Pluralism and Peer Review in Philosophy

volume17,no.19

september2017

Pluralism and Peer

Review in Philosophy

J. Katzav* University of Queensland

K. Vaesen Eindhoven University of Technology

*JoelKatzavistheprimaryauthorofthispaper.

© 2017 KatzavandVaesenThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/017019/>

1. Introduction

Peerreviewisthemainwayinwhichphilosophyjournalsdeterminewhat enters into the (official) record of philosophy. We examinethe role peer review had in two important episodes in the historyof twentieth-century philosophy, episodes that centre on changingeditorial policies at the journalMind under the editorships of G.E.MooreandG.Ryle.WeshowthatbiasaboutphilosophicalapproachradicallyaffectedMind’scontents.Wethusillustratetheimpactsuchbiascanhaveonacademicphilosophy.Wealsotakealookattherolepeerreviewhasin(recent)mainstreamphilosophy,whichweidentifywiththekindofphilosophythathasdominatedprominentphilosophyjournalsintheEnglish-speakingworldoverrecentdecades—journalssuch as Mind, The Philosophical Review, Noûs, Ethics, Analysis, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science andPhilosophy of Science.Wepointout thatpeer review (in journals)hasbeen, andcontinues tobe, partisan about philosophical approach inmuch the way it wasinMind underMooreandRyle.Wealsonotethatsuchpartisanshipshouldnot,ontheofficialviewoftheroleofpeerreview,bepartofpeer review.Wegoon to considerwhetherweought toaccept theverdictthatpeerreviewinmainstreamphilosophyisproblematic.Twofeatures of mainstream philosophy are important here, namely theabsenceofestablished-to-be-reliablewaysofansweringphilosophers’substantive questions and professional philosophers’ dependenceonfundsprovidedbyothers. Inviewofthesefeatures,currentpeerreviewpracticesturnouttobeepistemicallyandmorallyproblematic.

Finally,weexaminewhat, ifanything,shouldbedoneabout theepistemicandmoralproblemswehaveidentified.Weoutlinetwode-sideratathatneedtobefulfilledinordertoalleviatetheseproblems,includingfosteringpluralismregardingphilosophicalapproachesandevaluatingphilosophicalworkaccordingtoitscontributiontodevel-opingthoughtinwaysthatareofvalue.Wearguethatthesedesideratacanbebetterfulfilledwithrelativeeaseand,therefore,shouldbebet-terfulfilled.Weoutlineseveralproposalsthatarerelativelyeasytoim-plement,includingdiversifyingjournals’editorialboardsandreview

katzavandvaesen Pluralism and Peer Review in Philosophy

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.17,no.19(september2017)

F.H.Bradley,isBritishabsoluteidealism.Absoluteidealismhasatitshearttheideathatrealityisultimatelyonemind-like,concretewhole.BritishpluralisticidealismisanotherprominentschoolwithinBritishidealism,onethattakesultimaterealitytobeacommunityofmindsandthatariseslargelyasaresponsetoabsoluteidealism.2OpposedtoBritishidealismduringtheperiodathandareanumberofapproachesthat are predominantly critical. These include classical analytic phi-losophy,which emphasises the importance of logical and linguisticanalysisandgrewoutoftheworkofMooreandB.Russell,aswellasrealistapproachesthattaketheanalysisofperceptionastheirstartingpoint;thelatterapproachesincludenewrealism,whichwasaformofdirectrealism,andcriticalrealism,whichborrowedfrombothdirectand representational realism.3Anotherapproach tophilosophy thatisimportantinBritainduringourperiodisphilosophicalpsychology.This approach can, in principle, be combined eitherwith critical orwith speculative approaches to philosophy and centres on the ideathatpsychologicalanalysiscansolve,orhelptosolve,many,orall,oftheproblemsofphilosophy.4

Thefirst of our twohistorical case studies concerns the policiesofMooreinhisroleaseditorofMindfrom1921,whenhetookovertherolefromG.Stout,until1948,whenRyletookovertheeditorship.WewillseethatMoore’spartisaneditorshipofMind results,alreadyinthe1920s,inthemarginalisationofphilosophicalpsychologyandofBritish idealism.Going through the volumesofMind shows that, duringthefirstfouryearsofMoore’seditorship,MindwaspluralisticinawaythatwassimilartoitspluralismunderStout,whosepolicyofimpartialitybetweendifferentschoolsofphilosophyMooreclaimed(Schilpp1942)tocontinue.Absoluteidealism,pluralisticformsofide-alism, philosophical psychology, new and critical realism, classicalanalyticphilosophyandthehistoryofphilosophyareallprominentin

2. FormoreonBritish idealism,seeMander(2011)andBoucherandVincent(2012).

3. Formoreontheseformsofrealism,seeMarion(2000aand2000b).

4. Formoreonphilosophicalpsychology,seevanderSchaar(1995).

committeesaswellasmakingpeerreviewmuchmorepublicandfarlessselectivethanitcurrentlyis.1Ineffect,wesuggestminimising,asfarasfeasible,theroleofpeerreviewindeterminingwhatentersintothedebate.

Welookatthehistory,andcurrentpractice,ofpeerreviewinphi-losophy in section 2.We consider the partisanship involved in sec-tion3.Section4arguesthatthispartisanshipisproblematic.Section5examineswhat,ifanything,shouldbedonetochangepeerreviewinphilosophy.

2. Two Episodes in the History of Peer Review in Philosophy and Their Legacy

Somebackgroundtoourphilosophicalcasestudiescanbeprovidedbyavariantofadistinction thatwasused inBritainandelsewhereduringthefirsthalfof thetwentiethcentury,namelythedistinctionbetweenspeculativeandcriticalapproachestophilosophy(see,e.g.,Broad 1924; Mackenzie 1930; Stedman 1937). Roughly, speculativephilosophy has as a central aim the making of substantive claimsaboutrealityasawhole,aswellastheaimofdoingsoinawaythatisepistemicallyindependentofscience,ordinarylanguageandcommonsense.Criticalphilosophy,bycontrast,tendstoavoidmakingclaimstoknowledgethatareindependentinthisway;insome(particularlycritical)variants,criticalphilosophyaimstoavoidmakinganyclaimsto new knowledge at all and, instead,merely aims to illuminate orclarifywhatisalreadyknown.

Oneof themainapproaches tophilosophy inBritainduring thefirsthalfofthetwentiethcenturyisBritishidealism.Itis,asMander(2011, pp. 88–89) observes, predominantly speculative and, further,holdsthatrealityisultimatelymind-like.Oneimportantschoolwith-inBritishidealism,aschoolthatismostprominentlyrepresentedby

1. BasedontheAPA/BPAsurveymentionedearlier,wecalculatedthatfortherespondingjournals,theaveragerejectionratein2013was88.3%(SD=6),withamaximumof98%(The Philosophical Review)andaminimumof71%(TheAmericanJournalofBioethics).



particular,Philosophy—which, interestinglyenough,was founded in1926—andtheProceedings of the Aristotelian Society continuedregularlytopublishworksupportingBritishidealism.8WhenThe Philosophical Quarterlywasfoundedin1950withtheBritishidealistT.M.Knoxasitseditor,italsoprovidedaregularvenueforspeculativethought,includ-ingidealism.9AtleastsomeBritishidealistspublishedworkinAmeri-can journals suchasThe Journal of Philosophy, The Personalist (whichbecamethePacific Philosophical Quarterlyin1980)andThe Philosophical Review.10Thus,whileMindwassupposed—asSorleyattestsinhis1926MindarticlecelebratingfiftyyearsofMind—tobeajournalthatservedallphilosophicalapproachesinBritain,itnolongerdid.Thattheshiftin journalcontentscanbeattributedtoeditorialpolicy issuggestedbythesuddennessoftheshift.Moreover,sinceLewy’s(1976)contri-butiontothespecialeditionofMindputtogetherfor its100thanni-versarymakesclearthatMoorewasessentiallysolelyresponsibleforreviewingsubmissionstoMindanddecidingonwhethertheyshouldbepublished,itseemsMoorewasresponsibleforthechangeinpolicyand its implementation.Moorethus failedtocontinuethe impartialpolicyofStout.11

Our description ofwhatMoore included inMind fitswithwhatLewy (1976) tells us about this; Lewy’s description ismerely under-stated,andsubstantiallyincomplete,regardingthemid-1920schang-es in the journal.Ourdescriptiondoes,however, conflictwithWar-nock’s(1976)contributiontothe100th-anniversaryspecialeditionof

8. See, e.g., Mackenzie (1930), Fawcett (1932), Jeans (1932), Kamiat (1938),Oakeley(1945)andMure(1949)inPhilosophy;seealsoHallett(1931),Bow-man(1932),Paton(1935)andStedman(1937)intheProceedings of the Aristote-lian Society.

