Plague and Violence in Saint-Louis-du-Sénégal, 1917-1920

Cahiers d’études africaines

183 | 2006

Varia

Plague and Violence in Saint-Louis-du-Sénégal,1917-1920

Kalala Ngalamulume

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Plague and Violence in Saint -Louis-du-Sénégal, 1917-1920

par Kalala NGALAMULUME

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Kalala Ngalamulume

Plague and Violencein Saint-Louis-du-Sénégal,

1917-19201

The plague epidemic that struck Saint-Louis in 1917 was the latest of aseries of epidemics that ravaged the city since 1867, and one significantepisode in the spread of the disease in Senegal between 1914 and 1945.Both Francophone and Anglophone historians have contributed to our under-standing of plague not only as a disease of the uneven distribution of resour-ces and a disease of the poor “other”, but also as an ideological contestbetween the colonizers and the colonized, and as a signifier of social meta-phors. They have also underlined the ways in which plague helped framedebates about colonial urban policies, especially the administration of theurban poor. But, until recently, these studies have neglected Saint-Louis,the first Capital of French West Africa (AOF), despite the violence thataccompanied the implementation of unprecedented antiplague measures and,moreover, the role played by Saint-Louis as an experimental ground forcolonial policies later applied in West and Central Africa, and Madagascar(Pulvenis 1968; Betts 1971; Swanson 1977; M’bokolo 1982; Curtin 1985;Clément 1985; Goerg 1998; Echenberg 2002; Ngalamulume 2004).

This article attempts to fill the gap. It will explore the impact of theplague epidemic on urban policy and race relations as well as the specificways that these issues were defined and resolved in the city.

1. The materials for this article were collected in 1994-1995 during fieldworkresearch in Senegal and France assisted by grants from the Rockfeller Foundationand from the Joint Committee of African Studies of the Social Science ResearchCouncil and the American Council of Learned Societies with funds provided bythe Ford, Mellon and Rockefeller Foundations, and in 2001, 2002, and 2006 inFrance assisted by grants from Bryn Mawr College. I thank them all for theirsupport. I gratefully acknowledge the comments made on earlier draft of thisarticle by Professors David Robinson, Gary MacDonogh, Jane Caplan, MadhaviKale, and Sharon Ullman. I also thank the members of the Bryn Mawr Commit-tee on Appointments and the anonymous outside reviewers of my tenure dossieras well as the anonymous readers of the Cahiers d’Études africaines for theircritical comments. Any shortcomings are mine.

Cahiers d’Études africaines, XLVI (3), 183, 2006, pp. 539-565.

540 KALALA NGALAMULUME

The outbreak of plague captivated the public imagination and mobilizedstate resources in “sanitary defence of the colony” of Senegal in a way thatwas only matched by the terror caused by yellow fever. Principles of out-break surveillance were updated in order to deal with gaps in responsecapacity. The legislative framework on which the authorities based theircombat against plague included two keys texts, that is to say, the decreeof 15 December 1909 and the ordinance of 12 December 1912. The firstdecree, which replaced the decrees of 31 Mars 1897 and 20 July 1899related to maritime sanitary police, was inspired by the 1903 Paris Interna-tional Sanitary Convention which revised the sanitary measures used untilthen in the light of recent discoveries concerning the prophylaxis oftransmissible diseases. The new decree extended the permanent sanitarymeasures that applied until then to yellow fever, plague and cholera, toinclude “other transmissible and importable serious diseases”. Localauthorities were required to rapidly notify by cable the Department in Parisas well as neighbouring French and foreign colonies concerning confirmedcases of cholera, plague or yellow fever and the precautionary measurestaken in order to combat the importation or spread of these diseases byland or aboard ships. Each colony was required to equip at least its maincommercial port with the necessary sanitary infrastructure, including a laza-retto for the isolation of clinically-suspected “pestilential diseases” cases, abacteriological laboratory, and disinfection machines, preferably the Claytonbrand which had the double advantage of disinfecting and destroying rats,mosquitoes, and other insects found in the holds of ships arriving withunclean bills of health. Moreover, sanitary authorities were strongly advi-sed to balance the interests of public health with those of commerce2.

The ordinance of 12 December 1912 listed nineteen infectious diseases,including yellow fever, cholera and plague that required compulsory notifi-cation from physicians and paramedics to public authorities. The ordinancehad provisions for the official declaration of an epidemic in a given locality(circonscription), the isolation of suspected cases in their homes or inspecial wards, and the disinfection or destruction of suspected or contamina-ted houses and objects. A special commission was required to determinewhich houses were dangerous to public health and had to be destroyed andwhich ones would be spared and restored. Negligence or deliberate sab-otage was punished by fines or incarceration3. It should be emphasizedthat, although not explicitly stated, the preoccupation with unsanitary houseshad major implications for urban colonial planning.

2. G. Trouillot, Rapport au président de la République (A. Fallières), 15 décembre1909, Journal officiel du Sénégal, p. 70; Décret du 15 décembre 1909, Journalofficiel du Sénégal, pp. 70-79; G. Trouillot, Circulaire ministérielle relative àl’application du décret du 15 décembre 1909 portant règlement sur la policesanitaire maritime dans les colonies et pays de protectorat, 15 décembre 1909,Journal officiel du Sénégal, pp. 138-139.

3. Arrêté concernant les mesures à prendre pour prévenir ou faire cesser les mala-dies épidémiques, no. 293ter of 12 December 1912, Journal officiel du Sénégal,pp. 37-41.

PLAGUE AND VIOLENCE IN SENEGAL 541

Ecology of Bubonic Plague

Bubonic plague is a disease caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis thatis transmitted to humans through the bites of infected fleas, such as Pulexirritans, that have fed on infected animals, such as “squirrels, marmots,prairie dogs, mice, house cats, and, classically, the common domestic rat,Rattus rattus” (Biddle 1996). Human plague occurs after infected fleas runout of rodent hosts and start feeding on humans. There are three types ofplague: bubonic, pneumonic, and septicemic. Within six days of infection60 percent of bubonic plague victims develop a bubo, or a grossly swollenlymph node sometimes reaching the size of an egg or an orange in groin,armpit or neck, accompanied by a high fever, headaches, muscle pain, andmental disorientation; between 40 and 65 percent of infected humans suc-cumb to the disease within a week after the appearance of the bubo. Insome instances, varying between 5 and 15 percent of the cases, when thevictim’s lungs are infected, the bubonic plague can be transformed into a“primary” pneumonic plague, spread directly from person to person, andkill 100 percent of those infected. In cases of either complication or untrea-ted bubonic or pneumonic plague, the infectious agent spreads in the blood-stream, leading to a septicemic plague. The majority of plague victimswere children, the elderly, and the economically disadvantaged (Carmichael1993; Brossollet & Mollaret 1994: 14). The outbreak of plague seems tobe linked to the high-moisture weather that contributes to the multiplicationof rodents. The story of plague pandemics is well known and there is noneed to revisit it here. But suffice it to mention that the 1917 epidemicwas part of the third and last plague pandemic that started in China in1894, struck Bombay in 1896 and reached the African continent throughinternational travel and trade; it ravaged cities such as Tamatave, Durban,Cape Town, and Dakar (Echenberg 2002). Alexandre Yersin is creditedfor having isolated the plague bacillus, uncovered the role of rats in thetransmission of bubonic plague, and the anti-plague serum, while Paul-LouisSimond discovered the role of flea rats in the transmission of the bacillusthat was the missing link in Yersin’s work (Brossollet & Mollaret 1994:84-97). The operations of deratization and disinfection of ships as well asthe building of entrepôts and sewers inaccessible to the rodents contributedto reducing the spread of plague throughout the world. The treatment con-sists of sulfamides and antibiotics.

