Pluralism and Elitte Conflict in an Independence Movement Frelimo1

8/12/2019 Pluralism and Elitte Conflict in an Independence Movement Frelimo1

1/17


2/17

FRELIM O in the 1960s 67THE PEOPLES OF MOZ MBIQUE

Z MBI

Q ue | im a n e

SOUTH FRIC

SW ZIL ND LourenQo M arques

result of competition among elite factions for the highest power and status roleswithin the structure of the part y an d not a significant intrusion of pluralism intothe nationalist movement as a whole. During this period, different elites usedappeals to ethnic and class cleavages in an ideological manner as they vied forthe relatively few high level prestige and power positions available within theFR EL IM O party structure. The linkage between pluralism and elite behaviour

Lawrence M. Millinga; and the Unio National Africana Independente (UNAMI) led by JosBaltazar de Costa C hagong'a. F or more information on these groups consult: Eduardo Mondlane,The Struggle for Mozambique, Pengu in, 1969 ; Eduardo Mondlan e, 'The Struggle forIndependence in Mozambique', in John A. Davis and James K. Baker (eds.), Southern Africa inTransition, New York, 1966, pp. 19 7-2 13; Eduardo Mondlane, 'The Movement for Freedom inMozambique', Prsence Africaine, 25, 1965, pp. 8-37; George M. Chilambe, 'The Struggle inMozambique', East African Journal , 4, July 1966, pp .3- 8; JohnMarcum, The Angolan Revolution,

Volume 1: The Anatomy of an Explosion 1950-1962), Cambridge, Mass., 1969, pp. 195 -6;Uria hT. Simango, 'The Liberation Struggle in Mozambique', The African Communist, 32 , 1968, pp.4 8 - 6 1 ; and Ronald H. Chilcote, 'Les Mouvements de Libration au Mozambique', Le Mois enAfrique (Dakar) 7, July 1966, pp. 30 -42 .


3/17


4/17

FRELIMO in the 1960s 69

ethnolinguistic groups living near Louren9o Marques and in areas adjacent toRhodesia and South Africa a head start on northern groups in receiving thesocio-economic and educational advantages provided by the impact of western

colonialism. It is in this region that the non-Africans are most in evidence.Although they form only two per cent of the populationabout 100,000 arePortuguese, 18,000 Indians, 2,000 Chinese, and 32,000 mestigos, or people ofmixed European and African descent8their influence has been dispropor-tionately great and it has been felt largely by the peoples of southern Mozam-bique. Thus-a kind of stratification h as developed am ong the coun try's Africans.Groups from the north and central regions, such as the Mako nde and Yao, areconsidered by southerners as 'backward', 'primitive', and 'traditional' whilegroups in the south, like the Thonga, are considered by northerners to be'aggressive', 'domineering', and 'corrupt'. Ethnolinguistic differences are thussimplified into a perception of regional differentiation, especially between thosefrom north of the Zambezi and those from the south. In some cases, notablyamong the Islamic Yao and Makua-Lomwe, religious differences exacerbate a

sense of separation.Superimposed on these fundamental cleavages was a 'vertical' system of

stratification based upon socio-economic, educational, cultural, and racial fac-tors.9 At the highest level was a small minority, perh aps 2.5 per cent of the wholepopulation, which consisted of Portuguese, Asians, mestigos, and someassimilados,10 who lived in the major urban centres an d were engaged in the moneyeconomy in activities such as the civil service, commerce, manufacturing,transportation, and large-scale agriculture. During the 1960s it was possible todistinguish several catego ries within this m inority.11 At th e top were Portugueseowners of large plantations and the various large business enterprises, top-levelcivil servants and military officers, and successful professionals. This group,which was well-educated and almost exclusively white, considered itself aneconomic, political and social elite and had a sense of identification as such.Family connections were impo rtant; m embers felt they knew one another; andfavours in employment were often given to friends and relatives.12 Below themwere middle level civil servants, salaried white collar employees, and small

8 Oliveira Bolo, Monografia d e Moambique, Lisbon, Agncia-Geral do Ultram ar, 1971, pp.53-7 . On the Indian community, see D. J. Soares-Rebelo, 'Short N otes on the East Indian Groupin Mozambique', South African Journal of Science, 58, 1962, pp. 41- 4 and D . J. Soares-Rebelo,'Indians in Mozambique', Africa Today, 10, February 1963, pp. 12 -3.

9 Junta de In vestigas do Ultramar, Promocao Social em Mozambique, E studos de CinciasPoliticas e Sociais No. 71, Centra de Estudos de Servico Social e de DesenvolvimentoComunitario, Junto do Institute Superior de Cincias Sociais e Politica Ultramarina, Lisbon 1964,pp . 21-2.

10 Assimilated status was theoretically to be granted to any African upon application whodemonstrated tha t he was eighteen, employed, and able to read , write, and speak Portuguese.

11 The coup in Portugal of 25 April 1974 has resulted in fundamental political changes inMozambique. FRELIMO formed the first independence government in June 1975, and thismay well be the precurser to massive social changes. During the period with which this articledeals, however, stratification was a real and important phenomenon.12 Allison B. Herrick et al. Area Handbook or M ozambique, Washington 1969, pp. 86-7 .


