PIR Center · II On April 20-22, 2006 the PIR Center will host the Moscow International Security Conference "THE G8 GLOBAL SECURITYAGENDA: CHALLENGES AND INTERESTS. TOWARDS THE ST

International SecurityNonproliferation

Arms Control

Moscow, 2005

Volume 10, № 1–2

Winter/Spring 2005

II

On April 20-22, 2006 the PIR Center will host the Moscow International Security Conference

"THE G8 GLOBAL SECURITY AGENDA: CHALLENGES AND INTERESTS.

TOWARDS THE ST. PETERSBURG SUMMIT"

The Conference, held in the context of the Russian G8 Presidency, will bring together over100 decision-makers as well as leading governmental and nongovernmental experts from theG8 states, China, India, Brazil, non-G8 Global Partnership member countries, along with rep-resentatives of Russian and foreign businesses and organizations dealing with security issues,including GP practitioners.

The conference is being held in coordination with the Presidential Administration of the RussianFederation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The PIR Center alsoenjoys the active cooperation of several Russian governmental organizations, including theSecurity Council, the Ministry of Defense, and the Federal Agency of Atomic Energy.

Among the Russian speakers invited to address the Conference are: Aide to the President of theRussian Federation Sergei Prikhod'ko, Aide to the President of the Russian Federation andRussian G8 Sherpa Igor Shuvalov, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, Minister ofDefense of the Russian Federation Sergei Ivanov, Secretary of the Russian Security CouncilIgor Ivanov, and Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs of the Russian StateDuma Konstantin Kosachev.

The goals of the upcoming event are to gather on the eve of the G8 Summit in Saint Petersburgto discuss the most important items on the international security agenda:

• Energy aand IInternational SSecurity;

• Biological SSafety aand SSecurity;

• Outer SSpace aas aan AArena ffor IInternational CCooperation oor aa NNew AArms RRace;

• Multilateral AApproaches tto tthe NNuclear FFuel CCycle;

• Protection oof CCritical IInfrastructure;

• Implementation of Global Partnership Programs in the following Areas:

Chemical Weapons Destruction,

Nuclear Powered Submarine Dismantlement,

Strengthening Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting,

• Security Situation in such Regions as:

Central Asia;

The Greater Middle East;

East Asia.

This conference will provide an important platform for an in-depth discussion on national andinternational responses to new threats and challenges to international security.

For additional information please contact Conference Director Anton Khlopkovvia e-mail [email protected] or by phone +7 (095) 234-0525

Akhtamzyan Ildar, Dr., Moscow State Institute of InternationalRelations (MGIMO-University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of theRussian Federation, Moscow, RussiaAll-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics(VNIIEF), Federal Nuclear Center, Sarov, RussiaAntipov Sergey, Dr., Federal Atomic Energy Agency of the RussianFederation, Moscow, RussiaAntonov Anatoly, Amb., Dr., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RussianFederation, Moscow, RussiaArbatov Alexey, Corresponding Member, Russian Academy of Sciences(RAS); Center for International Security, Institute of World Economy andInternational Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, RussiaBaranovski Vladimir, Dr., Corresponding Member, Russian Academy ofSciences (RAS); Institute of World Economy and International Relations(IMEMO), Moscow, RussiaBelyaeva Marina, Federal Atomic Energy Agency of the RussianFederation, Moscow, RussiaBertsch Gary, Prof., Center for International Trade and Security,University of Georgia, Athens, USABunn George, Prof., Center for International Security and Cooperation,Stanford University, Stanford, USACirincione Joseph, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,Washington, D.C., USADhanapala Jayantha, Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process(SCOPP), Colombo, Sri LankaEggert Konstantin, BBC Russian Service, Moscow, RussiaEleukenov Dastan, Dr., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic ofKazakhstan, Almaty, KazakhstanEvstafiev Dmitry, Dr., Cros, Moscow, RussiaFedorov Alexander, Ph.D., Moscow, RussiaGeneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva, SwitzerlandGottemoeller Rose, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,Washington, D.C., USAInstitute of Strategic Stability, Federal Atomic Energy Agency of theRussian Federation, Moscow, RussiaJohnson Rebecca, Acronym Institute, London, UKKalinina Natalya, Dr., Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation,Moscow, RussiaKirichenko Elina, Dr., North American Research Center, Institute ofWorld Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, RussiaKoltunov Viktor, Maj.-Gen. (ret.), Prof., Institute of Strategic Stability,Federal Atomic Energy Agency of the Russian Federation, Moscow,RussiaKortunov Andrey, Dr., New Eurasia Foundation, Moscow, RussiaKozlov Viktor, Dr., Moscow, RussiaKrasnov Alexei, Federal Space Agency of the Russian Federation,Moscow, RussiaKurchatov Institute – Russian Research Center, Moscow, RussiaLadygin Fedor, Col.-Gen. (ret.), Global Consulting Group, Moscow,RussiaLaverov Nikolai, Acad., Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, RussiaLebedev Vladimir, Moscow City Government, Moscow, RussiaLewis Patricia, Dr., UNIDIR, Geneva, SwitzerlandLysenko Mikhail, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of theRussian Federation to New Zealand, Wellington, New ZealandMakienko Konstantin, AST Center, Moscow, RussiaMargelov Mikhail, Committee for Foreign Affairs, Council ofFederation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Moscow,Russia

Misyuchenko Vladimir, Dr., National Banking Journal, Moscow,RussiaMoscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI), Moscow, RussiaMoscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RussianFederation, Moscow, RussiaMueller Harald, Dr., Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt-am-Main,GermanyNikitin Alexander, Dr., Center for Political and International Studies,Moscow, RussiaNovikov Vladimir, Dr., Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI),Moscow, RussiaParkhalina Tatyana, Dr., Center for European Security Studies, Instituteof Scientific Information on Social Sciences (INION), Moscow, RussiaPikayev Alexander, Dr., Institute of World Economy and InternationalRelations (IMEMO), Moscow, RussiaPiontkovski Andrei, Dr., Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C., USAPodvig Pavel, Ph.D., Center for International Security and Cooperation,Stanford University, Stanford, USAPonomarev-Stepnoi Nikolai, Acad., Russian Research CenterKurchatov Institute, Moscow, RussiaPotter William, Prof., Center for Nonproliferation Studies, MontereyInstitute of International Studies, Monterey, USARybachenkov Vladimir, Dr., Embassy of the Russian Federation to theUnited States, Washington, D.C., USASafranchuk Ivan, Dr., Moscow Representative Office, Center forDefense Information, Moscow, RussiaSatanovsky Yevgeny, Prof., Dr., Institute of Middle East Studies,Moscow, RussiaSaveliev Alexander, Dr., International Security Center, Institute of WorldEconomy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, RussiaSemin Valery, Prof., Dr., Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation tothe United Nations Office and other International Organizations inGeneva, SwitzerlandSlipchenko Victor, Committee Established Pursuant to Security CouncilResolution 1540(2004), United Nations Headquarters, New York, USASmith Harold, Dr., Goldman School of Public Policy, University ofCalifornia, Berkeley, USASokov Nikolai, Dr., Center for Nonproliferation Studies, MontereyInstitute of International Studies, Monterey, USAStepanova Ekaterina, Dr., International Security Center, Institute ofWorld Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, RussiaTrenin Dmitry, Dr., Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, RussiaTuzmukhamedov Bakhtiyar, Dr., Constitutional Court of the RussianFederation, Moscow, RussiaTyulin Ivan, Prof., Moscow State Institute of International Relations(MGIMO-University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RussianFederation, Moscow, RussiaVolodin Yury, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, AustriaWallander Celeste, Dr., Russia and Eurasia Program, Center forStrategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., USAYakushev Mikhail, Ministry of Information Technologies andCommunication, Moscow, RussiaYesin Viktor, Col.-Gen. (ret.), Academy of Security, Defence and LawEnforcement, Moscow, RussiaZababakhin All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of TechnicalPhysics (VNIITF), Federal Nuclear Center, Snezhinsk, RussiaZvedre Yevgeny, Embassy of the Russian Federation to the UnitedStates, Washington, D.C., USA

CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES IN RUSSIA ADVISORY BOARD

In January 2006 the PIR Center will publish the English edition of its Guidebook on the Global Partnership

"GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AGAINST THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION"

In 2006 Russia will hold the G8 presidency. In the context of this presidency, the GlobalPartnership will inevitably be an important issue on the G8 agenda. As more than threeyears have passed since the G8 launched its Global Partnership initiative at theKananaskis summit in Canada, it is now possible to examine its preliminary results. ThePIR Center Global Partnership Guidebook, in both Russian and English editions, providesa "balance sheet" to assist in just such an examination. The books focus on the achieve-ments, problems, and prospects for cooperation within the framework of the GlobalPartnership and provide a great deal of practical information on how the machinery of theGlobal Partnership functions on the political, business, and technical levels. The informa-tion is presented in user-friendly form with many figures, graphs, images, and tables, mak-ing both the achievements and the problems of the Global Partnership clear.

The Russian edition of the Global Partnership Guidebook, published in early 2005, was avery successful project for the PIR Center. It was widely read by Russian-speaking deci-sion-makers and practitioners involved in the G8 Global Partnership. In Russia, thePresidential Administration of the Russian Federation, the Security Council of the RussianFederation, the Office of Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RussianFederation, the Ministry of Defense and the Federal Agency of Atomic Energy all showedgreat interest in the Guidebook. The PIR Center received many complimentary commentsfrom our readers. For example, Deputy Head of the Russian Federal Agency of AtomicEnergy Sergey Antipov told the media on March 24, 2005: "I am convinced that the PIRGuidebook 'Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction'should become the book to have for all people involved in the Global Partnership."

The English edition of the Guidebook is up-to-date as of September 2005. It will havefive chapters:

• Chapter 1: History of the Cooperative Programs to Eliminate the Legacy of theCold War

• Chapter 2: Spheres of Cooperation

• Chapter 3: Cooperation Problems

• Chapter 4: Global Partnership Member Countries

• Chapter 5: Prospects for Future Cooperation

This book will also provide a Russian perspective on the Global Partnership, which maybe especially valuable in the context of Russia's G8 Presidency in 2006.

To order a copy of the Guidebook please contact Trialogue company by phone +7 (095) 764-9896 or by e-mail: [email protected]

ContentsEEddiittoorriiaallWill the Iranian Atom Become a Persian Carpet For Russia? 3HHoott TTooppiiccKonstantin Kosachev: 'Russian Foreign Policy Priorities' 5IInntteerrvviieewwSergey Kislyak: 'Iran: the Situation Has Become Clearer,But Not All Questions Have Been Answered' 13IInntteerrvviieewwNikolai Spassky: 'Combating Terrorism Must Hold a Central Place in the New Russian National Security Concept' 15AAnnaallyyssiissThe Right to Withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): The Views of Two NPT Negotiators.By George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev 20AAnnaallyyssiissThe Russian Armed Forces in an Era of New Threats and Challenges. By Alexander Rukshin 30AAnnaallyyssiissNuclear Weapons Security – Russia's Top Priority in the Long Term. By Vladimir Verkhovtsev 38AAnnaallyyssiissU.S. Nuclear Policy beyond George W. Bush.By Nikolai Sokov 46AAnnaallyyssiissOn The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Providing for RussianSecurity in the 21st Century. By Alexander Saveliev 55VViieewwppooiinnttTime to Rethink the 'War on Terrorism'.By Gennady Yevstafiev 63VViieewwppooiinnttThe Threat of Biological Terrorism and the Role of the Mass Media. By Alexander Rabodzey 66SSuurrvveeyyThe Global Partnership in the Russian Far East:Did the Program End Before It Even Began?By Anton Khlopkov and Vadim Kozyulin 72

CCoommmmeennttaarryyThe Truth about 'Suitcase Nukes'. By Victor Yesin 78SSuummmmaarryyYaderny Kontrol Journal (in Russian), No. 1, 2005 84Yaderny Kontrol Journal (in Russian), No. 2, 2005 88Yaderny Kontrol Journal (in Russian), No. 3, 2005 90

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Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 10, No.1-2. Winter/Spring 2005

YADERNY KONTROL

International Security. Nonproliferation. Arms Control.Volume 10

No. 1-2 (33-34)Winter/Spring 2005

Published since 1996Contains selected analytical articles from Yaderny Kontrol, a journal published quarterly in Russian

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest Editorial StaffVladimir Orlov, Editor-in-ChiefGennady Yevstafiev, Senior AdvisorVladimir Dvorkin, ConsultantVasily Lata, ConsultantAlexander Bulychev, Copy Editor

Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Journal Editorial Board

Office in Russia

Subscriptions worldwide (Russian and English editions): please, send requests to Trialogue company byphone +7 (095) 764-9896 or by e-mail: [email protected]. Checks or wire transfers. Express mail delivery.

Circulation:Russian journal: 1,000 copies

English Digest: 500 copiesSigned for printing

on November 23, 2005• © PIR Center, 2005. All rights reserved. This publication may not be reproduced, stored in a retrieval

system, or transmitted in whole or in part, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording, or otherwise without written permission of the Publisher. To request permission,please, contact us at [email protected]. For educational purposes, permission is given free-of-charge.

• All views expressed in the Yaderny Kontrol Digest are solely the responsibility of the authors.• The editors wish to express special thanks to the Carnegie Corporation of New York for making this publi-

cation possible through their support of the Center for Policy Studies in Russia. Founder: Center for Policy Studies in Russia

Publisher:

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Cristina Chuen, TranslatorNadezhda Medvedeva, Assistant to the DirectorVyacheslav Zaytsev, AccountantOleg Kulakov, LayoutKonstantin Sirikov, Distribution

Vladimir Orlov, Editor-in-ChiefSergey BrilevVladimir DvorkinYury FedorovAnton Khlopkov

Vasily LataYevgeny MaslinMikhail YakushevDmitry Yevstafiev

Bulychev Alexander, Global Partnership ProjectCoordinator, Junior Research FellowDvorkin Vladimir, Major-General (ret.), ConsultantFedorov Yury, Dr., Executive Board MemberKhlopkov Anton, PIR Center Deputy Director Kozyulin Vadim, Dr., Conventional Arms ProgramDirectorKulakov Oleg, Systems AdministratorLaguta Anastasia, Conventional Arms ProgramCoordinator, Junior Research FellowLogutova Nadezhda, Information Project Coordinator,Junior Research FellowLata Vasily, Lieutenant-General (ret.), Consultant Maslin Yevgeny, Colonel-General (ret.), Executive BoardMemberMau Vladimir, Dr., Executive Board Member

Medvedeva Nadezhda, Assistant to the DirectorOrlov Vladimir, Dr., PIR Center Director, ExecutiveBoard MemberPonamarev Sergey, Intern Rasskazova Galina, Accountant Ryzhov Yury, Amb., Executive Board MemberSirikov Konstantin, Distribution of PeriodicalsSoroka Ekaterina, PR Manager, InternTimerbaev Roland, Amb., Executive Board ChairVotanovskaya Ekaterina, Education ProgramsCoordinatorYakushkin Dmitri, Dr., Executive Board MemberYevstafiev Gennady, Lieutenant-General (ret.), Senior AdvisorZagorski Andrei, Dr., Executive Board MemberZaytsev Vyacheslav, Chief Accountant

Address: Trekhprudny Per., 11/13, building 1, office 25Moscow 123001, Russia

Fax: +7 (095) 234-9558E-mail: [email protected]: http://www.pircenter.org

Editorial

WILL TTHE IIRANIAN AATOMBECOME AA PPERSIAN CCARPET

FOR RRUSSIA?

In the end of February 2005 Russia andIran signed a long-awaited protocol on thereturn of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) fromthe Bushehr nuclear power plant (NPP),an agreement several years in the making.It’s enough to recall that as early as August2002, Russian Minister of Atomic EnergyAleksandr Rumyantsev announced that thedocument would be in place inSeptember-October of that year. But newsof Iran’s secret nuclear facilities becamepublic in the summer of 2002, and forunderstandable reasons Russia was unableto force events, even though it clearlyunderstood that the light-water power reac-tor could not be related to a militarynuclear program in any way. It was impor-tant to preserve the option of freezing con-struction of the Bushehr NPP, in case theIranians proved intractable in their negoti-ations with the IAEA – Russia could thenplay the very same joker it did in 1995,when discussing the indefinite extension ofthe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) with Iran.

After Iran’s nuclear history was (more orless) clarified, thanks to the efforts of theIAEA, negotiations over the return of thespent fuel began. Iran’s representativesproved quite resourceful, presenting Russiawith a bill for SNF return saying: if youwant to take the fuel back from us, thenpay us for it. In the end, common sensewon out, and conditions for the return ofthe fuel were agreed upon beforeAleksandr Rumyantsev, now as head of theFederal Atomic Energy Agency, madeanother visit to Iran. But Rumyantsev washeading to a country where bargaininguntil the last minute is an essential part ofthe local culture. So it is no surprise thatthe Iranians decided to change the termsa little even after the Russian delegationhad already arrived, which meant postpon-ing the date for the signing of the proto-col, redacting it on the plane betweenBushehr and Tehran (where the heads ofthe two nuclear agencies were conductinga working meeting), and signing it on theirknees before the Russian delegation’s flightto Moscow took off.

In fact, the difficulties encountered duringnegotiations over the return of SNF fromIran were no exception in Russian-Iraniancooperation. Actually, the opposite is thecase: they are typical of bilateral coopera-tion in most areas, a fact that seriouslyinhibits Russian business from penetratingthe country. There is no real growth intrade between the two countries. Oneshould not be deluded by the trade statis-tics of the past two years: the nearly 50%growth rate, reaching sums of nearly $2billion, is the result of the simultaneousdelivery of large-scale equipment for theNPP and armaments that were orderedduring the last century; such contracts areunlikely to be repeated with the samefinancial return.

An examination of the best prospects forRussian-Iranian cooperation in the futuremust pay special attention to the construc-tion of NPPs in Iran. A series of meetingsbetween PIR Center experts and Iranianexperts and high ranking officials inMoscow, Tehran and Geneva in January-March 2005 further convinced us that Iranearnestly intends to develop a large-scalenuclear energy program. Yes, Tehran’s newplans to build 20 nuclear reactors–con-firmed by a decree of the Majlis (Iran’s par-liament)–look more like a belligerent ploythan a practical plan of action. But weshould heed the fact that Iran sees nuclearpower as an element of national prestige,and as an attribute of regional leadership inthe Middle East, with the utmost serious-ness. This is not a question of economicgain (Iran has already paid over 8 billionGerman marks and about $1 billion for theBushehr nuclear reactors) but a question ofprestige, which the country’s leaders willnot give up regardless of who becomes thecountry’s president this June.

Russia has no reason to stay on the side-lines when Iran’s nuclear market is divid-ed up. European commercial interests–firstand foremost those of the French nuclearindustry–have indicated a persistent desireto return to Akhvaz, where they began tobuild a reactor in the mid-1970s. A note-worthy episode in this regard occurred at

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a large international conference devoted tothe Iranian nuclear power program inTehran. At a reception in the name ofSecretary for the Supreme NationalSecurity Council Hassan Rowhani, highranking Iranian diplomats brought a manof European appearance to him and intro-duced him with the words, “This is a manwho will greatly help us with the solutionto our problems.” In point of fact this manturned out to be from the French nuclearindustry. And we cannot write off theAmericans, either. In answer to quiet ques-tions from the Americans themselves aboutthe possibility of renewing cooperation, theIranians (true, with cameras turned off) byno means speak about the great Satan.They answer quite pragmatically: “Makeyour proposals, and we will examine them.”And one should not doubt that the UnitedStates is preparing such proposals. Whetherthey will be acceptable to Iran is anotherquestion.

Therefore, Russia has no reason to hesitateand justify its decision to provide Iran withnuclear technology (Russia is only cooper-ating in the construction of an NPP andis not undertaking any cooperation on thenuclear fuel cycle). One should rememberthat in the mid-1970s the United Stateswas ready to agree to nuclear fuel produc-tion in Iran and did not object to thereprocessing of SNF in Iran, even express-ing its readiness to take part in the con-struction of an SNF reprocessing plant.Thus it seems that the Islamic revolution,in point of fact, was more of a plus thana minus when it comes to the nonprolif-eration regime. Otherwise Tehran wouldalready have acquired nuclear arms. Just asAmerica’s other ally from thisera–Pakistan–has done.

However, we have to be absolutely clearwith our Iranian partners that the weak-nesses in the Russian export control sys-tem have essentially been overcome. Soworking with Russian enterprises, includ-ing those in the defense industry, accord-ing to the Persian saying “A thief is a kinguntil he is caught” will have negative con-sequences for bilateral relations and causeexisting contracts to be frozen. MoreoverRussia should clearly show Iran thatcooperation prospects depend on the posi-tive development of the dialogue betweenIran and the IAEA and on how fast willthe IAEA consider the Iranian files.

In expanding its cooperation with Iran,Russia must learn from past experience.One of these lessons is that trustfulness,sometimes bordering on naivete, is inap-propriate in relations with Iran. In offeringto cooperate with Iran in NPP construc-tion, many Russian government expertsexpected that Iran would tell us about itsplans in the nuclear sphere, forgetting yetone more Persian proverb: “If partnershipwas holy, then God too would take him-self a partner.”

Having signed the protocol on the returnof SNF from the Bushehr NPP lastFebruary, albeit on their knees, Russia tookupon itself the obligation to supply freshfuel to Iran, a commitment it must fulfill.If we do otherwise, and forsake Iran inexchange for large-scale cooperation withthe United States in the nuclear sphere(and the U.S. continues to probe underwhat circumstances Russia might refuse toprovide fuel to Iran), yet one more Persianproverb comes to mind: “Enemies can bedivided into three categories: my enemy,the enemy of my friend, and the friend ofmy enemy.”

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Hot TTopic

KONSTANTIN KKOSACHEV:‘RUSSIAN FFOREIGN PPOLICY

PRIORITIES’

[This aarticle wwas ooriginally ppublished iin RRussianin Yaderny KKoonttrooll, NNo.3, VVolume 111, FFall 22005]

© Yaderny Kontrol, 2005. All rights reserved

© PIR Center, 2005. Translation into English

Chairman of the Russian State DumaCommittee for International Affairs Kon-stantin Kosachev was interviewed11 byYaderny Kontrol editor-in-chief VladimirOrrlov.

YADERNY KKONTROL: KonstantinYosifovich, you have worked in the Russian(Soviet) foreign policy establishment fornearly 15 years and have held leading postson the State Duma Committee forInternational Affairs for more than fiveyears, invariably finding yourself in themidst of the nation’s foreign policy events.How, in your view, has Russia’s foreignpolicy been transformed during this peri-od? What are the main factors that influ-enced these changes?

KOSACHEV: There are three major fac-tors determining the course of a state’s for-eign policy: interests, capabilities, and theinternational situation–or rather, the assess-ment of this situation by those who deter-mine foreign policy. The foreign policy ofany state is aimed, first and foremost, atthe realization of its national interests.Russia, both under President Putin andunder his predecessor, is no exception. Onthe other hand, these interests can be per-ceived differently.

Our country’s capacity varied significantlyat different periods of time. One can dis-cern, with many qualifications and reserva-tions, three stages in Russian foreign poli-cy: the “Yeltsin-Kozyrev” period of a weakRussia and a dependent foreign policy; the“Yeltsin-Primakov” period of a weak Russiaand independent foreign policy; and thecurrent period, associated directly withPresident Putin, of a strong Russia and anindependent foreign policy.

Finally, the global and regional environ-ment changed quite radically over theseyears. Assessments of the situation has also

changed. For example, the commitmentsRussia undertook vis-a-vis the EuropeanUnion in the early and mid-1990s wereclearly excessive, and were based on over-optimistic, romantic assessments. Today, acorrection of perceptions regarding the sit-uation in the post-Soviet space is happen-ing just as clearly.

Another problem is that Russia has yet tofinish creating a real foreign policy mech-anism, which would include the foreignpolicy of different branches of power andstate agencies–the president himself, execu-tive agencies (the Ministry of ForeignAffairs as well as other ministries andagencies), the legislature (parliamentarydiplomacy), regional authorities, theSecurity Council, “think tanks,” Russianforeign business activity, NGO activities,etc. A rigid hierarchical structure is notneeded here, but the basic coordinationpresent in all countries would be useful.

YADERNY KKONTROL: What are thepriorities of today’s Russian foreign policy?

KOSACHEV: Current Russian foreignpolicy, in my view, has three priorities. Thefirst, as banal as it may sound, remains theformer Soviet states. The second is Europe,the European Union. The third is thegrowing power in Asia, in particular Chinaand India, as well as Japan and, of course,the Republic of Korea, and in the future,a unitary state on the Korean Peninsula.Someone may ask: and where is theUnited States in this list of priorities?Without a doubt, Russia’s relations withthe United States are very important to us.There are two areas that are of equal inter-est to both the United States and Russia;they are: the fight against terrorism andthe nonproliferation of WMD. We arefruitfully working together to solve theproblems in these two areas. However, thisis the extent of our relations in the bigpicture. Nothing new or weighty can beseen on the agenda of our bilateral talks ineither the strategic or economic sphere.

Russia iin tthe FFormer SSoviet UUnion

YADERNY KKONTROL: You mentionedthe correction of Russia’s approach to thecountries of the former Soviet Union.What are the motivations for these changesby today’s Russian leadership? How willnational policy be transformed in this area?

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KOSACHEV: A reconsideration of Russianpolicy in the post-Soviet space is overdue,although President Putin, in July of lastyear, warned that Russia does not have amonopoly over activities in this region.However, Russia’s straightforward mobiliza-tion policy mostly benefits those countriesthat are trying to inflate their bargainingposition in negotiations with the West (forexample, those bargaining over EU acces-sion) and in negotiations with Russia(gaining current economic preferences).The primitive scheme of “pumping out”natural resources, debt cancellations, main-taining relations only with ruling elites,and relying mainly on direct oil and gasdiplomacy is not in Russia’s interest.

In reality, it is Russia, however strange itmay sound, that has yet to determine whatexactly it wants from the former Sovietrepublics. What do we expect from ourneighbors in the political sphere, otherthan demonstrative loyalty, which we havebeen receiving in doses that directly corre-spond to preferences granted?

We must now strengthen all of theresources of our policy in this area (orga-nizational and intellectual, first and fore-most), and make the existing levers worknot towards declarations of friendship, butfor concrete projects of integration. If dueattention is paid, the Single EconomicArea, the Collective Security TreatyOrganization, the Eurasian EconomicCommunity, and other structures will bereinvigorated, when their members clearlydefine for themselves what they are tryingto achieve and at the same time get rid ofillusions about quick accession to the EU.

Special attention should be paid to form-ing an “energy bloc” within the CISframework, which could become not just apowerful economic factor in Eurasia, giventhe rapid growth of the huge Asianeconomies and their growing energydemands, but also significantly influenceworld energy prices. The creation of a sin-gle energy and export strategy for Russiaand the raw material-exporting countries ofthe CIS could make them more inde-pendent of external influence and free tochoose their own partners. If so, the rapid“escape to the West” of the European and“semi-European” CIS states from the osten-sibly backward East of the Communitycould turn out to be a strategic loss forthem in the future.

Today Russia is quite capable of radicallychanging the situation, based not on “spin”but on its neighbors’ vital interests. Fromthe point of view of these interests (if wedo not pay attention to the growingmythology in neighboring countries aboutMoscow’s supposed imperial ambitions,which are allegedly dealt a heavy blow byeach “victory of freedom”), it is not Russiathat needs something from these countries,but these countries who have a far greaterneed of Russia. It may even turn out inthe future that the countries most impor-tant to Russia will not be the ones thatare such objects of contention today. Is itjust a coincidence that the United States isso active in Central Asia and the Caucasusat present?

The myth that Russia is blocking demo-cratic transformations in neighboring statesshould be dispelled as soon as possible.Since it is really a myth, although Russianbureaucrats do have the banal habit of con-tinuing to deal with their counterparts inthe CIS. In fact, Russia is more interestedin the democratization of its neighbors thanany other country, since democratizationwill make it significantly easier for Russianbusiness to operate there, while today localelites dictate rules that are rigid and farfrom market-based. True democracy guar-antees respect for the rights of Russian-speaking minorities, who are the first tobecome victims of a society’s authoritariantendencies. Finally, in a democratic societythere should be no political decisions thatcontradict the interests of its citizens. Thevital interest of the majority of CIS coun-tries’ citizens–the millions who come toearn money in Russia, those working incooperative enterprises created back in theSoviet era, and those for whom the obvi-ous and sometimes the only export marketis the CIS countries, that is, for all thesecategories of the economically active popu-lation–is to preserve stable and close rela-tions with Russia. Refusing to take theiropinion and essential interests into accountcontradicts democratic principles.

YADERNY KKONTROL: As a result ofthe Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO) summit, which took place on July5, 2005 in Astana, a joint Declaration of theHeads of the States Participating in theShanghai Cooperation Organization wasissued. Some experts see this document asevidence that Russia intends to increase itsmilitary presence in such post-Soviet coun-

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tries as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Do youshare a similar opinion?

KOSACHEV: You undoubtedly noticedthat Russia reacted fairly quietly to thegrowing U.S. military presence in thisregion at the time. The reaction was calmnot because Russia could not have reactedotherwise, because it was weak. The reac-tion was calm because at the time weunderstood the intention of the UnitedStates, which was trying to solve its ownproblems through this region, problems thatdid not relate to the region itself. Let’s say,the problem of Afghanistan, as well as ofIraq. And in this sense Russian andAmerican interests coincided, because theproblem of Afghanistan is no less impor-tant for Russia than it is for the UnitedStates. But no situation is static. We under-stand that the Afghan problem is far fromover; nevertheless, sooner or later it will beconcluded. This raises a question for thecountries of the region–and not just Russia,but China too–about what will happen tothe American military presence after theseproblems have been solved. I see this ques-tion as completely natural. No one is say-ing that the American military presence inthis region must be reduced right away. Weare talking keeping our intentions transpar-ent in order to avoid harboring suspicionsdirected at one another.

As far as Russian military presence in thesecountries is concerned, probably it is fullypossible only as long as the national forcesof the states concerned cannot manage theirtasks. For example, at one stage Tajikistandeclared that it no longer needed Russianborder guards on either the Chinese orAfghan sections of the border, since theTajik border guards had improved andcould take on the task themselves. I per-sonally have doubts that this is so. But werespect the sovereign right of Tajikistan toguard its national borders. However, if Tajikborder guards do not manage, we willagain raise the question of returning to theearlier cooperative regime.

But if we raise the question another way:does Russia intend to strengthen its mili-tary presence, for example, in Uzbekistanin order to help maintain the regime exist-ing there? Then I would say this type ofbehavior is wrong.

YADERNY KKONTROL: What contentyou do include in concept of union rela-tions? Economics, and free trade with bor-

dering union countries? Could there be amilitary alliance? Do the union relationsbetween Russia and the countries of theformer Soviet Union mean that these coun-tries should not join organizations like theEuropean Union? It is difficult to imaginea better thing for the CIS countries thanto begin trading energy resources at worldprices. Does this trend extend to Belarus?

KOSACHEV: When I talk about alliedrelations, I use this term more in a philo-sophical sense than in the sense of the cre-ation of some sort of concrete alliance. Forme, philosophically, allied relations indicatea fairly simple thing: I am ready to puteven my own national interests at risk iffor my strategic ally’s needs.

The U.S.-British alliance in Iraq is a clas-sic example. U.K. Prime Minister TonyBlair risked a lot to unconditionally sup-port the United States. A position similarto the German or French one would havebeen a lot easier and more comfortable forhim. He did what he did because heunderstood that at the time this was crit-ically important for his strategic ally, theUnited States.

Russia does not have this sort of alliancerelationship with a single country in theentire world. Not even with our closestpartners, such as Armenia or Kazakhstan.It is sometimes very difficult for us tomake agreements with such countriesbecause their own interests, not the inter-ests of the alliance, are their chief concern.However, it is difficult for me to condemnor criticize them for this.

We proposed this type of alliance relation-ship to Ukraine to the detriment of our owninterests, in the late stages of the presiden-tial campaign. We switched over to differen-tiating payment for energy resources accord-ing to the consigning country. Or when weprolonged the period that Ukrainian citizenscould stay in Russia without registration to90 days. This proposal was, as is wellknown, rejected by Ukraine.

Our difficulties in this sphere are alsocaused by the fact that we are not veryarticulate in our relations with neighboringcountries. In particular, we often find itdifficult to understand why particular rela-tions are developing in a certain way. Forexample, we supply gas to Estonia andMoldova for the same price: $80 for 1,000cubic meters. Our Moldovan friends seemto imagine that this will always be the

7


case. They think that because gas is sup-plied to Estonia despite extremely difficultrelations, it means that however long ordeeply they spoil their relations withRussia nothing serious will happen.

I would like to emphasize once more thatfor me it is not critical, for example, thatUkraine not join the European Union andNATO in order for us to maintain somekind of a relationship with Kiev. But in thissort of situation Ukraine could behave inseveral ways. It could take the initiative andcome to Russia and say, “we are joiningNATO, but don’t worry, we understand howimportant the Black Sea Fleet is to you,and we guarantee you that we are ready tosign any agreement. Nothing will happen tothe Black Sea Fleet after our entrance intoNATO.” This is one way to behave.

There is also a second way: to join NATOwithout discussing this matter, makingenigmatic expressions, and then in the endpreparing a very unpleasant surprise forRussia. We understand this well. The firstway I would call, although it is stretchingit a bit, a version of allied relations, wheremutual interests are considered and thereis a readiness to give up some of one’s owninterests in order to maintain these mutu-al interests. This approach, despite criti-cisms one might level at the currentregime, is the approach I see demonstrat-ed by Belarus. It is ready to sacrifice itsnational interests, although, unfortunately,not in the manner that Russia would like.And I do not see the conditions for aswitch to trading with Belarus on the basisof world prices. We must try to stimulateBelarus in every way possible, includingeconomically, to accelerate the process ofmutual integration. But here, in my view,the lack of a clear relationship interferes,just as it does in our relations with theEuropean Union.

Russia-EEU

YADERNY KONTROL: Despite theadoption of the Partnership andCooperation Agreement with the EU in1997, quite some time ago, Russia and theEU have yet to develop effective coopera-tion in even one sphere of cooperation inwhich they are both interested. How doyou explain this fact? And how does Russiaplan to develop its relationship if the EUexpands?

KOSACHEV: In my view, there are threedevelopments that have influencedRussian-EU relations: internal Russianevents, and, to be more precise, the adverseand not always appropriate and fair reac-tion of the European public to theseevents; the “velvet revolutions” in the CISand the active role of the EU, particularlyduring the events in Ukraine; and, finally,the most recent events in the EU itself–thefailure to adopt the EU Constitution andthe budget. This is a signal that the EUhas reached its natural limits of expansionfor the present; to go further would com-promise quality.

Russia will base its policy on the realitiesof the situation, since the EU, as time hasshown, is a living and developing organism,with its upswings and crises. To a largeextent, the direction in which it developswill determine it relations with Russia.Those EU member states that would liketo create a powerful, globally competitiveunion, to implement the “Lisbon Strategy,”will be interested in developing stable rela-tions with Russia. But those that havejoined the EU to settle old scores and toget cover for attacks on Russia, who areready to “censor” EU-Russia relations evenat the expense of economic pragmatism,having gained an opportunity to implementtheir plans, could significantly worsen theclimate between us.

However, it will take a lot of effort to con-vince the people in the EU that distancingthemselves from the continent’s mostresource-rich country, one capable of ensur-ing the realization of EU economic plans,is beneficial for them. One would have toprove that: a) there are no alternatives toconfrontation, and b) that Russia cannot beintegrated into either the EU or any othergeneral transitional structures, which wouldnot disturb the EU’s internal architecture.That is not likely to be the case.

Thus, we should follow the path of consis-tent rapprochement, and not let our emo-tions hamper us. The agreement on a pack-age of road maps for the creation of fourCommon Spaces has been adopted in anoptimal form: on the one hand, they aregeneral enough that they are not a substi-tute for the more comprehensive anddetailed agreement, which we will have toprepare in order to replace the existingPartnership and Cooperation Agreement; onthe other hand, they determine the areas toapply our joint efforts quite precisely.

8


But the European Union itself must solveone difficult dilemma: whether it is jealousof any attempts to create strong economicstructures in the CIS, fearing the emer-gence of a strong competitor and a weak-ening of its own positions, or it is notready to expand further and is interestedin the CIS states gaining strength and sta-bility on their own, without EU financialsupport. This would require the creation ofnew effective structures in the CIS, withRussia inevitably acting as their core (anyalternative structure, such as GUAM, willhave to be fostered).

The simplest way to overcome this inter-nal conflict is to determine the realprospects for Russia itself, and not simplyin a declaratory manner, but in such a waythat Russia’s neighbors–Ukraine, Georgia,Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, andBelarus–clearly understand that deepercooperation with Russia will not blocktheir way into the EU, but rather leads inthe same direction.

One more important nuance: we have livedwith the view that we are surrounded byenemies for too long. Recently, asEuropean and American mass medialaunch a massive attack, especially on theRussian president, they suppose that thispressure will lead to more democracy,along the lines of Georgia or Ukraine. Butin this situation Russians, instead, see thattheir suspicions that no one in Europe iswaiting for them are being proven, andthey, out of “habit,” begin to mobilize. AndEurope welcomes anyone who criticizesthem. The condition of Russians in theBaltic States confirms their worries, andUkraine, Georgia, Moldova are encouragedto think that they can resolve their com-plex problems with minorities either byforce or with massive violations of minor-ity rights (as in the Baltic States).

YADERNY KKONTROL: During thisJune’s US-EU summit U.S. PresidentGeorge Bush attempted to demonstrate theU.S. interest in a strong European Unionin every possible way. However, manyexperts believe that in fact the WhiteHouse does not want the European Unionto be a strong competitor on the worldstage, and that therefore it is promoting anunstable equilibrium within the EU and adeepening of the contradictions betweenleading European powers. Do you agreewith this theory?

KOSACHEV: The United States paysclose attention to trends strengthening theEuropean Union, since this strengthening,obviously, is not in its interest. It is natu-ral that it disturbs them. I think that theUnited States will always support theentrance of a maximum number of weakand unprepared states into the EU, becausethis weakens the EU and does notstrengthen it, just as the founders of theEU originally thought. But in reality thekey to solving this emerging situation liesin the European Union, not in the UnitedStates; the U.S. is a passive, not an activeplayer in this game.

As strange as it may seem, the active play-ers today are not so much the foundingfathers as the new states, the new ten orsome of the states in the new ten thatrecently joined the European Union.

Here, in my view, Poland has a special role.Last August the Polish press published aprogrammatic article by then-Minister ofForeign Affairs and now Speaker of thePolish Parliament WlodzimierzCimoszewicz. It included the statement thatuntil the Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarusenter the EU and NATO, Poland will feelthat it is a front-line state. And I imaginethat any state now is located on the outerboundary of the European Union willalways try to move closer to the center, andto move the border away from itself.

I think that has now entered the con-sciousness of the European Union’sstrongest states, Germany, France, and theUnited Kingdom, that clearly are going tostrongly resist further expansion.

And here we find yet another unexpectedcontradiction in the U.S.-European-Russiantriangle. I repeat again: the United States, inmy view, will actively promote EU expan-sion. Russia will actively try to prevent it inthis. And inside the European Union itselftwo opposing groups will collide.

Until this situation is resolved, there areunlikely to be any serious contradictionsbetween the United States and a weakenedEurope.

Russia-UUnited SStates

YADERNY KKONTROL: U.S.-Russianrelations have always been characterized bya combination of rivalry and cooperation.However, since September 11, 2001, and

9


thanks to the personal relationship that hasbeen established between the two presi-dents, the elements of rivalry have beenpushed into the background. In spite ofthis, since that time no new areas for coop-eration between the two countries haveappeared. What, in your view, are the areasin which Russia and the United Statesmight nonetheless be interested in cooper-ating in the future?

KOSACHEV: The U.S.-Russian agendalargely depends on how the United Stateschooses to realize its undisputed lead overother potential competitors: exercising itsleadership by dominating through consen-sus or via a hegemony based on a demon-stration of its power. Today, unlike in thesecond half of the 20th century, the pecu-liarity of the situation for Russia consistsin the fact that the international systemconcerns it neither more nor less than itdoes all other states (earlier, everything thathappened in the Soviet Union and theUnited States was first seen in the contextof the bipolar confrontation). Thus, newissues and common interests are emergingthat bring Russia and the leadingEuropean states together (such as a com-mon position on Iraq).

Among the obvious agenda items today are:preventing the proliferation of WMD; fight-ing international terrorism and organizedcrime; increasing stability in Eurasia; UNreform; discussing the criteria for interven-tions in the internal affairs of sovereignstates, and criteria for determining whatnon-democratic regimes, “humanitarian dis-asters,” and “failed states” are; where the G8is concerned: the prospects for development,and accession of new member states; coop-eration in the areas of energy as well asscience and technology; developing a US-Russian business dialogue; and supportingRussian accession to the WTO.

U.N. RReform

YADERNY KKONTROL: In March U.N.Secretary General Kofi Annan gave areport that presented the basic principlesfor reforming the organization. How doyou evaluate the prospects for the mod-ernization of such a global organization?

KOSACHEV: Of course, there is a long-standing need of reform, caused by globalchanges that have altered the world great-ly since the time when the organization

was created. At the beginning of the newmillennium, the traditional views of inter-national law and international relationswere severely tried. The attention of bothdomestic and international politics began tofocus not so much on the state, as on indi-vidual actors.