Outbreak in Saint-Louis and Political Response.September-December 1917

In early September 1917, there were rumours among the French residentsabout cases of plague observed in Saint-Louis and the apparent spread ofthe disease in the city’s slums. The medical authorities were disappointed


that the epidemic preparedness undertaken in 1914 to protect the city againstthe Dakar plague outbreak was ineffective4. Then, following the provisionsof the decree of 15 December 1909 and the ordinance of 12 December1912, the authorities chose the Gardettes Building to house the eventualpatients, opened a lazaretto on Baba-Gueye Island for plague suspects, regu-lated the movement of floating population, kept a watchful eye on theovercrowded slums of Guet-Ndar, Ndar-Toute, and Sor, and unsanitarydwellings, encouraged city residents to destroy rats by offering 0.25 centsper captured rat, and offered the Haffkine vaccine on a voluntary basis5.The circulation of rumours of an epidemic in the city three years later provo-ked fear and panic among city residents even if the authorities had not yetofficially announced the outbreak of plague.

It was not until 7 December that the governor confirmed the existenceof clinical cases of plague in the city. The focus of infection was locatedin Ndar-Toute and around Sidy Tall Mosque. The authorities took precau-tionary measures to stop the spread of the disease in other parts of the cityand the rest of Senegal. The decision was a calculated move on the partof the colonial officials, who had at their disposal panoply of urgent sanitaryand medical measures within the existing disease surveillance system, asdefined by the ordinance of 16 July 1903 related to the measures to beadopted, in order to combat the spread of epidemic diseases6. As in previ-ous epidemics, the authorities were hesitant to create panic that could disturbcommerce and paralyze the administration. But as the disease spread, thecolonial authorities decided to intervene.

According to the provisions of the ordinance of 7 December, city resid-ents were required to notify the colonial authorities about new plaguecases. The ordinance gave the medical authorities powers to isolate thesick for medical care, and put people who were in contact with the patientand were considered plague suspects under medical surveillance in the laza-retto at Pointe-aux-Chameaux for a period of 10 days; to destroy or disinfectsuspected dwellings, furniture, and other suspect objects; to inspect andissue an unclean bill of health to any ship leaving Saint-Louis; and to pro-hibit the importation of any product susceptible of transmitting the disease,such as skins, used objects, bedclothes and rags that were believed to carry

4. Décret du 2 Septembre 1914 édictant des mesures exceptionnelles en vue deprévenir et de combattre la propagation des maladies infectieuses; arrêté du20 octobre 1914 promulguant en AOF le décret du 2 Septembre 1914 étendantdans les colonies françaises les dispositions du décret du 14 Août 1914, JournalOfficiel de l’AOF, 1914, 924-5; décret du 28 Septembre 1916. See COLLOMB

et al. (1921). For an exhaustive list of sanitary measures, see COLLIGNON &BECKER (1989).

5. ANS/Senegal/H30, Hygiene and Public Sanitation Colonial Committee meetingrecords, May 20, 1914; ANS/Senegal/H30, governor to mayor, July 1914; ANS/Senegal/H30, governor to Health Service, December 13, 1914.

6. ANS, Ordinance related to the measures to adopt in order to combat epidemicdiseases, no. 195 of July 16, 1903, Bulletin officiel du Sénégal, 1903, p. 401.


infectious agents. Indigènes as well as foreign minorities (Moors, Syriansand Moroccans) present in Saint-Louis were required to hold a health pass-port or medical certificate issued by the sanitary authorities showing proofsof a completed quarantine or vaccination. Travellers without this medicaldocument would be denied access to the train station7. Vaccination wasmade available to city residents8. The declaration of an epidemic meantthat the colonial state would intervene into more and more aspects of peo-ple’s lives. Physicians were authorized to make daily inspection visits inthe houses located within the infected perimeter in search of people present-ing the symptoms of the disease. People would be told what to do andwhere to go or not to go.

But three days later, on 10 December, the disease acquired a specificsocial and spatial character, as the residents of Ndar-Toute and Guet-Ndarbecame the targets of the anti-plague measures. Indeed, the governor impo-sed a sanitary cordon on the two peri-urban villages, or slums, and restrictedthe contacts between them as well as between them and the rest of the city;targeted residents were prohibited to change residence without an officialauthorization9. In order to prevent the clinical cases and people who hadbeen in contact with them from spreading the disease, residents were requi-red to notify the municipal medical authorities of cases with suspectedplague symptoms as well as suspected plague-related deaths10. A three-member commission was put in place to evaluate the cost of infected prop-erty to be destroyed11.

Popular Protest

The urban poor found the health control measures described above arbitrary,discriminatory and alien, given the fact that they violated their social normsand cultural values. So the masses and their leaders were determined toresist such discriminatory laws even if the indigenous healers had no curefor plague (Echenberg 2002: 159-165). Resistance took various forms rang-ing from violent protests to peaceful demonstrations and passive actions.Some leaders of violent protests were often arrested and prosecuted. The

7. ANS/Sénégal/H49, Arrêté déclarant contaminée de peste la ville de Saint-Louis,(quartier de N’Dar-Toute, Mosque Sidy Tall), 7 décembre 1917.

8. ANS/Sénégal/H76, Police de la ville de Saint-Louis, rapport du 22-24 décembre1917.

9. ANS/Sénégal/H49, Arrêté interdisant aux habitants de Guet-Ndar et Ndar-Toute,pendant toute la durée de l’épidémie, de changer de domicile sans autorisationpréalable de l’autorité sanitaire, 10 décembre 1917.

10. ANS/Sénégal/H49, Arrêté interdisant l’accès du quartier de Ndar-Toute conta-miné de peste, 12 décembre 1917.

11. Arrêté nommant une commission chargée de procéder à l’évaluation des construc-tions et objets divers dont la destruction aura été ordonnée par l’autorité sanitaire,11 décembre 1917.


most popular form of peaceful protest was the refusal by the women ofGuet-Ndar to sell fish on the market12. The first protests started in Decem-ber when physicians Lailheurgue and Le Gallen visited a plague suspect,daughter of Amadou Moctar, in Ndar-Toute and were told that she went tothe city-island. At the same time, women of Ndar-Toute took to the streetto express their anger against the specific restrictions imposed upon them,and verbally abused the two doctors, as they were leaving the premises,prompting the resignation of Dr. Lailheurgue13. The next day, health offici-als extended the vaccination that started on 7 December to the rest of thecity and replaced the sanitary passports with vaccination cards. The sameday, François Carpot, the métis deputy and lawyer, conveyed the grievancesof the people of Ndar-Toute to interim secrétaire général Muller concerningthe harshness of the anti-plague measures and the unfair compensation fordestroyed property14.

The administration officials believed that, although the sanitary andmedical measures adopted were not sufficiently “energetic”, their strictapplication would have contained the epidemic. But most provisions ofthe early anti-plague measures never received the beginning of execution,especially in Guet-Ndar that was considered “the main focus of infection”because of a number of factors, chief among them the resistance of thepeople of Guet-Ndar and the loopholes in the legislation that made the pros-ecution of protestors difficult15. In the meantime, the ravages of the epi-demic continued to spread and, by the end of 1917, plague mortality wasestimated at 58 deaths.

Resistance resumed in mid-January when the first two deaths in Guet-Ndar were followed by the evacuation of only two individuals to the laza-retto, the other plague suspects refusing to be isolated. In a telegram dated16 January 1918 to the governor who was in an inspection tour at Bakelin Upper Senegal, interim secrétaire général Muller reported that the entirepopulation of Guet-Ndar had exhibited a “grave attitude of character”, threa-tened the Europeans, and resisted all attempts to remove the corpses ofplague victims and to evacuate the suspects, thus forcing the Hygiene Ser-vice to suspend its activities in that peri-urban village. He also mentionedanother serious incident that took place in the northern quartier of Saint-Louis where two European gendarmes—Bouville and Perennsez—and sev-eral European and African health workers were beaten up as they tried to

12. ANS/Senegal/H76, Police report, 15-16 February, 14-15 March 1918.13. ANS/Sénégal/H76, Rapport de l’inspecteur de Police, Albertini, 23 décembre

1917; ANS/Senegal/H76, telegram of Governor General Angulvant to governor,March 16, 1918.

