Pihlstrom

Studies / Studien / Études

OriginalPaperUDC111:165.741ReceivedJuly17th,2009

Sami PihlströmHelsinkiCollegiumforAdvancedStudies,Fabianinkatu24(P.O.Box4),FIN-00014UniversityofHelsinki

[email protected]

The Contextuality of Scheme-(In)Dependence in Pragmatist Metaphysics

AbstractThis paper discusses a modern, especially pragmatist, variant of the Kantian issue of the mind- or scheme-dependence of ontology. It is suggested that the distinction between scheme-dependence and scheme-independence in (pragmatist) transcendental metaphysics is itself contextual, not absolute, and that this contextuality is a “transcendental fact” about our practice-embedded world-constitutive activities.

Key wordspragmatism,ontology,metaphysics,realism,conceptualschemes,transcendentalidealism,contexts,contextualism

1. Introduction

Inthecentraltraditionsofmodernphilosophy,includingthepragmatisttradi-tion,severalthinkershavearguedthattheexistenceand/oridentityofthings(entities,facts,orwhateverthereistakentobeintheworld)isinawayoranotherrelativeto,ordependenton,thehumanmind,linguisticframeworks,conceptual schemes, practices, language-games, forms of life, paradigms,pointsofview,orsomethingsimilar.Amongthehistoricallyinfluentialde-fendersofkeyvariationsofthis“dependencethesis”–startingalreadyfromthepre-historyofpragmatism, including figuresonlymarginally involvedinpragmatism,andendingupwithrelativelyrecentneopragmatism–are,forinstance,ImmanuelKant(theempiricalworldisconstitutedbythetrans-cendentalfacultiesofthemind,i.e.,thepureformsofintuitionandthepureconceptsorcategoriesoftheunderstanding),WilliamJames(whateverwemay call a ‘thing’ dependsonour purposes and selective interests),F.C.S. Schiller (we “humanistically” construct the world and all truths aboutitwithinourpurposivepractices),JohnDewey(theobjectsof inquiryareconstructedinandthroughinquiry,insteadofexistingas“ready-made”priorto inquiry),RudolfCarnap (ontologicalquestionsaboutwhether therearecertain kinds of entities can only be settled within linguistic frameworks,“internally”,whereas“external”questionsconcernthepragmaticcriteriafor

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA51(1/2011)pp.(161–173)

S.Pihlström,TheContextualityofScheme-(In)DependenceinPragmatistMetaphysics162

choosingoneoranother linguistic framework),W.V.O.Quine (ontologyis not absolute but relative to a theory, language, or translation scheme),LudwigWittgenstein(the“essence”ofthingsliesin“grammar”,thusinthelanguage-gamesweengagein,insteadoftranscendingourlanguage-useand“form of life”), Hilary Putnam (there is no “ready-made world” but onlyscheme-internalobjects),NelsonGoodman(we“makeworlds”,or“worldversions”, by employing our various symbol systems), Thomas S. Kuhn(differentscientificparadigmsconstitutedifferent“worlds”),RichardRorty(our “vocabularies” constitute the ways the world is for us, and we must“ethnocentrically”startfromwithinthevocabularieswecontingentlypos-sess),possiblyevenWilfridSellars (thebest-explainingscientific theoriesarethe“measure”ofwhatthereisandwhatthereisnot),andothers–nottoforgetDonaldDavidson’sfamouscritiqueofsuchformsofrelativismandthe implicated distinction between a conceptual scheme and its allegedlyscheme-neutral content, or other noteworthy criticisms of conceptual andontologicalrelativism.1

Intheirdistinctiveways,theseandmanyotherthinkershavesuggestedthatthere isnoabsoluteworldan sich thatwecouldmeaningfullyconceptual-izeorcognize; if there is suchaworld,asKantheld, it isamere limitofourthoughtandexperience,aproblematicGrenzbegriff.Whatthereisfor us (für uns)isaworldwehaveconstructed,andarecontinuouslyconstructing,relativetoourschemesofcategorizationandinquiry.Pragmatists,however,generallyfollow–oratleastshouldfollow–Kantinembracingsomethinglikeempirical realism(andnaturalism)withinabroaderpragmatistpositioncomparabletoKantiantranscendental idealism.Eventhephilosophicalprag-matist should not simply opt for antirealism or radical constructivism andrelativisminontologybut, rather,seekamoderatepragmaticrealismcom-patiblewithnaturalism.Theproblemishowtocombinethe(transcendental)scheme-dependenceof entities2with theirpragmatic scheme-independence(at theempirical level) inpragmatistmetaphysics.3This is, essentially, thepragmatistversionoftheKantianproblemofmaintainingbothempiricalreal-ismandtranscendentalidealism–boththeempiricalindependenceofthingsandtheirtranscendentaldependenceonthewaysweconstructthemthroughourvariousschemes.ForKant,spatio-temporalobjectsintheempiricalworldarereally“outsideus”(ausser uns)andinthissenseexist,empiricallyspeak-ing,mind-orscheme-independently.Nevertheless,theyaretranscendentallydependentonus,becausethespatio-temporalandcategorialframeworkmak-ingthempossibleasobjectsofexperience(appearances)arisesfromourcog-nitive faculties (i.e., sensibilityandunderstanding).Replace the latterwithhumancognitiveandconceptualizingpractices,andyouhavethepragmatistissueofontological(in)dependence.ThefactthatIamformulatingthisproblemfromthestandpointofpragma-tismshouldnotbetakentoimplythatthiswouldnotbeaproblemfornon-pragmatists.On the contrary, the issue is general enough tobe relevant tomuchofpost-Kantianphilosophyfocusingontherealismvs.idealismprob-lem.NotealsothatIamnotheregoingtosettletheinterpretivequestionofwhatpragmatismis.Thisisnottherightplacetoprovidetextualevidenceforpragmatists’commitment to theproblemIhavedescribed.4Differentprag-matists, classical or recent,maybe committed to it in differentways; yet,somethingliketheabove-describedissueofscheme-(in)dependenceclearlyrunsthroughthepragmatisttraditionfromJamesandDeweytoPutnamandRorty,andbeyond.



