Platon Esclavos (1)

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DOI: 10.1177/0048393107303779 2007 37: 315Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Amir Meital and Joseph AgassiSlaves in Plato's Laws

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Slaves in Platos Laws1Amir MeitalTel-Aviv UniversityJoseph AgassiTel-Aviv University and York University, Toronto

Plato suggested ways to regulate and integrate slaves within the legal systemof his Utopian Cretan polis Magnesia as described in his work, Laws. Thistext alone invalidates most criticism of Poppers presentation of Platos polit-ical views. His 50-year-old reading of Plato fits the text better than any other.To preserve the noble tradition of classical scholarship, classical scholarsshould acknowledge explicitly that he was correct, and that by now they havesurreptitiously incorporated the substance of his views.

Keywords: Plato; slavery; apologetics; classical scholarship; Laws; Popper

. . . the bravest and most honest historians have not been able to escape thecoercions of the times, and . . . each new interpretation of slavery has pro-fessed to be more anti-racist than the ones it replaces. (Davis 1974, 11)

0. Background to This Essay

This study concerns Platos attitude toward slaves. It is limited to his last,posthumous work, Laws. We chose to limit our discourse for a simple reason. Hisphilosophy is controversial, particularly his social and political philosophy,more so his attitude toward slaves, on which the scholarly literature is apolo-getic. It is notoriously hard to decide what Platos own philosophy was, asmost of his works are dialogues, and it is not easy to discern a writers ownviews when he hides behind arrays of clever interlocutors. This essay istherefore limited to matters on which his attitudes and opinions are relativelyeasy to discern.

Philosophy ofthe Social Sciences

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315

Received 6 March 2006

1. We take responsibility for all the translations of passages that appear below. We are gratefulto Sir Karl Popper whose translations of two passages we have copied, and to A. E. Taylor whosetranslation of Laws we followed with significant deviations.

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There is a specific difficulty here, nonetheless: as Laws is posthumous,we will never know how Plato intended to polish it before publication. Yetthis very difficulty makes it easier to identify his attitude toward slaves,especially since it is agreed that in it, the interlocutor he calls the AthenianStranger represents him.

Our target is less the familiar scholarship concerning Plato and his ideas,and more the reception of Karl Poppers presentation of Platos politics. Inhis skillful, learned work The Open Society and Its Enemies, published in1945, Popper devoted much of the first volume to Plato. He argued there thatdespite Platos benign intentions, he was best described as a totalitarianpolitical thinker, unsuccessful in his immediate and practical undertakings,but in the long run very successful in his propaganda against a civilizationhe had good reasons to oppose (The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. I,chap. 10). The success of his propaganda was mostly due to his brilliance asa philosopher and sociologist, said Popper, which disarmed Platonists andmade them uncritical of his objectionable politics and morals.

We shall argue our case in this order: the historical background (section 1);Popper on Plato, and leading reactions to him (section 2); the distinctionbetween slaves and slavery (section 3); the defense and regulation of slavery(section 4); and the integration of slaves into the Utopian Cretan polisMagnesia (section 5). This final section looks in detail at what Plato saysabout slaves in Laws, with a view to showing that Popper did not exagger-ate when he said Platos stand is repulsive. All attempts to play this downby Platonists and others betray a refusal to take seriously Plato and/orPopper, a refusal that is understandable, but erroneous.

1. Plato in History

Famously, Plato was always the leading philosopher of Western thoughtsecond to none, except possibly Aristotle. Both were traditionally under-stood to have advocated elitist and conservative views. Things stood thisway as long as elitist conservative attitudes were unchallenged. In the Ageof Reason (roughly 1600-1800) they lost their popularity. This did not leadto a revision of views on the teachings of Plato and Aristotle, however,because the rationalists neglected both metaphysics and history, includingthese great classics.2 The study of Greek philosophy remained locked in the

316 Philosophy of the Social Sciences

2. Richard Popkin has uncovered a literature that justified slavery in the early United Statesby racist arguments (Popkin 1978). Even that was forgotten as not very interesting: that slaveryand racism merge is an unserious PlatonicAristotelian excuse.


circles of students of the classics and of education, where elitist and conser-vative attitudes were (and still are) in vogue, and where Platos views stillserve as foundations for liberal education.

Things changed when the reaction to the French Revolution led to therevival of the study of history, much due to Hegel. Admitting the value ofthe search for universal laws in the study of nature, he denied that it fits thestudy of humanity; this study has to be historical, he said. Soon a debate sur-faced on the question, was Plato a liberal? Conservative thinkers continued(and continue) the tradition of praise for Plato as a conservative (see notes8, 20, and 50 below). Some liberal commentators on Plato developed inge-nious new readings of him as a liberal, and they praised him as a championof the cause of liberty 19th-century style. This is not surprising: commen-tators traditionally see their own views in the texts that they study. Thus St.Augustine dubbed him a Christian before Christ, and the Hegelian BenjaminJowett Hegelianized him. A novel attitude emerged in the mid-19th century:George Grote (and other liberal commentators) deemed him illiberal andcensured him.

In The Open Society and Its Enemies of 1945, Popper broke new groundbecause he both declared himself a liberal admirer of Plato, and condemnedPlatos sociopolitical views as extremely hostile to the causes of individualliberty Athenian-fifth-century-BC-style. Naturally, this was hard to stomach;the leading Plato scholar, Manesse, being Hegelian, declared it embarrassing.3This conflicts with the idea of respectful disagreement, popular especiallyin politics. We adopt this popular idea even relative to unreasonable disagree-ments. We take it that reasonable disagreements may become unreason-able because the weight of evidence may render unreasonable the dispositionto cling to some views (although new evidence and new arguments may, ofcourse, also cause reversals). In particular, we view as reasonable both tra-ditional liberal and traditional conservative politics, as well as readings ofPlato as liberal and conservative. But we claim this is no longer so: Poppersevidence for Platos hostility toward liberalism, and his criticism thatdemolishes Platos arguments, render it no longer reasonable to assert thatPlato was a liberal, or to endorse his conservative argumentsnot as long asPoppers evidence and criticism were not criticized with reasonable argu-ments.4 The criticism that these arguments have thus far met, we will illus-trate in some detail, is at times friendly, and at other times below par.

Meital, Agassi / Slaves in Platos Laws 317

3. Manesse (1961, Beiheft 2, 183).4. In his comments on the dust jacket of Poppers The Open Society and Its Enemies, Bertrand

Russell said Plato will never be the same again. He had expressed earlier views similar toPoppers, and quite strongly, and yet he rightly found Poppers criticism heralding a new era.


Following this strategy we consider two traditional readings of Platospolitical concerns quite reasonable in their traditional context: the conserva-tive (mediaeval tradition) as well as the liberal-democratic (John Stuart Milland Ernest Barker). Yet we deem more reasonable liberal critics of Plato(George Grote, Bertrand Russell, Richard Crossman, and Popper). By theconservative reading, Plato offers a deadly criticism of Athenian democracyand advocates an intellectual-elitist rule. By the liberal reading, his commentson it are warnings against decline, and a plea for vigilant defense of indi-vidual freedom. Our accent here, however, is on the utopian character of hisviews, since he was preceded by writers who advocated constitutions of onesort or another, but not in a utopian vain.5

2. Popper on Plato, and Leading Reactions to Him

Poppers The Open Society and Its Enemies of 1945 has been a hardybestseller for over half a century. Its main message, surprising then andcommonplace now, is this: the minimal requirement from any governmentthat can claim to be civilized is that it should be peacefully replaceable. Theinstitutions that should insure this are those of public control; a regime thathas them deserves the honorific title of democracy. The only serious com-petitor to democracy is technocracy, the rule of experts. And technocracythreatens freedom.

Popper argued by challenging both the best defense for technocracyPlatos6and the best defense of the claim for the certainty of progressthat of Karl Marx. Popper took their motives to be the noblest, and theirarguments the best.7 This still awaits the appreciation of Plato and Marxscholars alike. Leaving the discussion of comments of Marx scholars on


5. Morrow (1939, 93) notices that Platos law of slavery in his utopia is an innovation ofhis, both as to contents and the utopian genre. This passage illustrates the great difference inMorrows writing in general, before and after the publication of Poppers The Open Societyand Its Enemies (1939, 1960).

6. Popper presents Plato as a technocrat. We are uneasy about this. Technicians need not bearistocrats, and usually they are not. In addition, they are usually emotionally uninvolved,whereas Plato demanded that his citizens feel allegiance to the polis. Morrow uses this againstPopper (Morrow 1960, 89, 559) without explanation. We find his criticism forceful but highlyexaggerated because he ignores Poppers strategy of presenting the best version of the opinionshe wishes to criticize.

7. Fields very friendly review of Poppers book warmly supports this strategy. Hedeclares that Popper applied it systematically enough to Marx, but not to Plato. We considerthis an error for which we blame in part Poppers style.