9. SeeKnox’spaper “Thoughtand ItsObjects” (1969) fora tasteofhisviews.ExamplesofidealistandspeculativepapersinThe Philosophical Quarterlyinthe1950sincludeHarris(1953&1956),Leclerc(1953)andHartshorne(1958).

10. ThepluralistidealistH.W.Carr,forexample,publishesarticlesinallofthesejournals(Seehis1926,1929and1949);hediesin1931,afterhavingmovedtoAmericafromBritainin1925.

11. Lewywassub-editorofMindintheearly1940s,whenMoorewasintheUnit-edStatesofAmerica.

thejournal.Moreidiosyncraticapproachestophilosophyandpragma-tismarealsopresent,thoughpragmatismisfoundonlyintheworkofF.C.S.Schiller.Here,wedofindsubstantialrepresentationoftheradi-callydifferentapproachestophilosophyfoundinBritainatthetime.In1925,thereisaflourishofworkonBradley’sabsoluteidealismandJ.Ward’spluralisticidealism;thisflourishisattributabletothedeathofBradleyin1924andthedeathofWardin1925.Afterthis,however,Mind changes.Work associatedwithnewand critical realism,workinthehistoryofphilosophyand,especially,workinclassicalanalyticphilosophyareprominentinthejournal;pragmatismcontinuestoberepresented, largelybySchiller’swork.However, from 1926until atleast1940,Mindincludesnofull-lengthpapersthatfavourpluralisticidealismandonlythreethatfavourabsoluteidealism.5Thesethreepa-persaside,absoluteandpluralisticidealistspublishfull-lengthpapersinMind onlywhen the papers are compatiblewith realist and ana-lyticapproaches,e.g.,whenthepapersarepurelyhistorical.6Twofull-lengthphilosophicalpsychologypapersappearinthejournalin1926,butwecountonlysixmorepriorto1940,fourofwhichappearin1931;bycontrast,forexample,thereareatleasttwelvefull-lengthpapersinphilosophicalpsychologyinthejournalduringtheyears1920–1923.7

Insum,around1924–1925,editorialpolicyatMind appears to have changedsoas to favoursomeof theapproaches tophilosophy thatwere still thriving in Britain over others thatwere doing so. For in-stance, it iswell documented that British idealism continued to beproductiveuntilatleastthe1950s(Broadie2009;Akehurst2011;Man-der2011).Moreover,whileMoore’spolicyisplausiblythoughttohavepushedsomeBritishidealistworkintobooksor,asourdiscussionofR.G.Collingwoodbelowwillsuggest,outofprintaltogether,BritishjournalsdidcontinuetopublishworkthatsupportsBritishidealism.In

5. ThethreepapersareHoernlé(1927),Mackenzie(1927)andFoster(1931).

6. See,e.g.,Loewenberg(1934)andHoernlé(1936).

7. Thepost-1925philosophicalpsychologypapersareRignano(1926),Strong(1926&1928),Mace(1931),Piaget(1931),Ritchie(1931),Morgan(1931)andDuncker(1939).



answeredcriticismofBritishidealistpositions—sometimesbyBritishidealists—continuesthroughoutthedecade.15Insum,adecisivebattlebetweenapproaches tophilosophyneveroccurred inMind. Instead,Moore’spartisanshipaboutapproachestophilosophygaverisetoanorthodoxyinthejournalalreadyinthesecondhalfofthe1920s.

OursecondhistoricalcasestudyconcernsRyle’seditorshipofMind, whichcontinuedfromtheendofMoore’seditorshipuntil1972.Ryle,likeMoore,wasessentially solely responsible for reviewing submis-sions toMind anddecidingon their fate (seeWarnock 1976).More-over,hisdecisionsonthismatterreflectedatleastthreerelevantpoli-cies regardingMind’s contents. First, Ryle substantially reduced thepresenceof thehistoryofphilosophy inMind (Hamlyn2003), thusreversingMoore’s policy on thematter. Second, Ryle believed thatphilosophical problems could be addressed briefly (Hamlyn 2003).Itisthusnosurprisethat,asFindlay(1976)pointsout,RylereducedthelengthofarticlesinMinddrastically.Moore,andStoutbeforehim,regularlypublishedarticlesintwotothreeinstalments,eachofwhichcouldbeover twentypages in length.Ryle almostneverpublishedarticlesmuchlongerthantwentypagesinlength.Findlayjudgesthattheshort-articlepolicyfavouredapiecemealapproachtophilosophy.AccordingtoFindlay,itchanged“Mindfrombeingacatholicjournalinto being the organ of a school, and drove thosewho did not be-longtoaschool intoeither foundingnewjournalsorwritingmajorbooks” (Findlay 1976,p. 60).Givenwhatwehave seen, Findlay,nolessthanWarnock,iswrongaboutwhenMindceasedtobea“catholic”journal.ButitisplausiblethattheemphasisonshortarticlesinMind encouragedthemorepiecemealapproachtophilosophythatwasondisplayinitspagesduringRyle’stenure.Asacorollary,thoughmoretentatively,itseemsplausiblethattheshort-articlepolicyencouraged,by encouraging articles composed of responses to other articles, aparticularlycombativeformofphilosophy,oneinwhichadversarial

15. See,e.g.,Stedman(1934)andActon(1936).

Mind.WarnockclaimsthatitwasduringtheSecondWorldWarthatanorthodoxyemergedinBritainandinMind,onewhichcomprisedanagreementthatBritishidealismwasnottobetakenseriouslyandanother agreement to take empiricism, positivism, analysis and thetrioRussell,MooreandL.Wittgensteinseriously(Warnock1976,pp.48–49).Further,Warnockclaimsthatthisorthodoxyemergedafterabattleinthe1930samongradicallydifferentspeciesofphilosophy.Insupportofthis,hementionsanearly-1930sexchangeinMindbetweenH.W.B.JosephandL.S.Stebbing,andRyle’s1935criticismofCollin-gwood’s treatment of the ontological argument.12According toWar-nock’sreconstruction,then,thechangesinMindwerenottheresultofMoore’spolicy,astheytookplaceonlyattheveryendofMoore’seditorshipandweretheresultofadebatewhichwasdecidedinfavouroftheneworthodoxy.

Yet,Joseph’sdiscussionofStebbing’sworkisacriticismoftheRus-sellianapplicationofthenewlogicinanalysingnaturallanguage;thistargetnotonlyreflectsaratherlimiteddisagreementwhencomparedwiththebroadrangeofdisagreementsfoundinMindbefore1926,butisconsistentwiththeorthodoxydescribedbyWarnockandisinthespiritofthe(partlyMoore-inspired!)ordinary-languagephilosophyofthe1930s.13WithrespecttophilosophythatisnotpartofWarnock’sorthodoxy,Warnockmistakesitspresenceasanobjectofcriticismorhistorical interest inMind of the 1930s for something else. Colling-wood responds to Ryle in private correspondence andwrites therethatnoeditorwouldconsiderpublishingtheresponse(Vrijen2006).TheresponsetoRyleinMindcomprisesonlyashortdiscussionnotebyE.E.Harris(1936),albeitonethatdefendsHegel’streatmentoftheontologicalargument.J.M.E.McTaggart’sidealistviewsarediscussedextensivelyinMindin1930,butinapurelycriticalway.14Indeed,un-

12. SeeRyle (1935)and, for the startof the Joseph-Stebbingexchange, Joseph(1932)andStebbing(1933).

13. See, e.g., J. Wisdom’s (1938) ordinary-language treatment of Joseph’sarguments.

14. SeeGotshalk(1930)andOakeley(1930).



inferenceandclarityinmainstreamphilosophym-rigourandm-clarity respectively.17 M-rigour predominantly characterises argumentationthataimstouncoverthecorrectanswerstosubstantivephilosophicalquestions(Brennan2010;Chalmers2015).Inaddition,asarguedbyHundleby(forthcoming)andobservedbyMoulton(1983)andFried-man(2013),m-rigourpredominantlycharacterisesargumentationthatisadversarial.Tothisweaddthatm-rigourpredominantlyincludesacertainperspectiveonwhatcountsasareasonableorplausiblestart-ingpoint forargumentation.Whatcountswill changesomewhat inresponse to discussion inmainstream philosophy andwith its sub-fields,butwill largelybe constrainedat anygiven time/subfieldbywhichauthorsanddiscussionsaretobecitedandbyaconservativebiaswith respect to these; the default assumption is that good rea-sonsneedtobefoundforrejectingtheseauthors’positions.Nodoubt,thereismoretom-rigourthanjustsuggested.