2. Contextualization

Themainproposalofthispaper,oneIhopecouldbeattractivetopragma-tists in particular (thoughnot only to them), is that onepromisingwayofdealingwiththisissueisbycontextualizingthedistinctionbetweenscheme-dependentandscheme-independententities.5Nothingisabsolutelyscheme-

1

See, e.g.: Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft(1781/1787),ed.RaymundSchmidt(Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1990); WilliamJames,Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking(1907),eds.FrederickH. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and IgnasK. Skrupskelis (Cambridge, MA and Lon-don:HarvardUniversityPress,1975);F.C.S.Schiller,Pragmatism and Humanism: Selected Writings 1891–1939,eds.JohnR.ShookandH.P.MacDonald(Amherst,NY:Prometheus/Humanity Books, 2008); John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty: A Study on the Relation between Knowledge and Action(1929)(NewYork: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1960); RudolfCarnap, “Empiricism,Semantics,Ontology”(1950), anthologized in (e.g.) Jaegwon KimandErnestSosa(eds.),Metaphysics: An An-thology(Malden,MAandOxford:Blackwell,1998);W.V.O.Quine,“OnWhatThereIs”(1948), in:Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia UniversityPress,1969);LudwigWittgenstein,Philoso-phical Investigations(1953),trans.G.E.M.Anscombe(Oxford:Blackwell,1958);HilaryPutnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981);HilaryPutnam,Realism with a Human Face,ed.JamesConant(Cambridge,MAandLon-don:HarvardUniversityPress,1990);NelsonGoodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indiana-polis:Hackett,1978);ThomasS.Kuhn,The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed.(Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1970[1sted.1962]);RichardRorty,Philoso-phy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton,NJ:Princeton University Press, 1979); RichardRorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1991); Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and KeganPaul,1963).ForDavidson’sseminalcritiqueof the scheme–content distinction and theresulting conceptual relativism, see DonaldDavidson,“OntheVeryIdeaofaConceptualScheme”(1974),inDavidson,Inquiries into Interpretation and Truth(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1984);cf.also,e.g.,IlkkaNiiniluoto’svigorousattackoncognitiverelativisminhisCritical Scientific Realism (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,1999).

2

Iamassuminganontologicalsenseofbothde-pendenceandindependencehere.Roughly,anentityaisontologicallydependentonanotherentityb,iffacannotexistunlessb exists,thatis,b’sexistenceisrequiredfora’sexistence.

Forexample,tropes(ormodes)aredependentontheparticularstheyqualify:ifthereisnosuchentityasthisparticularshirt,itsparticu-larshadeof redcannotexist (bereal)either–unlessparticularsthemselvesareconstruedasbundlesof tropes.The relevantnotionofontological (in)dependence must be distin-guished from causal (in)dependence (andofcourselogical(in)dependence).Atableiscausallydependenton itsmaker’sactivities,butwhenmade,itisontologicallyindepend-entofthem(atleastaccordingtorealistmeta-physicians),becauseitcouldremainexistingevenifitsmakerdisappearedfromtheworld.For more detailed discussions of ontologi-cal dependence and independence, see E. J.Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics: Sub-stance, Identity and Time(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1998);andLowe,The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press,2006).HereImustignorethedifferencesbe-tween, say, Lowe’s “rigid” and “non-rigid”notions of ontological dependence. Lowe’smetaphysically realist (very anti-pragmatist)ontology makes the interesting twist of re-gardingpersonsasametaphysicallyprimitiveground upon which other things are depen-dent.Comparedtomanyothercontemporary(largelymaterialist)formsofmetaphysicalre-alism,thisisarelativelyunorthodoxposition.(I amhere indebted toHeikki J.Koskinen’shithertounpublishedworkonthistopic.)

3

Yes,thereissuchathingaspragmatistmeta-physics.Cf.SamiPihlström,Pragmatist Met-aphysics: An Essay on the Ethical Grounds of Ontology (London: Continuum, 2009).Thispaperdoesnotargueforthepossibilityofsuchmetaphysicsbutinvestigatesafunda-mentalproblemwithinit,notadequatelydealtwithinthejustmentionedbook.

4

For a comprehensivediscussionof the real-ism issue in the pragmatist tradition up tomid-1990s, see Sami Pihlström, Structuring the World: The Issue of Realism and the Na-ture of Ontological Problems in Classical and Contemporary Pragmatism,ActaPhilosoph-icaFennica59 (Helsinki:ThePhilosophicalSocietyofFinland,1996).

5

Iwillsimplyspeakaboutscheme-(in)depen-dence,insteadof,say,mind-(in)dependence,prac-