Popper for another day, let us glance at the comments of Plato scholarson him.

It is hard to assess what is the received view, but perhaps the CambridgeCompanion to Plato of 1992 is a reasonable indicator.8 Its editor, RichardKraut, adds a note on Popper to his introduction (note 48), in which he says,


8. In these days of the information highways, we may also take as authoritative theEncyclopedia Britannica, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and the InternetEncyclopedia of Philosophy. The Britannica has next to nothing relevant to the present dis-cussion. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy discusses Poppers view apropos of thequestion, is the Republic totalitarian? It claims that its position is balanced or intermediate: ofthe different possible interpretations, it says, a mixed one

might seem to be called for. We can suppose that the good of the city and the good ofthe individual are independently specifiable, and that the citizens own maximal goodcoincides with the maximal good of the city. Since Plato believes that this coincidenceis realized only through propagandistic means in the ideal city, then the propaganda ispaternalistically targeted at the citizens own good, but not exclusively. On this view,if the citizens do not see themselves as parts of the city serving the city, neither thecity nor they will be maximally happy.

This reading is one that the Stanford Encyclopedia has picked from Popper. He addedto this what the Stanford Encyclopedia overlooks: it is the best justification possible ofPlatos totalitarianismbut it is far from being good enough. In the same encyclopedia Art.Plato on Utopia, makes no mention of Popper, democracy, or slaves, which enables itsauthor to conclude thus:

More cautiously, we should look for connections with the epistemology, metaphysics,and psychology of other dialogues which are plausibly thought to be post-Republic, butdo not fall into the final group of six, such as the Phaedrus and the Theaetetus. Byexamining Platos philosophical positions in these later dialogues, we can work out thedeeper justification for Platos vision of political and ethical community in Laws. Andby articulating this vision, we gain greater understanding of the other later dialogues onwhich it rests.

The question remains open, how much of Platos vision this author advocates. TheInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy says in the opening of Art. Plato/Platos Achievement,

Platos greatest achievement may be seen firstly in that he . . . offered to decadentAthens, which had lost faith in her old religion, traditions, and customs, a means bywhich civilization and the citys health could be restored: the recovery of order in boththe polis and the soul.

The conclusion of this item says,

Platos achievement as a political philosopher may be seen in that he believed that therecould be a body of knowledge whose attainment would make it possible to heal politi-cal problems such as factionalism and the corruption of morals, which can bring a cityto a decline. The doctrine of the harmony of interests, fairness as the basis of the best


Popper attributes to Plato the view that the criterion of morality is the inter-est of the state (p. 107), but it is more plausible to take Platos Republic tocontain a theory of what is good for any individual and to presuppose that anideal state is one that best promotes the good of its individual citizens.

This sounds reasonable. Readers who have some familiarity with Platomay wonder whether Plato is kind even to the poets whom he expels fromhis utopia; Kraut ends his note on Popper by referring to a text that dealsspecifically with this matter. Now surely Kraut must disapprove of theexpulsion of any poet, let alone Homer, so he knows that his note is claptrap.He surely also knows that Popper repeatedly ascribed to Plato good will. Thefollowing very slight correction of the above quote turns it around, mendsit, and renders it scholarly and decent:

Popper attributes to Plato the view that the criterion of morality is the interestof the state (p. 107), and yet, Popper adds (p. 109), it is very plausible to takethe Republic to contain a theory of what is good for any individual and to pre-suppose that an ideal state is one that best promotes the good of its individualcitizens.

This is a correction of Krauts text by replacing but with and yet, Popperadds (p. 109). It turns a spurious expression of dissent into the assent thatKraut grants Popper elsewhere (Kraut 1985), but conceals in his prestigiousCompanion. He conceals having borrowed9 an idea from Popper by pre-senting it as if against him. He agrees with Popper that Plato advocated an


political order, the mixed constitution, the rule of law, the distinction between good anddeviated forms of government, practical wisdom as the quality of good leadership, and theimportance of virtue and transcendence for politics are the political ideas that can rightlybe associated with Plato. They have profoundly influenced subsequent political thinkers.

9. Popper is not the first to state this important idea; possibly it is a quite traditional to viewPlatos strict illiberal measures as an expression of his paternalism. Nevertheless in a liberaldemocratic context it is strikingly new, and so it is reasonable to stress it, as the OxfordCompanion to Philosophy (first edition 1995, new edition 2005) does, and in some detail, andalso with no mention of Popper (p. 722a):

They will govern with a view to maximizing the happiness of the state as a whole, butPlato thinks that the way to achieve this is to impose a strict censorship to preventwrong ideas being expressed, to ensure that each person sticks to his own allotted jobso that he does not meddle with affairs that are not his concern, and so on. Plato wasfirmly against democracy, and seems to have seen no connection between happinessand individual liberty.


objectionable paternalism by placing his concern for the citizens on theirsouls, not on their rights. At least this way he could endorse Poppers ideastacitly.10 Another way to do so is to mention Gregory Vlastos instead, whileconcealing Vlastos regard for Popper.11

Poppers view of Platos politics is now more popular than ever, and isrightly seen as less innovative than within tradition. Yet it is for his innova-tion that Russell expressed high regard for him (see note 4 above). His inno-vation comprises two items, one generala reasonably complete pen-portraitof Plato that is, to repeat, both admiring and sympatheticand one specifichis answer to the strongest defense of Plato, the one from the sense of pro-portion: one should not expect Plato to oppose slavery because he lived ina society that took it for granted. Not so, said Popper: by Platos testimonya movement to free the slaves was on the rise (Rep. 549a),12 and he saw itas the anarchy that is rooted in democracy (Rep. 563b-c):13


10. Nails (1995) takes as given Poppers view that certain knowledge is impossible, andascribes this tacitly to Plato disregarding Poppers stress on the importance of knowledge forPlatos empowerment of the knowing philosopher king. She acknowledges the centrality of theSocratic problem in recent times without saying why, without mentioning that Popper forcedit onto the agenda. She barely mentions Popper, and ignores his argument about the politicaldisparity between Platos early and late dialogues, claiming that the variety of opinions inPlatos dialogues is due to his open mind. But an open mind would not speak contemptuouslyof slaves or advocate inquisition even as a thought experiment. Nails admirable scholarshipnotwithstanding, her conduct is unbecoming, especially her suppression of her indebtedness toPopper, and of her disagreements with him.

11. Vlastos (1981, 14, 120, 141) expressed unhesitating support for Popper, and he dismissesPoppers critics offhand. (He also expressed some disagreement with him, and some criticismof his reading of Plato. See p. 144.)

12. Today Poppers claim sounds much less surprising than at the time. We now haveEdward Cohens (2000) The Athenian Nation that has a chapter (chap. 5, 131) on wealthy freedslaves in ancient Athens: . . . the phenomenon of wealthy slaves and, in particular, the insti-tution of the koris iokountes (unfree persons maintaining their own households) are generallyunknown, partly as a result of scholarship which has since Roman times, denied the existenceof this group of slaves (who are in fact well attested in Athenian sources). We can imagineno better vindication of Poppers claim than this assertion and what follows it there, about therefusal of scholars to accept the evidence. To our regret, Popper is conspicuously missingfrom the detailed learned notes on that page.

13. These days the rule of law is generally taken as a precondition for democracy. Yet thequestion is, what happens when they clash? Today we say democracy has the right and abilityto alter the law. This was not always the case. A general recognition of a contrast betweenpopular sovereignty and the rule of law lingered in Athens. Both Plato and Aristotle vieweddemocracy as ochlocracy, as mob rule, a regime disrespectful of the law. Popper explains thisvery simply: the Athenian popular sentiment was egalitarian, and these great thinkers opposed


But, my friend, the extreme amount of freedom which appears in such a polisis when purchased slaves . . . are no less free than their owners. . . .

Popper saw in this passage of Plato direct evidence that the 5th-centuryBC experienced a struggle between a democratic movement that advocatedthe liberation of all slaves, and those who wished to preserve the institutionof slavery as it stood. He says,

It will forever remain one of the greatest triumphs of Athenian democracythat it treated slaves humanely, and that in spite of the inhuman propagandaof philosophers like Plato himself and Aristotle it came, as he witnesses, veryclose to abolishing slavery.14

One of the most important aspects of the debate on Poppers text on Platois absent, though it deserves mention.15 It is that Popper managed to makemost of the comments on Platos politics in the modern Plato commentariesto date (1945) disappear as if with a magic wandas utterly irrelevant. The


it. They could not appeal to any sentiment except that of the desire for social stability, and theydeclared the inequality sanctified by law as the proper means for attaining it. We shouldremember in this context that all ancient legislators (eponymoi) took inequality for granted, andgave their act some mythicalreligious tone. Plato and Aristotle supported their attitude asstrengthening the rule of law; they developed a forceful rationalist attitude meant to enhancesocial stability, but also to support underhandedly aristocratic values. As to the colonizers, theirlegislators acted differently, considering the traditional attitude too rigid. They preferred the useof lots to decide on all unavoidable inequalities, especially the divisions of new lands. Platounderstandably opposed the use of lots, and declared it the mark of democracy (Rep. 557a).In Laws Plato goes further and institutes fictitious lots (L. 759c) explicitly to pacify the democ-ratic sentiment.