Thestandardsofm-claritycanplausiblybepartiallycharacterisedin termsof the requirement that an author’sworkbe relatively eas-ilyunderstoodbyothermainstreamphilosophers,especiallybythosehaving theworkas their areaof specialisation.The standardsofm-clarity also plausibly involve the requirement that concepts, propo-sitions, inferences and larger-than-inference-level argumentativestructuresthatmakeupwrittenphilosophicalworkbepresentedus-ingoneofalimitedrepertoireofstandardisedlanguageforms;atthemostgenerallevel,theseformswillborrowfromsymboliclogicand/or regimented, informal reasoning, but they will also borrow frommoredomain-specificformssuchastheterminologyofrecentanalyticmetaphysicsorrecentmeta-ethics.Worked-outdefinitionsofm-clar-ityarehardtofind,anditwouldbeprematuretosettleonanysinglesubstantivedefinition.

17. Weusetheterms‘m-rigour’and‘m-clarity’ratherthan‘rigour’and‘clarity’inordertoremainneutralaboutwhatrigourandclarityare.Inthiscontext,notethatwedonotobjecttousingtheperhapsnatural‘(recent)analyticphiloso-phy’insteadof‘mainstreamphilosophy’,thoughwecautionthathowrecentmainstreamphilosophyrelatestotheanalytictraditiondiscussedearlierinthissectionmaynotbestraightforward.

argumentationplaysagrowing role.16Furtherencouragementalongthese lineswasprovidedby theproliferationofdiscussionnotes inMind—paperswithshortcommentson,orafewcounter-argumentsto,positionsdevelopedinthemoresubstantivearticlespublishedinthejournal(Hamlyn2003).

The third relevant policy concerns British idealism. On the onehand,aswehavealreadynoted,itstillattractedmanysupportersinBritainduringthe1950s.Ontheotherhand,thepagesofMindduringthisdecadereflectedanorthodoxyastowhoisworthyofdiscussion,aswehaveseenWarnock(1976)notes.Mindlargelylimitsitscontentstoapproachesthatcametobepartofmid-centuryanalyticphilosophy,namelyapproaches inspiredbyclassicalanalyticphilosophyandbylogicalpositivism.

Insummary,philosophyinMindduringRyle’speriodcomescloserto resembling the standard picture of analytic philosophy than didphilosophy inMind duringMoore’s period.UnderRyle, philosophyinMinddoestendtobea-historicalandpiecemeal,anditfrequentlyinvolvesapproachesthatcanbetracedbacktoMoore,Russell,Witt-gensteinandlogicalpositivism.Adversarialargumentationalsoseemstoreceiveencouragement.Toasubstantialextent,thesechangescanbeattributedtoRyle’sdecisionsaboutwhatwasappropriatecontentfor Mind.

Wecanhereonlytouchonthelegacyoftheaboveepisodesofpar-tisanship in peer review.Wedo so bynoting one important aspectofjournalpeerreviewthathasarguablysurvivedandspreadduringthesubstantial changes inphilosophysinceRyle’seditorship,name-lythecommitmenttoacertainargumentative,adversarialapproachtophilosophy and an associated approach to clarity. Let us call theadmittedly somewhat heterogeneous, but nevertheless related bystrongresemblance,standardsappliedoverrecentdecadesinjudging

16. Philosophicaldialogue in theadversarialmode“consistsofobjectionsandcounterexamplestowhichthebestresponsesarerefutationsofobjectionsandcounterexamplesfollowedby more of the same”(Friedman2013,p.28,italicsintheoriginal).



Finally,reviewersarepresumablyassubjecttopartisanshipaseditors.Iftheyareselectedinvirtueofsharingsimilarphilosophicalcommit-ments,theirjudgmentscanbeexpectedtoalignwiththosetheeditorwhoselectedthemwouldmake.

3. The Official Function of Peer Review and Its Role in Philosophy

LetusturntodescribingtheofficialviewoftheroleofpeerreviewandtoconsideringwhatthisviewimpliesaboutthepoliciesofMooreandRyle,andaboutmorerecentpeer review inmainstreamphilosophyjournals. The official function of peer review is certification: peerreviewcertifiesthequalityofresearchoutput(anepistemicrole)andofthescholarsproducingsuchoutput(anon-epistemicrole)(Shatz2004). Ideally, it ismerely in virtue of this certifying role that peerreviewregulatestheresearchagendaofafield.

The epistemic role of peer review is assessing the quality of re-search. From the hundreds of thousands, or evenmillions, ofman-uscripts submittedonayearlybasis,18 itweedsout thosewhicharenotsound,significantornovel.Peerreviewisthoughttobeaparticu-larlypowerful procedurebecause it is carriedoutbypeoplewhoseopinionon the subject is authoritative;who,as scientists, aremorelikelytojudgeworkonscientificmeritthanintermsofmoreordinaryconcerns (e.g.,market considerations, politics); andwho can be as-sumed to be impartial, in the sense of not being too closely linkedtotheauthor(s)whoseworkisbeingreviewed(Leeet al.2013).Theauthoritativenatureofpeerreviewiswidelysupposedpartlytorestonthefactthatworkistobejudgedonsharedstandardsofexcellenceandexpediency(Leeetal.2013).Inthisway,peerreviewissupposedtoreflectexistingknowledgeratherthantheperspectiveofthisorthatreviewerorgroupofreviewers.

As regards non-epistemic certification, peer review serves as anevaluativestandardinhiring,conferringtenure,promotionandgrant

18. Björk et al. (2009; cited in Lee et al. 2013) estimate that 1,346,000 peer-reviewedpaperswerepublishedin2006.Anaveragerejectionrateof50%wouldthusalreadyimplymorethan2,000,000submissionsforthatyear.

The full details of what m-rigour and m-clarity involve are not,however, of importance toour arguments.Whatmatters is that themainstreamphilosophy journalswe are concernedwith are, in em-ployingm-rigourandm-clarityas criteria forassessingsubmissions,partisanwithregardtowhichapproachtophilosophytheyserveandthuswhichpaperstheyarewillingtopublish.Whosuffersfromthispartisanshipissomethingwediscussinthenextsection.

Weneedtomakethreefinalremarks.First,wedonotmeantoim-plythatMooreandRylewerethesoleoreventheprimaryindividu-alsresponsibleforhowphilosophydevelopedduringtheirperiodsofeditorship.Yet,itseemsreasonabletoassertthattheirpolicieswereonesalientcontributingfactor,giventheprominenceofMind intheprofessionandgiventherolethatpublishinginMindhadoncertifyingpractitionersinphilosophy.

Second,theextentofsystematicbiasinpeerreviewinphilosophyremainstobeexplored,butcertainlyextendsbeyondtheexampleswehavedocumentedhere.Thus,forexample,Howard(2003)hasdocu-mentedR.Rudner’sexclusionofworkonvalues,politicsorsocietalconcernsfromPhilosophy of Scienceafter1958.Haslanger(2008)pointstothenearabsenceoffeministthoughtfromprominentjournals,in-cludingMind.Wehavedocumented (2017)howagroupofanalyticphilosophersbyandlargeexcludedspeculativephilosophyfromthepagesofThe Philosophical Reviewaftertheytookoverthejournalinthelate1940s.

Third,onemight think that the trend towardsout-of-housepeerreviewhassubstantiallydiminishedthediscretionarypowerof jour-naleditorsand,consequently,thattheirpartisanshipisinsufficienttoexplainthepresent-dayconvergenceofapproaches.Webelieve,how-ever,thatthereisstillampleroomforeditorstoexercisetheircommit-ments. For instance, amongphilosophy journals, desk-rejectionsbyeditorsarestillcommonpractice(LeeandSchunn2011).Further,evenunder triple-blind review, editorsmake crucial decisionswhich areopentopartisanship,e.g.,onwhowillserveasareviewerandonwhattodowithreviewerreports,betheypositive,negativeorconflicting.



fromamongthosetheyinfluencewithinthecommunityofactualandpotentialacademicphilosophers.19

4. Epistemic and Moral Problems with Peer Review in Mainstream Philosophy

Our discussion thus far has aimed to be descriptive. The questionremainswhetherpeerreviewthatispartisaninthewayitwasunderMooreandRyle, and,withall thedifferencesacknowledged, in theway that it still is in prominent mainstream philosophy journals,shouldbeavoided.Inthissectionwearguethatitshouldbeavoidedinthecontextofmainstreamphilosophy,atleastiffeasible.Weargue,first,thatthereisnogoodreasontoprefertheapproachofmainstreamphilosophy, including its emphasis onm-clarity andm-rigour, overavailablealternativesand,second,thattherearegoodepistemicandmoral reasons for avoidingpartisanship in peer review. In thenextsectionwearguethat,givenhoweasyitistoimprovecurrentpractice,itshouldbeimproved.