5/17

70 Journal of Southern African Studies

farmers, who could be thought of as a 'middle class'. Although they were byand large white, many members were mestigos and a few were assimilados.Finally, the lowest level of this min ority consisted alm ost entirely oi assimiladoswho worked as skilled or semi-skilled wage-earners.13

The middle stratum in the social structure of Mozamb ique w as a second smallminority, perhaps 3.5 per cent of the population; these were the recently'detribalized' Africans who had migrated to and lived permanently on theperipheries of the major urban centres such as Lourenco Marques and Beira.Mo st were young men w ho virtually had cu t their ties with the traditional societiesof the rural areas and abandoned the subsistence economy to live by wagelabour.14 T he lowest level of the system of stratification in Mozam bique w as thevast bulk of the popu lation, the 94 per cent of unaccu lturated, uneducated, andpoor Africans living primarily in the subsistence economy.15

The hierarchical social structure of Mozam bique w as the result of a colonialsystem which made distinctions among individuals on the basis of education,race, wealth, and culture. The Portugu ese missao dvilizadora required Africansto divest themselve s of wh at the colonisers conside red to be their 'inferior' cu ltureand all Africans not officially recognized as assimilados were classified as in-digenas. (natives). This latte r s tatus wa s to be legally witho ut citizenship and civilrights. In 196 1, when the regime do indigenato (native system ) was abolished, onlyabout seven thousand had been allowed to change their status even thoughperhaps as many as 250,000 had the qualifications.16 For Africans grantedassimilated status, there was the theoretic freedom to advanc e in any endeavou rbut in reality Portuguese racialism, the assimiladosstill compa ratively low levelsof education and the relative paucity of economic and political opportunitiesmilitated ag ainst any widespread social or economic mo bility. Mestigos, by con-trast, because of their mixed parentage were automatically considered to beassimilated and their colour gave them an ascriptive adv antage in the comp etitionfor the relatively sc arce education al and socio-economic opportunities available.

This pyramidal social structure has tended to produce among Mozambicansa general readiness to perceive the finest of distinctions am ong themselves. Unac-culturated A fricans inclined to see both assimilados and mestigos as representingPortuguese domination, while the assimilados contrasted themselves with themestigos who were seen as its direct agents. These varied perceptions addedanother dimension to distinctions between northern and so uthern ethnolinguisticgroup s. It was these distinctions, together with personality clashes and genera-

13 Herrick, Area Handbook, pp. 87-8.14 This categorization oversimplifies th e complexity of the social situation, in that many Mozam-

bicans 'comm uted' between the ru ral areas and the urban area s, but there is no reliable informationon their numbers. Many others worked in South Africa.

15 Junta de Investigaes do Ultramar Promoo Social.passim.16 Marvin Harris, The Assimilado System in Portuguese Africa', Africa Special Report, 3,

November 1958, pp. 7 -10; Portugal's African Wards , Africa Today Pamphlet N o. 2, New York1958, pp. 1 5-6 ; and 'Race , Conflict, and Reform in M ozambique', in Stanley Diamond and FredG. Burke (eds.), Transformation of East Africa, New York 1966, pp. 158-9.


6/17

FRELIM O in the 1960s 71tion conflict, which structured the competition for office within the nationalistmovement during the period from 1962 to 1969, when victory still seemed fardistant.

I l l

Almost before the ink was dry on the document signed in 1962 which createdFRELIMO, there were signs of internal conflict A number of expulsions fromthe Central Committee in the first year marked the beginning of a series ofschisms, revolts, and assassinations as elite factions competed for control of the'party and its highest prestige and power positions. Over the 1962-69 periodthe general picture is that middle-educated assimilados predominately fromethnolinguistic groups located in the central and northern districts of the coun-try, primarily Nyanja, Makua-Lomwe, and Makonde, opposed more highlyeducated mestigos and assimilados largely from ethnolinguistic groups located

in the southern districts, especially the Shangana, for positions of authoritywithin the movement. Although ideological, age, and personality differencesplayed their part, the perception of the importance of ethnolinguistic, regional,class, and racial cleavages in the home society and their use ideologically inelite competition were in large measure responsible for the pattern of internalconflict within FRELIMO and violence during the 1960s.

The scope for using such divisions in building up alliances of support withinthe leadership is suggested by the heterogeneous nature of the highest levelswithin FRELIMO. Eduardo Mondlane, the president, was born of a chieflyfamily in Gaza province in the extreme south of Mozambique, attendedthe Universities of Witwatersrand and Lisbon, and then studied in the UnitedStates, receiving his BA from Oberlin and his PhD from Northwestern. UriaSimango, FRE LIM O's vice-president, was a protestant pastor from the north ofMozambique and Marcelino dos Santos, the secretary of external affairs, was amestigo from the northern coastal town of Lum bo. The Central Comm ittee rangedin age from the 60 year old Lazaro Kavandame, who was a Makonde and aregional organiser, to Jorges Rebelo, a law student barely half his age.17

Immediately after FRELIMO's First Congress, Mondlane returned toNew York to complete his teaching contract at Syracuse University. Within a

17 John Marcum , Three Revolutions', Africa Report, 12 November 1967, p. 19. More details onMondlane's life can be found in Helen Kitchen, 'Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane', AJricaReport, 12 November 1 967, pp. 31 - 51 ; John Marcum, 'A Martyr for Mozambique', AfricaReport, 14 March/April 19 69, pp. 6-9 ; and Ronald H. Chilcote, 'Eduardo Mondlane and theMozambique Struggle', Africa Today, 10 November 1965, pp. 4-7 . Uria Simango's ideas can befound in 'Mozambique: my Country', African Communist, 32, 1968, pp. 4 8 - 6 1 ; Gwambe's in'Dangers of New Colonialism in Mozambique', Voice of Africa, November 1961 , pp. 31 -2. DosSantos, usually considered the most brilliant of FRELIMO's top leadership, has written

'Revolutionary Perspective in Mozambique', W orld Marxist R eview, 11 January 1968, pp. 91- 3;Guman e's views appear in two a rticles, 'Mozambique nsl ved ,Review of International Affairs, 15,5 April 1964, pp. 9-10, and 'Salazar's Misconception', Voice of Africa, 4 , May/June 1964, pp. 23,28 .