As David Cohen (1995, 38-9) notices, the idea that democracy is lawless appears lesssurprising when we remember that the very idea of the rule of law originally came to supportanti-democrats, particularly Plato and Aristotle. Cohen, we should note, concludes his 1993 essay(D. Cohen 1993) with the recommendation that we return to Platos Laws with slight modifi-cations. But possibly it is better to return to Cleisthenes, who applied the rule of law as ameans for democratization. This criticism holds against all reactionaries: how far back do theywant us to go and why?

14. Popper ([1945] 1971, 43, 70, 222, 236, and 278). Popper also refers here to Arist. PoL. 1313b 11-20 (see also 1253b), to Pseudo-Xen., and to Const. of Athens, I, 10f. Popper findsevidence for its existence in Platos condemnation of it. For more references, see Ober (1989, 10,n. 12, 12-13, 29-30, 197 n. 11, 225, 271, 274-5, and 277), where as usual, Popper is conspicuousin his absence.

15. We found only one hint at this idea in the review of K. R. Popper, The Open Societyand Its Enemies, Vol. I: The Age of Plato, The Classical Review 61:55-7) by R. Hackforth.


only texts that remain relevant are liberal commentaries by George Grote,16James Adam, and some of the best conservative commentaries on Plato,summed up masterfully in the comprehensive encyclopedic review of theliterature by Manesse (1961).17

The first severe criticism of Poppers reading of Plato was a slim (66pages) volume by the Dutch classicist Gerrit Jacob de Vries (1952).18 Hiswork is scarcely mentioned, but it was followed by most critics of Poppersreading of Plato. He offered two arguments for his dismissal of Popper,both still in use. First, Popper was no classical scholar. We will ignorethis argument. Second, Platos intention was not to found a real state buthe projects a model in heaven . . . he seeks an unchanging norm (p. 6). Whythen should the heavenly polis be in a constant state of military preparednesswith all citizens as soldiers (Laws, 753b; Open Society, i, 259), and not onein which the wolf also shall dwell with the lamb (Isaiah 11:6)?19

A still often-cited book-length critique of Popper is that of RonaldLevinsons In Defense of Plato (Levinson 1953), perhaps because it is enor-mous (over 600 pages) and very spirited. It declared Plato relatively liberal,and rejects Poppers critique based on exaggerations and exaggerated trans-lations. The qualifier relatively amounts to a big concession. But whatdoes Levinson do with Poppers evidence that Plato was not liberal? Forexample, Popper makes much of Platos demand for utter obedience. Is thatliberal? Yes, says Levinson, considering that Plato meant it only for soldiers,that Poppers suggestion that it was meant for all citizens is false. This can-not be true because Platos models were mainly Crete and Sparta, where


16. George Grote was an amateur philosopher and a commentator on Plato. See A. D.Momiglianos (1994) study of him in his Studies on Modern Scholarship, Berkeley:University of California Press, 1994.

17. Ernst Moritz Manesse, 1957, 1961. Bcher ber Platon, Philosophische Rundschau.18. Although peers respected de Vries as a classicist, they overlook his work on Popper

because it amounts to a caricature of the view that he dismisses as a caricature.19. Like many apologies, that of de Vries boomerangs and belittles the object it defends.

The standard defense of Plato against Poppers onslaught remains that he was a utopianengaged in a mere thought experiment, so that the cruelties that he described he did not advocate.No doubt we should not deprive Plato of the honor of having created social-science thoughtexperiment, which is the label given to science fiction by doyen science-fiction writer IsaacAsimov. Nevertheless, we should take care not to deprive him also of the honor he deservesas the inventor of social and political engineering proper. It is particularly true of Plato thatassessments of his ideas invite a blend of commendation and condemnation. Thus his thoughtexperiment is dead serious, particularly his ideas about the role of religion in politics, in thelaw, and in society at large: they still merit serious examination. We find little more to parrywith this dismissal of de Vries critique of Popper.


utter obedience was generally enforced. Popper cites Plato to say that hisUtopian Cretan polis Magnesia confers the right and duty to bear arms on allcitizens, whose military training since infancy is for utter obedience.Levinson ignored this. Popper has demolished it (in an added appendix tohis The Open Society and Its Enemies); leading scholars (including RichardKraut) still laud it, and appeal to it as a reliable authority.

The most scholarly response to Popper is by the Hegelian Manesse.Contrary to de Vries, he viewed Plato as a realist. He dismissed the democ-ratic critique of Plato as anachronistic, and the liberal one as too liberal:Ordnung muss sein. He presented ideas together with their backgrounds in adelightful way. He thus stands out in his effort to correlate Poppers method-ology to his study of Plato, and to his liberalism and democracy.20

Most current critics of Popper still borrow from Manesse, who rejectedPoppers critique by dismissing his arguments from the Athenian antislaverymovement, and from Platos merger of his politics with his metaphysics(Manesse 1961, 179-80), which is, incidentally, rather traditional. This is an


20. The most conspicuous matter here is that some critics attack Poppers view of Plato asa realist, and others attack him for not endorsing its realism. In any case now, thanks to Popper,it is more customary than ever to consider the Laws more realistic than the Republic, possiblyas a second best. The most authoritative expression of this view is in R-E (Pauly, A., G.Wissowa, and W. Kroll, Realencyclopdie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, 2501, 2511) andThe Cambridge Ancient History, p. 607,

The works published after the Republic reflect a concern with bringing philosophycloser to the realities of life, as a result, we may presume, of discussions both withinand outside the academy.

Similarly, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, says, p. 332a,

His Laws, on the contrary, is a would-be practicable plan. . . . Plato wrote his laws forpractical adoption. . . .

The Stanford Internet Encyclopedia, however, differs: the

claim that the city sketched in Laws is second-best does not suggest that the Republicstill represents Platos ideal political arrangement. What Laws represents as theidealthat is to be approximated as closely as possibleis a city in which all citizensare subject to the same extremely high ethical demands,

demands that the inquisition imposes, as it turns out. Of course, Poppers best critics arehis own disciples; see Hacohen (2000).


unusual misrepresentation for Manesse. Popper explicitly and systematicallyrefrained from using as an argument for his reading of Platos politics hisexplanation of Platos use of his theory of ideas to justify his conservativeview that earlier is better. As to Manesses dismissal of Poppers argumentfrom the Athenian anti-slavery movement, he argues (correctly) that Poppersevidence is not new (Manesse 1961, 182). This is too feeble a response. Thestandard apology for Platos harshness is the excuse that he was not theworst of his generation. Popper refutes this conjecture by utilizing evidenceavailable in Platos own writings. So the evidence should be not new. Also,Manesse complained (Manesse 1961, 184) that Poppers motto misleads. Itis a passage from Platos Laws that demands absolute obedience. It refersto soldiers only, says Manesse. In fairness, he notices that Popper does referto this, but he complains only in a note (Open Society, chap. 6, no. 33), andafter the damage is done, and Poppers readers get an unjustified bad impres-sion of Plato. Thus, the complaints about distortions dwindle into one aboutimpressions.

Of the mixed public reactions that is the lot of everything public, Poppersbook received primarily extreme reactions21general agreement or dismissal.The endorsement that Popper valued most was the review of his study ofPlato by a leading oxford classicist Richard Robinson (1951), who expressedsympathy with both Poppers defense of democracy, and his reading of Plato.He said judgment on Poppers controversial reading of Plato depends onjudgment on the accuracy of his translations of Platos texts that he presentsas evidence. And Robinson says these translations are fair and better thanmost, but are not the most impartial. Popper repeatedly referred to Robinsonsreview as vindication.

