agrowing volumeof secondaryliterature, this chapter also demonstrates that the seeds of policy revision were planted during this period, as ahandfulof mid-levelofficialsandtheirsponsorspressedforareappraisalof attitudes.This patternofhigh-levelresistancetoreformamidstagitationforchangefrombelowwouldbe characteristic of much of the Johnson administrations China record.The acute hostility that colored Sino-American relations for more than twenty years after thefoundingofthePRCinOctober1949wasnotnecessarilypredetermined.Indeed,many AmericansservinginChinaduringtheSecondWorldWarregardedMaoZedongsChinese CommunistParty(CCP)asadynamicmovementwithgenuineappealtomuchof thecountry. Uniqueamongothercommunistparties,theCCPcouldalsostakeitsclaimasanautonomous actor unbeholden to the whims of puppet masters in the Kremlin. Joseph Stalins spotty record of15supportfor hisally throughout the1930sand1940sdid notgounnoticed by those officialsin theTrumanadministrationlookingforsignsof TitoisminChina.1 PresidentTrumanandhis adviserscouldbarelydisguisetheircontemptfortheCCPsrivalforpower,theNationalist regimeofChiangKai-shek,whichwaswidelyseenascorrupt,inept,anddangerously predisposedtousingforceasacure-allforitsproblems.Washingtonsoverridingobjective during the Chinese civil war was not so much providing what aid it could to Chiangs discredited governmentaspreventingtheSovietsfromexploitingcommunistgainsinnorthernChina. Apprehensive of diverting scarce resourcesfrom more vital Cold War theaters in Europe and the MiddleEast,andincreasinglyimpatientwiththeGeneralissimosmachinations,George Marshall,who had ledafruitless year-long mission toarrange acease-fire in China and became Secretaryof StateinJanuary1947,concludedthatonlyaprogramof limitedassistancecould maximizeU.S.leverageovertheNationalistsandminimizethepossibilityoftheSoviets intervening on behalf of the CCP.DeanAchesonsharedhispredecessorsdistasteforChiangandforentanglementin China.HewasprimarilyinterestedincontainingSovietinfluenceonthemainland.Oncethe NationalistshadbeendriventoTaiwan,hesoughttomanageU.S.disengagementfromthe conflict and prevent a consolidation of the PRCs ties to Moscow. Acheson persuaded Truman in early1950toforgoany military responsibilitiesfor the protectionof Taiwan,knowingfullwell thatthe communistswouldeventually assume controlof theisland;intervention in Chinas civil war would only galvanize Chinese opinion against the U.S. and undermine any chances of driving awedgebetweentheSovietUnionandMaosnewregime.2 Some historianshavediscernedin AchesonsconductadeterminationtoforgeanaccommodationwiththePRC,aloftyaimthat was only derailed by the subsequent fighting in Korea.3Morerecently,scholarswithaccesstoChinesedocumentshaveconvincinglydebunked thenotionofalostchanceforanearlyreconciliationbetweenWashingtonandBeijing. AcutelysuspiciousofAmericanintentionstowardthenewChinesegovernment,intenton16maintainingtheinternalmomentumof therevolution,andcertainthatthesecurityof thePRC restedonclosealignmentwiththeSovietUnion,Maoandhiscomradeswerenotinclinedto reciprocate any U.S.overture.4Yet it isalso apparent that the Truman teams interest in averting a conflict with the mainland did not translate into any coherent policy of offering olive branches totheirChinesecounterpartsorbargainingwiththeminaneven-handedmanner.Delugedby stinging criticism from Chiangssupporters in Congress and the press for having lostChina to thecommunists,U.S.decision-makerswouldhavefounditexceedinglydifficulttosustainany domesticconsensus for aconciliatory approach to the PRC.5Moreover, most senior officials did notsenseacompellingstrategicneedtomeetthePeoplesRepublichalf-way.Hissporadic contemplationofrecognitionandlimitedtradenotwithstanding,Achesonratherarrogantly assumed that the U.S. did not have to rush into these commitments.It was taken for granted that Chinasnewleadershipwouldconfrontmyriadeconomicdifficulties,forcingthemtoturnto Americafor assistance that the Kremlin couldnot hope to provide.As Melvyn Leffler hasaptly noted, this wasnot a strategy of accommodation... it was infused with ideologicalantipathy and designed to force the Chinese Communists to appear as supplicants. 6AttitudestowardBeijingwereinfacthardeningbeforeKorea.Chinasanti-American rhetoricandtheconclusionof aSino-SovietallianceinFebruary1950appearedtorenderthe prospectofaschismbetweenthetwocommunistgiantsincreasinglyremote.7 Againstthe backdropofawide-rangingoverviewof U.S.nationalsecuritypolicies,setinmotionbythe drafting of NSC68,a number of officialsin both theState and Defense departmentsquestioned Achesonscomplacency towardTaiwansfateandstarted examining means by which the island could be defended against a communist takeover.When war broke out in Korea in June1950, the administrationimmediatelyorderedtheSeventhFleetintotheTaiwanStrait.Themovewas designed to head off an expansion of the conflict by discouraging either Chinese combatant from attackingtheother,yetitalsoreflectedthestrategicandpolitico-psychologicalvaluethatU.S. policymakersassignedtothepreservationofanon-communistTaiwan.8 TheAmericancommitmenttothisobjectivewouldpoisonrelationswithBeijingintothe1960sandbeyond. Leaders in Beijing were incensed by the deployment of theSeventh Fleet, condemning the act as nothing less than an infringement on Chinese sovereignty.9ChinasmilitaryinterventioninKoreainNovember,comingafter American-ledforces crossedthethirtyeighthparallelandthreatenedtooverthrowthecommunistregimein Pyongyang,hada profoundly negativeimpact on elite and popular opinion alike in the U.S.The ensuing bloody stalemate yielded an enduring bipartisan strategy of containment and isolation, as Washingtonmaintainedatotalembargoontradewith,andtravelto,themainland;sustained strong military and diplomatic ties to Taiwan;exerted pressure on its allies to avoid contact with, or recognition of, Beijing;andcommitted itself to preserving Taipeisseat in the United Nations (UN) and preventing the PRCs membership in that organization.10The broad parameters of this policy remained intact during the Eisenhower years. As with so many other facetsof the Eisenhower administrationsforeign policy, however,itsapproach to China was not nearly as rigid and dogmatic as its harsh rhetoric suggested.11To be sure, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles authorized the purge of several China hands and assigned high profile Asian posts at Foggy Bottom to hard-liners, yet much of this public posturing was not so much an indicator of his personalconvictionsasitwasashrewdeffort to protect his rightflank from the feared China Lobby and avoid the political fate of the much-maligned Acheson.12And while both PresidentEisenhowerandDullesvaluedTaiwanasabastionof anti-communisminAsia,they were persistentlysuspiciousof whattheyregardedasChiangsduplicitousattemptstoentangle theU.S.inafancifulschemetoreturntothemainland.AfterstallingonTaipeisrepeated requestsfor a mutualdefense treaty, the administration finally relented in the fall of 1954during the first offshore islands crisis,yet not withoutfirst covertly securing the Generalissimos pledgetoseek American approval of any major assaulton the PRC.The Eisenhower teams attempts to containChiangsadventurismreflectedtheirwishforapeacefulandstableAsia,whichwould enablethemtoconcentratetheirresourcesandattentiononEurope.Itwasalsoanimplicitrecognition that Maos regime, however unsavory, was a fact of life. Eisenhower and Dulles were ultimatelywillingtoacquiesceinatwoChinasarrangement,perhapstoberecognized formally by the UN.13Dulles reportedly attempted to recruit the services of Dean Rusk,a former colleaguefromTrumansStateDepartment,forrallyingCongressionalDemocraticopinionin favor of this option in1956.14A review of the documentary record has also revealed that, contrary to impressions at the time,Eisenhowerofficialsweresensitivetosignsof Sino-Soviettensionandsoughttoexploit thesetotheiradvantage.Seeninthislight,theadministrationsreluctancetoalter theinherited lineof containmentandisolation hasstrucksome historiansasadeliberatestrategic ploy rather than a manifestation of knee-jerk anti-communism.As Dullesexplained to one skeptic,the best way togetaseparation betweentheSovietUnionandCommunistChinaistokeep pressureon CommunistChinaandmakeitswaydifficultsolongasitisin partnershipwithSovietRussia. Tito did not break with Stalin because we were nice to Tito.. .It seems to me that if China can win ourfavorswhilesheisalsoworkingcloselywithMoscow,then thereislittlereasonfor her to change. 