14. ANS/Sénégal/H76, Note de service de Muller au gouverneur, 24 décembre 1917.15. ANS/AOF/H57/31, 29-30. The penalties for non-compliance with sanitary and

medical measures were either too severe (ordinance of December 12, 1912) ortoo lenient, weak and inoperative (decree of April 14, 1904 related to the protec-tion of public health in French West Africa) to be imposed by the courts.


remove the body of Bouna, an interpreter of the tribunal who had passedaway the night before. He described the situation as a “worrisome efferves-cence”, requiring the use of armed force, and urged the governor to returnto Saint-Louis where plague cases were in a “marked recrudescence”, asthe first European plague case was reported and sent to the lazaretto16.The colonial authorities’ anxiety was justified in the light of the publicationof the fatality case for the first two weeks of January which indicated atotal of 22 new plague cases and 14 deaths. Ndar Toute had the highestnumber of cases (15 cases with 11 deaths), followed by Saint-Louis (4 cases)and Guet-Ndar (3 cases with 3 deaths)17. But the people of Guet-Ndar hadtheir own perspective on the causes of the tension. In a letter to the gov-ernor dated January 18, 1918 they made it clear that they did not reject themedical advice; “what we disdain”, they argued, “is to see our dead takenaway by the hygiene service when we can ourselves bury them as well [...]according to the requirements of our religion”18. The response of the localpopulation shows that health officials were culturally insensitive.

It should be emphasized that the colonial authorities came to constructresistance as a “Wolof resistance”, while the Bambaras (Bamana) were des-cribed as “docile”, accepting to be evacuated to the lazaretto “without anyresistance.” Such a perception led Dr. Le Gallen of Hygiene Service towonder whether the colonial authorities could redefine the “native problem”in Senegal in terms of “races” instead of religions (Islam vs. “animism”),as both Wolof and Bamana were Muslims and yet responded differently tothe European demands, and to question the relevance of the usual colonialcategories (Europeans, assimilés, and indigènes)19. Moreover, the resis-tance of Guet-Ndar residents was seen as a contagious disease capable ofspreading and infecting (healthy) people in other parts of the city20. Butthe evidence suggests that violent incidents were first signalled in Ndar-Toute and Saint-Louis, at the time when the situation was still calm inGuet-Ndar. In addition, there were instances when the Bamana resistedthe evacuation to the lazaretto21. Clearly, Dr. Le Gallen’s assertions werebased on incomplete information.

A serious incident took place at the occasion of the death, on 22 January1918, of Coumba Diaw, a woman of Guet-Ndar who had shown symptomsof bubonic plague. Once notified of the death, Dr. Damian, Head of the

16. ANS/Senegal/H76, Official telegram of interim Secrétaire Général Muller tolieutenant-governor Bakel-Maka-Colybentan, no. 409 of January 16, 1918.

17. ANS/Senegal/H76, Inspection of Sanitary Services to governor general, January19, 1918.

18. ANS/Senegal/H76, “Habitants of Guet-Ndar” to governor, January 18, 1918.19. ANS/Senegal/H76, Police report, January 22-23, 1918; also ANS/Senegal/H76,

Dr. Le Gallen to Head of Medical Service, January 22, 1918.20. ANS/Senegal/H76, telegram of governor to governor general, no. C44 of January

17, 1918.21. ANS/Senegal/H76, Police Report, 1-2 March 1918.


Health Service, invited Inspector Mailleraud and two other municipal doc-tors to visit the Lodo quartier in Guet-Ndar in order to provide maraboutAldia Gueye with specific instructions for avoiding infection during theburial ritual, especially the ritual washing of the corpse, and to isolate inlazaretto the suspected cases, that is, those who had been in contact withthe victim. This first encounter between the medical authorities and theresidents of Guet-Ndar revealed a great deal of the mutual suspicion thatexisted between the mostly fishermen and the colonial officials as a resultof past experience. Indeed, the medical team noticed that the 7,000 resid-ents of Guet-Ndar were expecting their visit and were prepared to resist thesanitary and medical measures taken by the state officials. Nobody wantedto provide the medical team with the vital information they needed, especiallythe identification of suspected cases to be isolated. Plague patients fledtheir huts. The “mob” started to gather around the medical team and FalySene, a local notable, shouted that “tous refusent de se laisser évacuer et(que) personne ne bougera” (“everyone refuses to be evacuated and [that]nobody will budge”). As the tension rose, health officers left the quartier.The “mob attack” on them ended only when they reached the ServatiusStreet at the entrance to the quartier22. So the medical team left Guet-Ndar without seeing Coumba Diaw’s body or granting the permission tobury her, or applying other precautionary measures, such as the isolationof the suspected cases, the burning or disinfection of her home with sulfuricacid, formolisation and cresylage, and the deratization.

Alternative Strategies: Moderates vs. Hardliners

This first encounter between the medical authorities and the urban pooronly reinforced state assumptions about its Civilizing Mission, which weretranslated into plague policy, and about the “backwardness” of the urbanpoor. But there was a division within the administration between hardliners(medical authorities) and moderates (public officials) concerning the attitudeto adopt vis-à-vis the popular protest to sanitary and medical measures inthe early phase of the plague epidemic. The medical authorities, who hadobserved signs of popular violence in Guet-Ndar, argued in favour of a “lawand order” approach, that is, the “strict application” of the provisions ofthe ordinance no. 2093 of December 12, 1912 related to the compulsorydeclaration of epidemic diseases, which were being implemented and whichcontained provisions that violated the privacy of people’s homes. Physici-ans wanted the administration to suppress the protest and establish the “ruleof law.” Public officials (governor, governor general, administrators), incontrast, seemed to prefer accommodation to conflict. Governor Lévecque

22. ANS/Senegal/H49, Chief Medical Officer to Lieutenant-Governor of Senegal,January 24, 1918, no. 31 ss.


contended that the reaction of the people of Guet-Ndar to sanitary and medi-cal measures could be understood as a reflection of their “ignorance” andin the context of the Islamic religion. He suggested an approach that wouldconvince the moderate marabouts, such as Marseck from Ndar quartier inGuet Ndar, Aldia Gueye from Lodo quartier in Guet-Ndar, Amadou Sarrand Diaye Sarr Elimane from the mosque, as well as the cadis (judges atMuslim tribunals), who were the natural leaders of the Guet-Ndarians, aboutthe compatibility of the sanitary measures with the prescriptions of theKoran23. Some of the contentious issues concerned the widespread ritualburial, especially the washing of the corpses, the burial ceremony and themourning practices, which attracted crowds and contributed to the spreadof infectious agents. It was clear that Lévecque was not prepared to followthe “strict application of the indispensable sanitary measures” as health offi-cials had hoped. Initially, the views of colonial officials seemed to prevail.

Carrera’s Intervention

Governor Lévecque solicited the intervention of members of the leadingfamilies in Saint-Louis who had immense prestige among the lower classesand spoke Wolof. He persuaded Carrera, Administrator of Colonies, to actas mediator between the colonial state officials and the mostly fishermenfrom Guet-Ndar. Carrera accompanied Dr. Damian, Chief Medical Officer,and Dr. Dupont and his staff at the municipal Hygiene Service, to Guet-Ndar on January 27, 1918 in order to convince the local notables to complywith the anti-plague measures related to the isolation of plague suspects,the disinfection or burning down of infected dwellings, the ritual washingof the corpses, and other burial rituals, and the request for burial permits.But the delegation from the city-island failed to convince the notables fromGuet-Ndar to comply with the plague policy as defined by state officials.The local notables simply wanted “to be left alone with a disease that theyaccepted with the fatalism characteristic of the Muslim religion”. At theend of January, 12 cases with 12 deaths were reported in Guet-Ndar. Asof 9 February, 9 cases with 9 deaths were also reported. Doctors expressedthe fear that, given the fatality rate of 100% observed until then, the swarm-ing of the fleas in the next couple of months could transform the alreadyovercrowded peri-urban village into a dangerous “focus of infection24”.More mediation was needed.

