Pilapil vs Somera, Et Al

20/06/2015 G.R.No.80116

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/jun1989/gr_80116_1989.html 1/6

TodayisSaturday,June20,2015

RepublicofthePhilippinesSUPREMECOURT

Manila

SECONDDIVISION

G.R.No.80116June30,1989

IMELDAMANALAYSAYPILAPIL,petitioner,vs.HON.CORONAIBAYSOMERA,inhercapacityasPresidingJudgeoftheRegionalTrialCourtofManila,BranchXXVIHON.LUISC.VICTOR,inhiscapacityastheCityFiscalofManilaandERICHEKKEHARDGEILING,respondents.

REGALADO,J.:

AnillstarredmarriageofaFilipinaandaforeignerwhichendedinaforeignabsolutedivorce,onlytobefollowedbyacriminal infidelitysuitof the latteragainst the former,providesUs theopportunity to laydownadecisionalruleonwhathithertoappearstobeanunresolvedjurisdictionalquestion.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent ErichEkkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths atFriedensweiler in theFederalRepublicofGermany.Themarriagestartedauspiciouslyenough,and thecouplelivedtogetherforsometimeinMalate,Manilawheretheironlychild,IsabellaPilapilGeiling,wasbornonApril20,1980.1

Thereafter,maritaldiscordset in,withmutual recriminationsbetweenthespouses, followedbyaseparationdefactobetweenthem.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondentinitiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January,1983.HeclaimedthattherewasfailureoftheirmarriageandthattheyhadbeenlivingapartsinceApril,1982.2

Petitioner,ontheotherhand,filedanactionfor legalseparation,supportandseparationofpropertybeforetheRegionalTrialCourtofManila,BranchXXXII,onJanuary23,1983wherethesameisstillpendingasCivilCaseNo.8315866.3

OnJanuary15,1986,Division20oftheSchonebergLocalCourt,FederalRepublicofGermany,promulgatedadecreeofdivorceon thegroundof failureofmarriageof thespouses.Thecustodyof thechildwasgranted topetitioner.TherecordsshowthatunderGermanlawsaidcourtwaslocallyandinternationallycompetentforthedivorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by theapplicablelawofthatforeignjurisdiction.4

OnJune27,1986,ormorethanfivemonthsaftertheissuanceofthedivorcedecree,privaterespondentfiledtwocomplaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent,petitioner"hadanaffairwithacertainWilliamChiaasearlyas1982andwithyetanothermannamedJesusChuasometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,recommendedthedismissalof thecasesonthegroundof insufficiencyofevidence.5However, upon review, therespondentcityfiscalapprovedaresolution,datedJanuary8,1986,directingthefilingoftwocomplaintsforadulteryagainstthe petitioner.6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional TrialCourt ofManila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. ImeldaPilapil andWilliamChia", docketed as CriminalCaseNo.8752435,wasassignedtoBranchXXVIpresidedbytherespondent judgewhile theothercase,"Peopleof thePhilippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 8752434 went to the sala of JudgeLeonardoCruz,BranchXXV,ofthesamecourt.7

OnMarch14,1987,petitionerfiledapetitionwiththeSecretaryofJusticeaskingthattheaforesaidresolutionof

20/06/2015 G.R.No.80116


respondentfiscalbesetasideandthecasesagainstherbedismissed.8AsimilarpetitionwasfiledbyJamesChua,her coaccused in Criminal CaseNo. 8752434. The Secretary of Justice, through theChief State Prosecutor, gave duecourse to bothpetitionsanddirected the respondent city fiscal to inform theDepartment of Justice "if theaccusedhavealreadybeenarraignedand ifnotyetarraigned, tomove todefer furtherproceedings"and toelevate theentire recordsofbothcasestohisofficeforreview.9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend furtherproceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 8752434.Ontheotherhand,respondentjudgemerelyresetthedateofthearraignmentinCriminalCaseNo.8752435toApril6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitionermoved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension ofproceedings insaidCriminalCaseNo.8752435untilafter theresolutionof thepetition for review thenpendingbefore theSecretaryofJustice.11Amotiontoquashwasalsofiled inthesamecaseonthegroundof lackof jurisdiction,12whichmotion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed thearraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner andWilliamChia. The latter entered a plea of not guiltywhile thepetitionerrefusedtobearraigned.Suchrefusalof thepetitionerbeingconsideredbyrespondent judgeasdirectcontempt,sheandhercounselwere finedandthe formerwasordereddetaineduntilshesubmittedherself forarraignment.13Later,privaterespondententeredapleaofnotguilty.14

