title: PluralismandthePersonalityoftheStateIdeasinContext;47

author: Runciman,David.publisher: CambridgeUniversityPress

isbn10|asin:printisbn13: 9780521551915ebookisbn13: 9780511002809

language: English

subject Pluralism(Socialsciences),State,The,Politicalscience--History.

publicationdate: 1997lcc: JC328.2.R861997ebddc: 320.1

subject: Pluralism(Socialsciences),State,The,Politicalscience--History.

PluralismandthePersonalityoftheStateIDEASINCONTEXT47

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Pluralismandthepersonalityofthestatediscussestherelationsbetweenindividuals,groupsandthestate.Setagainstthebroadcontextofphilosophicalargumentsaboutgroupandstatepersonality,DrRunciman'sbooktells,forthefirsttime,thefullhistoryofthemovementinearlytwentieth-centuryEnglishpoliticalthoughtknownaspoliticalpluralism.Thepluralistsbelievedthatthestatewassimplyonegroupamongmany,andcouldnotthereforebesovereign.Theyalsobelievedthatgroups,likeindividuals,mighthavepersonalitiesoftheirown.Thebookisdividedintothreeparts:thefirstexaminesthephilosophicalbackgroundtotheseideasandrefersinparticulartotheworkofThomasHobbesandtheGermanOttovonGierke.Thesecondtracesthedevelopmentofpluralistthoughtbefore,duringandaftertheFirstWorldWar.Inthethirdandfinalpart,Runciman'sstudyreturnstoHobbesandlooksinparticularathisLeviathan,inordertoseewhatconclusionscanbedrawnaboutthenatureofthisworkandthenatureofthestateasitexiststoday.

PageivIDEASINCONTEXT

EditedbyQUENTINSKINNER(GeneralEditor)LORRAINEDASTON,WOLFLEPENIES,J.B.SCHNEEWINDandJAMESTULLY

Thebooksinthisserieswilldiscusstheemergenceofintellectualtraditionsandofrelatednewdisciplines.Theprocedures,aimsandvocabulariesthatweregeneratedwillbesetinthecontextofthealternativesavailablewithinthecontemporaryframeworksofideasandinstitutions.Throughdetailedstudiesoftheevolutionofsuchtraditions,andtheirmodificationbydifferentaudiences,itishopedthatanewpicturewillformofthedevelopmentofideasintheirconcretecontexts.Bythismeans,artificialdistinctionsbetweenthehistoryofphilosophy,ofthevarioussciences,ofsocietyandpolitics,andofliteraturemaybeseentodissolve.

TheseriesispublishedwiththesupportoftheExxonFoundation.

Alistofbooksintheserieswillbefoundattheendofthevolume.

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PluralismandthePersonalityoftheState

DavidRunciman

TrinityCollege,Cambridge

PageviPUBLISHEDBYTHEPRESSSYNDICATEOFTHEUNIVERSITYOFCAMBRIDGE

ThePittBuilding,TrumpingtonStreet,CambridgeCB2IRP,UnitedKingdomCAMBRIDGEUNIVERSITYPRESS

TheEdinburghBuilding,Cambridge,CB22RU,UnitedKingdom40West20thStreet,NewYork,NY10011-4211,USA10StamfordRoad,Oakleigh,Melbourne,3166,Australia

©CambridgeUniversityPress1997

Thisbookisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexceptionandtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements,noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewrittenpermissionofCambridgeUniversityPress.

Firstpublished1997

PrintedintheUnitedKingdomattheUniversityPress,Cambridge

Typesetin11/121/2Baskerville

AcataloguerecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary

LibraryofCongressCataloguinginPublicationdata

Runciman,David.Pluralismandthepersonalityofthestate/DavidRunciman.p.cm.(Ideasincontext:47)Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.ISBN05215519191.Pluralism(Socialsciences).2.State,The.3.PoliticalscienceHistory.I.Title.II.Series.JC328.2.R8619973201dc2196-46263CIP

ISBN0521551919hardback

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Tomyparents

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Doug.Anotherking!TheygrowlikeHydra'sheads;IamtheDouglas,fataltoallthoseThatwearthosecoloursonthem.WhatartthouThatcounterfeit'stthepersonofaking?King.TheKinghimselfShakespeare,HenryIVpartI

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CONTENTS

Preface pagexi

PartI:ThePersonalityofAssociations

1Introduction

3

2HobbesandthePersonoftheCommonwealth

6

3GierkeandtheGenossenschaft

34

4TrustsandSovereigns

64

PartII:PoliticalPluralism

5MaitlandandtheRealPersonalityofAssociations

89

6FiggisandtheCommunitasCommunitatum

124

7BarkerandtheDiscreditedState

150

8ColeandGuildSocialism

162

9LaskiandPoliticalPluralism

177

10 195

TheReturnoftheState

PartIII:ThePersonalityoftheState

11TheMaskofPersonality

223

12TheMaskoftheGroup

230

13TheMaskoftheState

251

14Conclusion

262

Bibliography 266

Index 275

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PREFACEThisbookisaboutthepoliticalthoughtofsevenmen:ThomasHobbes(15881679),OttovonGierke(18411921),F.W.Maitland(18501906),J.N.Figgis(18661919),ErnestBarker(18741960),G.D.H.Cole(18891959)andHaroldLaski(18931950).HobbeswasandisthegreatestofallEnglishpoliticalphilosophers;heisalsooneofthesupremeprosestylistsintheEnglishlanguage.Gierkewasoneofthedominantfiguresinlatenineteenth-andearlytwentieth-centuryGermanlifeandthought;ajurist,philosopherandlegalreformer,hewasalsoanintellectualhistorianofgenius.ThesameistrueofMaitland,thefoundingfatheroflegalhistoryinEngland;likeGierke,heisoneofthefewhistorianswhoseworksarestillbeingreadbyotherhistoriansoverahundredyearsaftertheywerewritten.FiggiswasafollowerofMaitland,andthoughhisworkhaslastedslightlylesswell,ittoohasretainedareadership,bothamongpoliticaltheoristsandhistorians.Barker,whowasapoliticaltheoristandhistorianhimself,achievedgreaterprominenceinhisownlifetimethandideitherMaitlandorFiggis,risingtoaprofessorshipandaknighthood;hisstock,however,hasfallenconsiderablyfaster,andheisnowsomethingofamarginalfigureintheintellectualhistoryofthiscentury(thougharecentstudyinthisserieshasattemptedtoreversethistrend).Barker'sstockhasnotfallenasfastasthatofCole,wholikeBarkerwasahistorian,butunlikeBarkerwasalsoasocialist;onceoneofthemostfamousintellectualsinBritain,heisnowfairlywellneglected,ifnotquitesoneglectedashewasadecadeortwoago.LaskiisoneofthefewBritishintellectualswhosereputationhassufferedadeclinemoredramaticeventhanCole's,despitethebriefflurryofinterestthatsurroundedthecentenaryofhisbirthin1993;afellowsocialist,andrival,ofCole's,hisideasarenowas

unfashionableastheywereoncefashionable;heis,inaddition,generallyregardedashavingbeensomethingofa

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fraud.Viewedchronologically,thisisnotasequencewhichfollowsanupwardcurve.

Whatthesesevenhaveincommonisasharedinterestintheconceptofgrouppersonality,anditisthisconceptwhichprovidesthesubjectformostofwhatfollows.Oftheseseven,thelastfive(andafewothers)makeupthemovementinearlytwentieth-centuryEnglishpoliticalthoughtknownaspoliticalpluralism.Itisthecentralaimofthisbooktotellthehistoryofthatmovement,anditisinthisrespectthatchronologyissignificant,becauseitisahistorycontainingaclearnarrativethread.ThethreadisprovidedbyGierke,fromwhomtheconceptofgrouppersonalityimmediatelyderived,andwhoseownworkcontainedanarrativeinwhichthecentralplacewasoccupiedbyHobbes.ItisnecessarytoknowaboutHobbesifwearetomakesenseofGierke,anditisnecessarytomakesenseofGierkeifwearetohaveanyunderstandingofthehistoryofEnglishpoliticalthoughtduringtheearlypartofthiscentury.

However,HobbesandGierkedonotappearheresimplyinordertoexplicateideaswhichwereinmanyrespectspalecopiesoftheirown.ThestrugglesofthepoliticalpluraliststoapplyGierkeanconceptsinamodernEnglishsettingthrowsomelightbackonthoseconcepts,andbackinturnonsomeoftheconceptswithwhichGierkestruggled,primeamongwhichwastheconceptoftheHobbesianstate.Inparticular,thehistoryofEnglishpoliticalpluralismthrowssomelightonanabsolutelycrucialbutoftenignoredfeatureofHobbes'sconceptionofthestateitsso-called'personality'.Itisforthisreasonthatthebookhasastructurewhichissomewhatdialectical.ThefirstpartlooksatHobbes'sandGierke'sideasofpersonsandgrouppersonsinordertoprovidethebackgroundtothehistorythatfollowsinpartII;thathistorythenprovidesthebackgroundforthefurtherexplorationofHobbesianandGierkeanideasofgroupsandstatewhichmakesupthesubstanceofpartIII.Therearethustwosetsof

ideasandtwosortsofcontextinvolvedhere:therearethephilosophicalideaswhichprovidethecontextforwhatisessentiallyanexerciseinhistory;andtherearethehistoricalideaswhichprovidethecontextforwhatisessentially(orisatleastintendedtobe)anexerciseinphilosophy.Itismyhopethatthesetwoexercisesmakesomesenseontheirownterms.Butiftheymakeanysenseatall,itisalsomyhopethattheybestmakesensetogether.

Therearetwopointstobemadeaboutthetext.First,Iamvery

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consciousthatthisisabookwrittenbyamanaboutmen,inwhichhumanbeingsingeneralarereferredtobytheepithet'men',andparticulargroupsofhumanbeings,includingallpoliticaltheorists,arereferredtoasthoughtheyalwaysweremen.ForthefirsttwoofthesefactsIcanoffernoexcuses.Forthethird,Icanonlysaythatoneofthecentralthemesofthisbookisthedistinctionbetween'persons'andwhatareusuallyreferredtoas'naturalmen',andthisisadistinctionIdidnotwishinanywaytoblur.Inthiscontext,thegender-neutralterm'person'isveryfarfrombeingneutralinotherrespects,andhastobesetagainstwhatisinotherrespectsaneutralterm,whichinthiscasemeans'men'.Astothefourth,itis,Iamafraid,primarilyamatterofstylisticconvenience,and'he'shouldbereadas'heorshe'whereverappropriate.However,Iwouldaddthatthepoliticaltheoristsdiscussedinthisbookwouldnotgenerallyhavethoughtof'he'as'heorshe'.Moreover,itisoneofthethemesofthisbookthatpoliticaltheoryshouldnotbeconfusedwithreallife.Politicaltheoryisnotreality,itissimplyoneversionofreality.Itis,inotherwords,justatale,fullofitsownsoundandfury,andduringtheperiodcoveredbythisbookittendedtobetoldonlybymen.

Thesecondpointconcernstheterm'state'itself.Intheliteratureoftheperiod(190033)itwasalmostalwaysprintedas'State'.Thisconventionhasnowdiedout,andthelowercaseisusuallypreferred.ForthepurposesofconsistencyIhaveused'State'inallquotationsfromtheperiod,eventhoughthisisnotwhatwaswrittenineveryinstance.Where'state'wasused,itwaspurelyamatterofconvention,thelowercasebeingpreferredinsomeAmericanpublications,andinoneortwoEnglishonesduringthe1920sand1930s.Therewascertainlynoattempttoassociate'theState'withanyparticularphilosophy(say,idealism)oranyparticularculture(say,Germany),norwasanydistinctiondrawnbetween'theState'andindividualorhistorical'states'.(Eventhosewhowishedtomakethatdistinction

tendedtocapitaliseboth.)OutsideofthequotationsIhaveused'state',asisnowconventional;again,nothingisimpliedbythis.

Iwouldliketoexpressmygratitudetothepeoplewhohavehelpedmetowritethisbook.Firstofall,toMichaelBentley,whosupervisedtheoriginalthesisfromwhichitderives,andwhohasprovidedmuchencouragementsince.IamalsoverygratefultotheMasterandFellowsofTrinityCollege,CambridgeforelectingmetotheFellowshipwhichaffordedthetimeandtheleisureinwhichtowriteit.Ihavereceivedmuchhelpfuladviceintheunfamiliarareas

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ofRomanlawandmedievalpoliticalthoughtfromMagnusRyan;allthemistakesthatremainareentirelymyown.Mostofall,Iwouldliketothankthethreepeoplewhoinspiredmetowriteit.First,myfather,W.G.Runciman,whopointedoutearlyonthewaysinwhichtheresearchIwasdoingmightbeconnectedwithHegel.Second,BeeWilson,whopointedoutthepossibilityofaconnectionwithShakespeare.Andthird,QuentinSkinner,whopointedouttheconnectionwiththepersonwithoutwhomthisbookwouldnotexistatall,ThomasHobbes.

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PARTITHEPERSONALITYOFASSOCIATIONS

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ChapterIIntroductionThequestionofhowmenformthemselvesintoassociationsliesattheheartofWesternpoliticalthought.Anassociationisagroupofhumanbeingspossessedofadistinct,formalidentitybasedontherelationsubsistingbetweenitsmembers,anditmayfairlybesaidthatitisaroundsuchgroupsthatourpoliticalunderstandinghasbeenconstructed.Themostprominentofthesegroupsisthestate,orcivilassociation,andthoughthestatecanberegardedasanassociationsuigeneris,tobeunderstoodinitsownterms,ithascommonlybeenunderstoodintermsoftheassociationsthatitcontains.Sometimesithasliterallybeenbuiltoutofthem,aconstructoftheseparateassociationsofrulingandruled,governmentandpeople.Asoftenithasbeenseenasanalogoustotheotherassociationsinwhichmenarefamiliarlytobefound.Someoftheseassociationshaveanaturalexistence,likethefamily,fromwhichtheAristotelianpolisisevolved.Othersexistwithinparticularsystemsoflaw,and,liketheRomanormedievalcorporation,mayofferamodelofconsiderabletheoreticalcomplexitytowhichthestatecanbecompared.Ineachcase,thestate'sidentityrestsontheidentityofassociationsotherthanitself.Andsonotonlymusttherebeatleastoneassociationifthereistobeastate,thecharacterofthatassociationwillfrequentlydependonwhatistakentocharacterisethebusinessofassociationperse.

Toaskquestionsaboutthepersonalityofassociations,however,isnotsimplytoinquireintotheirgeneralcharacter.Itistoinquireintotheirspecificabilitytobearthecharacterofpersons.Inevitably,thisisanarrowerproblemthanthatofman'sassociativecapabilitiesingeneral,anditpresupposesanarrowersenseoftheword'person'thanonewhichrenders'personality'synonymouswith'character'or'make-

up'.Yettheproblemofpersonalityinthisnarrowsensewasonceseenasthekeytoacompleteunderstanding

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ofpoliticallifeingeneral,andofthestateinparticular.Withinthetermsofcontemporary,English-speakingpoliticaltheorythisclaimseems,attheveryleast,anunlikelyone,ifonlybecausethetermsthemselves,'person'and'personality',havedisappearedfromthelanguageofpoliticalargumentinallbuttheirbroadestsenses.Yetitwasaclaimmadeduringthispresentcentury,andforawhileitdominatedpoliticalthoughtinEngland.ItisthepurposeofthisbooktodescribethatperiodinEnglishpoliticalthoughtandtojudgeitssignificance.Inordertodoso,itisnecessary'firstofalltoexplainwhyassociationsmightoncehavebeenthoughttobepersons.

TheperiodduringwhichthequestionofthepersonalityofassociationsengagedEnglishpoliticaltheoristswasrelativelybrief,barelyoutlastingthefirstthreedecadesofthiscentury.Furthermore,itsimmediateoriginslaynotinEnglandbutinGermany,intheworkoftheGermanjuristandhistorian,OttovonGierke,forwhomtheideaofassociationsasgrouppersonshadapeculiarly'teutonic'significance.Nevertheless,Gierke'suseoftheideaofpersonalitywasanythingbutparochial.Itprovidedhimwiththebasisforoneofthewidest-rangingofallhistoriesofideas,themonumentalDasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrecht,inwhichhesoughttoorganisethewholehistoryofWesternpoliticallifeandthoughtaroundtheproblemofgrouppersonality.Tothatend,GierkehadtounderstandtheargumentsnotjustofGermanbutofallpoliticaltheoristsasaresponsetothisproblem,andasamoreorlesssuccessfulresolutionofit.Again,bypresent-daystandards,inhistoriographyaswellaspoliticaltheory,thisisanunlikelyandinmanywaysanarcaneproject.Butitisnotaspuriousone.TheconceptofpersonalitydoesconstituteoneofthefamiliarmeansbywhichEuropeanpoliticalthinkershaveundertakentheircharacteristicengagementwiththequestionofgroupidentity.AndthoughnotallofthosewhomGierke'shistorysurveysmayhavethoughtintheseterms,hisparticularform

ofhistoryrequiresonlythatthethoughtsofeachshouldbecomprehensibleinthesameterms.Hisis,inthissense,adistinctivelyGermanhistory,forittellsthestoryofanideaimmanentintheworldofideas;whatitisnot,though,ismerelyastoryaboutGermany,becausetheconceptofthepersonwasoneGierkediscoveredin,andusedtomakesenseof,thehistoryofideasasawhole.WhatcametoEnglandfromGierkecametoGierkefromhistory.Andthebestillustrationofthepart

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playedbytheconceptofthepersoninhistoryisprovidedbythepartitplaysattheheartofoneofthemostsignificantofalltextsinthehistoryofEuropeanideas,writtennotbyaGerman,butbyanEnglishman,ThomasHobbes.

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Chapter2HobbesandthePersonoftheCommonwealth

I

Hobbes'sLeviathan,whichwasfirstpublishedin1651,isdividedintofourparts,'OfMan','OfCommonwealth','OfAChristianCommonwealth'and'OfTheKingdomeOfDarknesse'.ThoughmuchofthehistoricalinterestofthebookresidesinpartsIIIandIV,thepoliticalphilosophyonwhichitsfamerestsislocatedinthefirsttwo.PartIprovidesanaccountofman'snaturalcondition,ofthepassionsbywhichheisregulated,ofthestateofwartowhichhenaturallyinclines,andofthelawsofnaturebywhichhemaystillbebound.PartIIprovidesanaccountofman'sconditionincivilsociety,ofthecovenantbywhichsuchsocietyiscreated,ofthesovereignbywhomitisgoverned,andofthelibertieswhichhissubjectsmayyetenjoy.However,thefinalchapterofthefirstpart,chapterXVI,whichprovidesthebridgetowhatfollows,addressesnoneofthesethemes;instead,itconcerns'Persons,AuthorsandthingsPersonated'.1ItisinthischapterthatHobbesintroducestheconceptwhichestablishesthefundamentallinkbetweenman'snaturalandhiscivilconditions,thatofownership,orrathertheonlyformofownershippossibleinthestateofnature,ownershipofwordsoractions.Hobbesdefineshistermsasfollows:

APERSON,ishe,whosewordsoractionsareconsidered,eitherashisown,orasrepresentingthewordsoractionofanotherman,orofanyotherthingtowhomtheyareattributed,whetherTrulyorbyFiction.

1ChapterXVIofLeviathancontinuestoreceivelittleattentioninthegrowingmassofliteraturedevotedtoHobbes.ThemostsubstantialaccountisprobablystilltheonegivenbyH.PitkininherTheconceptof

representation(Berkeley.1967).Morerecently,ithasprovidedthefocusforapaperinwhichitisarguedthatHobbes'sdoctrineofrepresentationincorporatesthenotionof'latent''grouppersonality"'(seeM.Forsyth,'ThomasHobbesandtheconstituentpowerofthepeople'.PoliticalStudies,29(1981),191203).Forreasonsthatwillbecomeclear,thisisnottheviewthatistakenhere.

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Whentheyareconsideredashisowne,thenishecalledaNaturallPerson:Andwhentheyareconsideredasrepresentingthewordsandactionsofanother,thenisheaFeignedorArtificiallperson.2

Wordsandactionsarethustheresponsibilityofpersons,butthisdoesnotmeanthatwordsandactionsare'owned'bywhoeverisresponsibleforthem(i.e.whoeverperformsthem).Rather,theyareownedbythepersonwhotakesresponsibilityforthem.ThisallowsHobbestodistinguishinchapterXVIofLeviathanbetweenthreedifferentsortsofperson:thenatural,whoseactionsarehisown;theartificial,whoseactionsareownedbyanother;andthefictitious,towhomtheabilitytoownactionsisgrantedbypretence.

BeforeaskingwhatuseHobbesmakesofthesedistinctions,itisworthaskinghowthetransferenceofownershiponwhichtheyrestispossibleatall,suchthatonemanmayactwithoutowning,anothermayownwithouthimselfperforminganaction,andevenathingotherthanaman(Hobbesgivestheexamplesof'aChurch,anHospital,aBridge'3)mayownwhenincapableofactionaltogether.Theansweriscontainedinthenotionofrepresentation,andtheabilityofpersonstorepresent,personateoractthepartofoneanother.Inevitably,thisabilitytoactonanother'sbehalfpresupposessomepriorarrangementorformofrelationshipbetweentherepresenterandtherepresented,andthemostimportantoftheseisthatwhichHobbesdescribesassubsistingbetweenanauthorandanactorwhosewordsandactionstheauthorowns.Theactorisanartificialperson,andissaidtoactontheauthorityofwhoeverownshisactions.Thesimplicityofthismodeldoesnonethelessallowforsomesignificantvariations,forwhiletherelationbetweenactorandauthorwillfrequentlybefoundedonacovenantbetweenthem,itmayalsobefoundedonacovenantbetweentheauthorandathirdpartybindingbothtotreatoftheactor'swordsandactionsasthoughtheyweretheauthor'sown.Thisdistinctionissignificant,notonlyinthedevelopmentofHobbes'sown

argument,butalsoforthediverseconceptionsofauthoritywhichmayfollowfromit,sincethereisagreatdifferencebetweenactingaccordingtoaprioragreementtobeanother'srepresentative,andhavingone'sactionstakenasrepresentingtheactionsofanother:intheformercasetheactormaybequitenarrowlyconstrainedintherangeofactionshecanperform,whileinthelatterhemaybenotmerelyunconstrained

2T.Hobbes,Leviathan,ed.R.Tuck(Cambridge,1991),p.111.3Ibid.,p.113.

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butevenignorantoftheagreementofanothertoauthorisewhathedoes.Thustheactorboundbycovenantmayfindhimselfcommittedtoactinginaccordancewiththestrictlylaid-downpreferencesofhisauthor,whiletheauthorwhoisrepresentedbyanuncovenantedactormayfindhimselfcommittedtoowningactionshecouldnotpossiblyhaveforeseen.Neithertohaveauthority,nortogiveit,hasanynecessaryconnectionwithfreedomofaction,thescopeofwhichisdependentontheconditionsunderwhichauthorityisheldandthetermsonwhichitisgiven.

Thereis,though,anotherformofrelationbesidesthatofactorandauthorforwhichHobbes'sconceptofrepresentationallows.Arepresentative,orartificialperson,maysometimesactonbehalfofsome'thing'whichcannotitselfbetheauthorofitsrepresentative'sactions.Instead,theseactionswillbeauthorisedbywhoeverownsorhasdominionoverthethingtobepersonated,inorder,inHobbes'swords,'toprocure[its]maintenance'.4Thethinginquestionmightbeahumanbeingwhohappenstobewithoutthecapacitytoauthoriseactions'Children,FoolesandMad-menthathavenouseofReason,maybepersonatedbyGuardians,orCurators',ontheauthorityof'hethathathrightofgoverningthem'5butequallyitmightbepropertyofamoreconventional,inanimatekind,aswhentheownersofabridgeprovideitwithitsownrepresentative.Thepurposeofanarrangementlikethiswouldbetoprovideforsomestabilityinthetermsandconditionsunderwhichabridgeisused,whichmightnotbepossibleifitsuserswereheldtobetransactingwithitsownerseverytimetheyusedit.Ownersarenotalwaysavailable,noraretheyalwaysconstanttheydie,theydisappear,theyhaveotherinterests,theyloseinterestandrecognisingthis,theymayseektoprovideforareadilyavailablerepresentativeofsomemoreconstantinterest,andmoresolidthing,thantheythemselvesembody.Yetbecausetheactofpersonationispredicatedonthepersonalityofwhateveristobe

personated,thisisnotpossibleunlessthebridgeitselfisconceivedasaperson.Soithastobecomeapersonbyfiction,assumingtheguiseofanauthorbutrepresentedbyanactorwhoseauthorityisderivedfromelsewhere.Thuswhileartificialpersonsaremadefromthecapacityofnaturalpersonstorepresentoneanother,fictitiouspersonsaremadefromthecapacityofartificialpersonstobedeemedtherepresentativeofalmost

4Ibid.5Ibid.

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anything.AsHobbeshimselfsays:'Therearefewthings,thatareuncapableofbeingrepresentedbyFiction.'6

ThedifferentsortsofpersondescribedbyHobbesnatural,artificialandfictitiouscanthusbesetapartfromeachotherinaccordancewiththedifferentnumberofsubjectsorvehiclesofpersonalitythattheyrequire:inthecaseofanaturalperson,one,thenaturalmanhimself;ofanartificialperson,two,authorandactor;andofafictitiousperson,three,owner,actorandfictitiousauthor.However,thisdistinctionignoresafeaturecommontoallthreetypesofpersonality,andthatistheadditionalpresenceofsomeoneineachcasetoraisetheissueofanaction'sownership.Itonlymatterstowhomactionsbelongifthereexistsanaudiencefortheactionswhoseownconductwillbeshapedbytheanswertothatquestion.Thisaudiencemaytakealmostanyform:itcouldbesomeonethreatenedbyastranger,orsomeoneofferedacontractbytheagentofathirdparty,orsomeonenegotiatingwithagovernmentofficial,orsomeonewhowishestoknowagainstwhomhehasredresswhenthebridgeheisaccustomedtouseisclosed.Incomplexsituations,itmayevenbesomeonewhohashimselfhelpeddeterminetheownershipoftheactionsinquestion:theownerofabridge,forexample,mayfindhimself,perhapsasauserofthebridge,transactingwitharepresentativewhoactsonthebridge'sbehalf.Ineachinstance,theneedtoknowtowhomanactionbelongspresupposesthepresenceofsomepartytowhomanactionisaddressed,oristakenasbeingaddressed.Thusitisthat'actions'and'words'areinterchangeableinthiscontext,andareusedinterchangeablybyHobbes,foractionswhichraisetheissueofownershiparebydefinitioncommunicativeacts.

Thoughallactionsperformedbypersonsrequireanaudience,itisnotthecasethattheownershipofanactionisdeterminedbytheaudienceforwhomitisperformed.Amanwhoisthreatenedbyastrangerclaimingtoissuehisthreatsonanother'sbehalfdoesnotby

disbelievinghimconfinethosethreatstothestranger'sownperson;ifheiswrong,andhasmistakenanartificialpersonforanaturalone,hisdealingswillstillbewithwhoevertakeshimselftoownthemistakenlyattributedthreats.Nonetheless,Hobbesrecognisedthattheownershipofactionswasnotalwaystheresultofaperson'sdecisiontogiveauthority,andsoacceptresponsibility,forthem.The

6Ibid.

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difficultylieswithfictitiouspersons,andinthefactthattheirownershipofactionsisdeterminedbyadecisiontowhichtheythemselvescannotbeparty.Thatdecisionismadebywhoeverhasresponsibilityforwhateveristobepersonated,andsorestsonapriorarrangementdeterminingownershipnotofactionsbutofthings.Anarrangementofthiskindisonlypossibleagainstthebackdropofcivilsociety,because,asHobbeshasbeenatpainstoestablishelsewhereinLeviathan,therecanbenoownershipofthings'beforetherebesomestateofCivillGovernment'.7Thusthepersonationofafictitiouspersondependsnotmerelyonthedecisiontoauthorisearepresentativebutalsoontheconditionsofownershipwhichprecedesuchadecisionandgiveitforce.Andtheseconditionsmustholdforeveryoneinvolvedauthors,actorsandaudiencejustbecauseafictitiouspersoncannotestablishitsownclaimtoactionsundertakenonitsbehalf.Iftherepresentativeofabridgeisnotregardedassuchbythosewithwhomhedeals,thebridgeitselfcannotmakegoodhistitlebysomeactionofitsown;instead,itsrepresentativemustrelyonthetitleofthebridge'sowners,andonitsbeingupheld.

Thismarksanimportantdifferencebetweenfictitiousandartificialpersons.Forunlikefictitiouspersonality,artificialpersonalityisnotcontingentupongovernment,ifonlybecausegovernmentitselfiscontingentupontheauthorisationofatleastoneartificialpersonthepersonofthesovereign,withoutwhomtherecanbenocivilsociety.Asovereignisaman,orassemblyofmen,8who,havingbeenauthorisedbyagroupofnaturalpersons,has'theRighttoPresentthePersonofthemall,(thatistosay,tobetheirRepresentative)'.9He,orit,acquiresthisrightinoneoftwoways,correspondingtothetwomeansofauthorisinganactor:eitherthegroupofnaturalpersons

7Ibid.8Hobbesallowsthatanartificialpersoncanbeanassembly.Allthatisrequiredofanartificialpersonisthatitspeakwithonevoice,andinan

assemblythiscanbeachievedbythesimpleexpedientofmajorityvoting'AndiftheRepresentativeconsistofmanymere,thevoyceofthegreaternumbermustbeconsideredasthevoyceofthemall.Forifthelessernumberpronounce(forexample)intheAffirmative,andthegreaterintheNegative,therewillbeNegativesmorethanenoughtodestroytheAffirmatives;andtherebytheexcessofNegatives,standinguncontradicted,aretheonelyvoycetheRepresentativehath'(ibid.,p114).Itdoesnotmatterfortheminoritythemselvesthattheyhavebeenoutvotedinanyinstance,sincethepurposeofeachvoteistomakedecisionsonbehalfofwhomeveritisthattheassemblyrepresents.ThusHobbesdoesnothavetoconsideroneofthemorefamiliardifficultieswithmajoritydecision-makingthattheminorityarecommittedtosomethingthattheyopposesincehereitisnottheassemblywhichascommittedtoanything,butthepersononwhosebehalftheassemblyacts,andbywhomalonethewordsandactionsoftheassemblyareowned.9Ibid.,p.121.

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covenantwitheachotherthattheywilleachberepresentedbythesameartificialperson;ortheycovenantseparatelywiththesamepersonsuchthathebecomestherepresentativeofthemall.Ineithercase,thesalientfeaturesremainthesamecommonwealthsariseoutofthecapacityofartificialpersonstorepresentnaturalpersons,andareproperlycalledcommonwealthsonlywhenagroupofnaturalpersonsisrepresentedbythesameartificialperson,makingthatpersonsovereign.Itistheconceptofartificialpersonalityalone,therefore,whichprovidesmanwithhisescapefromthebrutishnessofanaturalexistence.

Theperformanceofthiscrucialtaskdoesnot,though,confinetheworkdonebytheconceptofartificialpersonalitytotheprocessoftransitionfromthestateofnaturetoastateofcivilsociety.Ithasalsotofunctionwithinthelifeofthecommonwealth,ifonlytoallowforthecreationofthosefictitiouspersonswhichcannotexistwithoutrepresentationandcannotexistelsewhere.Thisisasecondarytaskinitself,butitraisesoneveryimportantquestionaboutthenatureofthecommonwealththatcontainsit.Artificialpersonsmakefictitiouspersonsbyprovidingrepresentationforsomethingincapableofrepresentingitself.Isthentherepresentationbythesovereignofagroupofnaturalpersons(whichastheinitial,disparategroupisnopersonandisthereforeincapableofrepresentingitself)sufficienttocreateofthatgroupthesuppositionorpretenceofitsownpersonality?Putinthesetermsthequestionmightseemcontrived,butitisonetowhichHobbesprovidedanexplicitanswer.Hiscommonwealthwasindeedaperson.Forhewrites:

AMultitudeofmen,aremadeOnePerson,whentheyarebyoneman,oronePerson,Represented;sothatitbedonewiththeconsentofeveryoneofthatMultitudeinparticular.ForitistheUnityoftheRepresenter,nottheUnityoftheRepresented,thatmakeththePersonOne.AnditistheRepresenterthatbeareththePerson,andbutonePerson:AndUnity,

cannototherwisebeunderstoodinMultitude.10

Thegroupofnaturalpersonsrepresentedbythesovereignareoneperson,butonlybecausetheyarerepresentedbyoneperson,justasabridgeisapersononlybecauseithasapersonasitsrepresentative.Onthisaccount,thepersonrepresentedbythesovereigncalledbyHobbes'thePersonoftheCommonwealth'isafiction.Yetthisraisesanobviousdifficulty.Fictitiouspersonsonlycomeintobeing

10Ibid.,p.114.

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whenanownerseeksrepresentationforthethingheowns.No-oneownsthecommonwealth.Howthenarewetounderstanditspersonality?

ThesignificanceofthisquestioniseasilylostsightofinthefaceofthecentralpolemicalpurposeofLeviathan,whichwas,aboveall,abookagainstcivilwar.ThecontractualbasisofcivilsocietyasdescribedbyHobbesstandsinovertcontrasttopreviousattemptstoderivegovernmentfromtwoseparatecontracts,onebywhichmenmakeofthemselvesasociety,asecondbywhichthatsocietycontractswiththemenwhoaretogovernit.Thisdoublecontractcreatesunitypriortogovernment,andthusanassociationcapableofjudgingthepurposesofrulersagainstitsown.Wheretheactionsofgovernmentseemtoconflictwiththeneedsofsociety,thebondsofgovernmentmaybetakentobedissolved.ItwasthispossibilitywhichtheHobbesianversion,withitssinglecontract,wasdesignedtodisallow.11ForHobbes,theunityofsocietywasonlycreatedbytheestablishmentofgovernment.Whenmenerectasovereign,theyareunitedinhisperson;withouthim,theyarereturnedtothestateofnature.Thusthereexistsnosocialcontractwiththesovereign,andnobasisforjudgmentstobemadeaboutthecivilityofhisconduct,foritisuponhisveryexistencethatthepossibilityofcivilsocietydepends.Hobbes'saccountofpersonsandthingspersonatedprovidesthetheoreticalfoundationforthisposition:unitycannotbeachievedexceptwhereamultitudeisunitedinanotherperson,'andbecausetheMultitudeisnotnaturallyOne,butMany,theycannotbeunderstoodforone;butmanyAuthors,ofeverythingtheirrepresentativesaith,ordothintheirname'.12Theauthorityofgovernmentcomesfromindividualsintheirnaturalstate.Foragroupofindividualsinthecivilstatetoclaimauthorityagainsttheirgovernment,andsoriskacivilwar,isnonsensical.13

11Strictlyspeaking,thebasisofHobbes'scivilsocietyisacovenantrather

thanacontract,sinceHobbesunderstoodacontracttoinvolve'themutualtransferringofright'atagivenmoment,whileacovenantinvolvedthepromiseofsomefuturetransferbyoneofthecontractingparties.Hobbes'scommonwealthisinstitutedbycovenant,notcontract,becausethemultitudedonotexchangerightswithoneanotheratthemomentofitsformation,butratherpromisetotransfertherighttopresenttheirpersontothesovereign,onconditionthatothersdothesame.Nevertheless,itisfairtosaythatwhileeverycontractmaynotbeacovenant,eachcovenantisaformofcontract,andismadebypartiesHobbesishappytodescribeas'contractors'(seeibid.,p.94)12Ibid.,p.114.13ForsythhassuggestedthatdespitethisHobbesdidstillargueinLeviathanthat'thepeople'constitutedasingleentitywithasinglewillbeforetheinstitutionofthesovereign(seeForsyth,'ThomasHobbesandtheconstituentpowerofthepeople').However,heprovides

(footnotecontinuedonnextpage)

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Theabsenceofanyunitybeforethereissovereigntydoesnot,however,answerthequestionposedabove,whichconcernsthenatureoftheunitysovereigntycreates.Thisisnotaquestionabouttheauthorityofgovernmentsbutaboutthecharacterofthestate,andtheparticularcharacteroftheHobbesianstate,giventhathegrantstoititsownpersonality.Forthoughthesovereignisauthorisedbythemultitude,hedoesnotbearamultitudeofpersonsbutonlyone,apersondistinctfromhisownandalsofromthoseofhismanynaturalauthors.Anditaddsnothingtoourunderstandingofthatpersontoknowthatwithoutrepresentationitisnaturallyjustamultitude,sincethenaturalcharacteroffictitiouspersonsisimmaterial;abridge,afterall,isnaturallyjustanarrangementofbricks.Whatmatters,forbridgeandmultitude,isthedifferencemadewhenthenon-naturalcapacitytoownactionsisattributedtotheirnaturalforms.OfwhatthatdifferencemightconsistinthecaseofHobbes'scommonwealthwillbediscussedshortly.First,though,itisnecessarytogivesomesenseofhowmuchofadifferencetheattributiontothestateofitsownpersonalitycanmake.

II

TheclearestsenseofwhatcanhangonthisissueisprovidedbyMichaelOakeshott,inhisessay'OnthecharacterofthemodernEuropeanstate'.ForOakeshott,thestatesofearlymodernandmodernEuropehavetakentheircharacterfromtheassociationalmodelsofRomanprivatelaw,whichsanctionedtwodistinctmodesofassociation,andsoofferedtwodistinctmodelsforthestate.Oneisthesocietas(inEnglishusuallygivenas'partnership'ratherthan'society'),anassociationofindividualseachofwhomconditionshisactionstoaccordwiththetermsofajointagreement.Theotheris

(footnotecontinuedfrompreviouspage)

littleevidencetosupportthisassertion,beyondthefactthathadHobbesheldsuchaview,Leviathanwouldbetteraccordwithlatertheoriesoftheconstituentpowerofthepeople,particularlythoseofthelateeighteenthcentury.Alltheevidenceofthetextitselfpointstheotherway.Itistrue,asForsythargues,thatHobbesdoesnotexplicitlydenythat'thepeople'arepossessedofasinglewill;butgiventhathedoesexplicitlydenythatthereisanythingthattheycoulddowithsuchawill(beyondinstitutingasovereign,whichdoesnotrequirethepresenceofsuchawill,onlyacongruenceofindividualwills)itishardtoseewhatrelevancethishas.EverythingthatHobbessaysinLeviathanaboutthegroupthatinstitutesthesovereignissetoutinnegativeterms:theydonothaveunity,theydonothaveauthority,theydonothavepersonalityuntiltheyhaveasovereigntorepresentthem.Thus,asForsythisforcedtoadmit,howeverHobbesconceivedof'thepeople'beforetheinstitutionofthesovereign,itisclearthatafterit'hesawnoroleforthem'(ibid.,p.201).

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theuniversitas(inEnglishusually'corporation'),anassociationofindividualsconsideredcollectivelytoformasingleentityitselfcapableofaction.Themembersofasocietasshareacommonunderstandingabouthoweachshouldactbuttheydonotparticipateinanycollectiveendeavouritis'aformalrelationshipintermsofrules,notasubstantiverelationshipintermsofcommonaction'.14Auniversitas,bycontrast,existstoprovideitsmemberswithacommonidentityastheypursuesomecollectiveend.Asanassociationinprivatelaw,asocietasisnothingmorethanthesumofitsmembersandhasnoseparateidentityofitsown.Butauniversitasactsinitsownright,buying,selling,contracting,employing,suing,beingsued;itis,inotherwords,possessedofsomethinglikeitsownpersonality.'Thus',Oakeshottwrites,'itcouldhardlybesaidthatanygreatimproprietyhadbeencommittedwhenanassociationofthischaracterwasspokenofasapersonaficta'.15

Thestate,ofcourse,isnotsimplyanassociationinprivatelaw,butbecauseitisanassociationitmaybeunderstoodinanalogousterms.Whereunderstoodasanalogoustotheuniversitas,itisconceivedaswhatOakeshottcallsan'enterpriseassociation',whosemembersareassociatedinrespectofsomeidentified,commonpurpose.Thatpurposemightbereligious,ormilitary,oreconomic;itmightbedirectedbyamonarch,byanassembly(oraslikelyaparty)orbyapeopleasawhole.Butineachcasethestateisunderstoodasasingularandpurposivecommunity.Thestateassocietas,meanwhile,isa'civilassociation',16whosemembersareassociatedinrespectofsome'social'or'civil'relationsubsistingbetweenthem.Itisacommunityofsingularandpurposiveindividuals,orgroupsofindividuals,eachpursuingtheirownends,and

14M.Oakeshott,Onhumanconduct(Oxford,1975),p.201.15Ibid.,p.204.

16ForOakeshotttheideaofthecivitasisitselfconditionalontheideaofthestateassocietas.Hedescribestheideaofthecivitasas'notitselfanenterprise,anundertaking,an"economy",oraneducationalortherapeuticorganisation,andnotenterprisersorgroupsofenterprisersassociatedinseekingrecognitionoradvantageforthemselvesintheirundertakings,butanassociationofcives;anrelationshipofequals,andaself-sufficientconditioninbeingrelationshipintermsoftheconditionsofapractice(i.e.thelawsofastate)whicharenotusedupinbeingusedandnotintermsofasubstantivepurposeorpurposestobepursued'(ibid.,p.183).ForOakeshottthecivitasistheidealofthestateunderstoodassocietas,andtheidealofcivitasisthecivitasperegrina:'Anassociation,notofpilgrimstravellingtoacommondestination,butofadventurerseachrespondingasbesthecantotheordealofconsciousnessinaworldcomposedofothersofhiskind,eachtheinheritoroftheimaginativeachievements(moralandintellectual)ofthosewhohavegonebeforeandsomejoinedinavarietyofprudentialpractices,butherepartnersinapracticeofcivilitytherulesofwhicharenotdevicesforsatisfyingsubstantivewantsandwhoseobligationscreatenosymbioticrelationship'(ibid.,p.243).