Apopularargument forscepticismaboutphilosophy,namely the argument from disagreement,canbeusedtosupporttheclaimthatthereisnogoodreasontopreferthestandardsofmainstreamphilosophyover available alternatives. The argument from disagreementconcerns (at least) disagreement about the correctness of answerstosubstantivephilosophicalquestions,thatis,aboutthecorrectnessofphilosophicalpositions, includingphilosophicalpictures,theoriesanddefinitions.Thestartingpointoftheargumentfromdisagreementis the observation that philosophy is characterized by pervasive,persistent disagreement between epistemic peers about what thecorrect answers to substantive philosophical questions are. Giventhisobservation, theargumentwouldhaveus infer thatphilosophycannotsettlesubstantivephilosophicalquestionsinanepistemically

19. Thisdoesnotmeanthat,onthestandardperspectiveofpeerreview,journalsspecializinginspecificapproachesaregenerallybiasedinaproblematicway.Suchspecializationmight,forexample,havelimitedinfluenceonthosenotsharinginthespecialization,ormightevenservetoprovideatemporarycor-rectiontoabiasagainstanapproach.

committeedecisions.Peer-reviewedarticlesaretakentodemonstrateascholar’sabilityto(continueto)contributetoafield,inawayrecog-nizedbythatfieldand,atleastincomparisontoinvitedcontributions,independentlyfromthescholar’spersonalandprofessionalnetworks.

Forourpurposes,whatmattersisthat,fromthestandardperspec-tive justdescribed, thepartisanapproachesofMooreandRyledur-ingtheireditorshipsofMindshouldbeavoidedinpeerreview.Theepistemicroleofpeerreviewwasunderminedbecausetheepistemicstandardsofevaluationemployedduringtheseeditorshipswerenotsharedamongthescholarsservedbytheeditorships.

Things getmore complicatedwhen it comes tomore recentpar-tisanshipaboutapproaches tophilosophy. It isnatural to think thatthecommunitycurrentlyservedby,say,Mindjustcomprisescontem-porary,mainstreamphilosophers.Thiscommunitydoes, itmightbesuggested,sharestandardsforevaluatingphilosophicalwork.Thusitmightbethoughtthat,althoughthejournalhasrecentlybeenpartisanabouthowphilosophyshouldbecarriedout,itspeerreviewpracticeshavebeeninaccordwiththestandardrequirementsofpeerreview.

Such a line of thought is, however, too quick. Mind and otherprominentjournalscollectivelyplayanimportantroleindetermininghowresourcessuchasjobs,fundingandresearchtimearedistributedamongacademicsworking,andseekingtowork,inacademicphiloso-phyintheUnitedStatesofAmerica,theUnitedKingdomandothercountries.Accordingly, thecommunity these journals serveextendswell beyond thosewho accept the standards ofmainstream philos-ophy; it includes, forexample,manyworking inAfricanphilosophy,feminist philosophers critical ofmainstream philosophy,many con-tinentalphilosophersandmanyof thosewhoseethemselvesas try-ingtobridgetheanalytic-continentaldivide.Thecommunityinques-tionalsoincludesthosewhoarenotquiteagoodfitforanyparticularwidely adopted approach to philosophy. The journals being consid-eredarethus,deliberatelyornot,partisanaboutwhomtheysupport



includingmainstreamphilosophy,ispervasive;itleavesnoanswerstosubstantiveissueswithinphilosophyuntouched.

Amorepopular response to the argument fromdisagreement isthat the appropriate standards for acceptinganswers to substantivephilosophical questions are low enough so as not to be renderedproblematic by thedisagreementwefind amongphilosophers (see,e.g., Brennan 2010; Sosa 2011; Goldberg 2013; Siepel 2016). Thisresponse acknowledges that if reliability is demanded of standardsforacceptinganswerstosubstantivephilosophicalquestions,thennoacceptable standardsare tobe found.But,weare told, the relevantstandardsof acceptance inphilosophy shouldnotbe sohigh.Thus,for example, Sosawrites that philosophy, art criticism, politics andmorality are an essential part of life and that, accordingly,weneedtopursuethemwithwhatgoodstandardswehave,evenifthesearenotthoseofscience(2011,p.200).Similarly,Goldberg(2013,p.289)tells us that in contexts where, as in philosophy, the standards ofjustificationandknowledgecannotbemetanditisagreedthatthereisaneedforinformationoncertaintopics,lowerepistemicstandardscanlicenseassertion.

The just-mentioned proposals according to which answers tosubstantive philosophical questions need not be reliably arrivedat might provide an appropriate response to the argument fromdisagreement,butitisonethatmakespartisanshipaboutmainstreamphilosophy unreasonable. The proposals themselves, note, do notdistinguishbetweendifferentapproachestophilosophy;theclaimisthatphilosophyassuchcanproceedwithlessthanreliablestandards.Theproposalsthus,anddespiteoftenbeingmadebyrepresentativesofmainstreamphilosophy,donotbringwith themargumentsas towhywe ought to prefer specific approaches to philosophy, such asthoseemphasisingm-clarityandm-rigour. Indeed, itwouldbehardtodefendpartisanshipaboutmainstreamphilosophyasawholebyappealtowhatisneeded,orvalued,fromahumanperspectiveassuch.AsKitcherpointsout(2011),itisachallengeformuchofmainstream

acceptableway(see,e.g.,vanInwagen2004;Gutting2009;Brennan,2010;Frances2010;Dietrich2011;Kamber2011;Sosa2011;Plant2012;Kornblith2013;Lycan2013;Goldberg2013;Chalmers2015;Matheson2015;Haack2016).

Whethertheargumentfromdisagreementsucceedsinunderminingsomesetofstandardsforassessingphilosophicalworkmightdepend,tobeginwith,on theextent towhich thestandards inquestionareandhavebeenemployed.Ifthestandardshavebeenemployedonlytoalimitedextent,thentheexistenceofdisagreementinphilosophymightbethoughtnottounderminethesuppositionthattheyareableappropriatelytosettledisagreements.Thus,forexample,Williamson(2007,p.286)seemstosuggestthatrigourandclarityarestilllargelyabsentfrommuchofmainstreamphilosophy,eventhough,onhisview,the best ofmainstream philosophy realises themmore persistentlythantheyhavebeenrealisedinthepast.IfWilliamsoniscorrect,thenperhapsdisagreementinmainstreamphilosophyislargelyamatteroftheunfulfilledpotentialofrigourandclarity.Kamber(2011),toofferanotherexample,suggeststhatitisexperimentalphilosophythatmaygrowtoenableovercomingdisagreementinphilosophy.

Astandardresponsetoclaimsthatphilosophyisabouttobeputonafirmfootingistopointouttheirunsuccessfulhistory,ahistorythat appears to undermine similar claimsmade in the present (see,e.g.,Hacker2009;Brennan2010;Chalmers2015).Afurtherresponserelates specifically to mainstream philosophy. If the claim thatmainstreamphilosophyisbyandlargefarfrominstantiatingsomesetof standards is to block the argument fromdisagreement, even thesupposedlyverybestofmainstreamphilosophycannotbesupposedsubstantially tomeet the standards inquestion.For if theverybestofitsubstantiallymeetsthesestandards,theabilityofthestandardsacceptablytosettlethequestionsathandwillstillbeundermined.Thecandidatebestresultsofmainstreamphilosophyaresubjecttomuchthesamedisagreementasareotherpartsofphilosophy.Asmany(e.g.,Kornblith2010andSosa2011)haveputit,disagreementinphilosophy,



beenestablishedtobeareliablemeansofansweringsubstantivephil-osophicalquestionsandtryingneverthelesstolegitimatesomestan-dardsofacceptanceinphilosophy.Wehavealsosuggestedthat,oncethereliabilityofmainstreamphilosophyisheldtobeanopenissue,thereappearstobenogoodreasontoprefer itsstandards.Wenowturntoarguingthat therearegoodreasonstoavoidpartisanship inpeerreviewinphilosophy.Ourargumentproceedsintwosteps:first,wearguethatthereare(amongmainstream,andthusamongcontem-porary,philosophers)nointersubjectivelyestablishedgroundsfortak-ing available philosophical approaches to be reliablemeans for set-tling substantivephilosophicalquestions.While theargument fromdisagreementsupportstheconclusionthattherearenogoodreasonsfor thinkingthatavailableapproachesarereliable,our focusnowisontheabsenceofanyagreedreasons for thinkingthatavailableap-proachesarereliable.Wedonotdenythatthereiswidespreadagree-mentamongmainstreamphilosophersabouthowtodophilosophy.Ourpoint is that,nevertheless,mainstreamphilosopherswhohaveexamined the issue of the reliability of philosophy do not provideagreedgroundsforsupposingthatanyavailableapproachtophiloso-phyisreliable.Second,wearguethat, intheabsenceof intersubjec-tivelyagreedgroundsfortakingavailableapproachestophilosophytobereliable,therearegoodepistemicandmoralreasonsnottopreferanyparticularavailableapproachtophilosophyinpeerreview.