23. ANS/Senegal/H49, handwritten note, n.d., n.a. provided.24. ANS/Senegal/H49, Dr. Damian to Inspector of Sanitary and Health Services,

no. 58 ss. of February 11, 1918.


Blaise Diagne’s Intervention

In the last attempt to avoid the use of force, colonial officials sought andobtained the intervention of the Commissaire de la République, Mr. BlaiseDiagne, the first black to be elected député to French Parliament in 1914.On 21 February 1918, Diagne sent a telegram to the mayor of Saint-Louisurging him to get involved in the resolution of the medical crisis. He wrotethe following:

“I appeal to your high conscience in order to attract the attention of our compatriotsfrom Guet-Ndar on the imperious and urgent necessity for them to accept all theadministrative measures that were taken or would be decided in order to wipe outthe plague stop. Nobody would accept that because of lack of raison our compatri-ots would contribute to the spread of the epidemic disease which would ravageSaint-Louis as well as the entire colony and perhaps the entire FWA stop.At the time when military concentrations will take place following the recruitmentof natives any hesitation in the preservation of public health will be tolerated nomatter the cost. stop.I would thus be very grateful if you would apply an energetic and last pressure onGuet-Ndar by gathering the local notables of the village along with the leadingresidents of Saint-Louis in order to make them understand and accept all the meas-ures that the administration has adopted and will adopt. The deadly character ofthe disease requires these measures that, however painful they may be, remain com-patible with the principles of the Islamic religion stop. If I enfant du pays exhortmy compatriots to submit to the rigors of the situation it is because only there liesthe preservation of all the population”25.

The fact that the colonial officials bypassed the mayor in dealing withthe Guet-Ndarians strongly indicates the existence of some form of tensionbetween the municipal authorities and the colonial authorities. Indeed, dur-ing previous epidemics the administration officials blamed the successivemayors for the filthy state of the city and the peri-urban villages. An appealto other members of the African elite must be understood in this context.Diagne’s argument was not different from the “culture of poverty” explana-tions promoted by the administration, which viewed the Africans as ignorantand irrational. He did not take into account the urban poor’s grievances.This is the reason why his intervention through the first elected blackMayor, Pierre Chimere (1916), had little chance of success.

In the meantime, the administration expanded the methods of inspectionbeyond simple police surveillance by sending troops to enforce the sanitarycordon around Saint-Louis, Ndar-Toute and Guet-Ndar in order to arrestthe sanitary cordon violators by land and by river26. The authorities alsoimposed a quarantine of 10 days in the lazaretto on city residents planningto travel out of Saint-Louis while holding a medical passport. To obtain

25. ANS/Senegal/H49, telegram of Commissaire de la République, Diagne, to Mayorof Saint-Louis, February 21, 1918, no. 10.

26. ANS/AOF/3G3-7/38, Requisition, by Lévecque, February 28, 1918.


this document, the indigènes, Syrians and Moroccans were required to firstshow proof of vaccination. In any case, they were not allowed to take thetrain between Saint-Louis and Louga to Dakar27. Fishermen were allowedto fish and sell fish under certain strict conditions in order to ensure thecontinued food supply to the city, all transactions taking place along themetallic fence. A pass from the Hygiene Service was required to cross thesanitary cordon. A burial procession in Guet-Ndar was reduced to a maxi-mum of 10 people and had to be escorted by two soldiers. A militaryescort was also required for the maximum of three indigènes authorized togo to the city hall to request birth or death certificates for a relative, andfor those invited to appear at the city hall, the police or gendarmerie28.

Governor General Angoulvant endorsed the comprehensive policy sug-gested by Governor Lévecque. He encouraged him to enforce the sanitarycordon, and find a peaceful solution to the crisis29, but without letting therebellion against the police and hygiene service agents go unpunished.Given that all means of persuasion used by the administration, includingBlaise Diagne’s intervention, had failed, Angoulvant urged Lévecque toenforce the existing laws while avoiding a bloodbath30.

From Accommodation to “Assault on the Body”The Colonial Hygiene Committee

By March the medical authorities made a last attempt to convince the colo-nial officials to abandon their accommodationist approach in favour of theuse of force. The members of the Colonial Hygiene Committee, includingfive physicians, one veterinarian and five other members31, held an urgentmeeting on 21 March 1918 in order to consider the strategies to deal withthe health crisis. They unanimously agreed that “the free penetration ofthe Hygiene Service in Guet-Ndar to conduct their operations must be madepossible by any means necessary, including the use of an armed force andno matter the consequences that would result from it”; and that all the Guet-Ndar residents had to be classified, en masse, as plague suspects to bedetained and evacuated in successive groups to isolation camps to be erected

27. Arrêté édictant des mesures sanitaires pour la ville de Saint-Louis, pendant ladurée de l’épidémie de peste, February 28, 1918, Journal officiel du Sénégal,February 1918.

28. ANS/AOF/H49, Cordon sanitaire. Consignes pour les Chefs de poste, March 2,1918.

29. ANS/Senegal/H49, governor to governor general, March 15, 1918.30. ANS/Senegal/H76, Angoulvant’s telegram to Lévecque, March 16, 1918.31. The Hygiene Colonial Committee included Dr. Contaut (Head of Health Service),

Dr. Fulconis (Colonial Ambulance), Dr. Basque (Colonial Ambulance), Dr. Dupont(municipal Hygiene Service Head), Mayor Chimère, public works directorGrimaux, veterinarian Teppaz, and three notable residents (Douan, Cales, andMarsan).


in Sor and on Langue de Barbarie south of the Pointe-aux-Chameaux laza-retto for a period of 10 days32. Mayor Pierre Chimère attended the meetingbut did not question the harshness of the plague measures for reasons diffic-ult to explain without additional evidence. Taken in a context dominatedby the psychology of terror, this plague policy was not without risks for theadministration. The committee’s members did not even consider alternativesolutions, such as face-to-face communication with the notables of Guet-Ndar, nor did they calculate the financial as well as the political cost itsimplementation would require. In their view the city’s health had to beprotected by any means necessary33.

In his report to the lieutenant-governor the following day, Dr. Contaut,who had replaced Dr. Damian as Chief Medical Officer, argued that theuse of force was the best strategy to combat what he then perceived as anepidemiological shift from bubonic to pneumonic plague, which he believedwas dangerously spreading from human to human from its “irreducible cen-ter” in Guet-Ndar. He provided the details of the new plague policy adop-ted by the committee members, that included the evacuation and detention,over a period of several months, of the entire population of Guet-Ndar inthe isolation camps for a period of ten days for each group, the burningdown of the infected huts that formed the majority of the dwellings, thedisinfection of the few suspected houses built in durable materials, the relo-cation of everyone to a temporary segregation camp for further medicalsurveillance, and their final relocation preferably in several new peri-urbanvillages to be created. The confinement of the urban poor to one temporarylocation would provide the medical authorities with the opportunity to visitplague suspects, record deaths, and control burial rituals by putting antisep-tic substances in the coffin. Guet-Ndar would be cleaned up with fire, “theonly energetic and radical agent of sterilization”34. The same day, theautopsy performed on the body of a battalion chief Petitjean revealed thesepticemic plague as the cause of his death35.

Dr. Contaut’s report reflected the widespread belief among French colo-nial officials and others that the urban poor had brought the situation uponthemselves by putting themselves outside the common law; they were toblame for the spread of plague because of their “ignorance, lack of disci-pline, and undesirability”. Dr. Contaut went so far as to consider the urbanpoor, especially the fishermen of Wolof origin living in Guet-Ndar, as “aspecial race” with “a particular mentality”. He prepared the ground for ajustification of the special measures taken to combat the plague in the city.

32. ANS/Senegal/H49, minutes of the Colonial Hygiene Committee, March 21, 1918.33. ANS/Senegal/H 49, Colonial Hygiene Committee meeting minutes, March 21,

1918.34. ANS/Senegal/H49, Dr. Contaut to the Lieutenant-Governor of Senegal, no. 108

L.S. of March 22, 1918.35. ANS/Senegal/H49, Autopsy report done by Dr. Fulconis, March 22, 1918.


