Pipeline Safety Update - National Association of Pipe Coating

U.S. Department of Transportation

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials

Safety Administration

Pipeline Safety Update

NAPCA Workshop

August 18, 2011 Houston, Texas

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)

Steve Nanney

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PHMSA Safety Update - Topics

• Pipeline Safety – Past Year In-Review

• 2011 Workshops - Pipe Seam and Risk Assessment

• Year In-Review – Incidents

• 2011 - New Pipeline Quality

• The Year In-Review - PHMSA Actions

• Industry Actions

• The Impact of 2010

• PHMSA Web Site Links

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PHMSA Mission

• To ensure the operation of the Nation’s pipeline transportation system is:

– Safe

– Reliable

– Environmentally sound

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U.S. Pipeline System

Pipeline Mileage%

TotalOperators

%

Total

Hazardous Liquid

173,396 7 306 12

Gas Transmission

317,516 13 939 38

Gas Distribution

(main)

(service)

2,035,253 80

1,245 501,200,803 48

834,450 32

Total 2,526,165 100 2,490 100

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y = 81.869e-0.033x

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008

Inci

dent

s w

/dea

th o

r maj

or in

jury

Calendar Year

Pipeline Incidents w/Death or Major Injury (1988-2010)

Incidents w/death or injury

Exponential Trendline 1988-2008

'+1 Standard Deviation from trendline

'-1 Standard Deviation from trendline

Data Sources: PHMSA Incident Data - as of May 2, 2011.

Exponential regression to show long-tem trend




0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Pipeline Deaths and Injuries (1986-2010)

Injuries

Deaths

-4.9%/year

-1.9%/year

Data: DOT/PHMSA Incident data (May 2, 2011)

1,971 Injuries in 1994

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y = 160.77e-0.059x

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Spill

s w

ith

Envi

ronm

enta

l Con

sequ

ence

s

Calendar Year

Liquid Pipeline Spills w/Environmental Consequences (1988-2010)

Spills w/environmental consequences

Exponential Trendline 2002-2009

'+1 Standard Deviation from trendline

'-1 Standard Deviation from trendline

Data Sources: PHMSA Incident Data - as of March 1, 2011.

Exponential regression to show long-tem trend

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$-

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

$800

$900

Mill

ions

Property Damage from Pipeline Incidents, 1986-2010 (1985 dollars)

Data: DOT/PHMSA Incident data (May 2, 2011)

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0

5

10

15

20

25

EQUIPMENT CORROSION EXCAVATION MATERIAL /

WELD

OTHER OTHER

OUTSIDE

FORCE

DAMAGE

NATURAL

FORCES

INCORRECT

OPERATION

Incidents - Hazardous Liquid, Gas

Transmission and Gas Distribution

2002-2011 YTD

1124829 643

628 605456 445

1415

%




Aging Infrastructure (% by Decade)

DecadeHazardous

Liquid

Gas Transmission Distribution

Main Service

UNK/Pre 20s

2% ---

1920s 2% 2% --- ---

1930s 3% 4% 6% 3%

1940s 8% 7% 2% 2%

1950s 20% 22% 10% 8%

1960s 21% 23% 17% 13%

1970s 16% 11% 12% 14%

1980s 9% 10% 14% 17%

1990s 11% 11% 21% 22%

2000s 8% 10% 18% 21%

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Vintage/Legacy Pipe

• Grandfathered Pipe (with no pressure test)

• Pipe seam issues (LF-ERW, Lap Welded, etc.)

• Older manufacturing quality issues

• Hard spots

• Laminations

• Low toughness

• Legacy coatings (CP shielding)

• Population growth




PHMSA 2011 Workshops

• Managing Challenges with Pipeline Seam Welds – Wednesday, July 21

• Improving Pipeline Risk Assessments and Recordkeeping – Thursday, July 22

Workshops - Address Aging Infrastructure Issues

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Managing Challenges with Pipeline Seam Welds

DSAW Pipe Lap Welded Pipe

Spiral Weld – SAW Pipe ERW Pipe

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Pipe Seam - Failures

Pipe – ERW Seam

Submerged Arc Welded (SAW)

Electric Resistance Welded Pipe (ERW)

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What are the Issues for Pipe Seams?