However, we should understand that suchsignificant transformations of the basis ofinternational law cannot but cause tensionsin relationships based on the fundamentalprinciples of past centuries, upon whichthe so-called Westphalian order was based:state sovereignty and non-intervention instates’ internal affairs. Life, freedom, andpersonal dignity today are afforded protec-tions that, if not equal to those of states,are at least far greater than those of pastcenturies.

The UN–the main institution for the coor-dination of the will of all peoples, created60 years ago following the agreement ofthe victorious powers in the most devas-tating world war of the pastcentury–should not look like an anachro-nism against the backdrop of the rapidprogress of a new century. If the UN doesnot meet the requirements of the contem-porary world, it would simply not beworth the money spent on it – it wouldbe better to donate that money directly tothose in need. The key question is: towhich trends should the UN adapt? Are allof the current changes so positive andinevitable that they should be embodied ininternational law? Should the UN “bless”the new changes with its authority, orshould it preserve the most valuable thingsfrom the past?

These questions require the most carefulanalysis, since the goal is not to “sink” itsstatus via the reforms but instead tostrengthen it, and not weaken it, in theprocess of transformation. The fact that atpresent certain countries and organizationssometimes ignore the opinion of the UN,even when undertaking serious actions likemilitary operations against sovereign states,does not mean that this is a norm thatshould be codified. On the contrary, this isa deviation from the norm, which shouldbe thus evaluated, whatever reforms areimplemented and whatever number ofcountries sits on the new Security Council.If this does not happen, the threshold ofwhat is possible in the world will be fur-ther lowered, in contradiction to the goaland mission of the United Nations. And

10


we should not be ashamed of our deter-mination to stand for justice in interna-tional relations, even if not everyone likesthis and some see it as “outdated.” AsFriedrich von Schiller once said, “the truthdoes not suffer at all, if someone fails torecognize it.”

Russia today has a real chance to preserveand to strengthen its status as one of themajor powers that not only founded butalso reformed the UN. There is no sensein trying to throw its weight behind some-thing that is obsolete: either we lose, if wefail to defend our position, or the UNloses, if we will succeed in defendingsomething that is no longer needed.

Russia-NNATO

YADERNY KKONTROL: I have to ask aquestion about Russian cooperation withNATO. What factors, in your opinion, willdetermine the nature of such cooperationin the near future?

KOSACHEV: The Alliance currently isexperiencing a “time of change,” the resultsof which will determine its relations withRussia. If it preserves the obsolete role ofa military bloc, existentially in need of astrategic adversary (dispersed internationalterrorism does not fit this role), then coop-eration will be difficult. If it answers cur-rent realities, and becomes aimed atresponding to new challenges effectively,then interaction with such a structure(and, possibly, joining it) will not only beexpedient, but necessary, given increasingnational security risks. There are differenttrends inside NATO, and we will watchthem, seeking maximum possible coopera-tion at each of the stages of the evolutionof the Alliance.

If NATO continues to limit itself to con-centrating its forces in Europe, then Russiawill inevitably become if not a target, thenan object of its increased attention.However, NATO may change its geograph-ic priorities, as the Americans want it to; itis not yet clear for us how this will hap-pen, or whether the threat to Russia willgrow at its perimeter. One possibility is thatNATO will create joint bases in those loca-tions where it (to be more precise, theU.S.) has already received consent from theCIS states. Kyrgyz President Askar Akayevonce suggested this himself. Another issueis so-called interoperability, i.e. the possibil-

ity of matching up military equipment andcommand systems, if necessary.

YADERNY KKONTROL: When theFounding Act on Mutual Relations,Cooperation, and Security between NATOand the Russian Federation was adopted,there were loud declarations that we wouldnow be able to affect decision making inthe North Atlantic Alliance. However, someseven years have passed and we have seenthat this is not entirely true. There is anunderstanding of the fact that this greatexpectation was not confirmed. How, inyour view, should Russia conduct its rela-tions with this organization in future: signa new Founding Act or work within theframework of the existing one? Attempt tostrengthen our position or recognize thatwe have exhausted all positive possibilitiesand should not count on any more, andshould let it go, as all existing projects aresimply peripheral?

KOSACHEV: I completely agree thatthese agreements did not lead to a break-through in our relations and our coopera-tion truly is of a peripheral nature. On thepositive side, of course, one could note thatRussia and NATO, as partners, havebecome somewhat more transparent to oneanother. On the other hand, we neverfound an area where our interests coincide.And this is so because NATO itself hasnot been able to find its own place in thecurrent, changed world. Both Russia andthe United States understand this.

I would not exclude a qualitatively differ-ent level of Russia-NATO cooperation, ifNATO is transformed into a union withpolitical, and not just military functions,including, however seditious this sounds,peacekeeping cooperation, such as jointoperations in Abkhazia or in Transnistria,where, to date, Russian peacekeepers remainunder the aegis of NATO. But I would liketo emphasize: only in the case of substan-tial reforms of NATO itself, something thatone cannot imagine at present.

For Russia, the formation of some new typeof cooperation with NATO currently is nota main priority in view of the changed cir-cumstances. We find it much more inter-esting and more promising to negotiatebilaterally with the United States and otherNATO members like, for example,Germany. This spring, the State Duma rat-ified a unique agreement with Germany onthe transit of NATO troops through

11


Russian territory into Afghanistan. It is hardto imagine this happening two to five yearsago. Nevertheless, it is typical that this wasarranged through a bilateral agreement withGermany and not an agreement with theAlliance. I think that if we had attemptedto ratify this sort of agreement with NATOit would not have been approved despite allof the administrative leverage that theKremlin has in the State Duma.

The MMulti-VVector NNature of RRussian PPolicy

YADERNY KKONTROL: What, in youropinion, should Russia’s foreign policy pri-orities be in the near future?

KOSACHEV: Our policy should not belimited to relationships with the majorpowers of today, however dominant theycurrently appear. Creating a multipolarworld presupposes maintaining strong rela-tions with the countries that will form itsfoundations.

By advancing our relations with China andIndia, as well as with Brazil, Egypt, andall of other powers that are expected tobecome stronger in the medium-term, weare working for the future, strengtheningRussia’s position in the complex structureof the emerging world order. It seems thatthis structure will differ from the currentone, with its clear unipolarity, which makesit unstable and largely unjust, and withoutprospects for the future.

Eliminating the border problem with Chinaallowed us to attain a new level of coop-eration, a fact that was demonstrated by thevisit of the Chinese leader to Moscow inearly June. These are not just an attemptto play the “Asian card” in a “grand bar-gain” with the West; Russia has its ownpermanent interest in the region. An illus-tration of this is the Shanghai CooperationOrganization, which is emerging as a gen-uinely useful structure for reconciling theinterests of countries in the region.

YADERNY KKONTROL: If we were toconsider the development of cooperation inthe Far East, then what, in your view,could Russia propose to the leading coun-tries of the region–to Japan orChina–besides oil? Speaking of oil, fromyour point of view, what is more attractivefor Russia: an oil pipeline to Daqing or anoil pipeline to Nakhodka, taking intoaccount the shortage of pipelines in theeastern part of the country? And are youworried that these countries’ strong eco-nomic activity in Siberia and in the FarEast will eventually prove to be counter-productive for Russia?

KOSACHEV: Of course, at the presenttime we cannot propose anything to ourAsian partners that we cannot propose toour European partners or the UnitedStates. These are the same energyresources, the same raw material. This isthe reality of modern Russia. It is anothermatter that we can propose fundamentallynew projects in this area to our Asian part-ners, including the construction of the oilpipelines that you mentioned earlier. AndI am confident that we can propose thatthey cooperate in developing Siberia andthe Russian Far East in ways that areacceptable to Russia

As far as oil pipelines are concerned, I amundoubtedly a supporter of the plan tobuild a pipeline to Perevoznaya; there areno longer any discussions on Nakhodka.We made a serious error when we builtthe Blue Stream gas pipeline and lockedourselves into one end user, who immedi-ately began to dictate conditions to Russia.This time, we are not talking about givingJapan preference over China. We are talk-ing about the choice between a projectwith several end users and a project withone end user. The first is always betterfrom an economic point of view.

12


1 This interview was based on Konstantin Kosachev'sspeech to the Trialogue Club, organized by the PIR Centeron July 7, 2005.

Interview

SERGEY KKISLYAK: ‘‘IRAN: THE SSITUATION HHAS BBECOME

CLEARER, BBUT NNOT AALLQUESTIONS HHAVE BBEEN

ANSWERED’1

[This aarticle wwas ooriginally ppublished iin RRussianin Yaderny KKoonttrooll, NNo.2, VVolume 111, SSummer2005]


© PIR Center, 2005. Translation into English.

Abriged version.

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of theRussian Federation Sergey I. Kiislyakanswered the questions of PIR CenterDirector Vladimir A. Orrlov.

YADERNY KKONTROL: One of thecritical issues in world politics today is theobservance of the NPT. How can we guar-antee that some non-nuclear state that hasgone far in developing its own nuclear fuelcycle will not at some moment use itsright to withdraw from the NPT and cre-ate, outside of the NPT and outside of thecontrol of the international community, itsown nuclear arsenal? More concretely: howshould we deal with Iran? The EU-3(Britain, Germany and France) have pro-posed their services in resolving theIranian issue. How does Russia react tothis “European initiative”?

There are two polar-opposite viewpoints:one is that this is a no-lose situation forRussia, as the Europeans will resolve for usthose tasks that we would not likely havebeen able to bilaterally, and this will openthe way to easier cooperation with Iran,and will gradually remove the constraintsthat existed earlier; the other is that thisis, undoubtedly, a losing proposition for us,because the Europeans will be in theIranian nuclear energy market, and theywill not leave but will crowd us out. Thesupporters of this “pessimistic” view saythat France has nonproliferation on itstongue, but nuclear exports to Iran on itsmind. And after the second glass of redwine, the French themselves admit thattheir export interests are no less importantthan nonproliferation, and that they already“beat” Russia in the tender in Finland, andwill win in Iran too…

KISLYAK: The medicinal norm is oneglass of red wine, therefore, as a rule, I donot have a second. And I look at this situ-ation completely differently. This situation isnot a game. Neither for us, nor for Iran,and not for the three European states thathave actively taken part in the developmentof this dialogue. This is not a simple situ-ation. The history of the development ofthe Iranian nuclear program is that for 18years, Iran gathered components for thedevelopment of its nuclear program withoutunconditionally informing the IAEA of allof this work. From the IAEA’s viewpoint,not all of this is a violation of the rules.

Iran is not only our partner in the con-struction of the Bushehr NPP, it is a majorstate with whom we share the Caspian Sea– it is our neighbor. It is a country to whichRussia has historically wide economic, cul-tural and scientific connections. Therefore itis very important for us that our relationswith Iran develop on the basis of a mutu-al understanding of the beneficial nature ofthese relations, of the potential for these rela-tions, of their legal foundation. The negoti-ations of the EU-3 with Iran (ceased at themoment - ed.) are an independent processof our European neighbors for resolving theproblems that they have relating to the his-tory of the development of Iran’s nuclearprogram and the application of the lessonsfrom this history for the future.

YADERNY KKONTROL: Speaking of thelessons of history, you said that Iran hasgathered the components for its nuclearprogram for 18 years.

KISLYAK: Yes, they bought one technol-ogy in one country, and another in anoth-er. Moreover, these actions were not alwayslegal violations. However, Iran did create,unfortunately, an insufficiently transparentprogram. This is the source of the largenumber of questions concerning the pro-gram as a whole. There have been manyconjectures, hypotheses, and tense debates,about this, including at the IAEA.

YADERNY KKONTROL: How would youevaluate the documents Iran has providedto the IAEA?

KISLYAK: To date, Iran has delivered asufficiently detailed, several thousand pagereport on the goals of its program, whatcomponents they bought and where theybought them, for what purposes, and howone component links with the others. Iran’sviewpoint is fairly unambiguous in the for-

13


mation of this report: everything is forpeaceful purposes. This is a very largereport, and the IAEA has been studying itfor several months, not from scratch, buton the basis of a long history of cooperat-ing with Iran. Many questions that origi-nally existed concerning the nature ofIran’s nuclear program have, for all intentsand purposes, been answered.

YADERNY KKONTROL: Is everyone sat-isfied with Iran’s answers?

KISLYAK: Of course not. We know theposition of the United States. This positionis severe. We often heard proposals toincrease the level of the discussion, to takeit from the IAEA to the UN SecurityCouncil. We think that the path that waschosen a year and a half ago for the res-olution of issues relating to the past andfuture of Iran’s program on a cooperativebasis is the optimal approach. Moreover, itallows Iran to answer these questions in anatmosphere of cooperation, and not one ofconfrontation with the rest of the member-states of the Treaty and the Agency. Thisis the path whose development we haveconsistently tried to promote in relationsbetween the IAEA and Iran, in the rela-tions between Europe and Iran, and in therelations between the USA and Iran.

YADERNY KKONTROL: The Iranianproblem continues to be discussed at thebilateral level between Russia and theUnited States. How would you evaluate thecurrent level of this dialogue?

KISLYAK: We have our viewpoint in theconsultations with the United States onIran, plain and simple.

We are, absolutely against Iran acquiringnuclear weapons, just as we are not inter-ested in any other state going nuclear. Inthis regard, there are no discriminatoryapproaches in our relations with Iran. Andwe tell our Iranian friends that their pur-poses should be purely peaceful. They affirmthat their purposes are purely peaceful. Ifthis is so, we have to enhance cooperationin order to bolster confidence in the char-acter of the Iranian nuclear program.Clearly, after 18 years of lack of transparen-cy in the nuclear sphere on Iran’s part, theprocess of rebuilding trust is not a task fora single day or a single month. We knowthis from the development of relations withthe West after the Cold War. This is not likeelectricity: even if you have already agreedon everything, one cannot just turn on or

turn off the light. International relations aremuch more complicated. If doubts haveemerged, and especially if doubts havedeveloped over the course of decades, theycannot be removed with a single report.

YADERNY KKONTROL: What is yourcurrent impression of Iran’s nuclear pro-gram in brief?

KISLYAK: The current Iranian programis incomparably more transparent andunderstandable then it was a year and ahalf ago. However, not all questions havebeen answered, so the work in this direc-tion will continue. We will help in this.

YADERNY KKONTROL: Returning to thequestion of what is good for Russia, andwhat is not good for Russia, where Iran isconcerned. How will Russia conduct itselfin its relations to Iranian nuclear program?

KISLYAK: Iran is our neighbor andRussia stresses the importance of solvingthe problem politically. Iran needs to finda path to coexist with the rest of theworld, with its region, with Europe, in sta-ble, predictable political conditions. We areinterested in a stable, socially and econom-ically developed Iran, at peace with otherstates, as well as with consistently improv-ing relations with Russia.

We will do everything possible so that thepeaceful nuclear program in Iran developscooperatively. This means that Iran shoulddemonstrate transparency and predictabilityin its program and intentions. This alsomeans that Iran must have confidence thatthere will be no interference in the deliv-ery of equipment and materials for devel-oping its peaceful nuclear program.

We have been working and will continueto work in this direction. Our friends fromEurope have their dialogue with Iran, butwe are by no means sitting in our officeswaiting to see how it will end. Russia is avery active participant in the multilateraldiscussion on this issue. And we are alsovery seriously discussing this issue inde-pendently, in a bilateral format, with Iran.I hope that in the end, if we finally answerall of these questions, we will be able tosay that Russia played an important role indealing with these difficulties, and this isfully in Russia’s long-term interests.

14


1 This interview was taken before the adoption of theIAEA resolution GOV/2005/77 on Implementation of theNPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iranon September 24, 2005.

Interview

NIKOLAI SSPASSKY:‘COMBATING TTERRORISMMUST HHOLD AA CCENTRAL

PLACE IIN TTHE NNEW RRUSSIANNATIONAL SSECURITY

CONCEPT’

[This aarticle wwas ooriginally ppublished iin RRussianin Yaderny KKoonttrooll, No.1, VVolume 111, SSpring2005]



Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolai SSpasskygave an interview to Yaderny Kontrol editor-in-chief Vladimir Orlov.

YADERNY KKONTROL: The terroristacts of summer and fall 2004 renewed thevery acute question of whether Russia’sNational Security Concept can meet thechallenges currently facing the country.How is the development of a new NationalSecurity Concept covering this issue? Whatare the differences between this documentand the 2000 Concept, and has there beena dialogue with the public during the workon this new document?

SPASSKY: In accordance with instructionsfrom President Vladimir Putin, theSecurity Council staff, in cooperation withinterested ministries and agencies, is work-ing on a new National Security Concept.The need for this is obvious: in the fiveyears since the adoption of the currentConcept our country and the world haveundergone cardinal changes. New threatsand challenges have arisen that must bemet with appropriate responses. The maindanger that currently threatens the globalcommunity as a whole, as well as ourcountry in particular, is terrorism. Thereality of this is extremely severe. AsPresident Putin has emphasized repeatedly,terrorism is essentially a declaration of waron Russia. Therefore, the problem of com-bating terrorism must occupy a centralplace in the new Concept.

But speaking in broader terms, we under-stand that the new Concept must be anextremely concrete document. In fact, thisdocument must become the political core

on which all Russian government activitiesof the near future are based. We are try-ing to write the new Concept in simple,intelligible language. This document mustbe taken and accepted by Russian civilsociety. We expect the broadest participa-tion of academic circles in the preparationof the new Concept. To date the work isgoing well. It is interesting to note that wehave already had the first round tables onthe new National Security Concept atMoscow State University and thePresidium of the Russian Academy ofSciences, while the Concept is beingactively discussed through an Internet con-ference on the Security Council website.

YADERNY KKONTROL: What, in youropinion, should Russia’s main priorities bein combating terrorism? What is theRussian Security Council’s role in design-ing a system to warn of a terrorist threat?In your view, how should military andsecurity bodies be reformed in order toincrease the effectiveness of anti-terroristmeasures?

SPASSKY: Given the seriousness oftoday’s threats, we must completely rethinkour approaches to how we go about com-bating terrorism, both in the internationalarena and inside Russia. As for our coun-try, President Putin very succinctly formu-lated the task in his address to theenlarged session of the government onSeptember 13, 2004. We indeed should becreating an anti-crisis management systemin Russia. Only with this kind of rigorousapproach will it be possible to turn the sit-uation around. This is not a task that canbe completed in one day, but designingmature measures can not be delayed either.The first steps have already been taken.The next step is the drafting and adoptionof a law on combating terrorism. By theway, we are not going to reinvent thewheel. Even the first draft of this billechoes the U.S. “Patriot Act,” adopted afterthe tragedy of September 11, 2001.However, the U.S. anti-terrorist legislation,particularly its limitation of democraticfreedoms, is actually stricter than ours.

However, while taking measures at thenational level, it is important to rememberthat terrorism is by nature a global dan-ger. Successfully fighting it is only possiblethrough the united efforts of the entireglobal community. Russia is playing a veryactive role in the anti-terrorist coalition.Moreover, we know what must be done in

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order to radically increase the effectivenessof international anti-terrorist cooperation.In the first place, I would put the neces-sity of overcoming double standards,because they cannot continue as they havein the past. President Putin is absolutelycorrect in pointing out this issue. OurWestern partners, under our influence, aregradually changing their position, but onlyvery slowly. The adoption of U.N. SecurityCouncil Resolution 1566, a Russian initia-tive, was a serious breakthrough. Next, wemust undertake a number of concretemeasures, including: supplementary meas-ures to prevent terrorist financing, in par-ticular of bandit formations in Chechnya;the expansion of practical cooperationamong intelligence agencies in the sphereof anti-terrorist activities; the adoption ofthe Russian and Indian anti-terrorist con-ventions; the growth of anti-terrorist coop-eration within the framework of theNATO-Russia Council, in particular withregards to Afghanistan (the plan of actionon combating terrorism which has beenadopted is a good foundation); and engag-ing in anti-terrorist dialogue and coopera-tion between NATO and the CSTO.

Moreover, all of these practical steps mustbe supplemented by political efforts tostimulate dialogue between different partsof the world, a dialogue between civiliza-tions. We must not allow the fight againstterrorism to cause the world to be dividedon religious grounds.

YADERNY KKONTROL: The mostimportant question of international policytoday is the reform of the U.N. SecurityCouncil in order to make it more repre-sentative and increase the effectiveness ofits decisions. What type of United NationsSecurity Council would most meet Russianinterests?

SPASSKY: The report of the high-levelpanel on threats, challenges and change,the so-called “group of wise men,” is a seri-ous and interesting document. Naturally,time will be needed to study it. Often theentire issue of U.N. reform is reduced toone question: Security Council expansion.The issue of reform, of course, is consid-erably broader. Nevertheless, the questionof the composition of the UNSC is trulyof fundamental importance. Russia’s posi-tion on this issue is sufficiently well knownand has not undergone any particularchanges recently. Russia is ready to con-sider any reasonable proposals for expan-

sion with the understanding that any suchdecision requires the broadest possibleagreement inside the United Nations, asclose to consensus as possible. For us themost important thing is that expansion notreduce the effectiveness of the SecurityCouncil. Therefore, we are proceeding fromthe need to retain the compactness andefficiency of the council’s composition.

For Russia it is critical that the status ofthe current Security Council be fullyretained, particularly its veto powers. As forextending veto power to new members, itwould be most expedient to determine thislater, when the roster of new permanentmembers is known. In fact, the report bythe “group of wise men” recommends thatthe veto not be extended beyond the cur-rent five.

YADERNY KKONTROL: The appearanceof new threats and challenges to interna-tional security in recent years, at both theglobal and regional level, has resulted inmany new points of contact and areas ofreal cooperation between Russia and theUnited States. At the same time, in con-trast to expectations, there has been littleprogress in finding solutions to a wholeseries of questions and problems that areslowing the development of bilateral rela-tions. What, in your view, is the reason forthe fact that our bilateral relations are notrealizing their potential? What areas havethe most hidden promise for expandingRussian-American cooperation?

SPASSKY: Russia and the United Statesare two major powers with their owninterests that extend across the globe. Theterm “superpower” is not the most felici-tous, but is nevertheless accurate. It reflectstoday’s Russia, despite all of the domesticproblems, particularly in the economicarea, with which we have to contend. It isclear that the interests of such powers can-not be always, everywhere, and in all waysidentical. Common interests must pre-vail–the maintenance of global stability, theelimination of terrorist threats, averting theproliferation of WMD, and finding coordi-nated answers to other current challenges.Furthermore, in the fight against interna-tional terrorism we are acting as genuineallies. However, differences remain. Thereasons for this vary. There are completelynormal differences, tied to the differinginterests of two great powers. Further, it’sno secret to anyone that today’s UnitedStates very much supports one-sided

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approaches to the solution of internationalproblems, particularly within the adminis-tration. There is nothing surprising in thefact that this affects our relations as well.

Finally, many countries of the West,including the United States, continue tohave an antagonistic, and at times openlyhostile, attitude towards Russia thatremains from the Cold War era thanks toinertia. This inertia interferes both withimproving international cooperation andwith building strong bilateral relations withthese countries. We still have to contendwith the fact that it is very difficult forthem to acknowledge our legal right tohave security interests. There is a bias thatmanifests itself in various ways, includinganti-Russian campaigns in the Westernpress, for all sorts of reasons. Here, it istrue, we should not misspeak. We ourselvesshould more actively explain our decisionsand approaches to the Western public, inlanguage it understands and to which it isaccustomed. Nevertheless, to sum up, onecould say that we view our relations withthe present U.S. administration as fairlypositive. The Russian president, by theway, mentioned this at his year-end pressconference. We believe that we can workwith the Bush Administration. And in gen-eral we view the future of Russian-American relations with optimism.

YADERNY KKONTROL: How do theSecurity Council and Russian presidentcoordinate their work? Have permanentcontacts been established between theRussian Security Council and correspon-ding organizations in other major powers?

SPASSKY: In accordance with the statuteon the Russian Security Council, this bodyprepares proposals for the President of theRussian Federation on all issues related tothe provision of national security. In orderto fulfill this task, the Security Councilstaff maintains international contacts, instrict compliance with its legal rights. Theclosest contacts, including those of a mul-tilateral nature, have been formed withanalogous bodies in the CIS states. Butthese are not our only such contacts. Wehave working relationships with similarexecutive bodies in other countries, includ-ing the U.S. National Security Council.

YADERNY KKONTROL: What is Russia’sposition regarding the operation by theUnited States and its allies in Iraq? Whatare the Russian Security Council’s propos-als for getting out of this crisis?

SPASSKY: Our evaluation of theAmerican invasion of Iraq has notchanged. We continue to believe, as before,that a tragic error was made. As a resultof this error, we find ourselves in the sit-uation that we have to deal with today.This situation will have to be remedied byall of us together. Because all of us–Russia,the European states, and the UnitedStates–despite all of the differences in ourpositions, are interested in the stabilizationof the situation in Iraq so that Iraq doesnot become, like Afghanistan under theTaliban, a hotbed of terrorism and religiousextremism. The situation is very difficult.The optimism of American analyses, in ouropinion, is not justified. We see no realimprovements. However, there were anumber of important decisions in 2004.Security Council Resolution 1546 wasadopted and the International MinisterialMeeting on Iraq was convened in Sharmel-Sheikh. Gradually, though with greatdifficulty, our way of handling the situationis making some progress. This is occurringthrough an active political process with theindispensable participation of the UnitedNations, Iraq’s neighbors, and the opposi-tion forces inside Iraq that have not beencompromised by involvement in terroristactivities. In our opinion, there is no alter-native to this approach.

YADERNY KKONTROL: The tragicevents of September 11, 2001, would seemto have forced Russia and the EuropeanUnion to reexamine their security anddefense cooperation and to have removedmost of the obstacles to developing suchcooperation. However, if we look at theresults of our cooperation, the majority areno more than political declarations. What,in your view, is the reason for the slippagein the practical realization of these decla-rations?

SPASSKY: The past year was not an easyone for our relations with the EuropeanUnion. Through our joint efforts we suc-ceeded in loosening several knots. Weexpanded the EU-Russia Partnership andCooperation Agreement to new EU mem-bers in a timely fashion. Methods for han-dling Russian concerns were set down inthe Joint Statement on EU Enlargementand EU-Russia Relations signed on April27, 2004, in Luxembourg. The traditionalfall EU-Russian summit occurred, albeitwith delay. However, we continue to haveserious questions for the European Union.

17


We are counting on more active attentionto the critical task of forming the CommonSpaces. We consider this model to be verypromising. We await concrete steps inresponse, such as guarantees of the rightsof Russian-speaking minorities in Latviaand Estonia, and on Kaliningrad transit.Russia is ready to go very far in all areasof cooperation with the European Union.We are also ready to cooperate in the for-mation of a common foreign securityspace. But to make progress our counter-parts must show that they are also inter-ested in this. Lately, this interest has beenmissing. Sometimes one gets the impres-sion that the EU has not completely recov-ered from its expansion and cannot decidewhat type of relations it wants to buildwith Russia. We see again that “sins areremembered and bias has great inertia,” asI noted earlier in speaking about theUnited States.

YADERNY KKONTROL: For India,China, and Russia, combating terrorism isnot just being part of an internationalcampaign but a vital national mission.What can you say about the possible roleof a Russian-Indian-Chinese triangle in theanti-terrorist coalition?

SPASSKY: Russia, India, and China areinfluential members of the anti-terroristcoalition. Our states are directly affected bythe terrorist threat, which has led to theirshared interest in strengthening the anti-terrorist front. The geographical proximityof the three countries is also an importantfactor. We have a high degree of mutualunderstanding with India and Chinaregarding the goals and methods of thefight against terror. In our relations withthese states there is no problem of doublestandards in evaluating terrorist acts. Wegenerally pursue our cooperation bilateral-ly, but also welcome a trilateral format.Thus, combating terrorism was one of thecentral topics at the discussions betweenthe ministers of foreign affairs of Russia,China, and India that took place in Almatyon October 21, 2004.

YADERNY KKONTROL: Russian-Iranianrelations play a critical role in Russiannational security and in maintaining peaceand stability in the region bordering theCIS to the south. Therefore, Russia cannotbut worry about the lack of clarity withrespect to the research being undertaken inIran in the nuclear sphere. How serious ofan impediment is Iran’s “nuclear dossier” to

Russian-Iranian relations? What, in yourview, are the prospects for bilateral coop-eration if the IAEA completes its exami-nation of this case? It’s no secret to any-one that the European states’ great interestin Iran is in large part due to these coun-tries’ economic interest in Iran.

SPASSKY: We continue to maintain aregular political dialogue with Tehran,including between the two countries’ secu-rity councils. We encourage Iran to moreactively participate in international andregional affairs, particularly where combat-ing terrorism, extremism, and drug traf-ficking as well as issues related to nonpro-liferation and export control are concerned.Our main concern, which is shared by theUnited States and other major global pow-ers, is that Iran not become a nuclearweapon state. This principled positionanswers our national security interests. Atthe same time, Russia supports Iran’s right,as an NPT member, to the peaceful use ofnuclear energy and intends to continue theconstruction of the nuclear power plant inBushehr. Decisions regarding the prospectsfor and scale of this cooperation will takeinto account Tehran’s fulfillment of itsinternational commitments to the IAEA, aswell as the issue of the return of spentnuclear fuel from the Bushehr NPP toRussia. Russia has serious economic inter-ests in Iran and will develop mutuallyadvantageous cooperation in all areas whereit does not contradict our internationalobligations.

YADERNY KKONTROL: How realistic, inyour view, is it to expect that the adaptedCFE Treaty will come into force? What arethe prospects for its ratification by NATOcountries? Is any alternative agreement onthe reduction of conventional armamentsbeing considered?

SPASSKY: We need certainty with regardsto the CFE Treaty, which is the basis forRussia-NATO relations. Russia made itschoice. We ratified the agreement on theadaptation of the CFE Treaty and therebyfulfilled our key Istanbul commitment.However, the issue remains deadlocked.Everyone involved has already had achance to become convinced of the factthat protracted political maneuveringaround the CFE Treaty is hopeless andonly complicates the realization of theremaining Istanbul commitments on abilateral basis. The NATO countries’ pres-ent linkage policy only serves to push the

18


authorities of Moldova and Georgia into adeliberately unconstructive approach tothese negotiations. Nevertheless, we do notbelieve that the adapted CFE Treaty ishopeless. We do not intend to promote theidea of an alternative agreement in the areaof conventional armament reductions.

YADERNY KKONTROL: What is the cur-rent stage of Russia-NATO relations? Whatis their role in maintaining European secu-rity?

SPASSKY: Russia-NATO relations are ofgreat importance for European and inter-national security. In general, they aredeveloping well. The tasks posed by theRussia-NATO Rome Summit Declarationhave practically been completed, includingthose related to cooperation to meet new

challenges. Now the transition to the nextphase–active cooperation–will be on theagenda. The priorities include anti-terroristcooperation, eliminating the consequencesof emergencies, and the fight against theAfghan drug threat. Russian participationin the operation Active Endeavor isplanned. Work on improving Russia-NATOmilitary compatibility continues. Theprospects are extremely promising. Why isthe need of supplementary measures toincrease confidence, transparency, and avertincidents related to military activity alongthe line of contact between Russia andNATO seen to be so critical? We needconvincing assurance that the obligations inthe Founding Act that concern militaryrestraint will be fulfilled, particularly in theBaltic countries.

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Analysis

THE RRIGHT TTO WWITHDRAWFROM TTHE NNUCLEAR

NON-PPROLIFERATION TTREATY(NPT): TTHE VVIEWS

OF TTWO NNPT NNEGOTIATORS

George BBunn, PProfessor, CCenter for IInternational SSecurity aandCooperation, SStanford UUniversity

Roland TTimerbaev, CChairman, PPIRCenter EExecutive BBoard



Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Art.X.1:“Each Party shall in exercising its nationalsovereignty have the right to withdrawfrom the Treaty if it decides that extraor-dinary events, related to the subject matterof this Treaty, have jeopardized thesupreme interests of its country. It shallgive notice of such withdrawal to all otherParties to the Treaty and to the UnitedNations Security Council three months inadvance. Such notice shall include a state-ment of the extraordinary events it regardsas having jeopardized its supreme interests.”

This quotation is the “withdrawal clause”from the NPT. It shows that the “right towithdraw” from the NPT is qualified. AnNPT party may not withdraw unless “itdecides that extraordinary events, related tothe subject matter” of the treaty “have jeop-ardized the supreme interests of its country.”Even then, it is required by the treaty,before withdrawing, to give three-monthsnotice to all the more than 180 other nationsbelonging to the treaty “and to the UnitedNations Security Council.” The notice mustinclude “a statement of the extraordinaryevents it regards as having jeopardized itssupreme interests.” This clearly suggests thatthe adequacy of the withdrawing party’sstated reasons for withdrawal may be judgedby the Security Council as well as by theother parties to the NPT.

What can the NPT parties do if theyregard the reasons as inadequate? Supposesome NPT parties decide that the “extraor-dinary events” specified by the withdraw-ing party do not relate to nuclear non-pro-

liferation as required by the treaty lan-guage, or have not, in fact, “jeopardized”the withdrawing party’s “supreme interests.”If they so conclude, what could they do?If they petitioned the Security Council totake action to prevent or condition thewithdrawal, what could the Council do?

This article will look at why this languagequalifying the “right to withdraw” from theNPT was included in the treaty, and, howit was intended to limit or condition thatright. Does the history of the withdrawalclause negotiations suggest that the partieswanted to inhibit withdrawals by requiringthat a statement of reasons for withdrawalby the withdrawing party be sent to theSecurity Council as well as to the otherNPT parties? What powers does the with-drawal clause give to the NPT parties andthe Security Council to deal with thewithdrawal of North Korea, and perhaps,one day, Iran or some other party?

THE RRIGHT TTO WWITHDRAW

Do NPT parties like North Korea have aright to withdraw from the NPT for anyreason? What does the history of the with-drawal clause suggest?

The Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties says that that a party may with-draw from a treaty “in conformity with theprovisions of the treaty…” or with the con-sent of all the parties.1 The second of thesetwo justifications for withdrawal is clearlynot applicable if some parties object, andsome did object to North Korea’s with-drawal. The first of these two justificationsrequires compliance with the NPT’s with-drawal provisions. (At the 2005 NPTReview Conference, the United States tookthe position that NPT parties had a “sov-ereign right” to withdraw, apparently forany reason.2 This is not consistent with theposition the United States took in negoti-ating the NPT or with the generallyaccepted international law of treaties, quot-ed a the beginning of this paragraph.)

Did North Korea’s withdrawal satisfy theNPT withdrawal clause? The reasons forwithdrawal that North Korea gave weretwo: first, a South Korean-U.S. militaryexercise of 1993 that North Korea said wasthreatening, and, second, the lack of objec-tivity of IAEA inspectors who, in 1993, hadbeen given authority by the IAEA to con-duct a special inspection in North Koreaoutside the boundary of the research reac-

20


tor and small reprocessing plant that NorthKorea had declared open for inspection afew years earlier.3 These two reasons weregiven in its 1993 notice. This notice wasitself withdrawn a day before the with-drawal would have become effective in 1993because three months–less one day–hadgone by since the notice of withdrawal wasgiven. In 2003, however, North Korea rein-stated the 1993 notice taking the positionthat the only notice required in 2003 wasone day because all but one day of theNPT three-month period had gone by in1993 before North Korea retracted its noticeof withdrawal that year. Given NorthKorea’s view that it was simply reinstatingits 1993 notice of withdrawal, the reasonsgiven in North Korea’s 1993 notice to jus-tify withdrawal must be taken as NorthKorea’s reasons for withdrawal in 2003.4

In 1993, North Korea had refused to per-mit IAEA inspectors to inspect beyond theboundaries of the site that it had declaredopen for inspection. At this site were anuclear reactor, a plutonium-separationplant and some other nuclear facilities. Theinspectors concluded from evidence collect-ed at this site that North Korea had prob-ably separated more plutonium than it hadreported to the IAEA. The inspectorswanted to inspect other sites nearby inorder to look for other evidence relating toplutonium separation. North Korearefused.5 After the IAEA Board ofGovernors’s decision to support the inspec-tors request to inspect additional sites,North Korea gave its 1993 notice of with-drawal to the other NPT parties and tothe UN Security Council. It did not pro-pose to permit any IAEA inspections dur-ing the three-month withdrawal periodthat followed its 1993 notice.

The reasons for withdrawal cited by NorthKorea in 1993 were two: a U.S.-SouthKorean military exercise in South Koreacalled “Team Spirit” that North Korea saidwas threatening to its security, and the “lackof impartiality” on the part of the IAEAinspectors who asked in 1993 to inspect thenew sites that North Korea then refused tolet them inspect. Were these reasons“extraordinary events related to the subjectmatter” of the NPT that “jeopardized thesupreme interests” of North Korea, as theNPT withdrawal clause requires? How didone of many U.S.-South Korean militaryexercises in South Korea and the alleged“lack of impartiality” of the IAEA inspec-

tors “jeopardize” North Korea’s “supremeinterests” ? If North Korea’s claim had anymerit in 1993, did it still have merit in2003? In North Korea’s 2003 letter to NPTparties, it complained of President Bush’sinclusion of it within his “axis of evil” cat-egory and it maintained that the UnitedStates was targeting it for a preemptivestrike.6 But, since it did not provide a newthree-month withdrawal period, it had tohave been relying on its 1993 notice ofwithdrawal as justification, and that noticedid not contain these reasons.

To answer the questions stated above, let uslook at the history of the NPT withdraw-al clause. The language came, with twoimportant modifications, from the text thatthe Soviet Union, the United States andthe United Kingdom had agreed upon inMoscow when they negotiated the PartialTest Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. The orig-inal U.K.-U.S. PTBT draft brought toMoscow by these two delegations had amuch more detailed withdrawal clause thanwhat was finally agreed with the SovietUnion. The U.K.-U.S. draft listed severalspecific reasons that could justify with-drawal, including: “(a) that any other Partyhas not fulfilled its obligations under thisTreaty” or “(b) that nuclear explosions havebeen conducted by a State not a Party tothis Treaty under circumstances whichmight jeopardize the determining [with-drawing] Party’s national security…7 Thus,the American and British delegations to theMoscow negotiations felt that the theircountries needed a right to withdraw ifanother PTBT party [the Soviet Union?]violated its treaty obligations by testing, orif a “State not a party [China?]” conductedtests that might “jeopardize” the “nationalsecurity” of the withdrawing party.

For the U. S. negotiators, a right to with-draw from the PTBT was important togaining the consent of the U.S. Senate forratification in order to bring the PTBT intoforce in 1963. Some Senators might insistthat the United States have a right to with-draw to resume U.S. above-ground testingif , for example, China soon began testingabove ground (as it did in 1964). Such test-ing would be prohibited by the PTBT, butChina was not expected to join the treaty.8

In the Moscow negotiations, Soviet ForeignMinister Gromyko took the position thatany country had a right to avoid treaty obli-gations that became contrary to its supremenational interests.9 Gromyko offered a for-

21


mulation about withdrawal based not onany violation of the treaty but on the rightof a party to withdraw from it in exercis-ing the party’s national sovereignty.Gromyko wanted to formulate the right ofwithdrawal in a more general way. TheSoviet Union had no objection to inclusionin the treaty of a reference to events thatmight compel a party to decide to withdrawfrom the treaty in exercising its nationalsovereignty due to the existence of a threatto its supreme interests. However, Gromykosought to avoid any formulation that mightcontain a hint to China that its futureactions were considered. Therefore, the com-promise formula about “extraordinaryevents, related to the subject matter of thisTreaty” appeared in the text.10

The compromise was less detailed than theU.K-U.S. draft, but similar in that itrequired a statement of reasons justifyingwithdrawal. The compromise limited thereasons for which withdrawal would bepermitted to “extraordinary events relatedto the subject matter” of the PTBT. Itssubject matter was, of course, above-groundnuclear testing. It did not contain U.K.-U.S. proposed language saying that a partydesiring to withdraw would be able torequest the convening of a conference ofall the parties to “assess the significance ofthe situation.”11 It did require, as the U.K.-U.S. draft had, that a party intending towithdraw “give notice of such withdrawalto all other parties to the Treaty threemonths in advance.”12

Later, this PTBT language became thebasis for the NPT withdrawal clause. ThePTBT language was revised in two impor-tant respects before it was presented to theother countries represented at GenevaDisarmament Committee by the Americanand Soviet delegations in 1968. Like thePTBT (which many of these countries hadalready joined), the NPT draft said that the“right to withdraw” from the NPT couldonly be exercised if the withdrawing statedecided that “extraordinary events related tothe subject matter of the Treaty” had “jeop-ardized the supreme interests of its coun-try.” Unlike the PTBT, the notice of with-drawal had to be sent to the SecurityCouncil as well as to the other parties, andit had to describe the “extraordinary events”that the withdrawing party thought had“jeopardized its supreme interests.” Thus,the draft provided a fairly high standard forwithdrawal (“extraordinary events related to

[nuclear nonproliferation] … jeopardizedsupreme interests”). Most importantly, itrequired notice to the Security Council inaddition to the NPT parties (because theSecurity Council had authority under theUN Charter to deal with threats to thepeace such as a withdrawal from the NPTmight cause). In addition, it required astatement of the reasons to be given to theCouncil and the other parties. The reasonscould then be judged against the standardof “extraordinary events” that “jeopardizedits supreme interests.”