OnOctober 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for atemporaryrestrainingorder,seekingtheannulmentoftheorderofthelowercourtdenyinghermotiontoquash.Thepetitionisanchoredonthemaingroundthatthecourtiswithoutjurisdiction"totryanddecidethechargeofadultery,whichisaprivateoffensethatcannotbeprosecuteddeofficio(sic),sincethepurportedcomplainant,aforeigner,doesnotqualifyasanoffendedspousehavingobtainedafinaldivorcedecreeunderhisnational lawpriortohisfilingthecriminalcomplaint."15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents fromimplementingtheaforesaidorderofSeptember8,1987andfromfurtherproceedingwithCriminalCaseNo.8752435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaidpetitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent cityfiscaltomoveforthedismissalofthecomplaintsagainstthepetitioner.16

Wefindthispetitionmeritorious.Thewritsprayedforshallaccordinglyissue.

UnderArticle344oftheRevisedPenalCode,17 thecrimeofadultery,aswellas fourothercrimesagainst chastity,cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since beenestablished, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,requirement.18WhileinpointofstrictlawthejurisdictionofthecourtovertheoffenseisvestedinitbytheJudiciaryLaw,therequirement foraswornwrittencomplaint is justas jurisdictionalamandatesince it is thatcomplaintwhichstarts theprosecutoryproceeding19andwithoutwhichthecourtcannotexerciseitsjurisdictiontotrythecase.

Now,the lawspecificallyprovidesthat inprosecutionsforadulteryandconcubinagethepersonwhocanlegallyfilethecomplaintshouldbetheoffendedspouse,andnobodyelse.Unliketheoffensesofseduction,abduction,rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery andconcubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The socalled exclusive andsuccessive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery andconcubinage.ItissignificantthatwhiletheState,asparenspatriae,wasaddedandvestedbythe1985RulesofCriminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in theaforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In otherwords,onlytheoffendedspouse,andnoother,isauthorizedbylawtoinitiatetheactiontherefor.

Corollarytosuchexclusivegrantofpowertotheoffendedspousetoinstitutetheaction,itnecessarilyfollowsthatsuchinitiatormusthavethestatus,capacityorlegalrepresentationtodosoatthetimeofthefilingofthecriminalaction.Thisisafamiliarandexpressruleincivilactions infact, lackof legalcapacitytosue,asagroundforamotiontodismissincivilcases,isdeterminedasofthefilingofthecomplaintorpetition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does notmean that the samerequirementandrationalewouldnotapply.Understandably,itmaynothavebeenfoundnecessarysincecriminalactions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, theoffendedpartybeingmerelythecomplainingwitnesstherein.However,inthesocalled"privatecrimes"orthosewhichcannotbeprosecuteddeoficio, and thepresent prosecution for adultery is of suchgenre, theoffendedspouseassumesamorepredominant rolesince theright tocommence theaction,or to refrain therefrom, isamatterexclusivelywithinhispowerandoption.

Thispolicywasadoptedout of consideration for theaggrievedpartywhomight prefer to suffer theoutrage in

20/06/2015 G.R.No.80116


silenceratherthangothroughthescandalofapublictrial.20Hence,ascogentlyarguedbypetitioner,Article344oftheRevisedPenalCodethuspresupposesthatthemaritalrelationshipisstillsubsistingatthetimeoftheinstitutionofthecriminalactionfor,adultery.This isa logicalconsequencesincetheraisond'etreofsaidprovisionof lawwouldbeabsentwhere the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of thecriminalcase.21

In thesecases, therefore, it is indispensable that thestatusandcapacityof thecomplainant to commence theactionbedefinitelyestablishedand,asalreadydemonstrated,suchstatusorcapacitymustindubitablyexistasofthetimeheinitiatestheaction.Itwouldbeabsurdifhiscapacitytobringtheactionwouldbedeterminedbyhisstatusbeforeorsubsequent to the commencement thereof,where such capacity or status existed prior to butceased before, orwas acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case.Wewouldtherebyhavetheanomalousspectacleofapartybringingsuitattheverytimewhenheiswithoutthelegalcapacitytodoso.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as towhenprecisely the status of a complainant as an offended spousemust exist where a criminal prosecution can becommencedonlybyonewhoinlawcanbecategorizedaspossessedofsuchstatus.Stateddifferentlyandwithreferencetothepresentcase,theinquirywouldbewhetherit isnecessaryinthecommencementofacriminalactionforadulterythatthemaritalbondsbetweenthecomplainantandtheaccusedbeunseveredandexistingatthetimeoftheinstitutionoftheactionbytheformeragainstthelatter.