3. Slaves versus Slavery

Slaves and slavery loom large in the literature on Greece and on Plato.An aspect of it is the humanistic concern that it exhibits with liberty andfreedom. Freedom is an inalienable right (i.e., a right that cannot be soldaway), as the liberal code has it. Hence, the contrast between freedom and


21. A laudable exception is the appendix to Lodge (1956, 313-32) which is a presentationof a balanced judgment. Lodge is also clear about his judgment of contemporary tyrants: itis as extreme as it should be. He rightly takes it for granted that Popper and his like willnot place Plato among them. This, indeed, is tempered as far as it goes, but it does not govery far.


slavery is basic, and the concern with it is unselfish. The freedom in asociety that admits the institution of slavery differs fundamentally from thesame freedom in a society that proscribes it: the liberal law never allows forsituations in which citizens fear losing their freedom to slave owners. Platowas very sensitive to this possibility, and much of his discussion comes toprevent the enslavement of citizens. This is noble except that it pales incomparison to the demand to abolish slavery once and for all. In PlatosMagnesia as described in Laws, the inhabitants are different classes of Greekcitizens, foreign residents, and slaves.22 Both citizens and foreign residentsown slaves. Slaves are there as part of the collective. This is a moral outrage.23


22. Plato divides the class of citizen into four distinct subclasses according to possession.In each of these subclasses women live more-or-less within the confines of their class. The pop-ulation also includes visitors and guests, prisoners, and liberated slaves. (A slave who managedto stop an assault on parents and who testifies about is almost set free; otherwise he is flogged[L. 881c].)

23. Finley is condescending to slaves. Some of his ideas are less humane than Platos. He(Finley 1980, 126) says,

Slavery is not a moral category, comparable to good manners or honesty; it is an insti-tution performing various functions, in particular that of providing an important part ofthe labor supply. So long as that labor is needed, slavery cannot decline tout court; ithas to be replaced.

This is his Marxism: he takes economic factors as more basic than political ones, and moralfactors as even less basic. This allows him to dare speak of manners and honesty as exam-ples of things moral. Is democracy a moral category in his view? Adam Smith dealt withslavery forcefully (Preface to The Wealth of Nations), viewing it as sheer prejudice: puttingworkers in chains is obviously no incentive to increased production. (This may be an allusionto Xenophon (Oik. 14.6-10; Mem. 2.7.)

Smiths opinion is problematic: it holds against the institution of slavery, not against slaveowners in a society that practices it. There presumably, it makes sense to keep slaves, but totreat them much better than was common any time. This is no news to Finley, of course. Hereplies to it thus (127):

ancient slavery existed in a pre-industrial context and coexisted with other types ofdependent labor, not with free wage-labor.

Hence, Smiths argument allegedly holds only against modern slavery. This attempt to vin-dicate Marx is not serious for two reasons. First, Smith wrote in a pre-industrial context.Second, as Finley observes elsewhere (Finley 1981, 182, 199), hired free labor was always avail-able. Parrying this criticism, he declares that hired free labor was of little economic significance.This is a circular argument because hired free labor would have been more significant wereslavery abolished. Finley could scarcely be so glib were the academic culture of his day lessready to accept poor arguments against Popper. Finley is clearly familiar with Poppers works


However, this is not unique to Plato. In his time, nearly every other Greekpolis incorporated slaves (hypomeiones, Xenophon, HG. 3.3.6) and otherinferior dwellers (Morrow 1939, 148). Plato justified this in his politicaldoctrine, as did Aristotle in Politica (Arist. Pol. 1253b-1254a).24 OtherGreek thinkers did so too. Popper dissented from the view of this as charac-teristic of the age; in the fifth-century BC, he discerned a struggle betweena democratic movement that advocated the liberation of all slaves, and thosewho wished to preserve the institution of slavery as it stood. The disagree-ment is not on facts, but on principle: Popper hated slavery; Plato approvedof it wholeheartedly (see notes 5, 8, 14, 22, 29, 31-2 here). He wanted thelegal system that he envisaged and developed to serve as a reversion to amythical ideal past that he wished his compatriots to revive and preserve forall eternity. And slaves were a part of that past. This mythical system cameto justify their status as property and as inferior, not only in the ideal state,but also there and then. His ideal society, as described in his Laws, is aclosed society25 subordinate to two drives. The first is for the preserva-tion forever of the Utopian Cretan polis Magnesia as it is. This includes itspolitical organization, its legal system, its religious cult, its moral norms,and its social structure. The second drive is for victory, the urge to win allwars. For citizens, foreigners, and slaves, their origin, status, and role insociety derives from the (collectivist) bond between Platonic society andthese drives.

Plato accepted as a part of his model the view of the Athenian law: slavesare personal property. He added to this partial model several laws andnorms that transform the discrimination against slaves into something stillmore unsympathetic and immoral. He begins (L. 776c) by reference to the


because he uses and abuses them; but he does not name him, presumably out of misplacedrespect for his professional colleagues in classics. This is often the lot of Marx, too, whose viewof slavery as a necessary stage in social evolution Ste. Croix, Finley, and other Marxists assid-uously ignore. See also note 30 below.

24. Aristotle also writes that there is a dispute over the question whether slaves are slavesby nature or by convention (see Vogt 1975, 33).

25. (Popper [1945] 1971, 173):

The magical or tribal or collectivist society will also be called the closed society, andthe society in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions, the open society.


Spartan Helots26 in a discussion of what he deemed the Helotic problem,27namely, what is their status as slaves? They were a cast with duties to thecollective and with few rights. He went on to say,

. . . for most Greeks Spartan Helotism is a very difficult problem and a mostcontroversial one, as some see it as a good thing, some not . . . .

The status of slaves in Magnesia is lower than that of their Heloticcounterparts. Whereas the status of the Helots was between freedom andslavery,28 Plato wanted slaves to be inherently slaves. The essential differ-ence that he admitted between Helots and slaves is that only the former hadthe right to procreate and enjoy family life. Plato wanted offspring of slavesto be turned over to their masters, or else both slaves and offspring are tobe banished (L. 930d). Plato meant to prevent the rise of a nation of slaves,distinguished by its own definitive subculture or way of life.

The role of slaves in Magnesia is more important than it may appear tocasual readers. Slaves and citizens are obviously mutually dependent; one of


26. The Helots were mainly former Messenians. After the Messenian war they became acast of slaves like the Gibeonites. They were not protected against murder, yet they did havehousing rights. They wore special clothes that marked them and degraded them. Plato did notrecommend thishe had no need for it because his slaves seldom mix with citizens. In hisstate, slaves are marked only after being found guilty of having desecrated temples. And thenthey are tattooed on the face and arms (L. 854d). Then, says Bernadette (2000, 257), the slavebecomes a walking text.

27. Platos view of helots as problematic was not idiosyncratic: they constituted an obvi-ous danger to the stability of the regime, and indeed they revolted repeatedly. The problemwas, should the instability that they comprised be treated ad hoc or on a more general princi-ple? Despite the paucity of evidence, there is full agreement that the Spartans treated them adhoc, and even in panic. There were, however, some standing means for stabilizing the regime.For example, one of Spartas two kings had to stay home at all times. A much more vividexample for this stabilization and for its ad hoc nature is Th. 4.80, which describes succinctlya selection of the worthiest Helots, a fake rite of their initiation into Spartan society, their secretmassacre, and the staunch denial of it.

28. Pollux (3.83) offers information that is contrary to that of Kritias (88B37 D-K), writ-ing, in Lakaedaimon are to be found those who are the most enslaved and those who are themost free. England ([1921] 1976, 617) notes this difficulty regarding Laws (776b). This diver-sity of information is not due to the paucity of historical evidence because these authors hadancient sources at their disposal. Sparta, too, had the matter of slavery on its agenda, althoughof course differently from Athens. Popper does not refer to this item. It supports his claim: free-ing slaves is one option in a set that is the agenda, and it appears only in a democracy. No doubtthe Helots had some advantages not shared by Athenian slaves, especially regarding family life,and these are due to their status as occupied indigenous tribes.


these groups cannot exist without the other. The clear separation of these twogroups and their attitudes toward one another effectively defines both ofthem. Plato writes (L. 690b),

Slaves should submit and free men should rule, adding, as a justification, thatby the law of nature, the strong should rule and the weak should submit.

Slaves should fulfill their social destiny as worthless and subhuman byremaining very isolated, and being kept at a distance from citizens. Tothat end, they should have a different language,8 and avoid human contact(L. 777e-778a):

In most cases, one should address a servantmale or femalewith acommand, never playfully.

The roles of master and slave complement one another and allow the stateto achieve its optimal potential. Masters may engage in public service, in mil-itary service, and in studies. Their routine lives are those that befit their socialclass. Slaves work the field to ensure prosperity for their masters. ThisPlatonic synergy is dependent on the principle of the isolation of slaves. Toenforce this isolation, ethnic and linguistic differences are maintainedbetween citizen and slave; it is further maintained and established throughlaws and social norms. This is a principle, and it comes into play for the freeforeignersresidents and visitors alikein the maintenance of a similar sep-aration of their ways of life and of their occupations. Social benefits increasewhen different people cooperate unawares, as members of each group worktowards their own goals oblivious of other groups. This separation in Platosstate between slaves and citizens allows this synergy to flourish. Masters cancontinue to function as masters, and slaves continue to function as slaves.

