Pil Session 3

8/10/2019 Pil Session 3

1/6

G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS andROBERT GOHIER,petitioners,vs.HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and

ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.

The USA had a naval base in Subic, Zambales.

May 1972; the US invited submission of bids for the following projects:

1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines.

2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shorelinerevetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay,Philippines.

Private respondents submitted their bids. The company received from the United Statestwo telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bondingcompany. The company complied with the requests.

June 1972; Wilham I. Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities EngineeringCommand, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, sentrespondents a letter saying that the respondents did not receive the proposals becauseof its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall atthe boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.

Respondents sued the US and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and RobertGohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The order is to allowthe respondents to work on the project and in case of refusal, to pay for damages, andthe prohibit petitioner from contracting with third parties.

Petitioners question the jurisdiction of the court as the US have not given its consent to be sued.The trial court ruled for respondents.

WON our courts have jurisdiction over the US and its agents

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts ofanother State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of theprinciples of independence and equality of States.

It has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts(jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (juregestionis). The result isthat State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil.

"It is the Court's considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharvesor shoreline is certainly not a governmental function altho it may partake of a publicnature or character, as ruled by respondent judge.

G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983

JOSE B.L. REYES, in behalf of the ANTI-BASES COALITION (ABC), petitioner,vs.RAMON BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.

The Anti-Bases Coalition (ABC) sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peacefulmarch and rally on October 26, 1986, 2-5 pm, from Luneta to the US Embassy. Once there, in an

open space of public property, a short program is to be held

After the delivery of two brief speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on thelast day by the International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and


2/6

the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to arepresentative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may bedelivered to the United States Ambassador. The local and foreign participants of suchconference would attend the march. There was likewise an assurance in the petition thatin the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessarysteps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally."

October 20, 1986;

still no action was taken as to the application of the permit.October 25, 1986;respondent mayor filed an answer saying that on October 19, such permit was denied.

Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as the denial was sent by ordinary mail.

The reason for refusing a permit was due to police intelligence reports which stronglymilitate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place appliedfor." To be more specific, reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing]the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly orcongregations where a large number of people is expected to attend." Respondent Mayorsuggested, however, in accordance with the recommendation of the police authorities,that "a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or anyother enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the generalpublic may be ensured."

The trial court ruled for petitioner holding that there was no showing of any clear and presentdanger of a substantive evil that would justify denial of the permit.

WON the denial of the permit is valid

Free speech, like free press, may be Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly andtruthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment.

Freedom of assembly connotes the right people to meet peaceably for consultation anddiscussion of matters Of public concern.

An excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: "It must never be forgotten, however,that the Bill of Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of freespeech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gainingaccess to the mind. It was in order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions uponrational modes of communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generousscope. But utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal toreason and become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to besheltered by the Constitution."

There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a

substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start.

In Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas," a 1915 decision, where this Court categoricallyaffirmed that plazas or parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and thusnullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. Reference wasmade to such plaza "being a promenade for public use," which certainly is not the onlypurpose that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a permit shouldnot be granted for the opposed march and rally starting from a public dark that is theLuneta.

Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the USEmbassy, hardly two block-away at the Roxas Boulevard.

And the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by ChiefJustice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that 'a statute

requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a speciallicense therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of therights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construedby the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance oflicenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession,with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity toprovide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuselicense.


3/6

The Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adoptedin 1961. It was concurred in by the then Philippine Senate on May 3, 1965 and theinstrument of ratification was signed by the President on October 11, 1965, and wasthereafter deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations on November 15.As of that date then, it was binding on the Philippines. The second paragraph of theArticle 22 reads: "2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps

to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to preventany disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. " TheConstitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of thelaw of the land. ..." To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of thegenerally accepted principles of international law, it should be a part of the law of theland. That being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion ordamage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, therewould be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would bethe Embassy. Moreover, respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City ofManila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of fivehundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Unlessthe ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its invocation as a defense isunderstandable but not decisive, in view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rightsof free speech and peaceable assembly. Even if shown then to be applicable, that

question confronts this Court. The participants to such assembly, composed primarily of those in attendance at the