Americanjurisprudence,oncasesinvolvingstatutesinthatjurisdictionwhichareinparimateriawithours,yieldsthe rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to instituteproceedingsagainsttheoffenderswherethestatuteprovidesthat the innocentspouseshallhavetheexclusiveright to institute a prosecution for adultery.Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, adivorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to aconclusion.22

InthecitedLoftuscase,theSupremeCourtofIowaheldthat

'Noprosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband orwife.'Section 4932, Code.Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to havebeencommitted,hehadceasedtobesuchwhentheprosecutionwasbegunandappellant insiststhathisstatuswasnotsuchastoentitlehimtomakethecomplaint.Wehaverepeatedlysaidthattheoffense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for thisprovisioninthestatuteandweareoftheopinionthat theunoffendingspousemustbesuchwhentheprosecutioniscommenced.(Emphasissupplied.)

Weseenoreasonwhythesamedoctrinalruleshouldnotapply in thiscaseandinour jurisdiction,consideringourstatutorylawandjuralpolicyonthematter.Weareconvincedthatincasesofsuchnature,thestatusofthecomplainantvisavis theaccusedmustbedeterminedasof thetimethecomplaintwasfiled.Thus, thepersonwho initiates theadulterycasemustbeanoffendedspouse,andby this ismeant thathe isstillmarried to theaccusedspouse,atthetimeofthefilingofthecomplaint.

Inthepresentcase,thefactthatprivaterespondentobtainedavaliddivorceinhiscountry,theFederalRepublicofGermany,isadmitted.SaiddivorceanditslegaleffectsmayberecognizedinthePhilippinesinsofarasprivaterespondentisconcerned23inviewofthenationalityprincipleinourcivillawonthematterofstatusofpersons.

Thus,intherecentcaseofVanDornvs.Romillo,Jr.,etal.,24afteradivorcewasgrantedbyaUnitedStatescourtbetweenAliceVanDornjaFilipina,andherAmericanhusband, the latter filedacivilcase ina trialcourtherealleging thatherbusinessconcernwasconjugalpropertyandprayingthatshebeorderedtorenderanaccountingandthattheplaintiffbegranted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error ofsuchstance,thus:

TherecanbenoquestionastothevalidityofthatNevadadivorceinanyoftheStatesoftheUnitedStates. The decree is binding on private respondent as anAmerican citizen. For instance, privaterespondentcannotsuepetitioner,asherhusband,inanyStateoftheUnion....

ItistruethatowingtothenationalityprincipleembodiedinArticle15oftheCivilCode,onlyPhilippinenationalsarecoveredbythepolicyagainstabsolutedivorcesthesamebeingconsideredcontrarytoourconceptofpublicpolicyandmorality.However,aliensmayobtaindivorcesabroad,whichmayberecognizedinthePhilippines,providedtheyarevalidaccordingtotheirnationallaw....

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. Hewouldhavenostandingtosueinthecasebelowaspetitioner'shusbandentitledtoexercisecontroloverconjugalassets....25

20/06/2015 G.R.No.80116


Underthesameconsiderationsandrationale,privaterespondent,beingnolongerthehusbandofpetitioner,hadno legalstanding tocommence theadulterycaseunder the imposture thathewas theoffendedspouseat thetimehefiledsuit.

Theallegationofprivaterespondentthathecouldnothavebroughtthiscasebeforethedecreeofdivorceforlackofknowledge,eveniftrue,isofnolegalsignificanceorconsequenceinthiscase.Whensaidrespondentinitiatedthedivorceproceeding,heobviouslyknewthat therewouldno longerbeafamilynormarriagevowstoprotectonceadissolutionofthemarriageisdecreed.Neitherwouldtherebeadangerofintroducingspuriousheirsintothe family,which issaid tobeoneof the reasons for theparticular formulationofour lawonadultery,26 sincethere would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect ofdissociatingtheformerspousesfromeachother,hencetheactuationsofonewouldnotaffectorcastobloquyontheother.