15According to thislogic,a closed doorpolicy would increase Beijings dependency on Moscowfor itssecurity.When theSoviets proved unwilling or unable to help,the twoallies wouldbecomeincreasinglyestrangedfromoneanother.16 Evenmoreintriguingly,Eisenhower periodicallyvoicedmisgivingswiththisapproachandwonderedwhether theChinesecouldbe luredawayfromtheSovietsbythepromiseof trade.Whilepoliticalconsiderationsathome precludedanymodificationoftheU.S.economicembargo,thePresidentacquiescedinthe decisions of some allies to relax trade restrictions against the mainland.17Thisstarkdichotomybetweennuancedperceptionsanduncompromisingofficial pronouncementswaslostonmostcontemporaryobservers:domesticcritics,exasperatedallies, and, most importantly, the Chinese.Scarred by the political bloodletting over the lossof China, theEisenhoweradministrationdiscernedfewadvantagesindepartingfrompost-KoreaChina policyandchose toprojectunambiguousresolve.YetEisenhowersmilitancycannotbesolely19attributedtocrudepoliticalcalculations.ThePresidentandtheSecretaryevidentlysharedthe intense animosity toward Beijing that the traumaticexperienceof Korea hadengenderedamong mostAmericans.Attheheartof theirdistasteforthePRCwasthesensethatMaoandhis comradeswereimplacablerevolutionarieswhosoughttooverturntheregionalstatusquo.This imagecrystallizedin thelatterhalf of the1950sasU.S.decision-makerspursueddetentewith the Soviet Union, giving rise to unfavorable comparisons between the perceived prudence of their counterpartsin the Kremlin and the bellicoseChinese.18Eisenhower and Dullesworked to build positionsofstrengthandtocreatearegionalAsiaPacificstructureinwhichAmerican advantageswouldbemaximizedwhileChinasroleandopportunitieswouldbedramatically curtailed. 19Thusacloseddoorpolicy,besidespreservingharmonywithintheRepublicanParty, served as a tool of coercion, designed to secure any eventual reconciliation with China strictly on AmericantermsbywithholdingrecognitionandtradeuntiltheChinesehadlearnedhowto behave.Theconsequencesofthisheavy-handednesswereconsiderable.Eisenhowers brinkmanshipduringthe1954-55offshoreislandscrisis,particularlyhisthreattoutilize Americas nuclear arsenal,alarmed Chinas leadership and played no small role in their decision toacquire the bomb.20The administrations refusal to compromise its ties to Taiwan mostlikely contributedtotheradicalorientationofChinasforeignpolicyinthelate1950s.Afterthe inconclusiveoutcomeof the1954-55crisis,Beijingshiftedcourseandannouncedthatitwas willingtoresolve Taiwansstatus by peacefulmeans.Theobjectiveof sowingdiscord between Washingtonand Taipeiremainedunchanged,yetMaonowhoped toelicitU.S.concessionson Taiwanbypresentingamoreconciliatoryface.21 TheChairmansdisillusionmentwiththis stillborn initiative, most notably the failure to achieve a constructive dialogue with the Americans attheambassadorialtalkslaunchedinGenevainAugust1955,fedhisgrowingoppositionto Nikita Khrushchevs pursuit of detente with the U.S. Mao found the idea of Soviet collusion with anadversarythatcontinuedtoobstructhisdreamofreunificationbothunconscionableand20unsettling.22Eisenhower bequeathed to his successor a tense Sino-American relationship that was nearly as prone to confrontation as it had been eight years earlier.As the Kennedy team prepared to assume the reins of power in January1961,speculation abounded thattherewouldbeaconcertedattempttoreversethisgrimstateof affairs.23 Partof this impression, no doubt, can be attributed to the successful efforts of the charismaticleader and hisaidestoprojectaveneerof dynamismandopennesstoinnovation,animagethatwasonly magnifiedbytheseemingdrabnessof thedepartingEisenhoweradministration.Longafterthe youngPresidentsassassination,hisapologistsinsistedthat,despitearecordsuggestingthe contrary,Kennedywouldhaveusedasecondterminofficetoforgenewapproachestothe PRC.24 ExpectationsofnewChinainitiativeswerefuelledaswellbythefactthatseveral prominentmembersof theincomingadministration,namelyAdlaiStevenson(whowasnamed AmbassadortotheUN)andChesterBowles(appointedastheUndersecretaryofState),had expressedimpatiencewithexistingstrategytowardthemainland.Whilenolesssusceptibleto alarmistinterpretationsof ChinesebehaviorthanEisenhowerofficials,theycontendedthatan emphasisonisolatingBeijinghadalienatedalliedopinionandforeclosedanypossibility, howeverremote,of arrivingatamutualunderstandingwiththePRC.Bothbelievedthatthe effective containment of China required the cooperation of regional partners, which could only be securedbydiscardingthemorerigidandunpalatableelementsof U.S.policyandshiftingthe blameforSino-Americanhostility.Withpreciselythisconsiderationinmind,Stevensonand Bowles found much to recommend in adopting a two Chinas position at the UN (whereby both Beijing and Taipei would be offered a seat).25JohnKennedywasneitherpoliticallynorideologicallypredisposedtowardpolicy departuresasheenteredoffice.For reasonsowingtoacombinationof conviction,theneedto distancehimself fromhisfatherscontroversialisolationistviews,andadesiretoadvancehis political standing on a national level, JFK had consistently advocated the vigorous containment of21international communism throughout his congressional career.26As a Democratic congressman in 1949, he immediately recognized the political opportunities that the triumph of the CCP presented toRepublicansandthepitfallsassociatedwithappearingsofttowardthenewregime.To insulatehimselffromtheresultantpoliticalfirestorm,Kennedyjoinedthethrongofthose condemning the Truman administration and theState DepartmentsSinologistsfor selling out the Nationalists.27His instinctive caution on China could only have been reinforced by his slender margin of victory in the1960 presidential election; the new President reportedly carried with him a slipof paper bearing the small plurality of 118,574 votes as a constant reminder of his limited room for maneuver.28Moreover,KennedyhadbasedmuchofhiscampaignonthepremisethatAmerica neededfreshleadership to regain the initiative in the Cold War.While his promises to pay any price, bear any burdenin stemming further communist advances were stirring enough, they had the unfortunate side effect of narrowing his options in foreign policy, as a premium was placed on demonstratingfirmnessandresolveabroad.29 PartingwordsfromEisenhowerduringthe transitioninJanuary1961maywellhavecontributedsignificantlytothenewadministrations trepidacious approach toward experimentation in the China policy sphere. Whether Eisenhower in factwarnedhissuccessorthathewouldcomeoutof politicalretirementshouldthePRCbe recognizedorseatedintheUNremainssomewhatuncertain,30 althoughKennedyfrequently referred to this threat in conversations with foreign leaders.31In later years, hisSecretary of State, DeanRusk,leftnodoubtthatpoliticalconsiderationsdominatedthePresidentsthinkingon China. He recalled in his memoirs a private meeting in May1961, during which Kennedy alluded tohisrazor-thinvictoryasafactormilitatingagainstachangeinpolicy.Fearingtheissue might divide Congress and the American people,Rusk wrote, he decided the potential benefits of a more realistic China policy didnt warrant risking a severe political confrontation. 