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unitedonlybyanagreementastotheconditionsunderwhichtheymaypursuethem.Theseconditionsmaybebroadlyornarrowlydefined;theymaybedeterminedbyamonarch,byanassembly(orequallylikelyabodyofjudges)orbyapeopleasawhole.Butineachcasethestateisunderstoodasanassociationofcitizenswhoareboundtooneanotherbytheirjointacknowledgmentoftheauthorityofcertain'rules',and,byextension,certain'rulers',who,asrulers,frame,butdonotalwaysoversee,thelivesoftheirsubjects.17Oakeshottacceptsthatthesetwoconceptionsofthestate,thoughquitedistinct,arenotalwaysdistinguishableintheworkofparticulartheorists,buthedoesnonethelessregardWesternpoliticalthoughtasdominatedbyaccountsorunderstandingsofthestatewhichrecognisablyaccordwithoneorotherdisposition.ThestatesconceivedbyThomasCromwell,FrancisBacon,Calvin,Rousseau,FredericktheGreatandKarlMarxwereallanalogoustouniversitates.Meanwhile,forBodin,Spinoza,Kant,FichteandHegelthestatewastobeunderstoodasasocietas.Ofthissecondgroup,Bodin'sistheleastandHegel'sthemostsophisticatedaccountofthestateascivilratherthananenterpriseassociation.But,forOakeshott,itistheauthorofLeviathan'aworkofartofsuperbintegrity'whoseaccountofthestateassocietasis'themostintrepid'and'leastequivocal'ofall.18

TherecanbenodoubtingtheintrepidityofHobbes'swork(particularlyinthelightofwhatoneofhiscontemporariescalled'theextraordinarytimorousnesofhisnature'19),andnorcantherebemuchdoubtthatOakeshott'sclassificationofitmakesagooddealofsense.TheHobbesiancommonwealthisanassociationofindividualswhohaveallagreedtoabidebycertainrules.Itisanassociationwhichhasnosubstantiveendofitsown,beyondtheendwhichitsmembersshareasindividualsandwhichconditionsthetermsoftheiroriginalagreement'namely,thePeaceoftheSubjectswithinthemselves,and

theirDefenceagainstacommonEnemy'.20Peaceissecuredthroughtheruleoflaw,andwherethelawsaresilent,asatsomepointstheymustbe,menarefreetodoastheyplease:

ForseeingthereisnoCommonwealthintheworld,whereintherebeRulesenoughsetdown,fortheregulatingofalltheactions,andwordsof

17Oakeshottdrawsthedistinctionbetweenthosewho'rule'inasocietasandthosewhoexercise'lordship'overauniversitas:rulersmerelyestablishandenforcetheruleswhichconditionthebehaviourofcives;lords,meanwhile,'manage'allthosewholiveunderthem,andcontroltheirlivesaccordingtowhichever'policy'theyhavechosentoadopt.18Seeibid.,p.252.19SeeJ.Aubrey,Brieflives,ed.A.Clark(Oxford,1898),p.390.20Hobbes,Leviathan,p.150.

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men,(asbeingathingimpossible:)itfollowethnecessarily,thatinallkindsofactions,bytheLawespraetermitted,menhavetheLiberty,ofdoingwhattheirownreasonsshallsuggest,forthemostprofitabletothemselves.21

ButthoughthecommonwealthdescribedinLeviathanisessentiallyasocietas,itisnotoneunequivocally.Hobbes'scivilassociationisaperson.Itisnot,strictlyspeaking,apersonafictainHobbes'sownterms,forsuchpersonsmustbeownedorgovernedbeforetheycanberepresented;nor,however,asOakeshottadmits,areanyotherstatesstrictlyequivalenttothefictitiouspersonsofRomanprivatelaw,whichcouldbecreatedonlyby'analreadyrecognisedsuperiorlegalauthority'.22Themembersofastatemightbeunderstoodliterallytohaveassociatedinthemannerofasocietas,becauseRomanpartnershipswerefoundeduponcontract.Butastatecouldneverbealiteraluniversitas,sincecorporationswerealwaysthecreaturesofthestatethemselves.Thustheanalogyofthepersonafictamusthavesomefictitiouselementsofitsown.Ifitistoworkatall,itisbecausethestate,whateveritsorigins,mayatleastbeseentoassumeaformtowhichpersonalitycanbeattached.IntheHobbesiancase,thismeansthatitmustbedeemedtoownactions.Itdoesnothaveitselftoact,anymorethanabridgehasitselftoactinordertobeaperson.Butitsrepresentativemustbetakentobeactingonitsbehalf,andthisraisesaproblemforOakeshott'sunderstandingofLeviathan.OnOakeshott'saccountofthestateassocietas,thesovereignisarulerwhodoesnotspeakforthecommonwealthbutonlytoit,orrathertoitsmembers,throughitslaws.Yetifthesovereign'beareththePersonandbutonePerson'ofthecommonwealth,thenwhenhespeakshespeaksforthatperson,toanaudiencewhotakehiswordstobethecommonwealth'sown.Hobbes'saccountofpersonsandthingspersonated,restingasitdoesontheownershipofwordsandactions,allowsfornootherpossibility.Hisstatemust,therefore,requirea

personalidentityofitsownintheworldofactionsthatitinhabits.

III

What,though,isthisworldofactionsthatthestateinhabits,andinwhichstatesmaybesupposedtoactintheirownright?Thestate

21Ibid.,p147.22Oakeshott,Onhumanconduct,pp.2034.

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doesnotexistwithinthestate,soitisnotaworldthatcanbemappedontheco-ordinatesgivenbyitslawsithasnone,beyondthelawsofnature,whichascribetheownershipofactionstonaturalpersonsalone.Instead,itmustbedescribedthroughwhateverencounterstakeplacebetweenthesovereignrepresentativeandanaudiencewhotakehiswordsandactionstobethestate'sown.Thisaudiencehasonlytwopossibleconstituencies:eitherthesovereignaddresseshissubjects,orheaddressesthesovereignsofotherstates.(Ifheaddressesthemembersofotherstates,andtheylistentohim,itmustbepresumedthattheyarebehavingasmembersofhisstateandnottheirown.)However,inneitherofthesetwoencounters,asdescribedbyHobbes,isitpossibletodiscernthepresenceofthepersonofthecommonwealthbehindthesovereign'swords.Whenasubjectisfacedbythewordsofhissovereign,heencountersthemascommands,issuednotontheauthorityofthestatebutontheauthority,specifically,ofthesubjecthimself.Eachindividualsubjectownshissovereign'sactions,anditisthisthatprovidesthegroundsforobedience,'becauseitisinjusticeforamantodoanythingforwhichhemaybepunishedbyhisownauthority'.23Asubjectcannomoredisownhissovereignthanhecandisownhisownperson,andhehasnomoreuseofacontractwiththesovereignthanhehasofacontractwithhimself.Itistrue,therefore,thatasovereignaddresseshissubjectsbearinganother'spersonandbutoneother'sperson,butwhosethatpersonisdependsineachcaseuponwhichsubjectisbeingaddressed.Meanwhile,whensovereignspeakstosovereign,thecriteriadeterminingtheownershipofwhateverissaidaresimplythoseapplyinginthestateofnature,'becausetheLawofNations,andtheLawofNature,isthesamething'.24Likeamanthreatenedbyastranger,onesovereignmaywishtoknowwhatliesbehindthethreatsofanother.Buthewillneverdiscerntherethepersonofthestate.Allhewillfindisagroupofnaturalpersons,whocannotasagroupauthorisethewordshehears,butmayfindthemselvesassubjects

committedtocarryingoutthethreatcontainedinthem.Indeed,itisincircumstanceslikethesewar,orthethreatofwarthatagapappearsintheargumentofLeviathanwherewemightreasonablyexpectthepersonofthestatetobe.Thepersonalisedstateisafamiliarenoughfeatureinwartimestateshavehonour,theyhaveresponsibilities,theyneedprotection,

23Hobbes,Leviathan,p.122.24Ibid.,p.244.

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theyrequiresacrifice,oftentothepointwherethelivesoftheirsubjectscannolongerbeconsideredtheirown.YetnothinglikethisiscountenancedbyHobbes.Certainly,heacknowledgesthat'whentheDefenceoftheCommonwealth,requirethatoncethehelpofallthatareabletobearArms,everyoneisobliged;becauseotherwisetheInstitutionoftheCommonwealth,whichtheyhavenotthepurpose,orthecouragetopreserve,wasinvain'.25Butthisisalastresort,reachednotbyathreattothepersonofthecommonwealth,butbyathreattotheoriginalpurposeofhavingacommonwealth,whichistopreservethelivesofitsmembers.Otherwise,theobligationsofindividualsubjectsaretotheirownsafetyfirst,thecommandsoftheirsovereignnext,andthepersonofthestatenotatall.Hobbesallowsnocircumstancesinwhichasubjectcanbecalledupontosacrificehimselfforthecommonwealthtorunawayinbattlemaybecowardice,butbecauseitisdoneforself-preservation,itcanneverbedone'unjustly'.Moreover,asubjecthasnonecessarydutytoservethestateinhisownpersonwhencalledupontoserve,hemay'withoutInjustice'substituteamercenary.26Asubjectisobligedonlytoconditionhisactionsinaccordancewiththedemandsofthelaw,andonlytodosowhenthisdoesnotthreatenhislife.Betweenthesetwinpillarsofindividualismtheletterofthelaw,anddeaththereisnoroomforthepersonofthestatetoenter.

Weareleft,then,withnorecognisableworldofactionsinwhichtoplacethepersonafictaofthestate,andsowithanaltogetherintangiblefiction.ButthoughitseemstolackanysubstantialpresenceintheworldofHobbes'spoliticalphilosophy,stillitisunquestionablythere,hauntingthepagesofLeviathanlikeaghost.Forexample,inchapterXV,whendiscussingthe'JusticeofActions'underthelawsofnature,Hobbeswrites:'InCommonwealths,privatemenmayremittooneanothertheirdebts;butnotrobberiesorotherviolences,wherebytheyareendammaged;becausethedetainingofDebt,isanInjuryto

themselves;butRobberyandViolence,areInjuriestothePersonoftheCommonwealth.'27Thisisastrikingpassage,becauseitappearstousethepersonalityofthecommonwealthtopre-emptthejudgmentofsovereigns,towhomHobbesotherwisegrantscompletelicencetodecidewhatisandwhatisnotconducivetopeace.Inessence,sovereignsarebeingprevented

25Ibid.,p152.26SeeIbid.,p.151.27Ibid.,p.104.

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fromaccommodatingwithincivillawarightofsubjectsnottopresschargesagainsttheirassailants.Whyshouldthisbeso?TheanswerliesinHobbes'sdistinctionbetweeninjurywhichistheresultofbreachofcovenantanddamagewhichistheresultofmaterialhurt.Heexplainsthatamanmaybedamagedwithoutinjuryandinjuredwithoutdamage,aswhen'aMastercommandethhisservanttogivemonytoastranger;[for]ifitbenotdone,theInjuryisdonetotheMaster,whomhehadbeforecovenantedtoobey;butthedamageredoundethtothestranger'.28Onthisaccount,thevictimofviolencecannotremithisinjurypreciselybecausehehassufferednone,havingnocovenantwithhisassailant.ButHobbes'sargumentthatthereisnonethelessinjurydonetothepersonofthecommonwealth(allowingthesovereign,itsrepresentative,todropchargeswheneverheseesfit)nowmakesnosense,foritsuggeststhateachsubjecthasacovenantwiththecommonwealthitself,whichisthenmaster,andthesubjectservant.Thisisimpossible,becausethepersonofthecommonwealthspeaksonlythroughitssovereignrepresentative,whomHobbesisadamantcannotcontractwithasubject,andwithoutwhom,heisequallyadamant,thereisnopersonofthecommonwealthwithwhomtocontract.Infact,itisonlypossibletomakesenseofthispassageifweunderstandtheinjurytobedonetoeachoftheoriginalparticipantsinthecovenantwhichestablishesthecommonwealth.Thatcovenantconstituteswhatisinessenceamutualpacttogiveuptherighttoperform,asfeltnecessary,actionswhichdamageothers.Onlythesovereignretainsthisright.So,topersistinsuchactsisaninjury,nottothesovereign,nortothepersonofthecommonwealth,buttothenaturalpersonswhohaveagreedtorenounceviolenceonconditionthatallothersdothesame.Likeaghost,thepersonofthecommonwealthdisappearsifapproachedtooclosely.

ItreappearsinchapterXXIII,whichisanaccountof'thePUBLIQUEMINISTERSofSoveraignPower'thejudges,administrators,military

commandersandotherofficerswhoaretobefoundineverystate,andwhomHobbesdefinesasfollows:'APUBLIQUEMINISTER,ishe,thatbytheSoveraign,(whetheraMonarchoranAssembly)isemployedinanyaffaires,withAuthoritytorepresentinthatemployment,thePersonoftheCommonwealth.'29However,welearnnothingaboutthepersonofthecommonwealthfromthis

28Ibid.29Ibid.,p.166.

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definition,whichisusedbyHobbestomakeaparticularpointaboutthecourtsthatgatherattheseatofpower.Sovereigns,asmen,orgroupsofmen,alwaysbeartheirnaturalaswellasanartificialpersonality,andhavethereforewhatHobbescalls'twoCapacities,oneNaturall,andanotherPolitique,(asaMonarch,haththePersonnotonelyoftheCommonwealth,butalsoofaman;andaSoveraignAssembly,haththePersonnotonelyoftheCommonwealth,butalsooftheAssembly)'.30Bothpersonswillrequireservice,onefromministers,theotherfrompersonalattendants,andHobbeswishestodistinguishthetwo,sothatno'Ushers,norSeargeants,norotherOfficersthatwaiteontheAssembly...norStewards,Chamberlains,Cofferers,oranyotherOfficersofthehouseholdoftheMonarch'canclaimtospeakforthesovereign.31Thepersonofthecommonwealthisinvokedheremerelytoestablishthatpublicministersrepresentpersonswhoarethemselvesrepresentatives,anditimpliesnothingaboutthesortofservicethepersonofthecommonwealthmightitselfexpect.Indeed,thisisanotherinstancewherethepersonofthestateisnoticeableaboveallbyitsabsence.Thedistinctionbetweentheprivateandpubliccapacitiesofrulershasoftenbeendrawninordertoclaimforthestateownershipofpropertyinitsownright,andsotoprotectpublicproperty('thefamilysilver'inafamousrecentcoinage)fromrapaciousgovernments.ButHobbeswillhavenoneofthis,insistingthat'thesettingforthofPubliqueLand,orofanycertaineRevenuefortheCommonwealth,isinvaine;andtendethtothedissolutionofGovenment'.32Thesovereignmustbefreetotakewhathethinksisneededwhenhethinksitisneeded,ashemustbefreetoissuewhatevercommandsheseesfit,andtoenforcethem.Intheprosecutionofthesetaskssovereignsrequireministers,andlackeysaredistinguishedfromlegitimateofficersofthestatepreciselyinordertoestablishthatitisthesovereignrepresentativethattheseministersserve.

Nevertheless,chapterXXIIIdoesmarkaconsiderablefleshingoutofthestate'spersonalityinoneimportantrespect.Itishere,forthefirsttimesincebringingpersonsandthingspersonatedintotheargument,thatHobbesreintroducestoLeviathanitspresidingmotif,whichisnotofaperson,butofaman,'thatgreatLEVIATHANcalleda

30Ibid.31Ibid.32Ibid.,p.173.ForafullerdiscussionofthedistinctionbetweenHobbesianandotherviewsofstate'property',seepp.99102onthe'corporationsole'.

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COMMONWEALTH,orSTATE(inlatineCIVITAS),whichisbutanArtificiallMan;thoughofgreaterstatureandstrengththantheNaturall,forwhoseprotectionanddefenceitwasintended'.33Amanneednotbeaperson(unrepresented'fooles'arenotpersons),anymorethanabridge,becauseaperson,mustbeaman.Butinthisandlaterchapters,Hobbesseemstoconflatethetwo:ministerswhorepresentintheirdifferentemploymentsthepersonofthecommonwealtharealsodescribedas'partsOrganicall'ofthecommonwealth,tobecomparedbyanalogytothepartsofthebody.So,forexample,Hobbeswritesof'allthose,thathaveAuthorityfromtheSoveraign,toprocuretheExecutionofjudgements',that'everyacttheydoebysuchAuthority,istheactoftheCommonwealth[i.e.theyrepresentthepersonofthecommonwealth];andtheirservice,answerabletothatofHandsinaBodienaturall[i.e.theyrepresentthehandsoftheLeviathan]'.34Thesearetwoverydifferentformsofrepresentation:one,inHobbes'sterms,literal,apersonation,albeitofanintangiblefiction;theothermetaphorical,apersonification,albeitofsomethingfleshandblood.Byconjoiningthem,Hobbesidentifiesthepersonwiththeman,andsocloaksthestate'spersonalityinthemorefamiliar,andmoresubstantial,languageofthelivingbody.

Butifthepersonistobeaman,thentheLeviathan,assumingitisneitherachild,amadmanorafool,mustbeapersonwhichmeansthatLeviathanmustbecapableofperformingitsownactions,anditspartsmustbeco-ordinatedintheperformanceofeachaction.Tolooktothesovereigntoactonitsbehalfisentirelyquestion-beggingatthisjuncture,sincetheimageoftheLeviathanisbeingaskedtoprovidethestatewithanidentityapartfromtheidentityofitsrepresentative.Thesovereignmustbeapartofthebody,sothatthebodyasawholecanperformitsownactions,thusprovidingthemanwithneitherafictitiousnoranartificialbutwhatmightbestbedescribedasametaphoricalnaturalpersonality.Unfortunately,however,inHobbes's

analogy,thesovereignisnotarecognisablebodypartatall;instead,hecomparesitto'thePubliqueSoule,givingLifeandMotiontotheCommonwealth'.35Thisanalogycontrastswiththemorefamiliarimage,sooftenfoundinmedievalpoliticalthought,ofarulerastheheadofthebodypolitic.Theheadmaygoverntherestofthebody,butitisstillpartofanorganic

33Hobbes,Leviathan,p.9.34Ibid.,p.169.35Ibid.,p.230.HobbesismakingaplayhereontheLatin,inwhich'soul'becomesanima:itistheanimathat'animates'.

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whole,anditcannotbesaidalonetogiveitlife.Likethehands,theheadhasaparttoplayintheperformanceofanaction.Butthesoulrepresentsnothinglessthanactionitselfwithoutit,thebodyofthecommonwealthisentirelylifeless,amere'Carcasseofaman'.36Itistruethatthesoul,inHobbes'smaterialisticworld,isnaturallyapartofthelivingbody,andcanhavenonaturalexistenceapartfromit.37ButtheLeviathan,itmustequallyberemembered,isnotanaturalman.Itisartificial,anautomaton,ormachine,whichisabletoreplicatethelivingmanonlybecause,forHobbes,'lifeisbutamotionoftheLimbs'.38Thecommonwealthlivesbecauseitmoves,anditmovesbecauseofitssovereign.

Intruth,Hobbes'sanalogyisanunsatisfactoryone.Naturalmen,unlikemachines,aresubjecttotwosortsofmotion:oneHobbescalls'Vitall',whichistheactivityofthebody'beguningeneration,andcontinuedwithoutinterruption[its]wholelifethrough',39exemplifiedbythemotionofthebloodthroughtheveins;theotherhecalls'Voluntary',whichismotionbeguninthe'Imagination',depending'alwayesuponaprecedentthoughtofwhither,whichwayandwhat'.40Innaturalmen,theoriginsofmotionsofthissecondkindarein'theActofWilling',whichcanbeunderstood(thoughHobbeshimselfdoesnotputitintheseterms)astheprocesswherebytheactivityofthebodyisturnedintoactions.Ifartificialmenaretobedistinguishedfromnaturalmen(andthewordautomatonhasnomeaningunlesstheyare),itmustbebecauseintheircasethisdistinctionnolongerholds.Machinesaresimplythesumoftheactivitythevitalmotionsoftheircomponentparts.Tospeakofthesoulofamachine,therefore,istoinvokeapeculiarlyunhelpfulimage.Ifmachinesaresimplyactivity,thenthesoulissimplythatwhichactivatesthem,andmachinesareactivatedbywhomeversetsthemup.Nomachine,asHobbeswouldbethefirsttoadmit,isself-starting,sonomachinecancontainitssoul.Meanwhile,ifmachinesaretobetakentoperform

actions,thentheymustbeprovidedwithawill,andsincenomachinepossessesawill'naturally',eachmachinewillbepossessedofanartificialsoul.Inthissense,artificialmenandnaturalmenarequitedistinct,asHobbesacknowledges,whenhespeaksofthesovereignastheLeviathan's'Immortall

36Ibid.37ForHobbes,theideaof'aNaturallImmortalityoftheSoule'wasoneoftheabsurditiesofAristotelianism,aninstanceof'theErrorofSeparatedEssences'(seeibid.,pp.430ff.).38Ibid.,p.9.39Ibid.,p.37.40Ibid.,p.38.

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Soule'.41Thesoulsofnaturalmen,onHobbes'saccount,sharetheirnaturaldeaths.Butthesoulsofmachinesareseparatefromthemotionoftheirbodies,withtheresultthatanyactionsperformedmaybesaidtobethesoul'sown.AllofwhichmakesHobbes'sorganicimagery,inthecaseoftheLeviathan,somewhatanomalous.Theorgansofthecommonwealthnotjustitshands,butthejudgeswhoareitsvoice,theambassadorswhoareitseyes,andsoonallfacilitatetheperformanceofactions.Assuch,theycollectivelyembodynottheartificialmanbutitssoul,thesovereign:whenjudgesspeak,theyspeakforthesovereign;whenambassadorsobserve,theyobserveforthesovereign;and,asHobbeshimselfputsit,'thosethatareappointedtoreceivePetitionsandotherinformationsofthePeople,andareasitwerethepubliqueEare...representtheSoveraigninthatoffice'.42Theearsofamandonotrepresenthissoulinalisteningcapacity.Thefactthattheydo,asitwere,inanautomatonisjustwhatdeterminesthatitisnotanorganismbutamachine.

ItispossibletomakemoresenseofHobbes'sorganicimageryasitissubsequentlyappliedinchapterXXIX,wherehedepictsthe'Infirmities[that]tendtothedissolutionofaCommonwealth'.43Theinfirmitiesthatafflictanaturalmancanbedividedintotwocategories:those(like,say,blindness)whichimpairvoluntarymotion,andsothreatenaman'scapacitytoact;andthose(like,say,heartdisease)whichimpairvitalmotion,andsothreatenaman'scapacitytolive.ManyofthediseasestowhichHobbescomparestheafflictionsthatcanbesetacommonwealthareofthissecondkind,forexample'Pleurisie'(otherwise'FarmesofthePubliqueRevenue'),and'Ague'('WantofMony').44BoththeseailmentsplayonHobbes'searlierdescriptionofmoneyasthelife-bloodofthecommonwealth,itsmostvitalmotion,whichif'congealed'or'inflammed'canleadtodeath.ThustheLeviathandoesnothavetobeseenperformingactionsinordertobeseentoliveanddie.However,thereareotherdiseases

whichthreatenitslifeandwhichare,forHobbes,ifanythingmoredangerous.Thesearetheafflictionswhichintroducetothebodynotanimpairmenttovitalmotionbutratheralternativemotionstothoseactivatedbythesovereign.Onehelikens,somewhatbizarrely,to'Hydrophobia',45whichresultsfromtheprevalenceof

41Seeibid.,p.230.42Ibid.,p.169.43Ibid.,p.221.44Seeibid.,p.229.45Seeibid.,p.226.

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seditiousopinion.Themostdangerousofallhasnotechnicalname;itistheanalogueof'mixtMonarchy',andHobbeswrites:

TowhatDiseaseintheNaturallBodyofman,ImayexactlycomparethisirregularityofaCommonwealth,Iknownot.ButIhaveseenaman,thathadanothergrowingoutofhisside,withahead,armes,breastandstomach,ofhisown:Ifhehadanothermangrowingoutofhisotherside,thecomparisonmightthenhavebeenexact.46

Ofcourse,likemuchoftheargumentofLeviathan,thisishighlyrhetorical.Nevertheless,ithasimportantbearingsontheconceptualpremisesofthatargumentaswell.Forthetypeof'body'whoselifeismostimmediatelythreatenedifitcontainsseparateordisjointedvitalmotionsisnotanorganismatall,butanautomaton:aman,afterall,couldconceivablysurvive(aswenowknow)withmorethanonebody,butamachinepulledindifferentdirectionsmustbydefinitionbreakdown.Andthoughtheimageofadiseasedmachineisperhapsanobscureone,itmakessenseinHobbes'sterms:machines,likemen,andotheranimals,diewhentheyceasetomove,andanythingintheworkingsofamachinethatwilleventuallyterminatemovementconstitutesaterminalillness.Ultimately,then,Hobbes'sorganicismisasapplicabletothewatchtowhichtheLeviathanisfirstofallcomparedasitistothecommonwealthitself:bothmaysufferfromwhathecalls'intestinedisorder',inwhichcaseboth,unlessrepaired,willdie.47

IV

Atfirstsight,Hobbes'sorganicimagery,likehisattributiontothestateofitsownpersonality,ishardtoreconcilewithOakeshott'sclaimthattheLeviathanisanunequivocalsocietas,foritwasthecorporateuniversitas,nottheimpersonalpartnership,thatwascommonlydescribedincorporealterms.YetHobbes'speculiarlymechanisticorganicism,likehispeculiarlyintangiblestatepersonality,hardlyof

themselvessuggestanalternativetoOakeshott'sreadingeither.IftheLeviathan,likeawatch,livesanddies,thensodoesasocietas,whichceasestoexistwhenitsinternalcontractualarrangementsbreakdown48andasaresultHobbes'scorporeallanguage

46Ibid.,p.228.47Seeibid.,pp.9and221.48Apartnershipisdissolvedeitherwhenoneofthepartnersdies(i.e.whenoneofthepartsstopsworking)orwhenoneormoreofthepartnersrefusetoaccordtothetermsoftheoriginalcontract(i.e.whenthepartsceasetoworktogether).Whenthishappensthe

(footnotecontinuedonnextpage)

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ofbodiesandtheirmotionsneednotleadtothecorporatelanguageofpersonsandtheiractions.Oneinsuperableproblemremains,however,forOakeshott'scharacterisationofHobbes'sstate.ForevenifitistruethatcorpusanduniversitastheLeviathanandthecorporationmightbecountedasdistinctconceptsinHobbes'swork,itisalsotruethattheauthorhimself,inonefamousinstance,failstodistinguishthem.Ofalltheinfirmitiestowhichcommonwealthsareprone,perhapsthemostmemorableistheonethatresultsfrom'thegreatnumberofCorporations;whichareasitweremanylesserCommonwealthsinthebowelsofagreater,likewormesintheentraylesofanaturallman'.49Again,thesewordsareprimarilymemorableasanimage,andapurelyhistoricalstudyofLeviathanwouldlooktotheirrhetoricalsignificance,andtodiscoverwhichparticularcorporationsmighthaveprovokedthedeploymentofsuchstrikinglanguage.50YetwhateverHobbes'spolemicalpurposehere,theimageonlymakessenseifcommonwealthandcorporationcanbeunderstoodinequivalenttermsifthecorporationisbutalessercommonwealth,thenthecommonwealthmustbebutagreatercorporation.Moreover,thisisnotsimplyaterminologicalissue.ItbearsupononeofOakeshott'smostimportantdistinctions,betweenthestateseenasasocietasandthestateseenasauniversitas.Ofthelatter,Oakeshottwrites:

Justas[it]cannottolerateperformanceseccentricorindifferenttothepursuitofthepurposewhichconstitutestheassociation,soitcannotaccommodateotherpurposiveassociations[i.e.universitates]whosepurposesareeccentricorindifferenttoitspurposes.Therecanbeunregulatedvarietyofself-chosenassociationsonlywherethestateisnotitselfapurposiveassociation.Whatwecall'minority'associationscanexistonlywherethestateisrecognisedinthetermsofcivilassociation[i.e.asasocietas];andtheretheyrequirenoauthorisation.51

(footnotecontinuedfrompreviouspage)

remainingpartners,iftheywishtocontinueinpartnership,mustdrawupa

newcontractandtherebycreateanewsocietas.Asocietascanonlyenduresolongaseachofitspartsremaininafixedrelationtooneanother.Otherwiseit'dies'.49Ibid.,p.230.50Infacthewasthinkingofthegreatcitycorporations,suchastheCorporationoftheCityofLondon,whichsupportedparliamentagainstthekingduringthecivilwar;intheLatinLeviathanhegives'thegreatnumberofCorporations'as'oppidorumincorporatorummultitudo'(seeHobbes,Operaphilosophica,ed.W.Molesworth,5vols.(London,183945),vol.III,p.239).However,itisalsotruethatintheoriginalEnglishLeviathanHobbesusestheword'Corporation'todescribeanygroupofmerchantswhohaveformedthemselvesintoanassociation(intheLatinhesimplycallssuchgroups'systemamercatorum').IntheLatinLeviathanhereservestheword'universitas'todescribewhatinEnglishhecalls,andweshouldstillcall,universities.51Oakeshott,Onhumanconduct,p.316.

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Hobbes'sstatedoesnotallowforunregulatedcorporateactivity,andthereasonispreciselythatthestateitselfisofthesamespeciesofassociationasthecorporationsthatitcontains.Hobbes'sstatecannot,therefore,beunderstoodasasocietas.Ofcourse,thiswouldbealargeclaimtorestsolelyonthebasisofoneexceptionallyvisceralimage.Itdoes,however,haveasolidconceptualgroundingalso.Oakeshottarguesthatwherethestateisconceivedasasocietas,otherassociationsrequirenoauthorisation.ButHobbes,inchapterXXIIofLeviathan,arguesthatotherassociationsthanthecommonwealthcanonlyexistonthe'AuthoritySoveraign'.52Thisstatement,asweshallsee,isintegraltothewholeargumentofthebook.AndasaresultofchapterXXIIofLeviathan,Oakeshott'sdivisionofEuropeanpoliticalthoughtintotwocategories,andhissubsequentcategorisationofHobbes,finallycollapses.

ThesubjectofchapterXXIIis'systemes',whichHobbesdescribesasfollows:

'BySYSTEMES;IunderstandanynumbersofmenjoynedinoneInterest,orBusinesse.Ofwhich,someareRegular,andsomeIrregular.Regulararethose,whereoneMan,orAssemblyofmen,isconstitutedRepresentativeofthewholenumber.AllothersareIrregular.

OfRegular,someareAbsolute,andIndependent,subjecttononebuttheirownRepresentative:suchareonlyCommonwealths...OthersareDependent;thatistosay,SubordinatetosomeSoveraignPower,towhicheveryone,asalsotheirRepresentativeisSubject.

OfSystemessubordinate,somearePoliticall,andsomePrivate.Politicall(otherwiseCalledBodiesPolitiqueandPersonsinLaw)arethose,whicharemadebyauthorityfromtheSoveraignPoweroftheCommonwealth.Private,arethose,whichareconstitutedbysubjectsamongthemselves,orbyauthoritiefromastranger...

AndofPrivateSystemes,someareLawfull;someUnlawfull:LawfullarethosewhichareallowedbytheCommonwealth:allothersareUnlawfull.

IrregularSystemes,arethosewhichhavingnoRepresentative,consistonlyinconcourseofPeople.53

TosummarisethispassageinlessHobbesianlanguage:groupsofhumanbeingsareoftwokindscrowds(irregular)andassociations(regular,havingarepresentative);associationscanbeconstitutedintwowayseitherinlaw(political)orindependentlyofit(private);privateassociationscanbeconstitutedintwowaysalsoeitherbytheirmembers(subjects)orsomeforeignpower(astranger);allassociationsinlawarebydefinitionlegal,butsomeprivateassocia-

52SeeHobbes,Leviathan,p.156.53Ibid.,p.155.

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tionsmaybeillegal.Infact,laterinthechapter,Hobbesallowsonlyoneexampleofalegalprivateassociation,whichisthefamily.54Therestofthechapterisdevotedtodemonstratingthatallotherassociationsmustbesanctionedbythesovereign(i.e.theymustbe'bodiespolitique').Thereasoningbehindthisisclear.Allgroupsofnaturalmenapartfromcrowdsaccordtoonemodeltheyareassociationswithasinglerepresentative.Thesovereignissucharepresentativeofsuchanassociation.Therefore,allrepresentativesofallassociationsarepotentiallysovereign.Butifanyotherassociationthanthecommonwealthhasasovereigntherecanbenocommonwealth,becausenocommonwealthcancontainmorethanonesovereign.Hobbesexpressesitthus:

InBodiesPolitique,thepoweroftheRepresentativeisalwaiesLimited:AndthatwhichprescribeththeLimitsthereof,isthePowerSoveraign.ForPowerUnlimited,isabsoluteSoveraignty.AndtheSoveraign,ineveryCommonwealth,istheabsoluteRepresentativeofallthesubjects;andthereforenoother,canbeRepresentativeofanypartofthem,butsofarforth,asheshallgiveleave.55

Hobbes'sstatecannotallowunregulatedassociation,becauseallassociationsfollowthemodelofthestate.

ThisargumentwouldinevitablyhavehadaparticularsignificanceforHobbes'scontemporaries,andheisnotslowtopointoutthatamongtherepresentativeswhocanactonlywhereandwhenpermittedtodosobythesovereignare'theDeputies'authorisedbythesovereign'toenformehimoftheconditions,andnecessitiesoftheSubjects,ortoadvisewithhim,forthemakingofgoodLawes';56thatis,parliaments.Hobbesacceptsthataparliamentmay'representeverySubjectof[the]Dominion',57butforpreciselythatreasonitcanmeetonlywhensummonedbythesovereignandonlytodiscussmattersputtoitbythesovereign;'andwhenitshallbedeclaredthatnothingmoreshallbepropounded,ordebatedbythem,theBodyis

dissolved'.58Hobbesisquiteclearthatarepresentativeassemblymustbetheentirecreationofthesovereignifitisnotitselftobesovereign(thoughofcoursethesovereignitselfmightstillbeanassembly).Itisequallyclear,however,thathisargumentdoesnotapplysimplytowhatweshouldnowthinkofa'representative

54Seeibid.,pp.1623.HereHobbesreliesonthefamiliarargumentthatfamiliesareassociationsintheirownrightbecause'theFather,orMaster[is]beforetheInstitutionofCommonwealth,absoluteSovereignintheirownFamilies'.55Ibid.,pp.1556.56Ibid.,p.162.57Ibid.58Ibid.

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assemblies';itholdsforallmannerofassociations,amongthem'BodiesPolitiquefortheorderingofTrade'59whatweshouldnowthinkofas'corporations'.Hobbeswritesthat'thevarietyofBodiesPolitiqueisalmostinfinite',bywhichhemeanstoconveyboththe'unspeakablediversitie'ofpurposeswhichleadmentoformassociations,andalsothefactthateveryassociationisdistinct,becauseeveryassociationisconstitutedbythesovereign,its'times,placesandnumbers,subjecttomanylimitations'.60Almostanygroupofmenmightformanassociation,butnogroupmaydosoexceptwhereauthorised.Infact,Hobbesallowstwodistinctmodesofauthorisation,onebythegrantingof'LettersPatent...withallsealed,ortestified,withtheSeales,orotherpermanentsignesoftheAuthoritySoveraign',theotherthrough'ordinaryLawes,commontoallSubjects'.61Hobbesisnotinsisting,asearlierjuristsoftenhad,thatacorporationcanonlybecreatedbyanexplicitactof'concession'onthepartofthesovereign.62Butthisisessentiallyapracticalconsideration.Thesettingoflimitationsontheactionsofeveryrepresentativeis'notalwaieseasie,orperhapspossibletobedescribedinwriting';somoregenerallaws'mustdetermine,whattheRepresentativemaylawfullydo,inallCases,wheretheLettersthemselvesaresilent'.63

Theletters,orlaws,ofassociationshapebodiespolitic;theyalsoshapethemintopersons.ForthisistheonecertainpointinLeviathanwherebodiesandpersonsarethesame'BodiesPolitique'areotherwisecalled'PersonsinLaw',andwhentheirrepresentativesact,theyact'inthePersonoftheBody'.64Intruth,thepersonalityofthesebodiesissetoutbyHobbesinessentiallynegativeterms.Whenarepresentativeperformssomeactwhichisnotwarrantedbythetermsofassociation,thenitis'hisact,nottheactoftheBody,norofanyotherMemberbesidehimself'.65(Inthisrespect,itisaformofrepresentationquitedifferentfromthatundertakenbythesovereign,

whoseeveryactistheactofthoseherepresents.)Thepersonoftheauthorisedassociationcannotbehaveunlawfullybecauseitisbydefinitionlawfulitisapersoninlaw.(Thepersonofthecommonwealthcannotbehaveunlawfullyeither,butforaverydifferentreasonitsrepresentative,assovereign,isoutsidethelaw.)

59Ibid.,p.160.60Ibid.,p.158.61Ibid.,p.156.62Foramoredetaileddiscussionofthe'concessiontheory'seebelow,pp.4950andpp.934.63Hobbes,Leviathan,p.156.64Ibid.65Ibid.

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Butstill,Hobbesdoesallowfortwosortsofpunishmentofrepresentativeswhichisalsopunishmentofthebodiestheyrepresent.Oneis'forfeitureoftheirLetters,(whichistosuchartificiallandfictitiousbodies,capitall)'.66Theother,applicablewherethereisa'Commonstock'whichdoesnotbelongtotheindividualmembersoftheassociation,is'pecuniary'Mulct'.67Thusbodiespolitichavealifeapartfromthelivesoftheirmembers(whodonotdiewhentheydo),andtheymaypossesspropertyindependentlyoftheirmembers(whodonotpaypenaltieswhentheydo).Herewehavetangible,iffictitious,grouppersonsinhabitinganidentifiableworldofactions.ApersonofthiskindisnotafictionintheoriginalsenseHobbesgivesthatterminchapterXVI,becausethemembersofabodypoliticdonotownthebodyandthenappointarepresentativefortheirproperty.(Theymayformanassociationinordertoownpropertyincommon,buttheycannotownpropertyincommonbeforetheyformtheassociation.)Rather,itisafictitiouspersonasthecommonwealthisafictitiouspersonamultitudeofmenmadeonepersonwhentheyarebyonepersonrepresented.Andincontrasttothecaseofthecommonwealthitisnothardtodiscerntheusesthatbodiespoliticmightmakeoftheirownpersonality.Iftheirrepresentativesactlawfully,bodiespoliticcanownaname,resideatanaddress,enterintocontracts,accumulateproperty,evendoworkoverseas.68Memberscanalsomakeuseofthepersonalityoftheirassociationsbecauserepresentationmustbelimited,theliabilityofmembersmustbelimitedalso.Unlikethecommonwealth,therefore,bodiespoliticinhabitarecognisableworld:itiswhatwemightunderstand,inthebroadestsense,astheworldofcorporateactivity.

Sowearereturnedtoafamiliarproblem.Hobbes'saccountof'systemes'providesuswithsubstantivegrouppersons,butonlywithinthestate.The'fiction'oftheirpersonalitycanbegivensubstancethereby'artifice'Hobbesstatesexplicitlythatpersonsinlawarebodies

both'fictitiousandartificial'69andtheartificeristhesovereign.Indeed,thesovereignis'author'ofthesefictionsina

66Ibid.,p.157.67Ibid.68AmongthesystemsHobbesdiscussedinchapterXXIIare'BodiesPolitiqueforGovernmentofaProvince,ColonyorTown'.Theseincludethe'Companies'thatweresetup'whentherewereColoniessentfromEngland,toPlantVirginia,andSommer-Ilands'(seeibid.,p.159).ForanaccountofHobbes'sfirst-handexperienceoftheworkingsofoneofthesecompaniesseeN.Malcolm,'Hobbes,SandysandtheVirginiaCompany',HistoricalJournal,24,297321.69SeeHobbes,Leviathan,p.157.

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non-technicalaswellasatechnicallyHobbesiansense,because,likeawriter,andmoreoverinwords,thesovereigndeterminesthefictitiousworldtheyinhabit.Ofthecommonwealthwelearnonlythatitisafiction,andtolearnonlythatEmmaBovary,say,isafictionistodiscoveronlywhatsheisnot(sheisnotreal).Butinthecaseofbodiespolitic,wearepresentedwiththeactaswellasthefactofcreationartificeaswellasfictionandinconsequenceweknowwheretolooktodiscoverwhatthesepersonsare,asweknowtolooktothebooktodiscoverthefactsaboutMadameBovary.Associationsaredescribedin'letters'.Inthissense,thestateremainsdistinctfromthegroupsitcontains,becausethestatecannotbegivenacomparableidentity.Thesovereign'authorises'inthepersonofthestate,soforthestatetoplaythepartofapersoninlawisforthefictiontowritethebook(MadameBovarycannotbothbeanovelandalsoanautobiographyghostedbyFlaubert).Nevertheless,thisdistinctionbetweenthestateand'minority'associationsinnowayaccordstothedistinctiondrawnbyOakeshott.IfHobbes'scommonwealthisadifferententityfromthecorporationswithinit,itisbecausetheircorporatepersonalityliesinitsgift.Inotherwords,theHobbesianstateestablishesanidentitydistinctfromthatoftheuniversitasintheveryactofregulatingassociationallife,andnot,asOakeshottargues,byleavingitunregulated.Andthereverseisequallytrue.Ifthecommonwealthistohaveatangiblepersonalityofitsown,thenitmustbeallowedthatcorporatepersonscancomeintobeingwithoutpriorauthorisationbythesovereign.TheHobbesianstatecanonlybeunderstoodasauniversitasifuniversitatesareseentoexistindependentlyofit.Oakeshottsuggeststhattheexistenceofunauthorisedcorporationsisthebestpossibleevidencethatthestatecanbeunderstoodasasocietas.InHobbes'scase,itisthebestpossibleevidencethatthestatecanbeunderstoodassomethingelse.

Thissecondpossibility,thatunauthorisedcorporatepersonalitycanbe

attainedoutsidethelaw,isnotruledoutbytheargumentofchapterXXII,despiteitsemphasisonthenecessityofproperauthorisation.Byallowingthatillegalassociationsdoexist,eveniftheirexistenceistobecurtailedwhereverpossible,Hobbesseemstoacceptthatsubjectscanreplicatetheconditionsofgrouppersonalitywithoutinvokingthemechanismoflegalrecognition.Moreover,hislateridentificationofcorporationsasthe'wormes'ofstatepresupposesjustthispossibilityafterall,wereallcorporateactivitystrictlycontrolledbythetermsofassociationdrawnupbythesovereign,no

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corporationcouldeverconstituteathreattothestate.Thereare,then,someassociations,otherthanthefamily,whichareabletogeneratetheirownpersonality.Threethingscanbesaidofsuchgroups.First,theirpersonalitymustbeafictionthatthegroup'smemberscreateforthemselves.They'authorise'itinthenon-technicalsenseoutlinedabovetheyinventandgivedefinitiontoapersondistinctfromtheirownpersonsandalsofromthepersonoftheirrepresentative.Thisfictionwillnotbedescribedin'letters';therefore,itmustbeafictionwhichthemembersalreadyunderstand.Themembersmustbelieveinthegroup.Second,ifprivateassociationscanhavesuchapersonality,thensocanthestate.Itsmemberstoocancomprehendaseparatepersonofthecommonwealthwithoutthatpersonhavingatechnical'author'.Thestatecanbeaperson,butonlyifitsmembersarealreadypreparedtobelieveinthepersonalityofthestate.Third,ifthestatedoesnothavesuchapersonality,itsmembersmaynoticethelack.Theymayfeeltowardstheassociationsinwhosepersonalitytheybelievealoyaltywhichthestate,unlesspossessedofitsownpersonality,cannotmatch.Thestatewillalwayshavemorepower,inthepersonofthesovereign,whocancommandasheseesfit,andsooutlawanyassociation.Butloyaltyismorethanobediencetocommand(anobedientdogisnotnecessarilyaloyalone).Ifthestatedoesnotgenerateitsownpersonality,itsmemberswillstillhavetoobeytheirsovereign;buttheymayplacetheiruntappedloyaltieselsewhere.