7/17


mon th of his departure, FRE LIM O experienced its first schism. In August 1962Matthew Mmole, the president of the Mozambique African National Union(MANU), and its secretary-general, Lawrence M. Millinga, were expelled fromFRELIMO by the Central Committee. The expulsion of Mmole and Millingawas the first example of ethnolinguistic differences being used ideologically in th ecompetition for high level party positions. MAN U had been organized a roundMako nde tribesmen from Mozam bique living and working in Tanza nia and con-sequently they comprised a substantial num ber of the ordinary mem bership ofFR EL IM O during the initial stages of the organization. Mako nde leaders, suchas Mmole and Millinga, neither of whom ha d been elected to the Central Com -mittee, charged that the Makonde were being used by FRELIMO as ordinaryrank-and-file tro ops withou t proportio nal represe ntation in the upper level of theparty. W hen M mole and M illinga were expelled from FR EL IM O, they claimedthat leaders from southern ethnic groups were responsible for this situationbecause they had taken the highest positions within the party for themselves.18

After their departu re, however, there was no significant exodus of Ma kond e from

the movement in sympathy . Not for the last time, it was clear that leaders did notnecessarily receive widespread support from the ethnolingustic groups theyclaimed to represent and whose interests they purported to adv ance.

Two other cleavages which were used ideologically in elite competition earlyon were Mozambique's racial and regional differences and involved Leo Milaswho had been elected in absentia as FRELIMO's first publicity secretary andwas later to become secretary for defence and security. Milas was sent byMondlane from the United States to Dar es Salaam, probably to attempt toquash the animosity that had developed among some Central Committeemembers concerning the presence in FRELIMO of Marcelino dos Santos, ahighly educated mestigo, and his election to the position of secretary of externalaffairs. Resentful and suspicious of dos Santos because he was a mestigo, someblack Mozambicans, primarily from ethnic groups situated in the central andnorthern regions, charged that dos Santos was not a Mozambican at all but aCape Verdian and should, therefore, be expelled from the party.

Milas's presence only made the situation worse because questions had beenraised about his identity ever since his nomination by Mondlane during the FirstCongress. There were accusations that he was an agent of the Ame rican CentralIntelligence Agency who had been sent to Dar es Salaam to gather informationon FRELIMO. Mondlane, who had made Milas ' acquaintance in the UnitedStates, was reluctant to investigate these charges for fear of exacerbating analready delicate situation. Consequently Milas was seen by his detractors as anagent of the party leadership because by tha t time blacks from northern and cen-tral ethnolinguistic groups perceived the movement as dominated by mestigosan d assimilados from southern groups. In December 1962 Milas was beaten up

18 Frente Unida Anti-imperialista Popular Africana de Moambique (FUNIPA MO ),Memoranda Supporting Declaration o f Dissolution of FRELIMO, Kampala, mimeographed, 27May 1963.


8/17


by abo ut twenty suspicious FR EL IM O m embers. A month later, in Janu ary 1 963,David Mabunda, FRELIMO's secretary-general , Paulo Gumane, his deputy,Joao Mungwambe, the organizing secretary, and Manual G. Mahluza, themovem ent's representative in C airo, were expelled from the Central Com mitteebecause of their alleged involvement in the beating.19

These expulsions did no t, however, reduce suspicions concerning Milas ' iden-tity. Consequently, while on a trip to New York, Mondlane, with the aid of aprivate detective agency, investigated M ilas' background which revealed that hewas in fact a black A merican called Leo C linton Aldridge, who had taken an M Adegree in Rom ance L anguages at the University of Southern California. Milas wasexpelled in Au gust 1964 from the party after which he went to Kha rtoum , wherehe added Seifak-Aziz to his name, denounced FRELIMO, and began issuingpro-Chinese anti-FRELIM O propaganda in the name of the defunct M ozam-bique African National Union.20

Another event which intensified the perception that regional, ethnolinguistic,and racial cleavages were being infused into the nationalist movement was thedeath in October 1966 of Filipe Magaia, FR EL IM O's secretary of defence and anortherner. Imm ediately following his death, the Central Com mittee annou ncedthat M agaia h ad been killed in action against Portuguese forces inside Mozam-bique, and that Samora Moises Machel, then the commander of the Kongwamilitary camp and a southerner from the Shangana, would be appointed to thepost of secretary of defence. The black groups from the north an d central regionsperceived Magaia's death, which they blamed on the mestizo and assimilatedAfrican leaders from southern tribes, and Machel's appointment, as a ploy tocontinue dominating the party by denying them one mo re major leadership posi-tion. They charged th at M achel's appointment was 'unconstitutional', believingMa gaia's logical successor to be C asal Ribeiro, the deputy secretary of defence,and, like Magaia, a northerner.21

19 N e w Yo r k T i m e s , 15 N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 4 . F u r t h er d e t a il s o f n a m e s a r e fr o m N a r e i s e N . J o n aM b u l e , F r e n t e U n i d a de M o z a m b i q u e F U M O ) : P e t i t io n P r e s e n t e d to the OAU, N a i r o b i ,m i m e o g r a p h e d , J u n e 1 9 7 1 , p p . 5 - 7 .