At the Geneva Disarmament CommitteeNPT negotiations, this American-Sovietwithdrawal language was generally accept-ed by most delegations. For example, Egypt(then the United Arab Republic) agreedthat withdrawal should “not be a matter ofabsolute discretionary power [of the with-drawing party] but should depend on non-observance of the treaty arising from itsnon-application or violation by a contract-ing party, or from the fact that a thirdState is supplying nuclear weapons to someother State.”13 Many seemed to agree withEgypt’s support for the draft. Brazil, how-ever, wanted to make it easier to withdrawby adding more reasons that would justifywithdrawal14. However, it got little support.These negotiations and debates producedno change in the withdrawal language thathad been tentatively agreed between theSoviet Union and the United States.

This was the language applicable to NorthKorea’s withdrawal. Did it permit with-drawal for the reasons North Korea gave?North Korea’s 1993 reasons for withdraw-ing from the NPT were a U.S.-SouthKorean military exercise in South Korea,and the lack of objectivity, in NorthKorea’s view, of the IAEA inspectors whosought a special inspection outside theperimeter of its regularly-inspected nuclearreactor and plutonium separation facility atYongbyon.15 North Korea’s reasons werehardly “extraordinary events related to thesubject matter” of the NPT even in 1993,much less in 2003 when North Koreaannounced that its 1993 notice of with-drawal, which had itself been ineffective forten years, would be effective again almostimmediately. The 1993 notice of withdraw-al had been withdrawn by North Korea aday before the three-month notice periodexpired. In 2003, North Korea gave noticeof withdrawal to be effective in one day, anotice which seemed to reinstate its 1993

22


notice because it was to be effective in theone day left of the three-month noticeperiod for the 1993 notice.

In a 2003 press statement, North Koreaannounced “an automatic and immediateeffectuation of its withdrawal from theNPT” (effective on the next day).Withdrawal, the press release said, was jus-tified “[u]nder the grave situation where ourstate’s supreme interests are most seriouslythreatened.”16 This quoted conclusion was, ofcourse, based upon the withdrawal clauselanguage. On the same day, North Koreasent a notice to the UN Security Councilsaying that its withdrawal was effectiveimmediately for these reasons. In NorthKorea’s view, by its 2003 announcement anda one-day notice period, it had fulfilled theNPT’s three-month notice requirementbecause it was relying on the 89 days thathad gone by after the 1993 notice was givenbefore North Korea announced that the1993 notice was no longer in effect.

There were reasons in 2003 to challengewhether North Korea could complete a1993 three-month notice of withdrawal in2003 with one day’s notice. But manymore than three months have gone bysince the 2003 North Korean press releaseand the new notice of withdrawal.17 Let usturn then to the substantive adequacy ofNorth Korea’s reasons for withdrawal.

First, the 1993 U.S. military exercises withSouth Korean forces in South Korea thatNorth Korea’s 1993 notice gave as a reasonfor withdrawal were not “extraordinary”events in 1993 or in 2003. Nor did theyappear to relate to the “subject matter” ofthe NPT, preventing nuclear proliferation.Military exercises had happened in SouthKorea many times before and after 1993without causing North Korea’s withdrawal.They did not involve nuclear weapons orrelate to nuclear nonproliferation, asrequired by the NPT’s withdrawal clause.Indeed, U.S. nuclear weapons that oncewere deployed in South Korea had beenwithdrawn from that country in 1991.Moreover, a military exercise in 1993 couldhardly justify North Korea’s withdrawal in2003. Thus the exercises did not present anuclear threat in 1993 or 2003.

Second, the “lack of impartiality” of theIAEA inspectors alleged by North Korea,even if true, did not seem, in 1993 whenNorth Korea claimed the inspectors lackedimpartiality, to relate to the “subject mat-

ter” of the NPT. Thus, if the SecurityCouncil had taken jurisdiction and made ajudgment resolving the dispute in 1993 or2003, it probably would not have conclud-ed that North Korea had adequate justifi-cation for withdrawal based on its noticeof withdrawal’s contention that the IAEAinspectors were biased in 1993.

Third, North Korea’s 2003 claim that itswithdrawal was justified “[u]nder the gravesituation where our state’s supreme inter-ests are most seriously threatened” wasinadequate in 2003 to justify withdrawal(even in 90 days rather than one).18

Why did the Security Council not takeaction against North Korea’s withdrawal in1993 or 2003?

In 1993, China could not be persuaded toagree with the other P-5 permanent, veto-holding members of the UN SecurityCouncil that the Council should takeaction to compel North Korea to stay with-in the NPT, at least for the time beingwhile the controversy was being discussedin capitals and in the Security Council. Allthat was agreed was that the Councilwould call upon North Korea to permitIAEA inspections. North Korea refused toaccept this call.19 The Council took no fur-ther action after North Korea refused.

In 1993, after the Security Council failed toact, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perryand his assistants presented to PresidentClinton a justification for the use of force torestrain North Korea from acquiring nuclearweapons. During the White House discus-sion, Clinton received a call from formerPresident Carter, then in North Korea.Carter said that he was sure North Koreawould negotiate and that it would probablytake back its NPT withdrawal notice. Carterhad been talking to North Korea’s thensupreme leader, Kim Il Sung. Clinton askedCarter to explore the possibilities with KimIl Sung and then, based on Carter’s discus-sions, decided not to use force against NorthKorea, at least for the time being.Negotiations followed, and, as we have seen,North Korea pulled back its 1993 NPTwithdrawal notice just before the end of thethree-month notice period.20 The result ofthe negotiations was the Agreed Frameworkof 1994 between North Korea and theUnited States. This restrained North Korea’splutonium production for weapons, butapparently did not prevent what now appear

23


to be hidden efforts to enrich uranium, per-haps also to make weapons.21

Beginning in 2002, secret negotiations withNorth Korea by the United States joined byNorth Korea’s neighbors (China, Japan,Russia and South Korea) seemed to producelittle beyond North Korea’s apparent admis-sion of its uranium enrichment activities.22

In 2003, as we have seen, North Korearenewed its notice of withdrawal from theNPT. Because of China’s and Russia’s insis-tence upon negotiations with North Korearather than the issuance of a SecurityCouncil order to North Korea, and becauseof China’s likely veto of an order to NorthKorea, the Council did not take action torestrain North Korea.23 What should theCouncil’s role be in a case where all fivepermanent members of the Council (the P-5) agree that withdrawal might threateninternational peace and security, as manybelieved was true of North Korea’s with-drawal in 2003? What is the power of theSecurity Council in such a case?

Generally, for bilateral treaties without anyclause on withdrawal, international law per-mits withdrawal based on the circumstancesexisting between the two parties. On theother hand, modern multilateral treaties(where withdrawal of one party may affecttwo or more other parties) often contain awithdrawal clause, as the NPT does. Theright of withdrawal then depends uponwhat the agreement says, including what itsays about the rights of all the parties.24 Aswe have seen, the NPT gives a right towithdraw to a party if that party “decidesthat extraordinary events, related to thesubject matter of this Treaty, have jeopard-ized the supreme interests of its country.”Who besides the withdrawing party maythen judge if withdrawal is permitted? TheNPT says that the withdrawing party mustgive three months notice of its intention towithdraw to all the other NPT parties “andto the United Nations Security Council…,”including a statement of the “extraordinaryevents” described above. The PTBT didnot require notice to the Security Council,only to the other parties. This importantaddition seems to have been intended togive the Security Council the opportunityto deal with the withdrawal if withdrawalwould constitute a “threat to the peace”within the meaning of the UN Charterprovisions giving the Security Council wideauthority to deal with such threats.25

North Korea’s stated reasons for withdraw-al apparently seemed inadequate to the per-manent members of the Council exceptperhaps for China and maybe Russia in1993 and 2003, although the discussionsamong the P-5 have not been made pub-lic. In 1993, China apparently wanted tostimulate negotiations by the United Stateswith North Korea and refused to agreewith the United States not to veto aSecurity Council resolution against NorthKorea if one was presented to the SecurityCouncil. (Thereafter, as we have seen, nego-tiations did result, ultimately producing theU.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework of1994. After negotiations had begun in 1993,North Korea prevented its own withdrawalfrom becoming effective by pulling back itsearlier withdrawal notice – on the last dayof the three–month notice period.) In 2003,negotiations were going on periodically but,as North Korea apparently saw it, theywere not producing enough of value for itto stay within the NPT. So, as we haveseen, in 2003, it announced that its 1993suspension of its withdrawal was now end-ing, and it did not give another three-month notice. However, North Korea’s stat-ed reasons for withdrawal were inadequateto satisfy the standards of the NPT with-drawal clause in 1993 or 2003.

What is the appropriate role for theSecurity Council in a case of withdrawal,assuming the P-5 can agree and at leastfour other Council members do as well?26

As we have seen, the Soviet Union and theUnited States followed some of the PTBTlanguage in negotiating their proposal forthe NPT withdrawal clause. But theyadded language that showed a change ofmeaning. One addition was languageadding the Security Council as a requiredrecipient of the notice of withdrawal. Noreference to the Security Council hadappeared in the PTBT withdrawal clause.Secondly, the NPT added language sayingthat the withdrawing party must includein the notice “a statement of the extraor-dinary events it regards as having jeopard-ized its supreme interests.” The PTBT con-tained no such requirement. The require-ment was clearly added to give theSecurity Council notice of withdrawal anda statement of reasons because withdrawalcould threaten international security. TheUN Charter gives the Council authority totake action to deal with such a threat ifnine members including the P-5 agree.27

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Toward the end of the NPT negotiations atthe Geneva Disarmament Committee, Brazilasked why the draft NPT added, to thePTBT withdrawal language, notice to theSecurity Council of reasons for withdrawal.Brazil said that the “UN Charter entruststhe Security Council with functions specif-ically related to the maintenance of worldpeace and security and not with participat-ing in the mechanism of withdrawal fromany treaty.”28 The Romanian representativeasked a similar question. The American rep-resentative replied that it would be “impor-tant to have a situation which could affectinternational peace and security discussed inthe Security Council.”29 In a more detailedresponse at the end of the debates, theSoviet representative said:

“[The Security Council] has been entrustedby the States Members of the UnitedNations with the primary responsibility forthe maintenance of international peace andsecurity. [He cited several treaty precedentsthat required international organizations togive notice or reports to the UN SecurityCouncil concerning actions that might createthreats to international security.] The appro-priateness of the inclusion of such an obli-gation in the [NPT] treaty derives from thefact that in the event of the withdrawal ofany State from the non-proliferation treaty,the other parties to this treaty must receivean explanation of the reasons for withdraw-al from the treaty, not from any other source,but from the State itself that withdraws fromthe treaty. Receipt by the Security Councilof such notice together with a statement ofthe reasons directly from the State concernedwould help the Security Council to fulfill itsfunctions [including its “reaction … to sucha notice”] more effectively”.30

The final NPT withdrawal clause language,reported to the UN General Assembly bythe Geneva Disarmament Committee, wasthe same as that debated in Geneva. As wehave seen, it required notice to the Counciltogether with a statement of reasons forwithdrawal. The UN Charter authorizes theCouncil to take action, if necessary, to main-tain international peace and security. Sincethe Council has such authority under theUN Charter, it could take action to restrainwithdrawal in appropriate circumstances, ifgiven the required notice and the reasonsfor the intended withdrawal. The three-month notice would give Council memberstime to consult, to acquire further informa-tion about the consequences of the party’s

withdrawal, and to negotiate a Councilaction resolution if that was appropriate.

Thus, the NPT withdrawal clause’s require-ment that the UN Security Council be noti-fied of a withdrawal was intended to pro-vide information to the Council of a with-drawal since it was likely to be based on“security considerations” and clearly couldresult in a “threat to the peace” within themeaning of provisions of the UN Chartergiving the Council authority to act againstsuch threats.31 If the Council then foundthat the withdrawal might foreshadow sucha threat, it would have authority to takeaction to delay or prevent withdrawal, or torequire other action by the withdrawingparty to keep the peace before it would havepermission to withdraw. A withdrawal fromthe NPT that might constitute or producea threat to the peace would presumably bethe test of whether the UN SecurityCouncil should take action to restrain orotherwise deal with the withdrawal.

Did North Korea’s withdrawal produce athreat to the peace? A likely reason forNorth Korea’s initial withdrawal was topursue nuclear weapons without IAEAinspection. By 2003, that had become rea-sonably clear. China, Russia, South Koreaand Japan, North Korea’s neighbors, weresufficiently concerned that year that theypushed the United States into seriousnegotiations with North Korea in the Six-Party talks in which they also participated.They seemed concerned that DPRK’sacquisition of nuclear weapons couldthreaten the peace in their region.

How would the NPT withdrawal provisionlimit Iran’s right to withdraw from theNPT, if that is what it decides to do?

There has been a fear that Iran might with-draw from the NPT if it did not get a rightto enrich uranium in its negotiations withthe EU-3: Britain, France and Germany.Would the NPT withdrawal clause inhibitIran’s withdrawal from the NPT? If Iranonly proposed to enrich uranium for peace-ful purposes, its current position, it wouldnot violate the NPT as that treaty has beeninterpreted for many years. The new ideathat enrichment by a non-nuclear-weaponNPT party that does not already engage init should be prohibited has not, of course,been popular with non-nuclear-weaponNPT parties that do not already have suchfacilities.32 Germany and the Netherlands, forexample, have common ownership with

25


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Britain in Urenco, a multilateral organizationwhich operates a large enrichment plant inthe Netherlands. This plant has employeesfrom all three countries. The chance aregood that, for example, an employee fromthe Netherlands would find out if employ-ees from Germany operated the plant toproduce highly enriched uranium to use inmaking nuclear weapons. Moreover, inspec-tions are conducted regularly by Euratom,the nuclear regulatory agency in whichsome EU members are participants. In addi-tion, there are independent inspections byIAEA inspectors. If this is adequate forGermany and the Netherlands, would theEU-3 and the United States accept some-thing like it for Iran?

When EURODIF, another multilaterally-owned uranium enrichment organizationwas first created; France, Italy, Spain,Belgium and Iran were participating coun-tries. EURODIF now has one enrichmentplant in France. As was the case with someother EURODIF members, Iran was unableto absorb its share of the costs of theenriched uranium produced by the plant inFrance, and Iran dropped out of EURODIFyears ago.33 Suppose that Iran joinedEURODIF again, and that the enrichmentplant in France was under Euratom andIAEA inspection as well as observation byemployees or observers from the variousEURODIF members. Would this satisfy theUnited States and the EU-3? What if a newmultilateral, owning and operating, organiza-tion with inspectors from a multilateralorganization similar to Euratom as well asindependent IAEA inspectors was created byMiddle Eastern states and some other coun-trieswith nuclear reactors, plus Russia inplace of France, EURODIF’s nuclear-weapon state? (Russia is to supply Iran’s newpower reactor and its fuel). Perhaps ques-tions such as these could be considered bythe EU-3 negotiators, Russia and Iran.

WHAT IIMPORTANT AACTIONS HHAVEBEEN PPROPOSED TTO DDEAL MMOREEFFECTIVELY WWITH WWITHDRAWALSFROM TTHE NNPT?

Questions on the minds of many afterNorth Korea’s withdrawal were:How was North Korea’s withdrawal fromthe NPT different from the United States’earlier withdrawal from the Anti-BallisticMissile (ABM) Treaty?34 The ABM Treaty isbilateral; only Russia and the United Stateswere parties. The negotiations between the

two that took place before U.S. withdrawalfrom the ABM Treaty were not public.However, negotiation of the Moscow Treatyof 2002 to replace the earlier START IItreaty was probably part of the considera-tion paid by the United States for with-drawal from the ABM Treaty.35 Moreover,the withdrawal clauses of these two treatiesand of the NPT are different. The ABMTreaty requires no notification to the UNSecurity Council, and thus did not suggestSecurity Council participation in withdraw-al decisions.36 Whether U.S. withdrawalfrom the ABM Treaty was justified by theABM Treaty language is not therefore rele-vant to whether North Korea’s withdrawalfrom the NPT could be justified to theSecurity Council by the NPT’s language.

How could a consensus among NPT partieson the power and purposes of UN SecurityCouncil action in the event of NPT with-drawals be achieved? Several NPT partiessuggested ideas on withdrawal for consider-ation by the 2005 NPT Review Conference,but the failure of that conference precludedconsensus on any of them.37 Are there otherways of achieving such a consensus? We willdiscuss this in a moment.

Would North Korea’s past membership inthe NPT inhibit it from using the materi-als, technology and equipment it hadacquired for peaceful purposes while amember of the NPT to make nuclearweapons after it had withdrawn from theNPT? Some of the nuclear assistance thatNorth Korea received, because it was anon-nuclear-weapon party to the NPT,could be used to help make nuclearweapons. In the 1950s North Korean engi-neering students were trained in the USSRon nuclear processes and technology. In1964, Moscow provided a research reactorwith fuel rods. China also provided assis-tance to North Korea’s nuclear activities.38

But North Korea could not be persuadedby Moscow to join the NPT until 1985 andit refused to accept IAEA safeguards until1992. It became increasingly independent ofcountries that had provided assistance bylearning how to mine and refine its ownuranium, and how to build its own reac-tors and a plutonium separation facility.

How could this third issue be resolved?Nuclear-related exports that could assist anon-nuclear-weapon NPT party to makenuclear weapons are prohibited by theNPT – unless the nuclear facilities are tobe under IAEA safeguards.39 As a result,

should not the nuclear materials or com-ponents resulting from these exportsremain under IAEA safeguards eventhough North Korea has withdrawn fromthe NPT? The European Union (EU) hasproposed a “yes” answer to this question.Before the 2005 NPT Review Conference,the 25 European Union (EU) membershad agreed among themselves upon a“common approach” to NPT withdrawals.40

This approach said:“[A]s a matter of principle all nuclearmaterials, equipment, technologies and facil-ities, developed for peaceful purposes, of aState party to the [NPT] remain, in caseof withdrawal from the Treaty, restricted topeaceful uses only and as a consequencehave to remain subject to safeguards. …[A]s a matter of principle, a State with-drawing from the Treaty should no longeruse nuclear materials, facilities, equipmentand technologies acquired from a thirdcountry prior to withdrawal; and … suchfacilities, equipment and materials must befrozen [after withdrawal], with a view tohaving them dismantled and/or returned tothe supplier State, under IAEA control”.41

These conclusions seem to have been pre-cipitated by North Korea’s withdrawal.Pointing to the importance of SecurityCouncil review of NPT withdrawals, theEU proposals also said that NPT partiesshould affirm “that a withdrawal from theTreaty should in a given case constitute athreat to international peace and security.”(Italics added). The italicized language is,of course, from UN Charter provisionsdescribing the circumstances in which theCouncil may order the use of force.42 Thus,the EU is on record as supporting the useof force, if authorized by the Council,when necessary to deal with possiblethreats to international security posed by astate’s withdrawal from the NPT.In addition, Australia and New Zealandargued at the NPT Review Conferencethat “NPT parties should not be able toevade their commitments under the Treatyby withdrawal. …”43 Japan, like the EU,proposed that the NPT Review Conference“reaffirm that a State party which haswithdrawn from the Treaty remainsresponsible for violations it committedwhile being a party. [The] Conference[should urge] any supplier country … tomake necessary arrangements entitling it torequire the return or neutralization of any

such materials, facilities, equipment etc.transferred prior to their withdrawal.”44

The Russian Federation in its nationalreport on the implementation of the NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty, presented to theReview Conference, stated: “Recognizing itsresponsibility as a party to the Treaty as wellas its depository, the Russian Federationunderlines the exceptional sensitivity of theissue of the withdrawal from the NPT. Weconsider it necessary to minimize the possi-bility of situations where States refuse to ful-fill their obligations under the Treaty. Webelieve that enhancing the responsibility ofStates for making a decision to withdrawfrom the Treaty in accordance with articleX could be one of the ways to strengthenthe NPT. This objective could be achievedthrough the adoption of a number of polit-ical measures and procedures which wouldbe applied in such cases. However, suchactions should not lead to a revision of theprovisions of the NPT”.45

Because the NPT Review Conferencecould not reach consensus on any substan-tive conclusions, there was no report cov-ering any of these proposals.Even before this Review Conference, areport by a distinguished panel of 12 for-mer world leaders that the UN SecretaryGeneral had appointed to a “High-LevelPanel on Threats, Challenges and Change”recognized the power of the SecurityCouncil under the UN Charter to dealwith an NPT party’s withdrawal if thewithdrawal could constitute a threat tointernational peace. The report proposedthat, in such a case, the Security Councilshould hold a state withdrawing from theNPT “responsible for violations committedwhile still a party to the Treaty.” It added:A State’s notice of withdrawal from theTreaty on the Non- Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons should prompt immedi-ate verification of its compliance with theTreaty, if necessary mandated by theSecurity Council.46

The negotiations of the EU-3 (Britain,France and Germany) with Iran will likelycontinue. The EU-3 (representing the EUas a whole) have clearly been influenced intheir pursuit of negotiations with Iran byNorth Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT,and the failure of the Security Council orthe Six-Party Talks or the NPT ReviewConference to deal with that withdrawaleffectively. The EU proposals to the NPTReview Conference that we just quoted

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seem to have had both North Korea andIran in mind. The EU-3’s negotiating posi-tion with Iran would clearly have beenstrengthened by an NPT ReviewConference agreement to these principles.Suppose there had been general agreementwith the EU’s “common approach” to NPTwithdrawals which said, among otherthings, that “all nuclear materials, equip-ment, technologies and facilities developedfor peaceful purposes, of a State party to the[NPT] remain, in case of withdrawal fromthe Treaty, restricted to peaceful uses onlyand as a consequence have to remain undersafeguards….” Suppose the members of theSecurity Council could adopt such a prin-ciple for their future guidance in dealingwith cases of withdrawal. In 1992, themember states of the UN Security Councilagreed that the spread of nuclear and otherweapons of mass destruction constituted a“threat to international peace and security”within the meaning of the UN Charter.At their 2005 meeting in Gleneagles,Scotland, G-8 members took a strong posi-tion against North Korea’s withdrawal fromthe NPT, even implying that the DPRKwas still a member of the Treaty: “We reit-erate the necessity for the DPRK promptlyto return to full compliance with the NPT,and dismantle all its nuclear weapons-relat-ed programmes in a complete, verifiable andirreversible manner.” The G-8 affirmed theirsupport for the Six-Party talks betweenNorth Korea and China, Japan, Russia,South Korea and the USA to achieve thegoal of “full compliance with the NPT.”47

In the case of Iran, the G-8 statement said:“We remain united in our determination tosee the proliferation implications of Iran’sadvanced nuclear programme resolved.” Thestatement proposed rewarding Iran with“long term…political and economic coopera-tion” if Iran stayed within the NPT andrefrained from uranium enrichment and plu-tonium reprocessing activities. By its strongsupport for the EU-3 negotiations with Iran,negotiations which are of course based onassumption that Iran remains a party to theNPT, the G-8 are clearly warning Iran ofthe serious economic and political conse-quences of its withdrawal from the NPT.48

CONCLUSIONS AND RRECOMMENDATIONS

The language and history of the negotia-tion of the NPT withdrawal clause sug-gests that the NPT negotiators wanted to

inhibit withdrawals from the treaty byrequiring:• that a statement of reasons for with-

drawal by the withdrawing partydescribing the “extraordinary events”relating to its “supreme interests” thatjustified withdrawal be sent to all theother NPT parties and to the UNSecurity Council;

• that when the other parties wereunable to persuade a withdrawing partynot to withdraw, the Security Councilshould nevertheless consider whetherthe withdrawal could constitute a“threat to the peace,” and, if so, whataction the Council and UN membersshould take against it.

We agree with the EU conclusion that, ifan NPT party insists upon withdrawal andits withdrawal would not threaten thepeace, its nuclear facilities that were usedfor peaceful purposes must nevertheless berestricted to peaceful purposes in the future.Thus, these facilities would remain underIAEA safeguards even after withdrawal.Having acquired them while representing tothe world, by its joining the NPT, that itwill use them for peaceful purposes, thewithdrawing party should be prohibitedfrom using them to make nuclear weapons.We recommend that the Security Counciland the IAEA consider the NPT with-drawal issues raised by North Korea’s with-drawal. We urge the adoption of statementsby these bodies to provide guidance on theconsequences of withdrawal from the NPTand what should be done by the SecurityCouncil to inhibit future withdrawals andto deal with that of North Korea.

1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 54.2 See Sally Horn, “NPT Article X”, Statement to the 2005Conference on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons forthe United States, May 23, 2005, http://www.state.gov/t/vc/rls/rm/46644.htm, available as of June 1, 2005: “Theright to withdraw from the Treaty [NPT] remains a sov-ereign right.”3 These reasons are discussed in more detail below.4 A view held by some was that the 2003 notice was anew notice of withdrawal that could only become effectivethree months after it was given. However, more than threemonths have gone by since the 2003 notice was given. SeeJean du Preez & William Potter, “North Korea’s Withdrawalfrom the NPT” (Monterey, CA: Monterey Inistitute Centerfor Nonproliferation Studies, 2003), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week030409,htm, available as of June 9, 2003.5 See George Bunn, “A Brief History of DPRK’s NuclearWeapons-Related Efforts,” in Michael May, et. al, Verifyingthe Agreed Framework (Livermore and Stanford, CA:Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Center for Global SecurityResearch and Stanford University Center for InternationalSecurity and Cooperation, 2001), pp.15–16

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6 See du Preez and Potter, supra.7 See Anglo-American Proposal Submitted to the 18 NationDisarmament Committee: Draft Treaty Banning Tests inthe Atmosphere, Outer Space and Underwater, August 27,1962, Documents on Disarmament, 1962 (U.S. ArmsControl and Disarmament Agency 1963), p.804–805. (Thiswas the draft, already agreed within the U.S. Governmentand with the United Kingdom, that the two countriesoffered in Moscow.)8 See George Bunn, Arms Control by Committee (StanfordUniversity Press, 1992), p.38.9 Ibid.10 See Roland Timerbaev, Russia and NuclearNonproliferation, 1945-1968 (Nauka Publishers, 1999), p. 320(in Russian).11 Anglo-American Proposal supra.12 Anglo-American Proposal, supra.13 Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee ProvisionalVerbatim 245 (March 3, 1966), p.10.14 See, e.g., Brazil, Eighteen-Nation DisarmamentCommittee/Provisional Verbatim 363, Feb 8 1968, par. 17.15 See George Bunn, “A Brief History ….” supra.16 See Claire Applegarth and Rhianna Tyson, MajorProposals to Strengthen the Nuclear NonproliferationTreaty: A Resource Guide ( Arms Control Association andWomen’s International League for Peace and Freedom,2005), p. 30.17 See Jean du Preez and Willam Potter, supra.18 See Applegarth and Tyson, supra, p.30.19 See Bunn, “A Brief History…” supra.20 See Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, PreventiveDefense: A New Security Strategy for America(Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999), pp. 129-133.21 See Bunn, “A Brief History…” supra.22 See du Preez and Potter, supra.23 Ibid.24 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties providesthat a right of denunciation may be implied by the natureof the agreement, particularly in the case of bilateraltreaties. Art. 56. On the other hand, with multilateraltreaties such as the NPT, where termination of its obliga-tions by one party may effect not only a particular otherparty with whom it has had a dispute but still more par-ties, the right of withdrawal depends upon what the agree-ment says, including the treaty rights of other parties. SeeArticles 57 and 58(1) of the Vienna Convention. ClearlyNorth Korea’s withdrawal affected other parties, includingits neighbors with whom it was negotiating (South Korea,Japan, China, and Russia) as well as the United States.25 U.N. Charter, Arts. 1.1, 24, 39, 42.26 Article 27 of the UN Charter gives the Council powerto act on substantive matters by a vote of nine membersincluding all of the P-5.27 See UN Charter Art. 1.1, 24, 27, 39, and 42.28 Statement of Brazilian Representative (de Araujo Castro)to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, February 8, 1968,Documents on Disarmament, 1968 (Washington, DC: U.S.Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. GPO, 1969)p. 56.29 Statement of U. S. Representative De Palma to theGeneva Disarmament Conference, Feb. 20, 1968,Documents on Disarmament, 1968 (Washington, D.C. U.S.Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. GPO, 1969),pp. 92, 94.30 Statement of Soviet Representative Roshchin to theGeneva Disarmament Conference, March 12, 1968 duringfinal explanations before the NPT was reported by theConference to the UN General Assembly, Documents onDisarmament, 1968 (Washington, D.C. U.S. Arms Controland Disarmament Agency, U.S. GPO, 1969), pp. 177, 181-84.31 UN Charter Art. 24, 39, 41-42,32 See President George W. Bush’s speech proposing toprohibit enrichment by any non-nuclear-weapon country

that does not already have an enrichment plant. “PresidentAnnounces New Measures to Counter the Threat ofWMD,” National Defense University, Feb. 11, 200433 See IAEA Expert Group, Multilateral Approaches to theNuclear Fuel Cycle: Report to IAEA Director General,INFCIRC/640 (Feb. 22, 2005), pp. 48-49.34 See Christer Ahlstrom, “Withdrawal from Arms ControlTreaties,” SIPRI Yearbook 2004 (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress), chapter 19.35 The Russian Duma had made adherence to the ABMTreaty a condition of its approval of the START II treaty.Thus, U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty had endedthe START II treaty . The Moscow (or SORT) Treaty thusreplaced the START II treaty.36 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Art. XV.2, START II, Art.VI.4.37 The United States, for example, urged a prompt UNSecurity Council meeting after any notice of withdrawal toidentify steps to deal with the notice and to engage thewithdrawing state in dialogue. It also urged the NPTReview Conference to decide that the withdrawing partywould remain accountable for any violations of the NPT.“Strengthening the implementation of article X …” 2005NPT Review Conference, NPT/CONF.2005/WP.59. TheEuropean Union proposed stronger measures some of whichare quoted in the text below. The EU also asked theReview Conference to reiterate that the Security Councilwas the “final arbiter” in maintaining international peaceand security. See “Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” European CommonApproach, NPT/CONF.2005/WP.32. Australia and NewZealand proposed some similar and some stronger meas-ures. See “Working Paper on Article X submitted byAustralia and New Zealand” NPT/CONF.2005/WP.16.38 See Center for Defense Information, “Summary of NorthKorea’s Nuclear Arsenal,” May 31, 2005, http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=3032&from_page=..progr…39 NPT, Arts. I, II, III, IV, particularly Art. III.2 40 Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF. 2005/WP.32.41 Ibid.42 See UN Charter, Chap. VII. Useful proposals on NPTwithdrawal were also provided by Australia and NewZealand. See Working Paper on Article X (NPT with-drawal) submitted by Australia and New Zealand.NPT/CONF.2005/WP.16. In a statement on NPT with-drawal, the United States said that “The Security Councilhas made clear that the proliferation of nuclear weaponsconstitutes a threat to international peace and security.[T]he Council should consider the full range of optionsprovided by the Charter…Withdrawal by a party in breachof commitments freely undertaken – commitments thatother Parties based their security calculations on – wouldfurther underscore the need for consideration of options bythe UNSC.” Statement of Sally Horn, Senior Advisor,Bureau of Verification and Compliance, to the 2005 ReviewConference, May 23, 2005.43 See Working Paper on article X (NPT withdrawal) sub-mitted by Australian and New Zealand, NPT/CONF.2005/WP.16.44 Working Paper submitted to NPT Conference by Japan,NPT/CONF.2005/WP 21, www.reachingcriticawill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/wp/wp21.pdf., available as of June 10,2005.45 See National Report on the Implementation by theRussian Federation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT/CONF.2005/29, par. 87).46 A/59/565 of Dec 2, 2004, par. 134.47 G-8 Gleneagles Statement on Non-Proliferation, July2005, par.16.48 G-8 Gleneagles Statement on Non-Proliferation,par. 17.

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Analysis

THE RRUSSIAN AARMEDFORCES IIN AAN EERA OOF NNEWTHREATS AAND CCHALLENGES1

By AAlexander RRukshin,Deputy CChief, GGeneral SStaff oof ttheArmed FForces oof RRussia




Russian military reform cannot be separat-ed from the issue of pan-European securi-ty, questions of defense planning, and otheraspects related to the provision of an ade-quate response to new threats and chal-lenges.

I am certain that it will come as no sur-prise if I begin by asserting that the ColdWar era is in the past and that the worldhas begun, if slowly, to forget the stereotyp-ical thinking of that time of confrontation.

The world has become very different. Wehave all begun to understand better thatwe live in a complex, interdependent, andbrittle world with new challenges and newthreats. There is also a general under-standing that the current global challengesrequire an adequate response, first andforemost through the united efforts of theentire global community.

In other words, the task before us is toidentify the diplomatic, economic, financial,and military levers that will enable us tocounter any regional or global securitythreats.

The global military situation in particularis strongly influenced by the new chal-lenges and threats to international security.

First, the new threats stirred up by theprocesses of globalization must be countered.These challenges include: the proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction and means oftheir delivery, international terrorism, theactivities of radical religious associations andgroups, drug trafficking, and organizedcrime. The nature of these challenges issuch that it is impossible for individual

states to address them effectively on theirown. Therefore, the importance of interna-tional cooperation between military organi-zations, including intelligence agencies andthe armed forces, has been sharply increased.

Second, the use of force via internationaloperations is becoming more and morecommon. Instead of traditional militaryorganizations, military force is beingapplied by temporary coalitions. This prac-tice is likely to expand even further in thefuture, as it reflects the current interna-tional situation. However, Russia believes inthe strict observance of international normsduring the formation of such coalitions,particularly if the use of military force isinvolved, and will only join them if itmeets Russia’s foreign policy interests.

Third, domestic and international terrorismhas become intertwined. Given the currentinternational situation, where an interna-tional anti-terrorist coalition has become areality, it is senseless to attempt to separateterrorist activity between domestic andinternational. This concerns both politicalapproaches to preventing terrorist activitiesand military measures to neutralize suchactivities. It is clear that terrorism has beentransformed from a political to a militarythreat, and the responsibility of the military,particularly the Russian Armed Forces, tofight it has been significantly enlarged.

Fourth, nongovernmental participants inthe international system have an increas-ingly important role in determining theforeign policy priorities of various states.Nongovernmental organizations, interna-tional movements and associations, inter-governmental organizations, and informal“clubs” are exerting broad, and at timescontradictory, influence on the policy ofindividual states. Russia is striving to par-ticipate actively in the main intergovern-mental and international organizations inorder to ensure its security interests.

Approaches tto tthe FFormation of FForeign DDefense PPolicy Given the above, Russia’s military andpolitical leadership primarily bases its for-eign defense policy on:

• respecting and strictly observing thebasic principles and standards of inter-national law;

30


• retaining the status of a nuclear power,in order to deter (prevent) aggressionagainst it and (or) its allies;

• placing a high priority on strengthen-ing the Commonwealth of IndependentStates collective security system, as wellas developing and strengthening theCollective Security Agreement;

• considering as partners all states whosepolicy does not harm Russian nationalinterests and security or violate the UNCharter;

• preferring political, diplomatic, andother non-military means over militarymeans to avert, localize, and neutralizemilitary threats at the regional andglobal level;

• strictly observing international agree-ments on the limitation, reduction, andelimination of armaments;

• universalizing the regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of massdestruction and means of their deliveryand decisively increasing the effective-ness of this regime through a combi-nation of prohibitive, monitoring, andtechnological measures and the curtail-ing of testing and establishment of acomprehensive nuclear test ban;

• assisting in the broadening of confi-dence-building measures between statesin the military sphere, including mutu-al exchanges of military information,agreements on military doctrines, plans,and construction, and other militaryactivities.

The RRussian MMilitary’s MMainMissions TTodayThe changes in the international politicalsystem of the past few years and the struc-ture of military threats to Russian securitydetermine the missions of Russia’s armedforces (see Figure 1).

We have grouped them into three mainareas:

Deterring military threats to Russian secu-rity, including guaranteeing strategic stabil-ity and national defense.

Undertaking peace-time military operations,including fulfilling Russia’s alliance obliga-tions, the fight against international terror-ism, political extremism, and separatism,and carrying out peacekeeping activitiesunder UN or CIS mandates.

Figure 1

MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE ARMED FORCES

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

As for Russian engagement in “preventivestrikes against terrorists,” Russian Ministerof Defense Sergei Ivanov noted at a con-ference on security that took place inMunich, Germany on February 11-13 ofthis year that we did not invent this formof military activity. “Yes, we will carry outsuch strikes using all available means (ofcourse, excluding weapons of mass destruc-tion) against bandit camps and individualterrorist groups if we reliably learn of theirintent to perform terrorist acts against afacility or facilities on Russian territory.”2

The use of military force to eliminate amilitary threat, including the use ofweapons of mass destruction.

I would like to note that in 2005 weformed a separate motorized rifle brigadewithin the army to participate in interna-tional peacekeeping operations. It is cur-rently being equipped with special armsand military equipment.3

Current RRussian MMilitaryOrganizationRussian military organization has beenactively undergoing reforms for just overten years now, due to the fundamentalchanges in global geopolitics and the estab-lishment of the new Russian nation. Theorganization of the military underwentlarge-scale structural and quantitativechanges to meet the new realities of lim-ited funding and incomplete social andeconomic reforms.

At present, the renovated Russian militaryis made up of the country’s armed forces,other troops, military formations, and

31


Foreign policy

situation

Deterrence of military and military�political threats to the security of the Russian Federation

Conducting of peace�time operations

Implementation of military force to neutralize military threat

Tasks ofRussianArmedForces

Structure of military

threats to national

security of Russia

organizations that undertake national secu-rity missions using military methods. Inaddition, Russia’s military includes the por-tion of the country’s industrial and scien-tific complex that is involved in nationalsecurity.

Russia’s armed forces, after a long periodof reform and recovery from crisis, arebecoming qualitatively better, both in mil-itary preparedness and effectiveness, and inthe ability to defend Russia’s political andeconomic interests.

The Russian armed forces’ maturity andthe fact that the most difficult period inits development has been overcome is alsoindicated by force development and mili-tary planning, which is now based onRussia’s geopolitical needs and the princi-ple of sufficient defense, instead of avail-able means.

As for military reforms, one can say thatfundamental reform of the armed forceshas been completed. The positive resultsthat have been achieved make it possibleto commence the full-fledged, systematicdevelopment of military capabilities.

The basis for elaborating force develop-ment priorities is a realistic understandingof the features of the global geopolitical sit-uation, which is very complex and dynam-ic. As in the past, the military remains inhigh demand as an instrument of foreignpolicy and for ensuring the national inter-ests of a particular state. Russia has con-sistently called for the creation of an inter-national system in which the role of themilitary is minimized and its functionsconcentrated on the task of deterringarmed conflict.

The main result of the reorganizations thathave been carried out is the conversion ofthe armed forces into three main branch-es: the Ground Forces, the Air Force, andthe Navy; and three armed forces services:the Strategic Rocket Forces, AirborneTroops, and the Space Troops, as well astroops not included in the main armedforces branches, military logistics, andunits and organizations engaged in mili-tary construction and equipping (seeFigure 2).

This structure, in our opinion, meetstoday’s demands and permits the effectiveinteraction of related armed forces compo-nents, while simplifying the system forcommand and control of troops (forces).

Figure 2STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED FORCES

OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

At the same time, the legal basis for thedevelopment of the armed forces was cre-ated over the past few years: laws deter-mining the role and position of the armedforces in the country’s military organizationand ensuring Russia’s domestic and foreignsecurity have been adopted.4

A system for political control over theactivities of the armed forces has been cre-ated, and the basis for public control hasbeen put in place.

This is the most important element in thedevelopment of the armed forces in thecontext of strengthening the rule of law inRussia and the formation of civil society.The defense budget has become far moreopen as well.

Fundamental reductions in Russian mili-tary forces have also been completed. Ithas to be admitted that this process waspainful. This was not only due to the scaleof the reductions, but also because of thegeneral national economic crisis at thetime. However, the Russian military sur-vived this test too with honor.

As of January 1, 2005, the RussianFederation Armed Forces, including theRailway Troops, totaled 1.207 million troops.

32


THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION – SUPREME COMMANDER�IN�CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES

Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

The General Staff of Russian Armed Forces

Ground Forces Air Force Navy

Armed Services of the Armed Forces

StrategicRocket Forces

AirborneTroops Space Forces

Logistic service military

units and organizations

Quarter�masterservice military

units

Troops whichare not

included intothe Armed

Forces

Military units and

organizationsof the Railway

Forces

Arms of the Armed Forces

There have been significant changes in thesystem of military staffing. The transitionto staffing soldiers and sergeants’ positionsthrough the use of contracts has beenactively begun. But at the same time, weadhere to the principle of mixed-manning,particularly of units that are in constantcombat readiness.5

The prerequisites for developing a modernsystem for the welfare of servicemen havebeen created. In particular, real solutions tothe most difficult problems related to thelevel of pay received by servicemen havebegun, through planned raises and themonetization of benefits, as well as by pro-viding housing–via mortgages, the cumula-tive system, and the creation of a fund forservice housing.

The AAdaptation oof MMilitary PPolicy ttothe CCurrent SSituationRussian military policy has been adapted tocurrent global realities. At the same time asthe armed forces and the entire organizationof the military in Russia were beingreformed, new principles of Russian militarysecurity policy were being developed, takinginto account political relations with theUnited States and the industrially developednations of Europe. Several of the earlierfoundations of military planning were re-examined. In particular, global nuclear warand large-scale wars using conventionalarms with NATO or another coalition head-ed by the United States were excluded fromthe list of most probable conflicts for whichthe nation’s armed forces had to be pre-pared. This permitted significant reductionsin nuclear and conventional capabilitieswithout harming national security.