V

Ultimately,Hobbes'saccountofthepersonalityofassociations,includingthestate,isequivocal.Itequivocatesbetweentwoconceptionsoforder(or,inHobbes'sterms,peace).Thefirst,anddominantconceptionisthatofjuristicorderbywhichpeaceisunderstoodastheabsenceofwar.Juristicorderrestsonsovereignty,

andisexercisedthroughlaw.Itdoesnotrequirethatthestatebeaperson,onlythatthesovereignshouldrepresentthepersonsofhisindividualsubjects.Itisaconceptioncompatiblewithanunderstandingofthestateasasocietas.Itis,however,anarrowidea.Itinvolvestheregulationofallgroupactivity.Anditcreatesastaterestingontheprincipleofcommand,andsoatthemercyofwhoeverhappenstobeincommand.Asecond,andfullerconceptionisthatofmoralorderbywhichpeacemightbeunderstoodintermsofvirtue.One

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guaranteeofmoralorderisadutifulsovereign,andthedutiesofsovereigntyaresetoutbyHobbesinchapterXXXofLeviathan('OftheOfficeoftheSoveraignRepresentative').Anotheristhegrantingtothestateofitsownpersonality.Wherethestateisunderstoodasapersondistinctfromthepersonsofbothsovereignandsubjects,bothsovereignandsubjectsshareacommonunderstandingofthestate.Asaresult,conditionsofreciprocalloyaltymayarise,soguardingagainstthemoralchaosthattheunfetteredexerciseofsovereignpowercanbringinitswake.Unfortunately,however,thepersonalityofthestatedoesnotmakesenseinthetermsofjuristicorder;aswehaveseen,theessentiallyjuristicaccountofpersonsandthingspersonatedgiveninchapterXVIisinsufficienttogenerateatangiblepersonofthestate.Instead,itmustariseoutoftheunderstandingthatgroupscometohaveofthemselves.Thusitispossibleforthestatetogenerateitsownpersonality,butonlyifothergroupscandolikewise.Andthismeansthatmoralorderwillbeopposedtojuristicorder,forthelatterdependsuponacategoricaldistinctionbetweenthestateandallothergroups.Wherethestatehasapersonalityalongsidethatofothergroups,itmustcompetewiththemfortheloyaltyoftheirmembers,anditisnotacompetitionthatitiscertaintowin.Itis,ofcourse,certaintowinanycompetitionbasedonpower,butvictoryinsuchacontestisnoguaranteeofvirtue.Leviathanrepresentsperhapsthemostrigorousofallattemptstoreconcilevirtuewithpowerindeed,Hobbesmanagestoderivebothfromonebasicrule,'toseekPeace,andfollowit'.70Yetwithregardtothepersonalityofthestate,andtheassociationswithinit,theyremainunreconciled.

PersonalityisalsotheissueonwhichOakeshott'scategorisationofLeviathanfounders.ThisdoesnotmeanthatthestatedescribedbyHobbes,becausecapableofbeingunderstoodasaperson,isinthewrongcategory.Rather,thetermsofOakeshott'sargumentaresimplynotapplicableinHobbes'scase,andtoviewLeviathaninthoseterms

istomisrepresentitintwodistinctways.First,thoughitistruethatHobbes'scommonwealth,likeasocietas,isfoundedonacontractualarrangementamongindividualstoabidebycertainrules,thecontractitselfstipulatesonlyonerule,whichistoauthorisethesovereign.Oakeshottarguesthatacivilassociationmustrestonthe'loyalty[ofitsmembers]tooneanother';aloyaltydeterminedby

70SeeIbid.,p.92.

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theircommonacceptanceofcertain'rulesofconduct'.71ButtheconductofHobbes'scivesisshapedbytherelationofeachtothecommandsoftheirsovereign,notbytheirrelationtoeachother.Acommonloyaltyrequiressomethingmore,andthatsomethingisprovidedbythepersonalityofthestate.Second,Hobbes'sstatecannotbeunderstoodasanalogoustooneorotheroftheassociationsofprivatelaw,forthesimplereasonthatHobbes'spoliticalphilosophyincludesanaccountoftheseassociations.InLeviathan,allgroupsapartfromcrowdsareconstitutedbytheartificialpersonoftheirrepresentative.Thusallassociationsareanalogous,andthecharacterofthestatedependsonthedegreeofdifferencebetweenitandtheotherbodiestowhichitmightotherwisebecompared.Oakeshott'sconceptualframeworkcannotaccommodatethisfact.Yetwithoutit,itisimpossibletoaccountforthecharacterofHobbes'scivilassociation,whichisbothlesstolerant,andmoreequivocal,thanOakeshottwouldallow.

71Oakeshott,Onhumanconduct,p.201.

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Chapter3Gierkeandthe'Genossenschaft'

I

PartsofOttovonGierke'sDasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrecht,1towhichwemaynowturn,bearasuperficialresemblancetoOakeshott'ssurveyofEuropeanideasofthestate.LikeOakeshott,Gierkeplacedgreatemphasisonthecompetingclaimsofthesocietasandtheuniversitasasmodesofconceptualisingthestate.AndlikeOakeshott,hefoundaspecialplaceattheheartofhisstoryforthewritingofThomasHobbes.Butheretheresemblancesend.Gierke'sstoryisquitedifferentfromOakeshott's,andtheHobbeswhoemergesfromitshareswithOakeshott'sheroonlythevirtuesofhisintellectualcourage(Gierkecallsit'hisRadicalaudacity'2);inotherregards,heisanequivocalfigure,andhisideasaretreatedbyGierkewithcircumspectionborderingonregret.Aboveall,Gierke'sHobbesishistorical,andhischaracterisdeterminedbytheparticularsortofhistoryheinhabits.ForOakeshott,thebasicmodelsofsocietasanduniversitasservetodivideupthehistoryofpoliticalideas,andthentotranscenddifferencesbetweentheoristsononeorothersideofthisdivide.ThusthelanguageofpoliticalthoughtmightchangeHegel'scivilassociationisnotdescribedinthetermsofBodin'sbuttheideasbeingdescribedremainessentiallythesame.ButforGierkeideascanneverbeunderstoodinsuchstaticterms,andnorcantheybeunderstoodapartfromthehistoricalconditionssurroundingtheir

1DasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrechtwaspublishedinfourvolumesinGermany,thefirstappearingin1868(underthetitleRechtsgeschichtederdeutschenGenossenschaft),thesecondin1873(GeschichtedesdeutschenKörperschaftsbegriff),thethirdin1881(DieStaats-undKorporatzonslehredesAltertumsunddesMittelaltersundihreAufnahme

inDeutschland)andthefourthin1913(DieStaats-undKorporationslehrederNeuzeit).ItisonlyportionsofvolumesI,IIIandiVthathavebeentranslatedintoEnglish,andthesearethetranslationslistedinthebibliography,towhichdetailedreferenceismadeinwhatfollows.2O.vonGierke,Naturallawandthetheoryofsociety,15001800,trans.E.Barker(Cambridge,1934),p.37.

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formation.ForGierkewashimselfaHegelian.ThehistoryprovidedbyDasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrechtisdialectical,anditsprimaryconcerniswiththewaysinwhichideaschange.Init,modelsofpoliticalthoughtareseentoreactuponeachother,andthesemodelsnotonlyshapebutareshapedbythelanguageinwhichtheyareexpressed.ThusideasandthemeswhichOakeshottmustkeepdistinctGierkerendersinterdependent.Bothmen,ofcourse,recogniseHobbes'sgenius.Butwhereasforoneitistranscendent,andissuesinintegrity,fortheotheritremainscontingent,anditissuesonlyinacceleratedchange.

TheoverallprocessofchangedescribedbyGierkeisahighlycomplicatedone,anditinvolvesmanydifferentdialecticalrelations.ThiscanreadilybeillustratedbythepartplayedwithinitbythetwoassociationalmodelsofRomanprivatelaw,thesocietasandtheuniversitas.AfterthedemiseoftheEmpireruledfromRome,butmoreparticularlywiththerevivalofRomanlawatthebeginningofthetwelfthcentury,theseconceptionswereemployedinavarietyofdifferentcontexts,andforavarietyofdifferentendsbyRomanists,bycanonists,andlaterbynatural-lawtheorists,intheformulationofwhatGierkecallspublicisticdoctrine,andweshouldcallpoliticaltheory.ThesenewintellectualenterprisesoftenmadeuseofbothoftheRomanmodelstogether,withtheresultthatthetwoconceptionsreacteduponeachother.Stillitremainedpossible,inGierke'sterms,toidentifyeachconceptionwithoneoftwodistinctmodesoftheoreticaldiscoursethesocietaswiththelanguageofthemechanism,theuniversitaswiththelanguageoftheorganismwiththeresultthatjuristicconceptscameincreasinglytobeexpressedinotherthanjuristicterms.Meanwhile,RomanideasingeneralwereinvolvedinanaltogetherseparateengagementwithwhatGierkecalls'Germanism'.MostsignificantofallGermanistideaswastheGenossenschaftofGierke'stitle(usuallytranslatedas'fellowship')

whichprovidedanalternativeunderstandingofgrouplifetothatgiveninRomanlaw.Thenatureandsignificanceofthisalternativewillbediscussedbelow.Fornow,itissufficienttopointoutthatthedialecticalrelationsoftheconceptsofsocietasanduniversitastoeachother,tocontemporarydisputesinpoliticaltheory,andtothelanguageofpoliticalargumentwereallplayedoutinthebroadercontextofaculturalstrugglebetweenRomanismandGermanism.Unsurprisingly,theresultingdialecticalcomplexitiesareformidable.Nevertheless,itremainspossibletoestablishthreedominantthemes

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inGierke'swork.Thefirstiswhathecallsthe'intimateconnection...betweenlegalphilosophyandpoliticaltheory'.3Thesecondistheequallyintimateconnectionbetweentheoryingeneralandthecontingenciesofchanginghistoricalcircumstance.Andthethirdisanon-going,all-encompassingstrugglebetweentwodifferent,andirreconcilable,conceptionsoforder.

Eachofthesethemesmustbeunderstooddialectically,butinthecaseofthemostsignificant,thethird,thedialecticisofaparticularkind:itdescribestheinterplayofideasbetweenwhichGierke,quiteexplicitly,tooksides.Toputitatitssimplest,GierkesoughtinDasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrechttochampionGermanistconceptionsoforderagainsttheirRomanistcounterparts.ButitwouldbewrongtocharacteriseGierke'sargumentsimplyintermsofaconflictbetweenRomanandGermanideas.Thestrugglebetweenthetwodifferentconceptionsoforderwhichdominateshisworkalsopermeatesallpartsofit:itcanbediscoveredbothwithinRomanthought(inthecontrastbetweenthesocietasandtheuniversitas)andwithinGermanthought(inthecontrastbetweenHerrschaftandGenossenschaft)aswellasintheclashbetweenthem;itmightbediscernedineconomicandsocialaswellasjuristicandpoliticalhistory;anditcouldbedescribedbyGierkebothinminiature,withintheworkofasingletheorist(like,forexample,Hobbes),andalsoonthebroadestscale,intheclashbetweenwhathecalls'antique-modern'and'medieval'thinking.Noneoftheseconflictsofideasisindependent;eachmustbeviewedinthelightofitsrelationtotheideaoftheworkasawhole.

Itispossibletosummarisethisidea,whichisthefocusofeachoftheseconflicts,intermsofadistinctionalreadydrawninrelationtoHobbesthedistinctionbetweenjuristicandmoralconceptionsoforder.Gierkewasalwaysonthesideofthelatter,whichhebelievedtobecharacteristicof,thoughnotexhaustedby,Germaniclifeandthought,andagainstthenarrower,morelegalisticnotionswhichwere

typicallyderivedfromRomanlaw.Again,though,thisrisksoversimplifyingtheissue.Gierke'sinsistenceontheinterdependenceofpoliticaltheoryandjurisprudencemeansthatheunderstoodallconceptionsofordertohaveajuristicbasisincludingallconceptionsderivedfromthemorallifeofthe'teutonicpeoples',forwhichGierkefoundjuristicexpressioninwhathecalls'folk-law'.Forthisreason,theargumentofDasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrechtisbetter

3Ibid.,p.36.

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summarisedintermsofastrugglebetweentwodifferent,ifsomewhatabstract,conceptionsofgroupunity.EachoftheseconceptionsisapplicabletoanyofthosegroupsHobbescalled'systemes'andtoagoodmanyothersbesides,andthoughtheyaremutuallyexclusive,neitherhasanyexclusiveconnectionwithaparticularbodyoflaw.Bythefirstconception,groupsareseentohavewhatGierkewouldcalla'unity-in-plurality':thatis,aunitywhichisconsequentuponsomearrangementbetweenagroup'sindividualmembers,suchthatthepartscomebeforethewhole.Bytheother,groupshavea'plurality-in-unity':thatis,aunitywhichispriorto,andinsomesensesdeterminantof,theindividualityofagroup'smembers;thewholecomesbeforetheparts.'Unity-in-plurality'isthe'antique-modern'conception,thetypicalpreferenceofbothRomanandnatural-lawtheorists,exemplifiedbythemodelofthesocietasandusuallycouchedinthemechanisticlanguageofcontract.'Plurality-in-unity'isthe'medieval'conception,typicallyGermanic,exemplifiedbytheGenossenschaft,andassociatedwiththelanguageoforganicism.(Theuniversitas,whichcanbeopposedtoboththesocietasandtheGenossenschaft,andwhichisaconceptbothquintessentiallyRomanandquintessentiallymedieval,stands,asweshallsee,uncertainlybetweenthetwo.)Thereis,however,onefurtherdistinctionbetween'unity-in-plurality'and'plurality-in-unity'whichisofparticularsignificance:inGierke'sterms,groupspossessedoftheformercouldonlyhaveanartificialorfictitiouspersonality;butgroupspossessedofthelattermightbeunderstoodaspersonsintheirownright,inthemannerofthenaturalman.Clearly,Gierke'stermsherearenotHobbes's,forwhomtheideaofnaturalgrouppersonalityisessentiallyacontradictioninterms.Moreover,Gierketendedtospeakofgrouppersonalitynotassomething'natural'butassomething'real',acategoryofpersonforwhichHobbeshadnouse.4ButGierke'stermsdostillapplytoHobbes,astheydotoeachaspectofthestoryhetells.Inordertomakesatisfactorysenseofthatstory,itisnecessarytosay

somethingmoreaboutthemannerinwhichitunfolds.Andtheeasiestplacetostartissomewheretowardstheend,withGierke'sinterpretationoftheargumentcontainedinLeviathan.

4'Real'standsinoppositionto'fictitious'as'natural'standsinoppositionto'artificial'(anartificiallakemaynotbe'natural'butitisstill'real'inawaythatafictitiouslakeisnot).ForHobbes,personswhichwerenotfictitiouswereeithernaturalorartificial.Itwentwithoutsayingthatbothnaturalandartificialpersons(whichwerealwaysmenorassembliesofmen)werereal,i.e.thattheyreallydidspeakandact.

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II

Gierke'saccountofHobbes'sthought5comesinthefourth,andfinal,volumeofDasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrecht,whichwaspublishedin1913,thoughwrittentwentyyearsearlier.Thethemeofthislastvolumeis'thetheoryoftheStateandCorporationinmoderntimes',andthemajorpartofitisdevotedtoanexpositionofnatural-lawtheory.Gierkedividesthehistoryofnatural-lawtheoryintotwosections:thefirstcoverstheperioddownto1650;thesecond,theperiodfromthemiddleoftheseventeenthtothebeginningofthenineteenthcentury.Hischoiceofthisdividingpointisnotarbitrary.Itmarksthedecisivemomentinthedevelopmentofnatural-lawtheorythepointatwhichHobbes,'wieldingaremorselesslogic',altereditscourseforever,when'hewrestedasingleState-personalityfromtheindividualisticphilosophyofNaturalLaw'.6

TheperiodbeforethisbreakthroughischaracterisedbyGierkeasoneofintellectualconflict,drivenbytheconflictbetweenitstwodominantthemes.Thefirstoftheseistheproblemofsovereignty,bywhichnatural-lawtheoristswererequiredtoidentifythepre-eminentauthoritywithinthestate;thesecondisthelanguageofthesocietas,whichisessentiallycontract;andtheissuebetweenthem(beforeHobbesresolvedit),thatthelanguageofcontractwasunabletogenerateasovereigntythatwassingle.Instead,sovereigntywaspermanentlydividedbetweenthetwopartiestothecontractofgovernment,thepeopleandtheirrulers,eachofwhom,aspartnersincontract,hadrightsagainsttheother.Theresult,asGierkesawit,wasconfusion.Ontheonehand,therequirementthatsovereigntybefoundedonthebasisofcontractleftthestateinaconditionof

5Gierke'ssourcesareinfacttheLatinLeviathan(drawnupbyHobbeshimselfin1668)andalsoHobbes'searlierworkDecive(firstpublishedinitsoriginalLatinin1642).IhavebasedmyaccountonLeviathanbecause

itistherethatHobbesgivesbyfarhisfullestaccountofpersonsandthingspersonated.Howandwhyhearrivedatthisdevelopedpositionisaninterestingquestioninitsownright,whichcannotbediscussedhere.Gierkehimselfmakeslittleofthedifferencesbetweenthetwoworks,invariablycitingonealongsidetheother.Theonlydirectcontrasthedrawsconcernsthequestionofwhetherornotthepersonofthecommonwealthcan'sin'ThisquestionisnotdiscussedinLeviathan,butinDeciveHobbesarguesthatthestatecannotsin,sincesinsareoffencesagainstnaturallaw,whichholdfornaturalmenonly.ThisGierkecomparestotheargumentcontainedinchapterXXIIofLeviathan,whereHobbesallowsthatadelictcanbeattributedsimultaneouslytoa'systeme'andtoitsindividualmembers.ThedifferencebetweenthesetwopositionsGierkeexplainsasthedifferencebetweenpeccatum(sin)anddelictum(legaloffence):one,asa'natural'matter,cannotholdforanysystem;theother,asacivilmatter,canholdforanysystemexceptthecommonwealth,whichisnotsubjecttocivillaw.6Gierke,Naturallaw,p.61.

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evergreaterdisunity,rivenbytherivalclaimsofthecontractingparties.Ontheotherhand,attemptstounifythestatebyclaimingpre-eminenceforoneorotherofthesepartiesoftenhadlittleornocontractualbasis,andnatural-lawtheoristsincorporatedwithinargumentsostensiblyrestingontheconceptofthesocietas,ideasdrawnfromother,less'natural'sources.Inessence,thesearchforasinglesovereigntyleftnatural-lawtheoristsstilldependentuponideaswhichoriginatedinmedievalcorporationtheory,wherealonewasgeneratedtheunityonwhichsinglesovereigntyseemedtodepend.Thusthestateassocietasdependedupontheideaoftheuniversitastopreventitfromfallingapart.

Gierkeexplainsthisdependenceintermsofpersonality;andpersonalityheunderstandsintermsofrights.Sovereignty,forGierke,asformanyGermanjurists,isoneoftherightsofpubliclaw,andrights,inGermanjurisprudence,arealwaysbornebypersons.Therecanbenosinglesovereignty,therefore,withoutasinglepersontobearit,andcontractcannotgeneratesinglepersonality.Forjustasthecontractofgovernmentcannotunitethestate,socontractcannotcreateaunifiedpersonwithinthestatetowhomsovereigntycanbeascribed.Itonlycreatessocietates,whichare,asGierkeputsit(intermsofwhichHobbeswouldapprove)'meresystems...ofindividuals'.7Thusattemptstorendereitherthepeople,ortheirrulers,asinglepersontendedtofallbackonthenonnatural'fictions'ofcorporateunity,8andtoembracetheorganicistterminologyinwhichsuchunitywascommonlyexpressed.Thepresidingspiritofnatural-lawtheorywasmechanisticitspoliticalstructureswerebuiltoutofnatureratherthanbynatureandyet,Gierkepointsout,'therewashardlyasinglesystemofpoliticaltheorywhichentirelyescaped[the]''organic"tendencyofthought'.9

Hobbes,whodidmostofalltobringthiseratoaclose,wasalsohimselfapartofit.TheconceptuallanguageofLeviathanisthe

mechanisticlanguageofcontract;yet,asGierkeacknowledges,the

7Seeibid.,p.45.8Theseinclude,forexample,whatGierkecallsthe'fiction'ofmajority-votingthatis'theidentificationofmajority-willwiththecommonwillofall'(seeibid.,p.47).ThisideawasconsistentwiththeprinciplesoftheRomanlawofcorporations(universitates),butitwasnotconsistentwiththeRomanlawofpartnerships(societas),whichrequiredthatalldecisionsbeagreedunanimously.The'fiction'ofmajority-votingwasutilisedbyHobbesinordertoallowforsovereignassemblies,butHobbesdidnotdependuponit,sincehiscommonwealthcould(and,whereverpossible,should)bebuiltwithoutrecoursetoit,utilisinginsteadtheunanimouscontractinthestaleofnatureinordertoauthoriseamonarchy.9Ibid.,pp.512.

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Leviathanitselfisfrequentlypresentedasanorganism,suchthatHobbesisable'toexpound,inminutestofdetail,itsanalogieswithalivingbeing'.10WhatdistinguishesHobbesfromearliernatural-lawtheoristsisthatthisconceptualandterminologicalconfusionwasinhiscaseunnecessary:hedoesnotneedtofallbackonorganicismbecausehisargumentmakessenseinpurelymechanisticterms.Ofcourse,thisraisestheinterestinghistoricalquestionofwhyHobbesneverthelesschosetoemploytheimageryofthelivingbody.ButGierkeisnotreallyinterestedinthispoint.WhatconcernshimisHobbes'sremarkableachievementinrescuingnatural-lawtheoryfromtheapparentlyirreconcilabletensionswithinitbetweensocietasandsovereignty,partnershipandpersonalitybyprovidingapurelycontractualbasisfortheunifiedstate.Heshowedthatthestatedidnothavetobeunderstoodinthetermsoftheuniversitasinordertobeaperson,nortobedescribedinthelanguageoftheorganisminordertobewhole.

Thisachievement,asGierkeinterpretsit,wasdoublysignificant.First,itsolvedtheproblemofsinglesovereignty.Butsecond,itrevealedhowlittlewasachievedbydoingso.ForHobbeswasonlyabletoarriveatthesinglepersonalityofthegroupthroughtheartificialpersonalityofitsrepresentative,andartificialpersonality,inGierke'sterms,wasaninadequatebasisonwhichtorestthepersonalityofthestate.Indeed,Gierkearguesthatitinevitablygeneratesanemptyconceptionofthestate'spersonalitybecauseitaffordstothestatenopersonalexistenceapartfromthepersonalityofthesovereign,andsono'real'personalityatall.GierkefindsevidenceforthislackinthecompletedisjunctionhediscernsinHobbes'stheorybetweenthesupposed'whole'ofthestate'spersonalityandthe'parts'whichallgrouppersonsmustcontain.Likeallnatural-lawtheorists,Hobbesbeginswiththeindividual,astheonly'whole'(withthepossibleexceptionofthefamily)providedinnature.Butunlikeall

previousnatural-lawtheorists,heisabletoconstructfromtheseindividualcomponentsagreaterwholebywhicheachistranscended.However,suchtranscendenceasHobbesmanagesisforGierkeequivalenttoannihilation'hehadmadetheindividualomnipotent,withtheobjectofforcinghimtodestroyhimselfinstantlyinvirtueofhisownomnipotence,andthusenthroningthe"bearer"oftheState-authority[i.e.thepersonofthesovereign]asa

10Ibid.,p.41.

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mortalgod'.11Hobbesattainsastatewhole,therefore,butatthecostoftheparts.Thereisnoplurality-in-unityinLeviathan;thereisonlyunity,intheunifiedpersonofthesovereign.

ItisimportanttoemphasiseatthispointthattheGierkeanconceptofplurality-in-unity,thoughitgivesconceptualprioritytounity,doesnotgranttothegroupunitthecapacityevertodowithoutplurality.Thegroupunit,orgroupperson,mustcontainotherunits,orpersons,includingthepersonsofothergroups.ThistheLeviathan,insofarasitisanautomaton,doesnotdo.GierkeacknowledgesthatHobbes'sorganicismallowshimtoportrayindividualsandgroupswithinthestateasthoughpartsofalivingwhole.12Buthealsorecognisesthatthisisincidentaltothecentralissueofthestate's'personality',whichiscontainedexclusivelyinthepersonofthesovereign.The'systemes'withinHobbes'scommonwealtharenotpartsofitsperson;theystandapartfromit,andinneedofregulationbyit,justbecausethestate'spersonisrepresentedbythesovereign,andsovereignsdonotcontainanyotherpersonsthantheirown.SoHobbes'ssinglestatepersonalityisseentoemergefromanargumentwhichstartswiththenaturalpersonoftheindividual,concludeswiththeartificialpersonofthesovereign,andallowsnothinginbetween.Hiscommonwealthhas,inGierke'swords,apersonalitythatis'purelyexternal'.13

ThisextremelynarrowconceptionofthestateleadsGierketosuggestthatthemovefromthepersonalityofthesovereigntothepersonalityofthecommonwealthisinfactnothingmorethana'technicaldesignation'ifonemovesbeyondthepersonofthesovereign,onefindsnothingtherebut'mere,nakedpower'.14Unsurprisingly,GierkealsosuggeststhattheHobbesian'solution'totheproblemofsovereigntymighthavebeenexpectedtoleadothertheoriststoquestionthevalueofthewholetraditionwhichthrewupsuchaprobleminthefirstplace.Butitdidnot,and'insteadoffallingintoaprematuredeath,[thenatural-lawtheoryofthestate]drewanewand

unexpectedvitalityfromtheverycrisisthatthreateneditslife'.15Thiscrisishastobeunderstooddialectically.Hobbes'sreconciliationofsovereigntyandcontractrepresenteda'materialisticandmechanisticconsummation'ofnatural-lawtheory,16butitalso

11Ibid.,p.61.12HobbessaysatthestartofchapterXXIIofLeviathanthat'systemes'aretobeunderstoodasresembling'thesimilarparts,orMusclesofaBodynaturall'(seeHobbes,Leviathan,p.155).13Gierke,Naturallaw,p.61.14Seeibid.15Ibid.16Ibid.

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meantthattherewasnowmuchtowhichnatural-lawtheoryitselfcouldnolongerbereconciled.Toputitintechnicalterms,Hobbes's'solution'representsasynthesiswithinthenatural-lawtraditionbutalsotheantithesisofallthoseideaswhichstoodoutsidethattradition(includingsomeofthe'organic'ideaswhichfoundtheirwayintoLeviathan).Thusachoicehadtobemadebetweentheideaswhichcouldnolongerbereconciled,whichmeantinessenceachoicebetweenthejuristicandmoralconceptionsofordercontainedinHobbes'sthought.

Achoicewasmade.Natural-lawtheorydidnotdie,andEuropeanpoliticalthoughtcontinueditsfixationwiththejuristicconceptionofsovereignty.Whatismore,sovereigntysoonrevealeditselftobeanythingbutanarrowidea,andwithintheframeworkestablishedbyHobbesitprovedpossibletochallengemanyHobbesianassumptions.Despitehispreferenceformonarchy,Hobbeshadnot'solved'theissueofthebestformofgovernment,andsidesmightstillbetakenbyapologistsofaristocracy,democracyandeven,withintheconfinesofsinglesovereignty,those'mixed'(or,astheywerelatercalled,'constitutional')formsofgovernmentwhichhadbeenanathematoHobbeshimself.Meanwhile,withRousseaucamethepossibilitythattheconditionsofsinglesovereigntycouldbemetwithouttheabnegationoftheindividualentailedbytheauthorisationofasovereigngovernment.LikeHobbes,Rousseauarguedthatthestatewasasingleperson;butunlikeHobbes,hebelievedthestate'ssinglepersonalitycould,andshould,beattainedwithoutrepresentation.Rousseau'ssovereignisformedoftheindividualswhocontractwithoneanotherinthestateofnature.Thiswas,ofcourse,ahugelysignificantdifference,anditmarksafurtherturning-pointinthedevelopmentofnatural-lawtheory.ButGierkeremainsinsistentthattheideasofRousseauandHobbesconstitutevariationsonasinglethemeRousseau'sstatewasstill,asRousseauhimselfrecognised,an

'artificialperson'.17Solongasartificial,the

17ThedifferencebetweenRousseauandHobbesliesinthefactthatitisthestateitselfforRousseauthatisartificial,notjustthesovereign.Rousseauisthereforequiteclearthatthoughartificial,thestateisnottobeunderstoodasafictitiousperson,apointhemakesexplicitlywhenhewritesofthedutiesofcitizenship:'Foreveryindividualasamanmayhaveaprivatewillcontraryto,ordifferentfrom,thegeneralwillthathehasasacitizen.Hisprivateinterestmayspeakwithaverydifferentvoicefromthatofthepublicinterest;hisabsoluteandnaturallyindependentexistencemaymakehimregardwhatheowestothecommoncauseasagratuitouscontribution,thelossofwhichwouldbelesspainfulforothersthanthepaymentisonerousforhim;andfancyingthattheartificialpersonwhichconstitutesthestateisamerefictitiousentity(sinceitisnotaman),hemightseektoenjoy

(footnotecontinuedonnextpage)

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state'spersonalitycouldneverbeunderstoodasunitaryinitself,butonlyasawholefoundeduponsomepriorarrangementamongunitaryindividuals,'eitherontheCollectivebasisofunanimousagreement[inRousseau'scase],oronthealternativebasisofRepresentationbyasinglepersonorbody[inHobbes's]'.18Evenasitdeveloped,natural-lawtheoryafterHobbescontinuedtorevolveexclusivelyaroundtherelationbetweenindividualsandthesovereignstatetheyhadcreatedforthemselves,anditisforGierkenocoincidencethatHobbesandRousseaushared,amongotherthings,amutualantipathyforunregulatedgroupactivity.19Therewasnoplaceforgrouplifewithintheirstates,becausetherewasnothing'within'theirstatesatallthenatural-lawtheoryofthestatewas,andwastoremain,'external'.

III

ItistheclearimplicationofGierke'sargumentthatthechoicedescribedabovewasthewrongone.Inevitably,choiceisanambivalentconceptinthecontextofaHegelianhistory.YetGierkedoesatleastsuggestthattherewasanalternativetothepathonwhichHobbestooknatural-lawtheory.ForifHobbes'sconceptionofthestate'spersonalityrepresentsa'solution',itisfairtosaythatbyGierkeanstandardstheremusthavebeensomethingwrongwiththeproblem.TheproblemwhichHobbessolvedwastheproblemofsinglesovereignty,andtodosoheadoptedpremiseswhichGierkedescribesas'arbitrarilyassumed'.Hisargument,thoughconsistent,wascontingent,anditwascontingentupontheissueofsinglesovereignty.Withouttheprioritygiventothatissue,itmighthaveprovedpossibletogenerateaconceptionofthestatecontainingthatdiversityandvitalityamongits'parts'whichHobbeswastodeny.Moreoveritdidprovepossibleforonetheorist,thejuristJohannesAlthusius,20tobuildfromthecontractualfoundationsofthenatural-lawtraditionapoliticaltheorywhichassuredforallgroupswhat

(footnotecontinuedfrompreviouspage)

therightsofacitizenwithoutdoingthedutiesofasubject'(J.-J.Rousseau,Thesocialcontract,transM.Cranston(Harmondsworth,1968),pp.645).18Gierke,Naturallaw,p.136.19Rousseaufamouslyinsistedthat'thereshouldbenosectionalassociationswithinthestate'(Rousseau,Thesocialcontract,p.73).20JohannesAlthusius(15571638),whoalthoughborninGermanylivedandworkedintheNetherlands,waseffectively'discovered'byGierke.HiswritinghadbeenmoreorlessentirelyneglecteduntilGierkedevotedamonographtohimin1878,entitledJohannesAlthusiusunddieEntwicklungdernaturrechtlichenStaatstheorien.

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Gierkecalls'anorganicplaceinthestructureofcivilsociety'.21IntwotreatisespublishedmorethanthirtyyearsbeforeLeviathan,Althusiusarguedthatthestatewasbutoneofaseriesofassociationstheothersarethefamily,thefellowship(Genossenschaft),thelocalcommunity(Gemeinde)andtheprovinceeachwithitsownparticularfunctions.Thestatecouldstillbedistinguishedfromlesserassociationsbyvirtueofitsbeingsovereign;butotherassociationswerenottobeunderstoodasthecreationsofthestateinvirtueofthatsovereignty.Eachassociation,includingthestate,wastheproductofacontractualarrangementamonglesserassociationsseekingthesecurityofabroadercommunity(familiesinfellowships,fellowshipsinlocalcommunities,andsoon).Everyassociation,therefore,wasassuredofitsexistencewithinthestate,becausethestate,asconceivedbyAlthusius,couldnotexistwithoutthem.

Thefundamentalassumptionwhichlaybehindthisargumentisasimpleone.Gierkesetsitoutasfollows:'Ifacontractualagreementbetweenindividualshadpowerenoughtoproduceasovereigncommonwealth,itmustalsopossessthepowerofproducingFellowshipsandlocalcommunities.'22Itisalineofthought(disregardingthespecificformsofassociationinvolved)whichhassomeresonanceforalltheoristsinthenatural-lawtraditionevenHobbesacknowledgesthatassociationsotherthanthestatecanbeconstructedalongsimilarlines,sinceallgroupsofmencanberepresentedbyartificialpersons.WhereHobbesdiffersfromAlthusiusisinhisinsistencethatthestate'ssovereigntydependsuponallothergroupsinfactbeingconstructedalongdifferentlinesthanthestatethesovereignrepresentativeisauthorisedbyagroupofindividuals,whereasallotherrepresentativesmustbeauthorisedbythesovereign.ThisistheconditionofwhatIearliercalledjuristicorder.ButforAlthusius,theauthorityofassociationswasnot

conditionalinthissenseatall.Eachassociationinhisjuristicschemehadanauthorityderivedsolelyfromitsmembers,andtheresultwasaschemewhichaccommodatedtheconditionsofwhatmightbecalledjuristicdisorder.Thisisinpartaconsequenceofhisreliance,likeallothernatural-lawtheoristsbeforeHobbes,onacontractofsocietyprecedingtheestablishmentofgovernment,suchthatsovereigntywithinthestatewasessentiallydivided.Althusiusinsists,inGierke'sterms,that'itisthecommunityoftheRuledwhichisthetrue"Subject"orownerofthecommon

21Gierke,Naturallaw,p.71.22Ibid.,p.76.

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authority...andasthetrue"Subject"ofthecommonauthoritythecommunityissuperiortotheofficerentrustedwithitsactualexercise'.23However,thisconceptionofauthoritydoesnotholdforthestatealone.EveryassociationinAlthusius'sschemeisgeneratedbya'contractofsociety',andthereisthusprovidedineveryassociationthegroundsforcommunaldisobedienceofitsofficers.Whatismore,everyassociationinAlthusius'sscheme(exceptthefamily,whichiscreatedbyindividuals)iscreatedbyotherassociations.So,notonlycantheruledofeveryassociationresisttheirrulers,buttherecanbenorulersofthestate,orcivilsociety,withouttheexistenceofawholerangeoflessersocieties,eachwithrulersoftheirown.ThiswasthestateofaffairsthatHobbesdreaded.Itremainsconsistentwithaconceptionofsovereignty,totheextentthattheassociationwithwhichthisprocessstops,thestate,isdistinctfromtherest,becausepartofnoassociationgreaterthanitself.ButbyHobbesianstandards,thisisapurelytechnicaldesignation.ForHobbes,thestateissovereignbecauseotherassociationsareitscreation.ForAlthusius,thestateissovereignbecausethereverseistruehisstateiscreatedbyotherassociations,andsovereignbecauseitcreatesnootherassociationsitself.

Thisdoesnot,ofcourse,meanthatAlthusiuswaschampioningdisorder.Hissystemallowedforresistance,24butitdidnotencourageit,anditwasnaturallyassumedthatinawell-orderedstateresistancewouldbeunnecessary.Awell-orderedstateontheAlthusianmodelwasoneinwhicheverygroup,includingthestate,exercisedauthorityinitsownappointedsphere,andtheofficersofeverygroup,includingtheofficersofthestate,dutifullyservedthegroupthathad'elected'them.Thisconceptionofpoliticalexistence,embracingeveryaspectofsocialexistence,andeverygroupinsociety,closelycorrespondedtoGierke'sconceptionofagenuinelyunifiedsociety,inwhicheverypartisanaspectofthewhole.Crucially,however,Althusiusstillhad

torelyonideasdrawnfromoutsidethestricttermsofhisnatural-lawsystemtogeneratethatdegreeoforderonwhichthissocialunityultimatelydepended.Oneofthesewastheideaof'divineorder'whatGierkecalls'thatdivineorderoftheworldwhichisexhypothesirevealingitselfnaturallyinthis

23Ibid.,p.74.24RichardTuckhasrecentlydescribedAlthusiusas'settingoutmanyofthefundamentalsofCalvinistresistancetheory'(seeR.Tuck,Philosophyandgovernment,15721651(Cambridge,1993),p.158).

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natural-lawsystem'.25TheotherwastheideaoftheGenossenschaft,orfellowship.Thesewereessentially'medieval'ideas(inGierke'ssenseofthatword),andtheydonotaccordwiththejuristicbasisoftheAlthusiansystem,whichiscontract.YetAlthusiusmakesuseofthemforpreciselythatreason.Hisjuristicsystem,thoughcompatiblewithorder,doesnotdescribeorder.Whatitdescribesisaseriesofcontractsleadingfromtheindividualtothestateviathegroupsinbetween.Juristically,thepartsmustalwaysprecedethewhole,andthereforeunitycannotresidewithinthesystem,butmustcometoitfromoutside.Gierkerecognisesthis,andherecognises,inconsequence,thatAlthusius,forallhisefforts,cannotachievethesynthesisfromwhichtrueplurality-in-unitymightbederived.Acontractualpartnershipcouldnot,evenbyAlthusius,bereconciledwith'anythingmorethanacollectivesumofassociatedindividuals'.26ThusGierkeisforcedtoconclude:

TheTeutonicideaofthefreedomofcorporatebodiesisintroduced[byAlthusius]intothesphereoftheLawofNature;aninherentexistenceisvindicatedforassociationsoveragainsttheState;andyet,inspiteofeveryefforttoattaintheideaofatrueandorganicGroup-beingbytheuseoftheTeutonicconceptionof'Fellowship',thereisafailuretomakeeithertheStateorthecorporationawholewhichisreallyone,andcanassertitselfagainsttheindividualinthestrengthofitsowninherentexistence.27

Althusiusfailstocreateaunitywhichisanythingmorethanunity-in-plurality,andwhereHobbesgivesusthewholewithouttheparts,Althusiusintheendcanonlygiveusthepartswithoutthewhole.

Thisfailureisafailureofnaturallaw,anditdemonstratesthatthefailuresofnaturallawarenotsimplycontingentupontheissueofsinglesovereignty.TheAlthusian'solution'cannotbethewholeanswer,anymorethantheHobbesiansolutioncan.Whatbothlackedwastheonethingthatnaturallawwasunabletoprovide:aconceptionof'real'grouppersonality.Thegenuinelyunifiedgrouppersonsof

naturallaw,liketheHobbesiancommonwealth,werefictions,andthuslifeless.Meanwhile,theapparentlyvitalgroupsofnaturallaw,liketheAlthusianfellowship,wereultimatelyjustaslifeless,fortheywereartificial,andhadnorealpersonalityoftheirown.Realgrouppersonshadtobebothunifiedandvital,likeatrueorganism,andtrueorganicismwasonlytobefoundinthepoliticalthoughtofthemiddleages.ThisGierkehadestablishedinthethirdvolumeofDasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrecht,firstpublishedin1881and

25Gierke,Naturallaw,p.74.26Ibid.,p.76.27Ibid.

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dealingwithancientandmedievaldoctrinesofstateandcorporation.RealgrouppersonalityiscontingentonwhatGierkecallsinthatvolume'genuinelymedieval'thought,anditisherethatanalternativetobothHobbesandAlthusiuscanbefound.

IV

Politicalthought,Gierkewrites,'whenitisgenuinelymedievalstartsfromtheWhole,butascribesanintrinsicvaluetoeveryPartialWhole,downtoandincludingtheIndividual'.28Thisisthetrueplurality-in-unity,anditsdistinguishingcharacteristicisthereciprocitybetweenwholeandpartsdenotedbytheconceptofthe'PartialWhole'.Ifeachpartreflectsthewhole,thennotonlymusteachpartbeawholeinitsownright,butthewholemustshareapurposeorendwiththepurposesorendsofeachofitsparts.Forjustasacorporationcannotbealessercommonwealthunlessthecommonwealthiscapableofactingasacorporation,sonoindividualorgroupcanbeapartialwholeunlessthewholeiscapableofactinginthemannerofthepartsitcontains.Thewhole,therefore,mustbeapurposiveorganisation,containingindividualsorgroupswithpurposesoftheirown.Andthisisonlypossible,asOakeshottrecognised,ifthepurposesofwholeandpartsarebroadlyaligned.Yetthereciprocitybetweenthemmeansthatthepurposesofthepartscannotberegulatedbythepurposeofthewhole,asOakeshottbelievedwasinevitable,sincethepurposeofeachparthastobeallowedanintrinsicvalue.Nor,moreover,canthepurposeofthewholebeconditionedbythepurposeofitsparts,sincetheideaofplurality-in-unitymuststartfromthewhole.Instead,bothrequireasharedendoutsidethemselves.Inmedievalpoliticalthought,thatendwasGod,andplurality-in-unitywasfoundedonwhatGierkecalls'adivinelyinstitutedHarmonywhichpervadestheUniversalWholeandeverypartthereof'.29Fornatural-lawtheorists,theuniversalwholewaseithertheindividual,orhisnemesis,thestate.

ButinthisearliertraditionitwasliterallytheUniverse'thatCivitasDei,thatGod-State,whichcomprehendstheheavensandearth'andeverythingmightbeidentifiedwithit,notjusteveryindividual,buteverygroup,every'componentpartofthatorderingoftheworldwhichexistsbecauseGodexists'.30

28Gierke,Politicaltheoriesofthemiddleage,trans.F.W.Maitland(Cambridge,1900),p.7.29Ibid.,p.8.30Ibid.

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Thisvisionoftheworldnaturallylentitselftoorganicimagery,wherebytheorganisationoftheuniverseandofeachgroupwithinitmightbecomparedtotheliteral'organisation'(thearrangementoforgans)displayedbythelivingbody.Yet,aswehaveseen,theuseofsuchimagerywasnotofitselfsufficienttodenoteagenuinelymedievalconceptionofgrouplife,anymorethananrelianceonthedivineorderingoftheworldwassufficienttorenderAlthusiusagenuinelymedievalthinker.Whatwasneeded,beyondametaphoricalorametaphysicalunderstandingoftheplurality-in-unityofhumansociety,wasjustwhatAlthusiusandothernatural-lawtheoristslacked:ajuristicconceptionofthisunitywhichrenderedgroupsbothequivalenttoandindependentoftheindividualstheycontained.ThesocietasofRomanlawprovedincapableofgeneratingsuchaconception,butthiswasnottrueofRomanlawasawhole,forintheuniversitastheRomanshadcreatedaformofassociationwhichescapedthemechanisticconstraintsofcontract,andcouldtakeitsplaceinthelegalfirmamentalongsidetheindividual,asaunitinitsownright.Itwastotheuniversitasthatmedievalthinkersturned,onceRomanideasagainbecameprevalent,inordertoconveyinjuristictermstheirsensethatgroups,likeindividuals,wereaspectsofauniversalwhole,andtherefore,insomesense,universalsthemselves.