20 M a r c u m , T h r ee R e v o l u t io n s ' ; M o z a m b i q u e R e v o l u t io n , D a r e s S a l a a m , N o . 9 , p . 4 . I n a n i n -t e rv i e w in F e b r u a r y 1 9 7 2 M i la s c l a im e d to h a v e b e e n b o r n i n I n h a m b a n e i n M o z a m b i q u e in 1 9 3 4 ,t h e s o n o f a S h a n g a n a m o t h e r n a m e d M i la s i ( h e n c e M i l a s ) a n d a Z u l u fa t h e r . H e s a i d h i s f a m i l yw a s ' p o l i t ic a l l y a c t iv e ' . M i l a s c l a i m e d t o h a v e r e c e i v e d p r i m a r y e d u c a t i o n i n M o z a m b i q u e a n ds e c o n d a r y e d u c a t io n i n S w a z i l a n d . H e n o t o n l y a d m i t s a t t e n d i n g t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f S o u t h e r nC a l i f o r n i a b u t a l s o th e U n i v e r s i ty o f C a l i f o r n ia , L o s A n g e l e s . A f t e r h i s e x p u l s io n f r o m F R E L I M O ,h e c l a i m s t o h a v e o p e r a t e d fo r a s h o r t t im e w i t h a m i li ta r y u n i t i n C a b o D e l g a d o u n d e r t h e M A N Ub a n n e r a id e d b y o t h e r d i ss a ti sf ie d F R E L I M O m e m b e r s . A f t e r K h a r t o u m , h e w e n t t o A d d i s A b a b aw h e r e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e in t e r v i e w h e h a d l i v e d f o r f o u r y e a r s . F o r s o m e t i m e h e t a u g h t a t H a i l eS e l l a s s i e I U n i v e r s i t y a n d w a s l a t e r n e w s ed i t o r o f Th e E t h i o p i a n H e r a l d, a n d a p r o g r a m m e o r g a n i z e rf o r th e Vo i c e o f t h e G o s p e l r a d i o s t a t io n . H e h a s d o n e f r e e la n c e jo u r n a l i s m . S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , L e oM i l a s , ' P o r t u g a l ' s A f r i c a n V i e t n a m ' , Th e E t h i o p i a n H e r a l d , F e b r u a r y 2 5 1 9 7 2 . S e e a l s o hi s' M o z a m b i q u e L i b er a t io n ' , S p e a r h e a d , D e c e m b e r 1 9 6 2 , p p . 2 1 - 2 2 , w r i t t e n w h i le h e w a sF R E L I M O ' s s e c re t a r y f o r i n fo r m a t i o n .

21 M b u l e a s se r t s t h a t M o n d l a n e , d o s S a n t o s , a n d M a c h e l w e r e r e s p o n s ib l e fo r M a g a i a ' s m u r d e ra n d t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f M a c h e l . H e c la i m s t h i s u n l e a s h e d a 'r e ig n o f te r ro r ' t h r o u g h o u t F R E L I M Ow i t h t h o s e w h o s u p p o r t e d M a g a i a b e in g k i ll e d i f t h e y o p p o s e d M a c h e l ' s a p p o i n t m e n t . A c c o r d i n g


9/17


By late 1967 and early 1968 mutual distrust and hostility between these twofactions had become so intense that violence broke out between them. The firstmanifestation of this violence occurred at the secondary school operated by theMozam bique Institute in Da r es Salaam which was convulsed by a student revoltin March 1968. Before 1967 a significant aspect of the FR EL IM O programm e in-volved the training of the administrative cad res that w ould be needed in the post-independence period. This training was accomplished at the MozambiqueInstitute's secondary school and through study abroad. However, in 1967 theCentral C omm ittee, realizing that m ilitary operations would have to be increasedto overcome Po rtuguese resistance, decided to de-emphasize academic prep ara-tion and stress military training. Students at the Institute's secondary school,many of whom believed that they had been recruited solely to study, refused toaccept military training.22 On 5 March the dispute between theC entral Comm itteeand the stude nts cam e to a climax when the students went on strike and a riot brokeout. With the aid of the Tanzan ian police, the Cen tral Com mittee closed the schooland sent half of the student bo dy to R utam be settlement while the other half left for

Kenya. Eventually m ost of those sent to Rutam be slipped away for Nairobi.23

A commission, appointed by the Liberation Co mm ittee of the Organization ofAfrican Unity an d the Tanzanian government, determined that the student revoltwas the 'direct consequence of the interference in the affairs of the Institute byFather Mateus Gwenjere'.24 Gwenjere, an African Catholic priest, had joinedFR EL IM O at the end of 1967 , bringing with him a number of students from th e

junio r seminary in Beira where he taught. H e immediately exploited the alreadylatent distrust and animosity between the students, the bulk of whom came fromthe northern and central regions, and the Central C omm ittee. This was achievedby encouraging the students to expect scholarships for further study abroad, bydemanding that the medium of instruction be English rather than Portuguese,and by seeking the removal from the Institute's staff of four expatriate Por-tuguese teachers and the director, Janet M ondlane, all of whom were white. Heconvinced the stud ents tha t the new policy requiring military service was an otherploy by southern mestizos and assimilado leaders to elimate from the partyblacks from ethnic groups from the northern and central region s, especially those