The appearance of slaves in Laws is itself a novelty, because for the firstand only time in Platos works, he treats slaves explicitly as an integral, legit-imate part of society. This is the first instance in which Plato discusses thelaws that determine the integration of economic functions through the sepa-ration of all other social functions. In addition, the law in Platos ideal statedefines and treats slaves as inferiors who are less than equal, but who at thesame time retain certain rights. Slaves are hardly mentioned in PlatosRepublic; it is obvious that they exist there, but very little is said about them.They appear explicitly only as a part of the population (Rep. 433d), asVlastos (1981, 145-163) notes. They are also mentioned there (Rep. 549a) inpassing, implying that they were indeed a fixed part of society; and again, letus repeat, as a symptom for the sickly freedom (anarchy) that is inherent todemocracy (Rep. 563b-c):



But, my friend, the extreme amount of freedom which appears in such a polisis when purchased slaves . . . are no less free than their owners. . . .

Thus Plato saw the evil of democracy best manifest in its disposition tofree its slaves.29 As James Adam puts it in his comment on this passage(Adam [1902], 1965, Rep. 563b-c),

. . . but the ideal polis is one thing and the lawless democracy is another.

Relating abolitionism to democracy is still unpopular. G. E. M. de Ste.Croix, one of the 20th centurys leading classical authorities, reluctantly andtacitly agrees with Popper, but only in part. He notes (Ste. Croix 1972, 45),

The only serious objection to slavery in principle that we ever hear of in theancient world is the one mentioned in the couple of isolated passages inAristotles Politics (1 3, 1253b 20-3, 6, 1255a 5-12), where we are told thatthere were those who declared that slavery, being founded on force, was con-trary to nature and wrong. . . . And there is no indication that those boldunnamed thinkers whom we cannot identifyhad advocated the abolition ofslavery . . . .

Popper, who is conspicuous in his absence here, identified those boldunnamed thinkers as Antiphon of Athens, Euripides, Hippias, Democritus,Diogenes, and Antisthenes (Popper [1945] 1971, 69, 278-9). Ste. Croix refersto the ancient world and ignores democracy, as if abolitionism is hardlyrelated to democracy, and as if Aristotle is the only witness for ancient abo-litionism. Popper may be in error, of course, but then it behooves a scholarof Ste. Croixs standing to put him right.30

The contrast between slavery and democracy was never agreeable tothose hostile to democracy. Thus in Laws slaves appear merely as economicand legal items, only as present-absentees. They have duties vital for theeconomy, the polity, and the society in general, yet their social status is thatof absentees, the subhuman, the a priori inferiors who, save for some rare and


29. In addition to Poppers evidence for Athenian abolitionism in Platos condemnation ofit, see Ober (1989, 10, n. 12, 12-13, 29-30, 197 n. 11, 225, 271, 274-5, and 277), where Popperis conspicuous in his absence.

30. The excuse that Ste. Croix was ignorant of Popper or of his importance is unthinkablebecause he lectured in the London School of Economics in the early 50s. Like Finley, Ste.Croix was a Marxist. According to Wikipedia, they were nonetheless antagonists. One thingthat united them, as it did many Marxists of the time, was hostility to Popper because of hisswinging critique of Marx.


exceptional cases, have no freedom, no equality under the law, no education,and no culture.

Plato distinguished between slaves and the concept of slavery. Nowhere inLaws is there a definition of slaveryas a social institution or otherwise. Eachslave is considered separately as a legally defined object and as living understrict social norms, in recognition of slaves but not of the institution of slavery.(This is a common practice of discrimination even today.) Any generalizationabout the concept of slavery in Laws must be the outcome of an analysis of thedifferent laws that appear in it regarding slaves (not regarding slavery), aidedby Platos principle of inherent racial inequality. Usually, the word slaveryappears in Laws in some metaphoric use, expressing the unequal relationshipbetween two parts of a whole, in which one is superior to the other, morally orotherwise, and therefore fit to rule over the other. For instance, Plato proclaims(L. 727a) the gods (the divine souls) masters of humanity (of human souls). Healso divides some human characteristics this way. In the best-case scenario, themind is the superior part of the person, acting as a master and ruling over theentire person, constantly legitimizing its mastery by obedience to the state, andby the desire for goodness. The body is the inferior part of the person, obedi-ent only to the mind, much like a slave. The relationship between unequalbeings is a repeated theme that bears great weight (L. 757a-758a). Here Platodeals with the familiar principle of just equality. He proposes that bestowingequality on people who are not on the same moral level is unjust and immoral;only the master, rather than the slave, should have rights, being the better party,both by nature, and by being virtuous and well educated. Therefore, the prin-ciple of justice will be, in practice (L. 757d),

natural equality, which is distributed . . . to unequals . . .

Plato considered a curse the social equality that we know and advocatebecause it rests on the principle that all people are born equal. He gave thisequality the same status that he gave to the lottery: his Utopian Cretan polisMagnesia will have none of it. He viewed as unjust and not advantageous thenotion that all people are born equal: in managing the state, leaders can employthis principle to prevent revolt or settle conflicts. Settling differences amicablywith the aid of this principle is wise; otherwise it is better not to invoke it.

4. The Status of Slaves Defended and Regulated

The Platonic view of slaves took root in Western thought, especially inplaces where socioeconomic systems included slaves. The philosophical



justification of this practice is the assertion that some are inferior to othersby racial origin (by nature) or geographical origin. It draws its legitimacyfrom Platos Laws. There he recommends the practice of marking slaves assubhuman by nature, and thus (by definition) unable to perform basic mentalfunctions (Ti. 51e). In addition, Plato describes the slaves existence as poorand miserable (loc. cit.), and in Statesman (Pol. 309a) he extols the art ofpolitics as that in which statesmen makes slaves of those who wallow inignorance and abject humility.

This idea received an extreme legal expression for the first time in Platoscorpus in Laws, where we also read that the blood of slaves is not equal tothe blood of citizens, as they always belong to different races. Thus, killinga slave is not criminal. Plato considered the minds of slaves essentially dif-ferent from those of citizens. Hence, slaves are necessarily ignorant; theycan have opinions, but never knowledge. (He has doxa, but not logos[Vlastos 1981, 148]): slaves will be able to act on experience and on whatthey see, but they will never be able to reason deductively.

Opinion, said Plato (Republic, end of Book Five, 474b-480a), standsbetween knowledge and ignorance. Things that truly exist, he said, are fullyknowable. As a disposition, knowledge is the ability to turn to the things thattruly exist, namely, to the Forms, regardless of all practical considerations.Ignorance as a disposition is a different ability: it is the ability to turn tounformed things that therefore cannot even be properly spoken. Ignorance,thus, does not really turn to anything. Opinion lies in between knowledgeand ignorance, and turns to a different set of things, containing that whichsimultaneously is and is not.

Things get complicated here because there are two variants of Platosview about the intellectual powers of slaves, of his claim that they cannotpossess knowledge. The Republic renders the philosopher king and theslave opposite poles. Famously, Laws has no philosopher king. Accordingto one variant, Plato consequently allowed slaves to have opinions. Whetherin the Statesman (Pol. 309a) the discussion is of the philosopher king ornot is a moot point.31 Without discussing the best, it leaves no doubt about


31. As the method of the Statesman is uncompromising bifurcation, it is possible thatbecause the statesman is on top of everything, knowledge and power included, he may be iden-tified as the philosopher king. Why then is there no statement to that effect? Commentatorswho insisted that the statesman is a philosopher king do not ask this question. Perhaps this isdue to the absence of the third part of the projected trilogy, Sophist, Statesman, andPhilosopher. Our point here, however, is that Platos method puts the slave at the bottom sothat his imperfection is the negative of the perfection that is the philosopher king.


the worst. By this variant slaves are the embodiment of ignorance anddegradation: they turn their minds to things that definitely are not. Themeaning of this variant is that slaves minds resemble those of lower ani-mals; they cannot possess even opinions. It is hard to imagine that Platoseriously advocated this view because in his books a slave may take an oathin court, understand the local language, and in special cases, possess knowl-edge32 and earn freedom. A slave who is able to possess only doxa can turnto the world of phenomena and acquire doubtful ideas that rest on mereexperience and observation. But let us emphasize this description (in Laws,Statesman, and elsewhere) of the slaves mind is also applicable to most ofthe citizens: the difference between slaves and citizens is that only slavescan never know. (Hence, slaves can never become Platonists.)33

Platos Laws declares (L. 875c) that a real mind is obliged by its natureto stay free. The souls of slaves and of citizens thus differ inherently. Thishas significant corollaries in the realms of education, law, and the majorsocietal norms. Platos parallel between the soul and the state expels slavesfrom politics. This may explain his reticence about slaves (and slavery) inRepublic. It may also explain his reticence about slavery in Laws, despite thedifficulty that it raises for the part of Laws that attends to laws regardingslaves. Because Platos state is perfect, only perfect souls can be citizensthere (and they all must be Platonists). Obviously, few can pass the test of


32. The attitude towards slaves in the Meno (73c) is much more humane and tolerant thanin Platos later dialogues. Often this attitude towards slaves is attributed to Socrates and not toPlato, as there the slave shows mathematical ability. Moreover, in that dialogue the arte of aman and a woman free and slave is one and the same; they are all good in the same way (Sidley,1998, 373). Is that true? Socrates says there (73a) that arte is the same in men and in women:although men govern cities and women govern kitchens, they are equals as long as they keepto their separate and unequal places. To say that rich and poor are equally masters of theirhomes is not to equate the mansion with the hovel. The presence of this idea in the Meno andin the Republic is significant for the Socratic problem. (See note 10 above.)