In his perspective the financial, social and political cost of the plague oper-ation, including the complete suspension of civil liberties of citizens, wouldbe minimal in the short-term comparing with the long-term cost that thesuspicion of Senegal would create abroad if the epidemic was allowed tospread further from its dangerous hotbed. The general interest prevailedover individual liberties36.

Dr. Contaut did not solely focus on the plague policy; he also laid downthe foundations of a new urban politique indigène, based on the fragmenta-tion of the urban poor—who had acquired a kind of “class conscious-ness”—as well as the fluctuating population (Moors, Bamana, etc.) intoseveral ethnic-based villages. The ultimate aim was to avoid in the future“the negative mental disposition that has characterized Guet-Ndar untilnow”37. Dr. Contaut’s reasoned argument, warning about the consequencesfor the colony of the implementation of an alternative strategy to combatthe epidemic, was aimed at creating doubts in the mind of the governor ofSenegal, Mr. Lévecque, in order to convince him to adopt the new proposedplague policy. What was the governor’s response to Dr. Contaut’s report?

Governor Lévecque’s Dilemma

Governor Lévecque rejected the radical plague measures—such as openingfire on the protestors, setting houses ablaze in Ndar-Toute and Guet-Ndar,and resettling everyone somewhere else—, proposed by Dr. Contaut andhis colleagues, who dominated the Colonial Hygiene Committee, even ifthey both shared the colonial state’s perceptions of the urban poor. Indeed,in his long letter to the governor general of French West Africa dated25 March 1918, Governor Lévecque described Guet-Ndar as “overcrowded”,“with houses on top of each other”, and he characterized the response ofthe Guet-Ndarians to sanitary and medical measures as a “net resistance”compared to the “sporadic resistance” observed in other parts of the city.Lévecque nevertheless made a conscious effort to try to understand thereasons behind the Africans’ response to anti-plague measures. He attrib-uted that resistance not only to the “indigenous customs, superstitions, andreligious beliefs and practices”, but also to the encouragement that the prote-stors received from “unscrupulous individuals, for whom everything goeswhen it comes to conserving, regaining or winning the confidence of thevoters one may need38”. Clearly, a conspiracy theory was being developed

36. ANS/Senegal/H49, Dr. Contaut to the Lieutenant-Governor of Senegal, no. 108L.S. of March 22, 1918.

37. ANS/Senegal/H49, Dr. Contaut to the lieutenant-governor of Senegal, no. 108L.S. of March 22, 1918.

38. ANS/Senegal/H49, Governor Lévecque to governor general of FWA, March 25,1918.


within some administration circles to make sense of the reactions of theurban poor to sanitary measures.

Although Governor Lévecque and Dr. Contaut agreed on the causes ofthe crisis, they differed, however, concerning the solutions to the problem.From the governor’s perspective, the suggested anti-plague measures were“radical”, “excessive” and risky. He was aware of the fact that manyamong the European city residents disagreed with him, especially those“who are surprised that fire is not yet set on the four corners of Guet-Ndar,that no shots were fired at those people, that they were not thrown to thesea [...]”39. He had an answer for his critics: “I have not burned downNdar-Toute where the epidemic disease tends to disappear; I have not yetburned down Guet-Ndar because I had to consider the consequences ofthat radical measure, and did not want to aggravate an already complicatedsituation.”

Having set the records straits, Lévecque went on to present his alterna-tive solution to the crisis. His views were more moderate and realistic,taking into account the imperatives of justice, reason, the available financialand human resources, especially the small size of the police available for theplague operation, and people’s cultural and religious beliefs and practices.Moreover, Governor Lévecque was well aware of the fact that the majorityof the urban poor living in Guet-Ndar was French citizens since 1848; hedid not want their civil liberties to be violated in the name of public healthand was prepared to oppose radical measures that would leave an embitteredpopulation. His efforts were paying off. Some leading resistors had beenprosecuted for rebellion. Among them were Fergueye Gueye, AliouneM’Boye, and Makhary Samb. Gueye was charged with assault (voies defait) but he was acquitted on 18 January for having acted without discern-ment. M’Boye of the southern part of Saint-Louis opposed the evacuationof people to the lazaretto; he was arrested and charged with rebellion andmenace to the police inspectors during the exercise of their functions; hereceived a six-month jail sentence on 13 March. Samb was scheduled toappear for arraignment on 28 March. Thus, Governor Lévecque hoped thatthe combined effect of indictment and successful prosecution of some lead-ing resistors as well as the pressure from the sanitary cordon around Guet-Ndar, in addition to the one around Saint-Louis, would create wearinessand, eventually, would break down the protestors’ morale to the point ofsurrendering to the police40.

The optimism of the colonial officials was justified in the light of theencouraging signs coming from the leaders of the urban poor. In earlyMarch, 33 moderate notables from Guet-Ndar communicated to the colonial




officials their willingness to submit to the sanitary and medical measuresand revealed to them eleven names of the leading protestors against themeasures, including one former chief, Birahim Gaye41. The initiativereflected a split within the Guet-Ndarian community itself between modera-tes and radicals. There were reports of an increasing tension between theresidents of the two neighborhoods, one group preventing the other fromselling fish42. The leaders of the moderate faction also sought the interven-tion of Francois Carpot, former député (1902-1914) and a member of oneof the most prestigious Creole families in Saint-Louis. On 7 March 1918,28 “habitants de Guet Ndar” sent him a letter requesting his assistance inconvincing the colonial administration officials to lift the quarantine. Theyunderlined the social (and geographical) character of the plague policywhich discriminated against them simply because they were the most vulner-able segment of the urban population. They argued that such treatmentwas not appropriate in the light of the contribution they had made in theframework of the war effort in terms of troops43.

In addition, Moctar Bouna, Chief of Guet-Ndar, made contacts with thepolice chief to arrange a meeting with the municipal authorities in order todiscuss the conditions of the application of the plague measures. However,the police denied him access to the mayor’s office because he was only infavour of disinfecting the contaminated huts but opposed handing over thecorpses to the medical team as well as the isolation of plague suspects44.Both sides missed the opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully becauseWestern prophylaxis was incompatible with the indigenous theories of con-tagious disease and practices. Groups involved on both sides were unableto effectively communicate cross-culturally.

Mortality, Fear, Protest, and the “Radical Solution”

The publication, on April 3, 1918, of a special report on case fatality forMarch, confirmed the apprehensions of the medical authorities. There were9 deaths reported on the city-island, 1 in Sor, 1 in Ndar-Toute, and 57 inGuet-Ndar in the previous two weeks (15-31 March). Mortality in Guet-Ndar was increasing compared with 48 deaths recorded at the beginning ofthe month (1-14 March), including 43 deaths due to pneumonic plague.The clean-up efforts had resulted in the capture of 852 common domesticrats, Yersinia pestis carriers, during the same time period.

41. ANS/Senegal/H74, notables from Guet-Ndar to lieutenant-governor, March 1,1918.

42. ANS/Senegal/H74, telegram of cabinet director, Muller, to governor in missionin Ziguinchor, March 7, 1918.

43. ANS/Senegal/H74, “Habitants de Guet-Ndar” to Francois Carpot, March 7, 1918.44. ANS/Senegal/H49, Police Report, March 26, 1918.


The report showed that there was an improvement in the quartiers whereregular disease surveillance, disinfection and burning down of infected orsuspected dwellings and case notification took place and a high case fatalityin Guet-Ndar. In his construction of the epidemic, Dr. Contaut attributedthe high mortality in Guet-Ndar to “our inertia obligée vis-à-vis Guet-Ndar”and called for “a plan of action against this refractory village” that consti-tuted “a dangerous thorn on Saint-Louis’ side45”.