• Seam weld integrity issues are:

– not always being identified by operator’s integrity management and risk assessment approaches

• Inadequate actions taken:

– pipe seam not identified for special or urgent preventive and mitigative actions in some cases

• Grandfather MAOP/MOP

– No Code pressure test to +125% MAOP/MOP

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Pipe Seams Failures (2002-2010)

Seam Type GasHazardous

LiquidTOTAL

% of Total

DSAW 9 5 14 18

Flash Welded 1 5 6 8

HF ERW 2 14 16 22

LF ERW 5 21 26 35

Lap Weld 1 2 3 4

SAW 1 3 4 5

Other 4 2 6 8

Total 23 52 75 100

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Past Accident History

• Late 80s concern with LF-ERW

– PHMSA Technical Report 89-1, August 1989

• 172 LF-ERW Failures in HL P/L 1968-1988

• 103 ERW Seam Failures in Gas P/L 1970 – 1988

– PHMSA Alert Notices ALN 88-01 & 89-01

• Late 90s concern with managing integrity

– IMP rules including risk analysis

– Special requirements for LF-ERW & Lap Welded pipe

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Seam Integrity

• Present and Future Seam Integrity issues:

– Processes and tools to analyze seam integrity needs improvement

– Better analysis of interacting threats that could destabilize a marginally stable seam

– Process to obtain and integrate data relevant to seam integrity needs improvement

– Actions when data is lacking or suspect

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Improving Pipeline Risk Assessments and Recordkeeping

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Improving Pipeline Risk Assessments and Recordkeeping

• Panels

– Regulatory Perspective on Risk Assessments

– Pipeline Operator Perspective on Risk Assessments

– How Should Recordkeeping Gaps Influence Risk Assessments?

– Indentifying Interactive Threats and Understanding Options

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Integrity Management RuleRetrospective

• Need for accurate pipeline-specific risk assessment

• Underlying need for flexible regulations

– Enhance operator systems and processes

– Identify, prevent, and mitigate risks and threats specific to each pipeline




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Recent Events Illustrate Weaknesses in Risk Analysis




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Interacting Threats• Multiple discreet threats that endanger pipeline

integrity by simultaneously degrading pipe




Integrity Management Rule

• Success depends on OPERATOR

– Investigative

– Data-driven

– Analytical

– Integrity-related decision-making

– Prevention

– Mitigation

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PHMSA Risk Assessment Concerns

• Weaknesses of Simple Relative Index Models

• Records (Availability and Quality of Data)

• Data Integration

• Interacting Threats

• Vintage/Legacy Pipe

• Connection to Real Decision-Making

• Uncertainties




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Uncertainties

• Subject matter expert opinion

• ILI tool accuracy/tolerance and reliability

− Tool tolerance, excavations, usage of unity plots

• Hard-to-detect threats

• SCC, girth weld defects, long seam defects, equipment failure, manufacturing defects

• Hydrostatic pressure test

• Future growth of un-remediated defects

• Direct Assessment

• Heavy reliance in inferred conclusions

• Conclusions based on minimal excavations




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Challenges to Success

• Data validation

• Response to missing or suspect data

• Risk analysis methods suitable to support effective integrity-related decision-making

• Identify effective preventive and mitigative(P&M) measures

• Rigorous processes




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Summary

Historic opportunity to improve risk analysis

Challenges

• Data validation

• Response to missing or suspect data

• Deploy more sophisticated risk analysis methods

• Integrity-related decision-making

• Serious P&M measures

• Overall execution of integrity management




Challenges – Pipeline

• Repair, Rehabilitation, or Replacement

– Integrity Management Programs have driven thousands of repairs to the Nation’s energy transportation pipelines

• Hazardous Liquid – nearly through 2 assessments

• Natural Gas Transmission – through 1st cycle in 2012

• Distribution Systems – compliance begins August 2011

– Much work has been done to remedy repair issues, though more remains

– Some systems or segments, due to time dependent issues, need to undergo major rehabilitation or replacement