t o a n a n o n y m o u s s o u r c e , h o w e v e r , M a g a i a w a s a c t u a l ly m u r d e r e d a t N a c h in g h w e a b y a m a nr e p o r t e d l y d i s s a t i s f ie d w i t h h i s l e a d e r s h i p . T h i s ' d i s s a t i s fa c t i o n w i t h le a d e r s h i p ' p r o b a b l y i n v oi n f i d e l i t i e s o n t h e p a r t o f t h e m a n ' s w i f e a n d M a g a i a . M b u l e , P e t i t i o n P r e s e n t e d to the O A U , p . 7;C h i l a m b e , ' T h e S t r u g g l e in M o z a m b i q u e ' , p . 6 ; a n d M i g u e l A r t u r M u r u p a , S t a t e m e n t to theG o v e r n m e n t of t h e U n i te d R e p u b l i c of Ta n z a n i a , D a r e s S a l a a m , ty p e s c r i p t , F e b r u a r y ( 7 ) , n .d .M b u l e a n d M u r u p a b o t h c h a r g e F R E L I M O w i th M a g a i a ' s d e a th . M u r u p a s a y s h e w a s ' s h o t w i ap i s t o l in the s t o m a c h , o n o r d e r s o f t h e G a z a c l iq u e , b y L o u r e n i o M a t o l a . . . w h i l e c r o s s in gC h i t a n g a m w e R i v e r i n N i a s s a P r o v i n c e ... ( p . 2 ) .

22 E d w a r d A . H a w l e y , R e f u g e e s in K e n y a F o r m e r l y A f f i li a te d w i t h L i b e r a t io n M o v e m e n t s .N a i r o b i , m i m e o g r a p h e d . J o i n t R e f u g e e S e r v i c e s o f K e n y a , 1 9 7 1 , p . 4 .

23 H a w l e y , R e f u g e e s i n K e n y a , p . 6 . T h e m o s t d i ss a t is f ie d o f t h is g r o u p w e r e t h o s e w h o h a d b e e n

s e n t a b r o a d t o s t u d y a n d h a d r e t u r n e d t o D a r e s S a l a a m . T h e y b e l i ev e d t h a t F R E L I M O w a s n o ta d e q u a t e l y u t i l iz i n g th e i r n e w l y a c q u i r e d s k i ll s a n d e x p e r t i s e .24 S t a n l e y M e i s le r , ' M o z a m b i q u e R e b e l s D i s a g r e e ' , W a s h i n g t o n P o s t , 3 0 J u n e 1 9 6 8 .


10/17


training for future leadership po sitions. In spite of Gwenjere's role in this studentrevolt, there is no evidence that h e was receiving wide support from blacks fromnorthern ethnic groups. A late-comer to the movement and an extremely am-

bitious ma n, Gwe njere was undoubtedly m otivated b y his desire to take over thedirectorate of the Institution.25

This episode draws attention to another, and growing, cause of divisionamon g the leading figures of FRE LI M O , the perception of hierarchical differen-tiation within the movement. This perception was based on the different life-styles of the leadership and rank-and-file members, the latter of whom lived incam ps and crowded dormitories while the former h ad ho uses or lived in inexpen-sive hotels. During the early days of the movement, the leadership frequentlymade trips to international capitals and to the United Nations headquarters inNew York a nd, when in Dar es Salaam, were often seen in bars and restau rantswith visiting officials, newsmen, and diplomats.26 When the leadership, whichwas perceived by the students not only to be dominated by mestigos an dassimilados from the south but also 'corrupt' in their backsliding overscholarship promises, asked students primarily from northern ethnic groups todo m ilitary service, it is hardly surprising th at the y refused. Th e belief tha t theywould become cannon fodder for the southern leadership was fairly widelyheld.27

The second outbreak of violence within the movement occurred in May 1968when a group of Makonde marched on the FRE LIM O office in Dar es Salaam.After forcing U na Simango, then FRE LIM O's vice-president, and dos Santos tosurrender the keys of the building, the office w as closed and the keys turned overto the Tan zanian police. A few days later another group of about twenty men,armed with clubs an d pangas, once again invade d the office which in the mea n-time had been reopen ed. In the confrontation which followed, five people were in-jure d, three of who m end ed up in hospital with one of these dying later as a resultof his wo unds. A n umber of people were arrested by the Tanza nian police andthe office was closed pending an investigation by the Liberation Committee ofthe Organization of African Unity.28

25 Private Communication. See also Saul, 'FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution', pp.34-5.

26 Cf. in th e S o u t h e r n R h o d e s i a n c o n t e x t , J o h n D a y, I n t e r n a t i o n a l N a t i o n a l is m : the e x t r a -territorial relations of Southern Rhodesian African nationalists, London 1967.

27 Hawley, Refugees in Kenya, p . 3. See Do uglas L. Wheeler, 'A Docu ment for the History ofAfrican Nationalism: a FRELIMO 'White Paper' by Dr. Eduardo C . Mondlane (1929 -196 9),African Historical Studies, 2, 1969, pp. 31 9- 33 3 for FREL IMO's position and argumentation fortheir new policy. See Douglas L . Wheeler, ' A Docu ment for the History o f African Nationalism:the UDEMO 'White Paper o f 1968, a student reply to Eduardo Mondlane's 19 6 7 Paper',African Historical Studies, 3 , 1970, pp. 16 9-18 0, for a student reply containing a vitriolic attackon Mondlane wh o i s identified as the worst offender in using FREL IMO funds fo r self-aggrandizement.

28 Meisler, 'Mozambique Rebels Disagree'; Mbule, Petition Presented to the OAU, p . 8 says the

wounded in hospital were: Judas Sindi, V icente and Mateus Muthemba, Ma teus Muthemba dyinglater. Joaquim Chissano, FRELIMO's security officer, w as apparently hurt but did not enterhospital. T h e Central Committee in Os Graves Acontecimentos de 1968 e as D ivergnciasIdealgias, Dar e s Salaam, mimeographed, 1969 p. 3 , blames Gwenjere for this attack.