32If political timidity constituted a major impediment to policy reform during the Kennedy years,sotoodidhigh-levelhostilitytowardtheChinesecommunists.Indeed,Kennedys22concerns about a Chinese menace predated hisascension to the Oval Office. A tour of Southeast Asiaintheearly1950sleftanindelibleimpression,alertinghimtotheregionshungerand poverty,andtheopportunitiestheseconditionspresentedforcommunistexpansion.Theyoung congressmansubsequentlydevelopedanenduringfascinationwithcounterinsurgencyand cultivating non-communistelites.33 JFKssensethatanEast-Weststrugglefor theallegianceof thedevelopingworldwouldbeoneof thedefiningforeign policychallengesof hispresidency was confirmed by a speech Khrushchev delivered on 6 January1961, in which the Soviet Premier declaredhissupportforwarsofliberationornationaluprisings.Kennedyanticipateda stepped-up communist effort to infiltrate those nations struggling to emerge from colonial rule or that had just attained independence.34SuspicionsofChinasroleinAsianwarsofnationalliberationwererampantwithin Kennedysinnercircle.35 Theearlymonthsof KennedyspresidencycoincidedwithwhatU.S. analystsrecognized asa periodof acuteeconomicupheavalin China,as the country copedwith the disasters wrought by Maos Great Leap Forward.36Somewhat paradoxically, however,it was judged that the mainlands internal troubles did not diminish the threat it posed to its neighbors. A November1961SpecialNationalIntelligenceEstimatedefinedtheChinesechallengeas primarilypolitico-psychologicalinnature,assertingthatthecountrysrulerseschewedovertly confrontationaltacticsandsoughtinsteadtoexpandtheirinfluenceabroadatfarlesscostand risk through the techniques of Communist political warfare.Rather than engage the Americans or their Asian allies directly, the Chinese were providing materiel assistance and guidance to local communistforcesseekingtooverthrowWestern-backedregimes.37 Believingthatthese movementstooktheirinspirationfromBeijing,KennedyencouragedhisaidestoreadMaos writings on revolution and guerrilla warfare.38Impressionsof China werecoloredas wellbyevidence of growingSino-Sovietfriction. While the administrationsinitialassessmentsof theschism tended toerr on the side of caution, officials even at this early stage interpreted the dispute as arising out of clashing worldviews. One23of theintelligencecommunitysfirstoverviewsoftheglobaloutlookfortheKennedyteam predicted that the Kremlin would stick toits present policy of seeking towin victorieswithout incurring serious risks, and of alternating or combining shows of anger and bellicosity with poses of reasonablenessand compromise...[and]a recognition of some areasof commoninterest with theWest.The PRC,bycontrast,could beexpected to pressfor a moremilitantblocpolicy andopposemovestowarddetente.39 Accordingtothisview,whichhadbeenprevalentamong Eisenhowerofficials,theSovietUnionhadevolvedintoamaturepowerthatacceptedthe inadmissibility of war in a nuclear age and sought regulated superpower competition.40Haunted bymemoriesof Chinasinterventionin Koreaandrepelledbythemainlands reversiontoaradicallineinforeignpolicybytheendof the1950s,U.S.policymakerswere struckbyMaosapparentindifferencetotheimplicationsof hisbellicoserhetoric.AsGeorge Kennan,theeminentKremlinologistrecruitedbyJFKtobehisAmbassadortoYugoslavia, remarked, We have much more difficult problems with the Chinese than with the Russians. The latterhavemuchmoreincommonwithWesterncivilization. 41 Beijingsuncompromising public posture in early1961only exacerbated Kennedys inherent distaste for Chinas leadership. ItseemedthattheChineseCommunistswere justashostile tothe newadministrationasthey weretotheold,andwereattackinghim personallyalready,hecomplainedtoNewZealands PrimeMinister KeithHolyoake.Theirattitudeindicated thattheydidnotwish tobeon better termswithusbut preferredtomaintainanintransigeant[sic]position. 42 Kennedyssense that thePRCrepresented themoredangerousandunpredictableof thecommunistgiantssharpened over time,totheextentthathehopedtofoster theKremlinsinterestincontainingitsnominal ally.Kennedysfirstsustainedengagement withChina policyin1961illustrated the primacy ofdomesticpoliticalconsiderationsinthedecision-makingprocess.Washingtonssuccessin isolatingthemainlandthroughoutthe1950srestedinlargepartonmobilizingsufficient internationalsupport. This had often beensecured by grudgingly tolerating itsalliesinterests in24establishing economic contacts with Beijing in exchange for [their] adherence to a policy seen as morevital-thatofnon-recognitionandsupportofTaiwanintheUnitedNations. 43 The EisenhoweradministrationdeferredconsiderationofanymotiontounseatTaipeiandadmit BeijingasthesoleChineserepresentativebyofferingamoratoriumresolutionwhentheissue came upfor debate each year. By1961, however, the proliferation of newly independent African nationsandalliedimpatiencewithAmericanrigidityhadrenderedthisapproachalmost untenable.44 Rusk,Stevenson,andBowlesrecognizedthepressingneedforashiftintacticsif Taiwan was to retain its UN membership.45Oneof themoreambitiouseffortstoprovideastrategicrationaleforanewpolicyon ChineserepresentationcamefromRobertKomer,asenioraidetoNationalSecurityAdviser McGeorgeBundy.Likemostofficialsinthenewadministration,Komerdidnotforeseeany relaxationofSino-Americanhostilityinthenearterm;Beijingsinherentneedforanexternal bogeyman around which to rally domesticsupportfor the regime would continue tostand as the primaryobstacletoanewerainrelations.Allthemorereason,then,forsofteningtheharsher edgesofAmericasposturetowardChina.KomerpinpointedWashingtonsrelianceonthe moratorium procedure asa decidedly contentious matter among allied capitals, whofor long had acceptedthePRCasalegitimatepoliticalentitydeservingof UNmembership.Demonstrating moderation on thisquestion would prove particularly usefulin appeasingsentimentinIndia and Japan,whosecooperationwasdeemedcriticalforthelong-termcontainmentofChina.46 As Komer framed the stakes for Kennedy,adopting a twoChinasstance was not justone of our acceding to the inevitable...but of using greater flexibility on the UN issue to secure greater Free World support for preserving the GRC[Government of the Republic of China -Taiwan].47ThePresidentsconcernsweremoreparochial.HeconfidedtoBritishPrimeMinister Harold Macmillan that it would be best from our standpoint if Red China were not admitted this year...fromapurelydomesticpoliticalpointofviewitdidnotlookgoodforanew administration to have allowed Chinese Communist admission so soon. The problem,as he saw25it,wasto find a formulafor keeping them from wanting togetin. 48Rusk addressed the latter point in a memorandum he prepared for Kennedy at the end of May. Arguing that the moratorium wasnolonger a viableoptionand thata majorityin theGeneralAssembly would vote toadmit Beijing over Taipeiastheoccupant of asingle China seatif presented withsuch astark choice, theSecretaryadvancedtwoChinasasasolutiontotheadministrationsproblem.Itwould mostlikelyresultinthecontinuedexclusionof theChineseCommunists[,]whohavebeen stronglyopposedtoaTwoChinasconcept.Itshouldalsoservetoshifttheonusfortheir exclusion [from the UN] to the Chinese Communists themselves. 49Betraying his persistent fears of a domestic backlash, Kennedy tentatively endorsed the idea, but insisted that the U.S.should not take the leadin guiding such a motion through the UN and that a good discussion with key politicalfigures in the U.S.was required before a final decision could be made. He worried that anaggressivepushforthemeasurecouldadverselyaffecttheforeignaidbillandother objectives of his Administration. 50KennedyslukewarmsupportforatwoChinasapproachwassoonshakenbyhis readingof domesticand internationaldevelopments in the summer of 1961.Thereseemed tobe little indication that U.S.acquiescence in such a formula would receive support at home. Rumors ofanimpendingchangeinUNpolicyyieldedaunanimousSenateresolutionopposingany variantof twoChinas. 