– Age is ONE of many considerations in risk assessment

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Year in Review - Incidents

• Trans Alaska Pipeline, PS-9 – Crude oil

• Deepwater Horizon – (MMS/BOEMRE) – Major Tragedy

• Salt Lake City I – Crude oil

• Marshall, Michigan – Crude oil – Major Spill

• Romeoville, Illinois – Crude oil

• San Bruno, California – Natural Gas – LDC – Major Tragedy

• Upstate New York – HVL, Propane

• Texas and North Dakota – Excavation related fatalities

• Salt Lake City II – Crude oil

• Trans Alaska Pipeline, PS-1 – Crude Oil

• Philadelphia – Natural Gas - LDC

• Allentown – Natural Gas – LDC – Major Tragedy

• Yellowstone River – Crude oil

• Wyoming – Natural Gas – New Transmission Line

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Marshall, Michigan(Federally Regulated HL Pipeline)

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Marshall, Michigan(Federally Regulated HL Pipeline)

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San Bruno, California(State Regulated Gas Transmission)

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San Bruno, CA




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San Bruno, CA




Allentown, PA(State regulated Distribution Main)

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Allentown, PA




2011 – New Pipeline Quality

Low Strength Fittings

• Coating is cracking due to expansion of fitting during testing

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• 24-inch Fitting

– Hydrotest – 2160 psi

– Failed at – 1740 psig

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Right–of-Way• Backfill practices• Clean-up practices• Maintenance





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2011 – HF-ERW Pipe Seam

• Where is the pipe mill and

construction QA/QC?





• Mill applied repair removed by scratching with a finger nail

• No surface prep at coating plant

• 2-part repair over spiral seam with portion of repair lifting off coating

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The Year in Review – PHMSA Actions

• Safety Advisory Bulletins:

– Oil Spill Response Plans

– Emergency Response Plans

– MAOP/Risk Assessment/ Records

• Program Improvements

– Benchmarking study

– Interagency team on spill response

– Operator drill participation

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The Year in Review – PHMSA Actions

• Regulatory Agenda

– NPRM – Control Room Management Acceleration

– Final Rule – “One Rule” – Annual Reports

– ANPRM – Hazardous Liquid Pipelines

– ANPRM – Damage Prevention

– ANPRM – Gas Pipelines

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Industry Actions

• Workshops

• Pipe Quality Work Groups (8 work groups)

• Construction Work Groups (5 work groups)

• Standards updates

– API 5L

– API 1104

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The Impact of 2010

• Got the Attention of Everyone –

– Public, White House, Secretary, Congress, Media, and Oversight Agencies

• Expect to See More Media Attention to Pipeline Failures

• Expect to See PHMSA, DOJ and EPA Stepping Up Their Attention

• Delayed DOT Pipeline Reauthorization

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The Impact of 2010 - Other Issues

• Damage Prevention – Adequacy of State Laws/Programs

• Population Encroachment: Getting the PIPA word out

• New Construction

– OQ & QMS: Role of Contractors in Determining Quality

– Material Deficiencies

• Public Awareness Programs: Inspections and Effectiveness

• Repair Criteria and Response Times Outside HCA’s

• Research and Development Investment

• Transparency/Adequacy of Consensus Standards

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Current Challenges

• Rash of High Profile Accidents with Serious Consequences on Aging Infrastructure

• Incidents on Several New Pipelines in 1st Year of Service –

– Industry needs improved material, construction, and operational QA/QC

• Differing Levels of “Acceptable Risk” with Different Audiences

• We all have accomplished a lot. We all still have much work to do.

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PHMSA – Links

• Pipeline Safety Guidance – Advisory Bulletins, Low Strength Pipe Guidelines, MAOP Rule FAQs

– http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/guidance

• Construction

– http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/construction/index.htm

• Alternative MAOP Rule

– http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/maop/index.htm

• Distribution Integrity Management

– http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/dimp/

• Special Permits – FAQs

– http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/classloc/faqs.htm

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http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/guidance

http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/construction/index.htm

http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/maop/index.htm

http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/dimp/

http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/classloc/faqs.htm




Pipeline Construction Webpagehttp://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/construction/index.htm

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Thank You

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Documents

Pipeline Safety Update - National Association of Pipe Coating