(in)dependentbutisdependentorindependentonlyinagivencontext,orfromaspecificperspective,ratherthanfromanimaginedGod’s-EyeView.Thus,pragmatists shouldnotdeny the scheme-dependencevs. scheme-independ-encedistinction(understoodascontextualizable)butonlythecorrespondingdichotomyordualism(understoodasabsolute,non-perspectival,uncontex-tualizable).6Onemay,inotherwords,maintaintheformerbyredescribingitthroughpractice-relativecontextualization.However, thecontexts (orperspectives) invokedherecanalsobe regardedas“entities”thatthemselvesneedtobecontextualizedinordertobeidentifi-ableascontextsatall.(Thisfollowsfromourextremelybroadnotionofanentity.)AcontextCis“real”,andcontextualizesthescheme-(in)dependenceofcertainentities(a,b),onlywithinafurthercontextC’,andsoon(ad infini-tum).Noteventhecontextualization–and,hence,thecontextualvalidation–ofthedistinctionbetweenscheme-dependenceandscheme-independenceisnon-contextualorabsolute(orabsolutelyscheme-independent).Itisinandthroughourschemes,whichdescribethecontextsweareabletoworkwithiningivensituations,thatwedeterminethecontextswithinwhichthingscanbescheme-dependentorscheme-independent.Thisprocessofcontextualizationisindefinitelylong,asanyreflexiveprocesspotentiallyis.The“situations”weare“in”,givingrisetocertaincontextsofthoughtandinquiry,canthem-selves, again, be only contextually identified as such. Moreover, “we” arewhateverweareonlyincertaincontextswefindourselvesin.Iamnotevenassumingthatwewouldhaveacontext-independentidentity–eventhoughthecontextswemaybeindependonusandthusonourcontextuallyemerg-ingidentities.The contextualization I am trying to articulate amounts to a kind of prag-matic “naturalization”ofKantian transcendental idealism.7Given thekindof creatures we (context-embeddedly) are, we are fully naturally situatedwithin context-dependent and context-creating practices (or whatWittgen-steincalled“formsoflife”)8thatconstitute(againcontextual)transcendentalconditionsforthepossibilityofvariousthingsweassumetobeactualinourlives,suchascognitiveexperienceormeaningfullanguage.Thesepracticescontain“relativeapriori”conditionsthatstructureourwaysofexperiencingreality,thatis,contextualizedtranscendentalconditionsforcertaingivenhu-manactualities.Thekeyobservationhereisthatthispragmatic,naturalizedviewistranscendentallyidealisticinthesenseofemphasizingthetranscen-dentalroleplayedbyournaturalpracticesofcopingwiththeworld,thatis,inthesenseofacknowledgingthedependenceofnotjustsocialrealitybutthenatural,worldlyobjectssurroundingusonourspecificallyhuman,context-ladenwaysofrepresentingthemfromstandpointslyingwithinourpractices,withincontextuallysituatedpointsofviewembeddedinthosepractices.While I just said that contexts are “entities”, given a broad understandingof“entity”,itisveryimportanttoacknowledgetheirspecificwayofbeing.Contextuality isgenerality; contexts are, though perhaps entities, certainlynotparticulars. Instead, theyarewhatenablesus toontologicallypostulateand individuateparticularsor anyother entities, for thatmatter (that is, tomakeanyontologicalcommitments,toengageinontologicalcategorizationatall).InPeirceanterms,contextsarereal(butdonotthemselves“exist”inthewayparticularentitiesdo).9Contexts,intherelevantsenseinvokedhere,arecomparabletostandpointsorpointsofviewenablingusto“see”theworldincertainways–makingcertain (kindsof) entitiesontologically“visible”tous.Contextsprovideframeworkswithinwhichthings(entities)canexist



and/orbereal,andwithinwhichtheycanbemind-and/orscheme-dependentor-independent.Itisperhapsbettertotalkaboutcontextualizingasanon-go-inghumanactivityinsteadofpostulatingcontextsasentities,afterall;assuchactivities,however,theyarewhatPeircecalled“realgenerals”.However, the transcendental scheme-independence that I am describing interms of the notion of contextuality must not, as Robert Hanna points out(moreexplicitlyinconnectionwithKantscholarship),beunderstoodasde-pendenceonhumanbiologyordependenceonsocialconsensus,butinsteadas the dependence of the empirical world “on the existence of the specialfinitesensory,discursive,andrationalcognitivearchitecturethatdefinesusasmindedcreatures”10–thatis,ontheexistenceofthespecialkindofcogni-tivepracticeswehumanbeingsnaturallyengage in,practicesprovidinguswiththerelevantcontextsforconstitutingwhateverentitiesthereare,orcanbe,inaworldexperienceablebyus.ThekeyKantian-cum-pragmatic“facts”aboutusandour“cognitivearchitecture”, factsdefiningourfinitenessandpractice-embeddedness,aretrulynaturalfacts,thoughtheyatthesametimeplay the roleof transcendental facts, comparable towhatmay in theKan-tianframeworkbecalled“transcendentalfacts”abouttheirreduciblediffer-encebetween intuitionsandconcepts,about therebeingexactly twoformsofsensibleintuitionandtwelvecategories,aboutthespontaneoussynthesiz-ingpowerofimagination,abouttheoriginalsyntheticunityofapperception,about theouteraffectiononoursensibilityof themind-independentcausal

tice-(in)dependence, language-(in)dependen-ce, or categorization-(in)dependence, just inordertosticktoauniformterminology.Indi-vidualthinkersmayusedifferentexpressionshere.Also,Iwillspeakaboutentities,intend-ing this as an extremely broad ontologicalcategoryrangingoversuchsub-categoriesasparticulars(individuals),properties(whetheruniversalsortropes),processes,orevenstatesofaffairs.Nothingseriousregardingthereal-ism issue I amexaminingdependson theseterminologicalchoices.

6

Onthedistinctionbetweena(mere)distinc-tion and a (harmful) dichotomy, see HilaryPutnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Cambridge,MA and London: Harvard University Press,2002).

7

See,forfurtherelaboration,SamiPihlström,Naturalizing the Transcendental: A Pragmat-ic View(Amherst,NY:Prometheus/HumanityBooks,2003);and“TheProblemofRealismfromaPragmatistPointofView”,forthcom-inginRobertoFrega(ed.),Pragmatist Epis-temologies(Lanham,MD:LexingtonBooks/Rowman&Littlefield,2011).