International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal ofAll Foreign Military Bases would start from the Luneta. Proceeding through RoxasBoulevard to the gates of the United States Embassy located at the same street. Torepeat, it is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets,there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for thepermit, whether an individual or a group. If it were, then the freedom of access becomesdiscriminatory access, giving rise to an equal protection question. The principle underAmerican doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: "Thequestion, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is notas to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to Therelations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the

freedom of speech which the Constitution protects." By way of a summary the applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the

licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place.If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legalpossession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable thepublic official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant ofthe permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition tosuch refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for thedecision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger ofa substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.Thus if so minded, then, can have recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speechand peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in

our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on thejudiciary,even more so than on the other departments rests the grave and delicateresponsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights


4/6

G.R. No. L-24294 May 3, 1974

DONALD BAER, Commander U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Olongapo, Zambales, petitioner,vs.HON. TITO V. TIZON, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, andEDGARDO GENER,respondents.

November 17, 1964; respondent Gener, filed an injunction against petitioner, commander fo theUS naval base in Olongapo.

Respondent was engaged in the logging business in Bataan and that the American naval baseauthorities stopped is operations. Respondent judge granted Geners injunction.

Respondents contest jurisdiction of the court saying that the US has not given its consent.December 12, 1964; respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the same ground.

It was therein pointed out that he is the chief or head of an agency or instrumentality ofthe United States of America, with the subject matter of the action being official acts doneby him for and in behalf of the United States of America. It was added that in directing thecessation of logging operations by respondent Gener within the Naval Base, petitionerwas entirely within the scope of his authority and official duty, the maintenance of thesecurity of the Naval Base and of the installations therein being the first concern and

most important duty of the Commander of the Base. December 14, 1964; respondent opposed and upheld the jurisdiction of respondent court saying:

"a private citizen claiming title and right of possession of certain property may, to recoverpossession of said property, sue as individuals, officers and agents of the Government,who are said to be illegally withholding the same from him, though in doing so, saidofficers and agents claim that they are acting for the Government."

January 12, 1965;petitioner went to the Forestry Director of Bataan offering evidence thatrespondent was had no license to conduct logging business in the area. Notwithstanding,

respondent judge granted respondents writ of injunction.

WON the doctrine of immunity is applicable in this case

Raquiza v. Bradford, a 1945 decision.14

In dismissing a habeas corpus petition for therelease of petitioners confined by American army authorities, Justice Hilado, speaking forthe Court, cited from Coleman v. Tennessee,

15where it was explicitly declared: "It is well

settled that a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to bestationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil andcriminal jurisdiction of the place."

The solidity of the stand of petitioner is therefore evident. What was sought by privaterespondent and what was granted by respondent Judge amounted to an interference withthe performance of the duties of petitioner in the base area in accordance with thepowers possessed by him under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement. Thispoint was made clear in these words: "Assuming, for purposes of argument, that thePhilippine Government, through the Bureau of Forestry, possesses the "authority to issuea Timber License to cut logs" inside a military base, the Bases Agreement subjects theexercise of rights under a timber license issued by the Philippine Government to theexercise by the United States of its rights, power and authority of control within the bases;and the findings of the Mutual Defense Board, an agency of both the Philippine and

United States Governments, that "continued logging operation by Mr. Gener within theboundaries of the U.S. Naval Base would not be consistent with the security andoperation of the Base," is conclusive upon the respondent Judge. .. The doctrine of stateimmunity is not limited to cases which would result in a pecuniary charge against thesovereign or would require the doing of an affirmative act by it. Prevention of a sovereignfrom doing an affirmative act pertaining directly and immediately to the most importantpublic function of any government - the defense of the stateis equally as untenable asrequiring it to do an affirmative act."