Onwhatbasisdoweclaimthattherearenointersubjectivelyes-tablished grounds for taking available approaches to philosophy tosufficereliablytosettlesubstantivephilosophicalquestions?Webasethisclaimonareadingofabodyof literaturethathasalreadybeenextensively cited in our discussion of the argument from disagree-ment.Whilethehistoryoftheargumentfromdisagreementgoesbackat least to thePyrrhonists(SextusEmpiricus, I, 178)andextendsbe-yondtheboundaryofmainstreamphilosophy(see,e.g.,Vattimo2000;McCumber2013),our focushasbeenonitsdiscussionwithinmain-streamphilosophy.Thisdiscussiondoesnotincludeanargued,large-lyagreedconclusionthatsomephilosophicalapproachoranotheris

philosophy toshowthat it reflectshumanneedsandvalues,exceptperhapsthoseofitspractitioners.

Inanycase,theneedforanswerstophilosophicalquestionswillatbestservetoplaceweakconstraintsonthestandardsofassessmentusedinphilosophy.Thatweneedto,orshould,addressphilosophical,political, ethical and aesthetic questions in some context mightplausibly be thought often to require a modicum of clarity andargumentation; it, however, does not seem to require the peculiarstandards associated with any specific approach to philosophy,somethingthatismadeclearbysocietallyrelevant,non-mainstreamphilosophy,includingphilosophicalliteratureandart.

Similarconsiderationsapply to thesuggestionthatm-clarityandm-rigour, andmainstreamphilosophymorebroadly, shouldbepur-sued because they promote values other than truth and other thanwhatweclearlyvaluequahumans,e.g., elaboratephilosophicalpo-sitions, thesystematicnotingofdistinctions,m-rigourandm-claritythemselvesandsoon.Thus,oneoughttowonderwhethertheargu-mentativeapparatusofmainstreamphilosophyisneededinordertohave its distinctions or its elaborate philosophical positions. Morebroadly,non-mainstreamphilosophicalapproachespromotemanyofthesamevaluables; they,ofcourse,alsopromote theirownalterna-tivestom-rigourandm-clarity.Inanycase,promotingwhatmightbevaluableinmainstreamphilosophyisnotintensionwiththepursuitofnon-mainstreamapproachestophilosophy,sothewishtopursuewhateverit isthatmainstreamphilosophyprovidesishardlyreasonforpartisanship.20

Thusfar,ourdiscussionrecommendsrespondingtotheargumentfromdisagreementbyacceptingthatnophilosophicalapproachhas20.Rescher(1985)respondstotheargumentfromdisagreementbydistinguish-

ingbetweenourattitudetophilosophicalclaimswhenpracticingphilosophyandourattitudetosuchclaimswhenreflectingonphilosophy.AccordingtoRescher, theargument fromdisagreementaffectsonly the latter.WeagreewithPlant(2012),however, thatonecannotseparatereflectiononphiloso-phyandphilosophicalpractice.Philosophicalreflectionisappliedinpeerre-view,awardingoffundingforresearchinphilosophy,hiringandfiringandsoon.



thatphilosophicalmethodsareunreliable.Kitcher(2011)writesthatphilosophershavenoexpertise.Andsoon.

Thereare,tobesure,argumentsfortheclaimthatphilosophy’s,andintherecentliteraturethisusuallymeans“mainstreamphilosophy’s”,approachisreliable.Buttheseareascontestedasanyphilosophicalthesis.Guttingclaims that there isno reason to justifyphilosophy’sapproach, because it proceeds to develop knowledge in much thesamewayassciencedoes,thatis,viatheuseofdeductive,inductiveandabductiveinference(2009,p.229).Yettheliteraturealsocontainsmanywhoarguethatphilosophyisnotlikescience,including,mostobviously, those already cited as being sceptical about philosophy.Williamson(2007)goesfurtherthanGuttingandoffersanargumentfor optimism about philosophy. He tries to justify reliance on intu-itionsaboutparticularcasesinphilosophybyclaimingthatdoingsoismerelyaninstanceofourmoregeneralabilitytoreasonwiththehelpofcounterfactuals.Thisargument,however,doesnottellusthatthereis philosophical knowledgeof answers to substantivephilosophicalquestions.Therearealsomanyobjectionstotheargument(see,e.g.,Buckwalter2014;Machery2015).

Letusaccept,then,thattherearenointersubjectivelyestablishedgroundsfortakinganyavailableapproachtophilosophytobereliable.Whyconcludefromthisthatnoparticularsetofstandards,includingm-clarityandm-rigour,shouldbepreferredinpeerreview?Ourfirstargument fordoingso isbasedonepistemicconsiderations.There-centmainstream literature on the existence of philosophical knowl-edgedoesnot,aswehaveseen,distinguishbetweenestablishedap-proaches to philosophy. All approaches that have been extensivelytriedoutaresupposedlyequallysuspectwithregardtoreliability,andthere is supposedlyno agreedepistemicbasis forpreferringoneofthese approaches over another. Some approachesmight claim that,sincetheyarerelativelynew,theyhavemorepotentialforimprovingthe situation in philosophy thandoother approaches; butwhetherthispromisewillbefulfilledremainstobeseen.Insuchcircumstances,itwouldseemtobeamistaketofavouranyoneapproachcollectively.

reliable. By implication, contemporary philosophy does not includesuchagreement.

Gutting is, in comparison with most other mainstream philoso-pherswhohaverecentlywrittenabouttheavailabilityofphilosophi-cal knowledge, optimistic aboutwhat philosophical knowledge hasbeenachieved.Heargues thatwehavea substantialbodyofphilo-sophicalknowledge,onethatcomprisesknowledgeofphilosophicaldistinctionsandofwhichanswerstophilosophy’sultimatequestionsarecurrentlyviable—that is, canbedefendedandelaborateduponinphilosophicaldiscussion(Gutting2009&2013,p.135).Thismightsuggest that,according toGutting,philosophersareable reliably tosettlesomephilosophicalquestions.ButGutting’stwosortsofphilo-sophicalknowledgedonotincludeknowledgeofanswerstowhatwehave called substantivephilosophical questions.Other relativeopti-mistsaboutphilosophicalknowledge tend tohold similarpositions(see,e.g.,Chalmers2015).Hanna(2015)isperhapsparticularlyopti-misticandmaintainstheexistenceofsomephilosophicalknowledgeof answers to substantive philosophical questions. So, although hedoesnotexplicitlyaddresstheissueofthereliabilityofphilosophy,hemaywellsupposethatphilosophersareablereliablytosettlesubstan-tivephilosophicalquestions.

Themajorityofthosemainstreamphilosopherswhohaverecentlyaddressedthequestionoftheexistenceofphilosophicalknowledgeare lessoptimistic thanGutting.Theyemphasise theextremely lim-itedexistence,orevennonexistence,ofphilosophicalknowledgeandare explicit that we do not know the answers to substantive philo-sophicalquestions.Thesephilosophersdonotthinkmainstreamphi-losophy provides us with a reliable philosophical approach. Lycan(2013), for example, responds to Gutting, arguing that there is notevenmuchphilosophicalknowledgeofthesortsGuttingclaimsthereare.Haack(2016)tellsusthatphilosophyisnotadisciplinewithideasrangingfromthesolidthroughtothespeculative;itisallspeculative.Matheson (2015) tellsus thatphilosophical investigation isunlikelytobringusclosertothetruth.Sosa(2011)andBrennan(2010)write



philosophyis,byandlarge,fundedbytaxesandisnotusuallytakentobeparticularlyimportanttothespirituallifeofthecountriesinwhichitthrives.Finally,thepartisanshipwehavebeendiscussingmightbetolerablewhenthereisnofeasiblealternative.Aswewillseeinthenextsection,however,improvingthesituationwefindinmainstreamphilosophyisfeasible.

Itmight, inresponse,beobservedthatcontemporaryphilosophyisdiverseandthatsomephilosophyjournalscatertonon-mainstreamapproaches to philosophy; other avenues of publishing further en-hance diversity in the field. But thismerely tells us that non-main-streamapproacheshavesomeavenuesofdevelopment,notthatthesubstantialepistemicandmoralbiasesinourfieldarenotaswehavedescribedthem.Moreover,evenwherenon-mainstreamapproachestophilosophyarefavoured,thetendencyistofavournon-mainstreamschools such as phenomenology, post-structuralism, speculative real-ismandsoon.Ourargumentsdonotfavourapproachestophilosophyadoptedbyschoolsovermoreidiosyncraticapproaches.