8

See Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty,trans. G. E. M. Anscombe and Denis Paul(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969). The pur-poseofthispaperisnottoexplorethisoranyotherWittgensteinian concept, though. I am

referringtothenotionofaformoflifeonlytoemphasizethatourcontextualizingactivitiesareperfectlynaturalforusgiventhekindoflifewelead.

9

Whencontextualization isexamined inrela-tion to the Peircean (and generally pragma-tist) notion of habits of action, emphasizingthe meta-level habit of self-critically trans-formingourhabits,thelinktoPeirceanreal-ismaboutgenerality–thepostulationof“realgenerals”thatPeircelabelled“extremescho-lasticrealism”–isobvious.RelevantwritingsbyPeirceon this topic range fromhisearly(1871)Berkeleyreviewtohislateessaysonpragmatism and pragmaticism (1905–1907),availableinCharlesS.Peirce,The Essential Peirce, 2 vols, The Peirce Edition Project(BloomingtonandIndianapolis:IndianaUni-versityPress,1992–1998). However,pragma-tistsshouldnotinterpretthisformofrealisminametaphysicallyrealisticmannerbutmoreconstructivistically: we constitute generality(contextually, as suggested here).Yet, whensubordinated to the kind of pragmatism Iam proposing as a framework of any meta-physical inquiry, Peircean “real generals”,including contexts, should definitely be on-tologically postulated – though, again, onlycontextually.

10

Robert Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: ClarendonPress,2001),p.104.



sourceofexperience,etc.11AsHannaargues,thesefactsaboutusare“deep”;theyareconstitutiveandtranscendental,notsimplyaccidentalorempirical,andtheyfunctionas“ultimateexplanatorystartingpoints”forwhichnofur-therreasonscanbereasonablyrequired.12

ThereasonIaminvokingHanna’sconceptionoftranscendentalfactshereisthat Iwant toproposeaprofoundanalogybetweenKantian transcendentalstructuresandtheinevitablecontextualityofanyontologicalpostulationswearecapableof.Thefactthatourontologiesarecontextual–scheme-depend-ent–andthefurtherfactthatthedistinctionsbetweenscheme-independenceandscheme-dependencearealwaysinevitablycontextualaswellare“tran-scendentalfacts”aboutusandourconceptualscheming.Theycannotbefur-ther grounded or metaphysically explained by anything more fundamental–thatis,withreferencetoanythingnon-contextual.Eventhisfactaboutthecontextualityof thefact that thescheme-independencevs.scheme-depend-ence distinction is contextual is itself contextual, and so on, ad infinitum.Inordertohaveanynon-foundationalbedrockinthisthreateningreflexiveregress,wemustbeabletoappealtosomethinglikethetranscendentalfactsHannaemphasizesinhisdiscussionofKant’stranscendentalidealism.Mypictureof thecontextualityofwhatever there is,andthecontextualityof drawing thedistinctionbetweenwhat there is scheme-dependently andscheme-independently,isundeniablycircular,buthardlyviciouslycircular.Ourworld-constituting, contextual activity isboth transcendental andem-pirical,bothconstitutiveoftheworldandpartofit.Itisthiscircularityinher-entlypresentinanygenuinelytranscendentalanalysisofworld-constitutivitythatpreventsmypragmatic,naturalizedversionof transcendental idealismfromcollapsingintoafull-blownmetaphysicalidealism.Thefactthatthereissuchworld-constitutiveactivityatallcan,again,bedescribedasatran-scendentalfact.Likeallsuchfactsaboutus,itisitselfcontextual,butthereisnothingmorefundamentalthanthat(endless)contextualityitselfthatcangroundthisanalysisofthetranscendentalfeaturesofourworld-constitutiveactivities.Acriticmightaskwhyweshouldemploythevocabularyofthe“transcenden-tal”hereatall.13Instead,the“naturalistic”requirementthatourpractice-em-bedded,contextualwaysofexperiencingandcategorizingrealityshouldbeseenasfullynaturalmayleadustothinkthatthepragmaticallycontextualistpositionIamsketchingiscloserto,say,evolutionaryepistemologyorotherformsofnaturalizedepistemology–orevenrelativismorepistemologicalan-archism,ascapturedinPaulFeyerabend’sfamousslogan,“Anythinggoes”14– than anything like the Kantian transcendental critique of reason with itsfixedandimmutablecategories.True,thepragmatist(orpragmaticcontextu-alist)mustgiveuptheuniversalisticelementofKant’stranscendentalphilos-ophy:humanexperience,orourontologicalcategorizationsofreality,lacktheuniversal,immutable,andacontextual(non-relativized)structuresthatKantsawasnecessary.Whatevernecessitytheremaybeinourworld-structuring,itisinevitablycontextual,henceonlyrelativelyapriori.CertainlyKanthim-selfdidnotendorseanycontextualismlikethis.However,atouchofKantiantranscendentalityismaintainedhere,becauseitisonlywithinagivencontextthatweareabletoexperienceorcategorizerealityinanymeaningfulman-ner. It is, thus,onlywithinoneoranothersuchpractice-embeddedcontextthattheworldcanbeforusinanydeterminateway.Thereisapluralityofsuchcontexts,andtheymayalsochangealongwithnaturalchangesinourpractices(inWittgensteinianterms,again,alongwithchangesinourforms