Becauseofitsorigins,however,theideaoftheuniversitasalsocontainedwithinittheseedsofdestructionofthemedievalworld.ConceptionsofgroupunityonlyhadwhatGierkewouldconsiderasecurejuristicfoundationwhentheycouldbeexpressedintermsofpersonality.Itwascertainlypossibletothinkofuniversitatesaspersons,andthecharacteristicsocialunitsofmedievallifeitsguilds,cities,churchesandcollegeswereoftendescribedinthelanguageofpersonalityatthesametimeasbeingdescribedinthelanguageofuniversality.Butthepersonalitysodescribedcouldonlybeofaparticular,limitedkind.FortheuniversitasremainedwhatGierke

calls'aninstrumentforgedinthelaboratoryofPrivateLaw'.31Thisisapregnantphrase,anditcontainsamassofcontroversy.YettheessentialpointthatGierkewasmakingcanbeexpressedquitesimply:universitates,becauseconstructsofprivatelaw,couldonlybepossessedofapersonalitywhichwasaconstructalso.Auniversitaswasnotaconstructinthemechanisticsensethat

31Ibid.,p.68.

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contractualpartnershipsareconstructs;rather,itwasacreationofthelawitself,agrouppersonindependentofthepersonalityofitsmembersbutdependentonthelegalframeworkwithinwhichitspersonalidentityisformulated.Itwas,inotherwords,apersonaficta.Intime,thislineofreasoningdevelopedintowhatbecameknownas'theconcessiontheory',bywhichitwasdeterminedthatcorporatepersonalitydependedineachcaseupontheexplicitsanctionoftheultimatearbiterofprivatelaw,whowassovereign.InHobbesianlanguage,theconcessiontheoryinsistedthatitwasinspecific'letters',notin'generallaws',thatthepersonalityofauniversitasmustbedescribed.Ifso,theuniversitascouldhardlystandasthemodelforthecompleterangeofassociationswhichpopulatedthemedievallandscape,ifonlybecause,asHobbeshimselfconceded,thesettingdowninlettersofeverygroup'spersonalityisnotalwayseasy,norevenpossible.Infact,muchofthecontroversysurroundingmedievalcorporationtheoryrelatestotheissueofconcession,andtothequestionofwhetheritwasadoctrineformalisedinmedievaljuristicthoughttotheextentthatlaterjurists,includingGierke,weretosuggest.32YetevenifGierkedidoverstatetheimportanceofformalconcessionattheexpenseofother,moregeneralisedmeansofacquiringcorporatepersonality,hisfundamentalpointstillholds.Noconceptionofgroupunitywhichoperatedexclusivelyinthedomainofprivatelawcouldsatisfactorilyaccountforthosegroupswhichexistedinthepublicsphere,anymorethanthe'systemes'existingwithinaHobbesiancommonwealth,whetherauthorisedbylawsorbyletters,couldserveasamodelforthecommonwealthitself.Atrulymedievalconceptionofgrouplifehadtoaccommodatewithinasinglejuristicschemeallassociationsguildsandcities,churchesandtheuniversalChurch,naturalfamiliesandtheFamilyofManandsorequiredaconceptionofpersonalitywhichcouldcontainthewholeworldofmen,notjustthatareamappedoutbythelawsmenhappenedtohavemade.Becauseidentifiedwithanentirelyman-

madeworld,theuniversitasremainedafiction,asitsHobbesian

32Anumberofmedievaljuristsacceptedthatvariousgroupscouldformthemselvesintocorporateassociationswithouthavingtosecurethespecificsanctionofahigherlegalauthority.Allthatwasrequiredwasthattheybeassociatedforsome'justcause';wherethiswasso,corporatestatuscouldbesaidtoderivefromtheauthorityofthegroupthemselves.ItisnowgenerallyacceptedthatinhiskeennesstoemphasisethecontrastbetweenRomanismandGermanism.Gierkeignoredmuchofthismiddleground(see,forexample,A.Black,GuildsandcivilsocietyinEuropeanpoliticalthoughtfromthetwelfthcenturytothepresent(London,1984),pp.204).

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equivalent,theperson-in-law,remainsafiction,whetherpossessedofitsownlettersornot.Theuniversitascouldnot,therefore,becountedauniversalmodelofgrouppersonality,unlesstheuniversewastobedeemedafictionitself.

Thoughsuitedtotheorganicismofmedievalthought,theconceptoftheuniversitascouldnotescapetheconditioningofitsRomanorigins.Itremainedanantique-modern,ratherthanamedieval,conception,anditsinabilitytobridgethegapwellillustratesthefundamentaldistinctionbetweenthesetwomodesofthought,restingonthestrictdistinctionthatantique-modernthoughtalonedrawsbetweenpublicandprivatelawbetweenthelawswhichholdwithinstatesandthelawswhichalsoholdforthem.Thisdistinctionfoundvariousformsofexpression,fromitsRomanoriginsinthecontrastbetweenIusCivileontheonehandandIusGentiumandIusNaturaleontheother,throughtothequintessentiallymoderncontrastbetweenpositiveandnaturallaw.Initlaythesourceofthatcharacteristicengagementofantique-modernthoughtwiththeindividualsorgroupswhoweretakentobeboundbyonesetoflawsbutnotbytheotherthoseindividualsorgroupswhocametobeknownassovereign.ItwasadistinctionwhichreacheditsapogeeintheformprovidedforitbyHobbes,whosesovereignwas,byGierke'sstandards,freedfromtheconstraintsoflawaltogether.33Anditwasadistinctionwhichgenuinelymedievalthoughtcouldnotrecognise,sinceamedievalconceptionoftheuniversecouldallownosubstantivedistinctionbetweentherulesgoverninganyofitsparts,whetherindividuals,statesorgroupswithinstates.ThiswasthereasonwhythemedievalworldwasfinallyunabletoaccommodateRomanideas,eventhoseideasliketheuniversitaswhichavoidedtheindividualisticbias,anddivisiveeffects,ofcontract.Intheend,genuinelymedievalthoughtrequiredrecoursefromRomanism,andrecoursefromRomanism,Gierkebelieved,wasbesttobefoundinthelifeandthoughtofthe

Germanicpeoples.34

33GierkewritesofHobbes'spoliticalphilosophy:'Withalogicalinevitabilityallpublicrightisabsorbed,ineverypossibleformofState,byaSovereigntyoftheRulerwhichisabsolutelyunlimitedandillimitable,irresponsibleandomnipotent,freefromallobligationoflawandduty'(Gierke,Naturallaw,p.60,myitalics).34Ofcourse,themanwhoplayedthemostprominentpartinshapingmedievalpoliticalthoughtwasneitheraRomanistnoraGermanist.ButbecauseAristotledoesnotfiteasilyintoGierke'scontrastbetweenantique-modernandmedievalthought(hewasbothantiqueandmedieval)hisplaceinallthiscannotbediscussedhere(whichdoesnotmeanthatGierkedidnotdiscussit).

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V

Gierke'shistoryofGermanicconceptionsofgrouplifeoccupiesthewholeofboththefirstandsecondvolumesofDasdeutscheGenossenshaftsrecht,whichhepublishedin1868and1873respectively,andnosummaryofitcanbeattemptedhere.Whatcanbeattemptedisanoutlineofthemannerinwhichsuchconceptionsrepresentanalternativetotheantique-modernideaswithwhichvolumesIIIandivdeal.ForitisessentialtoanunderstandingofGierke'sworkasawholetorecognisethatthereceptionofRomanlawintotheintellectualworldofmedievalEuropedidnotmarktheeffectivebeginningofmedievaljuristicthinkingaboutassociations.Rather,Romanlawwasreceivedintoacontinentwhich,inparts,alreadypossessedajuristicschemewithinwhichtoframegroupactivity.Thosepartslaytothenorth,inEurope's'teutonic'regions,andtheschemewasthatoftheGenossenschaft,orfellowship.Tocallthisschememedievalisinonesenseamisnomer,sinceitwasalsotimeless,atleasttotheextentthatitsoriginswerelostintime.AsGierkewrites,evocatively,atthestartofthefirstvolumeofDasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrecht:

Whentheyfirstenteredhistory,theGermanicpeopleshadalreadylongagodevelopedbeyondthoseearliestbeginningsofcommunallifewhichwecanstillobserveamongprimitivepeoples.Thefamilyconnections,whichamong[Germanic]peoplestooatonetimewereundoubtedlytheonlyorganisedassociationsconsciousoftheircommonbond,hadextendedtoformbiggercommunities,inwhichindividualsareheldtogetherbyabondotherthanbloodrelationship.35

Thesecommunitieswerefellowships,andtheirbondswerebasednotonbloodbutonlaw,albeitofaprimitivekind.ThusGermanicconceptionsofthegrouphadajuristicbasiswhichwasnotspecificallymedieval,andwhichwasindependentofthosetwincolossi,ChurchandEmpire,bywhichspecificallymedieval

jurisprudencewasovershadowed.AndyettheGenossenschaftcanstillbecountedadistinctivelymedievalidea,forthesimplereasonthatitwasbasedonaconceptionofplurality-in-unity.TheideaoftheGenossenschaftpostulatedaworldinwhichmenformed,andwereloyalto,groupswhichwereneithermerecollectionsofindividualsnormerecreationsofasuperiorlegalauthority.Fellowshipsweregroupsintheirownright,andinconsequencemightbedeemed'real'group

35Gierke,Communityinhistoricalperspective,ed.A.Black(Cambridge,1990),p.13.

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persons.AGenossenschaftwasapersonbecauseitwasalegalentityitwasasubjectofrights.Itwasreal,however,justbecauseitwasnotanentitycreatedbylawitwasnottheproductofsomecontingentlegalarrangement,whethercontractualorconcessionary.ItispossibletodrawacomparisonherewiththeaccountofpersonsandthingspersonatedprovidedbyHobbes,eventhoughHobbes'saccountiscouchedindifferentterms(itdoesnotspeakofrights).The'right-subjectivity'oftheGierkeanfellowshipmakesofitabasicunittowhichlegalcapabilities(suchasownership)canbeascribed,aspersonality,inHobbes'sterms,determinesthebasicjuristicunitstowhichtheownershipofwordsandactionscanbeascribed.YetitistothenaturalpersoninHobbes'saccountthattheGenossenschaftmustbecompared.Itdoesnot,unlikeeithertheartificialorthefictitiousperson,dependforitspersonalityonsomepriorarrangementbetweenpersonstodetermineitslegalcapabilities.LawappliedtotheGenossenschaft,asitdidtotheindividual.ButitdidnotcreatetheGenossenschaft,anymorethanitcreatedtheindividualman.

Thereremains,though,oneimportantdifferencebetweenindividualsandfellowships,whichhelpstosetapartHobbes's'natural'personsfromGierke's'real'ones.Thefellowship,unliketheindividual,containsindividuals,whoarethemselvespersons,orsubjectsofrights.ThereisthuswhatmightbecalledaninternalaswellasanexternalaspecttothelegalstatusoftheGenossenschaft.Itsinternalaspecttakestheformofasetoflegalrelationsbetweenindividualsubjectsofrights;andtheserelationsmustreflecttheexternalaspectofthegroupasawhole,whichisitselfasubjectofrights.ItisthisreciprocitybetweenthepersonalityofthegroupandthepersonalityofitsmemberswhichrenderstheGenossenschaftatrueconceptionofplurality-in-unity.Itrequiresthateveryrightexercised,oractionownedbyagroup(awhole)mustbereflectedintherightsexercisedandactionsownedbyeachofitsmembers(itsparts).Theunityofthe

wholeismanifestedinthelegalrelationsofitsparts,andthisgeneratestheonethingwhichantique-modernjurisprudence,bothRomanandnatural,couldnotprovide:ajuristicallycoherentorganicism.Thisorganicismheldforanygroup,includingthosemadeupnotjustofindividualsbutofotherfellowships.Moreover,itwascompatiblewithaconceptionofthestatewithwhatGierkecalls'theoldGermanicideaoftheRechtsstaat'.36TheRechtsstaat(a

36SeeGierke,Politicaltheories,p.73.

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termmoreorlessuntranslatableintoEnglish)providedtheultimatelegalframeworkfortheideaoftheGenossenschaft,aswellasitselfbeinganextensionofthatidea.Itpostulatedastatewhichwasasubjectofrights(amongthemsovereignty,which,itshouldberemembered,wasunderstoodbyGierketobearightrequiringasubject)butwhose'right-subjectivity'couldonlyrestinthetotalityofthelegalrelationswithinit.Nopartofthestateneitherrulernorpeople,individualsnorassembliescould'represent'orinanyotherwaystandapartfromthewhole.Thewhole,rather,wasboundupwitheachofitsparts,individualandassociated,becauseeverypartwasanaspectofthewhole.

IftheideaoftheRechtsstaatseemsanobscureoneoutsideofitsGermaniccontext,itisbecauseitrepresentsthebroadestpossiblesynthesisofallthoseideaswhichhavethusfarbeenopposed.Gierkehimselfdescribesitas'theideaofaStatewhichexistedonlyinthelawandforthelaw,andwhosewholelifewasboundbyalegalorderthatregulatedalikeallpublicandallprivaterelationships'.37Itdoesnotfollowfromthisthatthedistinctionbetweenthepublicandtheprivatebreaksdownaltogethertheexternalrelationsofpersonswithinthestate,whetherindividualsorgroups,mustremainprivatesolongassuchpersonsarecapableofactingintheirownright,aswillbethecase,forexample,whenevertheycontractwithoneanother.Butitdoesfollowthatnodistinctioncanbedrawnbetweenpersonsonthebasisofthespherepublicorprivatetowhichtheybelong.AllpersonsintheRechtsstaatarepublicpartsaswellasprivatewholes,andsonopersoncaneitherbedeniedapublicfunction(i.e.reducedtothelevelofasubject),norclaimthewholeofpublicrightastheirown(i.e.raisedtothelevelofasovereign).Moreover,thedistinctionbetweenthepublicandtheprivatemustbreakdownaltogetherinthecaseofthestateitself.Asawholethestatehasanexternalaspect,butbecause,juristically,itistheultimatewhole,ithasnolegalrelations

outsideitself.38TheexternalaspectoftheRechtsstaatcanonlyberevealedinthelegalrelationsofitsparts.ThusthepersonalityoftheRechtsstaatresidesinthetotalityofitslaws,publicandprivate.This,then,istheultimatesynthesis.ItisasynthesisofthetwoideaswhichOakeshotttakestodivideup

37Ibid.38Gierkeexpressedthispointasfollows:'ThereexistsnolegallyorganisedgeneralityforwhichtheStatecouldbeamereparticular'(quotedinJ.D.Lewis,TheGenossenschaft-theoryofOttovonGierke(Madison,1935),p.73).

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Europeanconceptionsofthestate:likeasocietas,theRechtsstaatisanassociationfoundedentirelyonrule,orlaw;yetitretains,likeauniversitas,apersonalidentityofitsown.39Whatismore,theideaoftheRechtsstaatsynthesisesthatwhichHobbesleftunreconciled,foritgrantsthestateapersonalitywhileyetaccommodatingwithinitgroupswithpersonalitiesoftheirown.TheRechtsstaatisasynthesisofjuristicandmoralconceptionsoforder.

VI

TheideaoftheRechtsstaatmarksanappropriatelyHegelianconclusiontowhatisahighlydialecticalstory.Itis,however,atleastastoldabove,astorydifferentinoneimportantrespectfromanyHegelmighthavetold.ItrunsbackwardsbacknotjustfromvolumesIVandIIIofDasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrechttovolumesIIandI,butbackintime,fromHobbestoAlthusius,fromindividualisticnaturallawtounitarymedievaljurisprudence,fromreceivedRomanismtoprimitiveGermanism.Eachstepistowardsabroaderjuristicconceptionoftheassociationallifeofpoliticalcommunities,andsorepresentsaformofsynthesis.Yeteachsynthesisprecedesintimethedevelopmentofthoseideaswhicharereconciledbyit.Iftold

39AntonyBlack,inthemostrecentEnglisheditionofGierke,writesthatwhatGierkeunderstandsas'Rechtsstaat'isthesameaswhatOakeshottunderstandsas'stateassocietas'.Thiscannotberight.ThepassageinGierketowhichBlackappendsthisremarkspeaksof'thefreesystemofassociationinGermanlaw[recognising]thelesserassociationsofitscitizensascommunitieshomogenouswiththegreaterwhole,and[allowing]themindependentlifeevenwhileitusesthemasbuildingblocksfortheoverallstructure'(Gierke,Community,pp.11112,myitalics).Thisis,atleastinpart,whatGierkeunderstandsbytheRechtsstaat.IthasmuchincommonwithOakeshott'ssocietas.But,aswehaveseen,Oakeshottdidnotaccepteitherthatinthestateunderstoodassocietasotherassociationswouldbemodelledonthestatenorthatinsuch

astatethestateitselfwouldbebuiltoutofsuchassociations.Thatwastheprovinceofthestateunderstoodasuniversitas.ThisdoesnotmeanthatGierke'sRechtsstaatistobeunderstoodasauniversitasthatwouldbeequallydifficulttosustain,givenGierke'sinsistenceontheindependentlifeofassociationswithinthestate.ButjustwhatitdoesmeanisthatGierkewasattemptingsomesynthesisofthetwomodelsthatOakeshottsetsapart.ItshouldalsobepointedoutatthisjuncturethatGierkedidnotconceiveofthemodernGermanstateassolelyaRechtsstaat.ItwasalsotobeaKulturstaatthatis,astatewhichpropagatedasingleculturalideal.Inthissense,itwasclosertowhatOakeshottunderstoodbyauniversitas,ifnotquitewhathemeantbyan'enterpriseassociation'.However,itmustbepointedoutaswellthatGierke'sconceptionoftheKulturstaatwaswhollyboundupwithhisconceptionoftheRechtsstaat.Theculturethatwastobepropagatedwasaculturewhichfoundexpressioninlaw;andGierkewrotethatitwasthepurposeoftheKulturstaat'toformulateaslawtheconsciousnessofrightofthepeople'(quotedinLewis,TheGenossenschaft-theory,p.70).Inthissense,thecultureofGierke'sidealstatewastomanifestitselfaslaw,andlawwastomanifestitselfasaformofculture.ItistothisidealthattheidealconceptoftheRechtsstaatrefers.

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chronologically,therefore,thisisastorywhichassumesaverydifferentaspectfromthatgivenitabove.Itwilldescribethereplacementofbroaderconceptionsbynarrowerones,andtheincreasingdivergenceofideaswhichhadoncebeenunified:theunitaryRechtsstaatgiveswaybeforeRomanism,andsotoaseparationofthecorporatefromthecontractualsphere;induecourse,theunitaryoutlookofmedievaljuristsissupplantedbyadistinctionbetweennaturalandpositivelaw,andbetweentherightsofmenintheirnaturalandintheircivilstates;withintheconfinesofnatural-lawtheory,divisionsarisebetweenadvocatesof'ruler'and'popular'sovereignty,whilethegapcontinuestowidenbetweentheorganicistlanguageandthemechanisticpremisesoftheoriesofthestate;andeventually,wearriveatHobbes,the'technical'unityofwhosesystemofthoughtmerelyprovidesfortheabsolutedisjunctionofitsparts,ofsubjectsandsovereigns,personsandtheirrepresentatives,individualsandthegroupstowhichtheybelong.Witheachdivision,theideaoftheRechtsstaatisleftfurtherbehind.

DasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrechtisfirstofallahistoryofideasandlikeanysuchhistoryitcannotignorethechronologicalsequenceoftheideasitdescribes.Ideasfollowuponeachotherforareason,andnewideasreplaceoldbecausetheybettermeettherequirementsofthosewhopromulgatethem.GermanicthoughtgavewayfirsttoRomanthentonatural-lawalternativesbecause,asGierkeacknowledges,itwasunabletomeetthedemandsthatcametobeplacedonit.Gierkedidnot,inanycolloquialsense,idealisethepoliticalstructuresofearlyGermanicandmedievalcommunities,andherecognisedthatallsuchcommunitiescontainedstrongelementsoflordship(Herrschaft)aswellasfellowship(Genossenschaft).Atthosepointswherelordshipescapedthebondsoffellowship,RomanistconceptionsofauthoritywerebettersuitedtoprevailingsocialcircumstancethantheideaoftheRechtsstaat.Norwasthe

conditioningofsuchcircumstancesimplyacontingentpoliticalmatter:GierkealsorecognisedthatwiththeadventoftheChurchcameaformoflordshipthelordshipofChristandhisearthlyrepresentatives'whichfounditsoriginanditsgoaloutsideandbeyondamereschemeoflaw'.40TheresultingclaimsofPapalabsolutismweremetbytheclaimsofImperialabsolutism,andRomanlawprovidedjuristicballastforboth.Subsequently,aslordshipgavewayto

40Gierke,Politicaltheories,p.73.

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sovereignty(Obrigkeit),andthecompetingclaimsofPopeandEmperorgavewaytothecompetingclaimsofnationsandtheirgovernments,itfelltosystemsofnaturallawtoanswerthejuristicneedsofReformationandpost-ReformationEurope.Moreover,itwasnotjustonaccountoftheirgreateradaptabilitythatRomanandthennaturaljurisprudencesupersededGermanicideas.Thatadaptabilitywasitselfaconsequenceoftheirvastlygreatersophistication.EarlyGermanlawwasforthemostpartrootedinlocalcustoms.Romanlaw,instarkcontrast,wasnot,anditsclarityandcomplexitysuggestedarangeofapplicationwhichnosystemofcustomarylawcouldpossiblymatch.Systemsofnaturallaw,meanwhile,justbecausetheywerebuiltfromfirstprinciples,hadabroaderscopestillHobbes'ssinglestatepersonalitymayhavebeenmerely'technical'andfoundedonpremiseswhichwere'arbitrarilyassumed',butbecausegenuinelytechnicalthesearbitraryassumptionsgeneratedawide-rangingandintellectuallycompellingpoliticalphilosophy.Itisintheseregards,andwithgoodreason,thatGierkehastoconcedethe'insufficiency'oftheoldGermanicideaoftheRechtsstaat.41

Nevertheless,thereremaintwogoodreasonswhythetreatmentofGierke'shistorygivenabovetakesthestorybackfromHobbestotheearlyRechtsstaat,ratherthaninchronologicalorder,orindeedintheorderofitscompositionandpublication.First,becauseGierkewasprimarilyahistorianratherthanaphilosopher,itisnoteasytosummarisethephilosophicalthrustofhisargumentwhenitistakeninstricthistoricalsequence.Hishistoryofphilosophy,unlikeHegel's,isnotalwaysthephilosophyofhistory,anditpursuesmanyincidentalthemes,downwhatoftenturnouttobecul-de-sacs.ThiswillingnesstoaccommodateboththecontingencyandthecomplexityofmanyoftheideaswithwhichhedealsmeansthatthehistoryandthephilosophycontainedinGierke'sworkarenotalwaystobefoundmovingintandem.42Second,andmoresignificantly,the

quintessentiallymodernerainpoliticalthoughtinitiatedbyHobbesdoesnotinfactmarktheendofGierke'shistory.AsGierkewasonlytooaware,themoderneventuallygavewayinGermanytosome-

41Seeibid.42CertainlyGierke'sreputationasahistorianhasoutlastedhisreputationasapoliticalphilosopher.RichardTuck,inaworkpublishedin1993,ishappytodescribeGierkesimplyas'anineteenth-centuryliberal'(Tuck,Philosophyandgovernment,15721651(Cambridge,1993),p.158),whichhardlydoeshimjustice,butatthesametimereferstoGierke'shistoricaltreatmentofGermanconstitutionalisminthefourthvolumeofDasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrechtasstillthemostreliablesecondarysource(seeibid.,p.xii).

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thingelsetothatperiodofthought,initiatedinpartbyHegel,throughwhichGierkehimselfwaslivingandtowhichhisownthoughtbelongs.Gierkebelievedhimselftobewritingduringtheearlystagesofanerainthehistoryofideasfromwhich,asheputit,'weexpectthereconciliationofageoldopposites';43andthismeant,amongotherthings,areconciliationofmedievalandantique-modernconceptionsofthestate.Theculminationofhishistory,therefore,laynotinmodernitybutinwhatmightbecalled,byhisstandardsatleast,theincreasingpost-modernityofnineteenth-centuryGermanlifeandthought.Thissensethattheantique-modernworldofideaswasbeingsupplantedbyanewandpeculiarlyGermansynthesisprovidesGierke'sworkwithaconclusionwhichisproperlyhistoricalaswellasdistinctivelyHegelian,comingasitdoesattheendofhistoryratherthanatthebeginning.Itis,however,importanttorecognisethatthiswasstillasynthesis,andindeedaHegelianism,ofaveryparticularkind.ForGierkewasclearthatthedisplacementofantique-modernconceptionsofgroupandstatehadonlybeenmadepossiblebytherevivaloftheoldGermanicideasofGenossenschaftandRechtsstaat.

Itremainspossibletocharacterisethisrevivalinclassicallydialecticalterms.GierkedidnotbelievethatGermanicnotionsoffellowshiphadeverbeenentirelyswampedbyRomanism,andhealsobelievedthattheconceptoftheRechtsstaathadmaintainedalingeringpresenceevenduringthehightideofnatural-lawtheory(notjustinthethoughtofAlthusius,butalsointhe'constitutional'ideasofsomeearlyeighteenth-centuryGermanjurists).Likewise,heacceptedthatmedievalideashadalwayscontainedwithinthemtheseedsoftheirowndestruction,intherightsthatwerenecessarilyaccordedtoeachindividualhumanbeingasa'partialwhole',rightswhichintimecametobeseenas'natural'.Whathappenedduringthenineteenthcenturywasthatideaswhichwerealwayspresentbutneverreconciledfinallybegantofindcommonformsofexpression,andsobecameideasthat

couldsatisfactorilybeassimilatedtooneanother:aGermanismbegantodevelopwhichwasjuristicallycoherent;juristicschemesevolvedthatwerecoherentlyGermanic.Thetelosofthisprocesswasthe'longed-forharmony',44oforganicismandindividualism,unityandplurality,orderandfreedomindubitablyaHegelianideal.

43Gierke,Community,p.12.44Ibid.,p.3.

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Nevertheless,Gierke'sapproachtothisidealmustbecountedadistinctivelypost-Hegelian,ratherthanHegelian,one.ThemostobviousreasonforthisisthatGierkebeganwritingaboutitoverthirtyyearsafterHegel'sdeath,andcontinuedwritingaboutitinoneformoranotherforafurtherfiftyyears.Hisviewofthedevelopmentofnineteenth-centurythoughtbeginsatthepointwhereHegel'sends,andleavesthePrussianstatethatHegelknewfarbehind.Moreover,Gierkewitnessedthegrowth,notonlyofGermannationalism,butalsoofthosetheoriesoftheVolkwhichweretoprovideGermannationalismwithmuchofitsintellectualregalia.GierkewasnosimpletheoristoftheVolk,andhisGermanismhasmoreincommonwithHegel'sexpansiveconceptionoftheGermanicworld45thanwithmanyofitslaterandgrossermanifestations.ButGierke'sidealisedRechtsstaatmuststillbedistinguishedfromitsHegelianequivalentinoneimportantrespect.Itrests,explicitly,onanideadrawnfromGermany'spast,anditsrealisationdependedfirstofallontheresuscitationofthatideaaftercenturiesofcomparativeneglect.ThesameistrueoftheideaoftheGenossenschaftonwhichtheRechtsstaatdepends.Neithercouldreturninpreciselytheiroldform,sincebothcametobeneglectedjustbecauseoftheformthattheyoriginallyassumed.Butnorcaneitherbesaidtohavebeenentirelynew.TheGierkeanRechtsstaat,therefore,unliketheHegelianstate,standsatboththebeginningandtheendofhistory,andtheGenossenschaftlikewise.Gierkebelievedthatitwastheoldideaoffellowship,'re-awokenafteradeath-likesleeptomorevigorouslife',46onwhichthenewGermanicstatehadtodepend.In1868,atthebeginningofthefirstvolumeofDasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrecht,hewrote:

TheancientGermanideaoffellowship[is]newborn,bringingbothanincalculablewealthofnewformsofassociationandgivingnewsubstancetotheold.ItistakingpartinthetransformationoftheGermancommunity

andstate,whichhaveonlyachievedprogressinthepastandwillonly

45ForHegelthe'Germanicrealm'wasthefinaloffour'world-historicalrealms',theothersbeingtheOriental,theGreekandtheRoman.OfitHegelwrote:'Mindisherepressedbackonitselfintheextremeofitsabsolutenegativity.Thisistheabsoluteturningpoint,mindrisesoutofthissituationandgraspstheinfinitepositivityofthis,itsinwardcharacter,i.e.itgraspstheprincipleoftheunityofthedivinenatureandthehuman,thereconciliationofobjectivetruthandfreedomasthetruthandfreedomappearingwithinself-consciousnessandsubjectivity,areconciliationwiththefulfilmentofwhichtheprincipleofthenorth,theprincipleoftheGermanicpeoples,hasbeenentrusted'(G.W.F.Hegel,Thephilosophyofright,trans.T.M.Knox(Oxford,1967),p.222).46Gierke,Community,p.12.

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advanceinthefuturebymeansofareturntotherootoffellowship.Thisaloneisthecreatorofafreeformofassociation,becominginvolvedinandtransformingallareasofpublicandprivatelife;andalthoughithasalreadyachievedgreatthings,itwillachieveevenmoreinthenearanddistantfuture.47

ThetransformationofGermanlifewasthusanopen-endedprocess,bothforward-lookingandbackward-looking,andGierkemadethefurtheranceofithislife'swork.

Thisopen-endednessensuredthatGierke'scentraltheme,concerningtherelationshipbetweenstate(Rechtsstaat)andfellowship(Genossenschaft),wasitselfopentoanumberofdifferentemphases.Ontheonehand,itwascompatiblewiththeviewthatGermansocietywastobereformedfromwithinandfrombelow,asthenumberandvarietyofassociationswhichmightfitthefellowshipmouldbegantoproliferate.Ontheotherhand,itwasconsistentwithadesiretoseelarge-scalejuristicandpoliticalchange,inorderthatthefellowshipideamightmorereadilybeaccommodatedtomodernconditions.Thedifferencebetweenthesetwopositionswasnotofitselfthatgreat,butitwasexacerbatedbythesimplefactthattheGenossenschaftsideewas,inthebroadestsynthesis,tobemademanifestbothinthelifeofthehumblestassociationsinGermansociety,andalsointhelifeofthegreatest,uptoandincludingthestateitself.Asaresult,supportcouldbefoundfortheconceptoftheGermanicfellowshipinavarietyofdifferentcauses,rangingfromwhatweshouldnowthinkofasa'liberal'defenceoftherightsofgroupswithinthestate,towhatweshouldnowthinkofasa'conservative'championingofnationalidentity.ThetransformationofGermansocietythatGierkesoughtmightbeeffectedbyarevitalisednation-state,andthenfilterdownwards;oritmightissuefromsmall-scaleassociations,leadingtoanewkindofstate.Becausehistoryhadnotreacheditsconclusion,itwasnotalwayspossibletotell.

Gierke'sownintellectualdevelopmentreflectssomeofthisuncertainty.InthefirstvolumeofDasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrechttheemphasisisclearlyonchangefrombelow:Gierkedevotesasubstantialportionofthebooktodetaileddescriptionsofthevariousformsoffellowshipwhichhadgrownupduringthenineteenthcenturyandinwhichhebelievedlaytherootsofprogress.Thesewere,forthemostpart,economicassociations,foundedonprinciplesofcommunalityandindependence,whosenearestEnglishequivalent

47Ibid.

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Gierkefoundinthe'co-operative'movement.Hisanalysisofthesegroupsdrawsattention,firstofall,totheirwillingnesstodispensewithcapitalistformsofownership,andsecondly,tothesmallnessofthescaleonwhichtheycouldoperateinitiallytheywerelittlemorethansmallgroupsofcraftsmen,inthemanneroftheearliestmedievalguilds.YetfromthesemodestbeginningsGierkeexpectedmuch,notjustareformulationoftheroleofthestate,butalsowhathecalled'economicindependencefortheworking-classes'.48Unsurprisingly,thisemphasisoncapital,andonwhatmightbeachievedifthosewholivedbytheirlabourwereemancipatedfromit,hasledtocomparisonsbetweenGierke'searlyideasandthoseofMarx.49YetithasalsoledtoexpressionsofregretthatGierkedidnotpersistinthislineofthought,andinsteadalloweditsedgetobedulledbywhatisdescribedas'aninfectionofmysticalnationalism'.50ForitiscertainlytruethatinthelatervolumesofDasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrecht,aswellasinmuchofhisotherwriting,Gierkecametoplacelessemphasisontheeconomicstatusofsmallgroups,andmoreemphasisonthestate,asthevehicleofnationalidentity.Theimpetusbehindthischangeofheartisnothardtofind.TheFranco-Prussianwar,inwhichhefoughtandfromwhichGermanyemergedunified,affectedGierkedeeply.AshewastorecallintheinaugurallecturehegaveasrectorofBerlinuniversityin1902:

Therearetimeswhenthespiritofthecommunityrevealsitselftouswithanelementalpower,inanalmostvisibleshape,fillingandmasteringourinwardbeingtosuchanextentthatwearehardlyanylongerconsciousofourindividualbeingassuch.Here,inBerlin,intheUnterdenLinden,Ilivedthroughsuchanhourofconsecrationonthe15thJuly,intheyear1870.51

48Ibid.,p.211.49SeeAntonyBlack'sintroductiontoGierke,Community,p.xxvi.50Seeibid.,p.xxixxii.

51QuotedintheintroductiontoGierke,Naturallaw,p.lxix.ThefifteenthofJuly1870wasthedayfollowingthepublicationoftheso-calledEmstelegram,whichprecipitatedwarbetweenPrussiaandFrance.InthetelegramithadbeenrevealedthattheFrenchambassadorhadpressedaseriesofimpossibledemandsonKingWilliamofPrussiaduringaninterviewbetweentheminthetownofEms.ItwasthisassaultonPrussiandignitywhichbroughtthecrowdsoutontothestreetsofBerlinthefollowingday.However,itisworthnotingthatthetelegram,publishedbyBismarck,washeavilydoctoredbyhimfirstinordertogeneratethegreatestpossiblestrengthoffeeling,andtherebytomakemorelikelythewarthathewanted.Itissomethingofanirony,therefore,thattheelementalcommunityspirittowhichGierkereferswas,inthewordsofonerecenthistoryofthewar,'mobilisedandmanipulated'bythePrussiangovernment(seeW.Carr,TheoriginsoftheGermanwarsofunification(London,1991),pp.196200).

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Fortherestofhislife,uptoandbeyondthedefeatoftheSecondReichin1918,Gierkeremainedconvincedthatfellowshipshouldberealised,firstofall,bythenation-state.

Thischangeofheart,andthechangeofemphasisthatcameafterit,makeGierkeadifficultfiguretopindown.Still,thedifferencesbetweenthetwosidesofhisthoughtshouldnotbeoverstated.52BothareconsistentwiththeidealoftheRechtsstaat.ThusGierke'searlyaffinitiestoMarxarenecessarilydiminishedbythefactthathiswas,fromtheoutset,anidealist,notamaterialist,historyoftheGenossenschaft.Gierkedidnotseekgroup-basedalternativestocapitalismsothatthedistributionofmaterialgoodsmightbeharmonisedwiththelabourthatproducedthem;rather,hehopedthatalternativeconceptionsofownershipwouldproduceadifferentunderstandingofthegroupsthemselves.Toconcentrateonmaterialforcesmeantintheendaconcentrationofpowerinthehandsofthoseindividualsorgroupswhosejobitwastocontrolthem,andthiswasanathematoGierke,whodiscernedinallsocialistthoughtanexpressionofwhathecalled'theRomantendency'.Socialismpresupposedaunitarystatebecauseitinsistedalwaysontreatingthestateasacollectiveunitinneedofregulation,soproducinganantique-moderndivisionbetweentheregulatorsontheonesideandtheamorphousmassoftheregulatedontheother.Gierkealwaysinsistedthattheunitarynatureofthestatecouldonlyberealisedintheidealrelationofitsindependentparts.Evenin1868,therefore,hisgoalwasastatewhichreflectedtheideasbehindwhathecalled'themodernassociationmovement'itscommunalityanditspluralityratherthanastatewhichwouldinduecoursedothematerialworkofthatmovementforit.Inasimilarvein,hissubsequentattachmenttoovertlynationalistdoctrinesshouldnotbeallowedtodetractfromwhatwere,toGierke'smind,theparticularqualitiesofBismarck'sunifiedGermany,beyondthemerefactofitsbeing

unified.First,itwas,ostensiblyatleast,a'constitutional'state,andassuchgreatlytobepreferredtotheearlierPolizeistaatenoftheterritorialprinces.Second,thoughdominatedbyPrussia,itwasa'federal'state,inwhichtheunityofthewholewasheldtobeconsistentwiththe

52Forexample,AntonyBlackwritesthat:'After1868[Gierke]madehardlyanynoteworthycontributiontothequestionofhowstateandassociationarerelated'(Gierke,Community,p.xxii).Thisissimplyuntrue.Ifnothingelse,itwasafter1868thatGierkewrotethedefinitiveaccountofhowstateandassociationhavebeenrelatedthroughoutthehistoryofWesternpoliticalthought(vols.IIIandIVofDasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrecht),oneofthegreatachievementsinthehistoryofideas.

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independentidentityofeachmemberstate,orpart.Andthird,thenewGermanywasastateinneedofanewlegalcode,whichsuggestedthattheprinciplesoffellowshipmightfinallybeprovidedwithasecurejuristicfoundation.Induecourse,GermanydidgetanewcodeoflawstheBürgerlichesGesetzbuchof189653andthoughitwasnotasGermanisticassome,includingGierke,mighthavewished,itsdevelopmentprovidedtheimpetusformuchofhislaterthought.Germannationalism,forGierke,wasalwaysboundupwiththeattempttofreeGermanyfromtheRomanistyoke,andthatentailedrecognisingthe'right-subjectivity'offellowships.GierkebelievedintheGermannation-statebecausehebelievedthatinastatewhoselawswerespecificallyGermanicgrouplifewouldbesecure.Unitywassoughtforthesakeofprovidingjuristiccoherenceforplurality.TheidealoftheRechtsstaat,therefore,doesnotjustreconcilethewholewiththeparts;italsoreconcileschangeoriginatingfromabovewithgrowthproceedingfrombelow.

VII

TheresultisthatitisveryhardtofindanEnglishwordorphrasewhichsummarisesGierke'sphilosophicaloutlook.HisdebttoHegelisclear,butiscomplicatedbythefactthathisapproachwassimultaneouslymoreovertlynationalisticandmoreovertlyliberalthanHegel's.ThesetwostrandsofthoughtarenoteasilyreconciledinanEnglishcontext,andtheplaceswhereitmighthappenwithintheconfinesofwhiggismarehardlyamenabletothemetaphysicalbiasofHegeliandialectics.Norcananythinginthattraditioncapturetheparticularintensity,philosophicalorotherwise,ofGierke'sattachmenttothegroupasthevehicleoffreedom.ThemodernEnglishtermwhichbestapproximatestoGierke'svisionofthestateis'pluralism',whichissuggestiveofadiversityfoundeduponcoalitionsofindividualsratherthanonindividualsthemselves.Itisalsoaterm

whichpresupposessomebroadsettingwithinwhichdiversitycanbeaccommodated(ifwespeakofBritainasapluralistsocietyweimplythatthereispluralitywithinabasicunity).Yet

53Gierke'sinvolvementinthedraftingofthiscodeisdescribedindetailbyMichaelJohn(seeM.John,PoliticsandlawmlatenineteenthcenturyGermany:theoriginsofthecivilcode(Oxford,1989),pp.10816).Gierkewasaleadingcriticoftheoriginaldraftofthecodeproducedin1888,whichhesawasexcessivelyreliantonRomanratherthanGermanlaw,andasfailingtoaddressthe'social'issuesofprivatelaw.Thefinaldraftof1896tookaccountofsome,thoughnotall,ofhiscriticisms.

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'pluralism'issomewhatvague.Certainly,itconveyslittleofGierke'sspecific,andspecificallyGermanic,beliefthatadiversityofgroupscanonlybeachievedwherethereissomeformalidentitybetweenthem,andbetweenassociationswithinthestateandthestateitself.Gierke'sdoctrineinsistsonadegreeofconceptualunitywhich'pluralism',asitiscommonlyunderstood,cannotbesaidtoreflect.AnditachievesthatunitybymeansofconceptsGenossenschaftandRechtsstaatforwhichEnglishequivalentsareveryhardtofind.

Thereis,though,onesenseinwhichGierke'ssystemofthought,ifnotovertlypluralist,isatleastdistinctivelypluralistic.Itiscontainedinabodyofworkwhichitselfembracesadiverserangeofintellectualdisciplines,offeringdiverseapproachestotheconceptswithwhichitdeals.Thesedisciplines,asGierkeemploysthem,areshapedbythephilosophicaloverviewtheyshare;nevertheless,asinanysystemofplurality-in-unity,theystandontheirowntermsalso.Asaresult,Gierke'sthoughtgeneratesinsightsandargumentswhichcanbeappliedinavarietyofdifferentspheresoutsideofthespecificallyGermanicspherewithinwhichtheyoriginate.Inparticular,DasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrechtgenerateshistoricalinsights,anditalsogeneratesargumentsforpracticallegalreform.InEngland,inGierke'sownlifetime,therewereanumberofhistoriansofaphilosophicalbent,butlackingGierke'sdistinctivephilosophicalbackground,whohadaninterestinreformingthelegalpositionofassociations.ItwasthesemenwhoenabledGierke'sideas,despitethetechnicaldifficulties,tobetranslatedintoEngland.AnditwasoutofthisprocessthataspecificallyEnglishdoctrinearosethedoctrinewhichcameinduecoursetobeknownaspoliticalpluralism.

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Chapter4TrustsandSovereigns

I

Gierke'sideasarrivedinEnglandin1900,theyearthatF.W.MaitlandpublishedhistranslationofapartofthethirdvolumeofDasdeutscheGenossenschaftsrecht.AsnoteworthyasthetranslationitselfwasMaitland'scelebratedintroductiontoit,inwhichhesetoutwhathetooktobethesignificanceforEnglishreadersofGierke'sarguments.ThiswastobethefirstoftwoimportantintroductionstoEnglisheditionsofGierke'swork.ThesecondwasproducedbyErnestBarkerin1933,asaprefacetohistranslationofthatpartofthefourthvolumewhichdealswithnatural-lawtheoriesofstateandcorporation.WhatfollowshereisahistoryoftheperiodinEnglishpoliticalthoughtwhichisspannedbytheappearanceofthesetwotranslations.ItattemptstochartthewaysinwhichGierke'sideasweredevelopedinanEnglishsetting,oftenindirectionsdifferentfromanyGierkehimselfmighthaveenvisaged.ButitalsoattemptstoexplainwhatisamarkeddifferencebetweenthetwointroductionsprovidedbyGierke'sEnglishtranslators.ForwhereasMaitlandisbroadlyapprovingofGierke'sdoctrineoftherealpersonalityofassociations,Barkerisnot.Infact,Barker'sintroductionmaybesaidtomarkthedemiseofEnglishpoliticalpluralism,justasMaitland'sintroductionmarksitsbeginnings.Partofthereasonwhy'pluralism'isnolongeratermwithanyspecificallyGierkeanresonanceisthattheGierkeanmovementwhichoriginallyadopteditultimatelyfailed,andBarkertriestoexplainwhy.TheperiodinEnglishideascoveredbythisbookisthusaself-containedone,witharelativelyclearnarrativestructure:ideasarrivedinEngland,achievedsomeprominencehere,butfailedtotakeroot,andwereeventuallyabandoned.TomovefromMaitland's

introductiontoBarker'sistotellthatstory.