33. This passage is a refutation of Plato because some slaves surely did espouse his theoryof Forms. This is not fatal, however, because possibly they adopt this doctrine as a mere doxa,and there is no criterion to distinguish between true claims for episteme and false ones (thosePlato called doxosohoi). This permits Debra Nails to dismiss Poppers solution to the Socraticproblem by declaring all of Platos dialogues as expressing nothing but tentative opinions (seenote 10 above). We suggest Platos views on slaves, as expressed in Laws, conflict with hers. Ofcourse, she may claim that the refutation is invalid because she views the whole of this text asmere doxa (because the possibly necessary is admittedly possible and not necessary). Here,at least, we may observe, she is in a minority of one. See Simon Blackburn, The OxfordDictionary of Philosophy, Art. Forms. See also the same article in Edwards The Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, p. 325b, written by Gilbert Ryle.


this strict selection rule that Plato requires; at least, by this strict selectionrule citizens must be in possession of vast funds of knowledge,34 or at thevery least, they must exhibit the practical ability to acquire it. How does thestate manage to craft as many perfect souls as it needs? Plato solves thisproblem by an excuse: imperfect though the citizens are, they are potentiallyperfect, and so they are superior to slaves, whose inability to reach perfectionis inherent. All of Platos later works characterize slaves as having lowintellectual and moral potential. It also repeatedly refers to their ethnic origin(as foreigners), as well as to their legal position (as pieces of property) andsocial role (as servants). Plato systematically characterizes slaves negativelyby reference to their lack of proper education that justifies exclusion fromcivilized society. (Even in the Meno, which is the bright exception, it is thesearch for one who is unquestionably ignorant to act as an interlocutorthat leads to the choice of a slave.) This marks slaves as indelibly inferior;their presence highlights citizens and preserves their superiority forever.

All this is hard to take seriously.35 A perfect state should contain noimperfect beings like the slaves that Plato describes.36 Also, his characteri-zation of slaves as inherently both ignorant and foreign clashes with obvious


34. The argument against democracy from the ignorance of the population at large is dueto Plato and other friends of Sparta, who rendered antonyms the words mob-rule and jus-tice. (Nietzsche agreed about this.) It is still the strongest. Plato considered even the AthenianEcclesia (Assembly) a mob, and found intolerable its role as a jury that can adjudicate onmatters justice and of religious rites. Because the criticism of democracy as the rule of theignorant is the strongest, so is argument against it, namely, that we are all ignorant. It isSocratic. Popper has adopted it to the full: because we are all ignorant to this or that degree,it behooves us all to support democracy. Nevertheless it is not contested that democracydemands of its citizenry a certain minimal level of tolerance. Also it demands of the govern-ment to see to it that educational opportunities are open to all.

35. The assertion that the inferiority of the inferior is inherent is quite common. In BertrandRussells fictional Zahatopolk, children learn to hate foreigners because they eat peas. As evi-dence they are inferior, teachers show them foreigners eating peas. Similarly Fisher (1993,chap. 7) is devoted to the justification of slavery in Classical Greece. He says, the theories anddiscussions of the sophists

with Socrates and his varied pupils, seem to raise some doubts about the standard view(i.e., Platos) that slavery was natural and just. But the dominance of this view was notseriously affected, particularly if the slaves were not Greek.

This is a reply to liberal critics like Popper. It shows how lightweight some of the discussionof Platos view of slavery still is. Fisher first discusses (and dismisses) the idea that by theirnature Greeks are braver than others. He then suggests that possibly hints of a critique ofslavery existed, referring to the universalism noticeable in fragments of Antiphon, in playsof Euripides, and where Aristotle refers to some sources. Nonetheless he sums up (92):


facts: some slaves are Greek and some foreigners are free, not to mentionthe educated slaves of foreign origin. The presence of foreign residents inMagnesia requires some explanation. The status of slaves in his UtopianCretan polis as that of perpetual foreigners requires some explanation too.None is forthcoming. Plato does refer to Greek slaves, though. (Many Greekshad become slaves as war captives; others became slaves due to economicdislocationas individuals and even as groups.) He strongly opposed theenslavement of Greeks. Self-enslavement does not take place in his UtopianCretan polis because citizens, free by definition, cannot be enslavedbothbecause free souls are forever free and because the structure of the stateprevents enslavement (L. 774c-d):

. . . in our society, all citizens are assured of necessities of life and theirwomen are thus less likely to become arrogant and their men are also lesslikely to be subject to the mean slavery that is unbecoming to the free.

Such measures, Plato tacitly admits, are insufficient. In his Utopian Cretanpolis the classes are only relatively rigid so that downward or upward socialmobility (say, due to economic or ethnic assimilation) is unlikely; but it isstill possible. Nevertheless, Plato describes the social structure of his polisas utterly petrified. The foreigners who have become slaves are professionalslaves from the moment of the foundation of the polis, and continue to beso indefinitely. They fulfill the role for which they have been relocated, tobe the hewers of wood and drawers of water (Joshua 9:12). It is obviously


We have to state firmly that on existing evidence we cannot be sure that anyone in clas-sical Greece took the more radical step and proposed the abolition of chattel slavery.

He does not say why we can only accept interpretations of which we can be sure. He admitsthat in Laws, Platos

guidance on the treatment of slaves is somehow stricter than those current in Athensof his time.

Somehow. He explains this by Platos view of slaves natural inferiority (92), also by hisacceptance of some stereotypes (93), and by his elitism (93). See also notes 2 and 22 above.

36. The traditional excuse for slavery, namely that someone has to work, is surely unac-ceptable to Plato and his followers who opposed idleness. See the discussions of beggars andof specialization below. Platos enormous political influence was largely in his combinedlegitimating of elitism of all sorts (seldom slavery), his admonition against the use of superi-ority as an excuse for sloth, and against reducing the inferior to beneath their legally sanc-tioned inferiority.


true that what Plato said of slaves places them below their actual status athis time. It is less obvious but still true that the status he recommended forthem in his ideal state places them below their actual status. We remember hedisapproved of their status in his time because it allowed for their possiblerelease from bondage.

5. Integrating Slaves in the Utopian Cretan Polis

Let us backtrack a bit to state the crux of our argument. It is a straight-forward and systematic reading of how slaves appear in Laws. We do notfocus on disputed or difficult passages, but on those whose meaning is rea-sonably plain. This is more than sufficient to demand public recognitionthat Poppers criticisms of his moral and political outlook as just and as trueto the letter: the author of Laws merits the label of an arch reactionary.

Platos discussion of slaves (L. 776b-778a) opens by declaring extantopinions about them questionable, explaining this by reference to the con-troversial character of views about them as it transpires from extant reportsabout good and bad slaves. This gambit is odd because such reports are notat odds; only their generalizations are odd. Platos discussion continues witha condemnation of the torture of slaves for which Plato at once expresses con-tempt. What does this move amount to? One might expect him to move asusual to a discussion of some principles and their subsequent application tothe information at hand. Sadly, he moves instead on to one specific difficultyconcerning the need to stop slaves from organizing and rebelling. In responseto this need he offers feeble ideas about slave management. They rest on thereport he does not discussthat some slaves are good; some are bad.37 Rather,quite uncharacteristically, he suggests that slaves and citizens should not bedifferentiated directly, but as a result of two rules. First, slaves shouldremain foreigners, and their linguistic differences serve to hamper commu-nication between them. Second, citizens should treat slaves justly (L. 777d).


37. Levinson (1953) complains that Popper does not distinguish between servant and slavewhen translating Platos term doulea and its cognates. In the passage discussed in the text here(L. 776), clearly neither Plato nor his translators notice this difference. See Poppers reply(Popper [1945] 1971, 1, 334-6). The derogatory character of the word doulea in Plato isunmistakable. Platos reference to himself as a slave to the truth, incidentally, resembles the titleof Moses the Lawgiver as the slave (eved) of the Lord: it does not detract from the normal neg-ative connotation of this word, as Fisher notices. See his discussion of doulea in Fisher (1995,52 and notes 31 and 46 there), where he also notices that Plato praised slave ownership.