oflife),butsuchchangescanalsobemoreorlessrationallydiscussedandcriticallyexamined.Insofarascontextscan,quaPeircean“realgenerals”(cf.above),becomparedtothehabits of actionPeirceandotherpragmatistssawasfundamentaltoourbeingintheworldgenerally–especiallytoourbeliev-inganythingtobethecaseabouttheworld–itismostimportanttoobservethatcontextualizationcanandshouldbecontinuouslyreflexivelyexaminedandcriticized.Thehabitofself-critically transformingourhabitsofactionisavitalhabit,andcontextualizationsimilarlyneedstobeplacedinfurthercontextsenablingcriticalreflection.Accordingly,noFeyerabendiananarchismorradicalrelativismfollowsfrompragmaticcontextualism.Norisourcontextualworld-categorizingreducedtoevolutionarysurvivalofthe“fittest”schemesorvocabularies.Ourschemesand contexts do evolve in the course of human history, but their evolvingismuchmore than themerebiologicaldevelopmentofourperceptualandclassificatorycapacities,andmuchmorethanthereplacementofaworn-out“vocabulary”byanewone.15Thepragmaticcontextualist,whileendorsingnaturalism,mustbearinmindthathumanworld-categorizationisaculturallytransmitted,self-reflectivehabitofaction,andthatcontinuouscriticalreflec-tion, at a normative level, on how such categorization ought to be furtherdeveloped(withinrelevantcontexts)ispartandparcelofthatcategorizationitself.16

Oneinterestingapplicationoftheseissuesistherecentpragmatistdiscussionof the“fact-valueentanglement”.Factandvalue,according tobothclassi-cal(e.g.,James’andDewey’s)andmorerecent(e.g.,Putnam’s)pragmatism,arenotsharplydistinguishablebutdeeplyentangled. InJames’memorablewords,values“formthebackgroundforallourfacts,thefountain-headofallthepossibilitiesweconceiveof”.17Putnam’smorerecentpragmatismmain-tains that values are inextricably entangledwith theordinary, natural factswefindourselvesimmersedin.18Ifthereisanydistinctionbetweenfactand

11

Ibid.,p.118.Note,however, thatKanthim-self does not call these (or anything else)“transcendentalfacts”.IamemployingHan-na’sinmyviewusefulterminology,withoutclaimingtofaithfullyinterpretKant’soriginalviewsinanymannerwhatsoever.

12

Ibid.,pp.117–118.

13

Iamherebrieflyrespondingtosomehighlyusefulquestionsposedbyananonymousre-feree.

14

SeePaulFeyerabend,Against Method(Lon-don:Verso,1993;1sted.1975).

15

Rorty’sneopragmatistwayofunderstandingconceptual development in terms of causalclashesofvocabularies–aversionofthesur-vivalofthefittest–istooreductivefromtheperspective of the kind of pragmatism I amtrying to develop. See, e.g., Richard Rorty,Truth and Progress (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998).

16

Forfurtherreflectionsonthisreflexivestruc-ture of naturalized and pragmatic transcen-dental philosophy, see Pihlström, Naturaliz-ing the Transcendental,aswellasPihlström,Pragmatist Metaphysics.

17

William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), eds. Frederick H. Burk-hardt,FredsonBowers,andIgnasK.Skrup-skelis(Cambridge,MAandLondon:HarvardUniversity Press, 1985), p. 53; also quotedinMichaelR.Slater,“Pragmatism,Realism,andReligion”,Journal of Religious Ethics36(2008),pp.653–681(seep.675).

18

See especially Putnam, Realism with a Hu-man Face (citedabove).Putnam’sreasoningherecanbereconstructedasapragmatictran-scendentalargument(cf.Pihlström,Natural-izing the Transcendental,ch.7).Seethebriefdiscussionintheprevioussectiononthepos-sibilityofinterpretingpragmatismasa(natu-ralized)formoftranscendentalphilosophy.



valueatall,itisinevitablyfuzzyandcontextual.19However,onthebasisofwhathasbeensuggestedaboutthecontextualityofthescheme-dependencevs.scheme-independencedistinctionabove,wemayarguethatfactandvaluearealsocontextuallydistinguishable–buteventhenonlyinfurthercontextsthatspecifycriteriafordistinguishingthem.Hence,ourwaysofcontextuallydistinguishingbetweenfactandvaluearethemselvesvalue-laden,dependentonvaluationalschemes.Factandvalue,therefore,arenotabsolutelydistin-guishable,ordistinctfromatranscendentperspective(whichwefinitehumanbeingslack).Theirentanglement,wemaysay,isafurthertranscendentalcon-ditionforourbeingabletoexperience,categorize,andrepresentthe(againonlycontextuallyidentifiable)entitiesthatwepostulateintheworldaroundus.Thefactthatourworldisdeeplystructuredbyourvaluesis,again,atran-scendentalfactabouthumanlypossiblewaysofexperiencingreality.Whilebeing,again,relativelyfarremovedfromKant’soriginaltranscendentalthe-oryofthenecessaryconditionsforpossibleexperience,thepragmaticfact-valueentanglementplaysananalogousroleinsettingupandconstrainingtheframework(s)thatareneededforthekindofhumanworld-categorizationwearefamiliarwithtobesomuchaspossible.Analogously toRichardRorty’scontroversialproposal that thequestionofhowexactlytherelationbetweenontologyand“culturalpolitics”oughttobeconstruedisitselfacultural-politicalquestion,20wemightnowsuggestthatthequestionofhowexactlythefact-valueentanglementand/ordistinguish-abilityought tobephilosophicallysettled is itselfaquestion thatcanonlybe adequately approachedwithin avaluational context.There is nopurelyfactual–e.g.,scientific–waytosettlethisissueindependentlyofvaluationalconsiderations.Thus,thespecificwaysofdrawingthisdistinction,oravoid-ingit,arethemselvesdependentonourvalues.Itis,therefore,alwaysalreadyavaluational issuewhetherthereareanypurelyfactual issuestobedistin-guishedfromvaluationalones.Eventoclaimthattherearesuchnon-valu-ationalmatterswouldbeavaluationallyrelevantmove(andadmittedlythisisamoveweshouldmakeincertainhumanlyvaluablecontexts,especiallyscientificones).21