The same day, 3 April, Governor General Angoulvant sent a telegramto Governor Lévecque in response to his letter dated 25 March. Angoulvantalso rejected the radical strategy proposed by Dr. Contaut and the othermembers of the Colonial Hygiene Committee to combat the epidemic.Administrative and financial considerations weighted heavily in his deci-sion. He urged that the sanitary cordon around Guet-Ndar remain inplace, and that the governor initiates contacts with local moderate notablesin order to find if there were volunteers for 10-day quarantine at Pointe-aux-Chameaux, and give indemnity to the people who would loose theirdwellings. He posited a linkage between compliance with vaccinationand re-vaccination and the lifting of the sanitary cordon46. The taskahead was difficult given that at the same time there were reports that12 Guet-Ndar residents, who had to appear before the instruction judge,categorically refused to first submit to medical examination at the lazaretto47.

The next report, made public on 17 April and covering the previous twoweeks (1-15 April), gave 3 deaths in the Northern part and 3 deaths in theSouthern part of the city-island, 1 death in Sor, 4 deaths in Ndar-Toute,and 43 deaths in Guet-Ndar. The report indicated a general improvementin mortality compared with the previous report. The improvement was dueto two factors: a) the predominance of the bubonic and septicemic formsof plague and the decline in cases of pneumonic plague, the most contagiousform of plague, b) and the migration of infected rats from Ndar-Toute toGuet-Ndar and from Ndar-Toute to the city-island. The medical authoritieswere able to establish Ndar-Toute as the point of departure of the epidemicand to link the movement of the infected rats to the clinical cases and deathsreported. From its basis in Ndar-Toute the disease spread with the move-ment of rats as follows48:

45. ANS/Senegal/H49, Special Report on plague in Saint-Louis (15-31 March),April 3, 1918.

46. ANS/Senegal/H49, Official telegram, Governor General Angoulvant to governorof Senegal, no. 365 of April 3, 1918.

47. ANS/Senegal/H49, Police Report, n.d. mentioned.48. ANS/Senegal/H49, Special Report on plague in Saint-Louis (1-15 April 1918),

by Dr. Contaut, April 17, 1918.


THE EVOLUTION OF THE PLAGUE EPIDEMIC IN SAINT-LOUIS(adaptation from La Géographie, nos. 4-5 (Nov.-Dec.), 1925, p. 424

Mage St. (January, February) (from N to S)d

Ndar-Toute r Geole Bridge r City Place du Governement (February)d

Bisson St. (end of March)Ndar-Toute r Guet-Ndar (December, January)Ndar-Toute r Sor (Dec.): visit by two people incubating the disease;Guet-Ndar r Sor (Febr.): visit by infected people.

The medical authorities could reconstruct the evolution of the plagueepidemic with confidence. They explained the low mortality rate in Sorin relation to its particular ecology characterized by the abundance of sandthat was an obstacle to the multiplication of rats.


In the meantime the medical authorities continued with the operation ofderatization on the city-island and in Ndar-Toute. To expand the sanitarylaw enforcement powers, the governor general requested the abrogation ofarticle 31 of the local ordinance dated 12 December 1912 and its replace-ment with a new ordinance that would a) increase the size of the HygieneCommission of Saint-Louis to include the personnel already involved inthe execution of the sanitary measures, such as physicians, police officers,gendarmerie brigade chief, etc., b) and toughen the penalties. From thenon, refusal to comply with sanitary legislation would result in 15 days injail and the payment of a penalty of 1,000 francs49. Angoulvant also movedto resolve the issue of conflict of interest faced by the mayors of Dakarand Saint-Louis, especially during the epidemic crises, by suggesting thepromulgation of a new decree, issued on 6 May 1918 that delegated allprerogatives related to hygiene and public sanitation to an AdministrateurDélégué from the Hygiene Service who would represent the governor50.

By May the crisis in Guet-Ndar had deepened. The supporters of theconspiracy theory, who saw a linkage between the popular protest in Guet-Ndar and the covert actions of some “political personalities”, including“those who previously occupied high elective offices”, hoped that GovernorGeneral Angoulvant would take radical measures to deal with the “seriousincidents” reported in various quarters of the city as well as the continueddefiance campaign against the plague policy led by 8,000 Guet-Ndar resid-ents. But the governor general continued to support the strategy of accom-modation adopted by Governor Lévecque. In a letter to the president ofthe Conseil Général dated 4 May 1918, Angoulvant argued that burningGuet-Ndar would only be a partial solution, for the colonial state wouldhave to rebuild it, as the majority of its residents were French nationals.He broached aside any attempt to establish similarities between Guet-Ndarand Dakar in 1914, where a new quarter (Medina) was erected for the displa-ced people. He would only accept a temporary sanitary segregation butnot the erection of several new permanent quarters to accommodate theresidents of Guet-Ndar. He was in favour of a balance between civil libert-ies and health concerns, and of a new legal framework to deal effectivelywith the protest51. There were also financial considerations, as the expensesfor plague operation doubled, passing from 25,531 francs in 1917 to 50,000francs in 191852.

The publication, on 7 May 1918, of another special report on plaguemortality in Saint-Louis for the second half of April (16-30 April) revealed

49. ANS/Senegal/H49, governor general of FWA to lieutenant-governor of Senegal,April 22, 1918; ANS/Senegal/H57/31, 31.

50. ANS/AOF/H57/31, 32.51. ANS/Senegal/H49, governor general to president of General Council, May 4,

1918.52. ANS/Senegal/H77, Extrait des délibérations de la Commission coloniale, Janvier

14, 1918.


73 cases and 62 deaths, including 38 deaths in Guet-Ndar, 1 death in Ndar-Toute, 3 in Saint-Louis North, 4 in South, 3 in Sor, 1 in Gandiole, and 13in the lazaretto. The actual number of deaths in Guet-Ndar was higherthan the official statistics indicated, if one takes into account the clandestineburials taking place inside the dwellings. The report also established thatthe vaccination and re-vaccination of the population, the isolation of clinicalcases and suspects, the disinfection of homes, and the payment of incentivesfor the destruction of rats had intensified. But the residents of Guet-Ndardid not show signs of compliance with the sanitary and medical measures53,even after the issuance, on 25 June 1918, of an ordinance making the anti-plague vaccination and re-vaccination compulsory in Saint-Louis, Dakar andthe towns located along the railway between the two cities54. Given thedifficulties to import vaccine from France, the administration encouragedDr. Leger to produce vaccine in the laboratory in Dakar; the productionof vaccine went from 10,000 cm3 to 150,000 cm3 per month55. Vacci-nation consisted of a double inoculation at 5 days of interval; and the re-vaccination took place 5 months later. A certificate was issued as a proofthat the individual was vaccinated56. But more state intervention in peo-ple’s lives led to more protests.

Protest continued through July into early August, while the leaders ofGuet-Ndar multiplied contacts with the colonial authorities in Saint-Louisto reach a compromise but with little success. On 12 July, Lévecque sub-mitted a plan for a progressive evacuation and disinfection of Guet-Ndar,and the Général-commandant supérieur his military strategy57. On 1 August1918, Governor General Angoulvant tried one more time to persuade BlaiseDiagne to travel to Saint-Louis to bring the people of Guet-Ndar to theirsenses. The real problem, as the governor general understood it, hadnothing to do with the compensation for destroyed property, but their decla-red intention to disobey the laws and not to cooperate with the colonialauthorities in various matters ranging from disease control, to garbage col-lection and hygiene. He saw a direct correlation between the resistance ofthe people of Guet-Ndar to sanitary and medical measures and the formationof a permanent focus of infection, on the one hand, and the continued spreadof plague epidemic in the entire colony, on the other hand. He concluded

53. ANS/Senegal/H49, governor general of FWA to president of Conseil général,May 4, 1918.

54. ANS/AOF/H56/117, Arrêté déterminant les mesures propres à enrayer l’épidémiede peste constatée dans certaines régions du Sénégal, 25 juin, 1918; ANS/AOF/H56/117-6, Arrêté no. 806 déclarant contaminées de peste la ville de Saint-Louiset les escales de la voie ferrée Dakar-Saint-Louis, et en danger de contaminationla ville de Dakar, et déterminant les conditions dans lesquelles seront faites obli-gatoirement la vaccination et la revaccination dans ces agglomérations urbaineset suburbaines.