51 Publicopinionwasbarelymorereceptive;aGalluppolltakenin September revealed a majority of 65 percent against the PRCs admission to the world body, with only18percentin favor.52Moreover,deliberationsover Chinese representation occurredagainst thebackdropofaparticularlytroublingperiodforKennedysforeignpolicyleadership.The humiliatingfailureattheBayof Pigs,theretreatinLaos,Khrushchevsharshtreatmentof the PresidentattheViennasummit,andhisbrandishingoftheBerlinultimatumallinstilledin Kennedy an acute aversion toanother diplomatic debacle.In thiscontext, he was concerned that U.S.acquiescence in a move to seat Beijing,even if it was expected to fail and prolong the status quo in the UN, might convey an image of weakness. Such a success for the Communists -when26we face them in Southeast Asia and Berlin,he remarked,would give impetus to their prestige atadifficultandimportanttimeforus.ItwouldbeaverydamagingblowtoUnitedStates prestige. 53Nor could discordant noises from Taipei be ignored. Bundy reported to JFK in early July that the Chinese Nationalists are more disturbed about their relation to the U.S. than at any timeinthe pastfiveyears.Inpartthe productof Taiwansbiastoward presumablyfriendlier Republicans, Bundy noted thatsuspicions had also been stirred by the possibility of U.S.support foratwoChinasresolution.Ominously,hespeculatedthatChiangsdisenchantmentcould trigger dangerous adventures.. .up to and including a suicidal landing on the mainland. 54Attention soon turned to finding a less unpalatable alternative. At a White House meeting inlateJuly,thePresidentandhissenioraidesdecidedtopushforanimportantquestion formula,which would raise the bar substantially higher for themainlandsadmission to the UN byrequiringatwo-thirdsmajorityvoteintheGeneralAssembly.55 Themotionpassedbya comfortable margin in December.Even more momentous was Chiangssuccess in securing from Kennedy a secret pledge to use the American veto if necessary to prevent Beijings entry.56JFKs willingnesstograntwhathis predecessor hadrefusedstemmedfrom the needtodiscourage the GeneralissimofromsabotagingOuterMongoliasadmissiontotheUN,amovewhichwould have triggered similar Soviet action against Mauritaniassimultaneous bid for membership and a wave of French African resentment against the Nationalists.57KennedysambivalentflirtationwithtwoChinas,hisoptingfortheimportant questionmeasure,and thesecretvetopledgewerealldeterminedbythesamefactor thathad poisonedSino-Americanrelationsforoveradecade:afierceresistancetocompromisingthe alliancewith Taipei.Agitationfor achange in UN tactics had been propelledonly by thesense thatTaiwansholdon theChinaseat couldnolonger besecured by traditionalmethods.Itwas assumed by the Presidentand his aides that twoChinaswould be spumed by Beijing,thereby safeguardingTaiwansstatusandshifting theblamefor the mainlandsisolationawayfrom the U.S.Inshort,any contemplated departures from long-standing China policy at this time were,as27Noam Kochavi hasobserved, undertaken chiefly for reasons other than seeking to bring about a rapprochementwiththePRC. 58 Kennedysdeferencetoperceivedpublicsentimentandhis persistenthostilitytoMaosregime,sofundamentaltohisChinamindsetattheoutsetof his presidency, derailed even this defensive initiative and would continue to define the parameters of his China policy.A horrificfamine on the mainland,largely induced by the Great Leaps utopian effort to expediteChinaseconomicdevelopment through mass mobilization,introduced newstrainsinto theKennedyteamsalreadypricklyrelationshipwithTaipeiandwasoccasionforfurther considerationof a newapproach to Beijing. Reports of Chinasdomesticcrisis, which peaked in 1960-61,onlywhettedChiangsappetiteforamilitarylandingacrosstheTaiwanStrait.In separatemeetingswithRogerHilsman,directorof Statesbureauof IntelligenceandResearch (INR),and AssistantSecretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs AverellHarriman in March1962, heconveyedhisimpressionthatrecenteventsaffordeda uniqueopportunitytoexploitpopular discontentwiththeCCPandadvancehisdreamof reunification.TheGeneralissimoassured Hilsman that the administrations role in a military operation need not be substantial,asking only foritstacitconsenttothiscourseof action pluscovertlogisticsupport. 59U.S.officialswere hardly convinced. Intelligence reports agreed that mass suffering and resentment were widespread on the mainland, yet even these miserable conditions were not seen as conducive to a GRC attack orapopularrebellion;theregimesmonopolyonthecountrysinstrumentsof coercionwould enable it to ride through the current storm with little threat to its rule.60HauntedbytheBayof Pigsfiasco,Kennedyharborednothoughtsof acquiescing,let alone participating, in any adventure to overthrow the PRC. Like Truman and Eisenhower, JFKs unstintingpoliticalanddiplomaticsolidarity with Taiwandidnottranslateintoany unqualified backingforitswilderambitions.YetChiangsperceivedcapriciousnessseemedtodictatean ambiguousreplyfromtheadministration,lestanoutrightrefusalof hisrequesttriggeredan28irrationalresponse.61 DuringameetingwithCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA)DirectorJohn McCone,thePresidentinquiredwhatChiangwoulddoif heweretoldflatlythattheUnited States would notsupport him inany military operation against the Mainland.Itwasagreed that Chiang mightthengo it alone. 62Accordingly, the White House directed its envoys to handle theGeneralissimosprobesevasively,gentlyreminding himtohonorhisobligationstoconsult with the U.S. before opting for an attack.63Theadministrationsstudiedambiguitybecameincreasinglydifficulttosustain,as Beijinggrewalarmedover Taiwansthinlyveiledintentions.InJune1962,more than100000 Chinese troops were deployed to the coast to prepare for the contingency of a Nationalist assault. Whileavocalminorityof U.S.officialsinterpretedthemaneuverasapossiblepreludetoa Chinese strike on the offshore islands, Kennedysinner circle concluded that Maos actions were primarilydefensive.64 TheydeterminedthatdefusingyetanothercrisisintheTaiwanStrait depended,asithadbefore,onalertingthePRCsleadershiptoAmericasreadinesstorepel aggressionagainst Taiwan or its offshore possessions.Moreimportantly, however, the Kennedy teamalsomovedtodisabuseChinaof itsimpressionof U.S.hostilitybyutilizingavarietyof diplomatic channels at their disposal.Through the Soviets and British, Washington signalled that ithadnointentionof supportinganattackonthemainland.65 AmbassadorJohnMoorsCabot relayed thesame message to the Chinese during an exchange at the ongoing ambassadorial talks in Warsaw, highlighting the significance of this forum as a tool of crisis management.66AnuancedreadingofBeijingsintentionsandsensitivitytoitssecurityconcerns contributed handsomely to the administrations resolution of the affair.Some officials interpreted Chinasrelativelyprudentconductduringthebrief crisisasevidencethattheregimehadbeen chastened by thesevere economicfalloutfrom the Great Leap.Hilsmanspeculatedin July1962 that these conditions may well encourage it tofocus on domestic concernsand contribute to the adoption of a more moderate line in foreign policy during the1960s. 67There was in fact some indication that elements of the Chinese hierarchy supported such a course. In a conversation with29asenior British diplomat that same month, the contents of which were forwarded to Washington, Foreign Minister Chen Yi explained that his government wants international peace so that it may beleftfreetogetonwiththevasttasksof improvingthepeoplesstandardof livingandof nationaldevelopment...sincetheymustmobilizealltheirresourcesforinternaldevelopment, they do not want to get involved in any wars, big or small. 68Chens remarks were foreshadowed the previous summer by Ambassador Wang Bingnan in Warsaw, when a conciliatory appeal for a modusvivendiof sortswasissuedtohisAmericancounterpart.69U.S.analystshadviewed this overturewithsomesuspicion,thinkingitnothingmorethanapublicrelationsployorperhaps anotherefforttoexacerbatetensionsbetweenWashingtonandTaipei.70 Ruskauthorizedthe embassyinWarsawtoreciprocateWangssentiment,yettherefusalofeithersidetodiscuss concessions over Taiwan failed to produce a breakthrough.71Nevertheless, these hints of Chinese moderation were seized on by a handful of Kennedy officialsasanopportunityformodifyingAmericaseconomicembargoagainstthePRC.The most persistent members of this camp were Chester Bowles and Walt Rostow, who became head ofStatesPolicyPlanningCouncil(PPC)inNovember1961afterbrieflyservingasBundys deputy.Whiletheypressedtheircasewithoutanyapparentcoordination,bothsharedarather expansivesenseof Chinassusceptibility toAmerican powerandsolution. 