3. An infinite regress?

DoestheviewIhavedescribedandrecommendedleadtoaninfiniteregress?Thisisaseriousquestion,butuponreflectionitshouldbeanswerednegative-ly.Rather,theresultisjustapotentiallyindefinitereflexiveinquiryintothewaysinwhichwedrawandusedistinctionsinthecontextswecontinuouslyconstruct forourselves.Whatourcontextsare is,again, itselfacontextualmatter. In thissense,pragmaticcontextualism– theversionofpragmatismIhavetriedtotentativelydevelopabove–isaversionofKantiantranscen-dentalidealism,withoutsacrificingempirical(scheme-internal)realismanymoredangerouslythanKanthimselfdid.Alternatively,thismightberegardedasaformofPutnam’sinternalrealism,albeitonenotcommittedtothenoto-riousepistemic“idealization”theoryoftruthPutnamstillmaintainedinhisinternalrealistperiod.22

However,weneedtoconsiderthemetaphilosophicalstatusofourcontextual-itythesis.Itcanhardlyberegardedasanempirical,factual,andcontingenttruthaboutthewaysthingshappentobeintheworld.Norcanitbeanabso-lute,non-contextualtruthinthesenseofsupposedmetaphysicaltruthstradi-tionallyputforwardbyphilosophers.Itwouldalsobehardtobelievethatit



couldbeaconceptuallynecessarytruth,ornecessaryinthewayinwhich,say,logicalandmathematicaltruthsarenecessary(whateverweultimatelymeanbythenecessityoflogicormathematics–thisisnotatopicofthepresentpaper).Pragmaticcontextualismshouldsomehowcombine(relative)neces-sity, in a (quasi-)transcendental sense,withnon-absoluteness and reflexivecontextuality.Whatwehavehereisonlynecessityinacontext,relativizedtoacertainuseofconcepts,acertainpractice-ladenwayofviewingtheworld.Pragmatic contextualism is a truth–or at least a reasonablephilosophicalconviction–emergingfromourcontinuousreflectionsonouruseofconceptstostructuretheworld.23Ifitis“madetrue”byanything,itismadetruebyourcontextualizinginquiriesintotheverycontextualityofontology,notbyany-thing“ready-made”intheworlditselftakentobeindependentofcontexts.24

ThemetaphilosophicalstatusofthecontextualitythesismightbecomparedtothestatusofsuchcontroversialphilosophicalthesesastheWittgensteinianoneabouttheimpossibilityofaprivatelanguage.JustaswemayseeWitt-gensteinasarguing25that,necessarily,languageisapublichumanphenom-enon,insofarastherecanbeanylinguisticmeaningatall,wemayseethepragmaticcontextualistasarguingthat,necessarily,anyentitiestherecanbeforusareidentifiedwithin,andhenceexist–asthekindofentitiestheyare–onlyrelativeto,oneoranothercontextofcategorizationandinquiry.LiketheWittgensteinian impossibilityofaprivate language(or,say, the impos-sibility of disembodied agency, also sometimes transcendentally defended,forinstanceinthephenomenologicaltradition),theimpossibilityofnon-con-textualidentificationofobjects,orofanyabsolutescheme-independence,is

19

Cf.Putnam,The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy; and, Ethics without Ontology (Cambridge,MAandLondon:HarvardUni-versityPress,2004).

20

RichardRorty,Philosophy as Cultural Poli-tics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007), especially p. 5. I do not recommendthepragmatisttoendorseRorty’sreductionofphilosophytoculturalpolitics!

21

Thefact-valueentanglement,asacaseillus-trating the pragmatist metaphysician’s con-cernswithcontextualization,ismorecompre-hensivelydiscussedinSamiPihlström,“To-wardaPragmaticallyNaturalistMetaphysicsof theFact-ValueEntanglement:EmergenceorContinuity?”,Journal of Philosophical Re-search35(2010),pp.323–352.

22

For Putnam’s rejection of the internal real-ist (epistemic) theory of truth, see HilaryPutnam, The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1999). For discussions of Putnam’sstruggle with realism and pragmatism, seePihlström, Structuring the World and Prag-matist Metaphysics(citedabove).

23

TheWittgensteinianbackgroundof this for-mulationshould,onceagain,beobvious.For

somediscussionofthepossibilityofintegrat-ingpragmatismandlate-Wittgensteinianphi-losophicalmethodology,seeSamiPihlström,“SharedLanguage,TranscendentalListeners,and the Problem of Limits”, in Sami Pihl-ström (ed.), Wittgenstein and the Method of Philosophy, Acta Philosophica Fennica 80(Helsinki:ThePhilosophicalSocietyofFin-land,2006).Idonotwanttotakeanystandonthequestionofwhetheritismeaningfulatall(eitherinaWittgensteinianor,say,Jamesianpragmatistcontext)tospeakaboutthe“truth”of such philosophical or metaphilosophicalthesesaspragmaticcontextualism.

24

On the concept of truthmaking in metaphy-sics,seeD.M.Armstrong,Truth and Truth-makers (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2004); for a pragmatic critique, seePihlström,Pragmatist Metaphysics,ch.2.