This leaves unanswered the question that Plato himself recognizes as centralregarding the supply of slaves: where do they all come from? The discussionthen moves to town planning for the new polis of slave owners.38 Becausemoney and dealing with foreigners are forbidden to the citizens of Magnesia(L. 916a-c), how do they renew their stock of slaves?39

Plato said nothing about slaves incapable of workdue to illness, hand-icap, injury, or old agebecause they are cattle. This is defective even by hisstandards: to prevent revolt, management of the slave stock requires monitor-ing and control. To this end Plato prohibits estates with many slaves. Indeed,a correlation between the number of plots of land and the number of slavesis necessary: the structure of Magnesia rests on the number 5,040 and itsdivisors. Because all the 5,040 plots of land are of equal size, the nature ofwork demands that each citizen should own the same number of slaves.Most likely, the number of slaves in each household is limited. Magnesiaalso includes slaves of foreign residents and of the state. Their number isthen considerably larger than that of the rest.

The size of the Utopian Cretan polis Magnesia is fixed. The householdthere comprises two fixed systems: a plot of land and slaves as a work force,and a household and its domestic slaves. The size is fixed in terms of pro-duction of the amount of foodfor consumption and for rationing to slaves.40This system is aparche.41


38. Here as elsewhere, Platos utopianism covers unpleasant details such as slave markets.In Magnesia laws regulate everythingall tradeincluding trade in slaves.

39. This is no rhetorical question. As law regulates everything in Magnesia, some lawsshould regulate trade with foreigners. After all, there are commissioners there whose task isto supervise all markets.

40. Plato discusses food distribution between citizens, foreign residents, and slaves(L. 847e-848a) in a passage that does not help us to find out the exact number of slaves in hisutopia. The same holds for the amount of food that slaves consume, but there it is under-standable: the amount of food that masters give to their slaves is a matter for their discretion.Incidentally, in Greece slaves ate less than their masters; see the food distribution to slaves inSpectaria, and Th. 4.16, which reports that under siege, slaves received half of the rations offree soldiers.

41. The status of slaves is inherently different from that of vassals, tenants, and theirlikes: the latter own their land and must pay a share of their produce to their lords. Slaves,Platos or Talmudic, in principle have no right to own anything (L. 847e-848a). (The sameholds for minors and women, but with many exceptions: their inability to own is not a matterof principle.) Plato opposed the system of aparche because it is the recognition of propertyrights for slaves in Sparta. It even allowed slaves to sell surpluses, and thus have money. InAthens, slaves could own their personal belongings, and even earn money as oarsmen. Platochanged the meaning of the word aparche. This destroys the standard excuse for Platosmeanness to slaves by the claim that it reflects contemporary practice.


Unlike most Athenian slaves, those in Magnesia can have no propertyrights: they are human cattle. They cannot even obtain gifts. Thus they areunable to accumulate funds to buy their freedom. Nevertheless, Plato doesallow for this possibility for a slave who happens upon a treasure and noti-fies the authorities of the find: he may receive a part of it that should suf-fice to set him free (L. 914a).42 To conceal the find, incidentally, is to invitethe death penalty. One may also escape from servitude by helping parentsbeaten by their child (L. 881c), or by telling on maltreatment of parents(L. 932d). Release of slaves is permissible because they are property. Theythen become foreign residents, but must still go to work on the land of theirmasters three times a month and obtain from them permission if they wishto marry (L. 915a). They may not accumulate money in excess of a givensmall sum. Otherwise they must leave the country within 30 days.

Platos view of slaves is more severe than that of Aristotle,43 as his viewof ownership is more restricted. In his view, cattle and slaves (Rh. 361a)comprise mobile property that is the ability

to transfer it or to not transfer, when it is yours. And by transfer, I mean giftor sale.

This is hardly a definition; it is a touchstone. The test of ownership is thatit is transferable. But ownership is an institution: as Aristotle knew, with dif-ferent connotations in different societies, depending on some institutional-ized recognitionconcerning transfer and tenure (is that what he meant bynot transfer?), and therefore also the proper methods of staking claims.Yet Aristotles touchstone has merit: unlike Platos view of slaves, hismakes no mention of any ethnic or physical characteristic, much less spec-ification of permitted or forbidden relations between master and slave.(Aristotles assertion that slaves are Barbarians and possess lesser souls, torepeat, is a mere excuse for the very presence of slavery.)

Platos view of slaves concerns the different roles and duties that heallotted to them. Inferiority is the integral aspect of these roles, just as muchas their legal and mental state. This is Platos major moral flaw. As a prin-ciple, task discrimination may lead rapidly to racism because the linkagebetween a degraded task and the specific race of people who perform it is


42. L. 742a allows wages to artisans, even if they are slaves. To that end they acquire aspecial status. But only by finding a treasure can a slave in Platos Utopian Cretan polisMagnesia be liberated.

43. Aristotles writings offer several different definitions for slavery. See Pol. 1253b.


surprisingly strong. Slaves in Magnesia perform the degraded tasks notsuited for the upper class (Ducat 1974, 1455). The principle of the divisionof labor in Magnesia is essential for its very existence. The work of slavesprovides citizens with the leisure that enables them to devote themselves tothe arts of war, politics, and education.

In Magnesia, slaves are inherently poor. Their poverty is not a result ofthe nature of their work, but of their legal status and the nature of the regime.In Sparta, for example, Helots were able to accumulate possessions. Comparedto them, slaves in Platos Magnesia are wretchedly poor. This may lead torebellion. So Plato proposed to institute means for its prevention, chieflylaws concerning the origin of the slaves: they justify economic discrimina-tion by racial discrimination and separation. Slaves should even speak dif-ferent languages.

In Magnesia, slaves work as farmers (L. 805e, 806d); they may maintainsmall vineyards, orchards, and herds (L. 674c; L. 845a). A different type ofwork is their job as servants of citizens (L. 808a-b; L. 790a, 809e). Whenunemployed, slaves should perform public maintenance such as fortifica-tions, roads, and water supply systems (L. 760e-761c). A small number ofslaves belong to the public and work under the supervision of public officials(L. 763a). Their tasks possibly include work in the states three prisons. Butslaves there may not serve in policing and in informing (in Athens theycould). All slaves there perform tasks that involve minimal hours of sleepbecause long sleep is unhealthy (L. 808d): sleep all night is generally pro-hibited, as is drinking during work hours (L. 674b).

Plato did not allow citizens to share tasks with slaves; he likewisebarred them all from having more than one profession each as a principleof our society, as it is unnatural (L. 846e). Oddly, he applies this to slavestoo (L. 846d). He allowed foreigners, but not slaves, to acquire skills incrafts (L. 846d), or to have a profession such as commerce (L. 849b). Asto military service, because slaves serve as oarsmen (Arist. Rh. 1361a), pre-venting slaves from serving as oarsmen in the states navy requires that thestate should forego maintaining a navy (L. 707a-b):44

. . . states that owe their power to a navy also bestow the reward for their secu-rity on an inferior element of their forces. As they owe the security to the artof a sea captain, the lieutenant, the oarsmen, and to a miscellaneous and notover-reputable crowd, there is no possibility of rewarding honors aright to thevarious individuals.


44. This may be Platos response to Old Oligrach, 1.2, 1.12, and 2.14.


The absence of a navy saves Magnesia from the trouble of granting rightsto slaves, as happened in Athens and Sparta at the end of the fifth-centuryBC (Ducat 1974, 1455). As for slaves in the infantry, Plato does not mentionwhether or not they may/should fight alongside their masters. For slaves toaccompany their masters into battles was customary in all of Greece. Thisopened the door to social integration, and for cracks in the systems of iso-lation, discrimination, and separation, meant to distance slave from citizen.This brought grave trouble to Sparta, and led to a slaughter of freed Helots(Th. 4.80).26 Plato follows the Athenian norm here because it is unthinkablethat citizens should go into battle alone, and perform degrading tasks in thebattlefield. Possibly however, he wanted them to act only as servants, not ascombatants. And many slaves could be on the battlefield to provide foodand services.

Magnesia places severe limitations on some types of work, such as hunt-ing and fishing (L. 823b-824c). In general, Plato forbade all forms of huntingand fishing except for those done by (mainly young) citizens using horses ordogs. They may capture only four-legged animals, and only with their barehands or with bows and arrows. Plato was prejudiced against hunting ingeneral, and he explicitly proscribed hunting down slaves to death (kryptia),although Sparta allowed it as a rite of passage (L. 823e).

Plato prohibited begging (L. 936b-c). He asked, is this sort of occupationpossible in a proper state or even in a partly proper one? Though his UtopianCretan polis Magnesia has three prisons, he demanded that it expel beggarswith no delay. This is a particularly severe punishment, and its justificationis oddly religious (cleanliness). As in many societies, deviants are the mostfree of convention, perhaps the only ones, he saw in them untamable and sothreatening (L. 766):

. . . let him be trained insufficiently or amiss, and he will show himself moresavage than any other thing on the face of the earth will.