72 Thecoreof their argument wasthat Beijingsgrave troubles,morespecifically itsdireshortageof food,could be used as a source of U.S. leverage over Chinese behavior. Despite Chicom [Chinese Communist] verbal toughness,Rostow wrote the President, they are in such bad trouble at home...that they may beseekingalimitedaccommodation with the West.Hesuggested thattheadministration exploititspositionof strengthandconsiderofferinggraintothemainlandinexchangefora curtailment of its subversive activity in Laos and Vietnam.73A similar recommendation for lifting restrictionson the sale of foodstuffs and medicines appeared in a major October1961study authored by Edward Rice, a mid-level China hand at the PPCwhohadsomewhatmiraculouslyemergedunscathedfromtheMcCarthyitepurgesof the301950s.Unlike Bowlesand Rostow, he believed Americascapacity for shaping events in China waslimited,yetthe vastarrayof policy proposalsoutlinedin hisreport were nolessambitious and were a source of inspiration to sympathizers throughout the administration.74Rice took as his starting point theideathat the bulk of our China policy... is related not to the mainland directly but to measures for the support and defense of the Free World countries and areas around Chinas periphery.By focusingsolely on containment and isolation, previous administrations had made noperceptibleprogresstowardaCommunistChinawithwhichwecanlive.Incanvassing policyoptions,Ricerejectedbothacourseof maximumpressure,whichpromisedonlyto furtherestrangetheU.S.fromworldopinionwithouteffectingacommensuratedeclinein Chinesepower,andoneof accommodation,whichwouldbetantamounttoanadmissionof defeat in a vital region of the world.Themostinnovativefeatureofhiscallforanewlookwasthecontentionthat demonstratingU.S.flexibilityandopennesstowardBeijing,besidestarringtheChineseinthe eyes of the world with the charge of obstinacy (a consideration which had initially recommended twoChinastoJFK),heldoutthepossibilityof appealingtoyounger,pragmaticelementsof ChinasrulingcirclewhohadbecomeaccustomedtoAmericanhostility.Themeansbywhich long-termreconciliationwithanewgenerationofleaderscouldbesetinmotionreadlikea shopping list of items that would be deliberated for the duration of the decade:the permission of trade in non-strategic goods, removal of the passport ban, avoidance of unnecessary provocations, disarmament talks, enhanced dialogue in Warsaw, and closer examination of the conditions under which non-recognition and Chinese exclusion from the UN could be reassessed.75The advocates of food relief for China in1961were hampered by their minimal access to Kennedyorhismosttrustedaides.Theseniorrankof bothBowlesandRostowbeliedtheir inconsiderableinfluenceontheforeignpolicymakingprocessandlackofrapportwiththeir superiors.76When an ideafor providing wheat to the PRC through Burmese intermediaries came upfor discussion in November,it wasstruck down by the same considerations that had thwarted31a newapproach toChinese representation. AState Department cable approved by Rusk asserted that the proposal was bound to create an extremely sensitive political problem for this country. Furthermore,anyfoodassistancewassimplyoutof thequestionwhenBeijingappearedtobe splittingevenfromMoscowinpursuanceofamoreaggressivepolicy,andwhenourown contactswiththeChineseCommunistauthoritiesshownoindicationordesireontheirpartto lessen the threat or reduce tensionsin Southeast Asia.77A meeting of NationalSecurity Council (NSC)stafferssimilarlydismissedanyfoodprogramastoopoliticallyrisky. 78 Abrief paper draftedbyStatesINRbureauinJanuary1962highlightedthestrategicdrawbacksassociated withanychangeintheeconomicembargo.Itadvisedagainstaninitiativeatthistime,as assistanceatamomentof greatperilforChinamightsparetheregimefrommakingdifficult choices,such as diverting its expenditures from heavy industry and armaments to agriculture and restricting its regional activism. The implication here was that Chinese moderation would be best brought about by letting the country stew in its own juice.79Ironically,BowlesandRostowscausewasgivensomethingof aleaseonlifeaftera bureaucraticpurgeinNovember1961(theso-calledThanksgivingDayMassacre ),of which they were the primary victims, Bowles losing the second most powerful post at Foggy Bottom for anineffectualroleasarovingAmbassadorandRostowmovingfromtheWhiteHousetothe PPC.80WithsomeconsequenceforChina policy,one beneficiaryof thischangingof theguard wasAverellHarriman,theformidableWashingtonpowerbrokerwhohadsteadilygained Kennedys trust.Elevated to head of the Far East bureau, he recruited Edward Rice asone of his deputies,therebyensuringthatrevisionistthinkingwouldgetafairhearing.81 Indeed,Rices appealforcultivatingmoreaccommodatingChineseelitesevidentlyresonatedmoreamong senior policymakersasthey debated the meritsof foodassistance in thespring of 1962than the Bowles-RostowthesisthatChinesesubversioncouldbetamedbytheofferof foodrelief.By earlyApril,generalagreementwithintheStateDepartmenthadbeenreachedonusingthe WarsawchanneltoinformtheChinese thatWashingtonwaswillingtoreconsideritsembargo32againsttheshipmentoffoodgrainsifadequatesuppliescouldnotbesecuredelsewhere.82Harrimanfoundmuchtorecommendin theidea,asEvidence thatthe USwouldbewilling to playapartinmovingourrelationshipawayfromoneofimplacablemutualhostilitymight strengthen the hand of any elements [in China]which might favor doing so, now or later. 83This themefiguredprominentlyinabriefingpaperusedbyRusktodiscussthesubjectwiththe President on 29 May.84WhileBowlesnumerous memorandaon theadvantagesof foodfor Chinaensured that Kennedy had been exposed to this view, his own thoughts are difficult to trace. He may well have been favorably influenced by Michael Forrestal, who was appointed as an Asian hand on the NSC staff inearly1962.Forrestalscordialrelationshipwith both KennedyandHarrimaneffectively easedcommunicationsbetween theOvalOfficeand theFar Eastbureau.85 Onemaysurmise that JFKacquiesced inStates proposal,astheembassyin Warsaw wasalerted theday after his meeting with the Secretary that it might be instructed soon to raise the offer of food in a normal and low-key manner(thereby alleviating any Chinese suspicions that it was a propaganda ploy) at a future ambassadors session.86This bridge building gesture, the first of Kennedys presidency,was soon overtaken by a confluenceofexternalevents.Thesuddenescalationof tensionsintheTaiwanStraitinJune distractedtheattentionof U.S.decision-makers.87 Thesensethatthemomentmightberipefor sendingasignaltocertainfactionsof theCCPshierarchygavewaytoanacutehardeningof attitudes.AnespeciallysignificantcatalystforthisshiftinperceptionwasChinasmounting conflictwithIndia,a country whosefate many in Washington,including the President,assumed would bedecisive indetermining theallegianceof muchof thedeveloping world.88 Only afew weeks after endorsing the idea, Rusk doubted how food from outside could have much effect on the general situation in Chinaand thought it would be essential.. .to have some indication from theChinese communists thatthey were relaxing their tacticsof pressure onIndiaandelsewhere inordertogetitthroughtheSenate. 89 Whenabrief Sino-IndianwareruptedinOctober,theKennedyteamsmostalarmistpreconceptionsaboutChinasbelligerentandaggressive tendencieswerecorroborated.WilliamBundy,thenworkinginthePentagon,recalledthe widespread impression, New Delhisshare of blame for the conflict notwithstanding, that China wasthrustingtobecomethedominantpowerinthearea,thatithadnowshownconsiderable cohesionandcapacityforsophisticatedpressure-typeaction.. .thecentralpolicyconclusionwas reached.. .that it was more than ever necessary to contain Peking as a real threat. 