55. ANS/AOF/H57/31, 33.56. ANS, Moniteur du Sénégal, 413.57. ANS/AOF/H57/31, 34-5.


his message by stating that only “the rule of law in its entire rigor” couldcome to terms with such “stubbornness”58. Diagne’s second interventionfailed to convince the leaders of Guet-Ndar to comply with the anti-plaguemeasures.

The State of Emergency, 13 August-14 November 1918

The strategy of accommodation, referred to by the colonial officials as the“political phase” of the plague policy, ended in early August 1918, whenthe “mob” chased Mailleraud Frederic, an agent of the Hygiene Service onduty in Guet-Ndar, shouting insults at him. Plague administrators cameto the realization that the accommodationist strategy adopted so far wasunworkable59. They gave way, and on 13 August 1918, they inauguratedwhat they called the “medico-military phase” of the plague policy by declar-ing the state of emergency on Guet-Ndar, Ndar-Toute and on the isolationstation of Pointe-aux-Chameaux. The hardliners were delighted. Theythen had the opportunity to use the “purifying fire” to destroy Y. pestis, asthey had hoped since the beginning of the epidemic crisis. Dr. Thoulon,Head of Health Service, claimed that “because of their incurable inertia, theindigènes had irritated their opponents and exhausted their best friends”60.

It is interesting to note that not only the medical discourse borrowedthe military vocabulary, referring to the people from Guet-Ndar as “rebels”(habitants réfractaires), but also the plague operation was to be conductedlike a military operation, using the military tactics and military personnel.Prophylactic and sanitary measures were secondary. The plague operationincluded the immobilization of the fishermen’s canoes to prevent escape,the occupation of the targeted neighbourhoods, the progressive evacuationof the people to the lazaretto for 10 days before being sent to two temporarysegregation villages in Sor and in the hinterland of Saint-Louis, the system-atic disinfection of few houses that were built in durable materials, and theburning down of the majority of suspected huts. The instructions given tothe plague administrators were strict and uncompromising:

“It [the operation] is not about shuffling, negotiating, sparing such hut, sparing suchnotable, (hesitating) instead of burning down: weapons must speak—with cold steel,for the Tirailleurs (infantry) will have only the butt and the bayonet, the Spahiswill only use their sword or the clog of their mount”61.

58. ANS/Senegal/H77, Angoulvant to Commissaire de la République, no. 59 ofAugust 1, 1918.

59. ANS/Senegal/H49, agent Mailleraud Frederic to Hygiene Service physician,August 9, 1918.

60. ANS/Senegal/H49, Report on the evacuation of Guet-Ndar (14 August-14 Sep-tember 1920), by Dr. Thoulon.

61. ANS/Senegal/H49, Dr. Thoulon.


The operation started on 14 August 1918 at 4 p.m. after the fishermenreturned home, and was met with fierce resistance. Men, women and chil-dren were all armed with sticks, clubs, iron bars, harpoons, knives, axes, andswivels. Within three days, given the imposing military force deployed,the resilient residents of Guet-Ndar gave up all opposition and decided tonegotiate. On 17 August, a letter addressed to Governor Lévecque by the“habitants de Guet-Ndar” reached the desk of the secrétaire général. Writ-ten in broken French, it is almost incomprehensible because of the form ofsentences, grammar and disjointed ideas which reflected the problems thecolonial administration faced in making the Africans French. A close read-ing shows that the anonymous authors of the letter tried to present a counter-argument to all the accusations made against them. They attributed variousincidents that had occurred to serious “misunderstandings” and “non-comprehension”. They denied being “resistors” and reminded the governorthat they had a long tradition of cooperation with the colonial authoritiesgoing back to the time of Governor Faidherbe in the 1850s and 1860s. Themain evidence presented as the most recent example of cooperation with theadministration was the military conscription during the First World War.After setting the record straight, the letter’s authors complained about thenegative impact of the sanitary cordon on their fishing industry and aboutthe non-payment of allocations to the families of the soldiers sent to thefront lines. In conclusion, they reiterated their attachment to the patrie(France) and to Guet-Ndar, the land of their ancestors, and promised tocooperate with plague administrators in the hope that, after their stay in theisolation camps, they would be permitted to resettle in Guet-Ndar andresume their normal fishing activities62. The letter from the residents ofGuet-Ndar never reached the governor’s desk. It was discarded becauseof its anonymous character and classified by the hardliners within theadministration sans suite63. Argument could be made that by early Augustthe colonial officials’ construction of the plague epidemic was deeplyinfluenced by the doctors who had lobbied all along for a “radical solution”to the Guet-Ndar problem in order to achieve “the final extinction of thisdangerous focus” of infection64.

An orderly evacuation of the people of Guet-Ndar began on 18 August1918. Groups of women, children, the elderly and the sick in convoys weretransported in canoes, while men, escorted by the Spahis (cavalry) walkedto the lazaretto at the Pointe-aux-Chameaux on the Langue de Barbarie, asthe following table indicates.

62. ANS/Senegal/H49, Residents of Guet-Ndar to lieutenant-governor of Senegal,August 17, 1918.

63. ANS/Senegal/H49, cabinet’s minute, March 11, 1918.64. ANS/AOF/H57/31, 35.


EVACUATIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF GUET-NDAR (SAINT-LOUIS 1918)

Women; End ofDate Men Children TotalChildren Quarantine

8 August 54 583 — 637 29 August1st Sept. — — — 459 —11 — — — 128 —15 — — — 377 —16 — — — 397 27 Sept.28 A76 — — 464 —12 Oct. — — — 533 —3 Nov. — — — 248 —14 — — — — End of

emergency

Source: ANS/Senegal/H49, Report on the Evacuation of Guet-Ndar (14 August-14 Sep-tember 1918), by Dr. Thoulon. a. ANS/AOF/H56/48, Commandant militaire to governorgeneral, September 29, 1918.

The dwellings at Pointe-aux-Chameaux could accommodate a total of400 people at one time. The duration of the quarantine was 10 days. Inany case, by mid-September the leading protestors surrendered to the secur-ity forces after receiving assurances that they would receive special wardsin the isolation camp. In early November Guet-Ndar was empty and readyfor the “purifying fire” which consumed all but 126 dwellings built in dur-able materials65. The medico-military phase was then replaced by the“medico-hygienic” phase of the plague policy. Governor General Angoul-vant estimated the expenses engaged in the operation of evacuation of Guet-Ndar and the destruction of homes at around 1 million francs66.

The very operation of the quarantine itself in the lazaretto presented theadministration with a logistical challenge that became a real nightmare.Carrera, administrator of the plague policy in Saint-Louis, received manycomplaints about the inadequacy of food and water supplies, transportationof health officers, indiscipline of plague administration agents, inexperienceof canoeists, and delays in the payment of indemnity to the troops enforcingthe quarantine. Abdoulaye Wade, a local notable whose mother, niece, andtwo sisters—one having three little children—were isolated at the lazarettoat Pointe-aux-Chameaux, accused the administration officials of using adouble standard in their isolation practices by making exceptions and allow-ing some city residents to be isolated in their own homes, while rejectinghis request to keep his relatives in his house that was disinfected. Hismother and one of his sisters died of plague in the lazaretto. From hisperspective, a terrible injustice was done to him and others67. Other com-plaints came from people from out of town who simply found themselves

65. ANS/Sénégal/H73, État des baraques épargnées à Guet-Ndar, 1920.66. ANS/AOF/H57/31, 32.67. ANS/Senegal/H74, Abdulaye Wade to governor, December 6, 1917.


in the wrong place at the wrong time and who wanted to go back to theirfamilies68. The year 1918 saw a sharp increase in plague morbidity andmortality, with 1,233 officially listed cases and 1,033 officially listeddeaths69. Upon the completion of the quarantine in the lazaretto, 36 allegedleading resistors were arrested and detained. Later, 18 were released forvarious reasons70.