25

Here,Icannotdiscussthehotlydebatedques-tionofwhetherwemaytakeWittgensteintobe arguing at all, or committing himself toanyphilosophicaltheses,inthePhilosophical Investigationsorelsewhere.Foralucidcriti-caldiscussion,seeThomasWallgren,Trans-formative Philosophy: Socrates, Wittgenstein, and the Democratic Spirit of Philosophy(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books [Rowman&LittlefieldPublishingGroup],2006).



atranscendentalnecessity,yet(again)onlyacontextualone,itselfdepend-ingonthekindofbeingsweare(accordingtotheschemesorcontextsthatwecontingently, revisably,andfalliblyemploy), thusanecessityonly inarelativizedandnotanabsolutesense.Soareitsspecificversions,suchasthefact-valueentanglement:valuationprovidesonecentralcontextwithinwhichthingsandfactsmayberealforus–or,better,differentvaluationalschemesprovidedifferent contexts for identifying thingsand their relations toeachother–anditis(humanlyspeaking,contextually)necessarythatallfactsarevalue-laden.Thatis,thePutnamianthesisofthefact-valueentanglement(seeabove)isnotjustathesisaboutthewaysthingscontingentlyareintheworld;itisnotjustathesisaccordingtowhichfactandvaluehappentobeentangled.Rather, it is a pragmatic transcendental, and thereforemetaphysical, thesisaboutthewaysthingsnecessarilyareforus.Withoutavaluationalcontext,therecouldbenothings–nofacts–atallforus.Asalways,atranscendentalphilosophicalclaim,howeverpragmatic,hereexpressesaconditional neces-sity:something(valuationalschemes)isregardedasanecessaryconditionfortheverypossibilityofsomethingelsewetakeforgranted(suchastherebeingfactualthingsandstatesofaffairsidentifiablebyus).Contextuality,furthermore,isakindofcontingency:thewaythedependencevs.independencedistinctionisdrawndependsonthecontextwearework-ingin.However,thiscontingency,Ihaveargued,is(transcendentally)neces-sary–justlike,forinstance,thefactsthatanymeaningfullanguageispublic(asWittgensteinremindsus)orthathumancognitionandconsciousnessareembodied(asphenomenologistslikeMauriceMerleau-PontyandJean-PaulSartreusedtoargue).Moreover,thisnecessityisitselfcontingentatameta-level:thesetranscendentalreflectionsarevalidonlywithinahumanworld,our“formoflife”.Whetherthismeta-levelcontingencyisitselfinsomesensenecessary,ornecessarilycontingent,Imustleaveforotherstoreflectupon.Whatthesereflexivereflectionsindicate,inanycase,isthatanadequatein-vestigation of any pragmatist metaphysics of the contextuality of scheme-(in)dependence,andhenceoftheempiricalvs.transcendentaldistinctionthatI reliedonabove (and its contextuality), requiresadynamic integrationofpragmaticandtranscendentalapproaches.26Morespecificproblemsconcern-ing,say,thefact-valueentanglement–forexample,whetherthisintertwine-mentisbestunderstoodasamatterof,say,emergenceorcontinuity27–canfruitfullybeposed(perhapsonly)againstsuchabackground.Indeed,specificinvestigations of, say, the different versions of the contextualization thesisbasedupondifferentontologicaldependencerelationsareneeded.28

4. Concluding remarks (and some final worries)

My main argument for the contextualizing maneuver I have suggested is,thoughtranscendentalinthesenseofinvokingcontextualizationasaneces-saryconditionforthepossibilityofanyontologicalpostulationandindividua-tionwearecapableof,alsopragmatic(and,hence,itselfcontextualizedintoaspecificsituationinpragmatistphilosophicalinquiry,thoughhavingbroaderrelevancenotrestrictedtopragmatism).Thiscontextualizationenablesustomaintainbothempiricalrealismandthetranscendental-levelpragmaticcon-structionofentitiesthatItaketobedeeplyanalogoustoKantiantranscenden-talidealism.Thisisthepragmatic“cashvalue”ofmyproposal.Hence,mystrategy,Ihope,pragmatically“works”.



Itmightbeaskedwhetherthedistinctionbetweensubjectandobject,orsub-jectivityandobjectivity,canbemaintainedinanyforminthepragmaticcon-textualismIhavedefended.Afterall,preservingthisdistinctionmightseemnecessary,ascontextualizationmustpresumablybe“done”bysomeone–thatis, the subject, or perhaps something likeKant’s (andother transcendentalphilosophers’)transcendentalegoortranscendentalsubjectivity.Onceagain,weshouldunderstandthepresentpositionassofteningsomeoftheconcep-tualboundariesthatweretakentoberigidandabsoluteinKant’ssystemoftranscendentalphilosophy.Justasnothingis,forus,absolutelyscheme-inde-pendent,butonlycontextuallyso,weshouldalsomaintainthedistinctionbe-tweensubject(ivity)andobject(ivity)inacontext-relativeandthusscheme-dependentsense.Contextualizationhenceagainfunctionsatthemeta-level.Wedo,pragmaticallyandcontextually,needthesubject-objectdistinction(itdoeshaveits“cashvalue”,too),butwecandefinitelygiveitupasasharpdichotomy,letaloneafoundationalistprincipleofmetaphysicalorepistemo-logicaldualism.Wemustoccasionallyviewourselvesasnaturalobjectsintheworld,butwemustalsobeabletoswitchintoanotherperspective–anothercontext–andviewourselvesastheveryoriginsofanyperspectivesorcon-texts(anykindof“world-viewing”)theremaybe.Wearenevermereobjectsinnature,but,given thekindofbeingswenaturallyare,wearedefinitelyalsoabletocontextualizeourownontologicalstatussothatwecanalsoseeourselvesasobjectsinnature,too.Incriticallyreflectingandweighing,ataphilosophicalmeta-level,thosedifferentcontextsandtheirpracticalpurposesweare…well,somethingliketranscendentalsubjects?29Atleastwemaysaythatourtaskofself-reflection–ataskbothintellectualandethical–asbeingscapableofcontextualworld-categorizationisendless,or infinitelydeep,aswemayalwaysopenupnewcriticalperspectivesonthewayswecategorizereality,andonthecontextsweemployforthatpurpose.We should, finally, consider the reflexivequestionofwhether thepositiondevelopedhereiscoherent.Myworryisnotthatthepragmaticcontextualistembracesa”mystifying”constructivism;30rather,whatisknownas(Kantian)constructivismisdemystifiedandmadeplausiblebyexplicatingitintermsofpragmaticcontextualismandtranscendentalpragmatismMyworry,rather,isthatthepragmaticcontextualistmightneedastrongerformofmodal realismthanher/hispositioncandeliver.Thepragmatic method –thecontextualizingmethodofexaminingideas/concept(ion)sintermsoftheirpotential/conceiv-ablepracticaleffects31–arguablypresupposesrealmodalities,andsodoes

26

This is furtherdefended inPihlström,Natu-ralizing the Transcendental (citedabove).