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TheparticularhistoricalsignificanceoftheyearinwhichBarkerchosetoproduceatranslationfromtheworkofatheoristoftheorganicGermanstateishardtomiss;indeed,1933,aswellassignallingthedemiseofGierke'sinfluenceonEnglishpoliticaltheory,alsomarksthebeginningofnewinterestinhisthoughtinGermany,aidinghisposthumousreputationthereintheshortterm,diminishingitinthelong.Thereis,however,nothingparticularlysignificantaboutthemomentatwhichMaitlandchosetointroduceGierketoanEnglishaudience,thoughitwasalsotheyearinwhichtheBürgerlichesGesetzbuchfinallycameintoforceinGermany.IfthateventproducedamongGermansakeeninterestinsomeofthepracticalimplicationsofGierke'sideas,therewasnoreasontoexpectittohavethesameeffectinEngland.ThelevelofEnglishinterestinGermanlawwasnothigh,andthelevelofinterestinthepracticalproblemsofcodificationwasnohigher.Englishlawyers,andEnglishpoliticaltheorists,wereworkingwithajuristicsystemverydifferentfromitsGermanequivalent,withaverydifferenthistory.Aboveall,itwasnotasystemamenabletothesortofradicaloverhaulthatcodificationentailed.In1900itwasfarfromclearwhereGierke'sviewsaboutgroupsandtheirpersonalitymightfitintoanEnglishunderstandingofsuchthings.Inordertoseewheretheydidfitin,itisnecessaryfirsttodescribetheEnglishpositionasitstoodinthatyear,andhadstoodformanyyearsbeforethat.

II

ThemostimmediatedifferencebetweentherespectivesituationsinEnglandandGermanylayinthefactthatinEnglandanumberoftheissueswhichpersistentlytroubledGierkeregardingthelegalpositionofassociationshadalreadybeenresolvedbyparliamentasearlyas1862.IntheCompaniesActofthatyearparliamenthaddispensedwithmostoftheformalrequirementsofincorporation,anditwas

allowedthat'anysevenormorepersonsassociatedforanylawfulpurpose'mightconstituteacorporateentity.Maitland,inhisintroductiontoGierke,calledthisact'splendidlycourageous',1andGierkehimself,writingin1868,acknowledgeditssignificance,whenhedeclaredthat'regardingthestatusofthevariouspersonaleconomicfellowships[Genossenschaften]inthelegalsystem,onlythe

1Gierke,Politicaltheories,p.xxxviii.

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mostrecentEnglishCompaniesActisadvancedenoughtocomprehendallofthese'.2WhatbothGierkeandMaitlandwereapplaudingwasthewillingnessofparliamenttoabandonanypretencethatgrouppersonalitylayinthegiftofthesovereign,whoseexplicitsanctionwasthereforeineverycaserequired.Inotherwords,EnglishlawwasfreedfromwhatGierkeviewedasthemostperniciousconsequenceofRomanism,theconcessiontheory.Whetherornotthiswastheconsistentdoctrineofthemiddleages,ithadcertainlypersistedinthePolizeistaatenofGermany,where,asGierkeputit,'regardlessof[an]association'saimthestateasserteditspowertosupervisetheinternallifeofthesocietyand(followingtheprevailingtheoryofcorporations)itsrighttoapprove[its]existenceandorganisation'.3Thiswas,ofcourse,arightthatHobbeswouldhaverecognised.Nevertheless,itwasarightthatparliamenthadrepudiated.Duringthelastthirdofthenineteenthcentury,associationsinEnglandwerefreetoassumethestatusofgrouppersonsasandwhentheirmemberschose.

Aswehaveseen,theattainmentofcorporatepersonalitythroughgenerallawsratherthanspecificlettersdoesnotofitselfdenotethatthepersonalityattainedisa'real'oneitispossible,asHobbesshowed,tohaveafictiontheorywhichisnotsimplyatheoryofconcession.Furthermore,theactof1862wasdirectedprimarilytowardswhatweshouldnowcall'businesses',aformofenterprisewhichdoesnotexhausttherangeofpurposesforwhichmenassociatewithoneanother.Butforthosegroupswhetherclubs,charitiesorcongregationswhichdidnotfeelthemselvesaccommodatedbytheact,EnglishlawhadlongsinceprovidedanotherresourcewhichwasdeniedtotheirGermancounterparts.Thatresourcewasthetrust,whichMaitlandcalled'theblessedbackstair'ofEnglishlaw.4Itsblessednesswasrevealedbythenumberofdifferentassociationsthatmadeuseofit,rangingfromfamiliesandsmallsocietiestotheJockey

Club,theStockExchange,andeven,asMaitlandpointedout,theRomanChurchinEngland,withthePopeatitshead.

TheconceptoftrusteeshipfreedgrouplifeinEnglandovermanycenturiesfromtheconstrainingRomanapparatusofpartnershipandincorporation.Apartnershipdependeduponacontractualrelationshipbetweenitsmembers,andthusuponthespecificidentityofthe

2Gierke,Community,p.224.3Ibid.,p.188.4Gierke,Politicaltheories,p.xxxi.

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partnersinvolved.Atrust,incontrast,couldprovidealegalexistenceforgroupswhoseindividualmembersremainedcompletelyunknown(as,forexample,inthefamiliarcaseofafamilytrust,whoseindividualbeneficiarieshavenoexistence,legalorotherwise,whiletheyremainunborn).Thiscapacitytosecureanidentityforagroupapartfromitsmembersissomethingthatthetrustshareswiththecorporation.ButbecausethetrustdoesnotfallundertheswayofRomannotionsofgrouppersonality,itwasneversubjecttothelimitationsofincorporation.Atnopointdidtrustsrequirethesanctionofthesovereign,andtheycouldbeformedwhereveradesireexistedtoprotectthosethingswhichendurebeyondthelife-spanofanindividualman.Moreover,thebeneficiaryofatrustneednotbeconstruedintheconventionallanguageofpersonalityatallitmight,sayinthecaseofacharity,bea'purpose'whichhasno'personal'equivalent(so,forexample,theCouncilfortheProtectionofRuralEnglandisatrustforwhosebeneficiary,aprotectedcountryside,nopersonorpersonsareaconvincingsubstitute).Therewerefewthingsthatwereincapableofbeingprotectedbytrust.

Ofcourse,noneofthismeansthattrustsconcealedthepresenceof'real'grouppersonssimplybecausetheywererelativelyfreefromcertainformsofcontrol.Indeed,theformationofatrustisalmostsuggestiveoftheopposite:trusteesactforthosethingswhichcannotactforthemselves,whethertheybeincapable(orunborn)individuals,inanimateobjects(suchashospitals)orintangiblepurposes.Inthisrespect,thebeneficiariesoftrusteeshipbearanobviousresemblancetoHobbes'sfictitiouspersons,whoseinabilitytoactrequirestheappointmentofarepresentativetoactforthem.Butbecausetheconceptofthetrustisnotaconceptionofpersonality,thereareimportantdifferences.5Trustees,unlikeHobbesianrepresentatives,donothavetheiractionsascribedtowhateveritistheyaretobenefit(whenthetrusteesact,wedonotimaginetheprotectedcountrysideto

haveperformedtheaction);theymerelyactonthebeneficiary'sbehalf(asitmakesperfectsensetoactonbehalfofacountrysidewhichneedsprotecting).Similarly,trustsdonotdependonthepriorownershipofwhateveritisthatrequirestheappointmentoftrustees.

5Onedifferencewhichisnotcontingentupontheissueofpersonalityitselfisthatatrusteemayactonbehalfofaperfectlycapablehumanbeingforexample,ifthetermsofafamilytruststipulatethatpropertyistoremainintrustuntilbeneficiariesreachacertainage,beittwenty-one,thirtyorfiftywhileHobbesonlytreatsnaturalmenasfictitiouspersonswhenthereisgenuineincapacity('Children,FoolesandMad-men').

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OnHobbes'saccount,representativesareappointedbywhomeverhasdominionoverthethingtoberepresented,6whichinvariablymeantthesovereign.Trusteeshipcreatesentitieswhichnobodyowns,anditprotectstheminaworldinwhichdominionoversuchentitiesisoftenprized.ThisiswhyMaitland,inhisintroductiontoGierke,hasanimaginaryGermanjurist,askedtosurveytheEnglishlegalscene,beginhisreportasfollows:'''Thereismuchinyourhistorywhichwecanenvy,muchinyourfreeandeasyformationofgroupsthatwecanadmire.Thatgreat'trustconcept'ofyoursstoodyouingoodsteadwhenthedayswereevil:whenyourHobbes,forexample,wasinstitutingunsavourycomparisonsbetweencorporationsandascarides."'7

Thereisanotherpointtobemadeaboutthetrust.ThoughitwasadistinctivelyEnglishconcept,itwasnotEnglishinthesamewayinwhichtheGenossenschaft,asformulatedbyGierke,wasdistinctivelyGermanic.Thatis,itdidnotformpartofacoherentjuristicalternativetoRomanism.TheEnglishlegalsystemcontainedmanyRomanelements.Whatitalsocontainedwereelements,likethetrust,whichhadnosystematicjuristicbasisatall.Whatisdistinctive,anddistinctivelyEnglish,abouttheconceptofthetrustisthatitisanessentiallyadhocformulation,developedwithoutreferencetothe-isms,eitherRomanorGerman,oflegalphilosophy.ForMaitlanditwasthisaboveallwhichrenderedthetrustconceptsoserviceableashewrites,'behindthescreenoftrusteesandconcealedfromthedirectscrutinyoflegaltheoriesallmannerofgroupscanflourish'(myitalics).8ItwasMaitland'sfurtherconvictionthattheveryadaptabilityofthetrustmadeitunlikelythatitwouldbeabletosurvivethedirectscrutinyoflegaltheorists.Inalongessayhedevotedtothesubjectoftrustsandcorporations,Maitlandsuggestedthat'theTrustcouldhardlyhavebeenevolvedamongapeoplewhohadclearlyformulatedthedistinctionbetweenarightinpersonamandarightinrem'.9

6Hobbesdoesnotspeakofpurposes,buthedoesallowthatthingsnotmerelyinanimatebutimmaterialcanbepersonated,suchas'anIdol,ormeerFigmentofthebrain',eventhough'anIdolisnothing'(seeHobbes,Leviathan,pp.11314).However,heisalsoinsistentthatwherethereisnothingtobeowned,theauthorityforrepresentationmustproceedfromthestate.ThiswasjustwhattheEnglishconceptofthetrusthadmanagedtocircumvent,allowinggroups(includingvariousdissentingreligioussects)tosecureforthemselvessomepermanentorganisationonthebasisoftheircommonbeliefs,withouttheirhavingtoseekthepriorconsentofthestate.7Gierke,Politicaltheories,p.xxxiii.8Ibid.,p.xxix.9ThecollectedpapersofF.W.Maitland,ed.H.A.L.Fisher,3vols.(Cambridge,1911),vol.III,p.325.Thereasonthatthisdistinctionwasablocktotheevolutionoftheideaofthetrust

(footnotecontinuedonnextpage)

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Laterinthesamepiece,heasks:'CanwehaveatrustforaGenossenschaft,unlessitisendowedwithpersonality,orunlessitissteadilyregardedasbeingamerecollectivenameforcertainnaturalpersons?Ibelievethatouranswershouldbethatintheorywecannot,butthatinpracticewecan.'10

HereMaitlandsetsoutthejuristicalternatives:ifthetrustisnottohavean'endowed'personality(liketheuniversitas)ora'collective'personality(likethesocietas)thenitwouldappearitmustbepossessedofa'real'personality(liketheGenossenschaft).AndyetEnglishlawmanagedsomehowtosteerapathbetweenRomanismandGermanism,whereintheorythereisnoroom.Ifcalledupontoprovidesomeformulationforgroupswhichdidnotfitthemouldsoflegaltheory,Englishlawyerswerehappytodescribethemas'unincorporatebodies'.Nocontinentallawyer,howeverenviousoftheadaptabilityofthisphrase,wouldallowittostand(anymore,oneimagines,thanwouldhaveHobbes,whosepreeminentexampleof'aNamecontradictoryandinconsistent'was'incorporeallbody'11).MaitlandhashisimaginaryGermandeclareit'atermwhichseemstoustomakefortruth,butalsoforself-contradiction',12Whatweareleftwith,therefore,isadistinctivelyEnglish,anddistinctlyunHegelian,formofsynthesis:ideasareassumedtobetruebecause,whenpiecedtogether,theywork;theyarenotassumedtoworkbecause,whenpiecedtogether,theyaretrue.

InconclusiontohispaperontheEnglishtrust,Maitlandvouchsafesoneprediction,that'inEnglandsozialpolitischewilltakeprecedenceof

(footnotecontinuedfrompreviouspage)

wasthattherightscreatedbytheideaofthetrustbelongedneithertoparticularpersons(rightsinpersonam)nortoparticularobjects(rightsinrem).Thebeneficiaryofatrustwasnota'person',butnorweretrusts

organisedaroundtheownershipofparticular'things'(trustsmightremainintacteventhoughtheirpropertydidnot,asthethingstheyownedwereboughtandsold).Yetintheory(inRomantheory)therightsofownershipmustbeattachedeithertothepersonsthatdotheowningortothethingsthatareownedMaitlandmadeasimilarpointinaletterhewrotetoanAmericanlawyerin1902,inwhichhediscussesthe'unconscious'processbywhichtheEnglisharrivedattheconceptofthecharitabletrust:'IthinkthatcontinentallawshowsthatthiswasastepwhichcouldnotbetakenandshouldnotbetakenbymenwhoseheadswerefullofRomanlaw'(quotedinH.A.L.Fisher,FrederickWilliamMaitland.Abiographicalsketch(Cambridge,1910),p.134).10Maitland,Collectedpaper,vol.III,p.317.11SeeHobbes,Leviathan,p.30.Maitlandgivesadifferent,thoughsimilar,example.Inhisessayon'Moralpersonalityandlegalpersonality'hewrites:'Forsometimepastwehavehaduponourstatutebooktheterm"unincorporatedbody".SupposethataFrenchman[i.e.aproductoftheEnlightenment]sawit,whatwouldhesay?"Unincorporatebody:inanimatesoul!"'(Maitland,Collectedpapers,vol.III,p.317).12Gierke,Politicaltheories,p.xxxiii.

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rechtswissenschaftlicheconsiderations'.13Itwasfromthispriorityofthe'social-political'overthe'legal-scientific'thatthetrusthaddeveloped.14Butifthiswasso,itisnotclearwhatneedtheEnglishlegalsystemmightbeexpectedtohaveofaGierkeanGenossenschaftstheorie.Insimpleterms,itcouldbearguedthatgroupsinEnglandhadgotbyperfectlywellwithoutone.ButitmightalsobearguedthatinanEnglishcontextGierke'sideaswouldgenerateaparticularsortofdilemma.Bythestandardsoflegaltheory,Gierke'sargumentswereconsistentlysupportiveofindependentassociations;yetasexamplesoflegaltheoryperse,theyranagainsttheEnglishexperience,whichfoundfreedomforgroupsinanenvironmentfreefrompressingtheoreticalconcerns.Clearlytherearedisadvantagestoanysystemofdealingwithassociationswhichisprimarilypragmatic:whatappearstobeflexibilityatsomemomentsmayseemtobeunpredictabilityatothers,andthegroupsexposedtoitwillsometimesfeeltheneedofthesecuritythatcomeswithconsistency.Nevertheless,consistencyentailsrigidity,andexcessiverigiditywastheonethingwhichtheEnglishintheirtreatmentofgroupshadmanagedtoavoid.AnewlegaltheoryarrivinginEnglandhadtodemonstratenotjustitssuperioritytoothertheories,butalsothattheadoptionofanytheorywasworththeinconvenience.

Itwouldbewrongtopresstheparticularityofthissituationtoofar.Gierke'sGermanismwasitselfareactionagainstwhatheperceivedtobetheexcessiveformalismofRomanisttheories,anditwascertainlyintendedtoaccommodatebetterthanthemsocialandpoliticaldevelopmentsinGermany.Theconceptof'real'personalityis,afterall,suggestiveofalifelivedapartfromtherestraininginfluenceoflegaltechnicality.Butstill,Gierkedidexpresshisconvictionsinhighlytheoreticalterms.Hewasabletodosobecauseofthedialecticalidealismheembraced,whichallowedjuristicandsocialconsiderationstobesynthesisedwithinasingleworldofideas.The

ultimateexpressionofthisistheconceptoftheRechtsstaatitself:Rechtencompassesthe'legal-scientific'domain;Staatthe'social-political';togethertheyconstituteasingleconceptionofboth.Thiswas,however,adevicewhichwasunlikelytobefoundsatisfactoryanywherewhichhadnotbeenthoroughlypenetratedbyHegelianismfirst.ThiswasnottrueofEngland,anditwascertainlynottrueof

13Maitland,Collectedpapers,vol.III,p.382.14Thelawoftrustswasamatterof'equity',andmattersofequityweredealtwithintheCourtofChancery,themost'social-political'ofEngland'slegalinstitutions.

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Englishjurisprudence,suchasitwas.Therewere,therefore,stillparticularproblemstobefaced,ifGierke'sideasaboutgroupswithinthestateweretobetranslatedintoEngland.Itwasnotclear,firstofall,whethertherewasneedofanyalternativetothestatusquo.Andsecond,intheabsenceofanyidealistictendencytosynthesisethe'social-political'withthe'legal-scientific',itwaspossiblethattheGenossenschaftsideewouldfallsomewherebetweentwostools.

III

Ofcourse,thepositionofassociationswithinthestatewasonlyhalftheproblemasGierkeunderstoodit.Therewasalsothematterofthestateitself,andheretoothesituationinEnglandwassomewhatdifferentfromthatinGermany.Firstofall,therewasinEnglandnonationalistcausetowhichGierke'sviewsaboutgrouppersonalitycouldbeallied.GierkeownnationalismstemmedfromawishtoseeGermanyunified,andGermaniclawsofassociationthenappliedwithinthenewnation.InEngland,thelawregardingassociationswasasEnglishasitwasevergoingtobe,andthekingdomxwithinwhichitappliedhadlongagobeenunited.Unitedisnotquitethesameasunified,andthefactthatthestateitselfwasnotEnglishbutBritishmeantthatthereremainedconsiderablescopefornationalistpolitics.ButthiswasanationalismofakindquitedifferentfromthatcountenancedbyGierke.First,ithadnoobviousjuristicelementtheBritishstatealreadycontaineddistinctnationallegalsystems(thecriminaljusticesystemsinEnglandandScotland,forexample)withoutitscompromisingtheintegrityofthenation-stateasawhole.Second,itwasanationalismgearednottowardsunificationbutthereverse,aseparatingoutofnationalgroupsfromwithinthepreviouslyunitedwhole.Ingeneralterms,proposalsfordevolutionaryreformarecompatiblewithGierke'spreferenceforfederalistpoliticalstructures.ButfederalismforGierkepresupposednationalunity.Wherenations

themselvesconstitutegroupswithinthestate,theissuesareratherdifferent,notleastbecauseoftheinevitablecontrastthatexistsbetweenthehomogeneityofthepartsandtheheterogeneityofthewhole.Ifnationalidentitiesarestrong,thestateismorelikelytoappearasthesumofitspartsthanasaunifiedwhole.So,whereGierke'snationalismtendedtowardsaconceptionofplurality-in-unity('theGermanEmpire'),otherformsofnationalismtendedtowardsartificialconceptionsofunity-in-plurality

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('GreatBritainandIreland'),andtowardsthefragmentationwhichGierkebelievedsuchconceptionstobringintheirwake.

Nevertheless,therewasatleastonethingthatEnglandandGermanydidsharewithregardtotheirrespectiveexperiencesofthestate,andthatwasacommonheritageinthehistoryofideas.Thoughinvaryingdegreesandwithdifferingconsequences,bothnationshadbeentherecipientsofnatural-lawtheoriesofthestate;andinparticular,bothnationshadbeenexposedtotheintellectuallegacyofThomasHobbes.AsinGermany,politicaltheoristsinEnglandhadby1900longsinceabandonedanypreferenceforthefamiliardoctrinesofnaturallaw.ButwhereasinGermanythesedoctrineshadbeensupplantedbyidealisticandromanticconceptionsofthestate,inEnglandnatural-lawtheorygavewaytoutilitarianism.FollowingHume,utilitariansrejectedtheHobbesianconceptionofastatebornoutofacontractbetweenindividualsinthestateofnature.Therehadbeennostateofnaturefortheutilitarians,oratleastnosuchstatewhichcouldclearlybemarkedofffromthestateofcivilsocietythatreplacedit.ButthisrejectionoftheconceptualfoundationsofHobbes'sthoughtdidnotentailarejectionoftheultimatedoctrineinwhichitissued.UtilitariansacceptedHobbes'sconvictionthatpoliticalauthoritywasfoundedentirelyonsovereignty,andthatsovereigntywasbasedexclusivelyoncommand.Tothisextent,Englishpoliticalthoughtremainedsquarelyundertheinfluenceof'antique-modern'thinking:itpostulatedastatedividedbetweenthosewhomadethelaw,andthosewhoobservedit.In1900,themostfamiliarversionofthisdoctrinewasstilltheonewhichhadbeenformulatedbyJohnAustinnearlyseventyyearsearlier.Austin'sdefinitionranasfollows:'Ifadeterminatehumansuperior,notinahabitofobediencetoalikesuperior,receivehabitualobediencefromthebulkofagivensociety,thatdeterminatesuperiorissovereigninthatsociety,andthesociety(includingthesuperior)isasociety

politicalandindependent.'15Thisisanaltogetherpared-downaccountoftherelationwhichliesattheheartofHobbes'spoliticaltheory.Inthegapbetween'habitual'and'constant',andbetween'bulk'and'all',Austinleavesroomforthatareaofpoliticalexistenceinwhichcommandgiveswaytopunishment.Otherwise,heignoresallextraneousconsiderations,beyond

15J.Austin,Theprovinceofjurisprudencedetermined,ed.W.E.Rumble(Cambridge,1995)p.166.

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themerefactofobedience,andthedistinctionthatmustfollowbetweentheobedientandtheobeyed.

Austin'stheoryofsovereigntyseemstoprovideanobviousfocusfortheapplicationofGierke'sargumentsinanEnglishsetting.YetbecauseAustin'sissopared-downaversionofHobbes'saccount,itisnotalwaysclearhowGierke'sargumentsmightberelatedtoit.Forexample,Austinhasnogreatinterestintheconceptofpersonality.Certainly,echoingHobbes,16heacceptsthatadeterminatehumansuperiormayconsisteitherof'asovereignperson,orasovereignbodyofpersons',andthattheobedientbulkofthepopulationmightbedescribedas'personsinastateofsubjection[i.e.subjects]'.17Butheusestheterminwhathehimselfcallsan'extensive'sense,simplytosignify'physicalorindividual'personality.18Itcarrieswithitnoimplicationsaboutthenatureofsovereignpower.Austinalsoaccepts,asaresultofhisidentifyingpersonalitywiththephysicalman,thattherearesomeentities,suchas'collectionsoraggregatesofphysicalpersons',whichmayhavetobedeemedpersons'byfigment,andforthesakeofbrevityofdiscourse'.19However,thistoohasnobearingonthequestionofsovereignty.Itis,forAustin,simplyatechnicalmatter,relatedtocertainissuesinprivatelaw,andbelongingtherefore'tothedetailratherthanthegeneraliaofthescience'20thescienceinquestionbeingjurisprudence,anditsgeneraliaconstitutingthedefinitionofkeysterms,suchassovereignty.ThereisnothinginAustin'saccounttoproducethesortsoflimitationswhichHobbessoughttoimposeongrouppersonswithinthestate.Austin'ssovereignhasnopersonalityatall,beyondtheindividualpersonalitiesofwhicheverhumanbeingsmakeitup.Groupswhichareformedofitssubjects,andwhichmayhavea

16AustinquotesHobbesatlengthduringthecourseofhislecturesonjurisprudence,anddevotesanextendedfootnotetodefendinghimagainsthis'grosslyandthoroughlymistakenmoderncensors',writing'Iknowof

nootherwriter(exceptingourgreatcontemporaryJeremyBentham)whohasutteredsomanytruths,atoncenewandimportant,concerningthenecessarystructureofsupremepoliticalgovernment,andthelargerofthenecessarydistinctionsimpliedbypositivelaw[i.e.thedistinctionbetweenthesovereignandtherest]'(ibid.,p.231).Austindoes,though,criticiseHobbesontwocounts:'1.Heinculcatestooabsolutelythereligiousobligationofobediencetopresentorestablishedgovernment...2.Insteadofdirectlyderivingtheexistenceofpoliticalgovernment,fromaperceptionbythebulkofthegovernedofitsgreatandobviousexpediency,heascribestheoriginofsovereignty,andofindependentpoliticalsociety,toafictitiousagreementorcovenant'(ibid.,p.229).17Ibid.,p.165.18J.Austin,Lecturesonjurisprudence,orthephilosophyofpositivelaw,ed.R.Campbell,thirdedn,2vols.(London,1869),vol.1,p.362.19Ibid.,p.364.20Ibid.

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personalityoftheirown,posenothreat,becauseAustin'sconceptionofsovereigntydoesnotprovideapersonofthestateforthemtothreaten.Itsimplyprovidesforcommands,andforthejuristicsuperiorityofwhoeverissuesthem.

Infact,Austindidnotstrictlyspeakingproduceatheoryofthestateatall.Thisispartlyamatterofterminology.Asillustratedabove,thetermAustinusestodescribeanassociationwhichcontainsapersonorgroupofpersonswhoaresovereignis'societypoliticalandindependent'.Hedoesemploytheterm'state',ostensiblyasasynonymfor'sovereign',21butalsoinwhatcouldbecalledan'extensive'sense,todenoteanyassociatedgroupofindividualsoutsideoftheprivatedomain,whethercontainingasovereignornot.TheHobbesianequivalentofwhatAustincallsa'state'isthereforenot'commonwealth'butanyofthose'systemes'thatHobbeswoulddescribeas'politique'.Moreover,Austin'suseof'state'inthisextensivesenseallowshimtoaccommodatewithinhistheoryofsovereigntystateswhicharefederations,andfederationswhicharemadeupofstates,inamannerwhichHobbes'suseofthetermwoulddisallow.SoAustinspeaksof'compositestates'andalsoof'systemsofconfederatedstates'(withparticularreferencetothenewlyformedsystemknownas'theUnitedStatesofAmerica'),andhereconcileshisconceptionofsovereigntywithboth.Theoneusagehewillnotallowisthe'incongruousepithet'thatstylesstates'halforimperfectlysovereign'22thisisacombinationoftermsheconsidersimpossible,becauseitisnotthestateitselfbutonlywhatAustincallsa'portion'ofitthatissovereign,andbecausesovereigntyitselfisanabsolutequality,admittingofnohalf-measuresordegrees.Otherwise,Austinisstrictlyindifferentastotheformwhichstatesmayassume.AnditisthisindifferencewhichdistinguishesAustinfromthose'antique-modern'theoristsofthestatewithwhomGierkewasprimarilyengaged.Austindidnotbelievethatthedistinctionbetweenthe

sovereignportionofapoliticalsocietyanditsbulkhadanymoralorevenwhathedescribesas'constitutional'significance.Indeed,the'antique-modern'distinctionbetweentheobedientandtheobeyedissubsumedinAustin'saccountbywhatisamoreimmediatelymoderndistinction,betweenAustin'spreferred'science'whatwewouldnowcallanalyticaljurisprudenceandother,value-ladenapproachestothesubject.ForAustin,jurisprudencewas

21SeeAustin,Theprovinceofjurisprudence,p.190.22Ibid.,p.199.

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thestudyofpositivelaw,whichisthelawmadebysovereigns;andhisdefinitionofsovereigntywassimplydesignedtodeterminewhattheprovinceofjurisprudencemustthereforebe.Outsideofthatprovincelayquestionsof'positivemorality'and'constitutionallaw',andthesecouldnotberesolvedbyreferencetoanythingwithinit,butonlybyreferencetotheindexof'Divinelaw',whichwasutility.ThusAustinexplicitly,andinobviouscontrasttoHobbes,deniedthatadescriptionofwhatsovereigntyiscouldhaveanybearingonthequestionofwhatsovereignsshoulddo,orofwhatthepoliticalsocietiestheygovernedoughttobelike.Thatwasthebusinessofadifferentsciencewhathecalled'thescienceofpoliticaleconomy'23andAustinrailedagainstthosewhowouldconfusethetwo,reservinganespecialcontemptforallappealsto'thesacredrightsofsovereigns'(onceagainwithparticularreferencetotheformationoftheUnitedStates,andto'thestupidandinfuriatemajoritywhorushedintothatodiouswar[and]couldperceiveanddiscourseofnothingbutthesovereigntyofthemothercountryandhersocalledrighttotaxhersubjects'24).Austinhadnowishtoderiveatheoryofthestatefromhisconceptionofsovereignty,noramoralfromhisjuristicconceptionoforder,sincehebelievedthatmoralityandjurisprudencehadnothingtodowitheachother.

IV

ThesharpnessofthisdisjunctiontakessomeoftheedgeoffaGierkeancritiqueofEnglishpoliticalthoughtattheturnofthecentury,giventhattheplacewherean'antique-modern'conceptionofsovereigntyhadmoststeadfastlyenduredwasalsotheplacewheretheleastclaimswerebeingmadeonitsbehalf.ThatedgeisfurtherdulledwhenitisconsideredthatthedurabilityofAustinianideasdidnotmeanthatEnglishpoliticalthoughtwaslackingatheoryofthestatealtogether.ForifEnglishjurisprudencehadprovedentirelyresistant

toHegelianinfluence,Englishphilosophyhadnot.AlongsideutilitarianismtherehadgrownupduringthesecondhalfofthenineteenthcenturyanEnglishschoolofphilosophicalidealism,and

23Austinbelievednotonlythatpoliticaleconomywasthesciencethatlegislatorsoughttostudybutalsothatitoughttobestudiedbythepopulaceasawhole,writingthat'thebestofmoralsecurities...wouldarisefromawidediffusion,throughthemassofsubjects,ofthesoundestpoliticalsciencewhichthelightsoftheagecouldafford'(seeibid.,p.328).Hecertainlydidnotbelievethatthesamewastrueofjurisprudence.24Ibid.,p.55.

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withitaverydifferentperspectiveontheproblemsofpoliticaltheory.Theinfluenceofthisschoolwasprobablyatitsheightduringthe1870sand1880s,undertheaegisofT.H.Green,yetinasenseitwastoculminatein1899,withthepublicationofBernardBosanquet'sThephilosophicaltheoryoftheState.Bosanquet'spoliticalphilosophywasanythingbut'antique-modern'inGierke'ssense,foritportrayedthestateasaunifiedwholewhichembracedeveryaspectofsocialexistence.ThewholeitselfBosanquetdescribedas'organisation',andthoughthedirectanalogywasnotwithanindividuatedorganism,itwasstillwithanorganicentity,thehumanmind,whichBosanquetcharacterisedas'afabricoforganiseddispositions'.25Sovereignty,forBosanquet,residedinnoparticularportionofsociety,butinthegeneralwilloftheorganisedwhole.Andwithinthatgeneralorganisationheallowedconsiderablescopeforthelesserorganisationsthateverysuchsocietymustcontain:itsfamilies,partnerships,corporations,evenwhatBosanquetcalls(followingHegel)its'classes',allofwhichareaspectsofthegeneralwhole,andineachofwhichindividualsdiscoverwhatitistobepartofaparticularwhole.Bosanquetspentmuchofhislifechampioningthecauseofvoluntaryassociationsagainstthosewhowouldconcentrateonlyonadirectrelationbetweentheindividualandthestate.26InThephilosophicaltheoryoftheStateheexpressedtheseconvictionswithregardtowhathecallsthere'theCorporationorTradeSociety',27aphrasewhichcoversallthoseworkers'associationsthatGierkehadbroughtundertheheadingof'themodernassociationmovement'.Oftherelationoftheirmemberstothese'corporations',BosanquetagreeswithHegelthat'itistheveryrootofethicalconnectionbetweentheprivateandthegeneralinterest,andtheStateshouldseetoitthatthisrootholdsasstronglyaspossible'.28Hebelievedthatinsuchself-formedassociationsmenlearnedhonour,loyaltyandtheothersocialvirtues,andhealsobelievedthatwithoutafully

25SeeB.Bosanquet,ThephilosophicaltheoryoftheState,fourthedn(London,1923),pp.1601.26Bosanquet,alongwithhiswifeHelen,wastheleadinglightbehindtheCharityOrganisationSociety(COS),whichpromotedvoluntaryformsofsocialwelfareagainsttheorganisationofsocialwelfarebythestate.(AnaccountoftheworkoftheCOSisprovidedinR.PlantandA.Vincent,Philosophy,politicsandcitizenship:thelifeandthoughtoftheBritishIdealists(Oxford,1984),pp.94131.)Bosanquet'stheoryofthestatedidnotentailacommitmenttostateremediesforsocialills.TheapparentcontrarinessofthispositionformsthesubjectofS.Collini,'Hobhouse,Bosanquetandthestate:philosophicalIdealismandpoliticalargumentinEngland,18801918',PastandPresent,72(1976),86111.27SeeBosanquet,ThephilosophicaltheoryoftheState,pp.2589.28Ibid.

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developedrangeoftheseassociationsthestate'sowncapacitytodevelopwouldbestifled.

ClearlyBosanquet'sphilosophicaloutlookisveryclosetothatofGierke,totheextentthateventheirrespectivejudgmentsofHobbesarealmostidentical(Bosanquetarguingthat'[Hobbes]inheritsthelanguagewhichenableshimtopredicateunityandpersonalityofthestate,butinhismouththetermshavenotrecoveredatruepoliticalmeaning,andthesocialright,whichtheyareintendedtoaccountfor,remainsamerename').29Butthereisoneimportantdifference.Bosanquet'saccountofgrouplifehasnoobviousjuristicdimension.Itisnotsimplythathegivesnoclueinhiswritingastohowthestateistosecuretherootsofcorporateactivityinlaw.Itismorethatheregardstechnicaljurisprudenceassomethingaphilosophicaltheoryofthestatemustgetbeyond,asit'move[s]towardapointofviewwhichdealsmorecompletelywithlifeandculture'.30Inthisrespect,Bosanquet'sisabrandofHegelianismwhichcontrastsdirectlywithGierke's,andmorecloselyresemblesHegel'sown.Hedoesnotprovideasecurejuristicfoundationfortheparthewishesgroupstoplayinthelifeofthestate.Hedoesnotinfactprovidewhatisanovertlymoralconceptionoforderwithanyjuristicbasisatall.Instead,heconcentratesonthegeneralwill,whichisaproductofmind(essentiallyanethicalormetaphysicalconcept),notofpersonality(inthiscontextessentiallyajuristicone).ThismeansthatBosanquetdidnothavetofacetheproblemsencounteredbytheoristslikeHobbesandRousseau,whosoughttoformulatetheunityofthestateinjuristicterms.31ButitalsomeansthathedidnotaddresstheparticularproblemwhichengagedGierke,thatofprovidinggroupswithinthestatewithaclearjuristicexpressionoftheirownunity.Indeed,Bosanquetdidnotaddressanyofthoseproblemswhicharecommonlyunderstoodinlegaltermsthe

29Ibid.,p.98.

30Ibid.,p.37.31BosanquetmakesmuchofRousseau'sconceptionofthe'generalwill',buthealsosuggeststhatRousseauhimselfcouldnotmakefulluseofitbecauseheremainedpreoccupiedwiththeproblemofrelatingittothe'willofall'.Intheend,Bosanquetargues,Rousseausucceededonlyin'enthroning'thewillofall,becausehewasfixedonthenotionthatthegeneralwillcouldbeexpressedinthevotetakenbyanassembly.Wecanexpresstheargumentintermsofpersonality:forBosanquet,thegeneralwillwasanexpressionofthe'moral'personalityofthestate;thewillofall,incontrast,wasanexpressiononlyofits'legal'personality,sinceitwasarrivedatbylegalisticconventions(i.e.contractsandshowsofhands);andthesolution,forBosanquet,wastodiscountthepossibilityofderivingageneralwillfrommerelegalprocedures,andinsteadlookforitinthemorallifeofthestateasawhole.

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problemsofrepresentation,orofobedience,orofownership.Hedoes,itistrue,makesomereferencetothelawofproperty.Buthereferstoitas'Shylock'slaw',andhedismissesitonthegroundsthatitsimplyproducesaworld'appropriatedbylegal''persons"'.32ItwaspreciselythepurposeofBosanquet'spoliticalphilosophytotranscendsuchlegalisticnotionsaltogether.

Englishpoliticalthoughtattheendofthenineteenthcenturywasthussplitbetweentwoapproachestothesubject,oneresultinginajuristicconceptionoforderwithnomoraldimension,theotheramoralconceptionoforderwithnojuristicdimension.BothemployedthefamiliarlanguageofstateandsovereigntyBosanquetstillinsistedoncallinghisstate'sovereign'33buteachmeantsomethingquitedifferentbyit.Inonesense,therewasanobviousGierkeanresolutionofthissituation,andthatwastoseeksomesynthesisofthetwo.Buttherewasalsoanobviousproblem.ThephilosophicalapproachonwhichGierkeansynthesisreliedhadalreadybeenannexedbyoneofthetwosidestobereconciledHegelianisminEngland,insteadofbeingsomethingwhichmightwithprofitbebroughttobearonBosanquet'sthought,wasalreadyidentifiedwithit.So,justastherewasadilemmatobefacedatthelevelofpracticallegalreformifGierke'sideasweretotakerootinEngland,therewasalsoadilemmatobefacedatthemoreabstractlevelofpoliticaltheory.ThephilosophicaltheoryofthestatewhichmostnearlyreflectedGierke'sownhadbeenproducedbyamanwhosharedfewofGierke'sinterests,andintimethecurioussituationaroseofGierkeandoctrinesbeingusedtoattackthemostvisibleEnglishexponentofGermanicpoliticalphilosophy.Bosanquet'semphasisonthegeneralwill,andhisconsequentneglectoftheissuesofgrouppersonality,wastakentoreflectagreaterconcernonhispartwithunitythanwithplurality,andasweshallsee,theEnglishfollowersofGierkeheldthisagainsthim.Meanwhile,theintellectualdomaininwhichjuristicissueswerestill

takenseriouslywasalsotheplaceinwhichtheyhadbeendenudedofallmoralforce.TheuseofGierke'sideastochallengesomeofthe'antique-modern'notionsofAustinianjurisprudencedidnotofitselfgenerateanalternativeconceptionoforder;thatrequiredsomethingmore,achallengetothepresupposi-

32Ibid.,p.240.33BosanquetmakesuseofRousseautoexplainwhatheunderstandsbysovereignty:'Wemay,inconclusion,sumupthewholetheoryofstateactionintheformulawhichweinheritfromRousseauthatSovereigntyistheexerciseoftheGeneralWill'(ibid.,p.215).

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tionsofEnglishjurisprudenceperse,andattheendofthenineteenthcenturythemostvisiblechallengetothepresuppositionsofEnglishjurisprudencewasbeingprovidedbyBernardBosanquet.Hegelianism,whichGierkeusedtoreconcilejurisprudencewithotherdisciplines,servedinEnglandtosetthemapart.TheresultwasthatwhereGierkemighthaveseenanopportunityforsynthesis,Englishtheoriststendedtofaceaseriesofhardchoicesbetweenjuristicandmoralconsiderations,andforoneattheexpenseoftheother.

V

TherewasonefurtherchoiceavailabletoEnglishpoliticaltheorists,ofakindunlikelytohaveoccurredtoGierkehimself.InsteadofseekingtosynthesiseAustinandBosanquet,itwaspossiblethattheymightsimplyconflatethetwo,andthenuseaspectsofGierke'sthoughtintheattempttoconstructanalternativetoboth.TohavehadhisideasconflatedwiththoseofathinkerlikeBosanquetwouldalmostcertainlyhavebaffledAustin,giventhathedidnotconcealhiscontemptfor'thehighidealphilosophywhichtheGermansopposetothephilosophyofBaconandLocke;theearthly,grovelling,empiricalphilosophywhichdeignstoscrutinisefactsandstoopstoobservationandinduction'.34Moreover,thereisconcreteevidencethatitwasaprospectwhichcausedBosanquetrealconcern,andhewentoutofhiswaytoemphasise'thediametricalandfundamentalcontrastbetweenAustiniansovereignty,thesovereigntythatiscontemplatedbythelegalexperts,andthesovereigntycontemplatedbyatheorysuchasours'.35Nevertheless,Bosanquetmadethisstatementinthe1919prefacetoaneweditionofThephilosophicaltheoryoftheState,andhemadeitinresponsetothosewhohadovertheprevioustwodecadespersistedinignoringthisdistinction.PrimeamongthemweretheadvocatesofwhatBosanquetwasbynowcalling'pluralism',andtheyincludedtheoristswhohadbeeninfluenced,ifonlyviaMaitland,

byGierke.

WhathappenedduringthesetwodecadeswasthatanewsplithademergedinEnglishpoliticalthought,partlyunderGierke'sinfluence,between,ontheonehand,theproponentsofgroup-based,orwhatweresometimescalled'federalistic'theories,and,ontheother,thetraditionaltheoristsofstateandsovereignty.Whatthisentailedis

34Austin,Theprovinceofjurisprudence,p.342.35Bosanquet,ThephilosophicaltheoryoftheState,p.lv.

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bestillustratedintheremarksmadebyErnestBarkerinhis1914surveyofPoliticalthoughtinEnglandfromHerbertSpencertothepresentday.Barkerrecordsinthisbookthegrowinginterestthathadbeenshownduringtheearlyyearsofthetwentiethcenturyinassociationsotherthanthestate.Hegoesontospeakofwhathecalls'afederalisticfeeling[that]iscuriouslywidespread'.36Thisheattemptstocharacteriseas'afeelingthatthesingleunitarystate,withitssinglesovereignty,isadubiousconception,whichishardlytruetothefactsoflife'.37Yetsinglesovereignty,andthesingle,unitarystate,were,asGierkewouldhavebeenthefirsttopointout,notnecessarilythesamething.Afederalisticfeelingmightbeopposedtooneortotheother,butitdoesnotfollowthatitmustbeopposedtoboth:Austin,whogivesusasinglesovereignty,ishappywithallsortsoffederalisticstates,whileBosanquet,whosestateisunitary,iscontentwithadistinctlyfederalisticconceptionofsovereignty.Intruth,manyofthosewhosharedBarker'sfederalisticfeelingandtheyincludedfabians,distributists,guildsocialistsanddevolutionistswouldhavebeenuninterestedinthenicetiesofthesedistinctions.ButthatwascertainlynottrueofBarkerhimself(latertoproducehisowneditionofGierke),andnorwasittrueofsomeoftheotherscoveredbyhissurvey,includingMaitland,andalsoJ.N.Figgis,whohelpedMaitlandwithhistranslationofGierke,andwhoprovidesoneofthelatersubjectsofthisbook.Itisthereforenecessarytoaddressonefinalquestion,beforeturningindetailtothehistoryoftheperiodtowhichBarker'sremarksalludetoaskhowitmightbepossiblethattwoconceptionsasdifferentasBosanquet'sstateandAustin'ssovereigncouldbedeemednotmerelydubious,butdubiousinthesameway.

