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6. Villegas vs. Hui Chioing

Facts: Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and

signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen of the

Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade, business

or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor of

Manila and for other purposes, it is upon the discretion of the Mayor to whether or not to grant the

employment permit. Hiu Chiong, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of

preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.

Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the

Constitution.

Ruling: Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human

right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. Philippines as a state is not

obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life

without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down

any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.

7. Galvez vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego

were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide.

Before petitioners could be arraigned in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93, respondent

Bulacan Provincial Prosecutor Liberato L. Reyes filed an Ex

parte Motion to Withdraw Informations which was granted by Judge Villajuan

On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners for

murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal

possession of firearms 14which were subsequently raffled to the sala of Judge Victoria Pornillos .

Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners, Judge Pornillos

issued an order denying the motion to quash and, at the same time, directed that a plea of not guilty be

entered for petitioners when the latter refused to enter their plea.

Issue:

Whether or not the prosecution, after moving to withdraw the information for homicide altogether and

its motion was granted, re-file the information although this time for murdervirtual l

Ruling:

(Par 2) Section 14 of Rule 110, which is invoked by petitioners, reads as follows:


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... If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper

offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one

charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be

placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance

at the trial.

The second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint where the court can

order the filing of another information to charge the proper offense, provided the accused would not

be placed thereby in double jeopardy and that could only be true if the offense proved does not

necessarily include or is not necessarily included in the original information.

Yes, the prosecution can re-file the information for murder in substitution of the information for

homicide because no double jeopardy has as yet attached.

anroblesvirtual law library8. State Prosecutors vs. Muro

Facts:

Respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged

by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law,

grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, for

dismissing eleven (11) cases filed against the accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos [for Violation of

Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions {CB Circular No. 960} ] solely on the basis of newspaper

reports (August 11, 1992 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe) concerning the

announcement on August 10, 1992 by the President of the Philippines of the CB Circular No. 1353,

lifting by the government of all foreign exchange restrictions and the arrival at such decision by the

Monetary Board as per statement of Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia

The prosecutors contended that respondent judge acted prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had

no way of determining the full intent of the new CB Circular or Monetary Board resolution, and whetherthe same provided for exception, as in the case of persons who had pending criminal cases before the

courts for violations of Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations previously issued on the matter.

Also, That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the cases may be gleaned

from the fact that such precipitate action was undertaken despite already scheduled continuation of

trial dates, in brazen disregard of all notions of fair play, thereby depriving the Government of its right to

be heard, and clearly exposing his bias and partiality

Issue:

Whether or not respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion inissuing the order of dismissal

Ruling:

The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in order that the enactment can become

effective and binding. Laws take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in

the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation unless it is otherwise provided.


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Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not seen the official text of CB Circular No. 1353, he

was in no position to rule judiciously on whether CB Circular No. 960, under which the accused Mrs.

Marcos is charged, was already repealed by CB Circular No. 1353.

SC held that the dismissal of a case without the benefit of a hearing and without any notice to the

prosecution violated due process.

9. Martinez vs. CA

Facts:

An Information dated March 23, 1990 2 was filed before theRTC of Manila by Assistant Prosecutor

Antonio J. Ballena, charging Manuel F. Martinez with libel arising from the allegedly derogatory and

scurrilous imputations and insinuations against Laurel contained in Martinez' article entitled "The

Sorrows of Laurel" published on January 8, 1990 in his Manila Times column Narrow Gate.

Martinez filed a petition with the DOJ seeking review of the resolution of the City Prosecutor finding aprima facie case of libel against him. Accordingly, 3rd Asst. City Prosecutor Lourdes C. Tabanag filed a

motion to suspend proceedings pending resolution by the DOJ of Martinez' petition for review.

Then Acting Justice Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III declared inter alia that while the language used in

the article may be unsavory and unpleasant to complainant, the same was not actionable as libel, as if

embodied merely an opinion protected as a privileged communication under Article 354 of the Revised

Penal Code. The appealed resolution was therefore set aside and the City Prosecutor was directed to

cause the dismissal of the information filed against Manuel F. Martinez.

Upon appeal, CA Court ordered the setting aside of the said dismissal order and remanding the case to

the trial court for arraignment of petitioner as accused therein and for further proceedings.

Issue:

Whether or not CA erred in setting aside the dismissal order remanding the case to the RTC

Ruling:

The private offended party was deprived of due process as he was not furnished with a copy of the

prosecution's motion to dismiss. The dismissal of the criminal case against the accused was based

solely on the findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice.

In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon considerations other than the

judge's own personal individual conviction that there was no case against the accused.