90While the mainlands role in the simultaneous Cuban missile crisis was much less direct, seniorU.S.officialsinterpretedBeijingsvitrioliccondemnationofKhrushchevfor capitulationisminremovingSovietmissilesfromtheislandasfurtherevidenceofits recklessness.SomecametobelievethattheKremlinhadbeengoadedintoactioninthe Caribbean by the militantinfluence of the Chinese.91 These events madeanindelibleimpression onKennedy,whocontrastedtheSovietsultimatewillingnesstostepawayfrom the brinkwith Chinasseemingdisregardfor the utilityof internationalcompromise.Wewouldbefar worse off, he concluded, if the Chinese dominated the Communist movement, because they believe in war as a means of bringing about the Communist world. 92Thisresurgenceofhigh-levelanimositytowardthePRC,followingabriefreprieve occasionedbytheimperativeof conflictmanagementintheTaiwanStraitandbythehopeof nurturingpotentiallymoderatefactionsdisenchantedwithMaosfailedGreatLeap,notonly relegatedChinapolicyreformtothebackbumer.ItalsospurredthePresidentsobsessionwith pre-emptingthemainlandsacquisitionofnuclearweaponry,anationalsecuritypriorityfor which he was willing to work in concert with Moscow.The notion of a Soviet-American identity of interests in checking Chinese ambitions had infactbeenanarticleoffaithformanyU.S.officialssincetheadventoftheKennedy administration.Barelysettledintooffice,twoofKennedysmostsenioradvisersonSoviet affairs, George Kennan and Llewellyn Thompson, pressed him to develop relations with Moscowasameansof exacerbatingSino-SoviettensionsandencouragingtheKremlinsapparentdrift fromBeijingshard-line.Thissamelogicwasrepeatedinseveralmemorandapreparedfor the Presidentintheweeksleading uptohisViennameetingwithKhrushchevinJune1961.93 The intelligence community agreed that the USSR was by far the more moderate and amenable of the twocommunistcountries.AlengthyCIAreportinAprildocumentedthesteadydeclinein Sino-Sovietrelationssincethe1950s,attributingthismajor developmentinlarge parttosharp differencesoverhowbesttoconfronttheU.S.Khrushchevsgropingfordetentewith Washington had aroused Chinese suspicions of a superpower condominium working against their interestsandrancountertotheirinsistenceonarevolutionaryoffensive.ThePRCs adventurism,inturn,wasviewedwithsomeconcernbytheSoviets,whoweredecidedly reluctanttobedrawnintounwantedconflicts.Despitethepressuresstrainingthecommunist alliance,however,thisreportandothersstoppedshortof predictingadefinitiverupture.While Sino-Sovietrelationswouldremaincoolandattimeshostilefortheforeseeablefuture, competitionwiththeWestmandatedatleastsomesemblanceofcooperation.94 Evenasthey closelyfollowedthetroublesplaguingtheSino-Sovietbloc,theKennedyteamwasinitially reluctanttopubliclyacknowledgetheexistenceof asplitor totiltdecisivelyinfavorof either side, a caution borne out of uncertainty over the durability of the feud and apprehension that any American action might unwittingly prompt a reconciliation.95The administrations passivity was increasingly challenged as new evidence pointed to an aggravation of the dispute. A January1962 meeting of State Department principals, presided over by Rusk,providedoneof thefirstforumsforsustaineddiscussion of the topic.The participants concurredthatMoscowandBeijinghadreachedanimpasse,whichseemedtooffer long-term advantagesfor the U.S., yet consideration of an appropriate response wasdeferred.96An impetus to policy revision came with a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) produced the following month. Discarding the hedged analysis that had hithertodominated official deliberation,it rather starkly concluded that Sino-Soviet relations are in a critical phase just short of an acknowledged35anddefinitivesplit.Thereisnolongermuchchanceofafundamentalresolutionof differences...the chances that such a split can be avoided during1962are no better than even.97Embracingthisthinking,RostowsPPCrespondedwithadetailedlistofrecommendations. Asserting that there wasnolonger any need to inhibit ourselvesfrom action becauseof fear of driving Moscow and Peiping together,the paper covered familiar ground, calling for intensified effortstosearchforareasofoverlappinginterestwiththeKremlin,specificallythe containmentofChinasnuclearprogramanditssubversiveactivityinSoutheastAsia.More innovatively,itadvocateda two-prongedstrategytowardthePRC,combiningfirmdeclarations and military pressures todeter Chinese aggression withafreshfocusonestablishing newlines of communicationwith the mainland.Thelatter would be undertakenin thehope thatBeijing mightbeinterestedinbetteringitsrelationswiththeWestsoastobeindependentof bloc pressuresandwithaneyeaswelltomoderatingtheattitudesof thepost-Maogenerationof Chinese Communist leaders. 98Asontheissueoffoodrelief,however,Rostowswasaminorityview.Amore influentialschoolof thought, articulated by the administrations senior Kremlinologists (Kennan, Thompson,CharlesBohlen),heldthatFebruarysNIEhadunderestimatedthepotentialfora temporaryaccommodationbetweenthetwocommunistpowersandoverestimatedAmericas abilitytoinfluencetherelationship;inviewof theinsufficiencyof ourknowledgeof thereal factorsinoperationbetweenthesecountries,Bohlencautioned,wecertainlyshouldnot predicateanypolicyonthefactof theChinese-Sovietdispute. 99 Ruskevidentlyagreed.He shelved Rostows proposals, save for a modest idea to psychologically exploit the conflict via the dissemination of information concerning its development.100Sinceassumingoffice,Kennedyhadtakenakeenpersonalinterestintracking Sino-Sovietrelations.101 Hetendedtosidewiththosewhofavoredadiscreetpublicposture, thinking it 4tunwise for the UnitedStates to talk about a matter over which we have only limited control. 102Privately,however,the Presidentwaslessimpartialandneutral,ultimatelyhopeful36that he could cultivatea mutualSoviet-Americaninterest in thwarting Chinas nuclear program. When he raised the prospect of a nuclear PRC during a tense session with Khrushchev in Vienna, however,hewasrebuffed.103 TheSovietleadersreticenceappearedtoconfirmtheviewthat Moscow was unwilling to imperil its leadership of the international communist movement for the sakeof actingincollusion withtheimperialistsagainstBeijing.Evenasintelligencereports pointedtoanintensificationof theSino-Sovietrivalryintheaftermathof theCubanmissile crisis,104 severalofficialsopinedthatthe Kremlinssensitivity toChinasstingingindictmentof peacefulco-existence,whichwasincreasinglyresonatingamongAsiancommunistparties, would continue to tie its hands and complicate East-West dialogue on a host of issues.105Kennedydoesnotseemtohavebeendiscouragedbythisadvice.Havingjustbarely avertedanuclearcatastropheintheCaribbean,hebelievedthatfuturecrisescouldbestbe containedbyreininginthearmsraceanddiscouragingtheeffortsof otherpowerstoacquire weapons of mass destruction.106His push for Soviet-American detente in1963, culminating in the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in August, was determined in no small part by mounting concerns over the PRCs nuclear program. In January1963, McGeorge Bundy asked McCone for anewestimateonChinasnuclearprogress,explainingthatthePresidentwasof amindthat nuclearweaponsinthehandsof theChineseCommunistswouldsoupsettheworldpolitical sceneitwould beintolerabletotheUnitedStatesandtotheWest. 107JFKsfearof anuclear Chinawasintenseandlong-standing.108 Hisinterestinobstructingorpostponingthis development sprang from both a generalaversion to nuclear proliferation and, more importantly, animositytowardMaosregime.Expoundingonthenatureofthisthreatduringapress conference,he drewattention toa government[that]isnotonlyStalinistin its internalactions, butalsohascalledforwar,internationalwar,inordertoadvancethefinalsuccessofthe Communistcause...Andthenyouintroduceintothatmix,nuclearweapons.Thepotential acquisitionoftheseweaponsbyaninherentlybellicoseleadershipamountedtoamore37dangeroussituationthananywefacedsincetheendof theSecond[World]War,becausethe Russians pursued in most cases their ambitions with some caution. 