Inessence,therearetwopossibilities.Thefirst,andsimplest,meansofgeneratingacommonalternativetobothjuristicandmoralconceptionsoforderistoembrace,oratleasttoaccept,disorder.The

politicalphilosophyofdisorderisanarchism.Atfirstsight,anarchismisahighlyunlikelyrefugefordefendersofrealgrouppersonality,ifonlybecauseoftheterm'sextremeindividualisticbias.Butbytheendofthenineteenthcenturyanarchisticdoctrinewasstartingtoassumeadistinctive,group-basedform.Thiswassyndicalism.Again,syndicalismisanimprobablevehicleofGierkeanviews

36E.Barker,PoliticalthoughtinEnglandfromHerbertSpencertothepresentday,18481914(London,1915),p.181.37Ibid.

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abouttheroleofgroupswithinthestate.Syndicalists,whoseintellectualrootslayinFrance,believedinseekingindependenceforgroupsofworkersapartfrom,notwithin,thestructuresofthestate.Likealmostallanarchists,syndicaliststendedintheendtofallbackonmoralconceptionsoforder.Butunlike,say,Bosanquet,whosemoralconceptionofordersubsumedjuristicconcerns,syndicalistswerepreparedtoacceptthatmoralandjuristicconsiderationsmustclash.Inthesyndicalistschemeofthings,therightsenjoyedbygroupsapartfromthelawbroughtthemintoconflictwiththelaw,andcouldnotbeaccommodatedtoit.ThiswasnotsomethingwhichGierkecouldhaveacceptedanymorethancouldBosanquet.Andyet,inEngland,therewerepointsatwhichGierkeanandsyndicalistideasseemtohaveoverlapped.Barker,forinstance,writingduringthe1930s,offeredthisreminiscenceofanencounterhehadhadwithJ.N.Figgisovertwentyyearsearlier:'IshallneverforgethimtakingmeroundthehouseofthecommunityinwhichhelivedatMirfield[Figgiswasaclergyman],andsuddenlyexclaiming,"Barker,IreallybelieveIamasyndicalist!"'38Similarly,HaroldLaski,whowastobecomeoneoftheleadingexponentofEnglishpoliticalpluralism,wasalso,ashismostrecentbiographershavenoted,'aconverttosyndicalism'ongraduatingfromOxfordin1912,wherehehadbeenBarker'spupil.39ThisdidnotpreventLaski,anymorethanitdidFiggis,frombeingreceptivetoGierke'sideas,asLaskiacknowledgedonFiggis'sdeathin1919,whenhewrotethat'twenty-fiveyearsago[Figgis]wasstillanAustinian,andthemeansofescapefromthecobwebsofthatnightmarehedidnotseeuntilMaitlandtoldhimthatinGierke'smagistralbookhewouldfindthesecretofpoliticalfreedom'.40YetintheunlikelyconnectiontheydrewbetweenGierke'sargumentsandthetheoreticaltenetsofsyndicalism,FiggisandLaskialsoindicatedapossiblemeansofescapenotmerelyfromAustinian,butallconceptionsofthestateanditssovereignty.

Nevertheless,syndicalismcannotbethewhole,norevenaverylargepart,oftheanswer.ForifLaskididconverttoitwhileatOxford,itwouldnothavebeenunderBarker'sinfluence.41Syndic-

38E.Barker,Church,Stateandstudy(London,1930),p.131.39SeeI.KramnickandB.Sheerman,HaroldLaski.Alifeontheleft(London,1993),p.74.40Laski,'Agreatchurchman',NewRepublic,20(20August1919),95.41LaskimadeoutthatBarkerhadinfluencedhimgreatlybutBarkerknewbetter:'Laski'sdedicationofhisfirstbook,Studiesintheproblemofsovereignty,in1917to[H.A.L.]FisherandBarkerwitheffusivepraiseforbothwasclearlydifficultforBarkertoaccept.HewrotetoLaskithathemadetoomuchofhim'(KramnickandSheerman,HaroldLaski,p.60).

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alistwasnotawordwhichBarkerwouldeverhaveusedtodescribehimself,andnorwouldhehaveusedittodescribethebeliefsofmanyofthosewhosefeelingshecharacterisedas'federalistic'in1914.Indeed,'federalism'and'syndicalism'arenottermswhichcaneasilybereconciledwithoneanother:oneissuggestiveoforder,andtheotherisnot.Barkerbelievedinorder.Hedidalso,itistrue,includeFiggisamonghis'federalistic'thinkers,andsyndicalismiscertainlynohardertoreconcilewithfederalismthanitiswithGierke'sGenossenschaftsidee.ButFiggis'spublicpronouncementswere,asweshallsee,considerablymorerestrainedthanhisprivateconfessiontoBarkerwouldsuggest.Itisthiswhichmadeitaconfession,anditisthiswhichexplainsthesurprisedtoneofBarker'sreminiscence,aresponsewhichMaitland,whotaughtFiggisatCambridge,wouldsurelyhaveshared,hadhebutlivedtoseeitwhateverelseMaitlandmighthavetoldhisprotégétolookforinGierke's'magistralbook',itwouldnothavebeenencouragementforhisanarchistictendencies.ButifMaitlandandBarkerwerenotpreparedtocountenancetheradicalalternativeswhichattractedtheirformerpupils,thereisintheveryfactofthisrelationbetweenthemthesuggestionofadifferentmeansofescapefromstateandsovereigntycombined.MaitlandtaughtFiggis,andBarkertaughtLaski,becauseallfourwerehistorians.AustinandBosanquetwerenotonewasajurist,theotheraphilosopher.Thereisthusasecondalternativetotheoriesofbothjuristicandmoralconceptionsoforder,anditissimplyhistory.Historydoesnotpresupposedisorder.Itdoes,however,presupposechange.BothAustinandBosanquet,thoughtheyrecognisedhistoricalchange,soughttodiscountit,ifinverydifferentways:Austincircumventeditingrovelling,empiricalscience;Bosanquettranscendeditinhigh,idealmetaphysics.42Buteachbelievedthatitwaspossibletomakegeneralclaimsaboutpoliticalexistencewhichwerenotunderminedbychangingpoliticalcircumstance.

42Neither,ofcourse,discountedhistoryasanintellectualexercisealtogether,onlyastheprimarydeterminantoftheparticularintellectualexercisesinwhichtheywereengaged.Austinrecognisedthat'thespecificorparticularcausesofspecificorparticulargovernments,areratherappropriatematterforparticularhistory,thanforthepresentgeneraldisquisition'(Austin,Theprovinceofjurisprudencedetermined,p.247);Bosanquet,meanwhile,wrotethat'ifweconsiderthathypotheticalnecessaryorrelativejudgmentisentirelybaseduponcategoricaljudgments,thatallnexusiswithinanindividuality,weshallseethathistorymaybereceivedintotheintelligibleunityofknowledgewithoutsacrificingitsconcreteimportandcharacteristicsignificance'(B.Bosanquet,Logic,2vols.(Oxford,1911)vol.1,p.262).

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Austin'ssovereignandBosanquet'sstatearethemanifestationofthatbelief.Ahistorianofchangingpoliticalcircumstancecouldbeexpectedtoquestionboth.

Thecasethatahistorianmightmakeagainstthesinglestatewithitssinglesovereigntycanbeexpressedasaformofpluralism.Here,though,thecontrastisnotwithunitybutwithidentity:juristslikeAustinandphilosopherslikeBosanquetlookforanidentityinourexperiencesofsovereigntyandthestate;historians,incontrast,studyeachexperienceonitsownterms,andareabletherebytorevealthepluralityofthewhole.Itisinthiswaythathistoriansdisclosethecontingencyofourconceptionsoforder.Theyestablishthecontingentrelationbetweenaparticularpoliticaltheoryandthehistoricalcircumstanceswhichsurroundit,andtheyalsoestablishthepossibilityofdifferentcircumstancesgivingrisetodifferenttheories.ItwasashistoriansthattheEnglishpluralistsweredrawntoGierke,andfromhisworktheydrewaclearsenseofthecontingencyoftheoriesofthestateanditssovereignty.However,Gierkewasnotabletoprovidethemwithatheoryofpluralisminthesenseoutlinedabove.ContingencyinGierke'shistorywastranscendedbytheHegelianconceptoftheRechtsstaat,sothatthehistorygenerateditsownformofidentity.Hiswas,inKarlPopper'ssense,a'historicist'43accountofthepast:itfoundinhistoricalvarietya'rhythm'or'pattern'fromwhichgeneraltheoreticaltruthsmightbederived.Assuch,itstandsincontrasttowhatPoppercalls'historism':44theviewthatstatementsofgeneraltheoreticaltruthsaresimplythecontingentproductsofparticularhistoricalcircumstance.Historism,likeanarchism,isadenialofallthatAustinandBosanquetjointlyrepresent.Buthistorism,likeanarchism,wasnotaGierkean,norevenaGermanicdoctrine.45Instead,itwasclosertotherecentphilosophicaltraditionofanothernation,theUnitedStates,whosenational

43Popperdefineshistoricismas'anapproachtothesocialscienceswhichassumeshistoricalpredictionistheirprincipleaim,andassumesthatthisaimisattainablebydiscoveringthe"rhythms"orthe"patterns",the"laws"orthe"trends"thatunderlietheevolutionofhistory'(K.Popper,Thepovertyofhistoricism(London,1957),p.3).44Popperdefineshistorismas'thepossibilityofanalysingandexplainingthedifferencebetweenthevarioussociologicaldoctrinesandschoolsbyreferring...totheirconnexionwiththeinterestsprevailinginaparticularhistoricalperiod'(ibid.,p.17).45ThereisafamousGermanicaccountofhistorismgiveninFriedrichMeinecke'sbookofthattitle.However,whatMeineckemeansby'historism'isclosertowhatPoppermeansby'historicism'itisintendedtoprovideuswithanunderstandingofnationalidentities,ofwhatIsaiahBerlincallsinhisintroductiontoMeinecke'sbook'socialwholes,whichdeveloplikeplants,eachobedienttoitsownspecificnature'(F.Meinecke,Historism.Theriseofanewhistoricaloutlook,trans.J.E.Anderson(London,1972),p.xi).

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philosophyattheturnofthecenturywaspragmatism.TheAmericanpragmatistsemphasised,aboveall,thecontingencyofgeneralclaimstotruth.Theywerenotthemselveshistorians,buttheirunderstandingoftheworldwashistoristic.Whatismore,oneofthem,WilliamJames,characterisedthenatureofthatunderstandingas'pluralism'.ItwasfromJames,notGierke,thattheEnglishpluraliststooktheirname.

ThedetailsoftheroutethatEnglishpoliticalthoughttookduringtheearlyyearsofthiscenturytogetfromGierketoWilliamJameswillbesetoutinwhatfollows.Fornow,itisimportanttoemphasisethatthehistoristicelementinpluralistthoughtintroducesathirdleveltothecasethatmightbemadeagainstthesinglestatewithitssinglesovereignty.Beyondtheargumentsforlegalreform,andbeyondtheargumentswithinpoliticaltheory,therewasalsoscopeforargumentsaboutpoliticaltheory,takenasawhole.Theselasttookplaceatthelevelofmeta-theory,andtheyconcernednotanyparticularconceptionoforder,butratherwhatwasinvolvedinthebusinessoforderingsuchconceptions.Ofcourse,therewasadeeplymeta-theoreticalaspecttoGierke'sthought,asthereistoallformsofHegelianism.ButinEngland,whereHegeliansynthesiswasnotanoption,themeta-theoreticalissuestended,astheydidattheotherlevelsofargument,toresolvethemselvesintoaseriesofchoices.Thepluralists,ashistorians,wishedtorepudiateattemptsbytheoristsofthestatetotranscendhistory.Yettheyalso,aspoliticaltheorists,wishedattimestotranscendhistorythemselves.Theyhad,therefore,tochoosebetweenthosetheoriesofpoliticalorderwhichoverrodehistoricalcontingency,andthatsenseofcontingencywhichmadepoliticaltheoryimpossible.Thiswasthedilemmaofhistorism.

VI

EachofthedilemmasthatwerefacedbytheEnglishpluralistshadits

rootsinthesameproblemhowtotranslateGierke'sideasintoEnglandwithoutrecoursetothesyntheticidealoftheRechtsstaat.Initsabsence,theEnglishpluralistsweretotakeGierke'sideasaboutthepersonalityofassociationsindirectionsthatwouldhavesurprisedhim.Butastheydidso,theyhelpedtouncoverthelimitationsofhisthought.Forthelackofasynthetic,conceptualcatch-allisnotnecessarilyahandicapintheconstructionofpoliticaltheory.Itdoesatleastmeanthatthehardchoiceswhichcharacterisepolitical

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existencecannotbeglossedover,asthehighidealphilosophyoftheGermanshasatendencytodo.ThechoicesfacedbytheEnglishpluralistswere,asweshallsee,realones.Unabletoavoidthem,andwithouttheconceptoftheRechtsstaattofallbackon,theydiscoveredwhatGierke'sideasaboutthepersonalityofassociationsreallyentailed.

ThefollowingaccountofEnglishpoliticalpluralismfallsintothreestages.ThefirstexplorestheoriginsofpluralistthoughtinMaitland'sworkonGierke.ThesecondlooksattheattemptsoffourEnglishtheoriststobuildadistinctivepoliticaltheoryonthebackofthemesthatMaitlanddeveloped.ThesewereFiggis,Barker,LaskiandalsoG.D.H.Cole,whoseguildsocialismowedmuchtoMaitland'sinfluence.ThethirddescribestherapiddeclineinthesignificanceattachedtopluralistideasinEngland,culminatinginBarker'sreappraisalofGierkein1933.Intruth,theperiodduringwhichtheinfluenceofpoliticalpluralismcanbesaidtohavebeenatitspeakbarelyextendsbeyondtheseconddecadeofthecentury.Theseyearswere,ofcourse,overshadowedbytheFirstWorldWar,andthewarprovidesarecurringthemeinwhatfollows.Gierkelivedtoseeit,buthedidnotlivetoseemanyofitsconsequences(hediedin1921).Thepluralistswhodidfounditincreasinglyhardtoreconcileideaswhoseoriginslayinthenineteenthcenturywiththepoliticalconditionsofthetwentieth.Thistellsussomethingabouttwentieth-centurypolitics.Butitalsotellsussomethingaboutthosetheoriesofthestatewithwhichnineteenth-centurythinkerslikeGierkehadbeenengaged.Thisisthethemeofthelastpartofthisbook,whichseekstotakethestorybacknotjusttoGierkebutalsotoHobbes,inanattempttoresolvetheissueofthepersonalityofthatassociationwestillcallthestate,andtherebytosaysomethingaboutthelimitationsofpoliticaltheoryitself.

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PARTIIPOLITICALPLURALISM

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Chapter5MaitlandandtheRealPersonalityofAssociations

I

In1903F.W.Maitland,thegreatestlegalhistorianinEngland,deliveredtheSidgwicklectureatNewnhamCollegeunderthetitle'Moralpersonalityandlegalpersonality'.Hissubjectwasthelegalstatusofassociationswithinthestate,andalsothelegalstatusofthestateitself,giventhatittoowasanassociation,or'organisedgroup'asMaitlandtermedit.ThequestionMaitlandsoughttoaddresswaswhethersuchgroupsweretobeconsideredtobepersonsintheirownright.Hislecturesurveysthehistoryofthelawregardingassociations,andalsothetheorisingthatwentwithit,inordertoestablishsomeofthedifficultieswhichattachedtothefictiontheorythatcontinentaljuristshadderivedfromRomanlaw.Theviewthatgroupswerepersonsmerelybya'fictionoflaw'Maitlandcontrastswithwhathecalls'themoralityofcommonsense',whichunderstandsthemtobesomethingmore.1Onthequestionofwhatthatsomethingmightbe,however,Maitlandrefusestobedrawn.'Astophilosophy',heannouncesattheconclusionofhistalk,'thatisnoaffairofmine'.2Itbelongedtoothers'totellusoftheverynatureofthingsandtheverynatureofpersons'.3Allitbehovea'merelawyer'torecognisewasthat'ifnmenunitethemselvesinanorganisedgroup,jurisprudence,unlessitwishestopulverisethegroup,mustseen+1persons'.4AndyetthesedisclaimerswhichMaitlandputsdownto'consciousignoranceandunfeignedhumility'5aremorethanalittledisingenuous.Forevenamerelawyer,onceheinsiststhatgroupsofindividualshaveapersonalityoftheirown,iscommittedtolookingbeyondtherealmofmerelaw.Heis,afterall,insistingthatthelaw'see'thepersonalityofthegroup,asthoughit

1Maitland,Collectedpapers,vol.III,p.314.2Ibid.,p.318.3Ibid.4Ibid.,p.316.5Ibid.,p.318.

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weresomethingalreadythere,ratherthan'inventing'it,asthoughitwerenot.Itisthefictiontheorywhichisthe'lawyerly'responsetothequestionofgrouppersonalityitleavesthepersonalityofthegroupexclusivelyinthehandsofthoseresponsibleforthelaw.Maitland,inlookingbeyondthattheory,waslookingbeyondthelawitselftothe'reality'thatlayoutsideit.Ofwhatthatrealitymightconsistherefusedtospeculate,butthatitwasindeedakindofrealityhewaspreparedtoacknowledge.Andso,in1903,inthesamelectureinwhichheannouncedhimselftobenophilosopher,Maitlandalsoacceptedthatgrouppersonsmusthaveattheveryleast'aphenomenalrealitysuchreality,forexample,asthelamp-posthasfortheidealisticontologist'.6Grouppersonality,forMaitland,hadcometoseem'real';andifitwasnotreallyreal,itwasatleastnolessrealthananythingelse.

ThisreluctantentryintotheworldofontologicalspeculationisevidenceofthegreatinfluenceworkeduponMaitlandtowardstheendofhisintellectualcareerbytheideasofOttovonGierke,towhomidealisticconceptionsofrealitycamemoreeasily.ItwasasalegalhistorianthatMaitlandhadfirstbeendrawntoGierke.IntheletterhesentLeslieStephenin1902toaccompanyacopyofGierke'smonographonAlthusius,Maitlandwrote:'Ilikeall[Gierke's]books,andhishistoryofthingsingeneralasseenfromthepointofviewofastudentofcorporationsisfullofgoodstuff,aswellasbeingtoallappearancesappallinglylearned.'7ThelearningMaitlandcouldappreciateasafellowhistorian.ButitwasGierke'swillingnesstoderivefromhishistoricalresearchesanaccountof'thingsingeneral'whichdrewMaitlandintoterritorywhichhisownhistoricalresearcheshadhithertoleftuntouchedandfromspeculationaboutthingsingeneralitwasasmallsteptospeculationabouttheverynatureofthings.ThepaththatledfromthespecificconcernsofthelegalhistoriantothegeneralconcernsofthephilosopherMaitlandhad

alreadytracedintheintroductionhewrotetoGierkein1900:therehefollowsGierkefromwhathecalls'thelegalplain'('thepointofviewofastudentofcorporations')onthrough'themiddleregionofsociology'('thingsingeneral')andupfinallytothe'philosophicalsummits'('theverynatureofthings').Buthealsotraceditinhisownworkafter1900,beginningwithhisaccountsofthehistoryoftheEnglishcorporationandtheEnglishtrust,andculminatingwiththe

6Ibid.,p.316.7QuotedinFisher,Maitland,p.130.

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thoughtstowhichhegavevoiceinhisSidgwicklectureof1903.ThepathMaitlandtookinhiswritingonGierkeandthepathhetookinhisownworkareverysimilar,anditisbest,beforefollowingthesecond,firsttohavefollowedthefirst.

II

Maitland'spointofdepartureforhisintroductiontoGierkeistheReception.LiketheRenaissanceandtheReformation,towhichMaitlandcomparesit,theReceptionwasapan-Europeanphenomenon,butliketheseothersitsimpactinEnglandwasnotentirelycommensuratewithitsimpactelsewhere.Englishlaw,atthetimewhenRomanlawwasbeingreceivedonthecontinent,hadalreadyreachedwhatMaitlandcalls'thedoctrinalstageofgrowth'8ithad,essentially,turneditselfintoalegalprofessionanditwasforthisreasonthatEnglishlawyerswereresistanttocertainaspectsofRomanism.EveninEnglandthereweremanyexceptions,andMaitlandcitesas'byfarthemostremarkableinstancethereceptionofthatItalianTheoryoftheCorporationofwhichDr.Gierkeisthehistorian,andwhichcentresaroundthephrasepersonaficta'.9ButEnglishlaw,thoughaccommodatingtheideaofthepersonaficta,wasnotwhollydependentonit,andprofessionallawyerswereabletofindanescapeinthelawoftruststhattheythemselveshadbeenresponsiblefordeveloping.InGermanythingsweredifferent.There'folk-law'hadnotyetreachedthedoctrinalstage,andwasinstead'dissipatingitselfincountlesslocalcustoms'.10TheGermanshadnoInnsofCourt,andnoCourtofChancery,inwhichtheymightpreserveanddeveloptheirownjuristicconceptionsofgrouplife.Asaresult,theItaliandoctrine'sweptoverGermanylikeadeluge',11andforcenturiestherewasnorealmeansofescape.

MaitlandiscarefultocallthedoctrineofthepersonafictaItalianandnotRomanbecauseheisconscious,likeGierke,thatitssourcelay

lessintheDigestitselfwhere,hepointsout,'thereisnotextwhichdirectlycallstheuniversitasapersona,stilllessanythatcallsitapersonaficta'12thanintheinterpretationplacedonitbyInnocentIV,whobecamePopein1243.ItwastheInnocentinedoctrinethatRomanistsinGermanysoughttoupheld.ThebasictenetsofthisdoctrineMaitlandsummarisesasfollows:itallowedthatgroupsof

8Gierke,Politicaltheories,p.xiv.9Ibid.10Ibid.11Ibid.12Ibid.,p.xviii.

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individualsmightbepossessedoftheirownpersonality,butonlywhentheywereincorporated;acorporationwascapableofproprietaryrights;itwasnot,however,itselfcapableofaction('knowing,intending,willing,acting');instead,itsactionshadtobeperformedbyindividualcorporators,actingonitsbehalf;thusthecorporationitselfcouldnotbepunished,becauseitcoulddonothingunjust(itcould'do'nothingatall);itwassimplyapersonbyfiction,towhomthelegalcapacityto'own'actionswasascribed.Thisis,ofcourse,afamiliardoctrine,foritaccords,moreorlessexactly,withthepositionthatwastobeadoptedbyHobbes.ForMaitland,thedefiningcharacteristicoftheInnocentineaccountoffictitiouspersonalitywasareluctancetoallowcorporaterightstobeexercisedby'agents',since'agency'suggestedthatthecorporationappointedthosewhoweretoactonitsbehalf.Thiswastheonethingthatacorporationcouldnotbesupposedtohavedone,sinceifitwere,itwouldfollowthatithadbeencapableofperformingtheactionitself,andhadsimplyelectednotto.Uncoincidentally,itwasalsotheonethingthatHobbes'sfictitiouspersonscouldnotbesupposedtodo,sincetheirrepresentativeswerebydefinitionauthorisedbysomeoneelse,whichispreciselywhatmadethemrepresentativesandnotagents.Maitlandsuggeststhatanyonewhowishedtomakefunofthistheorycouldarguethat'itfillsthelegalworldwithhopelessidiotsandtheirState-appointedcurators'.13ButinHobbes'scase,anycriticismofthiskindwouldbeforestalledbythefactthatitistheveryanalogyhehimselfwoulduse:forHobbes,aswehaveseen,fictitiouspersons,whethercorporations,buildingsorpurposes,arenodifferentfrom'Mad-menandFooles'.

Innineteenth-centuryGermanythemostfamiliarversionofthisdoctrinewasneitherInnocent'snorHobbes'sbuttheversionpropoundedbyFriedrichKarlvonSavigny(17791861),theleadingRomanistofhisage.Still,forMaitland,asforGierke,the

implicationsofSavigny'stheoryremainedmanifestlyHobbesian.Fromitemergedastateinwhichcorporateactivitywasdirectlycontrolledbythesovereign,andthusastateinwhichcorporationshadnorightsoftheirown.'TheSavigniancorporation',Maitlandargued,'isno''subject"for"libertiesandfranchises"or"rightsofself-government".Reallyand"publicistically"itcanhardlybeotherthanawheelintheState'smachinery,thoughforthepurposesof

13Ibid.,p.xxi.

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PropertyLawapersonificationofthismachineryisfoundtobeconvenient'.14Indeed,Savigny'sviewswere,ifanything,evenstarkerthanthoseputforwardbyHobbes,forSavignywasadamantthatfictitiouspersonalitydependedinallcasesonaspecificconcessionaryactonthepartofthesovereign.Hobbes,aswehaveseen,thoughinsistingthatthesovereignis'author'ofallgrouppersons,doesnotinsistineachcaseonanauthoritative'act'.ButSavignydid,andhiswerethereforeliterally'State-appointed',notjust'State-authorised',curatorstheywererequiredtosubmitthemselvestothestateforapproval.Itwasforthisreasonthatthetheoryofthepersonafictatendedtoappeal,asMaitlandputit,to'anyPrinceorprinceling...inclinedtowardspaternaldespotism',foritimpliedthat'overthedoingsofguardiansandcuratorstheStateshouldexercise,nomerejurisdiction,butadministrativecontrol'.15Wherethefictiontheoryentailedtheconcessiontheory,corporationswereliabletobeseennotmerelyasthecreationsbutasthecreaturesofthestate.AndinGermany,landofprincelings,thisiswhathappened.

Nineteenth-centuryGermanism,ofthekindofwhichGierkebecametheleadingexponent,was,Maitlandexplains,areactionagainstSavigny.TheconcessiontheorywhichSavignyhadsoughttoenshrinewaswhollyincompatiblewiththeGermanists'conceptionoftheGenossenschaft.Germanfellowshipswerenot,andhadneverbeen,creaturesofthestate.However,itwasnotsimplywiththeconcessiontheory,andthebureaucraticcontrolsthatcamewithit,thattheGermaniststookissue.Theyalsoarguedthattheveryideaofthepersonafictaitselfwasirreconcilablewithwhattheysawastheessentially'organic'natureoftheGenossenschaft.This'organicism'hadsomespecificlegalramifications.Forexample,itchallengedtheSavignian(andHobbesian)viewthatacorporationcouldnotbeliablefortheactionsofitsrepresentatives,sinceithadnotitselfauthorisedthem;iftherepresentativesofacorporationareunderstoodtobeits

'organs',theirwrongsmustbelongtoit,makingthecorporationitselfineachcaseliable.Inevitably,though,Gierkeanorganicismhadbroaderimplicationsthanthese.Ifacorporationisregardedasanorganicentity,thenitmustbesupposedtobeborn,togrow,andtodie,allofitself.Itmust,inotherwords,beseentohavealifeofitsown,andunless,duringthecourseofthatlife,itdisplaystangiblesignsofmadness,thereisno

14Ibid.15Ibid.

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obviousreasonwhyitshouldbeprovidedwithguardiansandcuratorsinthefirstplace.

ItisthisorganicconceptionofcorporateactivitywhichleadsMaitland,inhispursuitofGierke,fromthelegalplaintothemiddleregion,'whereasociologyemulousofthephysicalsciencesdiscoursesoforgansandorganismsandsocialtissue'.16BysociologyMaitlandevidentlyunderstandsthesortofhistorywhichlookstouncoverpatternsofbehaviourintheeventsonwhichitreports.17HistoricisminPopper'ssensethesortofhistorythatisemulousofthesciencesisanotherwayofexpressingthis,butthereisathird,morefamiliartermforwhatMaitlandhasinmind,andthatisnaturalhistory.AtthecloseofhisaccountoftheGermanists'caseagainsttheconcessiontheory,Maitlandsuggeststhat'atimeseemsathandwhentheideaofa"particularcreation"willbeasantiquatedinCorporationLawasitisinZoology'.18Thenotionthatcorporationsarecapableofevolutionclearlyputspaidtotheideathattheirformationdependsalwaysupontheexplicitapprovalofsomehigherauthority.Butitalsoputspaidtotheideathattheyaremerelyfictions,sinceitisnoteasytounderstandhowafictionmightbesaidtoevolve.Ifgroupsaretobestudiedasthoughtheywereorganisms,thenthesuggestionisnotsimplythattheyhaveanidentitythatis'natural',butalsothattheyhaveanidentitythatis'real'afterall,itmakesnomoresensetothinkofanorganismassomethingimaginarythanitdoestothinkofitassomethingartificial.Maitlandrecognisedthis,andherecognisedasaresultthatif,asGierkehoped,'theConcessionTheoryhasnoticetoquit,[it]maycarrythewholeFictionTheorywithit'.19Itisnotimpossibletoconceiveofasociologicalchallengetotheconcessiontheorywhichdoesnotcarrythewholefictiontheorywithit:forinstance,itmightbearguedthatthetendencyinGermanicsocietieshadbeento'see'thepersonalityofindependentassociationswithoutitfollowingthatwhatwasbeing

16Ibid.,p.xi.17ThestandardEnglishexampleofthesortofsociologyMaitlandhasinmindwouldhavebeenHerbertSpencer's,andinparticularSpencer'sdetailedexplorationoftheanalogybetweensocialandorganicbodiesinhisessay'Thesocialorganism'.Itisinterestingtonotethatinthisessay,whichfirstappearedintheWestminsterReviewin1860.Spencer,likeGierke,acknowledgesthesignificanceofHobbes'sattempttoequatethestatewiththehumanbody,andalsoitsinadequacy,(Spencer'sspecificcomplaintbeingtheentirelyjustified'Ifthesovereigntyisthesoulofthebody-politic,howcanitbethatmagistrates,whoareakindofdeputy-sovereigns,shouldbecomparabletojoints?'(HerbertSpencer,ThemanversustheState,ed.DMacRae(Harmondsworth,1968),p.200).18Gierke,Politicaltheories,p.xxxviii.19Ibid.

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seenwasnecessarilyreal;here,'natural'wouldbeunderstoodinanarrowsense,tomeansimplythosethingswhichhaveatendencytooccurandwhichshouldnotthereforebeseenassubjecttoarbitrarycontrol.20ButaGierkeansociologyofgrouplife,becausenaturalinthemorefamiliarsense,tooktheextrastep,andasitdidsoitmovedfromthemiddleregiontothephilosophicalsummits,wherequestionsaboutpatternsandtendenciesgavewaytoquestionsabouttheverynatureofthosethingswhosepatternsandtendencieswerebeingdescribed.

Thisleavesonefurtherstagefortheargumenttogo.TheallusionMaitlandmakestoDarwinwithregardthecreationofcorporationstellsussomethingaboutthenatureofthestate,evenifitisonlythatthestatecannolongersetitselfupasthe'mortalgod'ofHobbes'sfancy.However,Maitlandusesthelanguageofnaturalhistorytomakeanother,morespecificpoint.'For',hedeclares,'whenallissaid,thereseemstobeagenusofwhichStateandCorporationarespecies'.21Hegoeson:

LetitbeallowedthattheStateisahighlypeculiargroup-unit;stillitmaybeaskedwhetherweourselvesarenottheslavesofajurist'stheoryandalittlebehindtheageofDarwinifbetweentheStateandallothergroupswefixanimmeasurablegulf,andaskourselvesnoquestionsabouttheoriginofspecies.22

Whatistrueofcorporations,therefore,istrueofthestateitself,andMaitlandusesthisconnectiontomaketwoobservationsaboutcontemporarytheoriesofthestate'sessentialnature.Thefirstisdirectedtowardsthosewhowerearguingthatthestatewaspossessedof'notonlyarealwill,buteven"the"realwill'.23Ifthestatehassuchawill,thenthesamecouldnotbedeniedtoanyofthegrouppersonswithinit,suchthattheirpersonalitiesmustberealalso.Theviewthatthestate'swillwasalonethe'real'onehad,Maitland

20ThiswouldbetoemploysomethinglikethecelebrateddistinctionthatHumemakesinhisAtreatiseofhumannature(thoughhere'artificial'takestheplaceof'fictitious'):'Toavoidgivingoffence,Imusthereobserve,thatwhenIdenyjusticetobeanaturalvirtue,Imakeuseoftheword,natural,onlyasopposedtoartificial.Inanothersenseoftheword;asnoprincipleofthehumanmindismorenaturalthanasenseofvirtue,sonovirtueismorenaturalthanjustice.Mankindisaninventivespecies;andwhereaninventionisobviousandabsolutelynecessary,itmayproperlybesaidtobenaturalasanythingthatproceedsimmediatelyfromoriginalprinciples,withouttheinterventionofthoughtorreflection.Tho'therulesofjusticebeartificial,theyarenotarbitrary'(seeD.Hume,Atreatiseonhumannature,ed.E.C.Mosser(London,1969),p.536).ThusitmightbearguedthatthoughtheGenossenschaftisaproductofhumaninvention,stillitisanecessary,or'natural'product,andnotthereforetobeunderstoodastheconcessionofthisorthatsovereign.21Gierke,Politicaltheories,p.ix.22Ibid.23Ibid.,p.xi.

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notes,started'mak[ing]somewayinEngland',24andtherecanbenodoubtthathistargethereisBosanquet,andBosanquet'swillingnesstodrawalinebetweenthemoralattributesofthestateandthemerelegalattributesofsomeofthegrouppersonswithinit.Butitfollowsthatifallassociationssharethebasicattributesofthestate,thenthestatemustsharetheattributesoflegalpersons.So,therealityofthestate's'life'mustbeseentoincludeajuristicdimension.Andhere,MaitlandturnshisattentionfromBosanquet,whogivesthestatelifebutnojuristicaspect,toAustin,whomanagedtoprovidethejuristicdimension,butfailedtoprovidealifeforthestatethatcontainsit.ByplacingsovereigntyinaportionofpoliticalsocietyratherthaninwhatMaitlandcalls'thewholeorganisedcommunity',25Austindeniedtothestatethecapacitytoactasapersoninitsownright.Itisforthisreason,Maitlandsuggests,'thatthesetofthoughtsintowhichEnglishmenwerelecturedbyJohnAustinappearstoDr.Gierkeasapaststage'.26ButGierkedidnotgranttothestateitsownpersonalitysimplyinordertomakeofitalegalentity(thatwouldbetoreplicatethepresuppositionsofthefictiontheoryatoneremove);heconsideredittobealegalentityjustbecauseitpossessedarealpersonalityofitsown.Thus,Maitlandwrites,'forGierkeitisasimpossibletomaketheStatelogicallypriortotheLaw(Recht)asitistomakelawlogicallypriortotheState,sinceeachexistsin,for,andbytheother'.27Thestateislaw;lawisthestate.ThisconcludesMaitland'sjourney,whichhastakenhim(inlessthanfortypagesoftext)fromthemedievallawofcorporationstotheidealisticconceptionoftheRechtsstaat.

III

AtthecloseofhisintroductiontoGierke,MaitlandconcedesthattheRechtsstaatsideewasunlikelytomeanmuchtohisEnglishreaders;tothemitcouldonlyappearassomething'unfamiliarandobscure'.28Butifso,heremarks,itisinpartbecausetheEnglishhavehadno

practicalexperienceofitsopposite,thePolizei-orBeamtenstaat.This,then,istheothersidetoMaitland'sstorythefactthatwhileGermansandGermanistswerewrestlingwiththegreatconceptsofKorporationstheorie,theEnglish,partlybyluck,partlybyingenuity,hadmanagedtoorganisethelifeoftheirstateinsuchawayastobe

24Ibid.25Ibid.,p.xliii.26Ibid.27Ibid.28Ibid.

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moreorlessuntouchedbythem.'Inthepast',Maitlandwrites,'wecouldaffordtoacceptspeciouslylogicalbutbrittletheoriesbecauseweknewthattheywouldneverbesubjectedtoseriousstrains',29andthough'thetrustdeedsmightbelongandthelawyers'billmightbelonger',30Englishmenknewthattheycould,iftheyhadto,turnadeafeartothelecturesofjurists.Butalthoughtherewerenoseriousstrains,thereweresomestrainsnonetheless,andeveninEnglandtheingenuityoflawyerscouldnotaccommodateeveryaspectofgrouplife.Inparticular,therewasoneassociationaroundthequestionofwhoseidentityconceptualaswellaspracticalargumentshadsometimesraged.Thiswasthe'organisedgroup'whichhadbeenknownatvarioustimesinEnglandas'Crown','Common-wealth','Publick'and'State'.ItwastotheargumentssurroundingthisgroupandthesenamesthatMaitland'sownattention,oncehehadfinishedwithGierke,cametobeturned.

Maitland'spointofdepartureforthelegalhistoryofthisorganisedgroup,whichhepursuedacrossfiveseparatearticlespublishedafter1900,31isitselfsomewhatobscure.HebeginswiththeoldEnglishideaofthecorporationsole.Englishlawyers,ontheinfrequentoccasionsonwhichtheywererequiredtogivesomeaccountoftheprincipleslyingbehindtheirlawofpersons,tendedtofallbackonthefollowing:'Personsareeithernaturalorartificial.Theonlynaturalpersonsaremen.Theonlyartificialpersonsarecorporations.Corporationsareeitheraggregateorsole.'32ThefirstthreeofthesesentencesrepresentanextremelybluntstatementofessentiallyRomanistprinciples(RomanlawknewotherartificialpersonsthancorporationsandRomanistswouldprefertocallthemfictitiousthanartificial).ButthefourthcontainsanideapeculiartoEnglishlawtheconceptofthecorporationsole.ThatthisideaexistedatallwasevidencethatEnglishlawyershad,onoccasion,beencompelledtoengageinsomespeculationsoftheirownintherealmof

Korporationstheorie,andMaitlandtracedthesourceofthesespeculationstoaparticularproblemtackledataparticulartime.Theproblemconcernedtheparishchurch,andthequestionofwhoorwhatwastobeunderstoodasthesubjectoftherightofwhichthechurchconstitutedtheobject;thetimewasthefirsthalfofthesixteenth

29Ibid.30Ibid.,p.xxxi.31Thesewereentitled:'Thecorporationsole';'Thecrownascorporation';'Theunincorporatebody';'Moralpersonalityandlegalpersonality';'Trustandcorporation'.32Maitland,Collectedpapers,vol.III,p.210.

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century.WhythisproblemtackledatthistimemighthaveproducedthecorporationsoleasitssolutionissomethingtowhichMaitlanddevotesconsiderableattention,andhisexplanationcannoteasilybesummarised.However,itisatleastpossibletosetoutsomeofthechoicesthatwereavailabletothosewhotackledit,andalsoonethatwasnot.Thislastwasthepossibilityofplacingtherightinacorporationaggregate:aparishchurch,unlikesayamonastery,couldnotbelongtosuchacorporationbecausetherewasnoorganisedcommunitytoformtheaggregate;therewasonlythechurch,theparsonandhispatron,andbetweentheselasttwotherewasno'organisation',sincetheirrelationwasinessencedeterminedbyasingleactofpatronage(an'appointment').Thisleftfourpossibilities.Therightmightbetakentoresideintheparsonalone;herethoughtherewasdifficultyinprovidingforthecontinuedexerciseofdutiesorobligationswhatwouldusuallybecalled'offices'asoneparsondiedandwasreplacedbyanother.Therightmightbetakentoresideinthepatronwhoappointstheparson;herethoughtherewasdifficultyinprovidingfortheindependentexerciseofrightwhichtheofficeofparsonseemedtodemand.Therightmightbetakentoresideinthechurchitself;herethoughtherewasdifficultyinprovidingforanyexerciseoftherightatall,sinceitwasnotclearhowthechurchmightitselfperformanaction.Finally,therightmightbetakentoresideintheparsonunderstoodasacorporation.Themeritofthislastsolutionwasthatitmaintainedtheindependenceoftheparsonwhileimplyingthathisactionswereneverthelessundertakennotonhisownbehalf(asanaturalman)butonbehalfofhisoffice(anartificialperson).Atanygivenmoment,theindividualparsonwastheoffice,andthereforetherewasnodistinctiontobedrawnbetweentheactionsofthenaturalmanandtheactionsoftheartificialperson.33Butbecauseatanygivenmomenttheactionsofthenaturalmanmightbeunderstoodastheactionsoftheartificialperson,therewasatleastsomesemblanceofcontinuityintheexerciseofrightsanddutiesas

oneparsondiedandwasreplacedbyanother.

Thiswasthedoctrineofthecorporationsole,andEnglishlawyers,ontherareoccasionsthattheyhadrecoursetoit,founditserviceable.However,asMaitlandisonlytoohappytodemonstrate,itdidhaveone,ratherEnglishflaw:injuristicterms,itwasawholly

33Maitlandpointsoutthatinthesixteenthcenturythewords'parson'and'person'wouldhavesoundedthesame,aidingthisprocessofassimilation(seeibid.,p.226).

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meaninglessconcept.Foracorporationsolecouldinfactdononeofthethingsthatcorporationsexistedinordertobeabletodo.Forinstance,itisoneofthedistinguishingcharacteristicsofwhatMaitlandcallsa'truecorporation'(acorporationaggregate)thatitcanundertakelegaltransactionswithsomeoralloftheindividualcorporatorsthatareitsmembers.Acorporationsolecannot,sinceamandoesnotundertakelegaltransactionswithhimself.Similarly,itisoneofthemarksofatruecorporationthatitisabletoendurewhensomeorallofitsmembersdonot.Acorporationsole,however,becauseboundupwiththenaturalexistenceofanindividualman,tendedtodisappearwhenhedid.Thusatjustthosepointswherethelawmighthaveneedofacorporateentitysuchasintheintervalbetweenthedeathofoneparsonandtheappointmentofanotherthecorporationsolefailedtodeliver.Andso,ashesurveysitsuses,andmoreparticularlyitslackofthem,Maitlandconcludesthattheconceptofcorporationsoleis'ajuristicabortion'34itisacreationwhichhasbeendeniedanylifeofitsown.

Becauseofitsfairlynarrowecclesiasticalorigins,theabortivenatureofthecorporationsolemightbeconsideredamatteroflittleimportance.However,theofficeofparsonwasnottheonlyoneinearlymodernEnglandwhichmightbefilledbyanaturalmaninneedofhisowncorporateidentity.ThesamewastrueoftheCrown.Theking,wholivedanddiedasmendid,occupiedanofficewhich,itwascommonlyhoped,didnotliveanddiewiththeking.Thisdistinctionbetweenmanandofficehadtraditionallyfoundexpressioninthelanguageofthecorporationaggregate(theuniversitas).However,bythesixteenthcenturytherewerethose,inEnglandaselsewhere,whowerereluctanttoaccedetothesuggestionthatthekingwasamereofficerofthestate,andthusinsomesenseitsservant.Norwouldtheyacceptthattheking,whowasfreetodoashewishedwithhisownproperty,wasmereguardianofthatproperty('thecommonwealth')

whichbelongedtothestateasawhole.Yetthesesameapologistsforkinglypowerdidnotwishtosuggestthatthekingoccupiednoofficeatall,northathissubjectsweresimplyobeyingapeculiarlypowerfulnaturalman.TheirwishwastopreservethedistinctionbetweenkingandCrown,whileyetmaintainingthatatanygivenmomenttheCrownwastheking.InEngland,thismeantthatthekingwastobeunderstoodasa

34Ibid.,p.243.