Anotherresponsemightbethatwearewrongregardingtheneedtohaveintersubjectivelyestablishedgroundsfortakingstandardsforassessingphilosophicalclaimstobereliablebeforeweareentitledtoassumethattheyarereliable.Williamson(2011)claimsthatphiloso-phyis,fromasociologicalperspective,anormalacademicdisciplineandthatthereaccordinglyisapresumptionthatitspractitionershaverealexpertiseaboutissuesinphilosophy.Suchapresumptionobtains,accordingtoWilliamson,becauseprogressrequiresit; ifweinsistedthatallclaimstoexpertisebetested,progresswouldgrindtoahalt.Accordingly,Williamson claims, it is up to critics of an establishedphilosophical approach to show that it doesnot lead toknowledgeratherthanforitspractitionerstoshowthatitdoes.Thus,onemightadd, itwouldarguablybeuptocriticsofmainstreamphilosophytoshowthatitisunreliablewhenitcomestosubstantivephilosophicalquestions rather than for its practitioners to show that it is reliable.Withoutsomethingliketheargumentfromdisagreement,therewouldbenoproblemwiththeapproachofmainstreamphilosophy.

Given uncertainty about the reliability of available approaches, itmakes sense to hedge one’s epistemic bets and to try out these ap-proachesaswellasnovelones.

Fromamoral perspective, it seemsproblematic topreferpaperson the basis of standards that have not been intersubjectively es-tablished tobe reliable. It is, tobeginwith, problematic in that thestandardsinquestionaretreatedasstandardsbywhichtojudgethetruth-conducivenessofworkonsubstantivephilosophicalissuesandyetitisclearlyanopenissuewhethertheyareappropriatestandardsfordoingso.Honestysuggeststhat,incasesofcollectiveuncertaintysuchasthatofphilosophy,thestandardsforassessmentshouldreflectthevariousapproachestakenbyallthosecompetingforthesameaca-demicresources.

In addition,we need to consider the non-epistemic role of peerreview.AsmentionedinSection3,peer-reviewedpapersarewidelyusedtodecidehowtoallocatevaluable,publicresources(e.g.,grants,academicpositions,etc.).Consequently,standardsforassessingphilo-sophicalarticlesindirectlyregulatethedistributionofsuchresources.Thestandardswill,accordingly,beunproblematiconlyinsofarastheyreflect the goals of the proprietors of the resources in question. Inparticular,standardsthat leadtoapartisandistributionofresourcesamongresearchersmightbeunproblematiconlyiftheproprietorsoftheresourcesinquestionhavedeemeditacceptablethattheresourc-esbedistributedinapartisanway.Thesourcesoffundinginphiloso-phy,e.g.,governmentfundingortuitionfees,donottypicallyprovideapprovalforthepartisanallocationoftheirresources.

Worse,itisonlyinspecialcircumstancesthatpartisanshiponthebasisofsomethinglikeviewsmightreasonablybetolerated,evenifwithreservations.Mostobviously,suchpartisanshipmightsometimesbetolerablewhenitisnotfundedbytaxesandissufficientlylimitedin its impact on the society inwhich it occurs; itmight alsobe tol-erablewhen thepartisanship is thatofan institution that isparticu-larlyimportanttotheculturalorreligiouslifeofthecountrieswhereitislocatedandistosomeextentcompensatedfor.Butmainstream



philosophy;theyleaveuntouchedthequestionwhetherphilosophyisofvalueforreasonsotherthanitsreliability.Wehave,accordingly,notprovidedanargumentforthinkingthatphilosophy,ingeneraloreveninitiscurrentacademicform,isnotofvalueandthusdonotnowhavetoaddresssuchaworry.Evenwereittoturnoutthatmainstreamaca-demicphilosophyisnotofsufficientvaluetojustifyitscurrentplaceinacademia,thiswouldbetangentialtoourclaimshere.Theproblemswehaveidentifiedwithitinitscurrentform,aswellasourproposalsforitsmodification,standirrespectiveofwhetherfurther,moreradicalchangesareneeded.

Onafinalnote,onemaywonderwhyourargumentsshouldbeac-ceptediftheyrequireacceptingthatavailablephilosophicalapproach-es,includingwhateveroursamountsto,arenotestablishedtobereli-able.Tobeginwith,notethatwehavebeenexamininganissuethatneedstobedecidedinpractice,namelythatofhowtomanagepub-lishinginphilosophy.Wehaveacknowledgedthatlowerstandardsofassertionmaywellbeacceptableinsuchcontexts.Thisacknowledged,thequestioniswhetherthestandardsthatwehavemetinthispapersufficeinordertocontribute,bymeansotherthanguaranteed-to-be-reliableoutput,toaddressingtheissueofhowtomanagepeerreviewinphilosophy.Inresponse,notethatwehaveaimedtoprovideapa-per that addresses the relevant literature inmainstreamphilosophyandthatgoessubstantiallybeyondthatliterature,andwehaveaimedtodosowithenoughm-clarityandm-rigoursoastoencouragefur-therdiscussionoftheissueswehaveraised.

Asecondresponseconcerningtheunprovenreliabilityofourap-proachisPyrrhonistinnature.Pyrrhonistscepticismcanplausiblybethoughtofasaimingtounderminethepositionsofitsopponentsnotbyacceptingcertainargumentsagainsttheopponents’positions,butbydialecticallyleadingtheopponentstotheconclusionthattheirpo-sitionsareself-refuting(Castagnoli2010).Similarly,wehaveaimedtousetheexistingliteratureaboutdisagreementinmainstreamphiloso-phy,alongwithsubstantialconcessionstothedemandsofm-clarityandm-rigour,inordertochallengethecommitmenttom-rigourand

Tobeginwith,however,theaboveargumentfailstoestablishthatthereisageneralpresumptionthatnormalacademicdisciplinesarereliable.Forwedonothave tochoosebetweenpresuming thatdis-ciplinesarereliableandshowingthattheyarereliable.Itispossible,forexample,simplytoletacademicphilosophersproceedinthehopethatphilosophymightprogressonsubstantiveissues.Onemightalsoallowacademicphilosopherstoproceedbecausewhattheydo isofvalueirrespectiveofwhethertheymightmakeprogress.Further,evenif there isageneralpresumption regarding the reliabilityofnormalacademic disciplines, the argument from disagreement does under-mine this presumption in the case of mainstream philosophy. Theargument suggests that there should be no presumption favouringthereliabilityofanyapproachtophilosophy.Inanycase,thereisnogeneralpresumptionregardingthereliabilityofnormalacademicdis-ciplines.Sinceresourcesspentonresearchneedtobejustifiedingen-eral,andwithrespecttotheirdistributionamongacademicdisciplines,researchinadisciplinecannotsimplybepresumedtobereliable.Sotoo,theapproachesemployedbyacademicdisciplines,includingthatofmainstreamphilosophy,arepotentialsourcesofharm;forexample,mainstream philosophy’s role in education, including in ethics andlogic classes, is a potential source of harm.Thismeans that the ap-proaches of academic disciplines cannot simply be presumed to bereliable.

The absence of established-to-be-reliable approaches in philoso-phy, alongwith theobservation that academicphilosophyneeds tojustify itsplace in theworld,mightgive rise todespondencyaboutphilosophy.Why,itmightbeasked,shouldonedophilosophyatall,neverminddo,andfund,academicphilosophy?Withregardtophilos-ophyingeneral,wehavealreadynotedthatitispracticallyunavoid-ableaswellasthatitisofvalue,andonecanmakeacaseforitsvalueby,forexample,buildingonphilosophy’shistoricalroleinshapingso-cieties,cultures,thesciencesandindividuallives,andbybringingoutitsaestheticandothernon-epistemicvirtues.However,theargumentsthatwehavedevelopedconcernonlythereliabilityofapproachesto



arguments do not suggest that all work be judged equal withregardtoitsnoveltyandsignificance.Indeed,plausibly,noveltyandsignificance can often be reasonably estimated; the significance ofphilosophicalworkcansometimesbeestimatedbecause it includessocietalimportanceandsocietalimpactaswellasaestheticandothernon-epistemicvirtues.Thus,overall,ourdesideratadonotmeanthatanythinggoesindecidingwhattopublishinphilosophy.Forexample,itisclearthatstudent-levelwork,aswellasworkthatconsistssolelyinaffirmationsbasedonscripture,isveryunlikelytomeetourseconddesideratum; suchwork is unlikely to contribute anythingnovel orsignificant toourdiscussionof philosophical questions. In addition,philosophythataimstoberelevanttosomepracticeoranotherwillbeconstrainedbythestandardsofthatpractice.Insofarasitistoinformapractice,philosophywillhavetomakeuseofthestandardsforclarityand rigour of that practice, including of the practice’s requirementsregardingempiricalevidence.