Finally, a new system was created to gov-ern Russia’s relations with its allies andpartners. This system is primarily based onthe principles of mutual respect for sover-eignty and transparency of military obliga-tions (see Figure 3).

The Partnership for Peace between theRussian Armed Forces and NATO resultedin partnership relations that matched thenew level of political relations, and permit-ted the creation of additional organizationsand institutions to ensure global stability.Russia’s cooperation with NATO is contin-uing, despite differences of opinion regard-ing the expansion of the bloc in the eastand NATO’s military activities in regions ofarmed conflict. One of the highest priority

projects within this cooperative frameworkwas the establishment of the Russia-NATOCouncil (RNC). RNC activities made itpossible to work out a fuller system ofcommunications and consultations betweenRussia and NATO in crisis situations.

We would like to discuss the furtherdevelopment of our relationship in moredetail:

First, the war on terrorism.6 Second, crisismanagement.7 Third, nonproliferation ofweapons of mass destruction.8 Fourth, armscontrol and confidence-building measures.9

Fifth, theater missile defense.10 Sixth,search and rescue at sea.11 Seventh, mili-tary-to-military cooperation and coopera-tion related to military reforms.12 Eighth,new challenges and threats.13

However, it should first be noted that notall problems in Russian-NATO relationshave been remedied.

Most obvious is the process of allianceexpansion without any attempts to trans-form the military alliance in accordancewith the new European security situation.The transformation is basically occurringvia the optimization of the commandstructure of NATO military command, anincrease in participating states’ defensebudgets, the standardization of armedforces and armaments, and the reconfigu-ration of military groupings. As a result,the military capabilities of the defensivealliance, to which Russia is not a party,are increasing on Russia’s western bor-ders.

Russia’s own goal is simple and clear, andtherefore should be understood by all: toprovide for the security of states and peo-ples through cooperation on the basis ofinternational norms.

33


UN

RussianArmedForces

BILATERALCOOPERA�TION WITH

OTHERCOUNTRIES

CSTO

CIS

SOC

NATO

EU

OSCE

Figure 3ADAPTATION OF RUSSIA MILITARY POLICY

FOR MODERN GLOBAL REALITIES

34


Russian political and military officials viewNATO as an important actor in theEuropean security system. But we also rec-ognize that despite the transformation ofthe North Atlantic alliance “under theenormous influence of the turbulentchanges” of the past decade and “NATOmodernization,” NATO remains, first andforemost, a military bloc.

Russian continues to consider NATOexpansion to be a mistake. This process isaffecting the general architecture ofEuropean security and affects the securityinterests of a large group of states. Takingthe responsibility for this decision uponitself, NATO should also take responsibili-ty for maintaining the positive aspects ofthe Rome summit, in fact and not just inwords, to demonstrate that expansion is notaimed against the interests of other states.

The arms control process is the mostimportant way to ensure regional and glob-al security. Its urgency has grown since theend of the era of global confrontation,since freeing the world from the burden ofthese weapons and strengthening trustbetween countries that were previouslyopponents are clearly worthy goals. Butthis too cannot be managed without diffi-culties.

The CCornerstone oof EEuropeanSecurity ((The TTreaty on CConventional AArmed FForces in EEurope)Today there are real, not contrived, worriesregarding the adaptation of the CFETreaty too, since several countries that havebegun the process of ratifying theAgreement on Adaptation are, in our view,artificially slowing the process. And NATOclaims that it will only consider ratifyingthe agreement after Russia has fulfilled itsIstanbul commitments, even though thesecommitments are shared by Russia,Georgia, and Moldova as well.14

One should realize that the CFE Treatycurrently in force is slowly “dying” andcannot maintain the stability and balanceof interests of member states. The recent-ly changed “geometry” of NATO does not,to put it mildly, “fit” into the treaty’s areaof application in the least. Its zone basis,which in its day skillfully concentrated onthe balance of NATO and Warsaw Pactheavy armaments, has completely collapsed.The reality is that we now see countries

on the map of Europe that are NATOmembers but are not covered by the treatyregime.

But the most important thing to realize isthat this state of affairs cannot continueindefinitely. Russia has been exercising theutmost restraint in this situation for justone reason: the European arms controlregime should remain one of the key toolsfor maintaining stability, building confi-dence, and developing cooperation, as wellas serve as an instrument to test the mil-itary and political intentions of members ofthe transatlantic alliance.

Another seriously destabilizing factor, fromthe point of view of international law, isthe fact that the Baltic countries are notmembers of the CFE Treaty. This meansthat the alliance can deploy any types ofarmed forces on their territory and subse-quently increase them to any number,without any limits being placed on it bythe CFE regime.

Russia took an important step towardsstrengthening European security when itratified the Agreement on Adaptation ofthe CFE Treaty on schedule, in essence onthe threshold of NATO’s “second wave” ofexpansion. We remain ready to conduct anopen and constructive dialogue, but not tothe detriment of our security interests.

Joint EExercises Today, we not only participate in jointexercises, but also conduct joint peacekeep-ing operations. Military and technical coop-eration with interested states, includingNATO, has become a reality, and is beingcarried out on a long-term basis, with thejoint development of various militarygoods. The problem of increasing the oper-ational compatibility of Russian and NATOarmed forces is being solved. This is a nec-essary condition for the successful realiza-tion of joint operations.

Here I would like to note that along withmissions related to their primary purpose,the armed forces continue to fulfill peace-keeping functions, including those involv-ing special operations to support andrestore peace in various regions and, pri-marily, on the territory of theCommonwealth of Independent States.

Our divisions have successfully functionedas part of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces inMoldova’s Dniester region, in the Collective

Peacekeeping Forces in the Georgian-Abkhaz zone of conflict, and in the MixedPeacekeeping Forces in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict area.

Great progress was made in the RussianNavy’s combat readiness through the con-duct of a whole series of large-scale mili-tary exercises, including some conductedjointly with NATO navies:

• the Russian-Italian exercise “IONIEX-2004” in the Ionian Sea, with the par-ticipation of ships from the Black Seafleet led by the missile cruiser Moskva;

• the Russian-French exercise in theNorth Atlantic; after the conclusion ofthis exercise the nuclear-powered sub-marine Vepr paid an unofficial visit toFrance’s naval base in Brest;

• the U.S.-Russian maneuvers “NorthernEagle 2004,” in which the large anti-submarine warships Severomorsk andAdmiral Levchenko took part.

I would like to call particular attention tothe special tactical exercise “Avaria-2004,”which was carried out at a Ministry ofDefense facility in Murmansk oblast,another key event in 2004.

Its main aim was the practical workup ofquestions related to defending nuclear war-heads against attempts at unauthorizedaccess, as well as the elimination of thepossible consequences of an accident wereterrorist acts to occur. There were 45 rep-resentatives from 17 NATO countries whoparticipated in the exercise as observers.

An analysis of the results of these exercis-es allows us to state with confidence thatat the present time we have everything weneed to reliably defend nuclear weaponsfrom any type of unauthorized access andto avert possible emergencies.

In accordance with a decision of theCouncil of Ministers of Defense, theCollective Security Treaty Organization(CSTO) carried out a joint exercise of theCollective Rapid Deployment Forces of theCSTO member-states called “Rubezh-2004” (Frontier-2004).

Command post exercises with commandechelons and stand-by forces of the inte-grated air-defense system of CIS memberstates were also held. These multilateralexercises were held in accordance with theplan for joint activities in 2004. In addi-

tion to Russia, the air-defense command ofArmenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,and Ukraine took part, along with the air-defense forces of these states that havebeen detailed to the integrated system.

In addition, as a permanent member of theU.N. Security Council, Russia actively par-ticipates in peacekeeping operations con-ducted under the aegis of this and otherlegitimate international organizations.

The MMain PPriorities ffor RRussianForce DDevelopmentIn discussing the prospects for force devel-opment, I would like to emphasize that2005 marked the completion of a five-yearmilitary construction plan. The develop-ment of conceptual long-term planningdocuments built on the successful conclu-sion of this plan has already begun.

Based on an understanding of the globalmilitary situation and the missions of theRussian Armed Forces, one can determinethe basic priorities for their future devel-opment, which are set by the type ofnational security missions they must carryout and the country’s geopolitical priorities.I will only dwell on some of them.

Maintaining the Strategic Forces’ deterrentcapability

The main objective of Russian policy inthe area of strategic deterrence is to notallow any type of coercion or aggressionagainst Russia or its allies, and to ensurethe defense of sovereignty, territorialintegrity, and other vitally important inter-ests of Russia or its allies.

Increasing the number of military forma-tions in constant combat readiness, andusing them as a basis for the formation of groups of forces to ensure that currentand potential military threats can be countered

As President Vladimir Putin noted at aconference of the Russian military leader-ship in October 2003, “The main founda-tion of Russia’s national security remains,and will remain for a long time, the nucleardeterrent forces. They are in good combatorder, there are plans to develop them, andthese plans are being carried out.”

Our long-term goal, taking combat experi-ence into account, is the creation of forcegroupings that are united under a single

35


administration and capable of carrying outcombat missions with peace-time contin-gents. These groupings will be based onthe military formations kept in constantcombat readiness.

Such military groupings are being createdin all strategic areas. Their compositionvaries, depending on the level of threat toRussia’s national security. Moreover, theyare designed to be fairly mobile, that is,they can regroup in any region if neededto localize possible armed conflicts anddefeat an enemy. Increasing the number ofmilitary formations in constant combatreadiness and expanding their ability to betransferred great distances is the centralpriority for the development of Russia’sarmed forces in the next few years.

Improving military training

Operational and combat training of armedforces will also take into account changesin the military and other threats facingRussia, guaranteeing that missions affectingnational security can be accomplished.They will also bear in mind new trends inthe nature of armed struggle and methodsof troop operations, tactical groupings, andthe special features of the theater of mili-tary actions as well as the potential enemy.

The further transitioning of the armedforces to contractual staffing

The conversion of military forces to con-tractual staffing is seen not as an end initself, but as a means to maintain Russia’sdefense capability and increase the combatreadiness of the armed forces. The decisionto transition to contractual staffing is not apolitical declaration. It has been well-thought out from a financial and organiza-tional point of view and was the result ofsustained work to evaluate the country’scapabilities.

The fulfillment of the program for the modernization of armaments and military and special equipment, and maintaining them in a combat-readystate

At the present time, the armed forces havethe required level of basic types of arma-ments, military equipment, and othermateriel. At the same time, troops havebegun to receive new and modernizedmodels of armaments and military equip-ment. In total, plans call for preparing forthe adoption of about 300 new and mod-

ernized models of armaments and militaryand special equipment this year.

The improvement of the technical equip-ment system will be based on the balanceddevelopment of the Strategic Forces, com-bat control systems (information support),and the General-Purpose Forces.

One of the most important areas of mili-tary development is the improvement ofthe military education system.

A federal program for the reform of themilitary education system through 2010 isbeing realized to solve the most difficultproblems in this area.

The realization of this and other develop-ment tasks, particularly the purchase ofnew military equipment and the support ofpromising scientific and development activ-ities, will enable us to create a truly mod-ern military.

ConclusionIn conclusion, I wish to emphasize that theleadership of the Russian Armed Forceshas a clear program to develop them andincrease their effectiveness, based on a real-istic understanding of the nation’s capabil-ities and the tasks that Russia faces in theprocess of integrating into the currentinternational system.

We can now state with confidence that ourarmed forces are making an important con-tribution to the strengthening of Europeansecurity.

1 This article is based on a presentation by AlexanderRukshin and his answers to questions during the seminar“Russian Military Reform” at the Geneva Center forSecurity Policy in February 2005.2 A question regarding the possibility of preventive actionby states to fight terrorists and their infrastructure wasbroached at the Munich conference by U.N. GeneralSecretary Kofi Annan. In his opinion, this should beresolved within the framework of the upcoming debates onU.N. reform. In addition, the report by the “group of wisemen” includes a recommendation to refine the criteria thatdetermine the “direct threat” that a state has a right torespond to with the use of force.3 The organization of the brigade, which numbers just over2,000 men, was developed in order to undertake peace-keeping missions. It is made up of three separate motor-ized rifle battalions and a reconnaissance battalion. In addi-tion, in contrast to standard brigades, it does not have tanksor artillery.Brigade personnel staffing is mostly done using militaryservicemen who are on contracts. Training and educationis based on current military training programs, with theinclusion of peacekeeping topics.4 The Russian president has affirmed the following pro-grams, which are now being realized: the Fundamentals ofRussian State Policy on Force Development in the Period

36


up to 2010; the State Armaments Program for 2001-2010;and the Plan for the Construction and Development of theRussian Federation Armed Forces for 2001-2005.5 The Russian president has approved and the Russian gov-ernment has affirmed a federal program for the transitionof several combat formations to contractual staffing. Inorder to achieve this goal, about 16,000 men were chosento serve as privates and sergeants in 2004. This made itpossible to convert the 42nd motorized rifle divisiondeployed in Chechnya to contractual staffing. Together withthe 76th airborne division, this division–the second in theRussian army–is completely staffed by military profession-als. This year, approximately 40 combat formations will beconverted to contractual staffing. In sum, the number ofservicemen on contract, including the officer corps, is todaymore than 55%. We estimate that in 2008 this number willgrow to 70%.6 On February 4, 2002, at the NATO Defense College inRome, on December 9, 2002, at the Russian FederationMinistry of Defense, and on April 5, 2004, at NATO’sAllied Command Transformation in Norfolk (U.S.), theRussia-NATO Council held joint conferences on the role ofthe military in combating terrorism. The conference resultsindicate that both Russian and NATO participants werevery cognizant of the fact that it is better to forestall orprevent terrorist acts than to work on the elimination oftheir consequences.On December 9, 2004, at the Russian-NATO Council anexchange of letters was undertaken at the level of minis-ters of foreign affairs determining the parameters forRussian Navy participation in operation Active Endeavor.This operation was organized at the request of the UnitedStates in October 2001 in order to get help in the strug-gle against international terrorism. Its missions includeinterception, detention, and inspection of ships suspected ofinvolvement in terrorist activities.7 The main focus of the Russia-NATO Council WorkingGroup on Peacekeeping is on developing a document thatreflects the military aspects of the basic concept for Russia-NATO joint peacekeeping operations.Cooperation between Russia and NATO in the sphere ofmilitary transport aviation is aimed at drawing up a jointprogram of maneuvers, comprising missions for militarytransport aviation during peacekeeping operations. InSeptember 2004, there was yet another meeting betweenRussian and NATO experts on the draft agreement andFramework Agreement between the Government of theRussian Federation and the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization on Cooperation in the Area of Heavy LiftTransport Aircraft. Negotiations will continue this year.8 Cooperation in countering the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction and means of their delivery is aimed atassistance in strengthening existing agreements in thesphere of nonproliferation on the basis of a structuredexchange of opinions leading to the development of jointestimations of global nuclear, biological, and chemicalweapon proliferation trends, and the exchange of experi-ences in order to study the possibilities for activating prac-tical cooperation to protect against nuclear, biological, andchemical substances. On August 2-5, 2004, a demonstrationexercise dubbed Avaria-2004 (or “Accident 2004”) was heldin Olenogorsk (Murmansk oblast). The exercise focused onthe elimination of the consequences of accidents and emer-

gencies involving nuclear weapons. There were 45 NATOrepresentatives who attended the exercise as observers.9 Cooperation in this sphere is aimed at the ratification bymember states of the Agreement on Adaptation of theTreaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFETreaty) and on its entry into force (this would make it pos-sible for states that are not yet CFE members to join thetreaty); as well as at continued consultation on the CFETreaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and the 1999 ViennaDocument, etc.10 At the current time, a mandate and work program havebeen adopted for the special working group on theater mis-sile defense, as well as a glossary of terms and definitionsin the area of theater missile defense and an experimentalconcept for Russia-NATO cooperation in this area. The fol-lowing spheres of cooperation have been designated: theatermissile defense terminology, a theater missile defense con-cept, the preparation and conduct of studies, and theatermissile defense systems and their possibilities. There areproposals to continue military training and studies on non-strategic missile defense under the aegis of the RNC infuture.11 The February 8, 2003, signing of the NATO-RussiaFramework Document on Submarine Crew Rescue did notsimply provide a legal basis for the further development ofcooperation in this area, but also contributed to a very richexperience of joint work in the spirit of transparent NATO-Russia relations. The work program for 2005 includesworking group sessions on equipment and tactics of com-bat swimmer activities, as well as search and rescue at sea.12 The training of Russians servicemen at NATO educa-tional institutions is developing in a positive direction.Operational compatibility is being achieved through jointpreparation and training, Russia is receiving help to destroyPFM-1 antipersonnel mines, and cooperation in the area ofmilitary reforms and their economics aspects, including mil-itary conversion, is deepening.13 Cooperation in this sphere is focused on studying waysto counteract the new challenges and threats to security inthe Euro-Atlantic region within the framework of theNATO Committee on Challenges of Modern Society(CCMS); interactions in the area of civil and military coor-dination of air traffic management; and the broadening ofscientific cooperation.14 At the February 11-13, 2005, Munich conference on secu-rity, Sergei Ivanov explained that we have fulfilled all of ourCFE Treaty obligations, and that the bases and presence ofour troops on Georgian territory is a bilateral concern thathas remained deadlocked through the fault of Tbilisi.We made yet another attempt to resolve the issue onFebruary 19, during Russian Foreign Minister SergeiLavrov’s working visit to Georgia, but unfortunately it toowas unsuccessful.As for Moldova, Russia met its Istanbul commitments asso-ciated with the CFE Treaty–for withdrawal of its troopsfrom Moldovan territory, and on-site destruction of thearmaments and technology that are limited under thetreaty – fully and ahead of schedule (in mid-Novem-ber 2001). The withdrawal and arms destruction was docu-mented as required and confirmed by OSCE observers.At present, the Istanbul decisions unrelated to the CFETreaty are being realized. These consist of the withdrawalfrom Moldova and on-site destruction of military propertyand munitions.

37


Analysis

NUCLEAR WWEAPONS SECURITY –– RRUSSIA’S TTOPPRIORITY IIN TTHE LLONG

TERM

By VVladimir VVerkhovtsev, Deputy HHead, oof tthe 112th-GGUMO1

of tthe MMinistry oof DDefense

[This aarticle wwas ooriginally ppublished iin RRussianin Yaderny KKoonttrooll, No.1, VVolume 111, SSpring2005]



The 1997 signing by top government offi-cials of the Founding Act on MutualRelations, Cooperation and Securitybetween NATO and the RussianFederation, which aimed to strengthenmutual trust and cooperation, initiatedRussian-NATO cooperation in many areasof mutual interest. For instance, there hasbeen cooperation in the prevention of pro-liferation of weapons of mass destruction,as well as in the area of nuclear securityand arms control, including nuclearweapons.

The Rome Declaration of May 2002 gavenew impulse to this cooperation, andopened a new page in Russia-NATO rela-tions with the goal of creating universal,comprehensive security in Europe in theinterest of all member states, based on theadherence to common values, principles, andcommitments. However, if we recall the his-tory of the beginning and development ofRussia-NATO cooperation in the area ofnuclear weapons, we must note that thiscooperation was conceived with difficulty,and did not always proceed smoothly.

To a significant degree, the constructiveforward progress of this process initiallyhas not been helped, and today is beingharmed, by the negative view of severalorganizations and officials who cast doubton Russia’s ability to ensure the security ofits nuclear weapons. However, as a rulethese individuals are not specialists in thissphere, and frequently their assertions arebased on insufficient knowledge.

Nonetheless, for many years Russia, togeth-er with its foreign partners, has beenundertaking a great deal of work to solve

the problems of nuclear security, relying onthe knowledge of foreign specialists withmuch practical experience in this area –both at the highest political levels, and atthe level of technical questions.

It is appropriate to remember here theevaluations voiced by a variety of foreignpolitical and military figures during theirvisits to Russian nuclear facilities (includ-ing U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, former [in1998] Commander-in-Chief of U.S.Strategic Command General EugeneHabiger, and Executive Secretary of thePreparatory Commission for theComprehensive Test Ban TreatyOrganization Wolfgang Hoffman). Theirassessment of the state of the security ofnuclear facilities in Russia is very objectiveand reflects the true state of affairs.

Foreign aassessments oof tthe ssecurityof RRussian nnuclear ffacilities In 1998 on a visit to Saratov, for example,an American delegation headed by GeneralHabiger was shown the national nuclearweapon storage facility, which houses notonly strategic, but also tactical ordnance infive storage depots. “They were very openin every respect. And at no time did I aska question and then not have a very thor-ough answer… I don’t have any seriousconcerns [about Russian nuclear weaponsprograms and security]. … One of the rea-sons why I think we’ve done so well withthe Russians is that our relationship, atleast at my level, is based upon just open,you know, very frank dialogue. And it’s notone of these things where you probe, try-ing to get answers to technical questions....we had never had access to anybody thathad ever worked at one of those facilitiesthat I’m aware of. And so, for them to takeme in there … and to take me into theareas where they have the nationalbunkers, that’s revolutionary,” said GeneralHabiger at a July 16, 1998 press conferenceon his recent trip to Russia.

In Secretary Hoffman’s letter on the resultsof his visit to Russia in 2003, addressed tothe Russian Deputy Minister of ForeignAffairs, he indicates his appreciation forRussia’s honest fulfillment of its obligationsunder the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,notes the openness of his Russian counter-parts regarding questions of nuclear disar-mament, and recognizes that the work car-ried out at Russia’s Central Nuclear TestSite does not violate the Treaty. NATO

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nuclear experts who took part in theAugust 2004 “Avaria-2004” exercises asobservers also gave the security of Russia’snuclear arsenal high marks.

“The qualifications of the Russian special-ists impressed me. They showed a highlevel of professionalism. We observed vari-ous operations involving nuclear weapons.We thank our Russian counterparts for theopportunity to attend these exercises. Wehope that this sort of activity will becomea regular event,” said Robert Irvine, direc-tor of NATO’s Nuclear Policy Directorateand head of the NATO delegation to theAvaria-2004 exercises.2

“If we are talking about the technologyused in the Avaria-2004 exercises, then I’dlike to note that it is very similar to thetechnology used in the United States tomeet these objectives. In addition, therewas a great similarity in the tactics usedto monitor the situation, and the opera-tional techniques were also of a similarlevel,” said Michael Hodkin, head of theU.S. Defense Threat Reduction AgencyEmergency Management Division, in reac-tion to what he had observed.3

Today we can state that cooperation with-in the framework of the Russia-NATOCouncil in the nuclear sphere, particularlyin the area of nuclear weapons security, isbringing practical results.

The rresults of tthe AAvaria-22004 eexercisesRussia’s actions to significantly deepenopenness in our cooperation with our part-ners during Avaria-2004 were trulyunprecedented, and not only because48 representatives from 17 NATO nationstook part as observers.

During these large, full-scale exercises car-ried out by the Russian Federation ArmedForces and Federal Atomic Energy Agency,practically the entire complex of measuresand tasks needed to ensure the security ofnuclear weapons were rehearsed anddemonstrated to the world. The develop-ment of practical measures within theNATO-Russia Council framework in thevery “sensitive” and closed sphere of nuclearweapons and the provision of their securi-ty began during these exercises as well.

The exercises were carried out in August2004 in Murmansk Oblast under the codename “Avaria-2004” (Emergency-2004). Theprimary objective of the exercise was to

practice providing reliable nuclear weaponssecurity at nuclear weapons storage depotsand transport routes. In addition, jointactions to eliminate the consequences ofpossible incidents (accidents) involvingnuclear weapons were also refined. Exercisepreparations were carried out under theclose supervision of the Russian Minister ofDefense, Russian Minister of ForeignAffairs, and the head of the RussianFederal Atomic Energy Agency. ColonelGeneral Igor Valynkin, head of theMinistry of Defense 12th Main Directorate,personally directed the course of the exer-cises. The exercise plan was worked out indetail by the Russian Armed ForcesGeneral Staff and confirmed by ColonelGeneral Yury Baluyevsky, chief of theGeneral Staff.

More than 2,000 people and over 500pieces of equipment from the RussianMinistry of Defense and Russian FederalAtomic Energy Agency were active in theexercises. Russian Minister of DefenseSergey Ivanov, Russian Deputy ForeignMinister Sergey Kislyak, Leningrad mili-tary district commander Army GeneralValentin Bobryshev and Northern Fleetcommander Vice Admiral MikhailAbramov were present at the exercises.

The coordination of different types andbranches of the Russian Armed Forcesproviding for the security and defense ofnuclear armaments, as well as the liquida-tion of the consequences of possible inci-dents involving nuclear weapons either instorage depots or being transported onRussian territory by road or by rail, wererehearsed during Avaria-2004. According tothe exercise scenario, the Russian ArmedForces, fulfilling the obligations of theTreaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions,were removing strategic nuclear warheadsfrom launch vehicles for their subsequenttransport to storage depots and eventualdestruction, under peacetime conditions.

Phases oof tthe AAvaria-22004 eexercise A logically deduced chain of possiblethreats and emergencies, and appropriateresponse measures to be taken by militarypersonnel, was the red thread that passedthrough all of the phases of the exercise:

• the transfer of decommissioned nuclearmunitions by various modes of trans-portation;

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• the repulsion of a terrorist attack on aspecial tactical task force;

• the conduct of a set of special meas-ures involving the nuclear munitionsconcerned in the emergency;

• the realization of a set of special meas-ures for the recovery of these nuclearmunitions.

Proceeding from the assigned tasks, theexercises were carried out as follows.

The tactical group began by transportingthe nuclear munitions on a rural road.Special attention is paid to the protectionof such tactical groups. Their route isreconnoitered in advance, reconnaissance isconducted along the route, and the groupis guarded by fixed guard posts. In addi-tion, the convoy includes specially trainedguard units from the Main Directoratetraveling on armored combat vehicles(ACVs), who are armed with a variety ofweapons. Thus, the composition of the tac-tical group includes, in addition to nucleararmaments transport, specially trainedguard units in armored vehicles. The tac-tical group is headed up by a combatreconnaissance patrol. It is followed by theadvance guard, which is in a state of con-stant readiness to defend the patrolthrough firepower, if necessary.

From the air the tactical group is protect-ed by helicopter gunships that have forceson board whose mission is to observe fromthe air and, in cases of attack, participatein repelling the assault. Under the exercisescenario, the tactical group came under ter-rorist attack.

The guard units engaged the terroristgroups. The basic tactic of the terroristswas to blow up the first and last vehiclesin the convoy and subsequently shoot thevehicles they are blocking. In this situation,the tactical group commander’s chief taskis to extricate the group from the assault.The helicopter gunships drop off theirassault forces, whose task is to outflank theterrorists. The assault force disembarkationoccurs some 150-200 meters from the siteof the assault. The primary task of thelanding force is to concentrate on moppingup the area and physically destroying theterrorists. Subsequently, the helicopter gun-ships assist in holding off the attackthrough fire and maneuver tactics.

Two guard units engaged the terrorists inbattle. The units are deployed in battleformation. The armored combat vehicletroops dismount on the deployment line.

In accordance with the provisions of theexercise, the four vehicles with nucleararmaments incur fire damage. This elementof the exercise was practiced without theuse of arms. Only simulants were usedhere. This phase concentrated on the inter-action of guard forces. However, in orderto conduct scientific and technical researchon the question of the ability of nuclearmunitions to withstand fire and explosions,each of the four vehicles (loaded withdummy nuclear weapons) were subjectedto various attacks, by explosives and gun-fire.

The first vehicle was blasted by two anti-tank mines.

The second vehicle was set on fire; thismodeled the situation wherein a nuclearcharge is in the center of a sizeable con-flagration.

The third vehicle was fired upon from agrenade launcher and small-arms weapons,resulting in the deflagration of the chemi-cal explosives in the nuclear charge, andthe simulated radiological contamination ofthe site.

The fourth vehicle was also fired upon bygrenade launcher and small-arms weapons.

All of this occurred in the presence ofNATO observers.

In other words, various emergency situa-tions (out of the spectrum of all possibleemergencies) were modeled, approximatingas closely as possible what might happento nuclear munitions if they were subject-ed to gunfire and fire in reality.

Before nuclear munitions are transportedwithin the Russian Federation, they are allbrought to a special state of preparedness,in order to completely eliminate the possi-bility of their being triggered.

After each training operation, specialistsfrom the Ministry of Defense and theFederal Atomic Energy Agency analyze theresults of the operation in order subse-quently to improve the technical design ofthe protective features of real nuclearcharges.

The NATO observers personally observedand were able to evaluate the condition of

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the nuclear armaments after they weresubjected to explosives and fire. During thetraining exercise the lead vehicle – whichwas carrying a supercontainer in which thedummy nuclear munition was packed – fellinto a small river. A firefighting squad thatincluded some specialists trained in specialcenters set up by the Ministry of Defense12th Main Directorate and the FederalAtomic Energy Agency exterminated thefire in the damaged vehicle. All of the spe-cialists were authorized to fight the firesengulfing the nuclear material. In order todecrease thermal levels, the container withthe burning armament was subjected toprolonged and abundant irrigation. Afterthe fire was extinguished, professionallytrained specialists examined the heatimpact on the weapon, and evaluated thecondition of the automated systems as wellas the explosion risk of the armament atthat time. It should be noted that Ministryof Defense and Federal Atomic EnergyAgency specialists devote continuous atten-tion to research on armaments affected byvarious types of accidents. Based on theanalysis carried out as a result of theseexercises, the exercise leadership was ableto make decisions regarding routines andoperating procedures to be used witharmaments that have been damaged.

A special helicopter is called to an accidentsite to perform a radiation analysis of thesite where an incident has occurred. Thehelicopter is outfitted with specially trainedpersonnel and the equipment needed tocarry out radiation analysis. The equipmenton the helicopter makes it possible todetermine whether radiation has escaped,and if so the scale of the radiation acci-dent. In order to determine if radiation hasescaped into the environment, the helicop-ter hovers above the damaged vehicle at apredetermined height, and then circlesaround the accident site along a spiralpath. The helicopter then continues bytacking in the direction in which theradioactive cloud is spreading. The recon-naissance results are sent to an informationanalysis center, which is located at a uni-fied Ministry of Defense and FederalAtomic Energy Agency command post.

The information received by the commandpost is used further to forecast the scale ofthe accident and to decide what measuresare needed to liquidate the consequences ofthe accident.

In order to perform ground-based radiationreconnaissance, another special helicopter issent to the site of the accident. This heli-copter is outfitted with specially trainedunits from the Ministry of Defense and theFederal Atomic Energy Agency, equippedwith the gear and instrumentation neededto carry out radiation analysis.

Two methods to drop off the specialistswere practiced and demonstrated to theNATO representatives at the exercises:

Variant 1: using special devices, needed ifthe territory does not allow a helicopterlanding;

Variant 2: landing the helicopter.

The radiation detection squads move alongfixed routes, measuring radioactive contam-ination and determining the borders of thecontaminated zone with the aid of specialinstruments, and marking them at the site.The results of ground-based radiationreconnaissance are sent to the commandpost in real time, so that the size of theaccident can be determined. Mobile med-ical groups that have been specially trainedto perform under conditions of radioactivecontamination are sent to provide medicalassistance to the wounded. After renderingfirst aid at the site of the accident, theinjured are evacuated to specialized med-ical facilities.

Professionally trained divisions of theRussian Ministry of Defense, equippedwith special Pomoshchnik (“assistant”)vehicles, are sent to accident sites to workon the nuclear munitions affected. EachPomoshchnik vehicle has a trained crewfrom the Main Directorate’s SpecialEmergency Command and state-of-the-artequipment, allowing them to carry out theentire range of measures needed to elimi-nate the consequences of an accident.Naturally, actual radioactive contaminationof the site was not envisaged during theconduct of the training exercises.

In accordance with the exercise plan:

• the prevailing situation was analyzedand suggestions were drawn up for theexercise leadership’s further workstrengthening the protection of nuclearmunitions and overcoming the conse-quences of accidents;

• the “damaged” nuclear munitions wereloaded in railcars and sent for subse-

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quent work-up to a Federal AtomicEnergy Agency (FAEA) plant;

• the rail convoy, which was travelingfrom the accident site towards theFAEA plant, was attacked by terrorists.

The blowing up of the rail bed under therailcars was demonstrated to the NATOobservers first hand, as were the complexof measures undertaken to recover theweapons from the special vehicles and rail-cars that were attacked:

• deploying the Pomoshchnik vehiclesand bringing them into “combat” readi-ness;

• evaluating the conditions of the muni-tions involved in the accident (by ana-lyzing the equipment attaching thesupercontainer to the vehicle, measuringits surface temperature, and evaluatingthe condition of the weapons with theaid of a videoendoscope) and recover-ing them with the use of special equip-ment.

One of the most important measures to becarried out in the case of accidents involv-ing nuclear weapons involves operationsrelated to radiation and chemical protec-tion, which are carried out by theRadiation, Chemical, and BiologicalProtection (RKhB) Troops. In managingthe consequences of the radiation accidentsupposedly created during the exercise, thetroops underwent decontamination, as didthe local terrain, road, military assets andequipment. The decontamination of theseitems was carried out in order to removeradioactive contamination and eliminate thepossible injury of personnel as a result ofcontact with contaminated equipment,materiel, and other items.

In order to organize the decontaminationof equipment, armaments, and personalprotective equipment, as well as the sani-tization (hygienic bathing) of personnel, anentire decontamination area is set up. Oneof the key elements of this area is the spe-cial decontamination center (PuSO),intended for the complete decontaminationof armaments and military equipment, per-sonal protective equipment, as well as thesanitization of personnel.

A PuSo was set up at an uncontaminatedsite that included the location where theRKhB Troops were deployed. Armamentsand military equipment, small-arms

weapons, personal protective equipmentand other materiel were decontaminated,and the sanitization of personnel carriedout.

Data from the exercises indicate that thePuSO capacity was as follows:

• treatment of military equipment – 60-80 items per hour;

• treatment of personnel – 50-60 individ-uals per hour.

NATO observers were shown the PuSOtreatment of the military unit that camefrom the location where the radiationemergency was being eliminated.

In accordance with the exercise plan,methods to search, inspect and raise thesupercontainer with nuclear munitions thathad fallen in the water together with thevehicle (after it was hit with explosives)were rehearsed.

The container was submerged at a depthof five meters.

The first stage at this point in the exercisewas the performance of a search for thesubmerged vehicle with the aid of a heli-copter with monitoring and detectionequipment on board. A buoy was droppedfrom the helicopter upon the detection, byphysical characteristics, of the nuclearmunition in the lake aquatory.Subsequently, a definitive search andinspection of the river was performed bydivers brought to the accident site by hel-icopter. The regulations of the RussianNavy diving service allow for several meth-ods of deployment from helicopters (jump-ing into the water while hovering, and inexceptional cases jumping while the heli-copter is in motion at low speeds from aheight of no more than five meters whenthe submerged depth is no less than threemeters). In the case in question the deci-sion was made to deploy the divers to theshore by rappel – in order to provide forthe safety of the divers in conditions ofzero visibility underwater and the presenceof submerged trees.

After locating the submerged vehicle andbriefly inspecting it (determining its posi-tion on the river bottom and the conditionof the bottom), and evaluating the condi-tion of the supercontainer holding nuclearmunition and the soundness of the equip-ment attaching it to the vehicle platform,

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a diver fastened a buoy to the sunken vehi-cle in order precisely to mark its location.

Next, a unit from the information analysiscenter field team conducted a radiologicalsurvey of the aquatic region of the acci-dent site with the aid of immersible detec-tors. This reconnaissance was conducted inorder to determine the amount of damage.If the water exceeds natural backgroundradiation levels, it means that the casing ofthe nuclear munition has damage throughwhich water is penetrating, and nuclearparticles are escaping. Simultaneously, theprotection of the submerged vehicle wasarranged.

During the exercise, this is the point whenan operation by Engineering Corps units(pontoon depot) to raise the supercontain-er using flexible lifting pontoons wasarranged.

Since the sunken vehicle was located at aconsiderable distance from shore, the deci-sion was made to deploy the diving sta-tion, consisting of two river and one shoreunits of the Engineering Corps pontoondepot with a combined load capacity of 50metric tons, on a ferry. The diving stationand diving post were deployed on a basewith a portable recompression chamber.Simultaneously, the ferry was set up andanchored next to the submerged vehicle.

Next, surveys and inspections were con-ducted of:

• the aquatory and bottom in the vicin-ity of the submerged vehicle;

• the bottom, for the presence of foreignobjects in the area near the submergedvehicle, the thickness of bottom sedi-ments, and the depth to which thevehicle had sunk into the sediments;

• the submerged vehicle, its position onthe bottom, whether the chassis or plat-form had been damaged, and the stateof the hood and the cab (in order toaccess the supercontainer a hole is cutin the vehicle hood);

• the submerged container, in order todetermine damages.

As a result of the inspection the procedurefor lifting the container out of the waterwas chosen.

The results of the inspection of the sub-merged vehicle made it possible to deter-

mine that the vehicle was resting on itswheels and had sunken one and a halfmeters into the bottom sediments. Thedecision was made to raise the containerwith the use of flexible lifting pontoonswith a lifting capacity of up to 10 metrictons (to lift the container off the bottomand raise it to the surface), tow it to shore,and use a truck crane to lift it and posi-tion it at a prepared site.

In this case the lifting method was deter-mined by the existence of a large layer ofbottom sediments (at the site where thesubmergence occurred, the sediment layerreached three meters thick). All underwa-ter operations involving the nuclear arma-ment were carried out by officers of theMinistry of Defense 12th Main Directoratespecial emergency unit who had undergonespecial training.

Operations to lift a container are carriedout in several stages:

• a diver removes the vehicle hood, cut-ting it off if necessary;

• a diver removes all equipment attach-ing the supercontainer to the vehicleplatform, using a hydraulic tool that ispart of the rescue equipment to cutthis equipment if needed;

• divers prepare and attach pneumaticpontoons to the supercontainer, inflatethe pontoons and raise the supercon-tainer to the surface;

• the raised supercontainer is towed tothe location where it will be extractedfrom the water, and is then lifted andpositioned at the prepared site. Theextraction of the supercontainer isaccomplished with the use of a truck-mounted crane. Next, the interior ofthe container is examined with the aidof a videoendoscope, and the conditionof the nuclear weapon is evaluated.After that, a squad from special emer-gency command evacuates the contain-er to the location where the final oper-ations are carried out and raises thesupercontainer.

The exercises were carried out with thecooperation and joint leadership of all com-mand agencies engaged in the exercises.The operations were directed from a uni-fied Ministry of Defense and FederalAtomic Energy Agency command post.

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This command post was the primary centerfor analysis and decisionmaking related toliquidating the consequences of the accident.

Exercise lleadership The deputy head of the Ministry ofDefense 12th Main Directorate headed theunified command post; there was a cleardivision of operational responsibilitiesbetween the Ministry of Defense and theFederal Atomic Energy Agency. DefenseMinistry forces generally were tasked withthe rougher jobs, related to the organiza-tion and administration of forces and facil-ities active near the accident site.

The FAEA carried out the more intricate,detailed analysis of the damaged nucleardevises, developed recommendations forRussian Ministry of Defense specialists onfurther actions to liquidate accident conse-quences, and made the proposals neededfor decisionmaking. The unified commandpost was composed like all Ministry ofDefense command posts. Its main unitswere a tactical division and a field com-munications center. In addition, combat(security, guard details) and rear guard(supply and personnel leisure) units weredeployed and equipped.

A distinctive feature of operations to liqui-date the consequences of an accident is thefact that the only Defense Ministry forcesthat take part in the initial stage are the12th Main Directorate emergency rescueforces (in order not to aggravate accidentconsequences). Subsequently, the sphere oftasks, depending on the type of accident,may widen considerably and may thenrequire the involvement of additional forcesand facilities.

In order to organize cooperation, promptdata collection, and the sound managementof the forces and facilities of the Ministry ofDefense and the other ministries and agen-cies involved, the command post was outfit-ted with locations supplied with all neces-sary equipment for the work of task groups.

The joint operation of the DefenseMinistry and FAEA command postallowed for close collaboration, organizingand undertaking operations at variousstages of the effort to liquidate the conse-quences of the accident in minimal time.Critical tasks include: the nonaggravationof accident consequences; evaluation ofdamaged nuclear munitions; implementa-tion of urgent measures to reduce the risk

of explosion; transportation to a storage siteor destruction and others.

During the exercises the command post’suse of various supplementary informationsources (besides the reports and dispatchesthat were received) was rehearsed: videodata from the accident site through the useof special equipment produced on the basisof scientific research of materials by a com-putational analysis support group, as well asthe deployment of dummy nuclear weaponsthat made it possible to analyze the dam-age to nuclear munitions, determine opera-tional procedures, and make recommenda-tions for emergency rescue squads.

The computational analysis support groupthat was deployed, which is a mobiledetachment of the 12th Main Directoratenuclear armament emergency decision infor-mational analysis support center, providedscientific and computational support to acci-dent consequence mitigation operations.

The group carried out the following tasks:

• developing scenarios and forecasting thepossible developments at the scene ofthe accident, estimating the range ofpossible consequences, including a fore-cast and assessment of the radiologicalsituation at the accident site, and devel-oping proposed measures to protect thepublic and proposals related to thearrangement of personnel operations;

• conducting spectrometric research ofsamples from the ground and water, aswell as the identification of fragmentsof special materials that had exploded;

• conducting other real-time analyses inaccordance with directives from theleadership of the emergency conse-quence elimination team.

Personnel from the units and detachmentstaking part in the exercises were stationedat a field camp. The arrangement andequipping of the field camp was carriedout in accord with the requirements ofnormative documents regulating the estab-lishment of armed forces afield.