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corporationsole.Thetermitselfwasnotalwaysused,butthereasoningwhichturnedtheparsonintoacorporationwasthesameasthatwhichdidthesamefortheking.Moreover,thiswasnoobscuredoctrine.Ithadprominentchampions,andithadthemovermanyyears.Ofthese,Maitlandusestheexampleofjusttwo.OneisHenryVIII.TheotherisThomasHobbes.

Maitland'sviewofHobbeswasnotGierke's.Certainly,hegivesnoimpressionofsharingthatadmiration(albeittingedwithhorror)thatGierkehadforthemanwhomhebelievedtohavechangedthecourseofthehistoryofideasforever.InthesameletterinwhichhewrotetoLeslieStephenaboutGierke,MaitlandalsowroteofHobbes(whoselifeStephenwasthenwriting):'Iratherfancythat[his]politicalfeatconsistedingivinganewtwisttosomewellworntheoriesofthejuristicorderandtheninventingapsychologywhichwouldjustifythattwist.'35ThisslightdisdainmayexplainwhatisinfactarathersuperficialcomparisonthatMaitlanddrawsbetweenHobbesianandHenricianviewsofthestate,whenhewritesthat'asforHobbes,soalsoforKingHenry,thepersonalityofthecorporatebodyisconcentratedinandabsorbedbythepersonalityofitsmonarchicalhead'.36ToexpressitinthesetermsistomissentirelywhatisdistinctiveaboutHobbes,whichishisrecognitionthattheconventionallanguageofcorporateunitycouldnotconveytheparticularconceptionofsovereigntyhehadinmind.Becausehemissesthis,Maitlandalsomisses,whichisrare,theopportunityforsomeword-play.ForitisnotinitsheadthatHobbesabsorbsthepersonalityofthecommonwealth,butinits'soul',whichissovereign.Thissaid,andonceitisacceptedthatthesoulofthebodypoliticcanbeanassemblyaswellasaman,theparallelsbetweenHobbes'ssovereignandtheparsonoftheEnglishparishareindeedstriking.Likethelawyersofahundredyearsearlierwhoturnedtheparsonintoacorporationsole,Hobbeswishedtofindaformulawhichwould

rendersovereigntyanofficebutwhichwouldidentifythatofficewiththenaturalmanormenwhoheldit.Hecouldnotallowsovereignrighttoresideinthegroupofnaturalmenwhoappointthesovereign('thepatron')becausethatwouldmakeimpossibletheindependentexerciseofrightwhichhedeterminedthatsovereigntyrequired;hecouldnotallowsovereignrighttoresideinthecommonwealth('thechurchitself')becausethecommonwealthwasnomorecapableof

35QuotedinFisher,Maitland,p.130.36Maitland,Collectedpapers,vol.III,p.248.

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actionitselfthanwasabridge;butnorcouldheallowsovereignrighttoresideinthenaturalpersonorpersonsofthesovereign('theparsonalone')becausethatwouldbetodestroytheintegrityoftheoffice.Sohemadethesovereignrepresentativeofacorporateentitywhichcouldnotexistwherethesovereignceasedtoexist,andtheconsiderableattentionwhichhedevotedtotheproblemsofsuccessionshowsthatheknewjustwherethemostpressingdifficultieswerelikelytoarise.37Becauseitwas'representative',thepositionofHobbes'ssovereigndidatleastrestonacoherentjuristicidea,unlikethecorporationsoleofEnglishlaw,whichwaslittlemorethanaformofwords.ButtheremarkableusewhichHobbesmadeoftheideaofrepresentationcouldnotconcealtheillusorynatureoftheentitywhosepersonthesovereignwassaidtorepresent.Maitlandcallstheideaofthecorporationsole'thismereghostofafiction'.38Itwasaphrasewhich,aswehaveseen,hecouldjustifiablyhaveappliedtothepersonofHobbes'scommonwealthaswell.

Toimply,asMaitlanddoes,thatHobbes'spoliticalphilosophywassimplyacaseofthecorporationsolewritlargeistosuggestoneoftwothings:eitherthatanideawithrelativelyhumbleoriginshadachievedremarkablethingsinEnglishpoliticaltheory;orthatoneofthemostcelebratedofEnglishpoliticaltheoristshaddonelittlemorethanrecastwhatwasaveryhumbleidea.ForMaitlanditisthelatter.HedidnotbelievethatthecorporationsolehadexercisedanenduringinfluenceonEnglishpoliticalthoughtforthesimplereasonthathedidnotbelievethatHobbeshadexercisedsuchaninfluenceeither.Rather,Hobbesstoodattheendofthatperiod,stretchingbacktoHenryVIII,when,asMaitlandputitelsewhere,thedayshadbeenuncharacteristically'evil'.39Whenthatperiodendedin1688,Englishmenwerehappytofallbackonthemorecomfortableideathatpublicpowerrestedwiththeorganisedbodyofthestateasawhole,anditwasanideathattheyhadremainedcomfortablewitheversince.

Moreover,thecomparativefreedomenjoyedbyassociationsinEnglandprovidedampleevidencethatEnglandwasnot,andhadneverbeen,anythinglikeaHobbesiancommonwealth,despiteafewuncomfortableinterludes,ofwhichthereignofHenryVIIIhad

37HobbesdiscussestheproblemsofsuccessionatlengthinchapterXIXofLeviathan.Recognisingthatthedoctrineofthecorporationsolecannotaccommodateaninterregnum,Hobbesallowsthatsuccessionunderamonarchymaybedeterminedeitherby'Custome'or'bypresumption'ofprimogeniture(seeHobbes,Leviathan,p.137).38Maitland,Collectedpapers,vol.111,p.241.39SeeGierke,Politicaltheories,p.xxxiii.

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beenone.ButthoughMaitlanddiscountedthelegacyofthecorporationsoleinthepurelypublicdomain,hedidneverthelessdiscernitelsewhere.Forwhiletheownershipofpublicrighthadlongsincebeenaccordedtothestateasacorporateentity,thesamewasnottruewithregardtotheownershipofproperty.Evenasthetwentiethcenturywasbeginning,Maitlandargued,EnglishlawyersandEnglishlegislatorshadyetformallytorecognisethepublicownershipofprivategoods('landandchattels').Thisdidnotmean,ofcourse,thatEnglishlawyersdeniedthatsuchathingwaspossibleitwasindubitablythecasethatthestatewasabletoborrowmoneyagainstwhatitowned,andthattheresultingdebtbelongedtothestateitself,andnottothenaturalmanormenwhoheldoffice,andwhomightwellhaveconsiderabledebtsoftheirown.ButEnglishlawhadbeenunabletoarriveataconsistentformulabywhichtoexpressthiscondition,andthis,Maitlandargued,forthesimplereasonthat'thefoolishparsonhadleditastray'.40Englishlawyers,havingaccommodatedthemselvestotheideaofthecorporationsole,founditdifficulttosecureanindependentidentityforthestateinlawapartfromthenaturalidentitiesofkingandgovernment.ThisMaitlanddidnotattributetoanysinistermotivesaking,afterall,wouldbemoreencumberedthannotifeverydebtheassumedbroughtwithitapersonalobligationbutsimplyto'clumsythoughtsandclumsywords'.41Nevertheless,hebelievedthatthisclumsinesshadproducedpersistentconfusion,notonlyinthestrictlyprivatedomainofdebtanddebt-collection,butalsoatthepointwhereprivateandpublicoverlap,intheareaof'service'.Shackledbythewhollyinappropriateconceptofthecorporationsole,EnglishlawhadbeenunableeventomakeclearthatdistinctionuponwhichHobbeshadinsisted,betweentheservantsoftheofficeandtheservantsoftheman.42Untilsuchconfusionswereeradicated,Maitlandwishedtosuggest,thesubjectsoftheEnglishCrownmightneverentirelybecertainwhoownedwhat,andwhatwhom.

Ofthepossibleremediesforthisuncertainty,themostobviousbyfarwassimplytoextendthecorporatepersonalityofthestatefrom

40Maitland,Collectedpapers,vol.111,p266.41Ibid.,p243.42Maitlandprovidesthisexample:'Astatuteof1887tellsisthat''theexpressions'permanentcivilserviceofHerMajesty',and'permanentcivilserviceoftheCrown'areherebydeclaredtohavethesamemeaning".NowasitisevidentthatKingEdwardisnot(thoughLouisXIVmayhavebeen)theState,weseemtohavestatutoryauthorityforholdingthattheStateis"HisMajesty".Thewayoutofthismess,formessitis,liesinaperceptionofthefact,forfactitis,thatoursovereignlordisnota"corporationsole"'(ibid.,p.259).

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thepublicintotheprivatedomain.Sinceitwasassumed,thoughrarelyexpressed,thatthestatehadapubliclifeapartfromthelivesofitsindividualmembers,thereseemedtobenoreasonwhylawyers,whosebusinessitwastofindconcreteexpressionforsuchassumptions,shouldnotgrantthestateapersonalitycomparabletothatallowedtoprivatecorporationsaggregate.Inthiswayitwouldmakeperfectsenseforthestate,ratherthanthekingorhisgovernment,toenterintocontracts,assumedebts,employservants,andgenerallybothtosufferwrongsforwhichcompensationmightbesoughtandcommitwrongsforwhichcompensationmightberequired.ItwouldnotmattergreatlywhatthiscorporationwascalledMaitland'sownpreferencewasfor'theCommonwealth',althoughheacceptedthat'theCrown'or'thePublic'woulddojustaswellsolongasitwasrecognisedthatitwasanentityquitedistinctfromitstitularhead(theking)andfromtherestofitstitularandnon-titularmembers(thegovernmentandthepeople).However,anarrangementlikethis,familiarasitwas,broughtwithitanequallyfamiliarproblem.PrivatecorporationsaggregateinEnglishlawwereallowedonlyanartificialorfictitiouspersonality,whichrestedineachcaseontheauthorityofthestate.Howcoulditmakesenseforthestate,oranythingelse,toauthoriseitsownpersonality?TheanswerwasthatunderEnglishlawitmadenosense.YetitwasneverthelesstruethatEnglishlawyershadbeenabletocircumventthisproblemforallthoseotherassociationsthateithercouldnotorwouldnotseekthestate'sauthorityfortheircorporateactivities.Asaresult,adifferentquestionimmediatelysuggesteditself.Ifothergroupshadmanagedtosecureforthemselvesadistinctlegalidentitythroughtheconceptoftrusteeship,whyshouldnotthestatedothesame,andincludeitselfamongthoseunincorporatebodiesinwhichEnglishlawabounded?

ThiswasanoptiontowhichMaitlandgavecarefulconsideration.Thoughthebeneficiaryofatrustwasnottechnicallyapersoninlaw,

lawyers,ifpreparedtoperformwhatMaitlandcalled'wonderfulconjuringtricks',43couldmakeitasgoodasone.Attheveryleast,theconceptoftrusteeshipsuggestedacleardistinctionbetweentheindividualmenwithwhomthelawdealtandtheentitiesonwhosebehalftheyacted.Thiswasadistinction,Maitlandargued,whichmightresolvetheuncertaintyshroudingmuchofEnglishlocalgovernment,wheretheramshackleconditionofEnglishKorpora-

43Gierke,Politicaltheories,p.xxxvii.

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tionstheoriehadleftitsmark.44Moreover,itwasadistinctionwhichhebelievedhadalreadypermeatedeverydaydiscourseaboutgovernmentingeneral.'Openanewspaper',hewrote,'andyouwillbeunluckyifyoudonotseetheword"trustee"appliedto"theCrown"ortosomehighandmightybody'.45Thiswasthereadiestmeanstohandofexpressingthecontinuousexistenceofthestateinboththepublicandtheprivatedomain,eventhoughthequestionremainedunansweredastothebenefitofwhomorwhat,exactly,theactionsofitstrusteeswerebeingdirected.

Therewasonesenseinwhichthiswasaquestionwhoseanswerdidnotgreatlymatter.Itwasthegreatmeritoftheconceptoftrusteeshipthatitfocusednotonsomeoneorthingbutonthetermsandconditionsunderwhichtherightsofsomeoneorthingwereheldbyothers.Thesetermsandconditionsweredeterminedbythetermsandconditionsofeachindividualtrust,anditwasherethatthelawyerscouldperformtheirtricks,fashioninglegalentitiesoutoftheconstraintswhichactedonthetrusteesthemselves.However,forpreciselythisreason,theconceptoftrusteeshipcouldnotreadilyserveasthebasicmodelfortherelationthatsubsistedbetweenstateandgovernment.Theproblemwasthattherewerenotrustdeedsinwhichthisrelationwasdescribed.Thisdifficultymightbeovercomewhereneworgansofgovernment,andparticularlyoflocalgovernment,werebeingestablished;here,'elaboratestatutes',asMaitlandcallsthem,woulddeterminethetermsunderwhichpublicpositionswereentrustedtonaturalindividuals.46Butunlessthestateasawholecouldbeprovidedwithsuchstatutesthatis,withawrittenconstitutionsetoutinthemannerofadeedoftrusttherewasnothingforlawyers,oranyoneelse,toworkon.Andthis,inturn,raisesamorebasicdifficulty.Maitland'scomplaintagainsttheconditionofEnglishKorporationstheoriewasnotthatitwasimpractical,northatithadproducedunacceptableresults;onthecontrary,hebelieved

Englandtohavebeenblessedwithamarkedlypracticalandliberalmeansofdealingwithquestionsofcorporateidentity.His

44Maitlandwrites:'Anaturalresultofthislonghistoryisacertaincarelessnessintheuseoftermsandphraseswhichmaypuzzleaforeignobserver.Icanwellunderstandthathemightbestruckbythefactthatwhereasourboroughis(ortospeakwithgreatstrictness,themayor,aldermen,andburgessesare)acorporation,ourcounty,afterallourreforms,isstillnotacorporation,thoughtheCountyCouncilis'Healsodiscussesatsomelengththerelationbetweenthenotionofcorporate'privilege',whichwasoneoftheconsequencesoftheconcessiontheory,andthe'rottenness'ofboroughs(seeMaitland,Collectedpapers,vol.111,pp.3989).45Ibid.,p403.46Seeibid.,p402.

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complaintwasthat,consideredastheory,theEnglishviewofcorporationshadnojuristicfoundations,whichledtouncertainty,asexemplifiedbythenonsenseofthecorporationsole.Whereuncertaintythreatenedtoproduceimpracticalityorevenilliberality,thetrustconceptwasreadytoretrievethesituation.Butthoughcurative,thetrustconceptcouldnotitselfpreventuncertainty,forthesimplereasonthatithadnobasisinlegaltheoryeither.Thestatedtermsofeachindividualtrustwereall.Withoutthem,therewasnothingtofallbackon,andtheconceptofthetrustbecamejustthat,amatterof'goodconscience'ratherthan'strictlaw'.Muchmightbeachievedbytrustinginconscience,buttheonethingthatcouldnot,bydefinition,beprovidedwasabridgeforthegapthathadopenedupinEnglishlawthegapbetweengoodpracticeontheonehand,andgoodtheoryontheother.

Maitlandneverquitespellsthisout.47Yetitisaconclusionheseems,tacitlyatleast,tohaveacceptedbythetimehedeliveredhisSidgwicklecturein1903.There,asinallhisotherwritingonthissubject,heacknowledgesthegreatpracticalresourcefulnessoftheEnglishlegalsystemindealingwithorganisedgroups.Hespeaks,moreapprovingthandisapproving,ofthe'Englishcontemptforlegaltechnique',madepossibleby'soundinstincts'and'convenientconclusions'.48ButhealsoacknowledgesthattheEnglishlegalsystemintheendhasnosatisfactoryresourcefordealingwithquestionsaboutoneorganisedgroupinparticular.Heprovideshisaudiencewiththisillustration:

[The]organisedgroupisasovereignstate.LetuscallitNusquamia.Likemanyothersovereignstatesitowesmoney,andIwillsupposethatyouareoneofitscreditors.Youarenotreceivingtheexpectedinterestandthereistalkofrepudiation.Thatbeingso,Ibelieveyouwillbeindignant,morally,righteouslyindignant.NowthequestionIwanttoraiseisthis:Whoisitthatreallyowesyoumoney?49

Facedbythisquestion,Englishlawyershavenowheretoturn.There

isnotrusthere,eitherinlaworinthemorecolloquialsense.SuchlegaltechniqueasEnglishlawyerspossessisboundupintheconventionallineamentsoftheconcessiontheory,whichtheyhavedonetheirbesttodisregardjustbecauseitcannotstretchtocaseslike

47Theclosesthecomesisattheendofhisessayon'Trustandcorporation',whereheacknowledgesthattheideathatgovernmentisatrustcanneverbemorethana'metaphor':'Thosewhospeakthuswouldadmitthatthetrustwasnotonewhichanycourtcouldenforce,andmightsaythatitwasonlya"moral"trust'(seeibid.,p.403).48Ibid.,pp.31819.49Ibid.,p.318.

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these.Allthatremainsistospeakofthedebtbeingowedbycertainmen.Butwhichmen?

ClearlyyoudonotthinkthateveryNusquamianowesyousomealiquotshareofthedebt.No-onethinksinthatway.ThedebtofVenezuelaisnotowedFulanoyZutanoandtherestofthem.Nor,Ithink,shallwegetmuchgoodoutoftheword'collectively',whichisthesmudgiestwordilltheEnglishlanguage,forthelargestcollectionofzerosisonlyzero.50

'Collectively'mustgivewaybefore'corporately'.Andifitispointedoutthatcorporationsarethefictitiouscreationsofsovereignstatesandnotthestatesthemselves,thenthereisonlyoneresponseleft:toarguethatcorporationscannotbethefictitiouscreationsofsovereignstates.Instead,theymustbetakentoexistintheirownright,andthelawnottocreatebutmerelytoacknowledgethem.Ifthiswereso,itwouldmeanthatthedebtmightbeowedbyNusquamiaitself,eventhoughthereisnoevidenceofNusquamiahavinghadanindependentlegalpersonalityconcededtoit.Itwouldalsomeanthatanyotherunincorporatebodymightbeunderstoodtobeacorporation.Inpracticaltermsthismightmakelittledifferencetohowthevastmajorityofsuchbodiesweretreated.ButinjuristictermsitwouldatleastmeanthatEnglishlawhadfinallyarriveduponaKorporationstheoriethatmadesense.

FurtherthanthisMaitlandwasnotpreparedtogo.Havingposedhisquestion,andhavingindicatedhowhebelievesitmightbestbeanswered,heannounceshisincompetencetodealwiththeissuesofphilosophy,andleavesthematterthere.Hehas,herecognises,indulgedinspeculationswhichinGermanywouldbeassociatedwithjuristslikeGierke,andgroupedundertherathergrandheading'Realism'.Butasa'merelawyer',andbecausenoGerman,heisreluctanttomaketheconnectionanexplicitone.Heprofessesnottocaregreatlywhetherlawyerspersistinthinkingofthepersonalityoforganisedgroupsasfictitiousratherthanreal,solongastheyaccept

thatgroupsdohaveapersonalityoftheirown,andthatthispersonalityisnotsomethingtobeascribedordeniedtothemonasovereign'swhim.Wemaypersistinthinkingofgrouppersonalityasafiction,Maitlandargues,justsolongasweacceptthatitis,liketheidealisticontologist'slamp-post,'afictionweneedsmustfeign',51andnotsomethingtobefeignedasandwhenwechoose.However,hecannotquiteleaveitatthat.Forthoughnophilosopher,Maitland

50Ibid.51Ibid.,p.316.

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recognisesthatthereissomethingpeculiaraboutafictionoverwhosecreationno-onehascontrol.Atsomepoint,headmits,howevermuchwemightdisregardthedeeperissues,'thethoughtwilloccurtousthatafictionweneedsmustfeignissomehoworanotherverylikethesimpletruth'.52

IV

TherewerethustwodifferentroutesbywhichMaitlandwasabletoarriveatthedoctrineoftherealpersonalityofassociations,oneGerman,undertakenonGierke'sbehalf,theotherEnglish,undertakenonhisown.TheGermanroutetookMaitlandfromtheInnocentinedoctrineofthepersonaficta,throughthemiddleregioninhabitedbytheGenossenschaft,andontotheideaofrealgrouppersonsexistingwithintheidealisticdomainoftheRechtsstaat.TheEnglishroutetookhimfromthedoctrineofthecorporationsole,throughthemiddleregionwheremenformedtrusts,andontotheideathatallorganisedgroupsmusthaveacorporatepersonalityoftheirown,whetherwewillitorno.Eachofthesestoriesfollowasimilarpattern,andtheproblemswithwhichtheydealintersectatmanypoints.Buttherearealsodifferences,anditisonthedifferencesthatInowwishtoconcentrate.WhatdistinguishesthesetwoaccountsofgrouppersonalityisthattheEnglishversionis,ateachpoint,morecontainedthantheGierkeanequivalent.So,forinstance,theconceptofthecorporationsoleisanideabothmoreparochialandmorelimitedinscopethanthebroaderconceptofthepersonaficta.Similarly,theideaofthetrust,thoughitisabletoproduceresultssimilartothoseGierkeextractsfromtheGenossenschaftsidee,doesnotofitselfleadMaitlandtospeculateaboutthe'nature'ofthosethingsthattrustsconceal.Hismiddleregionismorehistoricalthanitisnaturalhistorical,anditlooksathowmenhavedealtwithcertainproblemsratherthanatthespeciesofthingthatthoseproblems

address.Likewise,whenMaitlandarrivesattheviewthatgroupsmustbetreatedaspersonscomewhatmay,hisconcernismoretoregulariseproblem-solvingtechniquesthanitistojustifythemwithanaccountoftheworldthatthrewthemupinthefirstplace.Forallthesereasons,Maitlanddoesnotreallytelluswhataworldmadeupofrealgrouppersonswouldbelike,andnordoeshetellushowit

52Ibid.

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wouldoperate.This,though,isitselfaconsequenceofanotherdifferencebetweenMaitlandandGierke,andthatistheformer'spreoccupationwiththeissuesofprivate,asopposedtopublic,lawMaitlandismoreinterestedindiscoveringwhatitisforagrouptoowemoneythanheistodescribewhatitmightbeforagrouptoexerciseauthorityoveritsmembers.HefollowsGierkefromthelegalplaintootherregionstouchingonotherdisciplines,butateachpointheremainsweddedtowhathewouldcall'merely'legalconcerns.ThereisthusagapinMaitland'sEnglishdoctrineofrealgrouppersonality,whichintheGermanversionisfilledbytheconceptoftheRechtsstaat.Thisisthegapthatexistsbetweenanexplanationofwhatthedoctrineofrealgrouppersonalitymeansinlegalterms,andanaccountofwhatitspoliticalconsequencesmightbe.

TosaythatthepoliticalconsequencesofrealgrouppersonalityareaGierkeanRechtsstaat,however,doesnotgetusveryfariftheideaoftheRechtsstaatremainsanobscureone.ButitisinfactpossibletosaysomethingmoreaboutwhattheideaoftheRechtsstaatentailsifwesaysomethingmoreaboutthegapthatexistsbetweenMaitland'sownaccountofrealgrouppersonality,andtheonethatheproducesonGierke'sbehalf.Thelackofanobviouslypolitical(or,ashewouldtermit,'publicistic')dimensiontoMaitland'saccountleavesunansweredthequestionofwhetherthefinalstepthatMaitlandtakes,tentativeasitis,from'fictionsweneedsmustfeign'to'thesimpletruth',isonethatmakesanydifferencetotheargument.Ifitdoesmakeanydifference,thiswilltellussomethingaboutwhatwecanexpectfromtheRechtsstaatsidee.Butinordertoseewhetheritdoesmakeanydifference,itisnecessarytosaysomethingmorethanMaitlandispreparedtodoabouttherelationbetweentheworldoflegalpersonality,andtheworldthatsurroundsit.

ThefirstquestionthatneedstobeaskediswhetherMaitland'sargumentactuallyneedstotakeitsfinalstep,fromfictitious

personalitytoreal.ItisquiteclearthatMaitland'sviewofcorporatenesscannotbereconciledwiththenotionthatcorporationshavetheirpersonality'granted'tothembythestate,withallthesuggestionsofpatronagethatthattermbrings.Butgiventhattheconcessiontheoryisnotequivalenttothefictiontheory,doesitnecessarilyfollowthatanattackontheideaof'grants','privileges'and'concessions'mustintheendbringdowntheideaofthepersonafictawithit?ItisperhapsusefultoreturnatthispointtothedistinctionHobbesdrawsbetweenpersons-in-lawauthorisedbya'sealed'act(inletters)andthose

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authorisedby'ordinary'statutes(ingenerallaws).Hobbeswouldnothaveallowedthatthesovereignshouldgiveuphisrighttoconcedefictitiouspersonalitytocertaingroupsashesawfit,andtotakeitawayagainasandwhenhepleased.ButifwedisregardHobbes'sownviews,andlooksimplytothedistinction,itiscertainlypossibletoconceiveofastateinwhichallcorporationsareauthorisedbygenerallaws,andnonehavetorelyonthespecificapprovalofthesovereignpower.Werethisso,andwerethelawssufficientlygeneral,thereisnoreasonwhyanygroupofindividualswhoformthemselvesintoanassociationshouldnottherebyacquireapersonalityoftheirown.Yetitwouldremaintruethat,inHobbes'stermsanyway,thesegroupswouldstillbepersons-in-lawthatis,personsbyfiction.

ThispointcanbeexploredfurtherbytheuseofacomparisonMaitlanddrawsinhisintroductiontoGierke.There,whendiscussingthethinkinghetakestoliebehindtheCompaniesActof1862,heremarksonthecaseofcertainoftheAmericanstates,whoseconstitutionshadcome'toprohibitthelegislaturesfromcallingcorporationsintobeingexceptbymeansofgenerallaws'.53Inthesamevein,hepointsoutthatcorporatestatusinEnglandwasnolongerheldtohaveanythingtodowithwhetherornotagroupwas'chartered'(i.e.possessingletters).54Summarisingthesedevelopments,hewrites:'IthadbecomedifficulttomaintainthattheStatemakescorporationsinanyothersensethanthatinwhichtheStatemakemarriageswhenitdeclaresthatpeoplewhowanttomarrycandosobygoing,andcannotdosowithoutgoing,tochurchorregistry.'55Clearly,marriagewasnota'privilege'bestowedbythestatebutrathersomethingthatthestatesimply'recognised';so,Maitlandbelieved,forincorporation.Butthoughmarriageswerenotconcededbythestate,stillitisapparentthattheywere,inMaitland'swords,'made'bythestate.Inorderthattwoindividualsberecognisedbythelawtobemarriedtheyhavetofulfilcertaincriteriawhichare

themselvesdeterminedbylaw.Iftheydonotfulfilthesecriteria,theyarenotmarried.Soforcorporations.Thetermsofthe1862Actthatanysevenormorepersons'associatedforanylawfulpurpose'canmakeofthemselvesacorporationplacedlegalpersonalitywithinthereachofalmostanygroup.Whatitdidnotmean,though,wasthatalmosteverygroupthereforewasalegalperson.'Associated'herereferstoanygrouporganisedaccordingtotheformalcriteriaofassociation

53Gierke,Politicaltheories,p.xxxviii.54Ibid.55Ibid.

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(theywouldhavetohaveaname,anaddress,certainsignaturesoncertaindocumentsandsoon).Any'association'whichdidnotmeetthesecriterialacked,say,therelevantdocumentationwasnotproperlyassociated,justasanycouple'married'withoutsigningtheregisterwerenotproperlymarried.Theexistenceofcorporations,andmarriages,thoughnotdecidedbythestate,wasstilldeterminedbythestate,throughitsgenerallaws.

Infact,Maitlandwishestotaketheargumentfurtherthanthis.Intheessayshewroteafter1900hisrepeatedlyexpressedconcernisforthosegroupsthatdidnotmeettheformalcriteriaofincorporation,despitethe1862Act,andwhothereforeremainedintheuncertainconditionof'unincorporatebodiliness'intheeyesofthelaw.Thatmanygroupsdidremainunincorporateafter1862isitselfaconsequenceoftheconfusionthatpersistedregardingtheconcessionarynatureofcorporatestatus.Offeredthechancetobecomecorporations,manygroupsorganisedaroundthetermsofatrustbelievedthattoacceptwouldbetocompromisetheirindependence,sinceitwasfelt(withgoodreason)thatthestatehadsoughttocontroltheoperationsofsuchcorporationsasithadmadeinthepast.56Maitland'sworrywasthatgroupssuchasthesewould,forthewantofcertainformalities,sufferwhencomparedtotheirincorporatecounterparts.Again,acomparisonwithmarriageisusefulhere.Somecouplesmaynotwish,forwhateverreason,togothroughwithaformalceremonyofmarriage,yetlive,inallotherrespects,asthoughmarried,underthesameroofandwithpropertyheldjointlybybothpartners.Ifthelawdoesnotregardthepropertylikewise,thecouplemaysuffer,particularlyintherealmoftaxation,butalsowithregardtosimpleconvenience,whenevertheywish,asacouple,toundertakelegaltransactions,suchasbuyingahouse.Soforanunincorporatebody,whichmayexhibitallthesignsofcorporatenessdurability,singularityofpurpose,propertyheld'in

common','offices'yetwhichwouldsufferifthelawchose,say,totaxeachmemberindividuallywheneverpropertywasdisposedof,ortodemandthesignatureofeachmemberindividuallywhenevera

56ThusLloyd'sofLondonwasnotincorporateduntil1871,andtheStockExchangenotatallinMaitland'slifetime,forfearthatincorporationwouldbringwithitcontrolbytheBoardofTradeover'bye-laws'(seeMaitland,Collectedpapers,vol.III,pp.3723).Manyothersparticularlyclubs(liketheJockeyClub)andcharitiesdidnotseewhytheyshouldsufferincorporation,eveniftheriskswereminimal,sincetheyhadgotbysowellwithoutit.And,asMaitlandsays(hewaswritingforaGermanaudience):'InEngland,youcannotincorporatepeoplewhodonotwantincorporation'(ibid.,p.374).

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contractwasenteredinto.Thelawhasthiscenturycomeincreasinglytoacceptthatcoupleswhobehaveasthoughmarriedshouldbetreatedasthoughmarried(aprocessculminatinginthe1995FamilyLawBill).Maitlandwashopingthatsomethingsimilarwouldhappenforassociations,andthatthelawwouldrecognisewhathecallsthe'fact'ofgrouppersonalitywhetherornottheformalitiesofgrouppersonalityhadbeenobserved.

Nevertheless,itcanstillbequestionedwhether'facts'ofthiskindshouldbeheldtoconstitute'reality'.Foritremainstruethatevenwherethereisnoformalceremonyofmarriageorincorporation,theconditionofmarriageorincorporationisstilldeterminedbylaw.Itisinlawthatitisdecidedwhich'facts'aresufficienttogeneratewhichformsofassociation.Thustheconditionofmarriage,thoughitmaybeachievedwithoutceremony,cannotbeachievedunlesscertaincriteriaaremettheindividualsconcernedwillhavetohaveattainedacertainformalityintheirrelationstooneanotheriftherelationshipitselfistoaccordtoacertaintype.Becausethereisnoceremony,thesecriteriamaybebroadlydrawn,andtheymaybeopentoavarietyofdifferentinterpretations.Butitdoesnotfollowfromtheabsenceofanyceremonythatitisthecouplethemselveswhodeterminewhetherornottheyaremarried,andnordoesitfollowthatallcouplesareasgoodasmarriedwhethertheygothroughtheceremonyornot.Thebroaderthecriteriatheeasieritwillbeforindividualstoformthemselvesintomarriedunits.Butunlessthecriteriaaresobroadastobemeaningless,therewillalwaysbeconstraints,andthelawwillalwaysberecognisingmarriagesonitsownterms.Nowhereisthisbetterillustratedthanintheabilityofthelaw,intheabsenceofceremony,torecognise'marriages'wherethereisnoequivalentrecognitiononthepartoftheindividualsconcernedasmayoccur,forexample,wherechildrenareinvolved,andtheissueisoneofmaintenance.57Andwhatistrueofmarriageisalsotrueof

incorporation.Whereitisdecidedthattheperformanceofsomeactofincorporationisnotapreconditionofagroup'sbeingseenasacorporation,manydifferentassociationsmaycometoattaincorporatestatus.Buttheydonot

57ThesettingupoftheChildSupportAgencyisarecentexampleofanattempttolookbeyondtheformalitiesoffamilylawtowhatmightbecalledthe'facts'ofthematter.Butbecausethe'facts'areofnecessityformallydeterminedthemselves,theresulthasbeeninsomecasestocreate'familial'dutiesandobligationswheretheindividualsconcernedseenone.

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attainitontheirownterms.Theyattainitwhentheymeetthegeneralcriteria(ofsingularity,durability,communalityandsoon)whichdeterminecorporatestatusinlaw.Inallbutonerespectthedifferencebetweengenerallawswhichstipulateformalmeansofincorporationandgenerallawswhichdetermineformalcriteriaofincorporationisoneofdegreenotkind.Theexceptionoccursinthecaseofthoseassociationsthatdonotwishtobetreatedascorporateentities.Ifthelawstipulatesthatincorporationrequirestheperformanceofsomeact,thennon-performancewillensureunincorporateness.Butifthelawdeterminesthatcorporatestatusdependsuponthefulfilmentofcertaincriteria,thenagroupofindividualsmaybetreatedasacorporationiftheybehaveasacorporation,whethertheywishtobetreatedasacorporationornot.Thismayoccur,forexample,whentherepresentativeofanassociationactsillegallythegroupasawholemaywishtoseeonlytheindividualpunished,butifthelawisabletorecognisecorporatenessdespitethelackofformalincorporation,therepresentativemaybecountedan'organ'oftheassociation,andthegrouppunishedasawhole.Asforfamilies,soforcorporations:ifthelawistolooktothe'facts',itmayalightuponfactswhichbringwiththemunforeseendutiesandobligations.

ManyoftheseissuescanbeclarifiedwiththeaidofthedistinctionthatH.L.A.Hartdrawsbetweenlawfoundedoncommandandlawfoundedonrule.58HartmakesthisdistinctioninthecourseofhiscritiqueofAustinian(andbyimplicationHobbesian)jurisprudence,whichrestsontheideathatalllawissuesfromsovereigncommand,backedupbythethreatofpunishment.Hartpointsoutthatinallbutthemostrudimentarylegalsystemstherearelawswhichdonotfitthispattern,butinsteadtaketheformofrulestowhichnosanctionsareappended.Manyoftheseruleswillapplytothelegalsystemitself,suchasthelawswhichstipulateinwhichcourtswhichcasesshouldbetried.(Ifacaseistriedinthewrongcourt,no-oneispunished;

indeed,thelikelihoodisthattheopportunityforpunishmentwillhavetobeforgone.)Butthereareotherruleswhichapplymoregenerally.Hartgivestheexampleofthelawwhichstipulatesthatawillmustbesignedinthepresenceoftwowitnesses.Ifthisruleisnotfollowed,no-oneispunished;thewillissimplydeclared

58SeeH.L.AHart,Theconceptoflaw(Oxford,1961),especially,pp.2648.Infact,Hartpreferredtheterm'order'(asin'givinganorder')totheterm'command',preciselybecausehebelievedthatthelatterhadbeenannexedbyHobbesianandAustinianjurisprudence.Ihaveretained'command'inordertoreinforcethatconnection.

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invalid.Whatwehave,therefore,isnotacommand,butarulewhichestablishesthecriteriabywhichitisbedeterminedwhatcan,andwhatcannot,be'recognised'inlaw.Ruleslikethisdonotcompelindividualstobehaveincertainways;rather,theyprovideindividualswithguidelinesconcerningtheformsofbehaviourwhichwillallowthemaccesstotheresourcesprovidedbyagivenlegalsystem.Ifawillistoberecognisedinlawthenitmustconformtothelaw'sideaofawill;butitdoesnotfollowfromthisthatthelawisinsistingthatindividualsmakevalidwills,northreateningthemiftheydonot.Nowifwereturntothebusinessofincorporation,wecanseethattheconcessiontheoryisaproductoftheideathatlawsarecommands:incorporationishereunderstoodasanauthoritativeactonthepartofasovereign,compellingindividualstobehaveincertainways,threateningthemwithpunishmentiftheydonot.ItisnocoincidencethatHobbesembracesthisviewintheaccountheprovidesofincorporation.ButitisalsonocoincidencethatchapterXXIIofLeviathanmarkstheoneplacewhereHobbeshasdifficultysustaininghisviewthatlawiscommand.Forinallowingcorporationstobeauthorisedbygenerallawsalso,Hobbesisconcedingthatcorporateactivitycannotalwaysbeconceivedinthesimpletermsofsovereign(whocommands)andsubject(whoeitherobeysorispunished).Whereacorporationisauthorisedbygenerallaws,individualsareprovidedwithanopportunitytoassociatewithoneanotherinwayswhichthelawwill'recognise'.Theyarenotbeingthreatened;theyaresimplybeingtoldoftherulestheymustfollowiftheywishtomakeuseofthe'privileges'ofgrouppersonality.Hobbescannotgiveuptheideathatsuchprivilegesaccordtothemodelofconcession,whichisthemodelofcommand.Butinastateinwhich'letters'arereplacedby'generallaws',commandgiveswaytorule.

Ifthedifferencebetweencommandandruleisadifferenceinkind,thereiswithinastategovernedbyrulesthescopeforconsiderable

differencesofdegree.Theremaybemanyrulesortheremaybefew;theserulesmaybepermanentandunchanging,ortheymaystandinneedofconstantupdating;eachrulemaybestatedinthebroadestterms,allowingforaliberalinterpretationofitsrequirements,oritmayspecifytheperformanceofnarrowlydefined,evenofritualistic,actions.Andasforrulesingeneral,soforanyparticularsetofruleswithinthestate.Thustherulesgoverningthecreationofcorporationsmaybeflexibleandrelativelyeasytofollow,ortheymaybearcane,impracticalandexpensive,thepreserveof

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lawyersratherthanthoseforwhomthelawostensiblyexists.Butthoughthedifferencesbetweenthesortsofrulesthatholdforaparticularareaofhumanactivitymaybegreat,stillitremainspossibletoplotmostrulesonasingledifferentialscale,rangingfromthemostaccessibleatoneendtotheleastaccessibleattheother.Indeed,thereisonlyonesetofruleswhichcannotbeaccommodatedonsuchascale,andthesearetheruleswhichdonotspecifytheperformanceofactionsatall.Theperformanceofanactionrequiressomeconsciousnessofwhatisbeingdoneonthepartoftheactor.But,aswehaveseen,itispossibletoframeruleswhoseformalcriteriamaybemetunconsciously.Forexample,therulesgoverningthecreationofcorporationsmayallowforcorporateentitiestobeformedwithoutthecorporatorsbeingawareofit.Hereitisnottheperformanceofcertainactionsstipulatedinlawwhichenablesgroupsofmentoachievecorporatestatus;rather,itisthecongruenceofcertainactswiththetermsoflawwhichdeterminesthatgroupsofmenmustassumecorporatestatus.Whatismissing,inotherwords,istheelementofchoice,anditisthiswhichmakesitmeaninglesstoseektoplacesuchrulesonascaleofaccessibility.Withsuchrulesitisnotaquestionofcitizensseekingoutthelawswhichbestanswertotheirownneedsandthenattemptingtocomplywiththem;itisthelawwhichseeksoutthecitizens.

ThecategoricalnatureofthesedistinctionsisbestillustratedwiththeaidofHart'sownexample,will-making.Itisperfectlypossibletoconceiveofalegalsysteminwhichthebusinessofwill-makingrestsonanexplicitcommand.Forinstance,thelawmightstatethatallpersonsovertheageofeighteenmustmakeawillandmustexpectpunishmentiftheydonot.Clearlyacommandofthiskindwillincludearule-basedelement(peoplemustbetoldhowtheyaretomaketheirwills),buttheprimarymotiveforactionremainsfearofsanctionandasaresultthemodeofactionremainsimperative.Inthe

systemofwill-makingtowhichHartalludes,commandissupplantedbyrulealone,andtheimperativemodegiveswaytowhatcanbecalledan'enabling'modeoflegalactivitytherulewhichinsistsonthepresenceoftwowitnessesenablesbutdoesnotforcementomakevalidwills.Thisruleisonlyoneofmanythatcouldbeappliedtothedrawingupofwills,someallowingeasieraccesstothislegalresource,othersmakingtheuseofitmoredifficult.So,forexample,accessibilitywouldbediminishedifitwasstipulatedthatthewitnessestoanywillmustthemselvesbelawyers,

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anditwouldbeincreasedifonlyoneorevennowitnessesweredeemedsufficient.Indeed,therulesgoverningthemakingofwillsmightbeanythingfromimpossiblyeasy(anystatementinthehandofthedeceased)toimpossiblydifficult(onlystatementssanctionedbyparliament)withoutthemodeofactionitselfbeingaltered.Butthatmodeisalteredoncetherulesceasetodemandactionatall.Thustheruleswhichapportionsomeone'spropertyamongtheirfamilyaccordingtofixedprinciplesofprecedence,thoughhavingthesameeffectasotherruleswhichallowindividualstoapportiontheirpropertyamongtheirfamily,donotservethesamefunction.Theyarenotenablingbecausetheydonotexistasaresourceforthosewholiveunderthelawbutonlyasaresourceofthelawitself.Theyare,therefore,rulesofacategoricallydifferentkind,tobeclassifiedinHart'stermsashavingan'external'ratherthanan'internal'force.Ruleswhichoperateinternallyarethosewhichinviteindividualstomouldtheiractionsinaccordancewithcertainpatternsofbehaviour;theyinclude,amongotherthings,therulesofallgames.59Ruleswhichoperateexternallyarethosewhichimposepatternsonindividualactsandoccurrences;theyinclude,amongotherthings,therulesofscience.Wherethelawimposesapatternontheredistributionofpropertyafterdeath,itsmodeis'deterministic'ratherthaneitherimperativeorenabling.60But,ofcourse,wedonotthinkofsuchrulesdetermininganindividual's'will';theyonlyapply,inEnglandatleast,whensomeonediesintestate.

WhatisstrikingaboutMaitland'sargumentsconcerningcorporatepersonalityisthattheycanbetrackedacrossasimilartrajectory.Inrejectingtheconcessiontheory,Maitlandrejectstheviewthatcorporationsmustbeformedwhereandwhenthelawinsists.Inevitably,theconcessiontheorycontainsrule-basedelements(peoplestillrequiretobetoldhowtheyaretoformcorporations),anditisalsotruethatevencharteredcorporationstakemuchof

59Hartpointsoutthatitispossibletoviewtherulesofgamesexternally,simplybyobservingcertainpatternsofbehaviour.However,healsopointsoutthatitisimpossibleinthiswaytounderstandtherulesofagame;allyouwillarriveatare'observableregularitiesofconduct,predictions,probabilities,signs'(seeibid.,pp.868).60Thisdoesnotmeanthatthelaw-makerwillnothavetoissuecommandsinordertoensurethatpropertyisredistributedinaccordancewiththerules.Nordoesitmeanthatindividualsmaynotconditiontheirbehaviourinordertomakeuseoftherulesastheystand;forinstance,whereprimogenituredeterminesprecedence,familiesmayseektoproducesons.Butthedecisiontokeeptryingforamaleheirinordertomakebestuseofthelawisverydifferentfromthedecisiontousethelawinordertoleavepropertytothechildofone'schoice.