By early January 1919, the plague operation in Saint-Louis had createdserious administrative problems. After a ten-day stay in the lazaretto,people who had nowhere to go were settled in two segregation villages builtone in the southern part of Sor and the other in the hinterland of Saint-Louis, with the capacity to accommodate 1,000 people71 out of 7,000ex-residents of Guet-Ndar. Others became homeless. The reporter of thenewspaper La Tribune criticized the colonial authorities about the fate ofthe people left homeless after the destruction of their homes72. Some notab-les from Saint-Louis, whose relatives lived in Guet-Ndar, complained aboutthe social character of the plague policy because residents of the city-island(the elite and the middle class) were accorded a special treatment; they wereisolated in their own homes, not in the isolation camps as it was the casefor the urban poor73. F. Devès, General Councillor, was appalled by thedifficult living conditions of the people who were left to fend for themselvesin the city streets, including over 2,000 people camping on the beach inmakeshift tents. He blamed the government for the prevalence of “completeanarchy, brutality and illegality” during the post-quarantine period anddemanded explanations from the governor general about the crisis74.

After a period of vacillation and shuffling and under intense pressurefrom local elite and Paris, the administration finally decided to find solutionsto the crisis. An Evaluation Commission was set up to propose the compen-sation to the residents of Guet-Ndar for the loss due to the plague oper-ation. In 1919 there was a substantial decline in plague mortality estimatedat 257 deaths. The most crucial issue related to the reoccupation of Guet-Ndar remained under investigation until September 1919 when the authoritiesagreed to rebuild Guet-Ndar according to a new master plan to be designed,which would have provisions for large spaces and street alignment and givepriority to hygiene and waste removal75. The decision to rebuild Guet-Ndar can be seen as reflecting the final triumph of the moderates within the

68. ANS/Senegal/H74, unclassified document.69. ANS/AOF/H57/18.70. ANS/AOF/H56/51, lieutenant-colonel Lafitte to Commandant supérieur des Trou-

pes, September 27, 1918.71. ANS/AOF/H57/31, 33.72. ANS/AOF/P165/90, governor general to governor, January 13, 1919 about the

rebuilding of Guet-Ndar. See also Tribune, no. 66, January 5, 1919, 1.73. ANS/Senegal/H74, Abdoulaye Wade to governor, December 6, 1918.74. ANS/AOF/3G3.7/202, F. Devès to governor general, February 23, 1919; ANS/

AOF/3G3.7/210, letter of March 5, 1919.75. ANS/AOF/3G3.7/218, governor general to governor, no. 1196 of Septem-

ber 10, 1918.


administration who opposed the suggestion made by the Hygiene ColonialCommittee to create several new ethnic peri-villages instead. In October1920, the new mayor of Saint-Louis, N’Diaye Cledor Amadou, provided atotal amount of 5,000 francs for distribution among the most destitute peopleof Guet-Ndar76. The Commission was presented with fantasist claims. ElHadj Macaty Fall requested compensation for a building that never existed.Others misrepresented the rent they paid before the burnings jumping from40 frs. to 300 frs. per month. The estimated value of the building JohnBeigh went from 200 to 1,000 frs. It was evident that everyone wantedto take advantage of the victim compensation fund77. As far as mortalityfor 1920 is concerned, the statistics indicate a total of 197 plague victims.Thus, the cost of extinguishing plague in Saint-Louis, the capital of Senegaland of protecting Dakar, capital of French West Africa, from a secondplague outbreak left an embittered population.

*

The 1917-1918 plague epidemic in Saint-Louis revealed continuity andchange in the French medical policy with reference to previous epidemics.The French experience with yellow fever and cholera in Saint-Louis pre-sented many similarities with the 1914 Dakar plague epidemic in that, asMyron Echenberg (2002: 424) has suggested concerning Dakar, the Frenchmedical policy was authoritarian and dismissive of African concerns. Inthe nineteenth century, it was the members of the civil society who led thebattle for a balance between health concerns, commercial interests, and civilliberties. What was different in 1917-1918 was that there was a divisionwithin the French community between hardliners (physicians), who were infavour of the forced removal policy, and moderates (governor and governorgeneral), who were willing to take into account financial considerations,civil liberties and some aspects of African culture and religion that werecompatible with Western medical and sanitary measures. It took the admin-istration several months of negotiations before opting for the forced evacu-ation of the people of Guet-Ndar. Governor Lévecque never made the kindsof concessions he made to the Africans in Dakar concerning the vaccinationcard, the possibility to isolate plague suspects in their own neighbourhoodsfor medical surveillance (ibid.: 186), or leaving the dead bodies with theirrelatives for dignified burials; these were the contentious issues that provo-ked popular resistance to sanitary and medical anti-plague measures. Thegrave consequences of using armed force against people whom they had

76. ANS/Senegal/H78, Ordinance of mayor N’Diaye Cledor Amadou, October 25,1920.

77. ANS/Senegal/H78, Ordinance of mayor of Saint-Louis, October 25, 1920.


classified as unsanitary subjects led the colonial authorities to abandon the“ethnic villages” project in favour of rebuilding Guet-Ndar. This changeof mind shows that accommodation became a viable policy choice contribut-ing to political stability.

Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvanie.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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ABSTRACT

In this article I will examine the impact of the plague epidemics that hit the urbancolonial society in Saint-Louis between 1917 and 1920. This research shows thatbecause the poor, who lived in appalling hygienic conditions, were the most affected,the measures taken against the plague soon became discriminatory. The refusal bythe medical authorities to find a compromise between what was necessary to preventfurther contagion and the cultural and religious practices of the poor, especiallyfuneral rites, provoked anger amongst the poor and resulted in a disobedience cam-paign which lasted several months. This crisis revealed a deep gap between themedical authorities who advocated the use of force against the rebels on the oneside, and the political authorities on the other. Although well-know figures such asCarrera and Blaise Diagne intervened with the inhabitants of the contaminated areas,they failed to reconcile the two sides. The frightening idea of seeing the epidemicsreach the better-off classes pushed the authorities to declare a state of emergency,force the recalcitrants to go to the lazaret, and set fire to the contaminated areas.The evacuated remained homeless until the day when the decision was made torebuild Guet-Ndar.

RÉSUMÉ

Peste et violence à Saint-Louis-du-Sénégal, 1917-1920. — Dans cet article, nousexaminons l’impact de l’épidémie de peste sur la société coloniale urbaine à Saint-Louis entre 1917 et 1920. L’étude montre que puisque les pauvres, qui vivaient dansdes conditions hygiéniques déplorables, étaient les plus touchés, les mesures prises


contre la peste prirent très vite un caractère discriminatoire. Le refus des autoritésmédicales de trouver un compromis entre les exigences de la prévention de la conta-gion et les pratiques culturelles et religieuses des pauvres, concernant spécialementles rites funéraires, provoqua la colère de ces derniers et une campagne de désobéis-sance qui dura plusieurs mois. La crise révéla une profonde division entre les autoritésmédicales, qui recommandaient l’utilisation de la force contre les « rebelles » d’uncôté, et les autorités politiques. Malgré l’intervention des personnalités, telles queCarrera et Blaise Diagne, auprès des représentants des habitants des quartiers conta-minés, les positions des uns et des autres n’avaient pu être réconciliées. La peur devoir l’épidémie gagner les classes les plus aisées poussa les autorités à déclarer l’étatd’urgence, à forcer les récalcitrants à rejoindre le lazaret, et à incendier les quartierscontaminés. Les évacués restèrent sans domiciles fixes jusqu’au jour où la décisionfut prise de reconstruire Guet-Ndar.

Keywords/Mots-clés: Senegal, beliefs, colonial hygiene, health practices, plague,resistance/Sénégal, croyances, hygiène coloniale, pratiques de santé, peste, résistance.

Documents

Plague and Violence in Saint-Louis-du-Sénégal, 1917-1920