The field camp consisted of:

• a tent division, designed for the accom-modation of personnel of all units anddetachments, as well as rear guardequipment;

• a field depot, designed for the storage,technical servicing, repair, and prepara-

tion for designated use of the arma-ments and military hardware of theOperational Mobile Group and forcesand facilities assigned to it in the emer-gency consequence management area.

In order to ensure that personnel operateper regulations, a daily routine was main-tained that included morning and eveningactivities, aimed at the acclimation of ser-vicemen, the enhancement of their physi-cal resistance to sudden changes in thephysical environment and to the conditionsof combat operations, as well as the main-tenance of personal and public hygiene.The guarding and defense of the fieldcamp was performed by a temporary guarddetail and reinforcement units. A psycho-logical treatment post was deployed torestore the mental and physical state andalleviate the stress of personnel.

ConclusionThe exercises demonstrated that Russia’sprocedures for responding to the extreme-ly complex problem of eliminating theconsequences of an accident involvingnuclear weapons have been developed to avery high scientific level. They and are sys-tematic, and take everything into account,including minutiae. All components of thiswork in one way or another affect the gen-eral state of nuclear safety and security.

According to the official testimonials of ourpartners, the exercises were given very highmarks. Russia hopes that the first seriousstep in the strengthening of cooperationhas been taken, and that new steps in thisdirection will be made. There is every rea-son to believe that this is so.

According to the preliminary agreementreached at NATO staff headquarters inBrussels, the first such exercises were to becarried out on Russian Federation territo-ry. Henceforth, beginning in 2005, theywill be conducted both on the territory ofNATO member states that possess nuclearweapons, and on the territory of one of theNATO countries where American nuclearweapons are based. At all exercises the par-ties will participate as observers.

This step, taken by the Russian Federationin such a “sensitive” area, was called for todispel doubts and simultaneously strengthenour partners’ confidence in their knowledgethat Russia has undertaken the responsibil-ities and made the necessary exertions tomaintain the security of nuclear weapons in

storage and during transport, and know thatRussia is ready to act quickly if there areany incidents involving them.

In future, the parties plan to move fromobserving exercises to the undertaking ofjoint operations by specialists from mem-ber countries. Of course, in doing so theconditions of the Nuclear Non-proliferationTreaty will be observed. The participationof NATO representatives as observers atthe exercises is the first step in this coop-eration. At this stage exchanging the expe-rience in this area that countries possess-ing nuclear weapons have accumulated isimportant. This must be done with thegreatest possible transparency, as Russia didduring the Avaria-2004 exercises.

In future, the second stage of cooperationcould shift to joint actions by specialistsfrom various countries possessing nuclearweapons in the liquidation of the conse-quences of incidents (accidents) involvingnuclear weapons.

The specialists believe that this is extreme-ly labor-intensive work that does not pro-vide the luxury of making a mistake anddemands full mutual understanding andaccountability. The concerted action of thepersonnel squads dedicated to the elimina-tion of accident consequences, who willwork together in emergency situations (toliquidate the consequences of those emer-gency situations), is extremely importanthere.

I would like to emphasize once again thatthe primary task of the specialists workingin Russia’s nuclear weapons complex is therealization of a system of scientific, techni-cal, and organizational measures maximallyto prevent the possibility that incidentsinvolving nuclear weapons may arise at allstages of their life cycle.

I can also completely responsibly state thatthe standards of Russia’s nuclear reserves,judged by all criteria for nuclear securityused in nuclear weapons states, are in noway inferior to world standards, and bysome measures (for instance, in the abilityto prevent unauthorized operation) exceedthem.

1 The 12th GUMO (Main Directorate) of the RussianMinistry of Defense is in charge of the safe and securestorage and transportation of nuclear warheads.2 Irvine’s statement has been re-translated from Russian.3 Hodkin’s statement has been re-translated from Russian.

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Analysis

U.S. NNUCLEAR PPOLICYBEYOND GGEORGE WW. BBUSH1

By NNikolai SSokov, Senior RResearch AAssociate, CCenterfor NNonproliferation SStudies,Monterey IInstitute oof IInternationalStudies




U.S. nuclear policy is at the top of theinternational agenda. Doctrinal documentsthat allow for the use of nuclear weapons;development of earth-penetrating weaponsdesigned to destroy hardened, deeplyburied targets; and possible new weaponsdesigns and the associated renewal ofnuclear testing–all these developments arebeing widely discussed. In fact, however,only very modest practical steps have beentaken in recent years (at least, as far asbudget requests are concerned), and eventhese have met with serious resistance inthe U.S. Congress as well as opposition onthe part of experts and the political elite.One might say that the global communityis reacting not only to actual steps, but toits own expectations regarding future U.S.policy trends.

Nevertheless signs of a policy shift, even ifmodest so far, raise a number of questions.First, whether the ongoing discussions andthe extremely modest budgetary appropri-ations represent the beginning of a long-term shift in U.S. nuclear policy, orwhether current policy will change alongwith a change of administration in 2009.Second, is the new nuclear policy a pure-ly American phenomenon or does it reflecta broader shift?

The answers to these questions and con-clusions are the subject of this article.They are not comforting.

First, the evolution of U.S. nuclear policyis not so much the product of the currentadministration’s views, as a reaction to theemergence of a new international system,and is therefore likely to stay in place fora fairly long time. The policy may be

adjusted but is unlikely to be reversed,whether the next administration isRepublican or Democratic.

Second, since the current evolution of U.S.nuclear policy is driven by the new inter-national system, similar changes will occurin other countries as well. Indeed, somesigns of this evolution can already befound in Russia.

These changes are not irreversible, butaltering them will require more than thecriticism of the global community. Areturn to the disarmament agenda of the1990s is not likely. New times require newapproaches, and nuclear weapons are nolonger the defining element of internation-al security.

The NNew SSystem oof IInternationalRelations aand tthe RRole oof NNuclearWeapons After the Cold War ended many thoughtthat nuclear weapons would fadeaway–maybe not necessarily eliminated, butat least lose their military and political sig-nificance. Since the late 1990s, however, asort of nuclear renaissance could beobserved in a number of countries. U.S.and Russian nuclear policy has changed,India and Pakistan joined the “nuclearclub” in 1998, North Korea announced itsnuclear status, and there are reasons tobelieve that Iran is working on a nuclearweapons program of its own. Some signif-icant conclusions can be drawn, even ifthey are only preliminary.

First of all, it is now possible to confi-dently say that nuclear weapons and theCold War were not causally related.Nuclear weapons helped shape the ColdWar, but the Cold War was not the resultof the nuclear arms race, and therefore itsend could not end nuclear weapons’ mili-tary value. While many understood thiseven earlier, the “nuclear renaissance” ofthe past seven years removed any remain-ing doubts.

Second, and perhaps even more important,the transition period of the 1990s, whichhas often been described as the “post-ColdWar period,” is over. A new internationalsystem is emerging, whose features are notyet entirely clear. It would seem, however,that nuclear weapons will have a fairly sig-nificant role in it.

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Events that signaled the end of the tran-sition period were the 2000 elections inRussia and the United States (the govern-ments of the 1990s were basically engagedin drawing the line under the Cold War,while new leaders began to form newagendas), the terrorist attacks in Russia andthe United States in 1999-2001, the 2003war in Iraq, and North Korea’s acquisitionof nuclear status in late 2003. One mightadd a “non-event”–the gradual building ofa “containment belt” around China in thefirst half of 2001. This policy was inter-rupted by the events of September 11, butrecently has been resumed.

The “disarmament illusions” of the 1990sand progress in the reduction of nucleararsenals both resulted from the fact thatthe primary Cold War mission of nuclearweapons had exhausted itself. Until thenew international system began to takeshape, anti-nuclear sentiment was on therise. Today, unfortunately, we are witness-ing the opposite process, and it is not yetclear whether it can be stopped or slowed.

The place and role of nuclear weapons inthe new international system will likely bedetermined by the following factors:

• Paradoxically, the erosion of the rigidbipolar system (along with the equallywell-defined group of non-alignedstates) has decreased the system’s “man-ageability” and led to a relative increasein the degree of freedom states have inforeign and security policy decisionmaking. In addition–largely as a resultof the United States’ own actions–therole of international institutions andinternational law has been weakened.

• Although the new international systemthat is taking shape has all of the signsof unipolarity, the United States clearlydoes not possess sufficient power tocontrol the course of events while sup-port of allies cannot be guaranteed.This has been further complicated bythe explosion of international terrorism.If key states are able to establish asteady, cooperative relationship, the newsystem may eventually stabilize, but ifnot, one can expect the evolution of thesystem toward multipolarity–completewith its traditional negative features,such as unstable, rapidly changingcoalitions and the general unpre-dictability of the situation.

• The stable, easy predictability of threatsis now a thing of the past. The sources,scale, and very nature of future threatsare unknown. While reasonably reliableassessment of near-term threats is pos-sible, it is virtually out of the questionto foresee what threats states will haveto deal with in ten or twenty years.Therefore, states have to be preparedfor unforeseen threats arising fromunexpected directions. In the UnitedStates, this is called “capabilities-basedplanning” (in contrast to traditional“threat-based planning”).

• The perception that any use of nuclearweapons could lead to a global catas-trophe is part the past as well, sincelarge-scale conflicts between leadingmilitary and nuclear powers are nolonger deemed likely. Paradoxically, thesharp decrease (or possibly, the disap-pearance) of the threat of World WarIII has made the use of nuclearweapons theoretically feasible for thefirst time in four decades (the view thatnuclear war would mean the “end ofthe world” was fully formed in the late1950s-early 1960s).

• The uncertainty of the internationalsystem provides new incentives for agrowing number of states to acquirenuclear weapons, while the ability ofthe international community to preventproliferation is decreasing. This is truenot just for potential U.S. enemies buteven for its allies and partners, many ofwhich might be reluctant to unques-tionably rely on the American “nuclearumbrella” in the long term. Doubtsabout the durability of the nuclearnonproliferation regime are forcing thenuclear states to take measures againstthe possible increase in the number ofnuclear weapon states, including byslowing disarmament activities.

A response to these changes is the emer-gence of a new mission for nuclearweapons: limited use in the context of lim-ited, predominantly conventional wars. Thetraditional mission, the mutual deterrenceof the world’s major nuclear powers (par-ticularly, of course, the United States andRussia), remains in place but has been rel-egated to the background as a “just-in-case” scenario as neither Washington nor

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Moscow believes that a large-scale conflictis likely. Current disagreements are neitheras deep nor as fundamental as they wereduring the Cold War, when each believedthat the survival of their economic andpolitical systems was at stake.

The thesis about the limited use of nuclearweapons requires further explanation. Afterall, plans to use nuclear weapons on thebattlefield or in the military theater to sup-port conventional armed forces existed dur-ing the Cold War as well. However, thismission was largely assigned an auxiliaryrole within the context of a global war orof a regional conflict fraught with the pos-sibility of escalating into a global war.Limited use was likely to be part of large-scale strikes that used strategic weapons. Itis well known that the United States paidconsiderable attention to developing plansfor preventing escalation of a conflict fromthe theater to the global level (this issueattracted close attention in the first half ofthe 1980s in connection with the issue ofintermediate-range nuclear weapons inEurope; there were also similar studies inthe early 1960s that have recently beendeclassified), just as the essential weaknessof all of these plans is similarly well known.

The current views are quite different. First,because the likelihood of a global war ispractically zero, it has become theoreticallypossible to separate the missions of strate-gic deterrence and limited use and for thefirst time consider the possible use ofnuclear weapons with relative “impunity”(impunity in the sense that their use willnot lead to nuclear escalation). Second, theuse of nuclear weapons against third coun-tries has also become theoretically possiblefor the first time. While in the 1950s and1960s ideas about using nuclear weapons inlimited wars (such as Korea and Vietnam)were rejected, in part due to the fear thatthis might legitimize their use (and defacto “sanction” their similar use by theSoviet Union), the current U.S. politicaland military leadership clearly is not wor-ried about the same risks. Russia is nolonger seen as an enemy or a global com-petitor and, therefore, this kind of “sanc-tioning” is no longer a problem. Of course,there are other types of obstacles, such asthe proliferation of nuclear weapons andthe condemnation of a significant numberof countries, including allies, but these areproblems of another order entirely.

It’s worth noting here that the process ofdeveloping new missions is at a very earlystage. Many details remain unclear, as is theshape of the new international system thatis giving rise to the new view of nuclearweapons. The practical implementation ofthese ideas is in an equally early stage andis encountering serious political obstacles:the U.S. Congress has blocked appropria-tions for preliminary studies on low-yieldnuclear weapons (and there is as yet noinformation on Russian work in this area).

There are certain differences between theU.S. and Russian approaches to the con-cept of limited use. As far as one canjudge, the United States sees them as aninstrument of solving practical tasks inlimited wars such as the recent war inIraq–primarily the destruction of facilitieswhere weapons of mass destruction arebeing developed, produced, and stored(proposals to create earth-penetratingweapons emphasize this mission). OfficialRussian documents adopted in 2000-2003indicate that it views limited use primari-ly in the context of de-escalation–deterringa large-scale non-nuclear attack by a mili-tarily superior foe (particularly the UnitedStates and its allies). In both cases, nuclearweapons are expected to compensate forthe inadequacy of conventional arms–theirinability to reliably destroy hardened,deeply buried targets or to deal with aquantitative and, especially, a qualitativeimbalance.

It is important to note that the emergenceof a new, limited-use nuclear mission doesnot lead to an increase in nuclear arsenals,in contrast to the familiar trends of theCold War era. On the contrary, nucleararms reductions are likely to continue:under the 2002 Strategic OffensiveReductions Treaty (also known as theMoscow Treaty), Russia and the UnitedStates will reduce their strategic arms to alevel of no more than 2,200 deployed war-heads, and in future may make evengreater reductions. Stockpiles of nonstrate-gic weapons are also being reduced. It ispossible that over time other nuclear stateswill join this process in one form or anoth-er, at the very least committing not toincrease their nuclear arsenals. This isbecause the new mission does not requirelarge stockpiles of nuclear weapons; to date,all scenarios that have been discussed inboth countries involved the use of weaponsin single digits.

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Therefore, arms reductions should not beconfused with disarmament. It is more cor-rect to speak of the optimization of arsenalsand the elimination of surplus weaponsaccumulated during the decades of the ColdWar. The absence of any system to moni-tor the implementation of the 2002 MoscowTreaty also suggests that its focus is reallyoptimization, not disarmament. This trend isreally quite clear, and non-nuclear states dis-play an understanding of that trend whenthey declare that the Moscow Treaty cannotbe classified as implementation of Article VIof the NPT and condemn increasing atten-tion nuclear weapons. In the view of non-nuclear weapon states all this shows thatdisarmament is not on the agenda at thepresent time.

Trends iin tthe DDevelopment of tthe UU.S. NNuclear DDoctrineThe new view of nuclear weapons is partof a broader process of transforming theU.S. military in ways that are supposed toenable it to fight limited wars. Nuclearweapons are just one of the elements ofthis transformation, and a secondary one atthat. The role and place of nuclear weaponsis determined in the 2002 Nuclear PostureReview as part of the “new triad” – arather inadequate term, which is used todesignate the integration of three elementsof military power: offensive weapons, defen-sive weapons, and responsive infrastructure,which can design and produce new typesof equipment rapidly and in small quanti-ties. It is worth nothing that this infra-structure is viewed not just as a support-ing element, but as an integral part of mil-itary power alongside the services andbranches of the armed forces. All three ele-ments are integrated by C4ISR–command,control, communications, computers, intelli-gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Nuclear weapons are included in the cate-gory of offensive weapons, and can be usedwhen conventional weapons cannot meetspecific objectives. It is important toemphasize that the use of nuclear weaponsis considered to be an extraordinary meas-ure that may never be taken. Even whenthe enemy has weapons of mass destruc-tion at his disposal, the use of convention-al arms remains preferable. The modern-ization of conventional weapons, includingthe equipping of strategic missiles (includ-ing ICBMs) with non-nuclear warheads,should significantly enhance their militaryvalue. Nevertheless, it remains important to

maintain the “nuclear option” in reserve inorder to ensure maximum flexibility forboth planning and operations.

The limited use of nuclear weapons pri-marily has been considered in the contextof regional wars, such as the recent war inIraq, particularly against WMD-related tar-gets. The most likely scenario is that U.S.Strategic Command will launch nuclearweapons at the request of combatant com-manders. However, one cannot exclude thepossibility that combatant commandersmay be authorized to use specific StrategicCommand assets.

Issues of command and control are as yetunclear. Although the president will retainthe exclusive prerogative to authorize theuse of nuclear weapons, one cannot ruleout that operations against specific targetsmay be “pre-authorized” in the planningstage, or that the commander may begiven permission to use nuclear weapons athis own discretion in specified situationswithout additional authorization.

To the extent that nuclear weapons candeter the enemy’s use of WMD, the princi-ple of limited use may promote nonprolif-eration. If states that plan to acquire WMDconclude that they will not be able to useit to further military or political goalsagainst the United States or its allies, theincentive to obtain these weapons shouldweaken. In the case they try to use WMD,the United States should be able to destroyboth the weapons and related infrastructure.This is the reason for the strong emphasison earth-penetrating weapons capable ofdestroying hardened, buried targets.

A new phenomenon is the possibility ofusing strategic forces independently ofother services. In 2004, the media report-ed the adoption of the Interim GlobalStrike Alert Order, which directedStrategic Command to be prepared to usestrategic aircraft to strike nuclear sites inNorth Korea and Iran. The NationalMilitary Strategy and National DefenseStrategy, both adopted in 2005, officiallyprovide for the possibility of preventivestrikes, even in cases where there is nodirect threat to the United States.

As in the more general case, the possiblestrikes on North Korea and Iran do nothave to be (or rather, should not be)nuclear. However, some types of targets areapparently thought to require the use ofnuclear weapons. The possibility, in princi-

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ple, of using nuclear weapons in “non-con-tact” military action at great distances is ofparticular interest here. Attention to sce-narios of this kind may be caused by thefact that at present U.S. forces are simplynot capable of engaging in additional con-ventional military activities–they arealready occupied, and even overloaded, bythe missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The fact that the Nuclear Posture Reviewcontemplates the possible use of nuclearweapons against states with any type ofWMD represents a partial revision of neg-ative security assurances, adopted by theUnited States in connection with the NPT(these assurances require that nuclearstates–including, but not limited to, theUnited States–not use nuclear weaponsagainst non-nuclear weapon states, a provi-sion that eliminates the threat to states thatmay have, for instance, chemical but notnuclear weapons). Proposals to weakennegative security assurances initiallyappeared in the 1990s, after the signing ofthe Chemical Weapons Convention, whenthe only weapons of mass destructionremaining in the U.S. arsenal would benuclear weapons. Officially, the new for-mulation, however, was first adopted byRussia in 2000. The United States followedsuit nearly two years later.

It is clear that adopting the principle ofthe limited use of nuclear weapons in thecontext of limited conflicts is fraught withthe risk of expanding the missions of theseweapons even further. Although the mainmission remains the enemy’s WMD andrelated sites, it will be difficult to avoid thetemptation to assign additional missions,such as the destruction of fixed or mobiletargets, or the penetration of enemy defens-es, particularly when military developmentsare unfavorable.

Finally, it is worth noting that the divid-ing lines between different types of nuclearweapons are being erased, particularlythose between strategic and nonstrategicweapons. The use of short-range nuclearweapons seems extremely improbable. Onthe contrary, as noted above, it is morelikely that strategic or, at a minimum,intermediate-range forces under the controlof Strategic Command, such as the B-2heavy bomber, will be used.

This is very different from Cold War-eraplanning, where tactical weapons were pre-dominantly given the mission of combat

support and strategic weapons were usedfor strategic deterrence. The new state ofaffairs is primarily caused by the reducedrole of strategic deterrence, along with lowrequirements for limited use (as notedabove, these requirements are in single dig-its). As a result, strategic nuclear weaponshave become available for new missions.Strategic weapons have a number ofadvantages over tactical and intermediate-range weapons, primarily thanks to theirnearly unlimited range. This is particular-ly true of air-launched cruise missiles andshort-range weapons deployed on long-range aircraft. They can be used in prac-tically any military theater without havingto spend time transferring delivery systems,they are highly accurate, and have dualcapabilities–that is, they can be used withboth nuclear and non-nuclear warheads.

Given the above, the close attention ofnon-weapons states at various multilateralfora (the NPT Review Conference, U.N.General Assembly First Committee, etc.) totactical nuclear weapons seems at oddswith the trends in nuclear arsenals. Mostlikely, short-range nuclear weapons willgradually disappear. Similarly, the tradi-tional framework of the bilateral disarma-ment process, which has concentrated onstrategic and nonstrategic weapons sepa-rately (the Moscow Treaty is just the mostrecent example of this tradition), does notmake much sense either.

New MMissions aand TTrends in MModernizationThe credibility of the new missions–includ-ing the limited use of nuclear weapons ifneeded–depends on the availability of theappropriate assets. The following character-istics are critical:

• transferring technological advances inprecision guidance and rapid retargetingof nuclear weapons (to date theseadvances have mostly been concentrat-ed in high precision conventional arma-ments);

• low yield: the yield of warheads inher-ited from the Cold War is generallyhundreds, or at the very least, dozensof kilotons, which is not only excessivebut unacceptable for the purposes oflimited use during a predominantlyconventional conflict. It is critical inthis case to avoid excessive damage, the

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long-term radioactive contamination oflarge areas, and significant civilian loss-es (“collateral damage”);

• earth-penetrating capability in order todestroy deeply buried, hardened targets;

• capability to tailor effects, including theability to choose the appropriate mix ofvarious factors (such as shock wave,radiation, etc.);

• ability to reliably destroy chemical andbiological weapons;

• improved reliability and simplifiedmaintenance.

It is a widely shared belief that the exist-ing (“legacy”) arsenal does not have thenecessary assets. Consequently, there isconsiderable pressure to upgrade existingweapons and possibly develop new ones.

Even a quick overview of the current stateof efforts to improve nuclear weaponsallows one to point at some key variables.The scale of budget allocations, pace ofactivities, and modesty of the existing tasksstands in stark contrast to U.S. policy inthis area. U.S. plans and statements haveresulted in sharp criticism from both theglobal community and Bush administrationcritics. In reality, the new doctrine will notbe supported by appropriate assets for atleast 10-15 years, and given the recentsharp increase in Congressional resistance,possibly far longer.

Weapons modernization work consists oftwo main elements:

The first element is the creation of a newrobust nuclear earth penetrator (RNEP).This does not require the creation of anew physics package: the current B61-11RNEP, adopted in 1997 (and derived froman earlier model, the B61-7, which enteredproduction in 1985), should be fit with anew casing. Like the B61-7, the B61-11 hasa variable yield of between 0.3 and 340 ktand can penetrate into rock up to 6 ft,which is not considered sufficient; the newcasing should allow deeper penetration.Work on the new version began in 2003,one year later than originally planned, andat the current stage is basically devoted todetermining whether the existing B-61 andB-83 warheads could be modified toensure deeper penetration.

During the first two years, fundingamounted to $15 million per year. Plans

provided for an additional $27.6 million in2005 and $95 million in 2006. After thecompletion of the current tasks, budgetallocations–given a decision to move fromdesign definition to full-scale develop-ment–were expected to increase to $145.4million in 2007, $128.4 million in 2008,and $88 million in 2009. Completion ofdevelopment engineering was scheduled for2009.

However, Congress eliminated the programfrom the FY2005 budget request; fundingfor 2006 was partially restored, but only atthe level of $4 million (compared to theoriginal plan of $95 million or the $8.5million administration request).Furthermore, the money was transferredfrom the Department of Energy to the AirForce, under the assumption that the AirForce is better equipped to decide if itactually needs such weapons. However,since Strategic Command and the AirForce have long said that they needed anew RNEP with better performance thanthe one already in the arsenal, it is easy topredict the results of the feasibility study.Additionally, $4.5 million was allocated tofund a study on deploying the newweapons on B-2 bombers.

The two most important facts to keep inmind are that program funding wasrestored, and that program implementationhas radically slowed down.

The second element is (or was) known asthe Advanced Concepts Initiative (ACI), aprogram which was supposed to determinewhether new types of warheads (physicspackages) were necessary or feasible, toreplace those developed during the ColdWar. It is this program that dealt with theissue the current administration is beingcriticized for: creating new types and ver-sions of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously,this program was supposed to answerquestions about the feasibility of modifyingexisting physics packages in order toextend service lives and produce a weaponthat was more reliable, simpler, and cheap-er to maintain.

Initial funding amounted to $6 million peryear, but in 2005 the program was ended(the administration request was $9 millionfor 2005 and $4.4 million for 2006). Planshad called for the preliminary researchstage to be completed in 2006 and, givena decision begin to full-scale developmentefforts, funding was supposed to increase

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dramatically: to $14.9 million in 2007,$14.6 million in 2008, and $29.5 million in2009. The initial budget allocations werequite modest and indicated a slow pace ofwork even while funding was still available.

Unlike the RNEP program, ACI fundingwas not renewed. Instead, Congress initi-ated a different program, the ReliableReplacement Warhead (RRW) program,which replaced the previous LifeExtension Program. Under the RRW, newreplacement parts are supposed to bedeveloped for legacy warheads to make itpossible to increase their service lives, sim-plify design, and improve reliability. Inother words, the new program is expectedto achieve some of the aims of the ACI.In addition, plans call for examining thepossibility of decreasing the yield of lega-cy warheads, and operationalizing theprinciple of tailored effects. In 2005, theDepartment of Energy budget request forthe Advanced Concepts Initiative was sim-ply reassigned to the new program, and in2006 Congress allocated $25 million–$15million more than the administrationrequest. However, the law banned thedevelopment of new capabilities thatwould enable new missions; thus, not allof the Advanced Concepts Initiative pro-gram’s initial aims can be met under theRRW program.

According to the Department of Energy,approximately 10,000 warheads requirereplacement: they are already beyond theiroriginal warranty periods and have hadtheir service lives extended throughreplacement of parts. The replacement ofold physics packages with new and betterdesigns could help to reduce the overallnumber of warheads in the stockpile toabout 6,000 (an approximately 40 percentreduction), simply by making the warheadsmore reliable and extending their servicelives from 15 to 20-30 years. Upgradingthese warheads will cost an estimated $2billion between 2007 and 2017. The firstbatch of “new” warheads is expected in2012-2015. According to some reports, thefirst candidate for replacements is the W-76, an SLBM warhead, and it would entail,in effect, designing a new warhead,although observing the Congressionalrestrictions as well as the impossibility offull-scale testing.

To sum up, one might say that the cur-rent administration has suffered a politicaldefeat as it is not even able to carry out

a program of preliminary research on thecreation of new warheads. Nevertheless,some tasks can be undertaken under themore limited programs to develop newcomponents for legacy warheads. Thus,some movement in the initial directioncontinues, but far more slowly than andnot at the same scale as originally planned.

One basic task, which some view as criti-cal, is the rebuilding of industrial infra-structure for the production of nuclearweapons. Their production ceased at theend of the Cold War and a substantialproportion of production capacities wasdismantled.

In 2002 tritium production was renewedand in 2003, for the first time since 1989,a plutonium pit was produced. In future,construction of a plutonium pit productionfacility is planned (commencement of con-struction is tentatively planned for 2020;until that time pit production will contin-ue at the Los Alamos NationalLaboratory). However, Congress sharplyreduced funding for construction prepara-tions and banned the expenditure of fundson site selection for the future plant.

The program that naturally is attractingthe greatest attention is the one on testreadiness at the Nevada Test Site, reducingthe time from 36 to 18 months; tradition-ally this sort of program is seen as evi-dence of preparations for testing. Accordingto official U.S. policy, however, the UnitedStates does not plan to resume testing andhas not even examined this issue. The offi-cial statements should probably be believedsince there quite simply will be nothingready to test in the next few years: theDepartment of Energy and national labo-ratories do not believe that existing war-heads require testing and no new ones areyet under development. In addition, thepolitical costs of renewing tests would beso high that it would be irrational toexpect any such activities with regard toexisting warheads; such a serious measurewould only be taken for equally seriousreasons. An alternative explanation, offeredby officials, is more logical: at 1990s fund-ing levels test site degradation might havebecome irreversible. Additional funds arerequired to maintain the site at a stablelevel and restore some infrastructure thathas been damaged.

However, the administration has failed aswell. Congress only funded the first two

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years of the three-year program, andrefused further allocations. It seems likelythat gradually all of the program aims willbe met, but more slowly that initiallyassumed.

The PProspects for PPost-22008 NNuclear PPolicyA survey of U.S. doctrine and nuclearweapons modernization leads to fairly con-tradictory conclusions. On the one hand,the conceptual foundations for nuclear pol-icy as well as plans for the use of nuclearweapons under existing international cir-cumstances have progressed quite far andare being supported not just by the polit-ical leadership, but by the military estab-lishment as well. On the other hand, thedevelopment of the weapons required bythe new doctrine is not just in the veryearliest stages, but is also progressing veryslowly and with minimal funding (by U.S.standards, of course). Even these relativelymodest programs, moreover, are runninginto resistance in Congress and as a resulthave been slowed even further or modified.

Thus the question arises, whether currentpolicy will remain in some form afterJanuary 2009 and the end of the BushAdministration. Here we are primarily talk-ing about the limited use of nuclearweapons in limited, primarily non-nuclearconflicts. Despite all of the political zigzagsthis policy appears relatively stable. Changeis possible and perhaps even inevitable, butsome of the basic assumptions underlyingthe policy enjoy broad support.

In particular, this refers to the thesis thatthe international situation is unpredictableand could fluctuate rapidly and profound-ly; that predicting the sources, scale, andnature of future threats is impossible; thatpresent and, to an even greater degree,future opponents will be harder to deterthan the Soviet Union; and that deterrencebased solely on conventional weapons maybe insufficient. Finally, doubts as to thestability of the nuclear nonproliferationregime are widespread. While U.S. “friendsand allies” are likely to refrain from acquir-ing nuclear weapons in the foreseeablefuture, states that belong to the “axis ofevil” actively are pursuing nuclear status.Therefore, they must be restrained, in partby demonstrating that nuclear weapons donot yield the expected benefits; deterred, ifrestraints do not work; and destroyed, ifdeterrence fails.

Of course, one could argue over how well-founded these views are. Furthermore, thenew approach to nonproliferation adoptedby the administration in the past fewmonths only serves to undermine the non-proliferation regime–under the newapproach, proliferation only needs to bechecked (using all means available) if thenuclear weapons fall into the hands of“bad” countries, while the nuclear status of“good” countries can be accepted withoutobjection. Undoubtedly, the war in Iraqprovided a very powerful incentive forcountries that fear the United States toacquire nuclear weapons, particularly sinceU.S. policy openly advocates the removal ofa whole series of regimes that it deemsundemocratic and unfriendly.

Regardless of how well-founded such crit-icisms may be, it remains true that a sub-stantial part of the U.S. establishment andsociety is worried. These concerns are notso much focused on current enemies as onthe general unpredictability of the situationas well as the issue of whether or not U.S.forces can handle the unknown threats.Given these circumstances, the militarymust be strengthened as much as possible,an idea that lies at the core of the adop-tion of the principle of “capabilities-basedplanning” by the current administration inlieu of traditional “threat-based planning.”

The new nuclear policy, including the lim-ited use of nuclear weapons as an inde-pendent mission, is just one component ofthe effort to maximize military strengthunder conditions of uncertainty. These con-ditions, moreover, appear to be one of thekey characteristics of the developing inter-national system.

Since the new trends in U.S. nuclear pol-icy are answers to the threats and chal-lenges posed by the new international sys-tem, one can hardly expect that calls toreturn to traditional nuclear nonprolifera-tion will be successful. Current policy isunlikely to change as long as a significantportion of the U.S. establishment is con-vinced that relying on nuclear weapons isnecessary to counter possible threats, anduntil alternatives are proposed that areequally or better able to counter them. Inany case, it would be overoptimistic toexpect that a new U.S. administrationwould lead to a radical return to the dis-armament initiatives of the 1990s, whetherthe Republicans remain in the WhileHouse or the Democrats regain power.

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Furthermore, since the new internationalsystem is about the world as a whole anddoes not just affect the United States, thetrend toward revising nuclear policy–thepolicy inherited from the Cold War and theapproaches of the transition period–is notlimited to the United States. It is very like-ly that this trend will spread even further.

This is true of Russia, where nuclear pol-icy is also being influenced by uncertain-ties and the possible unforeseen appearanceof new threats from relatively stable quar-ters. Statements made in Washington andBrussels that the enlargement of NATO tothe east or the appearance of U.S. bases inCentral Asia do not pose a current orpotential threat to Russia are not veryeffective. Accordingly, “just in case” prepa-rations are being made to deter the threatof the use of force against Russia along thelines of the “Kosovo scenario,” includingdeterrence utilizing limited use of nuclearweapons. It is possible that in future, ifnothing changes, proposals very similar tothose in the United States regarding thepossible limited use of nuclear weaponsagainst third countries will appear.

In principle, it is fairly simple to changethis situation: at the very least, it is neces-sary to enhance significantly the effective-

ness of international organizations andother international institutions and developpartnerships between key states. It is like-ly that the next administration will notview international organizations as nega-tively as the White House does today.However, the question remains: will inter-national organizations themselves be up tothe tasks that arise? To date decisionmak-ing procedures, the nature of these deci-sions, and the effectiveness of their imple-mentation are not at the necessary level.The reforms that have begun at the UnitedNations are likely to be just the first stagein the reform of the entire internationalsystem, which may involve the formationof new organizations in addition to or inplace of existing ones. The alternative isthe victory of the “individualistic” approachto security provision, including reliance onnuclear weapons. The slow speed at whichthe United States is creating new weaponsthat meet new doctrinal requirements pro-vides some time to solve these questions.The critical period is likely to be duringthe next U.S. administration.

1 This article is based on a presentation made by theauthor at the Geneva Center for Security Policy in June2005.

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Analysis

ON TTHE RROLE OOF NNUCLEARWEAPONS IIN PPROVIDING FOR RRUSSIAN SSECURITY IN TTHE 221st CENTURY

By AAlexander SSaveliev,Director oof tthe DDepartment for SStrategic AAnalysis, CCenter for IInternational SSecurity SStudies of tthe IInstitute oof WWorld EEconomyand IInternational RRelations




“The art of war is a matter of national importance,

a life and death situation, the way (Dao) either to safety

or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry that can on no account

be neglected.”

Sunzi, 6th century B.C.1

At the present time, the global communi-ty, military, diplomats, and politicians arefocusing on the issues of international ter-rorism and the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction, and how to design andagree upon the ways and means to fightthis evil. Issues of nuclear policy andnuclear strategy, by contrast, have beengiven less attention. Where Russia is con-cerned, practically all of the questionsrelated to these latter issues have been dis-cussed, decisions have been made, and theformulation of these decisions in officialdocuments is now being completed. Thusone might consider that this article is sim-ply “catching up” to the decisions that havealready been made.

However, this author is certain that thediscussions that have occurred have in noway influenced decisionmaking in the areaof Russia’s nuclear arms procurement, pol-icy, and strategy. This is confirmed whenone looks at the long-standing debates inthe open press on the issues mentionedabove, and notes that they chiefly involveexperts who do not represent official exec-

utive branch agencies. The periodic speech-es by top-ranking military officials onlyconfirm the unfortunate conclusion thatthose in power are not ready for an opendialogue on these questions and do notwant even to discuss the many and oftenquite well-founded proposals put forwardby the independent scientific community.

Therefore, the thoughts and reflectionsrelated below should not be viewed as yetanother attempt to bring the attention ofthe powers that be to this issue or makerelevant recommendations, to say nothingof an authorial hope for the practical real-ization of such recommendations. Instead,this is simply an essay that attempts to“measure” the strategic ideas of the past(primarily those of ancient Chinese strate-gists) against the realities of the currentnuclear age.

Why are we so interested in the views ofthe authors of ancient texts on strategy?Clearly, they are attractive thanks to theclarity and completeness of thoughts there-in, the elegance of their logical constructs,and the simplicity of their articulation ofthe most complex issues. In addition, aclose reading of these works amazes thereader by their continued relevancy, whichis why they are of everlasting significance.The author hopes that this article will haveat least some success in confirming thisconclusion.

“…he who defends his home will long endure…”

Laozi, 4th century B.C.

Do WWe BBelieve iin tthe PPossibility oofNuclear WWar? Even within Russia’s community of expertsone can find dramatically opposed answersto this fairly rhetorical question: from acomplete denial of the possibility that anuclear conflict could arise that mightinvolve our country to the proposition thatthe likelihood of just such a conflict hasincreased in recent years.

There is an even more fundamental contra-diction involving the assessment of thenature of nuclear weapons. Some contendthat these weapons are in actuality not real-ly weapons, since they cannot be used inbattle. According to this logic, they can onlyfulfill the function of “deterring” a probable

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enemy from attack but cannot be used asinstruments to achieve victory in battle.

The other point of view is that a nuclearweapon is truly a weapon in the fullmeaning of that term. The application ofnuclear weapons is determined by the rel-evant conditions; they are maintained in abattle-ready state, they are capable of ful-filling concrete tasks during the course ofan armed conflict, and in the final analy-sis, they have been and continue to be thefoundation of our country’s national secu-rity, today as in the past, precisely becausethey could indeed be employed. And ifnuclear weapons were not really weapons,then they would not be able to deter anenemy or prevent war.

Without taking up either of these points ofview, we would simply like to emphasizethat even though the majority of thoseresearching this issue do not see anyrational uses of nuclear weapons, this doesnot mean that such uses are completelynonexistent. In order to find them, wemust carefully consider this question, ifonly to substantiate or invalidate the most-ly intuitive deductions of various authorswho have discussed the practical possibili-ties for or impossibility of implementing a“functioning” nuclear strategy and anuclear doctrine to undergird it.

Today it is fairly clear that the disintegra-tion of the Soviet Union and the end ofthe bipolar international system, inter alia,made it far more complicated to ensureRussia’s national security. On the onehand, the end of the confrontation withthe principle potential adversary–theUnited States and NATO–sharply reducedthe likelihood of a global conflict involvingthe use of weapons of mass destructionand opened the way to broad reductions inthe arsenals of strategic and tactical nuclearweapons that had accumulated during theCold War years. On the other hand, arange of new threats arose, demanding anadequate response throughout the govern-ment in order to guarantee the peacefuland secure life of its citizens.

It is also clear that nuclear weapons oftencannot contribute to the fulfillment ofthese tasks. Thus we must recognize thatnuclear weapons are not a universal meansfor providing security. Furthermore,Russian use of these weapons is extremelyunlikely, since the scenarios involving large-scale aggression against our country that

might lead to a situation in which a deci-sion on employing nuclear weapons mustbe made are extremely unlikely today.

Nevertheless, Russia cannot completelyignore these extremely adverse scenarios ofpossible military developments. As theancients repeated in one military tract afteranother, “he who forgets about war will bedoomed to danger” (Sima’s Art of War –“Sima Fa” – 4th century B.C.) and “the trueWay (Dao) of providing for national securi-ty is foresight. He who worries can avoidmisfortune.” (Wuzi, 5th–4th century B.C.)Laozi, cited in the epigraph at the begin-ning of this section, shares a similar view. Itfollows (though axiomatic, it is nonethelesstrue) that Russia probably will have tomaintain and support its nuclear deterrentcapability for the foreseeable future, whilesimultaneously trying to adapt it to chang-ing world conditions as much as possible, onthe basis of its economic capabilities andforce development priorities. Thus “faith” inthe impossibility of the emergence of anuclear conflict does not outweigh thenecessity of “foresight” where questions ofsecurity and perfecting one’s defense areconcerned. This accords with yet one moreprinciple, put forward by the great ancientChinese general and strategist Sunzi: “do notrely on the enemy’s not coming, but on ourown readiness to receive him.”

One should note that Russia’s approach toissues of nuclear policy has already under-gone conceptual changes and will continueto adapt in the foreseeable future. Thus,during the Cold War one of the mainprinciples upon which development ofSoviet nuclear forces was based was theprinciple of “equal security,” which requiredan accounting of all factors influencing thestrategic situation. In practice, this meantthat not only did parity (equality) withU.S. nuclear forces have to be maintained,but also that additional forces had to befielded to “compensate” for the nucleararms of the United Kingdom and Franceas well as nonstrategic weapons at U.S. for-ward bases that could reach Soviet territo-ry. Furthermore, maintaining a certain“reserve” of strategic forces that took intoaccount China’s nuclear capabilities wasalso regarded as well-founded.

All of this led to a significant overestima-tion of the demand for Soviet nuclearforces. It also created serious obstacles dur-ing negotiations with the United States,which maintained the principle of strategic

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“parity” and did not recognize the SovietUnion’s right to additional “compensation,”described above.

Furthermore, maintaining the Soviet strate-gic nuclear capability at an extremely highlevel was also dictated by political con-cerns. The Soviet leadership believed thatit was extremely important to demonstrateto the world that it was capable of com-peting with the West on an equal footingin the military sphere. The presence of anenormous nuclear arsenal was the clearestillustration of Soviet military might.

Today, due to a whole range of externalfactors, Russia will have to let go of theprinciple of parity, not just with thenuclear states as a group, but even withthe United States separately. Particularlysince the political value of a nuclear arse-nal, if not nonexistent, now plays a farsmaller role than it did in the period ofglobal confrontation. Today the idea ofstrengthening strategic stability on thebasis of supporting nuclear deterrence hascome to the fore. This issue requires a sep-arate analysis.