The trial judge must himselfbe convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the

accused.

What was imperatively required was the trial judge's own assessment of such evidence. Mere

acceptance of the prosecution's word for its supposed insufficiency is not sufficient for the valid and

proper exercise of judicial discretion.


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The CA did not err in setting aside said dismissal order and remanding the case to the trial court since

the dismissal order was issued in violation of private complainant's right to due process as well as upon

an erroneous exercise of judicial discretion.

10. Espeleta vs. Avelino

Facts:

Note:A case for recovery of Sum of Money was filed by private respondents Shell Philippines, Inc

alleging that petitionerESPELETA purchased products of [Shell] in the total sum of P264,250.29 and that

out of this sum ESPELETA allegedly paid P242,029.04 only leaving a balance of P22,221.25 still unpaid.

Petitioner JOSE ESPELETA, in this certiorari proceeding that he was denied procedural due process when

respondent Judge, HON. CELSO AVELINO, in a spirit of unwanted generosity towards private respondent

corporation, Shell Philippines, Inc., acceded to its plea that the testimony of a witness deemed by him as

vital to his case be ignored and disregarded in its entirety for failure to be present in court on the day set

for her cross-examination and that ESPELETA requested postponement of the hearing of this case after

having been duly notified of said hearing, which actuation is tantamount to delaying the administrationof justice.

ESPELETA, not once but twice, moved to reconsider, but respondent Judge did not budge from his

stand, now assailed as being vitiated by constitutional infirmity

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent Judge AVELINO had eroded ESPELETAs right to a day in court.

Ruling:

The petitioner can assert a grievance grounded on the due process guarantee.

If respondent Judge were to be sustained, then clearly evidence, which for ESPELETA was indispensable

for his side of the case to be aired, would be treated as non-existent. To that extent, he was not heard

at all. Nor is it of legal relevance that respondent Judge was provoked to take the step he did just

because it was not the first time petitioner had sought continuance.

As a result of the order of respondent Judg, petitioner would be condemned to pay before he had been

fully heard.

It would make a mockery of the requirement that the judgment should be only after a trial where the

litigants are given full and unimpeded opportunity to sustain their respective claims and to have their

evidence duly considered and weighed.

87. HImagan vs. People

Facts: Himagan is a policeman charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr and for the attempted

murder of Benjamins younger brother. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into

suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that Upon the filing of a complaint or

information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the


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penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the

accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall

be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the

suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be

limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is

contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection

of laws.

Issue: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.

Ruling: Himagans contention of his guaranteed right to equal protection is not valid, because the reason

why policemen are treated differently when it comes to the preventive suspension is concerned, is that

they carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses

against them. There is no violation of the constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

88. Almonte vs. Vasquez

Facts: Ombudsman, requires Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian,respectively, of the EIIB to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year

1988" and all evidence such as vouchers from enforcing his orders. Almonte was formerly Commissioner

of the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena

duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter

alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed.

The letter was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished to several government

offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman. In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner

Almonte denied all the allegations written on the anonymous letter. Petitioners move to quash the

subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum but was denied. Disclosure of the documents in question is

resisted with the claim of privilege of an agency of the government on the ground that "knowledge of

EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla will lead to knowledge of itsoperations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being" and this could

"destroy the EIIB."

Issue: Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and

salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified without violating their

equal protection of laws.

Ruling: YES. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to

state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters and in addition, privilege to withhold

the identity of persons who furnish information of violation of laws. In the case at bar, there is no claim

that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the

personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and

information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to,

economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting."

89. Telebap vs. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec 92 of BP 881 which provides for the Comelec time in

television and radio stations free of charge. They claim that they suffered losses amounting to millions


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during the 1992 presidential elections and the 1995 senatorial elections and that they would stand to

lose more if they were to do the same the following years. Furthermore, they contend that the assailed

law singles out radio stations and television stations which deny them of their equal protection of the

law.

Issue: Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the

equal protection of the laws.

Ruling: There is no violation of the equal protection clause. The court ruled that the petitioners

contention is of no merit. Stating that since the petitioners were given licenses by the government for

their operation and that they do not own the airwaves, they can be burdened by the government for

public service.

90. Tiu vs. CA

Facts: Congress passed into law RA 7227, Section 12 thereof created the Subic Special Economic Zone

and granted there to tax and duty incentives. President Ramos issued EO No. 97, clarifying the

application of the tax and duty incentives. EO No. 97-A was issued, specifying the area within which thetax-and-duty-free privilege was operative. Petitioners challenge the constitutionality RA 7227 being

violative of equal protection because the tax and duty incentives was only granted to the secured area

of the Subic Special Economic Zone but denying the same to those who live in the zone outside the

secured area.

Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Ruling: The court ruled no, stating that the constitution does not require absolute equality among all.

Since the real concern of RA 7227 was to convert the old Subic Naval Base into economic or industrial

areas, it was deemed necessary to extend the tax and duty incentives only to that are so as to attract

and encourage investors both local and foreign.

91. Aguinaldo vs. COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo, who was then Cagayan governor, and others who were incumbent

provincial or municipal officials in Cagayan, seek to prevent the COMELEC from enforcing during the

1998 elections Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code stating that:

...Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in

a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his

office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Petitioners contend that Section 67 is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as its

classification of persons running for office is not a valid classification since it is not based on substantial

distinctions.


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Under Section 67 candidates can be classified as an incumbent elective official who runs for the same

position as his present incumbency (and) another incumbent elective official running for another

position. Petitioners argue that the re-electionist is given an undue advantage since he is able to use

the resources, prestige, and influence of his position. The same is not available to one seeking an office

different from the one he is presently holding. This, according to petitioners, does not equalize the

playing field for all candidates.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is violative of the equal protection clause of

the Constitution

Ruling:

Section 67 is not violative of the Constitution as it does not unduly cut short the term of office of local

officials.

The classification embodied in Section 67 is reasonable and based on substantial distinction. It pointsout that incumbents running for the same position are not considered resigned because the intention of

the law is to allow them to continue serving their constituents and avoid a disruption in the delivery

of essential services. Those running for different positions are considered resigned because they are

considered to have abandoned their present position by their act of running for other posts. [As ruled

in the case of Dimaporo vs. Mitra Jr.]

160. Material Distributors vs. Natividad

Facts:

On March 24, 1947, Lope Sarreal filed a complaint seeking a money judgment against petitioners,Material Distributors, (Phil.) Inc, on three causes of action in the total of P1, 256,229.30. He then filed a

supplemental motion for the production and inspection of the originals of Annexes A and B of the

complaint.

The respondent judge, FELIPE NATIVIDAD, granted both motions and, under authority of Rule 27,

issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books and

papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc.

Material Distributors, (Phil.) Inc questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated

the search and seizure clause.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial judge, in issuing the order, has exceed his jurisdiction or acted with grave abuse

of discretion.ch

Ruling:

(Sec 1) Rule 21 Rules of Court states:


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... Motion for production or inspection; order. - Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor

and upon notice to all other parties, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to

produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party,

of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things,

not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and

which are in his possession, custody or control

The Court struck down the argument ofMaterial Distributors, (Phil.) Inc and held that the subpoena

pertained to a civil procedure that "cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches

prohibited by the Constitution..." The books and papers therein mentioned "constitute or contain the

evidence material to the matters involved in the above entitled case.

The hypothesis that the production and inspection of books and documents in question is tantamount

to a search warrant is erroneous. The procedure outlined by Rule 21 and followed by respondent judge

place them outside the realm of the prohibited unreasonable searches.

161. Oklahoma Press vs. Waling

Facts:

Petitioners, OKLAHOMA PRESS PUB. CO, were alleged to be violating the Fair Labor Standards Act.

In the course of investigations conducted pursuant to the said Act, the Administrator issued subpoenas

duces tecum.

The subpoenas sought the production of specified records to determine whether petitioners were

violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, including records relating to coverage.

Petitioners, newspaper publishing corporations, maintain that the Act is not applicable to them, for

constitutional and other reasons, and insist that the question of coverage must be adjudicated beforethe subpoenas may be enforced. They contend that the subpoenas will violate any of their rights against

illegal searches and seizures secured by the Fourth Amendment.

Issue:

Whether or not the Administrator's right to judicial enforcement of Subpoenas pursuant to the Fair

Labor Standards Act is violative of the petitioners right to protection from illegal search and seizures

Ruling:

The intent of Congress, in authorizing investigations supported by subpoenas and enforcement orders,

was to enable the Administrator to discover and procure evidence, not to prove a pending charge or

complaint, but to enable him to make oneif, in his judgment, the facts thus discovered should justify

doing so.


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Moreover, the corporate records sought to be inspected are not covered by the Constitutional

prohibition against self-incrimination, even though such documents may contain evidence tending to

subject any or all of the officers of a corporation to a criminal indictment.

It has been settled that corporations are not entitled to all of the constitutional protections which

private individuals have in these and related matters. As has been noted, they are not at all within the

privilege against self-incrimination, although this Court more than once has said that the privilege runs

very closely with the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure provisions.

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