11/17


In July 1968 FR EL IM O held i ts second Congress in the Niassa province ofMozam bique. To the foreign observers invited to attend, the Cong ress not sur-prisingly gave the impression that FRELIMO was indeed a unified and unitedorganization. However, this impression, while broadly true, concealed a newconflict within the leadership. During the pre-Congress planning stages, a dis-pute had arisen between Mondlane and Lazaro Kavandame, FRELIMO'sprovincial secretary for Cabo Delgado, over the site of the Second Congress.Mondlane wanted the Congress held inside Mozambique to demonstrateFRELIMO's capacity to provide a safe heaven for the meeting.29 Kavandame,who belonged to an old fairly well-to-do Makonde rural family, wanted theCongress held in Tanzania where he apparently enjoyed the support of certainmiddle-level leaders of the Tanganyika African National Union. Kavandameand a small coterie of followers believed that Mondlane wanted to hold theCongress inside Mozambique to assure his own re-election as president andother northerns w ere even convinced tha t Mon dlane would use force to con tinuehis leadership of the party.30 Kav and am e, however, wanted the Cong ress held in

Tanzania where his support was strongest and where he would gain themaximum advantage in the competition for the leadership. When the Congresswas finally held inside Mozam bique as M ondlane wished, Kava nda me refused toattend. To make it appear to outsiders that the leadership was united, FR EL IM Ohad K avand ame detained by the Tanz anian governm ent on a pretext, to make itappear that his absence was not by his own choice.31

Almost a year later, in April 1969, Kavandame defected to the Portuguese,reportedly w ith a suitcase full of classified FR EL IM O docum ents, and accusedthe Cen tral Com mittee of the exploitation of the Mak ond e people by its southernleadership. As Mmole and Millinga before him, Kavandame charged that fewupper-level leadership positions within the party were held by Makondes in spiteof the fact that they comprised a significant number of rank-and-flle. Kavan-dame's charge, however, was little more than opportunism and an effort toappear more useful to th e Portuguese then he actually was. For some time beforehis defection he had been involved in economic aggrandizement by skimming offsurpluses from FR EL IM O's comm ercial structures in Cab o Delgado for himselfand a small group of immediate followers. At the time of his defection, the Cen-tral Committee was moving to bring the situation under control.32 Some time

29 M o n d l a n e , T h e S t r u g g le f o r M o z a m b i q u e , p p . 1 8 7 - 8 .30 F o r e x a m p l e , M b u l e , P e t i t io n P r e s e n t e d to the OAU p . 9 , s a y s t h a t t h e f e a r s o f t h e K a v a n -

d a m e g r ou p w e r e ' . . . b o r n o u t a s t h e r e w a s an a r m e d g r o u p u n d e r t h e c o m m a n d o f M r M a b o t ew h i c h h a d i n s t r u c ti o n s t o a c t i f D r M o n d l a n e w a s n o t r e -e le c te d ' . O s c a r K a m b o n a , w h o w a s b o r ni n M o z a m b i q u e , w a s th e m o s t i m p o r t a n t m e m b e r o f T A N U s u p p o rt in g K a v a n d a m e .

31 P r iv a t e C o m m u n i c a t i o n . E v e n t s s u g g e s t t h a t K a v a n d a m e ' s a p p r e c ia t io n o f h i s T a n z a n i a ns u p p o r t w a s a l s o m i s p l a c e d . O n t h e S e c o n d C o n g r e s s , se e B a s i l D a v i d s o n , 'A f r i c a A f t e r S a l aW e s t A f r ic a , N o s . 2 6 7 8 a n d 2 6 7 9 , S e p t e m b e r 2 8 a n d O c t o b e r 5 , 1 9 6 8 , p p . 1 1 2 5 a n d 1 1 6 9 . r e s p e c -t i v e l y ; a n d ' I n t h e P o r t u g u e s e C o n t e x t ' , in C h r i s to p h e r A l l e n a n d R . W . J o h n s o n ( e d s . ) , A f r i c a nP e r s p e c t i v e s , C a m b r id g e 1 9 7 0 , p p . 3 2 9 - 3 4 5 .

32 S e e ' S u r r e n d e r o f M o z a m b i q u e R e b e l i s R e p o r t e d ' , New Yo r k T i m e s , 4 A p r i l , 1 9 6 9 ; ' P o r -t u g u e s e W o o A f r i c a n T r i b e i n M o z a m b i q u e ' , Ne w Yo r k T i m e s , 6 A p r i l , 1 9 6 9 ; 'M o z a m b i q u e : A


12/17


later, the Portuguese launched a propaganda drive among the Makonde,using appeals by Kavandame to lay down their arms and return homfi. FewMa kon de responded . Like Gwenjere before him, Kavan dam e h ad little influence

and support among the ethnic group he claimed to represent.33

But, likeGwenjere, he had tried to use appeals to ethnic solidarity and discrimination toadvance his own position.