109KennedysapparentwillingnesstocontemplatemilitaryactionagainstChinasnuclear facilities,includingthepossibilityofajointSoviet-Americanstrike,remainsapointof controversy.Some historians and former aides have insisted that the President merely engaged in speculativecontingencyplanningandwasnotirrevocablycommittedtotheradical pre-emptiveoption.110 Nevertheless,JFKssustainedconsiderationof thisalternative(evenif speculative)providesmuchinsightintohisChinamindsetduringhislastyearinoffice,his perceptions of Sino-Soviet differences, and how he hoped toexploit these to Americasstrategic advantage.Hehadallof thismindwhenhepressedfor theconclusionof atest banagreement with Moscow during a January 1963 meeting of the NSC. Our primary purpose in trying to get a treatywithRussiaistohaltordelaythedevelopmentof anatomiccapabilitybytheChinese Communists,heexplained.Hethoughtthisfeasiblesincethe Russiansarebelievedtobeas concernedabout[this]asweare. 111 Theconsiderablefaithinvestedinatreatyrestednotso much on theexpectation that Beijing would willingly accede toits termsas on the hope that the Kremlincouldberecruitedasapartnerinapplyingpressureonthemainlandtodeistfromits nuclear ambitions.112Kennedyevidentlybelievedthatthispressurecouldassumeanynumberofforms: political,economic,and,ifnecessary,military.Hehintedatthelatterwhenhepersonally instructedHarriman,hisenvoytotheMoscowtestbantalksthatstartedinJuly,toelicit Khrushchevs view of [the] means of limiting or preventing Chinese nuclear development and his willingnesstotakeSovietactionortoacceptUSactionaimedinthisdirection. 113 Harriman likely didnotexplicitly raise the topicof a jointstrike,Sovietacquiescencein aU.S.attack,or coordinated pressure of another sort;once theSovietleader refused toconcede concern over the prospect of a nuclear China, even after gentle prodding from his American interlocutor, the issue hadbeensettled.114While aSoviet-American initiativeseemedto have been takenoff the table,38the option of unilateral U.S.action against the mainlandsfacilities wasstill being considered at thetimeof JFKsassassinationandwasoneof manyoutstandingissuesthatwouldhave tobe resolved by his successor.115High-levelenmity toward the PRC in1963co-existed,as it had throughout the Kennedy presidency,withpressurefrombelowforareappraisalofattitudes.JustasHarrimans appointment to States Far Eastern bureau in November1961had lent considerable momentum to the administrationsdiscussion of afood initiative,the promotionof Roger Hilsman to thesame post in April1963spurred a renewed outburst of pro-reformsentimentin governmentcircles.116Brashandimpudent,theWestPointgraduateruffledthefeathersof many,withthenotable exceptionof Kennedy,with whom hesharedafascinationwithcounterinsurgency.117Striking a dissonant note, Hilsman assumed his new role with a nuanced reading of Chinese intentionsand capabilities.Hesurmised thatBeijingswarlike oratory belied tacticalcautionand thatits threat toU.S.securityinterestshadbeenexaggerated.ThedecisiontoattackIndia,forexample,had been in part a rational reaction to New Delhis provocative construction of military posts on its border.Criticism of Khrushchevsmove toremove the missilesfromCuba hadarisenfrom an opportunity.. .to assault theSovietsfor what Peiping considered a clumsy handling of the crisis andwasthereforenotanaccurateindicatorof whattheChinesewouldthemselveshavedone under similar circumstances.Indeed, Hilsman believed that Chinas instinctive wariness of rash military action, which had for long been conditioned by fear of an American reply, would only be strengthenedovertimebydoubtsaboutSovietbackingandbytheoverriding needtofocuson economicreconstructionathome.118 Intelligenceanalystsgenerallyaffirmedthisimageofa risk-averseChina,particularlywhenspeculationthatBeijingmightlashoutinreactiontoits growingisolationfollowingthesuccessfultestbantalksinMoscowwasconvincingly dismissed.119 Similarlycalmassessmentsof theimplicationsof aChinesenuclear testappeared late in Kennedys tenure and helped shape the Johnson teams handling of this issue.12039Hilsmans sober reflection on the Chinese challenge fed his interest in revising Americas traditionalapproachtothemainland.Hecametofavorapolicyofcontactaswellas containment:contact to break down the Chinese isolation and containment to prevent any further Communist aggression. Ultimately an emphasis on the former would hasten the changes which domestic economic pressuresand international problems willforce on Peiping. 121This thinking was strongly influenced by a core of State Department China hands, men such as James Thomson (whohadservedasanaidetoBowlesbeforemovingtotheFarEasternbureau)andMarshall Green(theConsulGeneralinHongKong),whoheldthattherewasacompellingshort-and long-termrationaleforprojectingmoderationtowardthePRC.Whileitwasconcededthat gesturesofgoodwillwouldmostlikelyfailtoelicitapositiveChinesereply,theywouldat minimumserve the purposeof burnishing Americaspeacefulimage.Revivinganidea thathad beendiscussedinEdwardRicesOctober1961paper,theseofficialsalsorecommendedthat attemptsbemadetoencourageamorefavorableimpressionof theU.S.amongthoseyounger leaders, presumably disillusioned with the excesses of Maoism, who would succeed the Chairman andhiscomrades.122 Onlybybroadeningasfaraspossibleourpresenttenuouslinesof communicationintoCommunistChina,Green posited,couldWashingtonhopetocounteract Peipingshatecampaign[againsttheU.S.],toestablishabetterlong-rangebasisfor rapprochement,and to abet already discernible tendencies toward moderation and realism within certainelementsof theChineseCommunistbureaucracy .123 HilsmandepartedfromtheChina dovesinplacingtheburdenonBeijingforanimprovementinrelations,124 yetthepolicy reviewundertaken at his direction firmlyensconced him within the reform camp.Healerted his superiorstothedearthof ChineseexpertiseatFoggyBottomandsuccessfullylobbiedforthe creationof anOfficeof AsianCommunistAffairs(ACA)intheFarEasternbureau.125 Bylate 1963,proposalsforarelaxationof tradeandtravelrestrictions,andforChinasinclusionin disarmament talks had been prepared.12640The mostnotable productof thisbureaucraticferment wasalandmarkspeech delivered bytheAssistantSecretaryon13December.Whilecarefullyworded,payingduelipserviceto popularimagesofanexpansionistChinaandofferingarationaleforthecontinuationofits containment, the address was path-breaking in two respects. First, in a highly significant symbolic gesture, Hilsman explicitly acknowledged what policymakers had for long implicitly recognized, thatthecommunistregimeonthemainlandwasnotapassingphenomenon.Second,reference was made to a second echelonof Chinese leaders possibly inclined to rapprochement with the outside world. With this faction in mind, he called for an Open Door policy based on strength andfirmness,accompanied byaconstantreadinesstonegotiate.Byannouncingan American willingness to reciprocate good behavior, he hoped to alert Maos successors to the prospect that thewaybackintothecommunityof manisnotclosed. 127 Assuch,thespeechrepresenteda subtlecritiqueof ongoingefforts toisolatethe PRCfrom theworldcommunity.Explaining his motivesinasubsequentlettertoAdlaiStevenson,Hilsmanassertedthattherewasaneedto justifythedivergenceinU.S.relationswiththemajorcommunistpowers.Detentewiththe Soviets,hereasoned,hadarisenfrombothU.S.resolveinfacingdowntheKremlinandan openness to responding in kind to signs of Soviet moderation. His hope was that, in signalling the administrationsreadinesstorewardprudentChineseconduct,asimilarstateof affairscould emerge with the mainland.128Had Kennedy been converted to thisembryoniclineof containment without isolation ontheeveof hisdeath?Thoseanswering in theaffirmativehavecitedan oft-quoted remarkof thePresidentsathislastpressconference:When theRedChineseindicateadesiretoliveat peace with the United States, with other countries surrounding it, then quite obviously the United States would reappraise its policies. We are not wedded to a policy of hostility to Red China. 