At the same time, our epistemic and moral case for pluralismmeansthatacknowledgingsignificanceasaconstraintonevaluatingphilosophical work should not justify an appeal by philosophersto significance in order to set up any kind of new, highly selectivecriteriaforpublicationinsteadofm-clarityandm-rigour.Indeed,ourdesiderata call for farmorephilosophical freedom than is currentlycommoninprominentjournals.We,forexample,seenoin-principleepistemic problemwith an approach to philosophy that, followingPyrrhonism,allowsweakargumentsa legitimateplace in reasoning(Sextus Empiricus, III 280–281). So too, we allow approaches tophilosophywhich, likeNeoplatonismandother formsofmysticism,leaveopenor reject thepossibility that philosophical knowledge isarticulableinclearorliterallanguage.Appealstothetruthofscripturewill be acceptable when they are part of work that, as a whole,contributestophilosophicalthought,e.g.,thatisnovelandsocietallyrelevant. And, since not only available approaches will count asacceptable,therewillberoomfornon-academicphilosophers,aswell

m-clarity in peer review. If one is committed to themainstreamap-proach,thenone’sownapproachsuggeststhattheclaimsofthispapershouldbeengagedwith.

5. Restructuring or Replacing Peer Review

Twodesiderataforadequatereviewprocessesinphilosophyjournalsare suggestedby theprevious section.Thefirstdesideratum is thattheseprocessesshouldtreatallavailableandproposedstandardsofacceptanceinphilosophyasepistemicallyequal(irrespectiveofwhoputs them forward). This desideratum is suggested by the thoughtthat pluralism about philosophical approaches makes sense giventhelackofanestablished-to-be-reliablephilosophicalapproach.Thesecond desideratum is that review of philosophical work shouldincludeevaluatingsuchworkinlightofthenoveltyandsignificanceof its contribution to addressing philosophical questions that weneedtoaddressashumans,andindeed,morebroadly,inlightofitscontribution to developing thought in ways that are of value. Thisdesideratumissuggestedbytheobservationthat,plausibly,addressingquestionsthatweneedtoaddressanddevelopingthoughtconstituteanimportantpartofwhatisofsocietalvalueinphilosophyapartfromitspotentialabilitytoanswersubstantivephilosophicalquestionsinareliableway.

Both of our desiderata clearly recommend that approaches tophilosophyaccordingtowhichithassomethingotherthanthecorrectanswerstoitsquestionsasagoal—e.g.,literaryvalue,suspensionofbelief,apurelyheuristicroleindiscovery—shouldbeincludedamongtherepertoireofapproachestophilosophy.Theseconddesideratumalso recommends pluralism in approaches to philosophy, as thehistoricalrecordshowsthatawidevarietyofphilosophicalapproaches,includingtheproposalofnovelapproaches,havebeenofvalue.

We emphasise that, while our arguments recommend takingdifferent standards of acceptance in philosophy to be epistemicallyequal, these arguments do not suggest that all philosophical workbe treated as being equal in the review process. In particular, our



thegoalofplacingpapersinprominentjournalsmightstillbestrong,somejournalsmighthavetopublish farmore ineach journal issue.Highervolumecouldbehandledfinanciallyandpracticallybymovingtoonline-onlypublishing.Editorialpolicieswould,ofcourse,havetochangeinlinewiththehigheracceptancerates,e.g.,editorswouldbemoreinclinedtoacceptpaperswherereviewersdisagree.

Additionally—alsoeasytoimplement—journalsmightdisclose,atthetimeofarticlepublication,relevantreviewreports(withoptionalblindingofreviewernames),authorresponsesandeditorialdecisions.Asidefromlikelyimprovingthequalityofrefereeing,thesemeasureswouldatleastpartlyaccommodateworriesofpartisanshipregardingapproachaswellasprovideanimportantopportunityfordiscussionofapproachestophilosophy.Inordertomakeprogressonquestionsrelatedto,forexample,m-clarity—whenitisinstantiated,whetheritistruth-conducive,etc.—itwouldbeadvisabletohaveabroadaudienceengagingwithparticularcasesinwhichm-clarityjudgmentsaremade;anditispreciselythesesortsofjudgmentsthatwillhopefullybepartofthecorrespondencebetweeneditors,reviewersandauthorswhendisagreementaboutthebasicsissubstantial.

Onemightworrythatahigheracceptanceratewouldmeanlowerstandardsofm-rigourandm-clarityin“top”journals.However,whileitmaymeanthatmorepublishedpaperswillfailtomeetthecurrentstandardsofthesejournals,itneednotimpacttheworkofthosewhoarededicatedtom-rigourandm-clarity.Further,theimprovedreviewprocessshould in factbeexpected to result instricteradherence towhateverstandardsarebeingappliedinreview.Inanycase,giventhatthemainsellingpointofm-clarityandm-rigourhasbeentheirtruth-conduciveness, and given that it is unclear whether they are truth-conducive in the context of philosophy, it is not clear that reducedemphasisonthesewouldbeproblematic.

Onemight alsoworry that implementing the above suggestionswould leadtohigher totalpublicationnumbers inphilosophy, to in-formationoverloadforreadersandtoreviewerswhoare(evenmore)overworked. But if we assume that those submitting articles also

asacademicphilosopherswhoareinaminority,toputforwardtheirownproposalsabouthowtodophilosophy.

Thequestionthatremainsforusinthissectioniswhat,ifanything,the twodesiderata just outlined, and theunderlyingmotivation forthese desiderata, suggest about how peer review in philosophyjournals shouldchange.Afterall,onemightacknowledge thatpeerreviewascurrentlypracticedinmainstreamphilosophyfailstomeetourdesideratawhile insisting thatdoingbetter in this regard isnotfeasible. We now argue that this response is untenable and do sobyproposing, inaprogrammaticmanner,waysof improvingonthepresentsituation,includingsomethatarerelativelyeasytoimplement.

With regard to fostering pluralism of approaches in philosophy,theeasiestoption is for journals to adopt editorialpolicies that arepluralist about approaches to philosophy and, correspondingly, forthemtodiversifytheireditorialboardsandreviewcommitteessothateachpaperisassessedbystandardsthatmatchitsapproach.Mind has, veryrecently,partlygonedownthisroute.Butwhilethisrouteisanimprovement on the current situation, itwill, plausibly, not do fulljusticetothediversityofexistingandpotentialapproaches.Ifdecisionsabouthowstandardsfitarticles’approachesaremadein-house,thatis,amongonlyaselectedgroupofindividuals,thereseemsplentyofroomforpartisanshiptounderminethepluralismofapproachesweareproposing. For sucha small samplewillbeunlikely toproperlyrepresent all available approaches. The review process itself facessimilarproblems.Therestrictedgroupthatselectsreviewerscanbeassumed to under-represent existing diversity; and the same holdsfor teamsofreviewers,whichusuallyconsistofnomorethanthreeindividuals.

A further change that retains thebasic setupof the currentpeerreviewsystemwouldbetolowerthebarforacceptance.Journalscouldsetrejectionratesat,say,around60%ratherthanatabove90%(ascurrently is thecase—see footnote 1).Lowermainstreamstandardsofacceptanceshouldmakeiteasierforworktomeetthosestandardswhilealsofulfillingnon-mainstreamstandards.Atleastinitially,when



nolongerveryimportant.Thereare,however,alternativewaysofcer-tification.Authors shouldget credited for their contributions to thephilosophicaldiscussion.Anauthormayearnareputationinvirtueofthereadershiptheyreach(e.g.,numberanddiversityofreadersandoffollowers),invirtueoftheamountofdiscussiontheirworkprovokes(e.g.,numberofsubstantivecommentariesreceived,numberofnewpapersitgivesrisetoo)andinvirtueofthecontentofthediscussionoftheirwork(e.g.,successfulobjectionshandled,novelpositionsde-veloped,highstandardssetandmet).

Plausibly, raising acceptance rates and changing editorial policystillcannotdofulljusticetothediversityofexistingandpotentialap-proaches.Moreover, plausibly, coming closer to doing sowould re-quiremore inclusive policies regardingwho participates in peer re-view,oreventheeliminationofpeerreview.Afeasiblewayofbroad-ening theparticipation inpeerreviewinvolves following thepublicreviewing practice of most of the journals issued by the EuropeanGeoscienceUnion(EGU),including,e.g.,Earth System DynamicsandClimate of the Past.Anypaperwhichpassesabasicqualitycheckisputonline andmade available for public review and discussion.Desig-natedreviewersandallinterestedpartiesmayprovidecomments,andauthorsgettheopportunitytorespond.Basedontheopendiscussion,theeditor takesadecisiononwhether thepiece is tobepublishedasis,needsrevisionoristoberejected.GoingbeyondEGUpractice,onecouldaddthatpapersmaybeassessednotonlyagainstapproach-appropriatestandardssetbythejournalbutalsobyauthor-selectedstandards.Inordertoensurethattheextraburdenofcommentingistakenup and rewarded, certification criteria should be extended toincludecriteriathattakeintoaccountthecareandeffortspentonre-viewing(e.g.,creditsfromauthors,numberandvarietyofsubstantivecommentsmade).