27

SeePihlström,“TowardaPragmaticallyNat-uralistMetaphysicsoftheFact-ValueEntan-glement”(citedabove).

28

SeeagainLowe,A Four-Category Ontology(citedabove).Notably,however,mostoftheworkonontologicaldependencerelations,in-cludingLowe’s,hasbeenstronglymetaphysi-cally realist and is thereforeonlyof limitedusetothekindoftranscendentalpragmatistIamhereimaginingasapotentialadvocateofthecontextualizationthesis.

29

Atthispoint,IamindebtedtoDavidCarr’sanalysisofthe“paradoxofsubjectivity”–ourneedtounderstandourselvesasbothsubjectstowhomtheworldisgivenandasnaturalob-jects in the world – developed in Carr, The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in the Trans-cendental Tradition (OxfordandNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1999).

30

See,e.g.,MichaelDevitt,Realism and Truth,2nded.(Oxford:Blackwell,1991).

31

Cf.theclassicalformulationofthepragmaticmethodinCharlesPeirce,“HowtoMakeOurIdeasClear”(1878),inThe Essential Peirce,vol.1.



thetranscendentalmethodofinvestigatingnecessaryconditionsforthepossi-bilityofgivenphenomena.Canthesenecessitiesandpossibilitiesthemselvesbe“merelycontextual”,ifpragmaticcontextualityitselfpresupposesthem?This is no problem for Peirce (pragmaticism needs “real generals”), but itmaybeaproblemforotherpragmatists,oldandnew.Thepragmaticmethod(whichIhavenotanalyzedinthispaperinanydetail)isneededforidentify-ingandreidentifyingcontextsintermsofhabitsofaction(seeabove).SoIamafraidImustendwithanopenquestion,insteadofanydefiniteconclusion:itseemsthatatensionbetween(particularlymodal)realismandanti-realismremainsinpragmatistmetaphysicsevenaftermycontextualizingproposal.Evenso,thesignificanceofthesereflectionsforpragmatistmetaphysicsandfor theentirepost-Kantian literatureon the“dependence”of thingson thetranscendental(yetrevisable)schemes(etc.)throughwhichweidentifythem,and on our transcendental subjectivity, should be obvious. The pragmatisttraditioncontributestotheKantiantraditionpreciselybyturningthedepend-enceandcontextualityatissuehereintosomethingthoroughlypragmatic.IttherebyalsosucceedsinturningourinquiriesintothatkindofdependenceorcontextualitymorefullyreflexivethantheoriginalKantiantranscendentalinquiry (whose key characteristic already is the reflexivity of reason-use).Itis(only)inandthroughourcontextualizinginquiriesthemselvesthatthecontextualityofanyontologicalpostulations,includingourownstatusassub-jectsofinquirersandcontextualizers,canbephilosophicallyexamined.32

Sami Pihlström

Kontekstualnost shematske (ne)uvjetovanosti upragmatičkojmetafizici

SažetakOvaj članak razmatra modernu, posebice pragmatičku, varijantu kantovskog problema umske ili shematske uvjetovanosti ontologije. Tvrdi se da je razlika između shematske uvjetovanosti i shematske neuvjetovanosti u (pragmatičkoj) transcendentalnoj metafizici kontekstualna, ne apsolutna, i da je takva kontekstualnost »transcendentalna činjenica« o našim praksom prože-tim svjetotvornim djelatnostima.

Ključneriječipragmatizam,ontologija,metafizika,realizam,konceptualnesheme,transcendentalniidealizam,kon-teksti,kontekstualizam

Sami Pihlström

Die Kontextualität der Schema(un)abhängigkeit in der pragmatischen Metaphysik

ZusammenfassungDas Paper erwägt eine moderne, vornehmlich pragmatische Variante der kantischen Frage-stellung hinsichtlich der Verstandes- und Schemaabhängigkeit der Ontologie. Man lässt darauf schließen, die Distinktion zwischen der Schemaabhängigkeit und –unabhängigkeit in der (prag-matischen) transzendentalen Metaphysik sei an sich kontextuell, nicht absolut, bzw. eine solche Kontextualität sei ein „transzendentales Faktum“ über unsere praxisverwobenen weltbildenden Aktivitäten.

SchlüsselwörterPragmatismus,Ontologie,Metaphysik,Realismus,konzeptuelleSchemas, transzendentalerIdealis-mus,Kontexte,Kontextualismus



Sami Pihlström

La contextualité de l’(in)dépendance schématique dans la métaphysique pragmatique

RésuméCet article traite de la variante moderne, notamment pragmatique, du problème kantien de la dépendance de l’ontologie de la raison et des schèmes. Il est suggéré que la distinction entre la dépendance et l’indépendance schématique dans la métaphysique transcendantale (pragmati-que) est elle-même contextuelle, pas absolue, et que cette contextualité est un « fait transcen-dantal » concernant nos activités constitutives du monde ancrées dans la pratique.

Mots-clésPragmatisme, ontologie, métaphysique, réalisme, schèmes conceptuels, idéalisme trascendantal,contextes,contextualisme

32

Iamgratefultotwoanonymousrefereesforinsightfulcriticalquestionsandcomments.

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