129Thisinterpretation,of course,fallsshortonseveralfronts.Itexaggeratesthesignificanceof a policy reviewthat,bylate1963,had notadvanced beyondthemid-ranksof the bureaucracy.130Moreover,itattributestoKennedyaviewforwhichthereisnoempiricalevidence;givenhis41propensity for confidentiality and off the record discussions, it may well never be known whether he had been keptfully abreast of Hilsmans projector,if he had,where hissympathieslay.The mostauthoritativeaccountofJFKsChinarecord,sensibly,doesnotarriveatanyfirm conclusionsastohisdispositioninthefallof1963.131 Yetifthedynamicsthathadclearly prevailed through thesummer -a conservative reading of his politicalmandate in general and of publicattitudes toward the mainland in particular,asense that the extension of any olive branch wouldonlybespumedbyBeijing,andapronouncedconcernaboutChinasbehaviorandthe progressofitsnucleardevelopment-aretobetakenasanyguide,thenonecouldplausibly surmisethatthePresidentwasnotprepared tolaunchnewChinainitiatives,mostcertainly not before the1964election.Thereappearstohave been littleof theambiguityin theChina policy sphere that characterized most other aspects of John Kennedys legacy.ThescarcityofpolicyinnovationandcontinueddeadlockbetweenWashingtonand Beijing notwithstanding,it does notfollow that the Kennedy years marked an inconsequential or evenstagnantphaseintheSino-Americanrelationship.Aparticularlynoteworthythemethat emergesfromanoverviewof thisperiodisthesustainedagitationfornewapproachestothe mainlandvoicedbyseveralKennedyofficials.Therationaleemployedtoadvancetheircase varied.Perhapsthemostcommonrefrain,towhichevenKennedyoccasionallysubscribed(as when he conditionally accepted a switch to two Chinas and appeared to signal his approval of a food initiative), was that the U.S. needed to divest itself of much of the heavy baggage associated withtheisolationcomponentof itsChina policyand therebydeflect the blamefor continued Sino-Americanfriction.ByevincinganopennesstoexpandingcontactswithBeijing,and exposing the mainlandsrigidityin the process, Washingtoncouldstem thelossof international support for Taiwan and bolster its justification for containing the PRC.Themoreenthusiasticadvocatesof policyreformcertainlyagreedwiththisdefensive logic,yettheyalsomaintained thatAmericacouldfavorablyinfluenceChinasorientation.The42most ambitious reformers (Bowles, Rostow) harbored what were surely misplaced hopes that the countrysexpansionistdesignscould be reinedin by the offer of American largesse,a grandiose idea that won few converts and was largely abandoned even by its most vociferous proponents in theaftermathofeventsinIndiaandCuba.132 Amoremodestandenduringschoolof thought (Hilsman,Rice,Green, Thomson)asserted that thefirst generation of Chinese revolutionariesin power,whilemorecautiousandrisk-aversethanprevailingassumptionsamongU.S. decision-makersallowed,wereinherentlyopposedtoaccommodationwithWashington. Long-term trends in China, however,offered reason for hope. A younger faction of leaders, more pragmatically inclined to focusing their energies on consolidating political and economic order at home,wouldeventuallyassumeresponsibility.Relaxingthemoreobdurateandantiquated aspectsof U.S.policy,particularlythetradeandtravelembargo,wouldsignalrestrainttothese elementsandpossiblysetthestageforanewerainSino-Americanrelations.Inshort,as internationalacceptanceof thePRCgatheredsteamandconditions on the mainlandevolved,so toodidattitudesandperceptionsinU.S.governmentcircles.Bothwhatmightbecalledthe defensiveand activistrationalesfor policy revision,having taken rootin theearly1960s, would be pressed with greater frequency during Lyndon Johnsons presidency.Theshort-termlegacyof KennedysantagonisticdealingswithChinawas,of course, decidedlynegative.Recentliteraturehasconfirmed thatBeijing boreitsfairshareof blamefor theSino-Americanimpasseatthistime.JFKstenureinofficecoincidedwithaperiodof profoundanxietyforMao,whosefearsofgrowingcollaborationbetweenMoscowand Washington were overshadowed only by the sense that the revolution at home had been hijacked bySoviet-stylerevisionism.AstheChairmanturnedhisattentiontoturningasidethethreatof capitalistrestoration,hesawaradicallineinforeignpolicyasanaturalcomplementtothis projectandacatalystfordomesticmobilization.133 Maoistrhetoric,particularlytheespousalof revolutionaryupheavalthroughouttheAffo-AsianworldandhostilitytowardMoscowssearch for peaceful co-existence with the West, made a deep impression on Kennedy. It served only to43confirmthedeeply-ingrainedimageofamilitant,expansionistChinawithnoregardfor AmericanconceptionsofinternationalorderthathehadharboredbeforeoccupyingtheOval Office.Itisdoubtfulheeverpartedfromthispreconception;itsmostdramaticmanifestation came late in his presidency as he and his most senior advisersseriously considered taking action todisruptthePRCsnuclearprogram.Kennedyssteadyresistancetonewapproachestothe mainland,cultivation of detente with theSoviets,andstaunch diplomaticsolidarity with Taiwan undoubtedlyunnervedhisChinesecounterpartsandcontributedtotheirgrowingsenseof encirclement.Camelotsrecordalsocastanimposingshadowforaninsecuresuccessorseton hewing as close as possible to the inherited line in foreign affairs.442Holes in the Dam:French Recognition and the Chinese Nuclear Test, 1963-1964WhenLyndonJohnsonunexpectedlyinheritedthepresidencyinNovember1963,a multitudeof domesticandforeignitemscrowdedhisagenda.Chinapolicy,forwhichhehad evincedminimalinterestthroughouthislongpoliticalcareer,wasnotoneofthem.LBJ approachedforeign affairsingeneraland Asiancommunism in particular with some trepidation, fearfulthatamisstepinthisarenacouldpotentiallysaphisdomestic standingandimperilthe passageof hislegislativeprogram.ItwasthereforeironicthatJohnsonsfirstyearinpower coincidedwithamomentouschangeinthePRCsinternationalrelationships.BothFrances recognitionof BeijingandChinasnuclear testexposed thesurreality of ostracizing the worlds mostpopulousnation,andbroughtforthatorrentof callsfromhomeandabroadforthenew administrationtoreviseAmericastraditionalapproachtothe PRC.Johnsonsreactiontothese developmentsprovidesconsiderableinsightintohisChinamindsetandmodusoperandiasa foreignpolicyleaderintheearlystagesof hispresidency.Instarkcontrasttohispredecessor, JohnsondisplayedneitherovertconcernovertheprospectofanuclearChinanorsustained interestin the optionof amilitarystrikeagainst Beijingsfacilities.Atthesame time,however, hewascontenttolettheforeignaffairsteambequeathedbyKennedyhandlethediplomatic responsetoChinasgrowinginternationalstaturewhilehefocusedonmorepressingconcerns. ThusdespiteamoderatingpresenceintheOvalOffice,therewasnocommensurateshiftin Americas posture toward the mainland.Bythetimeheassumedthereinsof thepresidencyinNovember1963,Johnsonhelddeeplyingrainedimpressionsof theworldwhichgovernedhisapproachtoforeignaffairsingeneral and his views of China in particular.As with so many of his generation, the lessonsofMunichleftanindeliblemark.FromthefailureoftheWesterndemocraciestodeterfascist45aggression in the1930s, Johnson acquired the conviction that America had an indispensable role toplayinensuring world peaceandsecurity,thatithadtomaintainahighstandardof military preparedness,and that it had to make its determination to protect its far-flung interests credible to foeandfriendalike.1LBJsoverridingpreoccupationwithcredibilitystemmedfromthebelief thattestsofAmericanresolvehadtobesuccessfullymetandaggressiveconductdecisively checkedsoastoavertthehorrorsof anotherglobalconflagration.In justifyinghisdecisionto interveneinVietnamtoDorisKearnsafterheleftoffice,Johnsonreasonedthatthevoicesof appeasementandisolationism had conveyed the wrong messages to Hitler and