“In order to prevent the enemy from engaging us, show him the (possible) harm

this might bring.”

Sunzi

Nuclear DDeterrence It is amazing how modern some of thestatements by ancient Chinese strategistssound today. The quotation used as an epi-graph for this section expresses the essenceof the strategy of nuclear deterrence in aconcentrated form. Indeed, in order to pre-vent an attack by a potential enemy, it isnecessary to show (demonstrate) that retri-bution is inevitable, that is, the harm thatwill befall him as a result of responseactions.

Sunzi also believed that an attack on theenemy’s walled cities (fortresses) was the“very last” act in the chain of escalatingconfrontation (“…the highest form of gen-eralship is to destroy the enemy’s plans;the next best is to prevent the junction ofthe enemy’s forces; the next in order is toattack the enemy’s army in the field; andthe worst policy of all is to besiege walledcities”). And although these “recommenda-tions” naturally relate to wars in earlier

times, attacking the enemy’s cities, fromthe point of view of contemporary nuclearstrategy, is indeed the final step that aparty to a nuclear conflict can undertake.

The concept of nuclear deterrence hasbeen well studied both by both Russianand foreign researchers. Therefore we willonly touch upon one of the key aspects ofthis issue: how much force is needed tomake deterrence “work,” that is, to havecomplete confidence that a potential enemywill not dare to use his nuclear weaponsdue to the threat of inevitable retribution.

The most interesting aspect of this ques-tion is that, in our view, the long-standingdebates and study of this issue have notresulted in a concrete recommendationregarding the size of nuclear arsenal thatwould provide such a guarantee. As a rule,the quantity of forces needed effectively todeter an opponent is thought to be rela-tive. Most analysts believe that it dependsupon the composition, quantitative andqualitative characteristics of both one’s ownforces and the forces of the potentialenemy. Furthermore, the question of theeffectiveness (credibility) of nuclear deter-rence is very frequently reduced to an esti-mate of the number of nuclear armamentsthat are capable of surviving an enemy’sfirst strike. Both the Soviet Union (Russia)and the United States developed computerprograms to model the various possiblescenarios involving strategic forces.Sometimes attempts were made to intro-duce the factor of the survivability of thecombat control and communications sys-tem into these equations, but this factordid not easily yield to quantitative or otherconcrete analyses.

Russia’s official approach to nuclear deter-rence is built on these theses. Thus, theRussian military doctrine demands thatRussia maintain a nuclear capability thatcan guarantee the infliction of “predeter-mined damage” on any aggressor “underany circumstances.” The worst such cir-cumstances, evidently, is the scenario of anunexpected mass attack on Russia’s strate-gic nuclear forces. In other words, Russia’snuclear forces should be able to “survive”this sort of unexpected attack and respondby inflicting “predetermined damage” on anaggressor (either an individual state or acoalition of states). But it is not entirelyclear who “determines” the value of this“damage” and according to what criteriathe corresponding calculations are to be

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made. However, this article is not beingwritten in order to criticize Russia’s officialapproach to nuclear deterrence.

Despite all of the possible evidence sup-porting this approach, the author cannothelp feeling that it is somewhat detachedfrom reality. Thus, in calculating the effec-tiveness of first and retaliatory strikes, theexperts manipulate hundreds and eventhousands of high-yield nuclear warheads,which are needed to neutralize the enemy’soffensive capabilities. The first strike is sup-posed to weaken the enemy’s capability oflaunching a retaliatory attack as much aspossible, to a level that is “acceptable” to theaggressor. The theory of nuclear deterrencein practice, strategic nuclear arms procure-ment decisions, and evaluations of the pos-sible effectiveness of antimissile defense sys-tems are all based on these calculations.

But almost no one thinks about the con-sequences–both for victims of the attackand for the aggressor himself–of such amassive use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, inthe 1980s environmental scientists fairlyconvincingly showed that the consequencesof the simultaneous explosion of dozens, tosay nothing of hundreds or thousands, ofhigh-yield nuclear warheads would be aglobal catastrophe. Nevertheless we contin-ue to use the hopelessly out-of-date“MacNamara criteria” that each side in anuclear conflict needs about 400 megaton-class nuclear warheads to inflict “unaccept-able damage.” But this level of damagewould be unacceptable on a global scalefor all of the world’s states, just as anuclear strike on a much smaller scalewould be (some scientists speak of just100-150 simultaneous explosions as result-ing in irreversible environmental conse-quences and “nuclear winter”).

Therefore, it would seem that it is hightime to consider the question of adoptingmore realistic criteria for unacceptable (or“predetermined”) damage. These criteria,even when a “safety margin” is included,should not exceed a simultaneous impactof over 200 strategic nuclear warheads, or300 such warheads in a nuclear exchange(150-200 explosives launched by one partyin a first strike and 100-150 explosiveslaunched in a retaliatory strike by theopposing party). Those who disagreeshould look at the record of nuclear tests,particularly of hydrogen bombs, and imag-ine the effect of several hundred flashes

and “atomic mushrooms” covering the ter-ritory of any country or continent.

This means that first-strike plans thatinvolve more than 200 strategic nuclearwarheads are not just irrational, but suici-dal, in the literal sense of the term. Anumber of important conclusions follow,concerning the formation of one’s ownforces on the basis of their survivability,estimates of the threat of a first strike,nuclear operations planning, prospects forfuture nuclear arms reductions in connec-tion with a revised understanding of needs,as well as other key aspects of nuclear pol-icy and strategy. But as was stated above,this paper is not attempting to make prac-tical recommendations. Instead, let us con-tinue our discourse.

“Military matters are not determined by the ruler’s commands;

they all proceed from the commanding general.”

The Six Secret Teachings of JiangTaigong,

approximately 11th century B.C.

“The important thing is: do not think!”

Famous answer of the commanders of Japanese army units to the shogun’squestion regarding the major principle

of successful military strategy, 17th century.

Nuclear SStrategy and NNuclear TTacticsEvidently the use of nuclear weapons isconsidered to be “strategic” due to theirenormous destructive power, the possibilityof their mass use, and their rapid and ter-rifying effects. Indeed, the forces themselvesas well as the individual weapon systemsare called by corresponding names: “strate-gic rocket forces,” “strategic weapons plat-forms,” etc. Nonetheless, nothing prevents usfrom splitting up strategy and tactics, inaccordance with classical definitions, inorder to conduct a more thorough analysis.

Thus, according to von Clausewitz, “tacticsis the art of using troops in battle; strate-gy is the art of using battles to win thewar.” The aim of war is to use “force tocompel our enemy to do our will.” Intoday’s context, this aim can be seen ascompelling our enemy to cease hostilitieson conditions acceptable to Russia.2 This

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“compelling” of the enemy, even in theofficial policy of Russia’s military leader-ship, is by no means a one-time engage-ment of the enemy but consists of severalstages, including the stages of the employ-ment of strategic nuclear weapons–from“demonstrational” strikes to inflicting “pre-determined damage” on the enemy. Inother words, the tactics of conducting anuclear war, if not entirely developed, haveat least not been rejected on the level ofRussian official military thought.

The formulation of tasks for the strategicnuclear forces should hold one of the cen-tral places in this sphere. Proceeding fromofficial documents and the statements ofmilitary representatives, these tasks can bereduced to three basic categories:

• rebuffing an aerospace attack;

• crushing enemy forces; and

• suppressing (destroying) enemy militarycapacity.

In Russian military doctrine, the aim ofusing the armed forces and other troops isformulated as “the rebuffing of aggression,inflicting defeat on the aggressor, coercingit to stop military actions on conditions thatmeet the interests of Russia and its allies.”It is not difficult to ascertain that Russia’smilitary doctrine provides for the use ofnuclear weapons in order to solve the sametasks that must be solved in a nonnuclearwar, whether regional or large-scale.

But if the strategic nuclear forces are calledupon to undertake these tasks, the risk ofuniversal destruction is considerablyincreased. To see this, one must simplyrecognize that in certain circumstances theRussian president will decide to make useof nuclear weapons and delegate powerover them to the country’s military leader-ship, through the use of the “nuclear suit-case.” The military, in order to fulfill thetasks it has been assigned, will have to actwith maximum effectiveness and speed,that is, “not think,” and fulfill the order ithas been given. But this means that thetargets of the first strikes will be the oppo-nent’s means of delivery of nuclear arms,its armed forces, and its control system andmilitary capacity.

It is absolutely clear that the attempt to ful-fill these tasks will bring utterly catastroph-ic consequences both for the aggressor stateand the defending state. And it is probably

unnecessary to repeat once again that thissort of scenario will likely lead to theuncontrolled escalation of the nuclear con-flict to a global scale, even if Russia’s initialnuclear strike is aimed at a nonnuclear“aggressor state” or one of the “tertiary”nuclear powers that is significantly weakerthan Russia in this type of armament.

The political decision to make use ofnuclear weapons and to transfer full con-trol over their use (delegation of powers)to the military is extremely risky, particu-larly when it comes to fulfilling the tasksthat Russia’s strategic forces are supposedto fulfill after receiving such orders togeth-er with the codes to unlock the strategicweapon systems.

Therefore, it is worth thinking aboutwhether the strategic nuclear forces, andnuclear weapons more generally, shouldcarry out the same combat missions torebuff aggression that are assigned to thearmed forces as a whole, particularly whenthere is the “temptation” to obtain tacticalsuperiority and quickly complete the “tra-ditional” tasks assigned them. Is it possible(and necessary) that the political leadershipcould retain control over the actions of themilitary after the decision has been madeto use nuclear arms? The answers to thesequestions remain open to date.

“Wenhou asked, ‘What determines victory?’

Wuzi answered, ‘Management of the army

is the basis of victory in war.’

Wenhou again asked, ‘‘Is it not the number of soldiers?’”

Wuzi, 5th-4th century B.C.

Management aand DDecisionmakingA rapid response to arising situations isone of the distinguishing features of thecurrent operationalization of nuclear deter-rence. Thus, an alert from an early-warn-ing system or a confirmation of a signalindicating a nuclear missile attack meansthat the country’s president must make adecision on actions in response to thesethreats within a very limited time period(calculated in minutes)–that is, whether touse the “nuclear suitcase” and delegatepower over the use of nuclear weapons tothe military. These procedures were worked

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out over the years in both the SovietUnion and the United States. They remainin force today. The fact that the U.S. andRussian presidents (wherever they are–athome or abroad) are accompanied con-stantly by an officer who has this devicewith him, allowing for immediate contactwith the appropriate parties and the trans-mission of codes to permit the launch ofnuclear missiles, is not even kept secret.

The decisionmaking procedures that wouldcome into play were a country to be unex-pectedly subject to a mass attack usinghundreds of warheads are similar. However,here the leadership also faces the questionof whether or not to launch its missilesbefore they are destroyed in their silos, orrisk the sharp (if not complete) decrease inits own abilities to launch a retaliatoryattack as a result of the loss of a signifi-cant number of its weapons and, possibly,control over its remaining forces.

But under any other scenarios–such as agradual escalation of conflict, a warningabout the launch of a limited number ofmissiles, or a single launch–an immediatedecision regarding response is not required.Moreover, a quick decision without seri-ously analyzing the situation can have cat-astrophic consequences for national securi-ty, since the probability of errors in thiscase is quite high.

One can imagine a whole range of sce-narios no less likely than an unexpectedmass attack on Russian strategic forces bythe United States (since only the UnitedStates has the theoretical ability to destroya significant number of Russian strategicsystems on their launch pads), where animmediate decision regarding the employ-ment of nuclear weapons is not necessary.As mentioned above, even planning for anunexpected mass counterforce strike num-bering over 200 nuclear warheads is irra-tional and suicidal.

But the fact of the matter is that the sys-tem for deciding whether or not to launchnuclear weapons is based on precisely thisleast probable scenario. Even if the courseof events does not fit this scenario, thepresident’s decisionmaking proceduresremain the same: he is given only a fewminutes to delegate power over the use ofRussia’s nuclear system to the military,after which time he loses all control overthese weapons (and, possibly, over theentire strategic situation).

It should be noted that both Russian andWestern researchers have proposed a wayto solve this problem–reducing the combatreadiness of strategic systems. Withoutgoing into detail, we note that theoretical-ly this could contribute to increased stabil-ity and give the leadership of the oppos-ing states more time to consider their deci-sions. In any event, they would first haveto decide to reestablish the combat readi-ness of their strategic forces and only sub-sequently decide to employ them.

Nevertheless, it would seem that reducingcombat readiness would not completelysolve the problem of increasing security,since the time factor would continue toplay a decisive role. After all, the party ableto reestablish the combat readiness of itsforces more quickly would have a power-ful incentive to launch a preventive attackagainst its unprepared enemy. In otherwords, it would be as though the decisionon the use of one’s strategic forces was“pre-programmed” in this scenario. Thedecision to make forces combat readywould be equivalent to a declaration ofmobilization, which, in the words of thefamous Soviet military strategist BorisShaposhnikov, is not simply the run-up towar, but war itself.

* * *

In ancient China, martial activities wereclearly separated from civilian activities.After appointing a commander and per-forming the relevant ritual in the ances-tral temple with the presentation of thefu (short-handled ax) and the yue (long-handled ax) to the commander, the civil-ian authority not only gave up all respon-sibility for waging war, but also the rightto interfere in decisions made by the armyauthority vested with military leadership.

Today we see a similar ritual, in which therole of the sacred axes is played by the“nuclear suitcase” and the codes to unblockthe nuclear weapons systems. After thepresident (of Russia or the United States)transfers these codes to the military, he willhardly be able to interfere in the subse-quent course of events. One should con-template how “good” this procedureremains in the 21st century, when war istruly a “way either to safety or to ruin” notjust for a single state, but for the entireplanet.

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“…the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means

excludes the cooperation of the intelligence…”

Carl von Clausewitz

The LLimits oof ““Rationality” The rationality of the leader who has athis disposal weapons as powerful and dou-ble-edged as nuclear weapons, and who, inaddition, declares that under certain cir-cumstances he is prepared to launch themfirst, should consist in the ability to calcu-late his actions several steps ahead undercrisis conditions and foresee the likelyresponse to these actions by the probableenemy. Therefore, reducing all possiblescenarios to the decision of launching ornot launching nuclear weapons is simplyunwise. A decision to launch carries toogreat a risk of complete destruction; a deci-sion not to launch demonstrates one’s inde-cisiveness and “paralysis of will” to one’sopponent, which might strengthen his con-fidence that he can continue his aggressionwith impunity.

Russia’s military leadership appears to havefully recognized this, and therefore has pro-posed the possibility of inflicting “demon-strational” nuclear strikes that would pre-cede a higher level of escalation. Some ana-lysts have proposed a system of “pre-nucleardeterrence,”3 which would be based onhigh-precision long-range weaponry used todestroy “high-value targets” on enemy ter-ritory in order to demonstrate one’s owndetermination to escalate the situation.

We believe that in this case militarythought is moving in the right direction,although the proposed solutions result inmore questions than answers. It would seemthat the “technical” development of the tac-tics of strategic deterrence or, more accu-rately, controlling escalation, cannot havepositive results unless moral and psycholog-ical factors are given serious consideration.

The country’s leader, put in the position ofhaving to decide whether to escalate, shouldnot have to act according to current proce-dures. In our opinion, the worst possiblesolution to this problem is the surrender ofresponsibility by delegating power over theuse of nuclear weapons to the military.

Here we should particularly emphasize thatstrengthening control of Russia’s politicalleadership over the country’s strategic

weapons does not mean that the militarycan not be trusted. The military, no worsethan civilians (and perhaps far better),understands all of the consequences of theuse of weapons of mass destruction. At thesame time, after receiving the relevantorder it will be obliged fully to carry outthe military duties with which it has beenentrusted.

But the heart of the matter is that nuclearweapons are not simply more powerful“traditional” weapons. Therefore, as men-tioned above, they cannot be used for thesame (“traditional”) tasks as conventionalarmaments and the armed forces as awhole. Furthermore, in a crisis it isextremely important to “draw out” the timeperiod during which a decision must bemade on whether or not to employ nuclearweapons. Thus the development of a “pre-nuclear deterrence” strategy could play animportant and, we hope, positive role.

It would seem that a “pre-nuclear deter-rence” strategy could consist of the follow-ing.4 Were a serious international crisis toarise that involved our country, includinglimited military actions that threatened toescalate into a more serious conflict,Russia’s leadership would engage in a log-ical series of military actions in order toforce the enemy (the aggressor) to ceaseactions against our country and acceptconditions that are advantageous or accept-able to us.

Moreover, the Russian leadership mustdemonstrate its willingness to escalate up tothe level of using nuclear weapons, whileat the same time firmly grasping that thispoint cannot be crossed. Here one can fullyuse Sunzi’s “precepts,” where he stated thatpreserving the enemy’s state capital is best,destroying their state capital second-best;preserving their army is best, destroyingtheir army second-best: “…to win one hun-dred victories in one hundred battles is notthe acme of skill. To subdue the enemywithout fighting is the acme of skill.” Onecan also refer to many of the other pre-cepts of the Art of War, which continue tobe very relevant today.

The above actions should not aim to oreven involve any physical damage to one’senemy. Moreover, this should be avoided inevery way possible. Otherwise a powerfulincentive for retaliatory action will be cre-ated, leading to an “automatic” increase inthe level of conflict escalation. One’s deci-

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siveness and the unpredictability of one’sfurther actions against the enemy must bedemonstrated to him, while he is shownhow defenseless he is and how vulnerablehe will be if he continues his aggression.The enemy must finally be put in theposition of deciding either to escalate (withunpredictable consequences) or to enterinto negotiations with his opponent.

One can “devise” a whole “set” of actionsthat meet these conditions. These includelaunching a “dark” satellite into space, forc-ing the enemy to guess about its purpose,or launching a single ICBM or SLBMwith a dummy warhead into the ocean. Anextreme scenario might include the launchof one single-warhead missile with adummy warhead at the aggressor’s territo-ry, or even at his capital. Of course, suchan action would be extremely risky, butthe “demonstrational” use of nuclearweapons against a single enemy target isfraught with even greater risk.

In order to have the option of a “flexibleresponse” to the actions of an enemy dur-ing a period of crisis, one must have a suf-ficiently flexible and manageable tool. TheRussian leadership already has such a toolat its disposal. It is the strategic rocketforces, the fleet of ballistic missile sub-marines, and the heavy bombers. They onlyneed to be given the capacity for missionsof “pre-nuclear deterrence.” Namely, some ofthese forces must be reequipped with con-ventional warheads and dummy warheads,and the supreme commander-in-chief mustbe given reliable negative and positive con-trol over them. This would fulfill one moreof the precepts in Sunzi’s Art of War,which asserts that “in battle, use the nor-mal force to engage; use the extraordinaryto win.” In this case, “victory” is obtainingthe aims of war, as we discussed above.

The supreme commander-in-chief, ofcourse, should maintain negative controlover strategic nuclear weapons and theoption of transferring power over their useto the military. But this action, whichcrosses beyond the boundaries of the rea-sonable, should only be undertaken in themost hopeless situation.

In LLieu oof aa CConclusion The absence of large-scale, real threats toRussian security at the present time, whichwould require making decisions about theapplication of nuclear weapons, does not

free the country’s leadership from theresponsibility to “not forget about war,”including the elaboration and refinement ofplans in case such a situation should arise.The widely held argument that nuclearweapons are not “weapons,” despite the factthat the adoption of this argument wouldunavoidably lead to universal destruction,remains just a theory, just as does theopposite assertion, that these weaponsessentially remains tools for waging warand ways to continue policy by “othermeans.”

Determining whether the first or secondargument is correct can only be done inpractice, when the country’s leadership isfaced with the need to decide whether ornot to employ these weapons. In practice,it is one concrete leader that will person-ally “resolve” this argument by his actionsor inaction. In the worst case scenario, thedecision will be made in an “automatic” or“pre-programmed” way in a very shortperiod of time.

As we have already repeated more thanonce, it is not our aim to make practicalrecommendations. We simply are attempt-ing to show that more possible proceduresand scenarios for leadership action in a cri-sis exist than those provided for in officialdocuments. In any even, we believe that amore detailed analysis of these issues, tak-ing into account humanity’s centuries-oldexperience in conducting wars, will by nomeans harm the cause of peace.

“Wenhou said, ‘‘I do not like military affairs’.’

Wuzi answered, ‘‘… in ancient times the head

of the Cheng Zang clan perfected virtue,but disregarded military affairs,

and thus ruined his state.’”

Wuzi, 5th-4th century B.C.

1 Sunzi, The Art of War.2 “Immediate Tasks for the Development of the ArmedForces of the Russian Federation” (Moscow: RussianMinistry of Defense), p. 41.It is interesting to note that this work, unofficially dubbedthe White Paper on Russian Defense Issues in the West,was published by the Russian Ministry of Defense as a sep-arate pamphlet in late 2003 without any information on theimprint or even the date of publication.3 This concept was introduced by the well-known Russianscholar Andrei Kokoshin.4 Once again we would like to emphasize that this is nota recommendation, but simply an argument being laid outby the author.

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Viewpoint

TIME TTO RRETHINK THE ““WAR OON TTERRORISM”

By GGennady YYevstafiev, Senior AAdvisor, PPIR CCenter




September 11, 2001–New York, September1–3, 2004–Beslan, July 7, 2005–London:these are the terrorist acts by terrorist cur-rently seen to be significant. Thousands ofsmaller terrorist acts are no longer consid-ered to be anything out of the ordinary inthe lives of many countries and peoples.

Despite individual successes, the “war onterror” cannot be seen as a successful strat-egy. Influenced by the tragic terrorist act inNew York and in solidarity with theAmerican people, the global communitygave Washington carte blanche, believing inits strength and ability to make consideredand objective decisions in the interests of allwho suffer from the development and con-sequences of terrorism. This was true ofRussia too, one of the first to decide to sup-port the United States by taking the geopo-litical risk of agreeing to the positioning ofU.S. military bases in Central Asia.

Today it is becoming clear that our expec-tations were overblown. CharacteristicAmerican “double standards,” even withregards to partners and allies, are again inview. “9/11,” which seemed to be a stereo-typical terrorist event to others, was notseen that way at all by the egotisticalAmerican political elite. It is hard to finda more obvious example of this than itsdisingenuous attitude toward the tragedy inBeslan. It later became clear that the “vul-cans” (as James Mann calls the group ofkey figures in the George W. Bush admin-istration) preferred to apply maximum mil-itary pressure worldwide instead of a bal-anced approach to counter terrorism (theyare the ones who coined the term “war onterror”), while simultaneously undertakingtheir own selfish pursuits, such as theattack on Iraq. As a result, the noble taskof uprooting terrorism was compromised

and lost public support in those countriesfrom which the terrorists themselves obtainsupporters.

Four years have passed, and it has becomeclear that the primitive understanding ofsources and, most importantly, methods tofight the terrorist plague is not providingthe necessary results. There is no doubtthat the military component plays animportant role, but in the end, the neu-tralization of this cruel and extremely dan-gerous phenomenon can only be donethrough a combination of ideological, socio-economic, and military methods. This isthe only path that will lead to a decisiveimprovement in international security. Afterthe well-known events of this July, Londonunderstood this very well. One of TonyBlair’s first meetings after the terroristattacks was a meeting with members of anIslamic group active in the UnitedKingdom. The decision to extradite AbuQatada, the popular cleric and vehementpropagandist of Islamic extremism, hometo Jordan was an eloquent confirmation ofthe ideological aspect of the problem.Further, the U.K. ambassador to Russiarecently announced that London is readyto send Akhmed Zakayev to Moscow ifprovided with proof of his involvement interrorism.

In Washington, too, they finally are begin-ning to understand. It is no coincidencethat the slogan “war on terror,” so sweet tohawks’ ears, is quietly disappearing fromthe lexicon of U.S. political actors. Evenleaders in the Pentagon, who are drawn tomilitary methods, have begun to admit that“there is a battle of ideas that will contin-ue for a long time.” Currently, the focus ofanti-terrorism is changing to fighting “vio-lent extremism,” and is currently aimedfirst and foremost at Islamic extremists(although it is not limited to Islam).

None other than Yuri Andropov pointedout the ideological composition of Islamicextremism already in the very end of the1970s. We understand that it is not fash-ionable to recall Soviet times, but never-theless will cite his words: “the Muslimreaction is trying to create a unified reli-gious philosophy for hundreds of millionsof people….. If this were to succeed, thenit would be the second ideological founda-tion, after Marxism-Leninism, not simply(and more significantly than) for faith, butfor concrete action…..”

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Often–intentionally or unintentionally–peo-ple try to equate Islamic fundamentalismwith Islamic extremism. But Islamic fun-damentalism in no way differs fromJudaism or Christianity–it preaches thepreservation of moral values, the mainte-nance of religious traditions, etc. WhereasIslamic extremist leaders are pursuing arigid course to violently advance the ideaof an “Islamic caliphate” in the conscious-ness of Muslims as well as its practicalrealization, that is, the introduction of avery problematic model of Islamic statethrough force. We have to recognize thatthe development of Islamic society, in thelong run, will depend not so much on theactions of the newly created “ActiveResponse Corps” to support new democra-cies, declared by President Bush in May2005, as on whether or not Islamic funda-mentalism, as Academic Yevgeni Primakovbelieves, can reject religious and politicalextremists, regain influence over theMuslim masses (the “ummah”), andbecome an Islamic democracy based ontraditional values. But we should be readyto accept the fact that such a democracywill differ from the Western European orAmerican model.

This is, we believe, the only sensible way.

Many experts believe that “Al Qaidaism”only encompasses a tiny minority of theapproximately 1.3 billion believers in vari-ous Islamic religions to date, but moderateforces in Islamic society are already beingmarginalized. And these are the groupsthat, despite their current difficulties, couldbecome the global community’s real part-ners in a political dialogue on the normal-ization of the situation in several of theworld’s conflict zones. But that would meanovercoming the widely spread idea thatIslam is intrinsically an extremely aggres-sive and problematic religion, and haltingthe indiscriminate spread of the notion ofa “conflict of civilizations.” (Similarly, onecould extrapolate the Huntington’s theoriesto Orthodox Russia as well, after all.)Particularly since globally the political andreligious crisis and, as a result, religiousextremism and the so-called “jihad,” aregradually waning. A significant proportionof the Islamic world have embarked on thecourse of conciliation, particularly wheresocioeconomic conditions are improving andliteracy is increasing, and the like.

Political scientists and government expertscontinue to discuss the question of whether

or not Al Qaida has a global network capa-ble of carrying out powerful attacks andmaintaining a long-term, though slow-burning, struggle in several regions of theworld. Some believe that even after themilitary defeat of the Taliban and Al Qaidain Afghanistan, Bin Laden has a powerfulterrorist network that is organizing terroristattacks throughout the world. Others thinkthat this phenomenon is really a sort ofpolitical brand, that is, a well-known trade-mark without any real content or power.

Probably the truth is somewhere inbetween. Al Qaida, despite serious losses ofpersonnel and leadership, has maintainedand perhaps has somewhat restored itsstrength. However, at present it is morelikely not a well-coordinated military organ-ization with many branches throughout theworld, but a sort of ideological center try-ing to maintain the good will and supportof its supporters and members of other ter-rorist and extremist groups through fatwasand other messages. This is how it gener-ates support for its positions in the strug-gle against the West, “Crusaders,” and non-believers oppressing Muslims wherever theymay be, and against authorities, particularsecular authorities, in the Islamic world, inaddition to determining priority objectivesfor concrete terrorist attacks. The faithfulleading wretched lives who reject theunceremonious and course introduction offoreign values in their traditional ways oflife still respond to this radical extremistideology, allowing them to increase recruit-ment of supporters who can be trained for“jihad” and suicide bombing in the nameof Islam. But there is no reason to benaive – much of this involves money (it isno coincidence that the majority of theleaders and famous terrorist fighters comefrom rich or at least well-to-do families inSaudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan), and thesource the vast sums being spent is well-known, for instance on the activities ofWahhabi madrasahs in Pakistan, the estab-lishment of networks of Internet cafes inmosques in the Balkans, etc.

Expenditures on the fight against terror andimproving security are increasing through-out the globe. In 2006, Russia will spend atotal of 10 billion rubles (2.2 billion in2005) on these tasks. But even this in noway diminishes the need of undertake socialpolicies and ideological work thatwould–together with efforts in the militarysphere–help us to narrow the basis of sup-

64


port for terrorists on the part of certainparts of the Muslim community, first andforemost in the Northern Caucasus. Thewhole world needs to find effective ways tocut the ties between intransigent fightersand their ideologists, with whom negotiationis not possible, and the local population.

Russia will soon take up the presidency ofthe G8. Given recent positive developmentsin rethinking ways to fight terrorism,Russia, which has suffered so deeply fromterrorism itself, could propose a renewedprogram (agreed to by others) to overcometerrorism.

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Viewpoint

THE TTHREAT OOF BBIOLOGICALTERRORISM AAND TTHE RROLE

OF TTHE MMASS MMEDIA

By AAleksandr RRabodzey1,Center ffor SSecurity SStudies,Massachusetts IInstitute of TTechnology




Numerous publications on the threat ofbiological terrorism, in both the foreignand Russian media, have caused the pub-lic to have a much distorted idea of ter-rorist capabilities. For instance, in 2000 for-mer CIA director James Woolsey actuallysaid that any fourth grader could producebiological agents, while the specialistCaitlin Bailey said that $10,000 wasenough to produce biological weapons.2,3

Among the reasons for this distortion ofinformation is the lack of data on whichto base rational conclusions and the inter-est of various groups in exaggerating orunderestimating the threat. Moreover, themedia and scientific journals create fertilesoil for terrorists by describing the ways toconduct acts of terror that would do great-est damage, suggesting possible ways toobtain pathogens and even publishing workon the artificial modification of organismsin order to weaken immunity4 or strength-en pathogenic viruses.5

The threat of bioterrorism, nourished bydistorted information, is becoming moreand more real because of the stir that hasbeen created around it and the conse-quences that have been predicted for soci-ety. It has become imperative to explain tojournalists and scientists who write aboutbioterrorism that bioterrorism could stopbeing simply a fruit of their imaginationand that instead terrorists could begin toact in accordance with the scenariosdescribed in the media and use the tech-nology published by scholars in the openliterature.

Clearly, a ban on the publication of mate-rial on biological weapons and bioterrorismis impossible since the public should know

about this danger. Moreover, informationabout pathogenic organisms, their possibleuse by terrorists, and the timely identifica-tion of diseases and treatment must bemade more accessible to medical personnelas well as the society at large.6 However,one might also ask whether there shouldbe norms and limitations covering thematerials on bioterrorism and biologicalweapons.7 Some materials are of no publicor scientific value, and are instead simplyan attempt to distort information aboutbioterrorism and garner attention. Somescientific articles, including those mentionedabove-on weakening immunity on purpose-do not have direct scientific applications.Instead, they show criminals how to usebiotechnology for nefarious purposes.

The aim of this article is to determine therational basis for fears of bioterrorism andprovide recommendations for the media,scientific journals, and government officialson how to reduce the distortions in infor-mation about bioterrorism

The RRole oof tthe MMedia iin CCreatingthe BBioterrorist TThreatBeginning in 2001, the threat of biologicalterrorism has been publicized more andmore frequently. The September 11 terror-ist attacks in the United States and thesubsequent distribution of letters contain-ing anthrax spores produced the effect ofan exploding bomb. The U.S. media and,later, Russian media began to write aboutthe possibility of a large-scale terrorist actusing biological weapons.

The general tone of foreign publicationshas left no doubt that this sort of terror-ist act is inevitable. An enormous numberof new “experts” on biological weaponshave given estimates of the number of vic-tims of such an attack, analyzed the finan-cial losses, and have declared that biologi-cal agents are accessible to “every universi-ty student.”

The Russian media has taken up this pop-ular theme and begun to reprint storiesfrom U.S. sources, and sometimes inventedtheir own, no less impressive stories. Themore they write about the threat of bioter-rorism, the more strongly one wants tounderstand what is real and what is myth.Unfortunately, this is not easy to deter-mine, since most of the articles in themedia on bioterrorism are based onassumptions and inferences, not on realfacts. The history of bioterrorism contains

66


too few facts to make predictions, whiledata on biological weapons are classifiedand the independent media and scientistsdo not have access to them. This is pre-cisely the reason for the distortion of infor-mation by certain interested groups.

One can identify several groups of peoplegenerally interested in distorting informa-tion about bioterrorism. Exaggerating thedanger of bioterrorism benefits:

• the media;

• pharmaceutical companies;

• government agencies receiving fundingto fight bioterrorism;

• biotechnology as a branch that needsfunding (including biodefense researchinstitutes).

Underestimating the danger of bioterrorismbenefits:

• government agencies interested inreducing the related public outcry;

• biotechnology – in the interest ofreducing control over related activities.

Thus, almost all U.S. interest groups havebenefited from the wave of informationabout the threat of bioterrorism that beganin 2001: the media got a hot topic of dis-cussion, pharmaceutical companies receivedmultimillion dollar orders for the productionof vaccines, and the intelligence services gotfunding for the fight against the potentialthreat as well as the creation of a new divi-sion for the fight against bioterrorism in thenew Department of Homeland Security.The biotechnology industry itself got anextra incentive for work in the area ofbiodetection and the analysis of geneticmaterial. In Russia, the interest in bioter-rorism is advantageous to the same groups.In addition, publications about bioterrorismespecially feature specialists from enterprisesformerly engaged in the production of bio-logical weapons; Biopreperat, in particular,wins from the increased interest inbioweapons. This does not mean that thereis any evidence whatsoever of intentionalcomplicity in terrorism or adding to fearson purpose–all of the activities describedabove are either the fruit of the carelessnessand incompetence of so-called “specialists inbioterrorism” who appeared after the waveof terrorist acts in 2001, or are simply a wayto survive and attract interest.

On the other hand, soon after the generalhysteria faded materials began to appear onthe ephemeral quality of the threat, alongwith numerous predictions regarding thelosses that the fight against bioterrorismwould cause biotechnology.

8,9The possibil-

ity that limitations on exports and importsof equipment and stricter controls overtechnologies and publications might beintroduced particularly agitated scientists,especially those in the United States.

10As

paradoxical as it may sound, those inter-ested in underestimating the dangers werethe same categories of people who benefitfrom exaggerating these dangers. Thus,state intelligence agencies, which receivefunding to fight bioterrorism, are trying tocalm the public, while scientists workingon biotechnology projects unrelated tobiodefense fear that the beginning of a“witch hunt” could lead to additional con-straints on their activities and the exportof necessary equipment. Thus, it is nowonder that articles cited in footnotes 8and 9 appeared on the site of the journalCommercial Biotechnology.

11

To sum up, information on biological ter-rorism is based on a small number of factsand is strongly polarized thanks to variousinterest groups. Thus, many of the materi-als on the danger of bioterrorism reflect apreconceived point of view and distortfacts, for the reasons above. Moreover, somematerials contain a potential threat tonational and international security. I willanalyze what is known about the threat ofbioterrorism based on the limited informa-tion available about biological weapons andthe capabilities of terrorist organizationstoday. One must get the facts straight inorder to understand the bases for estimatesof the bioterrorist threat, and separate outattempts to impose subjective opinions.

A CContemporary HHistory of BBioterrorism The contemporary history of bioterrorism,if we take the last 50 years, includes justa few cases of the use of biological agentsfor terrorist purposes.

12The three that are

mentioned most often merit consideration:

• 1984 – Rajneeshee cult followersattempted to disrupt elections by infect-ing food at a salad bar with mousetyphus (Salmonella typhimurium).While 751 people were sickened, therewere no lethal consequences.

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• 1993 – Aum Shinrikyo believers dis-persed anthrax spores in Tokyo. Bysheer luck the strain of bacteria wasnot virulent and no one was harmed.

• 2001 – an unknown individual sent let-ters with anthrax spores in the UnitedStates–over 20 were infected and fivedied.13

It might seem that these statistics indicatethat the multibillion-dollar funding ofbiodefense14 in the United States and thecalls to concentrate attention on the secu-rity of biotechnology facilities that workwith microorganisms throughout the worldare a senseless waste of money. Indeed,during the same period of time terroristattacks using conventional armamentskilled thousands of people. Is it worth rais-ing this issue in Russia, if none of thecases enumerated above have any relationto it, and most of its citizens view biolog-ical terrorists as characters in fantasticalblockbusters?

The EEvolution oof BBiotechnology aandthe GGoals oof TTerrorist OOrganizationsHowever, there is more than one way tointerpret these same statistics. If we rejectthe numerous speculations about theattempts of Al-Qa’eda15 and Chechen ter-rorists16 to produce biological agents asunreliable and unrealistic,17 we see thateven the remaining cases of infection bybiological agents indicate that the threat isserious. Here we are not only talking aboutterrorism but also about the governmentprograms to develop bioweapons for mili-tary purposes, as well as about potentialsources of biological weapons.

The topic of the security of Russian facil-ities that work with pathogenic microor-ganisms has lost its urgency, since not asingle case of a leak of materials fromthese enterprises has been registered in theyears since the disintegration of the SovietUnion. Speculations about his issue, mostlikely, are political in nature and not well-founded. However, the globalization of ter-rorism means that terrorist organizationscan obtain access to pathogens developedin other countries, by both governmentsand private companies.

Therefore, the threat of terrorists obtainingaccess to bioweapons exists, and cannot bedenied simply because to date terrorist actsinvolving pathogens have led to far fewer

losses in human life than those involvingconventional weapons.18 On the other hand,one must realize that distorting and exag-gerating the threat is also dangerous–itleads to an incorrect understanding of thesituation and can harm efforts to preventterrorism.

For instance, the 1979 leak of anthraxspores in Yekaterinburg led to the deathsof 96 people and caused an additional 359to become ill.19 The United States mighthave faced similar consequences in 2001 ifthe spores had been dispersed, for exam-ple, at a basketball game and not sent insealed envelopes. The motive for this actionremains unknown, but one of the reasonscould have been a wish to avoid majorharm, a desire not unknown in the theo-ry of the psychology of terrorism. At thesame time, even the three letters withspores caused a drop in the stock market;U.S. financial losses from the panic anddrop in the stock market were estimated tototal billions of dollars.20 According to fore-casts by the consultants Abt Associates, thenext terrorist act using biological agentscould cost the United States $40–400 bil-lion, depending on its scale.21

It is impossible to evaluate the danger ofbioterrorism without examining likelydevelopments in the area of terrorism andbiotechnology. Thus, if in earlier times thepossibility of using pathogens as an instru-ment of terror seemed to terrorists to besomething unattainable and fabulous, today,now that the level of biotechnology andthe accessibility of information has grownand the media has created a public fear ofbioterrorism, the use of bioweapons for actsof terror is more attractive than everbefore. Indeed, it is the media thatdescribed how and what must be dispersedto achieve the greatest effect, and to com-plete the picture even published detailedprocedures on how viruses are producedunder laboratory conditions!22 The mediahas offered scenarios which would have thegreatest public resonance. Some specialistsassert that Al Qa’ida terrorists did not evenconsider using a “dirty bomb” made ofradioactive wastes until they read about theidea in the media.23

On the other hand, terrorist organizationsthemselves have evolved and aspire to newlevels of terror–conventional explosives usedagainst large facilities are no longer inter-esting. Moreover, one of the foremost spe-cialists on Al Qa’ida, Professor Rohan

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Gunaratna, contends that Al Qa’ida itselfno longer presents a threat, but that itsactions have given birth to many followersfor whom the act of terror has ceased tobe simply the means to achieve an objec-tive: for them what is important is thescale of the public reaction and their placein history.

24

For this sort of organization, either state-sponsored or independent, that is united byan ideological purpose, the idea of becom-ing the first to carry out a terrorist actwith biological weapons

25that leads to

mass infection could be very attractive.The only question is that of capabilities.

The DDevelopment oof BBiotechnology:the SSource oof tthe FFuture TThreat? The basic obstacles preventing terroristsfrom using biological agents as instrumentsof terror are the complexity of obtainingand producing biological weapons andtheir unreliability. Recently the media hasmentioned a new area of possible bioter-rorism–genetically modified, artificial organ-isms

26–particularly frequently. Unfortunately

or fortunately, the majority of publishedmaterials about the possibility of usinggenetic engineering for the production ofkiller viruses is not based on scientific evi-dence and appears to be more inventionthan reality. The main reason for the masserrors, even among some specialists, ispolitical scientists’ misunderstanding of thepossibilities of biotechnology and biologists’lack of understanding of the needs of pol-icymakers. That is, the numerous newspa-per articles written by journalists who donot have a background in biotechnologyand security abound with scientific inaccu-racies and, in many respects, are simplynot true. While the articles written bybiotechnologists concentrate on scientificdetails to such a degree that they are prac-tically incomprehensible to most of thoseinvolved in legislative decisionmaking.

27

A clear example is the assertion that “any-one can create racial weapons,” with refer-ence to the British medical association,

28as

well as the article “Purely BiologicalMurder,”

29which asserted that a “bio-nega-

tive perception of the environment” unitesterrorists and that it is allegedly knownthat “various groups and individuals areready or plan to use biological weapons.”As long as similar assertions continue toappear in the press, it is hard to imagine

that the public and politicians will under-stand the real situation clearly.

30

The threat of the use of genetically mod-ified microorganisms by terrorists cannotbe discounted; it is simply necessary tounderstand its possible scale and timeframe. One of the leading specialists in thestudy of the application of biotechnology toproduce genetically modified organisms,John Ellis,

31believes that in the next 10-

15 years developments in biotechnologywill make it possible to genetically manip-ulate pathogenic organisms in order toincrease their virulence or produce resist-ance to existing vaccines.