Blindingofauthors’namesisnotpartoftheprocessatEGUanddoes seem to be redundant in the review process we have been

reviewarticles,thateacharticlerequirestworeviewersandthateachphilosophermakesfivesubmissionsayeartojournals,eachphiloso-pherwillhavetoreviewonlytenjournalarticlesayear.Asforinfor-mationoverload,scientistsdonotappeartoengageanylesswithworkpublishedinhigh-profilejournalswithhighacceptanceratesandtotalpublicationrates,suchasPhysical ReviewandPLoS ONE.21Conferences,professionalnetworks,emailalerts, theabilitytofollowtheworkofparticularindividuals,blogsandsoonseemtobesufficienttoguaran-teethatmessagesofparticularsignificancecomeacross.Thereisnoreasontosupposethatitwouldturnouttobeotherwiseinphilosophy.Further, it isnot clear that lower rejection rateswould substantiallyincreasetotalpublicationnumbers.Foritisuncleartowhatextenttheincreaseinpublicationnumbersincurrentlyhard-to-get-intovenueswouldgoalongwithanincreaseintotalpublicationnumbers;thein-creaseinpublicationsinpreviouslyhard-to-get-intovenueswill,afterall, arise partly because papers they publishwould have otherwisebeenpublishedelsewhere.Moreimportantly,ifphilosophersarerea-sonablyconfident that theywillbeable topublish theirwork, theymayopttoimprovethesignificanceoftheirworkratherthan,orevenattheexpenseof,paperquantity.Indeed,acontextinwhichpublica-tionsaremucheasiertocomebythantheycurrentlyareislikelytocre-atestrongincentivestochangetheinstitutionalsetupthatacademicphilosophersworkin—includingthewayinwhichtheyarecertifiedasacademics—sothattheyarerequiredtodistinguishthemselvesbymeansother thanpublicationnumbers.Academicphilosopherswillthushavestrong incentives todosomethingother thanspendtheirtimetryingtoincreasetheirpapercount.

Thereremains,finally,theissueofhowacademicphilosophersaretobecertifiedifpublicationisrelativelyeasyandpublicationvenue

21. Intheperiod1948–1956,PhysicalReview,thenthemostprominentjournalinphysics,hadacceptanceratesof80%forsingle-authorpapers,andofover95%formulti-authorpapers(ZuckermanandMerton,1971).Overthatperiod,PhysicalReviewpublishedatotalof11,609papers(minimally).In2014,PLoSONEhadanimpactfactorof3.234,despiteitspublishing30,040papersintotal,withanacceptancerateofnearly70%.



theirapplicationgivesrisetotensions.Apointtokeepinmindisthat,aswehavenoted,theappealtowhatisofvalueinthoughtshouldnotbeusedbyphilosopherstosetuphighlyselectivecriteriafordecidingwhatistobepublished.Suchappealsshould,accordingly,bemadeinamannerthatisconsistentwiththeimplementationofdiverseedito-rialboards,lowrejectionratesandsoon.Thismeansthat,ifauthorsaregiven the right todecidewhether theirwork is tobepublished,thecriterionofphilosophicalsignificancewillonlyhaveanimpactviapeerreview.

Weacknowledgethatchangesthattosomeextentrealiseoursug-gestionscan,atmost,beafirststepinchangingourdisciplinesothatitmorehonestlyrepresentsphilosophy’sspecialrequirements.Main-streamphilosophywouldremainmuchasitis,merelybyvirtueofitscurrentdominance,evenwereallofoursuggestionsputinplace.Still,there is also reason foroptimism.First, scholarswouldbeacknowl-edgednotonlyfortheirabilitytoengageothersindiscussion,butalsofortheirparticipationindiscussingtheworkofothers.Atleastinthisregard,differentapproachestophilosophyareonapar.Second,main-streamphilosophymightneedtoputmoreeffortintoaddressingthewidersignificanceofscholars’work.Yet, increasedsensitivitytotheissueofsocietalrelevanceplausiblyalsohelpsinpromotingworktopeopledecidingontheallocationofresources(universityadministra-tors,fundingagencies).

To summarize,we doubt that the current peer review system isthebestoftheworst.Someoftheadjustmentsdiscussedabove,suchasincreasingacceptanceratesandmakingthereviewprocesspublicand/oropen,areimplementableandwouldbringusclosertosatisfy-ingthedesideratawestartedthissectionwith(i.e.pluralismandrele-vance).Inlightofavailableonlineresources,ourdemocraticproposaldoesn’tseemtoposesubstantialtechnicalproblemseither.23Herethemainchallengemightbechanging thedeeply ingrainedhabitofas-sessingscholarsbytheprestigeofthejournalstheypublishinorby

23.See,forexample,theresourcesathttp://www.peerevaluation.org.

describing.22Raisingjournalacceptanceratesanddiversifyingreviewteamsalreadyhelpstoreducetheneedforsuchblinding;thesetwostepspresumablyreducebiasesrelatingtowhoauthorsare,e.g.,thoserelatingtotheirgenderorseniority,byallowingmuchwideraccessto journalsandbroadening thegroupofpeople fromwhich reviewteamsaredrawn.Makingthepeerreviewprocesspublicaddsafurtherlayerof critical scrutiny,one thatmakesbias easier touncover andaddress.OptionalblindingofreviewersispartofthereviewprocessatEGUanddoesstillseemtobeimportantinsofarassomereviewerswillneedprotectionfromsomemoreinfluentialreviewees.

Thereisanobviouswayinwhichwecanfurtherimprovetheex-tenttowhichreviewispluralistic.Forwehavestillleftreviewprimar-ily in thehands of editors and relatively small groups of reviewers.Andeditorsmightstillbepartisanintheirfinaldecisions,andpaperswould probably still be assessed by relatively homogeneous, likelypartisansubsetsoftheentireprofessionalcommunity,thelatterduetothefactthatneitherauthorsnorreviewersareincentivisedtoengagewithscholarsandworkoutsidetheirapproach.Thiscouldbeavoidedbyallowingauthorstocuratetheirownpapers.Authors,ratherthaneditors,wouldthusdecidewhetherandhowtoreviseinlightofcom-mentsreceived,whentoconsidertheirpaperstobefinalortoretract.Moreover,authorswouldrecordtheirdecisionsandthesubsequentreceptionoftheirworkinapublicway,alongsidetheirpublishedwork.

Thus farwehaveconsideredhowto foster thekindofpluralismrecommendedbyourfirstandseconddesiderata.Theseconddesid-eratum can be further fulfilled by including, among the criteria forcertification,criteriaregardingtheextenttowhichphilosophicalworkinstantiateswhat isofvalue in thought (beyond thedirectcontribu-tiontothesearchfor truth).Animportant issuethatwouldneedtobeaddressediswhich,ifany,ofourtwodesideratagetsprioritywhen

22. Thisredundancydoesnotarisebecausephilosophicalapproachesmightbeunreliable means of providing answers to substantive philosophical ques-tions.Afterall,blindingmightstillbeneededinordertosafeguardtheobjec-tiveapplicationofreviewprocessdesideratasuchasours.

http://www.peerevaluation.org/









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howconvincingwefindthembyourownstandards,ratherthan,aswepropose,bytheircontributionstoongoingdiscussion.

6. Conclusion

Peerreviewinphilosophyhasbeen,andstillis,subjecttopartisanshipthatishardtojustifyonepistemic,moraland,aswehavearguedintheprevioussection,pragmaticgrounds.Thus,altogether,thereseemstobenocompellingreasonforkeepingcurrentreviewpracticeasitis.

Pluralism about philosophical approaches, partly recommendedin light of the lack of an established-to-be-reliable approach in phi-losophy,and increasedattention towhat isneeded,orvalued, froma broad non-epistemic perspective, partly recommended in light ofphilosophers’dependenceonfundsprovidedbyothers,mightrequireadditionalsortsofreform.Theseaimsmayforinstancebefosteredbytrainingphilosopherswhohaveatleastabasiccompetenceinmultipleapproachestophilosophyandwhoplacemoreimportanceonwhatisofsocietalvalueinphilosophy.Further,tenure,hiringandgrantcom-mitteesmayneedtobetterreflectexistingdiversity.Insum,wehopethatourstudywillprovokediscussionofissueswellbeyondthewayinwhichscholarlypublishinginphilosophyiscurrentlyorganized.24

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Pluralism and Peer Review in Philosophy