Platos Magnesia has two firm foundations: conscious obedience to lawsand public religious rituals. He confined cultic ceremonies to public temples.It is hard to know whether he permitted slaves to practice their home cus-toms, including their holidays and festivals; nobody knows what these are.It is likewise hard to know if they should celebrate state holidays.45 Havingno right to education, they are practically outside civilization, relegated to


45. Burkert (1985, 259) notes that in Athens slaves were often excluded from cults; foreignslaves could preserve their customs. Parker (1966, 5-6) notes that in Athens they were allowedto enter temples.


a subculture that is unworthy of the rest of humanity: education is only foreleutheroi (Morrow 1960, 323-324; Th. 4.80). Culturally speaking, Platosslaves resemble the Spartan Helots of whose culture, Ducat says (Ducat1990, 116-17),

Par-l comme par le port de vtements bruts, les hilotes taient carts de laculture; on leur mnageait la place pour une sorte de sous culture, convenant des sous hommes, et pense comme une parodie grotesque et sauvage decelle des citoyens.

Plato describes slaves as helpless creatures devoid of the skills of read-ing, writing, and arithmetic. They cannot understand or enjoy art. They areuntrained in harmony and rhythm, skills normally acquired by dancing, march-ing, and wrestling. Plato allowed only children of citizens to learn the skillsthat give them control over their bodies and distinguish them from animals.To ensure the inferiority of slaves, he forbade training them in rhythm andharmony. In the same manner, he did not allow them to cultivate any abilityto understand and control or act like citizens. They could not qualify for anypublic activity, political, legal, or military. Moreover, like Helots, they arenot to partake in the common, daily meals46 that are an integral part of publicinteraction between citizens. The goal of education in Magnesia is to forgea citizen, useful and obedient,47 who will in time accept from the ances-tors of Magnesia responsibility for it and control over it, and subsequentlytransfer it to the next generation in the same orderly way. That is why theonly thing worthy of being called education (L. 643e) is,

. . . the schooling from childhood in the goodness that inspires the recipientwith passionate and ardent desire to become a perfect citizen, knowing bothhow to wield power and how to submit to righteous rule.

The differences between the ignorant slave and the educated citizen alsoappear in the allegory involving physicians and poets as analogous to legis-lators (L. 720c-e, 858c-d). Plato describes two kinds of physicians, citizens


46. The exception would be for caregivers of daughters of masters who may eat with thefree women and their daughters.

47. On the assumption that the obedient do not need companionship, Plato cherished obe-dience despite its damage to solidarity. Yet his kind of obedience is poor and artificial. Not invain, he exhorted his legislators to be watchful in maintaining it as strictly as they could,regardless of any sense of proportion. Healthy obedience is the normal outcome of solidarity.Its absence from Magnesia makes its durable maintenance utterly impossible, yet it he pre-sented it as utterly stable and unchanging.


and slaves. Slave physicians learn their practice by imitation; free physicianslearn by the acquisition of abstract knowledge, and they gain the trust oftheir patients. Plato required that physicians and their patients should be ofequal status to maintain the separation of slaves and citizens, as he requiresthroughout Laws. Yet surprisingly, somehow a slave physician has theopportunity to speak with a Greek counterpart. He says (L. 857d-e),

You are a fool, not treating the patient, but educating him as though hewanted to be made a medical man rather than to recover his health!

The moral is this: slaves will never grasp the justification for laws, nor dothey need it. Their perspective, narrow for want of education, abides noexplanation and no understanding; their reality is nothing but a series ofsenseless events.

The proscription of education for slaves disqualifies them for developingany ability for self-examination, self-control, or judicious decision. They canhardly learn from experience. Educated citizens obey the supreme rule (thegolden thread, the mutual law of the state [L. 645a]) that is the highestexpression of soul-searching; slaves cannot. For them obedience is out offear of punishment, not out of understanding of the rational concepts thatjustify it.

The worst is this. As slaves are deprived of education, they will foreverbe without the sense of shame and self-restraint that characterizes citizens.This is their most noticeable feature. Exaggerated and imbalanced behavioris inappropriate for the culture that Plato tried to construct, the cultureimmune to deterioration. Exaggerated self-confidence, boldness, and audac-ity, are the big enemies of education Plato-style. Against them, Plato positsthe divine fear, the sentiments of shame and honor. Shame is the mold ofculture.48 A good legislator uses it to supervise order, beauty, and decorum.It is the culture of sedate drinking while listening to music (L. 671b-c), andof submission to the law and to social norms. Educated citizens obey thelaw to avoid embarrassment, not sanctions (L. 671d-e).

The climax of Platos expression of contempt for slaves is his discussionof their incapacity for shame, especially as combined with poor artistic taste.They cannot even dance like citizens; their dances are inferior, unfit for citizens


48. Today we speak of shame-cultures and guilt-cultures (Benedict [1946] 1989), and sug-gest that shame is more primitive, whatever this may mean. This is superficial: already PlatosGorgias speaks of three kinds of shame.


(L. 669c): the rhythms and harmonies suitable for slaves are not meant forthe free (L. 669c-d). There are collective tastes determined according to thepreferences of the elders who carry the culture and transmit it to the nextgeneration.49

This is cultural segregation (Ducat 1990, 1458). It acts as the conditionfor contempt for slaves, and also as its outcome. The physical segregationthat acts as a fear of infection is not unique to the classical culture (Ducat1990, 1457). The alienation of slaves begins with speech, continues withamusement, and ends with sexual pleasures (L. 841d-e). It receives artisticexpression and reinforcement from prohibitions of participation in allegedlyhumiliating performances. Plato warns against them (L. 816e):

We shall enjoin that such representations be left to slaves and hired aliens,and that they receive no serious considerations whatever. No free person,woman or man, shall be found taking lessons in them . . .

The virtue of the citizen comprises four separate moral qualities that bal-ance emotion and reason: courage, moderation, righteousness, and intelli-gence (Sidley 1998, 374). The only virtue that Plato expects of slaves is thewish to work well. Their lack of education, segregation, severe limitationson reproduction and family life, and the worthlessness of their lives, all bringtheir humanity into question. In Magnesia behavior results from manydecrees but one validation (L. 716c):

. . . it is God who is, for you and me, of a truth the measure of all things,much more truly than, as they say, man.

God is the measure of all things is a reversal of Protagorass man is themeasure of all things. It is a theological-religious principle, inviting peopleto try to imitate Godbut not slaves, who know no God. Discriminationagainst them thus deepens and receives further expression in passages inLaws about religion that exclude them from sacrifices to the Olympic Gods,and to the poliss heroes and tribal ancestors. This is the outcome of the


49. The influence of these ideas was tremendous all over Western civilization. The ascrip-tion of supreme importance to the control of fear and hope became the cornerstone of muchof the philosophy of late Antiquity. Richard Wagner, who had hardly heard of Plato, accusedthe Jews of bad taste in music.


proscription of private temples and on lay religious performances50(L. 910d-e). Yet for centuries, Plato was called a Christian before Christ.

Plato exhibited to the fullest his rejection of slaves in his dealing withkilling and murder. The law should be the same if killer and victims are ofequal status (L. 872a). A citizen who has killed a slave has to pay a fine to theslaves owner and undergo purifications more burdensome and numerousthan those enjoined on those who cause loss of life at the sports (L. 865c).The exception is the murder of a slave meant to conceal a crime (L. 872b-c).A slave who murders his master should be tried by the masters family andexecuted (L. 868b-c); other murders of citizens are punishable by death atthe hands of the victims kin; killing ones master by mistake is punishableby flogging to death over the victims grave (L. 872c); killing a citizen inself-defense is punishable by execution in a manner similar to the executionof a father killer (L. 869d). A slave who kills another slave in self-defense,however, is to be acquitted.

As to injury, willful injury of ones master is punishable by death like thatof a free son who injures his parent (L. 877b); a slaves willful injury of acitizen should allow the injured to punish him as he may wish unless themaster of the slave pays damages (L. 879a); a citizen attacked by a slavemay beat him and then bring him to his master in chains (L. 882a-b).


50. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy speaks in Poppers vein about Laws (althoughhe is absent even from its reference list for Plato), saying (p. 417a),

Philosophers often do not read Laws. But Book 10 presents Platos natural theology. . . concerns the very idea of legislation. It is the notion of a prelude to a law, whichis the attempt the legislator should make to persuade citizens of the necessity of pre-scriptions of the law itself.

Naddaf (2005) opens his book with the same idea.Plato managed to give the platitude that religion has a sociopolitical aspect, a new and

unheard-of depth that altered the very me

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Platon Esclavos (1)