32

Among the possible applications ofbiotechnology for the development of bio-logical weapons the following three aremost realistic:

33

• the development of artificially modifiedorganisms that are resistant to vaccines;

• the creation of new pathogens;

• the recreation of pathogens that havedied out–for example, the smallpoxvirus.

34

Meanwhile, it is clear that just as the pro-duction of a thermonuclear bomb initiallyrequired development and nuclear testing,so too the use of genetically modifiedorganisms by bioterrorists is only likelyafter the use of more accessible naturalagents such as anthrax, tularemia or ebola.Thus, ideas about the creation of virusesthat target certain races or of hybrid virus-es combining AIDS and influenza are like-ly to remain more mythical than realthreats for at least the coming decade.However, scientists’ carelessness and mediadistortions of the threat of bioterrorismcould make the use of pathogenic organ-isms simpler and more attractive for ter-rorists or states.

The MMedia aat WWar wwith IItself:Should tthe mmedia ccultivate tthreat?The paradoxical situation that writingabout bioterrorism finds itself in is that alarge quantity of literature is currentlybased on just three reports, only one ofwhich had lethal consequences. Theabsence of official information about eitherbioterrorism or research into biologicalweapons generates speculation in the mediathat in turn creates a false sense of the realthreat of bioterrorism.

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Scientists and journalists involved in com-bating bioterrorism have themselves pro-posed the scenarios that would lead to thegreatest losses and characterized the agentsused in each scenario.

35Moreover, scientists

have published numerous materials on thepossible use of biotechnology for the pro-duction of pathogens.

In a democratic society it is not possibleto establish total control over science andthe media. One cannot foresee how scien-tific discoveries in the field of genetic engi-neering will be used; however, it is possi-ble that in future these discoveries will beput to work against humanity.

Journalists and scientists should themselvesunderstand and sense where the boundaryline between scientific concerns and therealm of national security lies, or when ascientific article may have a negative effecton political decisionmaking. The followingrecommendations could improve the situa-tion with regards to public informationabout bioterrorism:

• Stories in the popular media and sci-entific publications should be based onthe principles of rationality and scien-tific substantiation. Governments shouldpublish requirements, made widelyaccessible, regarding publications thatcould weaken security. Here I am par-ticularly referring to preventing thepublication of scientific materials thatcan be directly used for the develop-ment, modification, production, or useof pathogens as weapons. Examples ofthis sort of publication were providedabove.

• Russia can learn from the U.S. andE.U. experience of making informationabout biological weapons and pathogensaccessible to the public and medicalpersonnel. The creation of a centralizedinformation system is a major step inthe fight against conjecture and the dis-tortion of information.

36Thus, for

instance, the U.S. Centers for DiseaseControl (CDC) distributes its own jour-nal and trains medical personnel andthe public in identifying and eliminat-ing the consequences of possible bioat-tacks. The CDC also has a websitewith complete information on all typesof diseases and recommendations onthe actions that should be taken inemergencies. A similar system would

allow Russian citizens, medical workers,and the media to obtain official infor-mation on a possible threat and avoidunnecessary speculation based on igno-rance and fear.

• The government could also involve sci-entists and journalists in a dialogueabout bioweapons and bioterrorism.The first steps in this direction havealready taken place–conferences onbiosecurity have been held in Moscowand Novosibirsk. Russia, though, is aworld superpower, and as such shouldnot simply follow others’ example, butalso set an example in the area ofbiosecurity. Instead, the lack of infor-mation in the West about Russian pro-grams to prevent bioterrorism is nega-tively affecting international programsto assist Russia in this area.

It is unlikely that the current state ofinformation about biological weapons andbioterrorism will change in the near future;the provision of information is complicatedby the numerous obstacles described above,as well as by a lack of funding. However,understanding this problem and adoptingmeasures to solve it today will help toavoid the threat of bioterrorism in thefuture.

1The author would like to thank Dr. Pavel Podvig (Center

for International Security and Cooperation, StanfordUniversity, USA) for his recommendations and review ofthis article, Theodore Postol (Security Studies Program,Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA) for financialsupport for this project, Elena Makovskaya (Department ofInternational Relations, Boston University, USA) for discus-sions and commentary related to the subject of the article;as well as the Moscow Physical-Technical Institute’s Centerfor Disarmament, Energy, and Ecology for helping to organ-ize the international summer symposium on security.2 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 50.3 In this article, the concepts of “biological weapons” and“pathogenic organisms” are used interchangeably, since thedifferences between them are not critical here. In general,only certain pathogenic microorganisms in sufficient quanti-ties can be used as biological weapons. Thus, for instance,the smallpox virus and anthrax can be used in this manner.4 R.J. Jackson, A.J. Ramsay, C.D. Christensen, et al.,“Expression of mouse interleukin-4 by a recombinantectromelia virus suppresses cytolytic lymphocyte responsesand overcomes genetic resistance to mousepox,” Journal ofVirology, Vol. 75, No. 3 (February 2001), pp. 1205-10.5 V.E Volchkov, et al., “Recovery of infectious Ebola virusfrom complementary DNA: RNA editing of the GP geneand viral cytotoxicity,” Science, Vol. 291, No. 5510 (March 9,2001), pp. 1965–9.6 This sort of information is spread among medical per-sonnel in the United States, and detailed descriptions of theactions that must be taken if biological weapons are usedis available on the Internet on the website of the Centers

70


for Disease Control (CDC). The European Union plans tocreate a similar website, http://www.scanbalt.org/sw920.asp.In Russia similar information is nearly inaccessible, andgovernment websites are not very informative,http://www.munition.gov.ru/rus/biol.html.7 Here and throughout, biological terrorism refers to theuse of pathogenic agents by terrorist organizations or indi-viduals. However, similar arguments could be made regard-ing state-sponsored programs for the production of biolog-ical weapons. Some developing countries, such as Iran,could be undertaking this sort of activity.8 Grigoriy Tarasevich, “Bioterrorism: ‘Threat No. 1’ or a‘Paper Tiger?’” Natsbez.Ru, http://bio.su/press_2004nov_019r.htm, November 17, 2004.9 “The Paper Tiger of Bioterrorism” Part 2, “The struggleagainst the shadow,” www.cbio.ru, http://bio.su/press_2004oct_005r.htm.10 “Are Science and Technology Governable?” The Scientist,Volume 16, Issue 9 (April 29, 2002), p. 16.11 www.cbio.ru12 The number of victims resulting from the use of (or acci-dents involving) biological weapons by states is noted above.13 Jeanne Guillemin “The Deliberate Release of AnthraxThrough the United States Postal System,” JulianP.Robinson, ed., Public Health Response to Biological andChemical Weapons: WHO Guidelines (Geneva: WHO),pp. 98–108.14 About $6 billion was expended by DHS for the fightagainst bioterrorism in 2004.15 “Evidence suggests al Qaeda pursuit of biological, chem-ical weapons,” CNN, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/11/14/chemical.bio, November 14,2001.16 “A million dollars for Basaev: a Russian general namesthe reward for the head of the Chechen commander,” LaStampa, http://www.inopressa.ru/print/archive/1999/10/26/13:07:31/arc:lastampa:russia, October 26, 1999.17 After the seizure of Al Qa’ida training bases by the U.S.Army, experts could not find confirmation of the presenceof a program for the production of biological weapons.Chechen fighters also do not have the capacity to producebioweapons.18 Thus, the head of the Russian State Health Inspectorate,Gennadii Onishchenko, believes that the threat of bioter-rorism is real. Natalia Yeliseyeva, “Bioweapons: the genie isout of the bottle,” Strana.ru, http://www.rambler.ru/db/news-new/msg.html?mid=5471050&s=260005085,January 12, 2005.19 Jeanne Guillemin, Anthrax: The Investigation of aDeadly Outbreak (University of California Press, 1999).20 “Cost of anthrax attacks ‘surges’,” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1629872.stm,October 31, 2001.

21 Abt Associates, http://www.abtassociates.com.22 John Travis, “Do-It-Yourself: Virus recreated from syn-thetic DNA,” Science News, Vol. 162, No. 2 (July 13, 2002),http://www.sciencenews.org/articles/20020713/fob8.asp.23 Personal correspondence with U.S. security specialists.24 Presentation to the 6th International Security Forum,Montreux, Switzerland, October 6, 2004.25 The anthrax letter attack does not fully correspond tothe classic definition of a terrorist act: to date, the terror-ists have not stated their demands, their aims, or who theyare. And the act aimed to infect the people to whom theletters were addressed, not mass infection.26 “Anyone can create racial biological weapons,”MedNovosti.ru, October 27, 2004.27 Scientific articles in Russian and foreign journals focuson scientific issues alone, for instance, the problems of virol-ogy or epidemiology. It was only in 2003 that a sympo-sium on biosecurity was held in Moscow, bringing togeth-er specialists in the sphere of biological weapons(http://bio.su/ru.htm). One of the goals of the reports therewas to make recommendations to legislators regardingimprovements in the nonproliferation of bioweapons andpreventing bioterrorism.28 “Anyone can create racial biological weapons,”MedNovosti.ru, October 27, 2004.29 Mikhail Supotnitskii, “Purely Biological Murder,”Nezavisimaya gazeta, http://www.ng.ru/style/2004-09-08/16_murder.html, September 8, 2004.30 Unfortunately, access to official information on the threatof bioterrorism in Russia is limited, and it is difficult todetermine the sources that the government is using tomake decisions regarding the fight against bioterrorism andthe proliferation of biological pathogens and technologies.31 Dr. John Ellis, Senior Fellow, West Point Center forCombating Terrorism, New York, USA.32 John Ellis, “Terrorism in the Genomic Age,” 2003, per-sonal communication with author.33 For a more detailed description of international instru-ments for the control of biotechnology in Russia and theWest see Aleksandr Rabodzey, “Biotechnology ControlMeasures – Focus on Development Stage,” submitted to theInternational Bioterrorism Conference in Furigen(Nidwalden), Switzerland, April 22–23, 2005, “Meeting theChallenges of Bioterrorism: Assessing the Threat andDesigning Biodefense Strategies.”34 Aleksandr Rabodzey, “Biosecurity implications of the syn-thesis of pathogenic viruses,” Politics and the Life Sciences,September 2003, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 44–49.35 Tara O’Toole, “Smallpox: An Attack Scenario,” EmergingInfectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July-August, 1999),http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/otoole.htm.36 About bioweapons and information protection.

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Survey

THE GGLOBAL PPARTNERSHIPIN TTHE RRUSSIAN FFAR EEAST:DID TTHE PPROGRAM EENDBEFORE IIT EEVEN BBEGAN?

Anton KKhlopkov,Deputy DDirector, PPIR CCenter Vadim KKozyulin,Conventional AArms PProgramDirector, PPIR CCenter




Global Partnership Against the Spread ofWeapons and Materials of MassDestruction was launched three years ago.These three years witnessed a seriousprogress in some dimensions of globalpartnership – declaration-making wasreplaced by problem-solving, whichdemonstrates how effective internationalefforts in the field of nonproliferation maybe. However there are some dimensions,including those, declared as priorities bythe G-8, where there is no real coopera-tion and no real progress. Having visitedseveral objects in the Russian Far East,where GP initiative is to be carried out,the authors believe that situation withnuclear-power submarines dismantlementthere may be a good illustration to the sadthesis above.

Russia identified the dismantlement ofnuclear-powered submarines as one of itstwo top priorities for the GlobalPartnership, the nonproliferation initiativelaunched by G8 leaders at their July 2002summit in Kananaskis, Canada.

The Russian submarine dismantlementprocess is based on Russian GovernmentDecree No. 518 of May 28, 1998 and the“Strategy for the Integrated Dismantlementof Nuclear-Powered Submarines andNuclear-Powered Surface Vessels.” Theprincipal contractor undertaking submarinedismantlement in the Russian Far East isthe Zvezda Far Eastern Shipyard, a statefederal unitary enterprise. Of 38 scrappedPacific Fleet nuclear submarines, 31 weredismantled at Zvezda. In addition to

Zvezda, there are two other shipyards inthe region with dismantlement capacities:Shipyard 49K (in Seldevaya Bay,Kamchatka) and Shipyard 30 (in ChazhmaBay, Primorye), which are both RussianDefense Ministry enterprises (ZvezdaShipyard is subordinate to the FederalIndustry Agency). The main submarinedismantlement technique, resulting inthree-compartment units, requires the fol-lowing operations:

• Unloading spent nuclear fuel (SNF)from submarine reactor cores at ZvezdaShipyard’s on-shore defueling facility,loading the SNF into specialized TypeTK-18 (TUK-108/1) containers, andtemporarily storing them until they canbe sent in a special train echelon to theMayak Production Complex for repro-cessing;

• Removing solid radioactive waste(SRW) and liquid radioactive waste(LRW) from dismantled submarines, itstemporary storage and eventual treat-ment;

• Cutting the submarine hull and form-ing sealed three-compartment unitsmade up of the reactor compartmentand two adjoining compartments, sothat the reactor may be temporarilyheld in floating storage at a specialfloating storage site;

• Scrapping the fore and aft submarinecompartments.

Between 1998 and 2001, with the supportof U.S. funding (and, for LRW manage-ment, Japanese assistance), the infrastruc-ture needed to undertake nuclear subma-rine dismantlement was created at theZvezda compound. It included three spe-cialized facilities:

• An on-shore SNF unloading and han-dling facility;

• A radioactive waste management facili-ty;

• A facility for cutting submarine hullsand processing scrap metal.

To guarantee nuclear submarines are dis-mantled at the required rate, the timelydefueling of decommissioned vessels, andthe temporary storage and shipment ofSNF for reprocessing, an on-shore defuel-ing facility was commissioned in April

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2003 that can defuel four submarines peryear. The facility includes the followingassets:

• A plant where SNF is loaded into TK-18 (TUK-108/1) containers, outfittedwith loading equipment; demag cranes(overhead bridge cranes); power supplysystems; occupational safety, radiation,technological control, and physical pro-tection systems; and sanitary inspectionsites;

• Equipment for defueling the nuclearsubmarines, consisting in a versatile setof equipment for unloading SNF fromsubmarine reactors and filtration units;

• Equipment for loading SNF into TK-18 and TUK-108/1 containers, for dry-ing, for leakage tests, and for containerdecontamination;

• Hoisting and conveying machinery usedto transport containers from the load-ing facility to the temporary storagesite;

• Sites for the temporary storage of80 containers. Temporary storage,according to design parameters, is sup-posed to last 6–24 months;

• Railways for the loading, stand-by, andformation of echelons of TK-VG-18container railcars;

• The railroad from the on-shore techni-cal base to Bolshoy Kamen station;

• Electric power supply and physical pro-tection facilities.

The Zvezda On-Shore Defueling Facilitywas commissioned by an Act of theGovernment Acceptance Committee onJanuary 30, 2003, and confirmed by theRussian Shipbuilding Agency.

The radioactive waste management facilityincludes the following assets, which havebeen built and commissioned:

• The Landysh floating LRW treatmentfacility;

• The low-level liquid radioactive laundrywash/rinse water treatment facility,with a capacity of 2,599 m3 per year;

• The solid radioactive waste (SRW) con-ditioning (decontamination and com-pacting) facility;

• An SRW storage facility, 1,500 m3 involume, for the temporary storage ofconcentrated, solidified wastes from theLandysh, laundry water treatment facil-ity, and SRW conditioning facility,which are transferred in 200-liter can-isters.

The Landysh (in Japanese, Suzuran, or“lily of the valley”), was built withJapanese financing and commissioned in1999. It ensures the treatment of LRWfrom nuclear submarines; the liquidremaining after the treatment of LRW isso clean that it can be discharged backinto a fishery. The Landysh is the onlyLRW treatment facility in the Russian FarEast that has gone through a state envi-ronmental impact examination and wasaccepted into service by a governmentcommission.

The floating plant is a ship with a dis-placement of 4,500 tons, on which anLRW cleaning (treatment) plant built bythe U.S. firm Babcock & Wilcox NuclearEnvironmental Services is mounted. Theship was designed by the Vympel DesignBureau and the Krylov Central ScientificResearch Institute, and built at the AmurShipyard.

Measures were taken during the design ofthe floating treatment plant to ensure thatit met Russian legal requirements for theobservance of standards for the radiationsafety of personnel, the general public, andenvironmental protection. At the same timethe possibility of extraordinary (emergency)situations during the use of the floatingplant, which can be used in other off-shorelocations in the Sea of Japan, was takeninto account. There is a system for moni-toring the external environment. Thedesign also included plans for the decom-missioning of the plant.

The newly built facilities for handlingradioactive wastes and SNF are equippedwith automated radiation control systemsthat enable real-time monitoring of theradiation environment.

The submarine hull cutting facilityincludes:

• A guillotine with 2,000 tons of shear-ing force to cut hull structures of greatand medium width, including the sub-marine pressure hull;

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• A baler for compacting and packaginglight-gauge metals;

• Hoisting truck-mounted cranes andtruck trailers;

• A gantry crane and crawling tractorcrane;

• Excavators with shears to cut structuresof medium width;

• A conveyor system and scrap metalcontainers;

• Oxyacetylene torches, equipment forgas-powered and plasma-arc cutting;

• Tools and equipment for pneumaticmechanical cutting;

• A concrete pad and transformer sub-station to support the guillotine;

• A facility to process the cables strippedfrom the submarines;

• Scaffolding;

• Occupational safety systems.

Thus, between 1998 and 2001 a completenuclear submarine dismantlement capabili-ty was established that can defuel four andscrap up to eight decommissioned PacificFleet submarines each year, while ensuringthe nuclear and radiation security of thepopulation and surrounding environment.

Difficulties iin IImplementing ttheGlobal PPartnership PProgram iin ttheRussian FFar EEast From 1989 to 1996 Zvezda Shipyard dis-mantled 11 nuclear submarines, in1997–1998 – none, in 1999 – two boats, in2000 – three, in 2001 – three, in 2002 –two, in 2003 – three, and in 2004 – four.One of the reasons for the cessation of dis-mantlement activity in 1997–1998 was thatthe boats could not be defueled due to thedecommissioning of the Project 326-classfloating service vessels used to refuel/defu-el submarine reactors, a ban on transport-ing SNF in type TK-11 containers thatwere manufactured in 1971–1972, and thedeterioration of loading equipment, as wellas several other factors.

After a two-year hiatus in 1997-1998, whenno submarines were defueled, SNF wasunloaded from two boats in 1999. In 2000,three boats were defueled, in 2001 – threeboats, in 2002 – three boats, in 2003 – four

boats, and in 2004 – two boats. In total,between 1999 and the end of 2004 ZvezdaShipyard offloaded SNF from 17 nuclearsubmarines.

The efficient execution of dismantlementtasks in the region during 1999–2003 waslargely due to the financial support of theU.S. Department of Defense through theCooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) pro-gram. To compare: in 2001 Zvezda receiveda Minatom (now Rosatom) state order forthe maintenance and dismantlement ofnuclear submarines, use of the Landyshfloating LRW treatment facility, and capi-tal investment totaling 88 million rubles,and in 2002 – 123 million rubles, whileunder CTR contracts the shipyard com-pleted 520.7 million rubles worth of dis-mantlement work in 2001, 444.8 millionrubles worth in 2002, and 198.4 millionrubles worth in 2003.

In 2003 Zvezda completed the dismantle-ment of ballistic missile submarines(SSBNs) funded by the U.S. CTR pro-gram in Russia in accordance with theStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty (STARTTreaty). At present, the shipyard is chieflydismantling first- and second-generationmultipurpose submarines, which are sup-posed to be scrapped under the GlobalPartnership program.

However in practice, despite the existenceof the necessary infrastructure, the estab-lishment of the Global Partnership pro-gram, and the announcement by G8 lead-ers that they would spend $20 billion dol-lars to rid Russia of its “Cold War legacy,”the Russian Far East appears to be outsideof the program.

And while Zvezda Director Yury Shulganbelieves that “the Global Partnership pro-gram does not work in the Russian FarEast,” it is our view that the program hasnot even begun in the region, boggeddown somewhere between the CTR pro-gram and the Global Partnership initiative.In the three years since the establishmentof the partnership, only one nuclear sub-marine has been dismantled in the RussianFar East, with Japanese funding.Negotiations over the scrapping of an addi-tional five boats with Japanese funds areprogressing only with great difficulty.(These negotiations were succesfully con-cluded in November 2005 only. OnNovember 21, 2005 Russia and Japansigned an implementation arrangement for

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dismantling of 5 multipurpose submarinesin the Russian Far East- ed.).

In addition, Japan’s sluggishness in solvingissues related to the Global Partnership has“hung up” the funding promised byAustralia (over U.S. $7.5 million) that isbeing donated through the Japanese pro-gram because of the lack of a Russian-Australian intergovernmental agreement.On top of this, after the completion ofSSBN dismantlement in 2003, the UnitedStates began to remove some of the equip-ment that it had provided earlier (as iswell known, the United States is not fund-ing the dismantlement of multipurposesubmarines). Under these circumstances,the sole source of funding for submarinedismantlement in the region is the federalgovernment. However, this funding is clear-ly not enough to pay for the dismantle-ment of all 36 decommissioned nuclearsubmarines in the region.

It is clear that given current financing lev-els, submarine dismantlement cannot becompleted by 2010, as is envisioned by theStrategy for the Integrated Dismantlementof Nuclear-Powered Submarines, even ifthe Russian-Japanese implementationarrangement for dismantling five submari-nesis signed during Putin’s visit to Japanat the end of November 2005.

Another critical issue in addition to thefinancial one is the reconstruction of therailway between Smolyaninovo andBolshoy Kamen, without which even fed-erally funded submarine dismantlement isunder threat. After the completion of thetasks specified in the 2005 State Order, theon-shore temporary SNF storage sites willbe 85% full, and in 2006 Zvezda’s defuel-ing facility could defuel another 1-2 sub-marines. The further use of the defuelingfacility will be possible only after TUKcontainers of SNF are sent to Mayak.However, the 29-kilometer railway betweenSmolyaninovo and Bolshoy Kamen wasbuilt in 1934-36, is currently in unsatisfac-tory condition, and is restricted to lightloads. In comparison, the entire railwayfrom Zvezda to Mayak is 7,500 kilometers.The Vladivostok branch of the Far EasternRailroad prohibited the shipyard fromsending out special railcars with TUK-18containers over this section of rail due toits technical condition on May 17, 1998(order No. P-7/68).

The reconstruction of the railway spur wasdebated at a session of a Russian SecurityCouncil interagency commission in August2002. The Russian government charged theRussian Shipbuilding Agency, Ministry ofAtomic Energy, and the Ministry ofRailways with undertaking immediatemeasures to finance and reconstruct therailway in order to ensure that spentnuclear fuel from dismantled nuclear sub-marines could be removed.

However, to this day Japan has not signedan implementing arrangement for thisproject, despite the fact that in 2001 theGeneral Secretary of the Russian-JapaneseCooperation Committee, ToshiyukiKawakami, even named a concrete sched-ule for the completion of this task: 3 years.Thus, the use of the on-shore defuelingfacility will be impossible after 2005 with-out the reconstruction of the rail spur. Thealternative – using Russian DefenseMinistry floating service vessels to unloadSNF – will mean increased federal expen-ditures or the increased use of the fundsof donor countries helping to solve sub-marine dismantlement issues.

Rosatom is currently looking for budgetmoneys to solve this problem. But it isclear that if this is done with federal funds,it will result in a reduction of funding inother areas approximately equivalent to theamount needed to dismantle one nuclearsubmarine.

Yet one more problem in the region thatmust be solved in the very near future isthe transportation of nuclear submarinesthat are no longer hermetically sealed fromthe bases where they are laid up to thedismantlement site.

At present the Pacific Fleet has 36 decom-missioned submarines subject to dismantle-ment. Fifteen of these boats are inPrimorye, all with nuclear fuel on board.

About half of all of the submarines havebeen laid up for 10 or more years, whichmakes it difficult to maintain them as theyawait dismantlement. The technical condi-tion of the hulls of first generation decom-missioned submarines, built from the late1950s through the early 1960s and in oper-ation for more than 40 years, is generallyunsatisfactory. All of them have main bal-last tanks that are no longer hermeticallysealed, are listing, and have a trim differ-ence fore to aft, caused by the deteriora-tion of the materials used for the tanks,

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damage incurred under sail, and the fail-ure to observe maintenance schedules.

Given the maximum capacity of Shipyard49K – the dismantlement of three sub-marines per year (and in the opinion ofcivilian experts, two), the question arisesregarding the need to transport some ofthe submarines laid up in Kamchatka fordismantlement at Zvezda, which cannot beaffected by towing, given the condition ofthe boats.

In addition, we must not forget the grow-ing need to dismantle the nuclear mainte-nance vessels, a question that must be con-sidered together with submarine dismantle-ment. However, the dismantlement of thenuclear service boats has several importantdifferences from submarine dismantlement:

• Their dismantlement requires the pro-vision of radiation safety and the cre-ation of strict exclusion areas the fulllength of the decommissioned vessels;

• The dismantlement of nuclear servicevessels creates a large volume of SRW.Practically speaking, the quantity ofSRW is equivalent to the mass of thevessel being dismantled;

• Virtually the entire nuclear service ves-sel is contaminated with radiation;

• There are no technologies for thedecontamination of nuclear service ves-sel hardware; therefore, all parts of thedismantled vessel can be consideredSRW;

• The infeasibility of decontaminatingany part of the vessel means that accessis difficult.

Accordingly, in the Russian Far East theGlobal Partnership should undertake thedevelopment of design and technical docu-mentation for dismantling each nuclearservice vessel class, analogous to thosedeveloped for the dismantlement of sub-marine classes.

Also, in the near future the problem ofdecreasing the volume of solid radioactivewaste must be tackled. The dismantlementand defueling of one submarine results inapproximately 30 m3 of SRW. Given thatthe dismantlement program financed byRosatom involves the scrapping of 2–4submarines per year, the yearly generationof SRW makes up about 150 m3, while thevolume of the temporary storage facility

(Building 131) is 1,500 m3, enough for thisprogram’s needs for 10 years.

Though existing capacities can solve theproblem of nuclear submarine dismantle-ment, the dismantlement of nuclear servicevessels remains an open question. The dis-mantlement of nuclear service vessels thathave already been decommissioned or willbe decommissioned in the next two to fiveyears will create a significant volume ofradioactive waste, including high- and inter-mediate-level wastes of irregular shapes.This means that the use of traditional SRWtreatment techniques will not be possible.

Scrapping a nuclear maintenance vesselresults in a quantity of SRW dozens oftimes greater than submarine dismantle-ment. In practical terms, the mass of theresulting SRW is close to the mass of thevessel that is dismantled. The schedule fornuclear service vessel dismantlement atZvezda indicates that the additional SRWcreated will total about 4,000 m3. The stor-age facility (Building 131) will not be ableto handle the temporary storage of thesevolumes of SRW. This means there is ademand for the creation of radioactivewaste handling infrastructure in theRussian Far East – storage and disposalfacilities, radioactive waste transportationand packaging facilities, and means totransport TUK containers with radioactivewaste to storage and disposal facilities.

Besides this there are two damaged nuclearpowered submarines floating in PavlovskBay, that cannot be safety towed for dis-mantling at the present time. They havealready been in floating storage withnuclear fuel on board for over 15 years.Their safety is being ensured by theRussian Navy, but with each year this isbecoming more and more difficult.Therefore, in the near future a decisionabout the way to mothball these vesselsmust be made. One of possible solutions isto store these submarines on-shore.

Otherwise the vessels may sink, with con-sequences, according to Fleet experts, thatwill be felt by the residents of all of thecountries in the Far East. According tovarious estimates, the cost of these projectsis $10–40 million.

There is much to be done: the infrastructurefor the creation of one-compartment unitsmust be built, so that reactors could be putin long-term storage, and an on-shore tem-porary storage facility for these units must

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be created in Razboynik Bay, which is partof the territory of the Rosatom enterpriseDalRAO. The creation of a similar long-term storage facility and related infrastruc-ture for the Russian Noth-West in SaydaBay, is being financed by the FederalRepublic of Germany. The facility in Saydacosts some 300 million.

What iis tto bbe DDone?Given the current situation in the RussianFar East, it is critical that urgent measuresare taken to ensure that the GlobalPartnership is active in the region, and thefollowing dire scenario described byFederal Atomic Energy Agency DeputyDirector Sergey Antipov does not come topass: “We could find ourselves in the situ-ation where all of the problems associatedwith nuclear submarines and SNF in theRussian Northwest are solved, but theproblems in the Russian Far East remainfor many long years. From the point ofview of possible threats ... this would benot simply a regional problem, but a prob-lem for the entire global community.”

Top priority measures that must be singledout include:

• The intensification of Japanese funding,which was promised at the relativelymodest level of $200 million, and todate has only been expended on thedismantlement of a single submarine(an implementation arrangement ondismantling additional five submarineswas signed in Tokyo on November 21,2005 - ed.);

• Finding alternative ways for countriesthat do not have a relevant bilateralagreement with Russia to finance thedismantlement of submarines in theRussian Far East, given that Japan hasset political conditions for the provisionof assistance to Russia. In particular,some way must be found to make useof the over $7.5 million that Australia

has given to Japan for the dismantle-ment of submarines in the Russian FarEast (signing of implementationarrangement with Japan on November21, 2005 opens the way for usingAustralian money as well - ed.);

• The reorientation of donor countries tosolving dismantlement problems in theRussian Far East. There is alreadysome positive movement in this direc-tion. After a visit to the Russian FarEast in November 2004, German offi-cials agreed to supply transport equip-ment for use in Razboynik Bay, wherethe temporary one-compartment reactorstorage facility will be built, analogousto the equipment that will be used inNorthwest Russia’s Sayda Bay to trans-fer reactor compartments onto shore. Inaddition, the Germans promised to con-sider providing the Russian Far Eastwith a special heavy-lifting crane formoving containers of SNF, to be paidfor by German grant aid.

An additional alternative funding source isCanada, which has broadened its interestin the Russian Far East as a whole. InApril 2005, Russian Prime MinisterMikhail Fradkov signed an order on theopening of a Canadian general consulate inVladivostok. Of the Canadian $300 million(approximately U.S. $240 million) commit-ted to submarine dismantlement, Canadahas only determined how it will spendCanadian $150 million (for submarine dis-mantlement at Severodvinsk’s ZvezdochkaShipyard).

Of the practical measures needed to imple-ment submarine dismantlement, primacyshould be given to the reconstruction of theSmolyaninovo-Bolshoy Kamen rail spur,needed to send SNF to Mayak so that theentire dismantlement process does not cometo a complete standstill in 2006. The esti-mated cost of this project is $7 million.

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Commentary

THE TTRUTH AABOUT “SUITCASE NNUKES”

By VViktor YYesin,Vice PPresident, AAcademy oof SSecurity,Defense aand LLaw EEnforcement

[This aarticle wwas ooriginally ppublished iin RRussianin Yaderny KKoonttrooll, No.2, VVolume 111, SSummer2005]



The monstrous terrorist act of Septem-ber 11, 2001, in New York, and the subse-quent train bombings in Spain and hostagetakings in Russia (at the Nord-Ost Theaterand Beslan school), in which victims werecounted in hundreds and thousands, indi-cate that a priori terrorists have no moralqualms. They will not hesitate to employthe most barbarous means to destroy peo-ple. This is why it would be so very dan-gerous were they to get their hands onnuclear munitions, which can bring aboutmass destruction and the death of nothundreds and thousands, but millions ofpeople.

This threat is most often associated withthe possible terrorist possession of mobilenuclear munitions, or so-called “suitcasenukes.”

In the mid-1990s, stories began to appearin the media of several countries regardingthe possession of “suitcase nukes” by ter-rorist organizations and extremist move-ments. Moreover, in general the reportsdeclared that these “suitcases” were ofeither Soviet or Russian origin and thatthe terrorists (or extremists) had acquiredthem from Russian military, who had soldthem off practically by accident.

In the interest of truth, I should note thatthe sensational broadcasting of this storywas largely aided by “leaks” of informationfrom Russian secret services at the time.Thus, in the fall of 1995 media stories cit-ing the Russian Foreign IntelligenceService reported that Dudayev’s fightershad acquired two special nuclear munitionsin Latvia from the Russian military in1992. Then-Russian Security CouncilSecretary Oleg Lobov sent an officialrequest to the head of the Russian Armed

Forces General Staff, Mikhail Kolesnikov,for clarification. He received the answerthat any information about the loss ofSoviet or Russian nuclear munitions wasuntrue, and that the announcements madeby Dudayev’s men and others like themconstituted disinformation aimed at fright-ening the global community.

I do not believe that it is necessary todayto enumerate all of the news stories aboutlost Soviet and Russian nuclear munitionsand their falling into the hands of variousterrorist groups and other armed gangs.Instead, it is enough to recall the particu-lar resonance provoked by the 1996-1998declarations of former Russian SecurityCouncil Secretary Alexander Lebed andthe statements of Alexei Yablokov, of theRussian Academy of Sciences, regardingthe supposed losses of “suitcase nukes” ofSoviet manufacture during the break-up ofthe Soviet Union.

After the Russian Ministry of Defenseissued answers to these and analogousstatements, as well as media stories, onewould have thought that the problem of“suitcase nukes” would have been exhaust-ed. But in the book Osama’s Revenge,which was recently published in theUnited States, the reporter Paul Williamsavers that the Al Qa’ida international ter-rorist organization possesses dozens of“suitcase nukes” stolen from Russian stor-age depots. Moreover, the author states thataccording to intelligence sources these“suitcase nukes” are already in the UnitedStates.

One of the motivations for Mr. Williams’assertions is apparently the wish once againto “expose” Russia as a country incapableof guaranteeing the security and safety ofits nuclear weapons and, therefore, suppos-edly posing a threat to humanity. And so,yet again, the subject of “suitcase nukes”has been raised.

As an official whose duties as head of oneof the directorates in the Russian SecurityCouncil staff (1997–2002) included answer-ing questions related to Russia’s possessionof mobile nuclear munitions, I consider itmy duty to share my knowledge of thisissue. As a patriot, I believe that my coun-try’s image should not be made to sufferdue to the current lack of informationregarding some details of Russian nuclearpolicy. Naturally, I will not reveal statesecrets, but I want to dispel the existing

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myths about “suitcase nukes” and relate, asfar as possible, details about the mobilenuclear munitions that have actually beenbuilt in the world.

The media widely uses the term “suitcasenuke,” bbut tthis iis aa sslang tterm. In truth,we are really talking about mobile, special-purpose nuclear munitions carried in back-packs (special nuclear mines).

Thus Igor Valynkin, head of the RussianMinistry of Defense 12th Main Directorate,1

was correct when he said, as a lieutenantgeneral on December 2, 1997, in an inter-view with a Nezavisimaya gazeta corre-spondent, that “no suitcases, carpetbags,purses, or other handbags with nuclearammunition... have ever existed.”

The wworld’s ffirst ssmall-sscale nnuclear mmuni-tions wwere ccreated bby tthe AAmericans. In1960, Los Alamos National Laboratory con-structed the plutonium-based W-54 minia-ture nuclear implosion-type devise. Itsyield, depending upon its mission, could bechanged with the use of a special regula-tor from about 10 tons to 1 kiloton. Theweight of this nuclear charge was about27 kilograms. It was used in several typesof nuclear munitions. All of them wereclassified as Special Atomic DemolitionMunitions (SADMs).

Initially, the W-54 nuclear charge was usedin 120 and 155 mm calibre nuclear artilleryshells. In 1964, it was also used to producetwo types of special nuclear mines: theM129 and the M159, known in the UnitedStates as “portable” atomic bombs. The M-159 special atomic munition was manufac-tured in two versions: the M-159-V1 andthe M-159-V2. The construction of thesetwo versions differed little, one from theother. Their principle difference was in thesize of the minimal yield of the nuclearcharge: M-159-V1 had a yield of 10 tons,while M-159-V2 had a yield of 250 tons.

The M129 and M159 special nuclear mineshad identical dimensions: they were both70 cm in length and had a maximumdiameter of 31 cm. They were housed inspecial H913 transport containers, which inaddition to the nuclear mines also con-tained all of the necessary additionalequipment such as code locks (also knownas permissive action links, or PALs), radioreceivers, and timers. The H913 containerwas 87 by 65 by 67 cm in size, andweighed 68 kg when fully loaded. It couldbe carried by one person using a specially

designed backpack, or by two people usinga special sling. The M129 and M159nuclear mines could be set off using timersor from a distance using special radio sig-nals.

In total, Los Alamos National NuclearLaboratory produced about 600 M129 andM159 special nuclear mines between 1964and 1983. Production was halted in 1983.

“Backpack” atomic bombs were part of theequipment of the U.S. Army’s “GreenBerets,” U.S. Navy “Seals,” and special divi-sions of the U.S. Marines. They weredesigned to be used for acts of sabotagebehind enemy lines, in particular for thedestruction of airfields, ports, majorbridges, dams, underground commandposts, and other similar facilities, as well aslarge troop concentrations. These nuclearweapons were very effective: they werecompact, and thus could secretly be movedbehind enemy lines in order reliably todestroy the intended targets. This is clearwhen one looks at the basic parameters ofthe nuclear explosion, which had an explo-sive yield of 1,000 tons: the radius of theshock wave (with a blast pressure of 0.3kg per square centimeter) was 800 meters,thermal radiation 3.8 calories per squarecentimeter, and ionizing radiation 670 rems.The shock wave would destroy installations800 meters away from the blast epicenter,destroying all living things inside, whilethe thermal radiation would ignite fires.

During the Cold War, M129 and M159special nuclear mines were located at U.S.military bases in Western Europe (WestGermany and Italy), the Republic ofKorea, Guam, and possibly Okinawa, inaddition to U.S. territory. During theVietnam War these mines were brought toClark Air Base in the Philippines.According to some sources, the Americanshad planned to use special nuclear minesto destroy mountain passes on the famedHo Chi Minh Trail, the main transportartery between North and South Vietnam.However, these plans were never realized,apparently due to the dangers intenseradioactive contamination would pose inthe region.

The Americans also considered the use ofspecial nuclear mines by NATO specialforces divisions (in Germany, Italy, andelsewhere). However, after the “thaw” inrelations with the Soviet Union andWarsaw Pact countries that began in 1987,

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these considerations were ended and allspecial nuclear mines removed fromWestern Europe and the other locationswhere they had been deployed, to bestored on U.S. territory.

In late 1991-early 1992 all remaining spe-cial nuclear mines (there were about 300 atthat time) were dismantled at the PAN-TEX facility in Amarillo, Texas (in fulfill-ment of the 1991 unilateral declaration byU.S. President George Bush on deep cutsin U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons).

The SSoviet UUnion bbegan tto pproduce ssmall-scale sspecial nnuclear mmunitions iin 11967,three years after the Americans. Thesebackpack-type nuclear munitions werecalled “special mines.” This was probablybecause they were designed exclusively forequipping special divisions of the USSRarmed forces: special forces brigades underthe Main Intelligence Directorate of theRussian General Staff and special units ofthe Soviet Marines.

The design of Soviet special mines, partic-ularly earlier types, was largely similar toU.S. special nuclear munitions.Accordingly, their military characteristics,weight, and dimensions were about thesame.

The Soviet Union produced four types ofspecial mines, totaling just less than half ofthe number of U.S. special nuclear mines.The most advanced design was the RA115,the final type of Soviet special mine, whichwas the type mentioned by AlexanderLebed. The weight and dimensions of thismine were considerably superior to U.S.analogs.

The main producer of Soviet special mineswas the formerly secret Avangard facility inSarov, Nizhnyy Novgorod region (formerlyknown as Arzamas-16). All of the specialmines that were constructed were deliveredto a USSR Ministry of Defense 12th MainDirectorate arsenal, the only one of itskind, for storage and handling (the arsenalwas located on the territory of the RussianSoviet Federated Socialist Republic, today’sRussian Federation). Throughout theSoviet period, to say nothing of the newRussia, these special mines were nevertransferred from this arsenal or the pro-duction facility to military forces (this hasbeen confirmed by documentation).Therefore, they could not have been lost orstolen at military units. Sabotage teamsfrom Soviet, and later Russian, special

forces brigades trained using simulators, aswell as on the ground with the use ofdummy special mines. It is possible thatsome of these dummy mines may haveremained in the armed forces of the newlyindependent states created after the break-up of the Soviet Union.

Stories that appeared in the media in thelate 1990s regarding the construction of acertain number of special mines (“suitcasenukes”) for the KGB, and their delivery tothe agency, are false. It has been reliablyestablished that the all-powerful SovietKGB never ordered or joined in an orderfor any type of nuclear munitions, andtherefore could not have been issued suchweapons. In fact, the functions of theSoviet KGB, like that of Russia’s FSBtoday, were limited to monitoring theobservance of regulations by productionfacilities and the armed forces in the pro-duction and handling of nuclear munitions.

By the early 1990s, only the final type ofspecial mine (the RA115) remained, thennumbering about 200. Earlier types of spe-cial mines had already been returned tothe production facility and dismantled inaccordance with established procedures bythat time. In the second half of the 1990sthis fact was substantiated through anexamination of documentation carried outby a special commission, as describedbelow.

All remaining RA115 special mines weresupposed to be destroyed by 2000, inaccordance with the unilateral U.S.-Sovietinitiatives of 1991 on the reduction of non-strategic nuclear munitions, mentionedabove, which were confirmed by BorisYeltsin, the first Russian president, inJanuary 1992.