Before Kavandame was to defect, however, an untimely event took placewhich precipitated a numb er of major schisms among the FR EL IM O leadership.On 3 Febuary 1969 Mondlane was killed by an explosion from a bomb con-cealed in a hollowed-out book which he had received in the mail. Mondlane'sassassination intensified suspicions between the two leadership factions andcharges and countercharges were lodged, each group accusing the other of hismurder.34 ' ,

Following M ondlan e's death, a triumvirate was formed called the PresidentialCouncil, consisting of Simang o, dos Santos, and M achel. In April 1969 the Cen-tral Committee met for eleven days at Nachingwea to discuss the leadershipcrisis in the party. D uring these meetings, Simango 's name w as connected withMondlane's assassination and Silveiro Nungu, FRELIMO's administrativesecretary, who was responsible for the mail, was arrested and take n into M ozam -bique. Later in June F RE LIM O announced that he had died while on a hungerstrike. Simango and o ther mem bers from ethnic groups in the northern and cen-tral regions maintained tha t Nung u had been murdered by the southern mestizosan d assimilado leaders.35

On 4 November 1969 Simango, in a statement to the press, protested aboutChief Surrenders', Africa Confidential, No . 8 , April, 1969, p. 70 8; Alfredo M agaidb, 'Mozam -bique: A propos de la Reddition d 'un Chef Makonde', Rvue Franaise tudes PolitiqueAfricaines, N o . 4 3 , July 1969, pp . 2 0 -2 2 ; a nd Aquino de Bragana 'Pourquoi Mondlane a tAssasin', AfricAsia, No . 1 , October 27-Novem ber 9 1969, pp . 38-39 .

33 Kavand ame's defection was not without immediate cause as he was a prime suspect inMondlane's assassination.

34

New York Times, 5 Febr uary, 1969. Although Mondlane's assassin is still unknown, there isevidence which links th e killing indirectly to the Portuguese. In addition to the bomb sent toMondlane, bombs were also sent t o Simango and dos Santos. In the investigation o f Mondlane'smurder, Tanzan ian police found a piece of detonator wire an d part o f a battery. The brown paperwrapper carried t he postmark 'Moskva'. The remains of the bomb that killed Mo ndlane plus partsof the on e sent to dos Santos were sent to the Interpo l Office a t Scotland Yard where chemical testsshowed t he bombs to be identical. Details were sent to the Interpol Office in Tokyo. O n April 16 ,the Japanese police reported t o their Tanzanian co unterparts that t he batteries used in the bombswere part of a consignment manufactured in August, 1968, by Hitachi Maxwell, Ltd., of Osaka.None of the batteries ha d been shipped to the Soviet Union or Eastern Europ e. However, 2,000 hadbeen shipped to a firm called Casa Praff in Loureno Marques on 29 August 1968. Tanzanianpolice believe t he batteries used in the bombs came from this batch. How they reached Dar esSalaam bearing th e 'Moskva' postmark is still a matter of speculation. Most likely, they wereassembled by the Portuguese security service (DGS) and carried to Dar es Salaam by aFREL IMO member working as a DGS agent and left a t a po st office fo r FREL IMO 's private mailbag. See David Ma rtin, 'Mondlane Assassination Nearing Solution', The Washington Post,February, 1972.

35 Th e aftermath of Mondlane's assassination is reported by Lawrence Fellows, 'SlayingThreatens to Divide Mozamb ique Rebels', New York Times, 6 February 1969. Se e also for the dis-sidents' perspective, M bule, Petition Presented to the OAU , p. 10, and Murupa, Statement.


13/17


the poor treatment of the ordinary soldiers in the movement, claimed that in-creasing defections and desertions were due to tribalism, regionalism, andracialism, and accused dos Santos, Machel, and Janet Mondlane of Nungu's

death.36

On the following day President Nyerere met the three members ofthe Presidential Council hoping to reconcile them. On 6 November the Libera-tion Committee of the Organization of African Unity also tried its hand at recon-ciliation, but it, too, was unsuccessful. On 9 November Simango was suspendedfrom the Presidential Council. Finally, on 19 February 1970, after attempting tolaunch a riv al nationalist organ ization, he was declared persona non grata bythe Tanzanian government and ordered to leave the country within forty-eighthours. A reshufflng of the Central Comm ittee resulted in Machel becoming presi-dent and dos Santos vice-president.37

The schisms, expulsions, and resignations among the leadership during thisperiod from 1962 to 1969 produced a number of riva l nationalist parties. Theseparties, however, were never more than paper organizations and had no signifi-cant following or support. In 1962, when Gwam be was expelled from Tanzania,after his departure from FRELIMO, he organized the Comite Secreto deRestauracao da UDENAMO in Kampala. Some time later he reformedUDENA MO under the name Uniao Democratica Nacional de Monomotapa(UNDENAMO-Monomotapa). The expulsion of Mmole, Millinga, Gumane,and M abunda in 1962 led to the formation of the Uniao Democratica N acionalde Mocambique (UDENAM O-Mocambique) in Cairo by Gumane and Mabun-da with M ANU being reorganized by Mmole and Millinga. In Kampala in May1963 UNDENAMO-Monomotapa, MANU, and the Mozambique AfricanNational Congress (MAN C) under Sebastene Sigauki came together to form theFrente Unida Anti-Imperialista Popular Africana de Mocambique(FUNIPAMO). Additional FRELIMO expulsions led to the creation of theMozambique Revolutionary Council (MO RECO) in early 1964. Later, in Juneof that year, MORECO, UDENAMO-Mocambique, MANU, andUND ENAMO-Monomotapa coalesced to form a new party called the ComiteRevolucionario de Mocambique (COREMO) which was based inLusaka and had a foreign office in Cairo.38 Among the approximately 400Mozambican refugees in Kenya a modicum of political organization took place,

36 Uria Sim ango, 'Triste Situa o n a F R E L I M O , ' D a r e s Salaam: typescript, Novembe r 3

37 After Simango left Tanza nia, a number of C entral Com mittee members resigned: Miguel A.Murupa, Alexander Mango, Casal Ribeiro, Lourenco Mu taca, and Francisco Kufa. Murupa andMango defected to the Portuguese. See 'African Defector Joins P ortugue se', New Y ork Times, 29February 197 1; and 'Portugal Venecer', N otcias de Portugal Lisbon, No . 1244, 6 March 1971,pp. 2 -3 , 14, for reports on Murupa's defection.