The aforecited case ofUnited States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. Inapplying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of theRevised Penal Code,whichpunishedadultery"althoughthemarriagebeafterwardsdeclaredvoid", theCourtmerelystatedthat"thelawmakers intended todeclareadulterous the infidelityofamarriedwomantohermaritalvows,even though itshould bemade to appear that she is entitled to have hermarriage contract declared null and void, until andunlesssheactuallysecuresa formal judicialdeclaration to thateffect".Definitely, it cannotbe logically inferredtherefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that themarriageisvoidabinitioisequivalenttostatingthatitneverexisted.Therebeingnomarriagefromthebeginning,anycomplaintforadulteryfiledaftersaiddeclarationofnullitywouldnolongerhavealegtostandon.Moreover,whatwasconsequentlycontemplatedandwithinthepurviewofthedecisioninsaidcaseisthesituationwherethecriminalactionforadulterywasfiledbeforetheterminationofthemarriagebyajudicialdeclarationofitsnullityabinitio.Thesameruleandrequisitewouldnecessarilyapplywheretheterminationofthemarriagewaseffected,asinthiscase,byavalidforeigndivorce.

Privaterespondent'sinvocationofDonioTeves,etal.vs.Vamenta,hereinbeforecited,27mustsufferthesamefateof inapplicability.Acursoryreadingofsaidcasereveals that theoffendedspousethereinhaddulyandseasonably filedacomplaintforadultery,althoughanissuewasraisedastoitssufficiencybutwhichwasresolvedinfavorofthecomplainant.Saidcasedidnotinvolveafactualsituationakintotheoneatbaroranyissuedeterminativeofthecontroversyherein.

WHEREFORE,thequestionedorderdenyingpetitioner'smotiontoquashisSETASIDEandanotheroneenteredDISMISSINGthecomplaintinCriminalCaseNo.8752435forlackofjurisdiction.ThetemporaryrestrainingorderissuedinthiscaseonOctober21,1987isherebymadepermanent.

SOORDERED.

MelencioHerrera,PadillaandSarmiento,JJ.,concur.

SeparateOpinions

PARAS,J.,concurring:

ItismyconsideredopinionthatregardlessofwhetherWeconsidertheGermanabsolutedivorceasvalidalsointhePhilippines,thefactisthatthehusbandintheinstantcase,bytheveryactofhisobtaininganabsolutedivorcein Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case his former wife actually has carnalknowledgewith another, because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexualrelationswithothers.Acontraryrulingwouldbelessthanfairforaman,whoisfreetohavesexwillbeallowedtodeprivethewomanofthesameprivilege.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorcebetweentheAmericanhusbandandhisAmericanwifeasvalidandbindinginthePhilippinesonthetheorythattheirstatusandcapacityaregovernedbytheirNationallaw,namely,American law.There isnodecisionyetoftheSupremeCourtregardingthevalidityofsuchadivorceifoneoftheparties,sayanAmerican,ismarriedtoaFilipinowife,forthentwo(2)differentnationalitieswouldbeinvolved.

In thebookofSenatePresidentJovitoSalongaentitledPrivate InternationalLawandpreciselybecauseof theNationallawdoctrine,heconsiderstheabsolutedivorceasvalidinsofarastheAmericanhusbandisconcernedbutvoidinsofarastheFilipinowifeisinvolved.Thisresultsinwhathecallsa"sociallygrotesquesituation,"wherea Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of theundersignedthatverylikelytheoppositeexpressesthecorrectview.Whileunderthenationallawofthehusband

20/06/2015 G.R.No.80116


theabsolutedivorcewillbevalid,stilloneoftheexceptionstotheapplicationoftheproperforeignlaw(oneoftheexceptions to comity) is when the foreign lawwill work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of theforum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would beinjuriousorprejudicialtotheFilipinowifewhosemarriagewouldbestillvalidunderhernationallaw,itwouldseemthatunderourlawexistingbeforethenewFamilyCode(whichtookeffectonAugust3,1988)thedivorceshouldbeconsideredvoidbothwithrespecttotheAmericanhusbandandtheFilipinowife.

TherecentcaseofVanDornv.Romillo,Jr. (139SCRA[1985])cannotapplydespite the fact that thehusbandwasanAmericancanwithaFilipinowifebecause insaidcase thevalidityof thedivorce insofaras theFilipinowifeisconcernedwasNEVERputinissue.

SeparateOpinions

PARAS,J.,concurring:

ItismyconsideredopinionthatregardlessofwhetherWeconsidertheGermanabsolutedivorceasvalidalsointhePhilippines,thefactisthatthehusbandintheinstantcase,bytheveryactofhisobtaininganabsolutedivorceinGermanycannolongerbeconsideredastheoffendedpartyincasehisformerwifeactuallyhascarnalknowledgewithanother,becauseindivorcingher,healreadyimplicitlyauthorizedthewomantohavesexualrelationswithothers.Acontraryrulingwouldbelessthanfairforaman,whoisfreetohavesexwillbeallowedtodeprivethewomanofthesameprivilege.