There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by this Court.Petitioner, as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo, does not


5/6

possess diplomatic immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against in his personalcapacity, or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to the government which herepresents.

The infirmity of the actuation of respondent Judge becomes even more glaring when it isconsidered that private respondent had ceased to have any right of entering within thebase area.

G.R. No. L-35131 November 29, 1972

THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and DR. LEONCE VERSTUYFT, petitioners,vs.HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance ofRizal, MAJOR WILFREDO CRUZ, MAJOR ANTONIO G. RELLEVE, and CAPTAIN PEDRO S.NAVARRO of the Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC), respondents.

Petitioner doctor was assigned by the WHO to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Director ofHealth Services is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host Agreement

executed on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine Government and the World HealthOrganization.

When petitioner Verstuyft's personal effects contained in twelve (12) crates entered the

Philippines as unaccompanied baggage on January 10, 1972, they were accordinglyallowed free entry from duties and taxes.

Respondent judge issued on March 3, 1972 upon application on the same date ofrespondents COSAC officers search warrant No. 72-138 for alleged violation of RepublicAct 4712 amending section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code

3directing the search

and seizure of the dutiable items in said crates.

March 6, 1972; Dr. Francisco Dy, WHO Regional Director for the Western Pacific withstation in Manila, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, personally wired on thesame date respondent Judge advising that "Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity fromsearch in respect of his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomaticmissions" pursuant to the Host Agreement and requesting suspension of the searchwarrant order "pending clarification of the matter from the ASAC."

May 8, 1972; the Office of the Solicitor General appeared and filed an extended comment

stating the official position of the executive branch of the Philippine Government thatpetitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, he did not abuse his diplomaticimmunity,and that court proceedings in the receiving or host State are not the properremedy in the case of abuse of diplomatic immunity.

The Solicitor General accordingly joined petitioner Verstuyft's prayer for the quashal ofthe search warrant. Respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied quashal of thesearch warrant per his order of May 9, 1972 "for the same reasons already stated in (his)aforesaid order of March 16, 1972" disregarding Foreign Secretary Romulo's plea ofdiplomatic immunity on behalf of Dr. Verstuyft.

WON respondents judge denial to lift the search and seizure order is valid

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation ofpowers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should

refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government,andwhere the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branchof the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept theclaim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of thegovernment, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his direction.

The unfortunate fact that respondent judge chose to rely on the suspicion of respondentsCOSAC officers "that the other remaining crates unopened contain contrabanditems"rather than on the categorical assurance of the Solicitor-General that petitionerVerstuyft did not abuse his diplomatic immunity,which was based in turn on the officialpositions taken by the highest executive officials with competence and authority to act on


6/6

the matter, namely, the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Finance, could not justifyrespondent judge's denial of the quashal of the search warrant.

The Philippine Government is bound by the procedure laid down in Article VII ofthe Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of theUnited Nationsfor consultations between the Host State and the United Nations agencyconcerned to determine, in the first instance the fact of occurrence of the abuse alleged,

and if so, to ensure that no repetition occurs and for other recourses. This is a treatycommitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government and as such, has theforce and effect of law.

Hence, even assuming arguendoas against the categorical assurance of the executivebranch of government that respondent judge had some ground to prefer respondentsCOSAC officers' suspicion that there had been an abuse of diplomatic immunity, thecontinuation of the search warrant proceedings before him was not the proper remedy.

Finally, the Court has noted with concern the apparent lack of coordination between thevarious departments involved in the subject-matter of the case at bar, which made itpossible for a small unit, the COSAC, to which respondents officers belong, seemingly todisregard and go against the authoritative determination and pronouncements of both theSecretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Finance that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled todiplomatic immunity, as confirmed by the Solicitor-General as the principal law officer ofthe Government. Such executive determination properly implemented should havenormally constrained respondents officers themselves to obtain the quashal of the searchwarrant secured by them rather than oppose such quashal up to this Court, to theembarrassment of said department heads, if not of the Philippine Government itself vis avis the petitioners.

Documents

Pil Session 3