38 Ronald H. Chilcote, 'Mozambique: The African Nationalist Response to PortugueseImperialism and Underdevelopment', in Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale (eds.), SouthernAfrica in Perspective, New York 1972, pp. 192-193. Documents which give details on thesesplinter groups include: Comit Secreto da Restaurao de UDE NAMO , Press C ommu niqu,Kampala, mimeographed, 14 May 1963; Uniao Democrtica Nacional de Monomotapa, Mozam-bique African National Union, and Mozambique African National Congress, Declaration of


14/17


primarily among the students who left the Mozambique Institute in 1968. InMarch 1971 old members of the Mozambique Liberation Front (M OLIM O), adefunct earlier effort at organizing Mozambican refugees in Nairobi, formed a

new organization called the Frente Unida de Mocambique (FUMO). Aprovisional committee was established to administer and conduct the affairs ofthe organization.39

COREMO was the only rival organization that presented any seriouschallenge to FRELIMO's dominance of the nationalist movement before thecoup in Portugal of 25 April 1974. Like FRELIMO, however, COREMO alsoexperienced schisms and leadership quarrels. For example, early on its nationalplenipotentiary secretary, Zarica Sakupw anya, found himself in trouble with theZambian authorities and was expelled from the party. Gwambe, the first presi-dent, was expelled in 1966, after which he formed another paper organizationcalled the Partido Popular de Mocambique (PAPOMO). In May 1966CO RE MO was reformed and Gu ma ne was elected president. In 1968 a splintergroup from COREMO established the Uniao Nacionalista Africana deRomb ezia (UN AR ) in Blantyre with the aim of the unification of Rom bezia, thearea between the Rovum a and Z ambez i rivers. There were reports that U NA Rwas linked to a group of Portuguese settlers in Mozam bique who had organizedfor a Southern Rhodesian type UDI. According to those reports, the settlergroup was headed by Jorg e Jardim, the editor ofNoticias deBeira and linked tothe Banco Nacional Ultramarino and the Portuguese financier Antonio Cham-palimaud, who owned that newspaper.40

COREMO criticized FRELIMO for excessive expenditures of resources onnon-military activities and for trying to occupy territory in Mozambique at thecost of excessive casualties. CO RE M O's strategy wa s to infiltrate party militantstrained in guerrilla warfare into Mozambique who were to organize localpolitico-military units and clandestinely prepare for an uprising at some futuredate selected by the party leadership. In August 1971 a meeting was held inLusaka between COREMO and Simango, who had since his expulsion fromTanza nia drifted between Cairo, the United States, and Za mb ia; at this meetingthe possibility of working together was explored. At the close of the conferencetheir forces were declared united and the Sim ango group becam e memb ers of theexecutive of COREMO.4 1

39 Frente Unida de Mocambique, Proclamation, Nairobi, mimeographed, Marc h (?) 1971; andMbule, Petition Presented to the OAU, p. 14.

40 United Na tions, General A ssembly, Special Comm ittee on the Situation with Regard to theImplementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries andPeoples, Territories Under Portuguese Administration, Working Paper Prepared by theSecretariat, Document A/ AC . 109/L. 625/Add. 2 (Part I), 12 May 1970, p. 10.

41 Marcum, 'Three Revolutions', p. 2 0; Comite Revolucionrio de M oambique (COR EM O),Dissolution of FRELIMO, Kam pala: mimeographed, 21 May 1963; Frente Unida Anti-Imperialista Popular Africana de Moambique (FUN IPAM O), Draft Constitution and Rules,(Kampala: mimeographed, n.d.); U n i o e m o c r a t ic a N a c io n a l de Moambique, Constitution andProgram, Cairo: mimeographed 19637; Press Communiqu, Cairo: m imeographed, 22 August,1963; and Comit Revolucionrio de Moambique, Constituio, Lu saka: m imeographed, 1965.


15/17


16/17


17/17


likely.45 While elite conflict is an ever present possibility, as the experiences ofmany African countries have shown, the crucial question relates to the connec-tion between the ordinary people of Mozambique and the elites. If the pluralismwhich was used ideologically in the 1960s comes to represent the perceptions andloyalties of the majority of Mozam bicans, the optimism with which M ozambiquesets out on its independence may be misplaced. On the other hand, FR EL IM Otriumphed in spite of the app eals m ade by its oppon ents in the nam e of pluralism.And more optimistically, it could be argued that the social cohesion of post-independence M ozam bique will be strengthened by the integrating experience ofmilitary conflict and its ultimate conclusion in political victory over thePortuguese.

45 Since the cease fire took effect in Augu st 1 974, a number of African political groups sprang up tochallenge FRELIMO's dominance of the political scene. Although many are defunct, five cametogether to form a united party called the Partido de Coligao (PC N) loca ted in Beira. PC N's presi-dent was Uria Simango and vice-president was Paulo Gum ane, both of CO REM O. Joana Simio, aone-time COREMO member and the past vice-president of the now moribund Grupo Unido deMocambique (GUMO ), and Mbule of FUM O were important members of the PC N executive com-mittee. See Portugal Hoje, Lisbon, No . 17, 31 August 1974.