InthecaseofRectov.Harden(100Phil.427[1956]),theSupremeCourtconsideredtheabsolutedivorcebetweentheAmericanhusbandandhisAmericanwifeasvalidandbindinginthePhilippinesonthetheorythattheirstatusandcapacityaregovernedbytheirNationallaw,namely,Americanlaw.ThereisnodecisionyetoftheSupremeCourtregardingthevalidityofsuchadivorceifoneoftheparties,sayanAmerican,ismarriedtoaFilipinowife,forthentwo(2)differentnationalitieswouldbeinvolved.

InthebookofSenatePresidentJovitoSalongaentitledPrivateInternationalLawandpreciselybecauseoftheNationallawdoctrine,heconsiderstheabsolutedivorceasvalidinsofarastheAmericanhusbandisconcernedbutvoidinsofarastheFilipinowifeisinvolved.Thisresultsinwhathecallsa"sociallygrotesquesituation,"whereaFilipinowomanisstillmarriedtoamanwhoisnolongerherhusband.Itistheopinionhowever,oftheundersignedthatverylikelytheoppositeexpressesthecorrectview.Whileunderthenationallawofthehusbandtheabsolutedivorcewillbevalid,stilloneoftheexceptionstotheapplicationoftheproperforeignlaw(oneoftheexceptionstocomity)iswhentheforeignlawwillworkaninjusticeorinjurytothepeopleorresidentsoftheforum.ConsequentlysincetorecognizetheabsolutedivorceasvalidonthepartofthehusbandwouldbeinjuriousorprejudicialtotheFilipinowifewhosemarriagewouldbestillvalidunderhernationallaw,itwouldseemthatunderourlawexistingbeforethenewFamilyCode(whichtookeffectonAugust3,1988)thedivorceshouldbeconsideredvoidbothwithrespecttotheAmericanhusbandandtheFilipinowife.

TherecentcaseofVanDornv.Romillo,Jr.(139SCRA[1985])cannotapplydespitethefactthatthehusbandwasanAmericancanwithaFilipinowifebecauseinsaidcasethevalidityofthedivorceinsofarastheFilipinowifeisconcernedwasNEVERputinissue.

Footnotes

1Rollo,5,29.

2Ibid.,6,29.

3Ibid.,7.

4Ibid.,7,2930AnnexesAandA1,Petition.

5Ibid.,7,178.

6Ibid.,8AnnexesB,B1andB2,id.

7Ibid.,89,178.

8Ibid.,9,178AnnexC,id.

9Ibid.,910,178AnnexD,id.

10Ibid.,9AnnexesEandE1,id.

20/06/2015 G.R.No.80116


11Ibid.,10AnnexF,id.

12Ibid.,9,179AnnexG,id.

13Ibid.,10AnnexH,id.

14Ibid,105.

15Ibid.,11.

16Ibid.,311313.

17Cf.Sec.5,Rule110,RulesofCourt.

18Peoplevs.Mandia,60Phil.372,375(1934)Peoplevs.Zurbano,37SCRA565,569(1971)Peoplevs.Lingayen,G.R.No.64556,June10,1988.

19Valdepeasvs.People,16SCRA871(1966)Peoplevs.Babasa,97SCRA672(1980).

20Samilinvs.CourtofFirstInstanceofPangasinan,57Phil.298(1932)DonioTeves,etal.vs.Vamenta,etal.,133SCRA616(1984).

21Rollo,289.

222Am.Jur.2d.,973citingStatevs.Loftus,104NW906,907ReSmith,2Okla.153,37p.1099Statevs.Russell,90Iowa569,58NW915.

23Rectovs.Harden,100Phil.427(1956).

24139SCRA139,140(1985).

25ThesaidpronouncementsforeshadowedandareadoptedintheFamilyCodeofthePhilippines(ExecutiveOrderNo.209,asamendedbyExecutiveOrderNo.227,effectiveonAugust3,1988),Article26whereofprovidesthat"(w)heremarriagebetweenaFilipinocitizenandaforeignerisvalidlycelebratedandadivorceisthereaftervalidlyobtainedabroadbythealienspousecapacitatinghimorhertoremarry,theFilipinospouseshalllikewisehavecapacitytoreunderPhilippinelaw.

26U.S.vs.Mata,18Phil.490(1911).

27Footnote20,ante.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

Documents

Pilapil vs Somera, Et Al