In April 2000, then-Russian Minister forForeign Affairs Igor Ivanov told theReview Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in New York that“Russia [is] about to complete the destruc-tion of nuclear warheads… from nuclearmines.” This allows us to confirm thatRussia fulfilled its promise to destroynuclear mines, if not in the first half, thenprobably in the second half of 2000.

Thus, ttoday nneither tthe UUnited SStates nnorRussia hhas pportable ((backpack) sspecialnuclear mmunitions ((“suitcase nnukes”) iin iitsarsenal. However, they do of course con-tinue to possess the technology and man-

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ufacturing base for the renewed productionof this type of nuclear munition.

As is well known, Washington recentlydecided to carry out research and develop-ment work on the design of miniaturenuclear explosives. Yet the U.S. governmenthas stated that these nuclear explosives, ifa decision to deploy them is made, will beused for the construction of high-precisionearth-penetrating nuclear munitionsdesigned to destroy hardened targets withpinpoint accuracy and not for the renewedproduction of special nuclear mines. It isimpossible to confirm or contest this asser-tion. We shall simply have to wait and see.

Could another nuclear state besides theUnited States and Russia have portablespecial nuclear munitions in its arsenal? Ido not have an unequivocal answer to thisquestion.

According to the Stockholm InternationalPeace Research Institute’s Yearbook 2005,China mmay ppossess ssome 1120 aatomic ddem-olition mmunitions aand IIsrael mmay hhavenuclear aartillery sshells aand llandmines.However, there is no information on thepossible weight, dimensions, or power ofthese nuclear munitions. Therefore, it isimpossible to determine whether or notthey fit into the category of portable spe-cial nuclear munitions.

Recently, it appears that there hhave bbeenrenewed aattempts tto aaccuse RRussia oofunsatisfactorily sstoring iits nnonstrategicnuclear wweapons aand ““losing” pportable sspe-cial nnuclear mmunitions ((“suitcase nnukes”).Alexei Yablokov, who was mentionedabove, once even said that “Russia possess-es nuclear explosives that are not underpresidential control” (that is to say, “suit-case nukes” that could be employed–or, toput it simply, detonated–without theauthorization of the Russian president).

Alexander Lebed too did his bit in thecampaign unleashed by Alexei Yablokov inmid-1997 to accuse Russia of supposed“failures” in monitoring its nonstrategicnuclear weapons, largely thanks to his lackof knowledge in the sphere of nuclearweaponry and his excessive credence of theunverified information with which he wasinundated. This information was providedby officers from the Main IntelligenceDirectorate of the Soviet/Russian GeneralStaff who were in the reserves or hadretired (and who, it would appear, wereacting in their own self-interest).

Russian President Boris Yeltsin, albeit withsome delay, reacted to the rising “brouha-ha” in the global community regarding the“proliferation” of nuclear weapons fromwhat was now already the Russian arsenalby charging the Ministries of Defense andNuclear Industry with carrying out a ded-icated enquiry into the existence and safe-guarding of all types of nuclear munitions,both nonstrategic and strategic. In order tofulfill Yeltsin’s order, a special joint com-mission was formed by the RussianMinistries of Defense and NuclearIndustry. This commission, having workedin all of the Russian Armed Forces organ-izations that dealt with nuclear weaponsand at industrial enterprises that producednuclear munitions, concluded tthat Russia’ssystem oof oordering, aaccounting ffor, ddistrib-uting, aand ddismantling nnuclear mmunitions,along wwith iits ssystem ffor ccontinuouslymonitoring tthe ssafeguarding oof ttheseweapons tthroughout ttheir llife ccycles aandfor ssystematically cchecking tthem oon aa rreg-ular bbasis, ddemonstrate tthat tthere hhavebeen nno ccases oof lloss oor ttheft oof nnuclearmunitions iin RRussia’s iinventory dduring ttheentire pperiod oof tthe eexistence oofSoviet/Russian nnuclear wweapons.

The results of the work of this commis-sion, after consultation with Boris Yeltsin,were provided in early December 1997 bythe Russian Ministries of Defense andAtomic Energy to the public at large viamedia publications. However, it is true thatin order to avoid divulging state secrets,the information on the results of the com-mission’s work were presented in a restrict-ed and not very convincing manner.

Thus it is not surprising that in early 1998there were renewed accusations that Russiahad lost mobile nuclear munitions, whichhad fallen into the hands of terrorists andextremists. True, this time there was notalk of other types of Russian nonstrategicnuclear munitions.

Boris Yeltsin then gave a special mandateto Andrei Kokoshin, then-Russian SecurityCouncil Secretary, to thoroughly clear upthe issue of the “suitcase nukes” and reporton the actual situation.

The resulting dedicated enquiry, carriedout in the spring of 1998 by a group ofRussian Security Council staff experts,myself included, involved the accounting ofindividual weapons and cross-checking ofall accounting data regarding the produc-

81


tion, dismantlement, and inventory of spe-cial mines both at the Russian Ministry ofDefense arsenal, mentioned above, and atthe Russian Ministry of Atomic Energyproduction facility. This enquiry confirmedthe conclusion of the joint Ministry ofDefense/Ministry of Atomic Energy com-mission: there have been no cases of theloss or theft of special mines, and allaccounting data correspond to the facts onthe ground. Simultaneously, the expertsmade recommendations for increasing thesecurity of special mines awaiting disman-tlement; these recommendations werequickly realized both by the RussianMinistry of Defense and at RussianMinistry of Atomic Energy enterprises.

Some time later, in order permanently to“do away with” the issue of Russia’s mobilespecial nuclear munitions, at the initiativeof Alexei Kokoshin a presidential decreewas prepared and issued banning thedesign and production of similar types ofnuclear munitions at any time in thefuture.

As for Alexander Yablokov’s assertion thatRussia possesses nuclear explosives thatcould be employed without the authoriza-tion of the president, I will clarify the sit-uation as far as I am permitted.

When the first prototype special mineswere built by the Soviets, the question ofauthorizing their use was indeed giveninsufficient attention. Measures to preventtheir unauthorized use were primarilyorganizational in nature. But this “short-coming” was soon eliminated. Subsequenttypes of special mines already had codelocking mechanisms (PALs) that made itimpossible to trigger them without author-ization. The most thorough technical meas-ures to prevent unauthorized use of thenuclear charge were realized in the con-struction of the RA115 special mine, whichpossessed an electromechanical PALdevice.

Since Russia no longer had any types ofspecial mines other than the RA115 by theearly 1990s, Alexander Yablokov’s assertionregarding the possible use of “suitcasenukes” without presidential authorization,made in 1997, cannot be taken seriously.Both tthen aand nnow, tthe uuse oof bboth nnon-strategic aand sstrategic nnuclear wweaponspossessed bby RRussia iis oonly ppossible wwiththe aauthorization oof tthe RRussian ppresident,commander-in-chief of the Russian armed

forces. I am certain that this will remaintrue as long as Russia possesses nuclearweapons. Anything else is simply not pos-sible.

If one asks the question of whether it ispossible to create extremely small nuclearmunitions that could fit in a container thesize of a small suitcase, handbag, or purse,then I would answer as follows.

The current state of knowledge in the areaof nuclear weapons design makes it possi-ble, in principal, to create an extremelysmall “suitcase nuke” weighing 10-12 kg.But this would require not weapons plu-tonium, to say nothing of highly enricheduranium, but transplutonic materials thathave a small critical mass, but also a shorthalf-life. This implies that new militarytechnologies would have to be designedand new production lines created fortransplutonic materials. The costs would becolossal compared to existing militarynuclear materials. Of course, a series ofnuclear tests would also be needed.

Such easily-carried “suitcase nukes” wouldbe so expensive that not even the richestcountry could afford them. In addition,they would be short-lived due to the shorthalf-lives of their nuclear warheads–withlifetimes of just a few months. Besides, asa rule, short-lived elements are much moreradioactive, making it much more difficultto store extremely small nuclear munitionsand likely giving rise to overexposures ofmaintenance staff. As the saying goes, “thegame is not worth the candle.”

If one were to seriously evaluate theoptions for terrorist organizations andextremist movements to obtain nuclearexplosive devices, then one wwould pprimari-ly hhave tto cconsider tthe ppossibility oof ttheirconstructing sso-ccalled ““dirty bbombs.” Thistype of explosive device is so simple thatit could be created using crude methods.In essence, the device is a container withfissile materials attached to conventionalexplosives. When set off, the radioactivematerials do not initiate a chain reaction,but are instead diffused. The living wouldnot be harmed by a nuclear explosion,since none would occur, but instead wouldbe subject to radiation.

There are many different radioactive mate-rials, and many of them are widely usedin industry as well as for other uses. Intotal, there are over a hundred countriescapable of producing radioactive materials.

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As unfortunate as it is to admit, theradioactive materials needed for the con-struction of a “dirty bomb” can now beobtained relatively easily on the de factointernational “black market” of nucleartechnologies and materials. Here it is per-tinent to note that very recently it becameclear who has been heading this “blackmarket.” It turned out that it was not peo-ple from so-called “pariah states,” but the“father” of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, DoctorAbdul Qadeer Khan. And Pakistan’s presi-dent, Pervez Musharraf, magnanimouslyforgave A. Q. Khan and even denied theIAEA access to him, thus preventing thisinternational organization from clarifyingthe “black market” situation.

This is the real threat to global security,not inventions about the “proliferation” ofSoviet (or Russian) “suitcase nukes” aroundthe world.

The only effective way of preventing ter-rorist acts using “dirty bombs” is to put allproduction of fissile materials for nuclearweapons and other explosive devises underthe complete control of the IAEA. A draft

of just such an international agreement hasexisted for more than five years, albeit notin a final form. However, to date it has notbeen possible to come to an agreement onit within the framework of the GenevaConference on Disarmament. There areserious disagreements between nuclearweapon states and non-nuclear weaponstates. In addition, several states worry thatif the agreement is adopted they will losethe option of developing nuclear energy.

Still, the global community must adopt theTreaty on the Ban of the Production ofFissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons andOther Explosive Devises if it wishes to liveunder conditions where terrorist acts usingnuclear munitions and their surrogates –“dirty bombs”–are impossible, to say noth-ing of the appearance of new nuclearweapon states. But that is another issue,which is not the subject of this article.

1 The Russian Ministry of Defense 12th Main Directorateis the division of the Russian Armed Forces responsible forthe procurement, storage, and use of nuclear munitions.

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Summary

Yaderny KKontrol ((Nuclear CControl)Journal oof tthe PPIR CCenter

for PPolicy SStudies, NNo.1 ((75),Volume 111, SSpring 22005

EDITORIAL

The HHigh-llevel PPanel DDid IIts JJob –– ““TheProcess iis UUnderway”

In 2004, UN Secretary-General KofiAnnan formed the “High-level Panel” alsoreferred to as “Group of Wise Men” toevaluate the character of the changes goingon in the world, and the new threats andchallenges facing humanity. The goal laidbefore the Panel was to try to find a con-sensus opinion on the outlook for, and pos-sible solutions to, many of the world’s mostcritical situations; including one of today’smost vital issues – the conditions for, andgeneral appropriateness of, the use of forcein international relations for neutralizingthreats to the stability and security of allpeoples.

Now, after the presentations of Panel’sreport, it is clear that Kofi Annan suc-ceeded in forming a sufficiently objectiveand balanced team consisting of 16 leadingpolitical and governmental figures fromvarious countries, a team for whichRussian President Vladimir Putin proposedEvgeny Primakov. The panel created anintellectually rich 100-page document. Thedocument’s stand is, naturally, a compro-mise one, but very convincing and helpful,including pieces of advice on how to makethe UN a more effective instrument for thecooperative resolution of global problems.The report by the 16 wise men, as theyare being called more and more often, istitled “A More Secure World: Our SharedResponsibility.”

In creating the High-level Panel, UNSecretary-General Kofi Annan took a know-ing risk. One can already state that the riskhas paid off. The High-level Panel has suit-ably fulfilled its mission, and gave consideredanswers to these and other questions. TheHigh-level Panel did its job – it launchedthe process. Now, it is the duty and honorof the Secretary-General and his colleaguesat the United Nations to correctly compre-hend the intellectual impetus it received andapply it for the common good of the worldcommunity.

INTERVIEW

“How ccan oone sspeak oof tthe ddevelopmentof nnuclear ppower aand, mmeanwhile, pput llim-its oon iits ddevelopment? –– TThis iis tthedilemma tthat sstands bbefore tthe NNPTmember-sstates” –– SSergio DDuarte – What isthe outlook for the 2005 NPT ReviewConference, and what are the basic chal-lenges to the nonproliferation regime, thesequestions are raised in an interview withthe President of the Conference SergioDuarte by the editor-in-chief of this jour-nal, Vladimir Orlov. One of the possiblemechanisms for strengthening the regimeis giving the Additional Protocol obligato-ry status, making it mandatory for all non-nuclear states.

“Combating TTerrorism MMust HHold aaCentral PPlace iin tthe NNew RRussian NNationalSecurity CConcept” –– NNikolai SSpassky – Inan interview with Vladimir Orlov, DeputySecretary of the Security Council NikolaiSpassky discussed the nature of the devel-opment of the Concept, how it differs fromthe 2000 Concept, measures for increasingthe effectiveness of the war on terrorism,the outlook of the CFE Treaty, Russian-NATO relations, and the outlook ofRussian-Iranian nuclear cooperation.

“Iran: tthe ssituation hhas bbecome cclearer, bbutnot aall qquestions hhave bbeen aanswered” ––Sergei KKislyak – Answering the questionsof this journal’s editor-in-chief VladimirOrlov, Deputy Minister of Foreign AffairsSergei Kislyak dwelled upon the issues ofRussia’s participation in the ProliferationSecurity Initiative, the up-coming 2005NPT Review Conference, gave an evalua-tion of the EU initiative on Iran’s nuclearprogram, as well as on issues relating tothe whole spectrum of Russian-Iranianbilateral relations.

ANALYSIS

Nuclear WWeapons SSecurity –– RRussia's TTopPriority iin tthe LLong TTerm –– VVladimirVerkhovtsev –– Using as his example theexercise “Emergency-2004”, the DeputyHead of the 12 Main Directorate of theMinistry of Defense of the RussianFederation examines practical measures forsecuring Russia’s nuclear arsenal, andcomes to the conclusion that Russian pro-tection measures are in accordance withthe criteria for nuclear security adopted bythe nuclear powers, do not fall belowworld standards, and in some areas (in par-

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ticular, the criteria for immunity fromunsanctioned use), exceed them. The arti-cle notes that to ensure reliable security forits nuclear weapons, Russia has, over thecourse of many years, cooperated with for-eign partners, and has used the knowledgeof foreign specialists with long practicalexperience in this area, both at the high-est political level, and as the level of spe-cialist issues.

Indian NNuclear SSecurity: SStrategic CCultureand DDoctrine –– RRajesh BBasrur – How bal-anced is India’s nuclear strategy, and hasIndia reached its stated objectives throughis possession of nuclear weapons? In theopinion of the Director of Center forGlobal Studies (Mumbai), the future ofIndia’s nuclear weapons is unclear; in thefirst place, due to the risky strategy of theuse of nuclear weapons as an element ofpolicy toward Pakistan, which has shownits ineffectiveness and danger in practice.As a result, nuclear weapons will likelyplay a more modest role in India’s securi-ty policy.

Missile DDefense AAfter tthe AABM TTreaty ––Pavel PPodvig – Currently, it is impossibleto predict all of the positive and negativeconsequences of the US decision to beginthe development of missile defenses. TheResearch Associate Center for InternationalSecurity and Cooperation of StanfordUniversity (CISAC) asserts, however, thatthe development of a missile defense sys-tem cannot ensure the resolution of thosetasks that stand before the US, and it willnot have a significant impact on US for-eign policy. In the end, the missile defensesystem will, most likely, occupy a placesimilar to that of air defense – an impor-tant component of the armed forces, capa-ble of providing a real impact on thecourse of one conflict or another, but notcapable of changing the strategic balancein the relations between states.

Will tthe PPSI BBecome aa RReal IInstrumentfor CCounterproliferation PPolicy? ––Alexander KKalyadin – What place is therein the nonproliferation “arsenal” for theProliferation Security Initiative (PSI),aimed at preventing the further spread ofWMD? The Deputy Administrator, Centerfor Political and Military Forecasting of theInstitute of World Economy andInternational Relations of the RussianAcademy of Sciences proposes that the sig-nificant expansion of international supportfor the PSI reflects a new tendency in

nonproliferation, in particular, in relationstowards states that do not observe thenorms of the WMD nonproliferationregime. Thus, Russia joined the PSI, aswas required by its vital security interests.Becoming a member of the PSI “core,”Russia can actively take part in the processof making concrete decisions, and enable amore effective use of the collective capa-bility for strengthening the nonproliferationregime.

The ““Very GGreat GGame”: TThe UU.S. NNewFrontier iin CCentral AAsia –– VVicen ddeKytspotter – This article makes the pro-posal that US actions in the region afterSeptember 11th were aimed not only atsolving short-term security problems, butalso objectively enabled the establishmentof definite stability in Central Asia. In theopinion of the author of this article, Major,French Armed Forces, however, US partic-ipation in the region’s problems is foremostpursuing long-term strategic tasks thatcould, likely, destabilize conditions in theregion, leading to the creation of new chal-lenges to the security of the states ofCentral Asia and to the region as a whole.

VIEWPOINT

Mutual AAssured DDestruction: IIs TThere aanAlternative? –– AAleksei OObykhov – Thisarticle examines the current status of thekey doctrine of nuclear containment – theconcept of “mutually assured destruction”(MAD). Ambassador (Ret.) Obykhov isagainst attempts to return to the nuclearconfrontation of the Cold War, and, inrelating to today, to introduce the conceptof “non-confrontational containment/deter-rence” and proposes that the US andRussia exchange the dangerous concept ofMAD for a wide-ranging agreement onmutual security.

The NNorth KKorean NNuclear CCrisis aandInternational RRelations iin NNorth-EEastAsia – YYoshinori TTakeda – What influencehas North and South Korea, China, Russia,the US and Japan exerted on the crisis onthe Korean Peninsula, and what changes inthe regional security system can be expect-ed in the future? The author, a diplomatwith the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ofJapan and a Research Fellow atGeorgetown University, comes to the con-clusion that through most of the 1990’s,the US was, de facto, the only actor influ-encing the development of the NorthKorean crisis. The reason for Washington’s

85


“monopolization” of the Korean problemwas, foremost, the fact that the DPRK didnot pay much attention to relations withother governments and organizations.Furthermore, the other actors were notvery active in the process of regularizingthe problems on the Korean Peninsula,including the development of nuclear andmissile programs.

COMMENTARY

The TThreat oof tthe UUse oof EEMP WWeaponsfor MMilitary aand TTerrorist PPurposes ––Valdimir BBelous – Before long, terroristacts using electromagnetic weapons, actingon various facilities with the aid of pow-erful electromagnetic pulses (EMP), arelikely. The author, Lead Research Fellow atthe Institute of World Economy andInternational Relations (IMEMO), Major-General (Ret.), proposes that to neutralizethis threat it is necessary to unite theefforts of scientists in different countrieswith the goal of discovering and neutraliz-ing devices that could be used for the real-ization of such scenarios, as well as withthe goal of developing methods for coun-tering and protecting facilities from attackswith EMP weapons. It is not impossiblethat, in terms of importance for ensuringnational security, such a program will, inthe near future, become no less urgentthan the creation of missile defense sys-tems, and the importance of such programswill only grow with the passage of time.

Nuclear SShipbuilding aat tthe BBeginning oofthe 221st Century –– MMikhail BBarabanov –This article gives a short historical outlineof, current conditions of, and outlook fornuclear military and civilian shipbuilding.The author, a Russian independent expert,notes that currently there is reducedenthusiasm in military fleets for the use ofnuclear plants for military escort ships andcruisers. The article also analyzes the rea-sons for the continued use of nuclearpower on American aircraft carriers.

SURVEY

On tthe PProliferation oof CChemical aandBiological WWeapons iin tthe SStates oof ttheMiddle EEast aand NNorth AAfrica –– VVitalyYurchenko –– In the opinion of the authorof this article, an expert at the Institute forIsraeli and Middle Eastern Studies, Colonel(Ret.), there is on-going work by countriesof this region to develop and producing

chemical and biological weapons underconditions of the utmost secrecy, includingwork in violation of officially acceptedinternational responsibilities. Taking thisinto account, the relative accessibility ofthese types of WMD, the presence of thenecessary infrastructure and specialists aswell as means of delivery all enable thepossession of chemical and biologicalweapons by Middle Eastern and NorthAfrican states.

On tthe NNew UUS IInitiative ffor EEnsuring ttheSecurity oof NNuclear aand RRadioactiveMaterials –– VVitaly FFedchenko –– How effec-tive is the American Global ThreatReduction Initiative (GTRI), announced inMay 2004, and how does it correlate withthe already existing nonproliferation pro-grams? The author, Coordinator ofEducational Programs for the PIR Center,notes that the basic advantage of the GTRIprogram is its global character. Taking thisinto account, its adoption could create agood chance to ensure the security of thematerials most dangerous from the point ofview of the threat from terrorism.

New DDirections ffor tthe GGlobal PPartnershipProgram –– AAleksei SShitikov – The chang-ing conditions in which the GlobalPartnership (GP) program should be ful-filled could require corrections in the time-line for beginning the realization of proj-ects and the structure for cooperation,notes this article. The author, Attache,Department for Security and Arms ControlIssues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of theRussian Federation, notes that Russianeeds to define new directions for cooper-ation within the GP and that look to bethe most important from the point of viewof nonproliferation and protecting nationalinterests. It is of central importance that allnew projects are in accordance with theunderling principles of the GP, as well asthat all of the cooperation potential is usedfor the resolution of concrete tasks in theareas of nonproliferation and the liquida-tion of the threat connected to the use ofWMD by terrorists.

HISTORICAL PPAGES

Lessons ffrom tthe FFourth NNPT RReviewConference, 11990 –– RRoland TTimerbaev –Ambassador (Ret.) Timerbaev reconstructs,on the basis of his diary entries, the eventsof the final phase of consultation on thedevelopment of the concluding documentof the conference on nuclear testing. The

86


article notes that the 1990 conference endedwithout the adoption of a concluding dec-laration, but this did not detract from theimportance of the NPT or reduce its effec-tiveness. In this regard, its results served asa sobering and, to a certain degree, mobi-lizing factor for the US. Despite the his-torical character of the events, they havenot lost their relevance today.

LIBRARY

The BBlix MMemoirs –– GGennady EEvstafiev –In the pages of his memoir, the head ofthe UN Commission on Iraq Hans Blixfurther tells of the years and millions wast-ed on the search for signs of that which

the author aptly christened “weapons ofmass disappearance” in Iraq.

LETTERS TTO TTHE EEDITOR

Makhmut GGareev –– What are the missilespointed at? – In this letter to the editor,the author, President of the Academy ofMilitary Sciences of the Russian Federationproposes that we stop beating around thebush, and define the future of nucleardeterrence in US-Russian relations; as, atleast in theory, the missiles and bombswith nuclear warheads “are not targetinganyone” and practically speaking – com-pared to what they once were – nuclearrelations and mutual perceptions are total-ly different.

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Summary

Yaderny KKontrol ((Nuclear CControl)Journal oof tthe PPIR CCenter

for PPolicy SStudies, NNo.2 ((76),Volume 111, SSummer 22005

EDITORIAL

Will tthe IIranian AAtom BBecome aa PPersianCarpet ffor RRussia? –– A series of meetingsbetween PIR Center leaders and Iranianexperts and high ranking officials inMoscow, Tehran and Geneva in January-March 2005 further convinced us that Iranearnestly intends to develop a large-scalenuclear energy program. Under the cir-cumstances, Russia must make certain thatit is not sidelined when the divvying upof the Iranian market begins. Russia mustbe sure to learn from its previous experi-ences, which have not all been positive,when expanding its cooperation with Iran.

INTERVIEW

Sergei KKislyak: ““Iran: tthe SSituation HHasBecome CClearer, BBut NNot AAll QQuestionsHave BBeen AAnswered” –– In an interviewwith editor-in-chief Vladimir Orlov,Russian Deputy Ministry of Foreign AffairsSergei Kislyak communicated Russia’s posi-tion on the Iranian nuclear program, offi-cial Tehran’s cooperation with the IAEAand the prospects for the development ofbilateral Russian-Iranian relations. He alsospoke about his expectations for theupcoming Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treatyreview conference.

ANALYSIS

The RRussian AArmed FForces: NNewChallenges aand TThreats –– AAleksandrRukshin ––Deputy Head of the GeneralStaff of the Russian Armed Forces exam-ines the basic trends in the organizationand development of the Armed Forcesgiven the transformation of the nationalsecurity threats facing Russia. Critical pri-orities in this process are to maintain thecapacity of the nation’s strategic deterrenceforces, to increase the number of taskforces and units maintained in constantcombat readiness, and to implement thearmaments modernization program.

Low YYield NNuclear WWeapons –– aa PPossibleFoundation ffor tthe NNuclear AArsenal oof ttheNew CCentury –– IIgor AAndryushin, VViktor

Mikhailov, YYuri TTrutnev, AAleksandrChernyshev –– The need for nuclearweapons to provide for the security ofRussia and its allies is determined not onlyby future relations with the United States,but also the possible aggravation of globalcrises. In the opinion of the group of theleading Russian nuclear weapons expertsfrom Sarov, current circumstances aredeveloping in such a way that one likelyscenario for the development of nuclearweapons systems in the near future is theappearance of new nuclear arsenals withlow yield charges, mounted on both tacti-cal and strategic nuclear missiles.

Brazil’s NNuclear-PPowered SSubmarineDevelopment PProgram: TThrough SSqualls ttothe DDepths –– AAndrei FFrolov – Based on adetailed analysis of Brazil’s design and con-struction of a pilot nuclear-powered sub-marine, the author, a Russian independentexpert, proposes a system of criteria toevaluate the political, economic, and tech-nological preparedness of a state to join theclub of nuclear-powered submarine owners.The author concludes that without foreignassistance and with a relatively low level oftechnological development, it is doubtfulthat Brazil will be able to bring itsnuclear-powered submarine R&D up tothe level needed to build such boats.

VIEWPOINT

The PProliferation oof UUnmanned AAerialVehicles iis aa GGrowing SSecurity TThreat ––Gennady YYevstafiev –– An analysis of theworld-wide development of unmanned aer-ial vehicles (UAVs) leads to the conclusionthat the global community must finallypay adequate attention to this growingproblem, in order to prevent a new typeof arms race. Given the newness and manydimensions of this incipient problem, theSenior Advisor of the PIR Center arguesthat it would be advisable to set up aworking group of government experts withthe appropriate mandate under the auspicesof the UN General Assembly FirstCommittee to undertake a comprehensiveexamination of the situation.

COMMENTARY

The TTruth aabout ''Suitcase NNukes' – VViktorYesin – The numerous media articles aboutterrorist organizations and extremist move-ments in possession of “suitcase nukes” haveseriously worried the public at large, once

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again raising the question of the existenceof compact nuclear weapons in Russia. Onthe basis of rich factual material, the Firstvice-president of the Academy for security,defense, law and order tells the history ofthe design, production, and subsequentcomplete destruction of this class of nuclearweapon in Russia.Viktor MMurogov aand NNikolai PPonomarev-Stepnoi –– NNuclear TTechnology: GGuaranteeingRussia’s SSteady DDevelopment – Russia’slong-term energy and national security inter-ests, as well as its sustainable development,require an increase in the use of nuclearenergy in the production of electricity, aswell industrial and household heating.However, in the opinion of the FormerDeputy General Director of the IAEA andthe Vice-President of the Kurchatov Institutein Moscow, Russia’s lack of a clear nuclearenergy strategy is causing the intergenera-tional continuity of specialists in this area tobe lost, requiring the adoption of urgentnational measures.

SURVEY

Central AAsia: TThe CCollective EEfforts oofStates tto PPrevent tthe TThreat oofInternational TTerrorism –– AAibek TToktomu-shev –– The development of cooperationamong Central Asian states in the struggleagainst international terrorism is occurringin an atmosphere of regional political insta-bility and an aggravated geopolitical game.The inconsistent and unpredictable foreignpolicy of the region’s young independentstates, together with the disagreementsbetween them, reduce the level of confi-dence and, in the opinion of security expertfrom Kyrgyzstan, slow the processes of inte-gration in the sphere of security.

SNF RReprocessing iin tthe CContext oof ttheGlobal PPartnership PProgram –– DDmitryKovchegin –– One of the main difficultiesin the process of nuclear-powered subma-

rine dismantlement is the handling of irra-diated nuclear fuel unloaded from nuclearsubmarines. The consultant to Booz, Allenand Hamilton considers the scale of theproblem through the prism of the GlobalPartnership programs against the prolifera-tion of WMD, and concludes that foreignfinancial assistance could significantlyincrease the safety and security of thisprocess, including both its environmentalaspects and the physical security of nuclearmaterials.

HISTORICAL PPAGES

South AAfrica: HHow IIt CCreated NNuclearWeapons, aand HHow aand WWhy IItRelinquished TThem –– RRoland TTimerbaev ––The dismantlement of South Africa’snuclear weapons is a truly unique occur-rence in the history of nuclear nonprolifer-ation. In the opinion of the PIR Center’sExecutive Board Chairman, regardless of themotives that guided the RSA governmentwhen it decided to give up these weapons,this precedent clearly demonstrates thatnuclear nonproliferation – given the properpolitical will – is attainable and can be real-ized with reliable international monitoring.

LIBRARY

From tthe SShadows iinto tthe LLight… oorShowing ttheir TTrue CColors –– VVladimirOrlov –– TThe eeditor-iin-cchief oof tthe jjournalread tthe bbook Ennggaggiinngg EEurrasiia’sSeparratiist SStates by BBritish eexpert DDovLynch aand nnow aasks tthe qquestion: shouldthe conflicts in Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetiareally be managed through a policy ofincreasing the “engagement” of these terri-tories into global society, primarily throughexpanding economic contact with them?Or is there only one way to fight these“pirate republics” – excising the abscesses?

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Summary

Yaderny KKontrol ((Nuclear CControl)Journal oof tthe CCenter ffor PPolicyStudies iin RRussia, NNo.3 ((77),

Volume 111, FFall 22005

EDITORIAL

Time tto RRethink tthe ““War oon TTerro-rism” – Despite individual successes, the“war on terror” cannot be seen as a suc-cessful strategy. Influenced by the tragicterrorist act in New York and in solidaritywith the American people, the global com-munity gave Washington carte blanche,believing in its strength and ability tomake considered and objective decisions inthe interests of all who suffer from thedevelopment and consequences of terror-ism. This was true of Russia too, one ofthe first to decide to support the UnitedStates by taking the geopolitical risk ofagreeing to the positioning of U.S. militarybases in Central Asia.

Four years have passed, and it has becomeclear that the primitive understanding ofsources and, most importantly, methods tofight the terrorist plague is not providingthe necessary results. There is no doubtthat the military component plays animportant role, but in the end, the neu-tralization of this cruel and extremely dan-gerous phenomenon can only be donethrough a combination of ideological, socio-economic, and military methods. This isthe only path that will lead to a decisiveimprovement in international security. Afterthe well-known events of this July, Londonunderstood this very well. One of TonyBlair’s first meetings after the terroristattacks was a meeting with members of anIslamic group active in the UnitedKingdom. The decision to extradite AbuQatada, the popular cleric and vehementpropagandist of Islamic extremism, hometo Jordan was an eloquent confirmation ofthe ideological aspect of the problem.Further, the U.K. ambassador to Russiarecently announced that London is readyto send Akhmed Zakayev to Moscow ifprovided with proof of his involvement interrorism.

In Washington, too, they finally are begin-ning to understand. It is no coincidencethat the slogan “war on terror,” so sweetto hawks’ ears, is quietly disappearing fromthe lexicon of U.S. political actors. Even

leaders in the Pentagon, who are drawn tomilitary methods, have begun to admitthat “there is a battle of ideas that willcontinue for a long time.” Currently, thefocus of anti-terrorism is changing tofighting “violent extremism,” and is cur-rently aimed first and foremost at Islamicextremists (although it is not limited toIslam).

Expenditures on the fight against terrorand improving security are increasingthroughout the globe. In 2006, Russia willspend a total of 10 billion rubles (2.2 bil-lion in 2005) on these tasks. But even thisin no way diminishes the need of under-take social policies and ideological workthat would–together with efforts in themilitary sphere–help us to narrow the basisof support for terrorists on the part of cer-tain parts of the Muslim community, firstand foremost in the Northern Caucasus.The whole world needs to find effectiveways to cut the ties between intransigentfighters and their ideologists, with whomnegotiation is not possible, and the localpopulation.

Russia will soon take up the presidency ofthe G8. Given recent positive developmentsin rethinking ways to fight terrorism,Russia, which has suffered so deeply fromterrorism itself, could propose a renewedprogram (agreed to by others) to overcometerrorism.

INTERVIEW

Konstantin KKosachev: ““Russian ForeignPolicy Priorities” –– What are the prioritiesof Russia’s foreign policy, how Russia’s pol-icy in the Former Soviet Union should beformed, which factors shape the US-Russian agenda? Konstantin Kosachev, theChairman of the Committee on ForeignAffairs of the Russian State Duma answersthese and some other questions of thejournal’s editor-in-chief Vladimir Orlov.

Viktor MMourogov: ““Russia IIs ““Doomed” TToDevelop NNuclear PPower IIndustry” –– FormerDeputy Director General of the IAEAViktor Murogov in his interview to thejournal’s correspondent Nadezhda Logutovadiscusses future prospects for developmentof the nuclear power industry in the worldas a stabilizing factor of energy-related,social and political progress, and the role ofRussian technologies in this process.According to the well-known Russianexpert, today Russia faces an urgent need to

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develop and implement technological inno-vations, which would ensure long-term andlarge-scale development of the country’snuclear power industry.

ANALYSIS

The RRight TTo WWithdraw FFrom TTheNuclear NNon-PProliferation TTreaty: TTheViews oof TTwo NNPT NNegotiators –– GGeorgeBunn, RRoland TTimerbaev –– Why a provi-sion limiting the right to withdraw fromthe NPT has been included in the text ofthe Treaty? What powers does the with-drawal clause vest in the NPT memberstates and in the UN Security Council inorder to solve the problem of opting outof the Treaty by DPRK or Iran, or anyother member state? These and otherquestions are considered in the joint workby two “co-authors” of the Treaty,Ambassador Roland Timerbaev, Chairmanof the PIR Center Executive Board andGeorge Bunn, Consulting Professor,Stanford University.

On TThe RRole oof NNuclear WWeapons iinProviding ffor RRussian SSecurity iin tthe 221stCentury – AAleksandr SSaveliev –– Currentlack of large-scale and credible threats toRussia’s security does not liberate the coun-try’s leadership from its responsibility “toremember about war”, including the devel-opment and improvement of operationalplans for nuclear forces, which may be usedin case if such threats will arise.Considering options of the country’s leader-ship in a crisis situation, linked to a possi-bility of the nuclear weapons use, which isenvisaged in officially approved regulations,strategies, and doctrines, Aleksandr Saveliev,Head of Strategic Studies Department,Center of International Security, IMEMO,Russian Academy of Sciences, and professorof the World Politics Department at theMoscow State University, proposes a num-ber of different measures, aimed at preven-tion of escalation of such a crisis into amore serious conflict.

The PProspects oof UUS NNuclear PPolicy AAfterthe GGeorge WW. BBush AAdministration ––Nikolay SSokov –– The evolution of USnuclear policy continues drawing closeattention all across the globe. According tothe opinion of the author, a senior researchassociate of the Center for NonproliferationStudies at Monterey Institute ofInternational Studies, in fact, the practicalsteps taken in the recent years are verymodest (at least compared to budgetary

requests), and even they meet stiff resist-ance in the US Congress and opposition ofpolitical and expert elites. Therefore, onecan say that the world community reactsnot to real steps, but rather to its ownexpectations related to the future directionof the US policy.

Proliferation SSecurity IInitiative: LLookingfrom RRussia –– MMarat BBerdyev, MMariaProkhorova – Based on detailed analysis ofvarious aspects of the PSI – the USPresident’s initiative in interception andsearching shipments, suspected in trans-porting materials that can be used forWMD production, the DiplomaticAcademy trainee and expert of theInstitute for US and Canadian Studiesassess conformity of the initiative with theinternational law. The authors consider thereasons of Russia’s accession to the initia-tive and possible consequences of thisaction for Russia.

Information SSecurity aand GGlobalization ––Aleksandr FFedorov –– The transition to the“information society” leads not only to eco-nomic growth, creation of global industriesand strengthening the countermeasuresagainst “new challenges”, but also toenhancement of opportunities for using themethods of economic and military infor-mation confrontation, and information war-fare means in economic and politicalspheres. Aleksandr Fedorov, an expert ofthe Russian Foreign Intelligence Service,analyses the issues related to ensuringglobal security through the perspective ofsolving the problem of international infor-mation security.

VIEWPOINT

The TThreat oof BBioterrorism: RRole oof MMassMedia –– AAleksandr RRabodzey ––Information on bioterrorism is based on asmall number of facts and it is significantlypolarized due to the interests of variousgroups. As a consequence, many materialson the threat of bioterrorism reflect a pre-conceived point of view and distort factsfor the reasons mentioned above. Accordingto Aleksandr Rabodzey, an expert of theCenter for Security Studies at theMassachusetts Institute of Technology, thethreat of bioterrorism, nurtured by distort-ed information, is becoming ever morerealistic due to agitation created around itand due to its predicted consequences forthe society.

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COMMENTARY

The NNPT RReview CConference: iin SSearch oofConsensus –– WWilliam PPotter –– The NPTReview Conference, which took place inMay 2005 in New York has ended in fail-ure, being unable to adopt a final docu-ment. However, even despite the pessimisticforecasts of the results of the Conference,which had been made on the eve of itsopening, the author of this article, directorof the US-based Center for NonproliferationStudies was surprised by the extent of ten-sions inside many major political groupsand by the energy displayed by one of themember states in blocking almost anyattempt to reach consensus both on proce-dural and on substantive issues.

Results oof tthe NNPT RReview CConference aandPakistan’s NNuclear PPolicy –– MMasood KKhan –Pakistan is not a member of the NPT andit has not been represented at the NPTReview Conference. However the failure ofthe Conference requires the expert commu-nity to go back to the genesis and raisond’etre of Pakistan’s nuclear program,Islamabad’s official vision of contemporarySouth Asia, its security architecture and ofthe future of the international non-prolifer-ation regime. A commentary on Pakistan’snuclear policy by Ambassador MasoodKhan, Permanent Representative of Pakistanto the United Nations at Geneva gives a lotof food for thought in this regard.

SURVEY

Civilian CControl oover tthe AArmed FForces iinRussia: HHistory aand FFuture PProspects –– YYuriNazarkin –– Presence of civilian control overmilitary activities of a state is not only anecessary component of a democratic state,but also an essential precondition for increas-ing its efficiency and combat effectiveness ofits military. A well-known Russian diplomat,former arms control negotiator, AmbassadorYuri Nazarkin reflects on the existing prin-ciples of control over the armed forces incontemporary Russia.

“Second LLine oof DDefense” RResults oofInternational CCooperation iin tthe ZZone oofOperations oof AAstrakhan CCustoms –– KKatyaShadrina – An important role in strength-ening controls over shipments of nuclearand radioactive materials through Russianborders is played by an international pro-gram entitled “Second Line of Defense”.Katya Shadrina, an expert of the GenevaCentre for Security Policy, also working at

the Geneva Center for Security Policy,examines the mechanisms, which areaimed at countering the threat of illicittrans-border trafficking in sensitive materi-als with specific reference to implementa-tion of the program at Astrakhan Customs.

HISTORICAL PPAGES

Deideologized ddiplomacy: aan EExperience oofUS-SSoviet SStrategic AArms LLimitation aandArms RReduction TTalks –– AAleksey OObuk-hov – During the Cold War there was asphere of diplomacy, which practiced dei-deologization and pragmatism long beforethe revelations of Perestroika. They weredone without much fuss and publicity,both due to conditions that existed at thattime and also because there was no otheralternative way. One of the participants ofthose events, Ambassador AlekseyObukhov, former arms control negotiatorand a deputy foreign minister of Russia,remembers nuclear arms negotiationsbetween the USSR and the United States,which were kind of a testing ground fordeideologized diplomacy.

Pioneer oof RRussian AAeronautics –– MMikhailPavlushenko –– On the basis of archiveddocuments and discussions with childrenand grandchildren of “the key character ofthe story”, Mikhail Pavlushenko, professorof the Operational Art Department atPeter the Great Academy of StrategicMissile Forces, gives an account of the lifeof a founding father of Russian aviationand aeronautics Aleksandr Kovanko. Hisbiography is nothing else but the historyof Russian aeronautics.

LIBRARY

The SSmell oof FFear, tthe SSmell oof DDust ––Vladimir OOrlov –– A review of AsneSeierstad’s books dedicated to the two cen-tral events of the last five years in worldpolitics: defeat of the Taliban regime inAfghanistan and American invasion of Iraq.The books by this author do not offer aprofound political analysis of origins andconsequences; a clash of geopolitical inter-ests is not visible there either. A BaghdadJournal and The Bookseller of Kabul by theNorwegian journalist consider democratiza-tion of Afghanistan and Iraq through voic-es, faces, and thoughts of ordinary peple, the“little guys”, overwhelmed by war.

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