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theircharacterfromtheusethattheirmembersareabletomakeoftheircharters.Nevertheless,theconcessiontheoryremainsanexampleoflawfunctioningintheimperativemode.Asheleavesitbehind,Maitlandcomestoembraceanalternativemodeoflegalactivity,bywhichcorporatestatusismadeavailabletothosewhowantit.Theexemplarofthiswasthe1862CompaniesAct,whichallowedgroupsofsevenormoreaccesstoalegalresourcewhichhadpreviouslybeenkeptunderlockandkey.Still,Maitlandworriedthatthe1862Actwasnotenough.Inpart,hisconcernturnedonthequestionofaccessibility,sinceMaitlandbelievedthatmanygroupshadfailedtomakeuseofthisresourcebecauseoftheirlingeringconcernsabouttheinconvenienceandinterferenceinvolved.ButinanothersenseMaitlandwastakingissuewiththecriterionofaccessibilityitself.Intheend,whatwasinsufficientabouttheCompaniesActwasthatitleftmattersinthehandsofassociationsthemselves,withtheresultthatgroupswhichfunctionedinacorporatemannermightrefusetorecognisetheirownposition,leavingthelawpowerless.Inarguingthatitwasuptothelawtorecognisewhatwas'really'there,Maitlandmovescorporationlawfromtheenablingtothedeterministicmode.Nolongerwasitaquestionofmenchoosingtoenterthelegaldomaininordertoframeaspectsoftheirlivestosuittheirownpurposes;rather,lawwastoprovidetheframeworkforthelivesmenchosetoleadregardless.Thisdidnotmeanthatthelawmustcontrolthoselives,anymorethanthelawsofsciencemustcontrolthenaturalworld.Butitdidmeanthatlawhadtopatternhumanendeavour,assciencepatternsthenaturalworld.AndthisMaitlandseemstohaveacknowledgedattheendofhisintroductiontoGierke,wherehedeclaresthatitistime'togivescientificprecisionandlegaloperationtothoughtswhichareinallmodernminds,andwhicharealwaysdisplayingthemselves'.61

ItisthisthatmakesthefinalstepinMaitland'sargumentfrom

fictitioustorealgrouppersonalitysosignificant,foritentailsthereplacementofoneconceptionoflawbyanother.Wheregrouppersonsarefictitiousentities,bethosefictionsfoundedoncommandorrule,thelawistobeunderstoodasanextensionoftheliveslivedbynaturalpersons,adistinctrealminwhichtheiractionsareformalisedinsuchawayastosuiteithertheirownpurposesorthepurposesoftheirsovereign.Butwheregrouppersonsaredeemedto

61Gierke,Politicaltheories,p.xl.

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bereal,thelawisnothingmore,andnothingless,thananaccountofthelifethatsurroundsit.Theconceptofrealgrouppersonalityclosesthegapbetweentheworlddescribedinlawandtheworldinwhichmenlive.Ofcourse,alllawsmusthavesomeconnectionwiththeworldaroundthemiftheyaretobeotherthanartificialinapejorativesense.Moreover,itwillsometimesmakesensetoseektoestablishthatrelationinthelanguageof'reality'.Thus,forexample,arealmarriagemightbecontrastedwithamarriageofconvenienceinordertodeterminewherethelawneeds'tighteningup'.Butacontrastlikethisstilldependsontheexistenceofthegapwhichtheconceptofrealpersonalitywouldclose.Marriagesofconvenienceareonlypossiblewherethelawfunctionsinanenablingcapacity,asaformalextensionofthearrangementsindividualsmakeforthemselves.Anyinsistencethatmarriagesshouldwherepossiblebe'real'andnotsimplyconvenientpresupposesthatthelawcontinuestofunctioninthisway,andtakesissuewithitonthegroundsofaccessibilityalone.Asimilarargumentcouldbemade,andindeedhasoftenbeenmade,toapplytocorporations.Attheturnofthecenturymanyfeltthatcorporatestatushadbecometooaccessibleandwasopentoabuse;inparticular,attentionfocusedontheso-called'one-mancorporations',whichfulfilledthetechnicalcriteriaofgrouppersonalitywithoutprovidingfortheexistenceofanyrecognisablegrouptobearthatpersonality(thepurposeofsuchcorporationsbeingtoallowindividualstoescapecertainformsofliability62).

62Theproblemofone-mancompaniesformedthebasisofacelebratedcasein1897,whichisdiscussedinsomedetailinP.W.Duff,PersonalityinRomanprivatelaw(Cambridge,1938).Duffwrites:'Aninterestingproblemispresentedbythe''one-mancompany",andwasdiscussedbytheCourtofAppealandtheHouseofLordsinthecaseofSalomonv.SalomonandCo.MrSalomonsoldhisbusinesstoalimitedcompanywithanominalcapitalof40,000sharesof£1each,thecompanyconsistingonlyofthevendor,hiswife,adaughterandfoursons(thesevenrequired

bylaw),whosubscribedforoneshareeach.TwentythousandadditionalshareswereissuedtoMrSalomon,andalsodebenturesformingafloatingsecurity.Badtimescame,andthecompanywaswoundup,andallitsassetswereclaimedbyMrSalomon,asdebentureholder,leavingnothingforunsecuredcreditors.'VaughanWilliams,J.,intheChanceryDivision,said:"ThisbusinesswasMrSalomon'sbusinessandnooneelse's."Lindley,L.J.,intheCourtofAppeal,approvinghisdecision,said:"Itismanifestthattheothermembersofthecompanyhavepracticallynointerestinit,andtheirnameshavemerelybeenusedbyMrAronSalomontoenablehimtoformacompany,andtouseitsnameinordertoscreenhimselffromliability...Inastrictlegalsensethebusinessmayhavetoberegardedasthebusinessofthecompany;butifanyjurywereasked,Whosebusinesswasit?theywouldsayAronSalomon's,andtheywouldberight"'(Duff,Personality,pp.21315).TheHouseofLords,however,insistedonlookingatthematterina'strictlegalsense'only,anddecidedunanimouslyforMrSalomon.Duffconcludes:'LikemostEnglishcasesandmostRomantexts,Salomonv.SalomonandCo.canbereconciledwithanytheorybutisauthorityfornone'(ibid.,p.215).

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Buttoprotestagainstthissortofmanipulationofthesystemisverydifferentfromdemandingthatthelawmust,andmustonly,recognisecorporationswhicharereal.Undersuchconditionstherewouldbenoabuse,butnorwouldtherebeanyaccesstothelaweither;instead,menwouldhavetocreatecorporationsastheywentabouttheirextra-legalbusiness.Andthesamewouldbetrueofmarriage.Inaworldinwhichallmarriageswerereal,whatweshouldrecogniseasthelegalbusinessofmarriageformalbondsandtheformalseveringofbonds,weddingsanddivorces,ceremonyandalimonywoulddisappear.Marriageswouldhavetobemadeduringthecourseofeverydaylife.Aworldofrealmarriages,likeaworldofrealcorporations,wouldhaveeithertobehighlymoralised,orhighlyunpredictable,orquitepossiblyboth.

Thedeterministiclegalmodewhichisrequiredbytheconceptofrealgrouppersonalityhelpstodeterminethenatureofthestatethatcontainsrealgrouppersons,theRechtsstaat.Aboveall,itmakesclearthattheRechtsstaatcannotbeunderstoodasacivitas(acivilsocietas)inOakeshott'ssenseofthatterm.ForOakeshott,thestateisonlyanalogoustoasocietaswhereitslawsconditionbutdonotdeterminethesubstantiveactionsofitsmembers.Theyexistasrulesdesignedtoformaliseindividualendeavourinsuchawayastoallowindividualstoco-existwithoneanother.Theendeavoursthemselves,whichmakeupthesubstantivelifeofeachindividual,existquiteindependentlyofthelaw;thelawsimplyrepresentsanadditiontoindividuals'lives,givingthemlegalformasandwhenrequired.Attimes,whentheconditionsofco-existencebecomestrained,rulemayhavetobesupplantedbycommand,andcitizenscompelledtoperformcertainsortsofactions.Butwhetherimperativeorenabling,thelawinasocietascanneverbethewholeofacitizen'slife,andeachcitizenwillbeawareofalinedividinghislegalfromhisextra-legalperformances,whetherundertakenindividuallyoraspartofagroup.

InaRechtsstaatthislinedisappears.Butjustbecauseitdisappears,itdoesnotfollowthattheRechtsstaatistobeunderstoodasauniversitasinOakeshott'ssense.Certainlyitistruethatwherethestateisanalogoustoauniversitasallindividualactionsaregovernedbythecollectivelifeofthestate.Yetitisalsotruethatthecollectivelifeofsuchastateisnotdeterminedbyitslaws,butbysomeendoutsideofthoselawswhichthelawitselfexistsinordertofurther.InaRechtsstaat,thelawdoesnotguideindividualstowardssomeendthattheycollectivelyshare.Instead,asGierkemakesclear,individuals

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andgroupsofindividualswithintheRechtsstaatchoosetheirownends;itissimplythat,asGierkemakesequallyclear,thelawmanagestoaccountfortheworldinwhichthosechoicesaremade.IftheRechtstaathasapurpose,therefore,itissimplylawitself,foritisinlawthatthemorallifeofthestaterevealsitself.

YetwhateverGierkemightsayaboutthe'intimateconnection'thatexistsbetweenlegalandextra-legalformsoflife,itcannotbeclaimedthatthetwoareindistinguishable.NowhereisthismoreapparentthanintheworkoflegalhistorianslikeMaitlandandGierkethemselves.Forthoughbothmenrangewidelyacrosssocialandintellectualhistoryinthecourseoftheirwritings,theydonotdosoindiscriminately.Bothrecognised,asanyonemust,thatthelaw,whetherornotitappliestoeveryaspectofsocialandmoralexistence,dependsforitsownexistenceonparticularinstitutionsandthemenwhoconstitutethem:lawfindsitsimmediateoriginsinparliaments,courtsanduniversities,andintheworkoflegislators,lawyersandjurists.Thesemen,andtheseinstitutions,donotmakeuptheentirelifeofanystate,asMaitlandandGierkewereonlytooaware.Yettheydostillprovidethefocusofattentionforbothofthemaslegalhistorians.Eachwishedtomaintainthatlegalactivitywasinseparablefromthebroadersocialconditionsinwhichitoccurred,butneithercouldclaimthatthetwowereinterchangeableitissimplynotthecasethatagroupofmenarethesamewhethertheyareassembledinsideoroutsideacourtroom.Forthelegalrealist,therefore,particularlyifheisalsoalegalhistorian,afinaldecisionremains:howtodecideanorderofprioritybetweentwoinseparablebutnonethelessdistinctversionsofreality,onetheversionthatisproducedbylegalinstitutions,theothertheversiontowhichtheproductionsoflegalinstitutionsapply.

Inessence,thechoicesaretwo:eitheritmustbeheldthatthelifeofthelawdeterminesthelifeofthestateingeneral,oritmustbeheld

thatthelifeofthestateingeneraldeterminesthelifeofthelaw.Iftheformer,thenitwillbetotheactivitiesofthestate'slegalrepresentativesthatwelookinordertodiscoverthetruthaboutthestateitself;inotherwords,thestatewillbedescribedinitslaws.Ofcourse,thisisapositionwhichcloselyresemblesthatadoptedbyHobbesinLeviathan.There,thestateisidentifiedwiththeactionsofitssovereignrepresentative,suchthatnothingcanbesaidonbehalfofthestatewhichhasnotfirstfoundlegalexpressionintheactionsofthesovereign.However,Hobbes'spositiondiffersinonecrucial

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respectfromanythatmightbeadoptedbyalegalrealist.Hobbes'sstateisnotreal;itisafiction.Assuch,itisanadditionto,notanexpressionof,reality.Itdoesnotitselfrepresenteveryaspectofthelivesofitsmembers,butonlythoseaspectswhicharegivenlegalformbytheirsovereign.ThedifficultywithHobbes'sposition,aswehaveseen,liesinrelatingthisjuristicconceptionofthestatewiththebroadermoralexistenceofthegroupofindividualswhomakeitup.Thisisnotadifficultyforlegalrealists,sincetheydiscernnogapbetweenthetwo.Butjustbecauselegalrealistsfindthemorallifeofthestatecontainedinitslawsandlaw-makingbodies,theyhavetofaceaseparateproblem,thatofknowingwherethemoralcontentofthelawcomesfrom.Fortoclaimthatthelawlookstoitsimmediatesurroundingsformoralguidanceisimpossiblewithoutimplyingasubstantivedistinctionbetweenlegalandextra-legalformsoflife.Norcanitbeclaimedthatthelawlookstosomeendwhichexistsoutsidethestateasawhole,sincetheRechtsstaatmustnotbeunderstoodasanalogoustotheuniversitas.Instead,theonlypossibleendforlawinastatewherelawisthewholeofthestateistheideaoforderitself.Thisideamayassumeanumberofdifferent,oftenhighlymoralisedforms,includingahostofvariationsonthethemeofnationalidentity.Buteach,intheend,mustcomedowntoonesingle,unvaryingtheme,thatoforganisationforitsownsake.Andorganisationforitsownsake,intheend,isfascism.

Thereis,though,thealternativepossibility,thatinsteadofseeingthewholelifeofthestatedeterminedbylaw,alegalrealistmightunderstandlawtobedeterminedbythelifeofthestate,takenasawhole.Inotherwords,itcouldbearguedthatitistheformsoforganisationwhichmenmakeforthemselvesthewholepanoplyoftheirprivatetransactionsandassociationswhichconstitutetheessenceoflegalreality.Yettosuggestasmuchisnecessarilytocountenanceaformofanarchism.Legalrealismcannotbeequated

withanarchismpureandsimple,ifonlybecausethelatterhintsatawillingnesstodispensewithlegalformsaltogether,whereasrealistsdiscernlegalityineveryaspectofhumanexistence.Butiftheviewistakenthatitisthelegalorderwediscoverinsocialreality,incontrasttothefascisticnotionthatitissocialrealitywediscoverinthelegalorder,thenitmustfollowthatlawoperatesontwodistinctlevels,oneactual,theotherlatent.Actuallawsarethosewhichexistinstandardisedform,institutedbytheappropriateauthorities.Buttheremustalsobepresentateverymomentthepossibilitythatmen

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willinstitutetheirownlegalformsapartfromthosealreadyinexistence,simplybyassociatingwithoneanother.Thisviewiscertainlyconsistentwiththebasicdoctrineofrealgrouppersonality.Alltheoristsofthecorporationhaveacceptedthatself-governancethecapacityofanassociationtoexercisejurisdictionoveritsownmembersisoneofthequalitiesofthecorporatelife.63Ontheconventionalaccount,whichseescorporationsasfictitiouspersons,thiscapacityiseitherconcededtoagroupinlaworachievedbyagroupthroughrecoursetolaw.Thedoctrineofrealgrouppersonality,meanwhile,insiststhatthecapacityofself-governanceisinfactinherentinthegroupitispartofwhatmakesthepersonalityofanygroupreal.Legalrealistsmaystillarguethatitistothelawasitstandsthatwemustlookforanaccountofthisconditionofcorporateactivity.Butwhereitissuggestedthatthelivesmenleadbestdescribethelawasitstands,thenitiswiththeassociationsthatmenformthattheessentialorderofthestatemustreside.Prioritywillhavetobegiventothewaysgroupsofindividualschoosetoformalisetheirrelationswithoneanother,independentlyoftheformalisedaccountsofthoserelationsprovidedintheexistinglegalstructuresofthestate.Andthoughthismaynotbeanarchismpureandsimple,itbearsastrongresemblancetothetheoreticaltenetsofsyndicalism.

ToimposeonMaitland,asanadvocateofrealgrouppersonality,astraightchoicebetweenfascismandsyndicalismmightseemalittleunfair.Maitlandwas,asheremindsus,justalegalhistorian,andasanhistorianhesoughtconstantlytoemphasisethefluidityoftherelationbetweenjuristicandmorebroadlysocialformsofendeavour.Atnopointdidheseektoestablishanorderofprioritybetweenthetwo.Instead,hishistoriespointupthepossibilityofeithergivingtheleadtotheother,attimesfindingthelifeofthestatebestexpressedinitslegalinstitutions,attimesfindingitbest

63Corporationsmustbecapableofexercisingjurisdictionovertheir

membersbecauseanygroupthatactsinitsownrightmustbeabletocompelitsmemberstorecognisetheauthorityofitsactions,andtoconditiontheirownactionsaccordingly.Hobbesrecognisedthis,winchiswhyhewasabletocomparethecommonwealthtoacorporation,andwhyhewassoinsistentthatcorporationsshouldberegulatedbythesovereign.InBritain,whereaHobbesiansystemofregulationwasneverproperlyestablished,corporationsparticularlythecorporationsofcityandlocalgovernmentwereabletodevelopsophisticatedlegalsystemsoftheirown,andtoexercisejurisdictionbymeansofextensive'bye-laws'.Alltheoristsofthecorporationhavetoacceptthepossibilityof'bye-laws'eventherepresentativeofaHobbesiancorporationcanbesaidtoexerciseaformoflegalauthoritywhenperformingrepresentativeactions,foritisintheperformanceofrepresentativeactionsthatthesovereignmakeslawsforthecommonwealth.Thequestionishowfaracorporationshouldbeabletogoindeterminingthescopeofitsbye-lawsforitself.

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expressedintheextra-legalactivitiesofitsmembers.Maitland'srealismwastemperedbyaconsciousnessofthevariabilityofhistoricalcircumstance.Nevertheless,evenahistoriancannotentirelyavoidfacinguptothesortofchoicesoutlinedabove.Forhistorythatis,theproductionsofhistoriansitselfconstitutesapatterningoftherealityitdescribes.Historyandhistoricalrealityareinseparablebuttheyarebynomeansindistinguishable:no-oneconfusesanaccountofbattlewiththebattleitself,anymorethantheyconfusethetrialofacriminalwiththeperformanceofthecrime.Historians,likelegalrealists,wishneithertocontrol,nortoaddto,butsimplytoaccountforwhatisreallythecase.Yet,likelegalrealists,historiansmustacknowledgeadistinctionbetweenpatternedrealityandtherealitywhichissopatterned.Again,therefore,thereisachoicetobemadehere,betweenformalisedpatterningofthepastandaversionofthepastwhichresistspatterningofthiskind.Inessence,itisachoicebetweenhistorismandhistoricism.Historicistslooktodeterminethe'laws'ofhistoricaldevelopment.Theadvantagesofhistoricismlieinitsabilitytoorderthevastmassofhistoricalcircumstance.Itsdisadvantageisthatsuchorderingcanappeararbitrary,theimpositionofformalstructuresfortheirownsake.Historistsemphasisetheunpredictabilityofhistoricalcircumstance,andtheylooktotheabilityofeachhistoricaleventtogenerateapatternofitsown.Theadvantageofhistorismisitsbroadmindedness;thedisadvantage,thatitcanmakethetaskoforderingthepastseemanimpossiblywishfulone.Ofcourse,itmightbesaidthatnohistorianneedfaceastraightchoicebetweentheseoptions,anymorethanMaitlandshouldfaceastraightchoicebetweenfascismandsyndicalism.Ahistorianmightwishtomovefromoneformofhistorytotheother,asandwhenhedeemsitappropriate;perhapstobeanhistoricistwhenhefeelshecan,andahistoristwhenhefeelshemust.Buttoallowhistoriansthisfreedomismerelytoreconstitutetheproblematanotherlevel.Forestablishingtherelationbetweenhistoricismandhistorismisitselfa

patterningofakindofreality,therealitythatiscontainedinthehistorian'sownpatternsofthepast.Istheformalpatterningofthesepatternstobeheldtodeterminetheessenceofthatreality,oriseachdecisionthehistorianhastomaketobeheldtogenerateapatternofitsown?Andiftheissueisleftundecided,becausetheanswerissaidtovary,thentheproblemwillreconstituteitselfatafurtherlevelstill,andsoon,adinfinitum.Achoicehasatsomepointtobemadeifaregressis

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tobeavoided,anditisachoicewhichhasitsrootsinthedilemmasfacedbytheadvocateofrealgrouppersonality.

V

TheseissuesarenotaddressedbyMaitland;theyaremerelysuggestedbywhathewrote.Infact,hisownpoliticswerecharacterisedbyhisfriendH.A.L.Fisheras'non-dogmaticliberalUnionism',64whichcarriesechoesoftheideaof'plurality-in-unity',butinotherrespectsconveysverylittle.Meanwhile,hewasinhiswriting,aswehaveseen,extremelyreluctanttopressanyofthetheoreticalimplicationsofGierke'swork,andheshiedawayfrom-ismsofallkinds.Thisreluctancehasbeendescribedbyonecommentatoras'sheerintellectualfastidiousness'.65Butwhateveryoucallit,itispartofthereasonwhyMaitland'sworkonGierkeprovedsoinfluential,forhiswritingprovokedasmuchinwhatitleftunsaidasinwhatitsoughttosay.Asaresult,Maitland'sargumentscametobeusurpedinawidevarietyofcauses.Hisworkonmoralpersonalityandlegalpersonality,thoughitselfprofoundlyapolitical,servedtoinspiretwosocialists,LaskiandCole,aswellasfindingitswayintoarecentanthologyofkeyconservativetexts.66Inanotherfield,histhoughtswereputtoausehewouldlikelyhaveactivelydisapproved:thoughananti-cleric(hewas'adissenterfromalltheChurches'67),hewasenlistedbyFiggisinthecauseofclericalindependence.OnewayofaccountingforthisrangeofimpactistopointtotherichnessoftheveinofthoughtMaitlandhaduncovered.Another,however,istopointtoitsessentialopen-endedness,orambiguity.Itisthelattercoursewhichhasbeentakenhere,andwillprovidethethemeforwhatfollows.Maitland'sfastidiousnessmaymorepolitelybecalledareticenceonmattershefelttobebeyondhisexpertise,andthisiscertainlyhowhewishedtopresentit.Butitmayalsobecalledanunwillingnesstopursuelinesofthoughttowhichnosatisfactoryconclusioncouldbe

brought.Itwaslefttootherstoseehowfartheycouldget.

64Fisher,Maitland,p.174.65S.Collini,Publicmoralists:politicalthoughtandintellectuallifeinBritain,18501930(Oxford,1991),p.303.66'Moralpersonalityandlegalpersonality',includedinR.Scruton(ed.),Conservativetexts(Basingstoke,1991),pp.193203.67Fisher,Maitland,p.100.

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Chapter6Figgisandthe'CommunitasCommunitatum'

I

AnoteattheendofMaitland'sintroductiontoGierkerecordsthethanksthatwereowedbytheauthor'formanyvaluablesuggestionstoMrJ.N.FiggiswhoseessaysonThedivinerightofkings(1896)andonthePoliticsoftheCouncilofConstancewillbeknowntostudents'.1Figgiswasayoungclergymanandhistorianwhohadin1896returnedtohisoldCambridgecollegeofStCatherine'sasalecturerinhistory.WhileinCambridge,FiggisfellunderMaitland'sspell,andinduecoursehecametoshareinhismentor'senthusiasmforGierkeandGenossenschaftstheorie.Butthoughthetwomenenjoyedthesameintellectualinterests,theyweretemperamentallyratherdifferent.Figgiswasinnosenseafastidiousman(GeoffreyElton,inabizarreintroductiontooneofFiggis'sbooks,describeshimas'large,greedy,desperatelyuntidy'2),andinhiswritingheexhibitedfewofMaitland'sscruplesaboutbranchingoutintopoliticalphilosophyproper.NordidheseektoconfinehishistoricalenquiriestothelegalfieldinwhichMaitlandhadprovedhimselfpre-eminent.Figgiswasahistorianofideasinsomethingclosertoourcurrentsense,exploringthehistoryofpoliticaltheoryanddogmafortheirownsakes.Hewasprepared,inwaysthatMaitlandwasnot,toengagedirectlywiththepersistentissuesofpoliticalthought,concerningwhatMaitlandwouldcallthestate'sverynature,andtheverynatureofsuchfreedomsasitmightcontain.Figgisargued,passionately,forcorporatefreedom,andagainstthattheoryofthestate'ssovereigntywhichhebelievedtoprovideitwithitsmostpotentthreat.Intime,hesoughttodevelopacoherentpoliticaltheoryofhisown,aprocess

1Gierke,Politicaltheories,p.xlv.2G.Elton,'Introduction'toJ.N.Figgis,Thedivinerightofkings(Torchbookedn,NewYork,1965),p.viii.

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whichculminatedinthepublicationin1913ofChurchesinthemodernState,perhapsthemostcompletestatementofapluralisticpositioninEnglishpoliticalthoughtthiscentury.Yetthiswork,likemostofFiggis'soutputafter1900,hasitsrootsinMaitland'stentativehintsabouttherealpersonalityofassociations.WhateverthevalueofFiggis'ssuggestionstoMaitland,therefore,itisoutweighedbythevalueofwhatMaitlandsuggestedtoFiggisnothinglessthantheattempttoseehowaGierkeanpoliticaltheorymightactuallybemadetoworkinanEnglishsetting.

IfChurchesinthemodernStaterepresentsasignificantadvanceontheideasputforwardbyMaitlandinhisintroductiontoGierke,italsomarksanadvanceontheworkofFiggis'stowhichMaitlandrefersinthatintroduction.Figgiswrotehisfirstbook,Thedivinerightofkings,beforehehadanyknowledgeofGierke.Whenhecametowritetheprefaceforasecondeditionin1914,heexplainedthatthisproductofhisyouth(ithadstartedlifeasaprizeessayinCambridge)'hadbeenwrittenundertheshadowoftheAustinianidol'.3TwothingshadhappenedintheinterimtocauseFiggistorevisehisopinion.Thefirstwasthathehadcome,throughMaitland,toviewtheproblemsofpoliticaltheoryintermsofgrouppersonality,andasaresulttoregardconventionalEnglishtheoriesofsovereigntyasinadequate.Butinaddition,theearlyyearsofthecenturyhadthrownupanumberofimportantlegalcasesinwhichthebasicpremisesofEnglishcorporationtheory,suchasitwas,wereputtothetest.Astheywereputtothetest,sotheywerefoundbyFiggistobewanting.Thecasesthemselves,ofwhichthemostcelebratedwastheScottishChurchcaseof19004,hadtakenplaceduringMaitland'slife-time,butthoughMaitlandmakesreferencetotheminhiswriting,hedidnotchoosetodiscusstheminanydetail.4Figgisdid,andapproachingtheissuesinvolvedfromaGierkeanperspectiveheconcludedthattheEnglishabilitytomuddlethroughtoconvenientconclusionscouldnolonger

bereliedupon.AfaithinthetoleranceengenderedbyEnglishinstitutionshadpermeatedhisearliestwriting,andinThedivinerightofkingshehadsoughttoidentifyitwiththeutilitarianprinciplesofAustinianism.Buttheevidenceofthe

3J.N.Figgis,Thedivinerightofkings(London,1896),p.ix.4MaitlandremarkedattheendofhisSidgwicklecture:'Icannotthink...thatitwasabrilliantdayinourlegalannalswhentheaffairsoftheFreeChurchofScotlandwerebroughtbeforetheHouseofLords,andthedeadhandfellwitharesoundingslaponthelivingbody'(Maitland,Collectedpapers,vol.III,p.319).That,though,wasallhewaspreparedtosay.

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yearsthatfollowedpersuadedhimthatantique-modernconceptionsofstateandassociationled,unavoidably,toilliberality.InMaitland,Gierke'sinfluencehadbroughtaboutachangeofdirection,drawinghimfurtherandfurtherintothepreviouslyunexploredfieldofcorporationtheory.ButinFiggisitproducedachangeofheart,bothaboutthenatureofthestateitself,andabouttheimmediacyofthethreatfacedbythegroupswithinit.

II

Figgis'sThedivinerightofkingsisnot,atfirstsight,anobviouslyAustinianwork.Austintreatedallquestionsofrightanalytically;Figgis'sisahistorybook,anditstreatmentofrightisnotanalytic,buthistorical.Moreover,becauseitisahistoryofpoliticalthought,itisopposedtothepurportedtimelessnessofallpoliticaltheory.Init,Figgiswrites:

Nosystemofpoliticscanbeimmutable.Itisimpossibleinframingadoctrineofgovernmenttolaydowneternalprincipleswhichmayneverbetransgressed.AuniversaltheoryoftheStateisachimera,forhistoricaldevelopmentandnationalcharacterarethemostimportantofallconsiderationsininvestigatingthelawsofhistoricaldevelopment.5

IfthisstatementformspartofanAustinianwork,thenAustin'stheoryofsovereigntyclearlycannotbecountedauniversaloreternalprinciple.Infact,FiggisisnotconcernedanywhereinthebookwithAustinhimself,butonlywithwhathedescribes,thesovereign.Thisinstitutionhetakestobecompatiblewiththeabsenceoftheory,forhepostulatesanon-,orevenanti-theoreticalsovereign.Thecentralthemeofthebookisthemannerinwhichmodernpoliticallifehasescapedfromtheabsoluteclaimstoauthorityoftheearlymodernera.Theseclaims,paradigmaticamongwhichisthatofdivineright,Figgisidentifieswithcontingenthistoricalconflicts,primarilyreligious,inwhichtheparticipantsformulatedthepoliticalendtheysoughtin

universalterms.Onepossibleconsequenceofthisforthehistorianisadistrustofpoliticaltheory;theconsequencefortheparticipantswasaneventualdiminutionoftheroleofpolitical

5Figgis,Thedivinerightofkings,p.153.Byspeakingofuniversaltheoryas'chimerical',FiggisisembracingaformofhistorisminthesensethatIhaveusedtheterm.Byspeakingof'nationalcharacter',FiggisisembracingaformofhistorisminsomethinglikeMeinecke'ssense.Byspeakingof'thelawsofhistoricaldevelopment',FiggisisembracingaformofPopperianhistoricism.Whethertheseareconsistent,andwhichofthemmightbesaidtoprevail,isdiscussedbelow.

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theory,astheclaimsofitsproponentsevolvedmeansofco-existencewithoneanother.ThisevolutionFiggisassociateswiththeendofthereligiousstrifethathadcharacterisedtheReformationandCounter-Reformation,andwiththeriseofrationalism,whichhedescribesintermsofutility.Andofthisprocess,Figgiswritesinthehistoricalpresentofitsfutureculminationin'theabandonmentoftheattempttofindanimmutablepoliticaltheory;andpoliticswillbecome,astheyareatthepresentday,purelyutilitarianorhistorical'.6Theresultisastatewhichcontainssovereignauthority,butnotasovereignwhoseabilitytosecureobediencefollowsfromatheoryofitsauthoritativeness.Itwillbe,asFiggisputsit,possessedofa'historical'sovereigntyitwillcommandwhereitcan,orpossiblywhereitmust,butnot,asimmutabletheoriespostulate,whereitwill.

This,then,isaconceptionofalimitedstate,somethingthatbestisillustratedbyFiggis'streatmentofthequestionofreligioustoleration,whichwasalwayshisownmainconcern.Figgisarguesthattheonlysuretyofreligiousfreedomderivedfromthefailureofdoctrinesofreligiousabsolutism,foritwasfromthisfailurethattherearose'thedoctrineoftoleration,bywhichalone,asapracticallimituponStateaction,religiousfreedomcanbesecuredwithoutclericalsupremacy'.7Figgismakesclearthatthegrowthofthisdoctrinewasinsomesenseinadvertent:itresultedfromthecompetitionofabsoluteclaimsnecessarilyleadingtotherecognitionofapluralityofclaimsasmuchasfromtheindependenttriumphofanabsoluteinsistenceonplurality.8Asaresult,itispossibletospecifytheparticularAustinianshadowunderwhichFiggiscouldbesaidtobelabouring:thelimitonstateactionwasthatprovidedbythehistoricaltriumphof'utilitarian'politics;therefore,theexerciseofsovereigntywasconditionaluponthesovereignstandinginthralltothelawsofutility.Figgiswashappytosecurethestateofitssovereignauthoritybecauseoftheusestowhichhebelievedsuchauthoritymustintheendbeputinthecause

oftoleration,andagainstauthoritarianismperse.

6Ibid.,p.162.7Ibid.,p.262.8Figgissummarisedtheprocessasfollows:'Inthefirststage,theStateprescribesareligionofitsownandcompelsallmentoworshiptheEmperor.Inthesecondstage,theStaterecognisesthatitisincompetenttodecideuponquestionsofreligiousbelief,andmustgotothespiritualauthoritytofindtruth;butstillitregardsenforcementoftruthasaduty,andpersecutionasitsproperfunction.Thethirdstageisthatofcompletetolerationofallformsofbelief,whentheStatehasgivenupitsclaimtomeddlewithopinion,andregardsreligiousquestionsasbeyonditscompetence'(ibid.,pp.21516).

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Thiscounts,intwosenses,asaratherspecialreadingofAustin.First,itpostulatesahistoricalstateofaffairswhichAustinhimselfdidnotpostulate;indeed,Austincontinuallyemphasisedthat,thoughtherewasamoral,therewasnonecessaryhistoricalconnectionbetweenthedivinelawofutilityandthepositivelawsofagivensovereign.Second,thepurposeofAustinianjurisprudencewastocircumventtheneedforthesesortsofhistoricalconclusions,andtoestablishascopeforsovereignauthoritywhichwasnotdependentonwhatwasbythelightsofjurisprudenceamoralaccident.Austin'ssovereignderivesitsauthorityfromthenecessaryfactofobedience,notthecontingentfactofthecoincidenceofitspurposewithahigherone.FiggisdrewtogethertheanalyticalandhistoricalsidesofAustin'saccountofsovereignty,whileAustinhimselfsetoutthereasonswhytheyshouldbekeptapart.Inthissense,Figgis'searlyAustinianismwasdependentonahistoricistimpulsetranscendinghisbroaderhistorismthatis,onabeliefthathistoryfollowsaparticularlawofprogress,overridingthesensethatgeneraltheoriesaretheproductofhistoricalcircumstance.Withoutthemorespecific,teleologicalbelief,twoconsequencesmightbeexpectedtofollow,revealingthegapbetweenFiggisandAustinwhichthespecialnessofFiggis'sinterpretationobscured.Ontheonehand,unalliedtoutility,thesovereignmightappearasthepotentialenemyoffreedom,foritsauthoritymayserveotherpurposes.Ontheotherhand,freedfromapre-determineddialectic,thetheoryofsovereigntymightappearasoneofthechimericaldoctrinesofimmutabilityagainstwhichFiggis'slatenthistorismhadwarned.

BythetimeFiggiscametopublishhissecondmajorworkonthesubjectoftheoriesofthestate,hishistoricistconvictionshadbeenundermined.ThatworkwasStudiesofpoliticalthoughtfromGersontoGrotius,14141625,whichstartedlifeasaseriesoflecturesdeliveredatCambridgein1900,butwhichFiggisdidnotseefitto

publishuntil1907.IntheaudiencefortheoriginallectureswasMaitland,anditistoMaitland'smemorythattheirheavilyrevisedfinalversionisdedicated.9Likeitspredecessor,StudiesofpoliticalthoughtfromGersonto

9Maitlandhaddiedattheendofthepreviousyear.Figgiswritesinthepreface:'Whilethebookwasbeingrewritten,nearlythreeyearsback,Iasked[Maitland's]permissiontodedicatethelecturestoonewhohadtaughtmesomuch.Attheverytimewhenheacceptedthissuggestionwithhisaccustomedgraciousness,Ifeltthattheendmightcomebeforemytaskwasaccomplished.Ithascome.AndnowIcanonlysayhowunworthyofhismemoryisthisbunglingtreatmentofasubjectsomeaspectsofwhichhehimselfilluminated'(Figgis,StudiesofpoliticalthoughtfromGersontoGrotius,14141625(London,1907),pp.vivii).

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Grotiusapproachesitssubjectfromahistoricalperspective(itis,asitstitlewouldsuggest,ahistoryoflatemedievalandearlymodernpoliticalthought);here,however,theemphasisisdefinitelyhistorist.Figgisreiterateshisbeliefthat'wemustnotstudypoliticaltheoriesapartfrompoliticalconditions',10andmoreover,hestatesagainthat'outofconflictandcontroversies,inessencereligious,modernpoliticshavedevelopedthemselves'.11However,inthisworkhedoesnotdrawthefurtherconclusionthatmodernpoliticshaveachievedaspecialstatusbydintoftheirstandingattheendofsuchdevelopment.Instead,a'solidarity'isinsisteduponbetweenpresentandpastdisputesinpoliticaltheory,andthisisasolidaritywhichconstrainsratherthanliberates.ModernpoliticalargumentisseentousethesameconceptsaswereusedbythosewhoformedtheterminologyofEuropeanpoliticalthoughtinthelatemedievalandearlymodernera.Asahistorian,Figgisappreciatesthattheevolutionoftheseconceptslinksthemtoparticularhistoricalcontroversies;henolongerbelieves,however,thatthisappreciationisitselfconstitutiveofanew,modernconceptionofpoliticallife.ThusthethemeofinadvertenceappearsinFromGersontoGrotiusinanewguise.InThedivinerightofkingsclaimstoclericalorsecularsupremacyhad,bytheirincommensurability,inadvertentlylaidthegroundworkforthedoctrineoftoleration.Forthelaterwork,incontrast,thesepurportedlyimmutabletheorieshaveaninadvertentlydivisiveeffectbecausetheylingerinpoliticalargumentlongerthantheconditionsforwhichtheyweredesignedremain,theyperpetuateclaimstosupremacybeyondtheconditionswithwhichthehistorianshouldliketoidentifythem.Theseclaimsdothenacquireanimmutability,undeservedperhaps,butreal,fortheirhistoricalcontingencyhasbeentranscended.Theresultisthatpoliticalauthorityisconceivedintermswhichareabsolute,andfurthermorewhicharetiedtohistoricallyrelativeratherthanmorallyimperativerequirements.Thesovereignisthenbecome,asAustinoriginally

conceivedit,notthevehicleofutility,butonlythevehicleofcommand,foritsapologistsaredestinedtodescribeitasthevehicleofthosecontingentintereststheywishtosecure.

Inonesense,thislossoffaithintheabilityof'historical'politicstosecuregroupfreedomsservestomoveFiggisawayfromGierke.Hisearliestworkhad,ifnothingelse,soughttolocatefreedomattheend

10Ibid.,p.30.11Ibid.,p.5.

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ofhistory,asnarrowerconceptionsofpoliticallifebecamereconciledinthebroadercontextofhistoricalprogress.Thiswasadialecticalunderstandingofthepast,ifmorewhiggishthanHegelian.Buthoweveritisunderstood,thetelosofthisdialecticremainedaprofoundlyunGierkeanonethetolerantAustiniansovereign.ItwasFromGersontoGrotiuswhich,forallitsemphasisonthecontingencyofpoliticalideas,revealedtheextenttowhichFiggiswaswillingtoembraceaGierkeanviewofpolitics.Bythetimeofitspublication,hehadcometounderstandthemodernideaofsovereigntyaslittlemorethanahistoricalaccident.Thismeanthecouldnolongerplotthehistoryofpoliticalthoughtasaprogressiontowardstheidealofthetolerantsovereign.Butitalsomeantthathewasfreetosearchthehistoryofpoliticalthoughtforanalternativetothatideal.ThattherewassuchanalternativeprovidesFiggiswiththecentralthemeofhisbook.LikeGierke,Figgishadcometoregardthemodernfixationonthesovereignstateanditsindividualcitizensastheantithesisof'themedievaltheoryofcommunitylife'.12Modernsovereignstatesallowedrightstoindividuals,andindividualsoftenusedthoserightstoformthemselvesintoassociations(indeed,asFiggispointsout,manygroups,particularlychurches,havechampionedtherightsofindividualsforthisveryreason).Butassociationswithinmodernstatesdidnothaverightsoftheirown,andasaresulttheydidnotconstituteintegralor'organic'partsofthosestates.Thistheyhadinthemedievalcommunitascommunitatum.UnlikeGierke,FiggisdidnotbelievethatthemoderntheoryofsovereigntyandthemedievaltheoryofcommunityweretoachievesynthesisinanewidealoftheRechtsstaathewasstillnoHegelian.Buthedidnowbelievethatsomethingofthemedievalconceptionofthestatecould,andshould,berescuedwithinamodernsetting,andthishetooktohavebeendemonstratedbyonemaninparticular,JohannesAlthusius.

AlthoughFiggis'sbookconcludeswiththeessentiallymodernfigureofHugoGrotius,itishiscompatriotandcontemporaryAlthusiuswhooccupiesprideofplace.FollowingGierke(besidewhosework,Figgissuggests,everythingelseonthesubjectis'butprattle'13),FiggisarguesthatAlthusiusmustnotbeunderstoodasachampionofresistancehiswasnotsimplyaVindiciaecontratyrannos.Rather,hewasatheoristofwhatFiggiscalls'theorderedlifeofthe

12Ibid.,p.205.13Ibid.,p.201.

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communityasawhole'.14Thelinchpinofthisorderwasthelegaltheoryofsovereignty.Buttheformitwastoassumeembracedmuchmorethanapurelylegalisticunderstandingofthelifeofthestate;italsoembracedtheideaoffellowship.TheAlthusianstateismadeofassociations,byassociations,forassociationsitis,inFiggis'swords,'atrueGenossenschaft'.15Theseassociations,andthestatethatcontainsthem,arestilldependentuponthequintessentiallymodernnotionofcontractfortheirformation.Butitis,Figgissays,acontract'farlessartificial'thananyofitsconventionalequivalents,16anditwasusedtogenerateastatewhichresembledanorganismmorethanitresembledamachine.InAlthusianpoliticaltheoryFiggisrecognisedanattemptto'combineelementswhichonecommonlyfindsopposed'17thatis,todiscoverthemedievalidealofsocialorganisationinthemodernideaofjuristicorder.

Intheend,Figgishastoaccept,withGierke,thatthisattemptwasafailure.Althusiuswasunabletomakethefinalbreakfrommechanisticconceptionsofgrouplife,whichmighthave'preparedthewayforthetruetheoryofthecorporation,inwhichauthorityandself-dependenceareinherentessentially,andnotdependentonanagreement,sincetheyarisefromthenatureofthecase'.18Moreimportantly,hewasunabletodiminishtheappealofatomisticconceptionsofthestateforthosewhohadtoliveinthem:groupsofindividualscontinuedtoseektheassurancesofjuristicorderlongafterithadbecomeapparent,tothelikesofGierkeanyway,thatjuristicorderassuredthegroupsthemselvesofnothing.BeforeMaitlandintroducedhimtoGierke,Figgishadbeenoneofthosewhoidentifiedfreedomwiththetolerantexerciseofsovereignty.Butby1907hefounditasourceofregretthat'themodernunitarystateisstillconceivedasaHerrschaftsverbandratherthanaGenossenschaft'.19AlthusiushadbeenunabletobreakthecontingentholdofjuristicconceptionsofsovereigntyonEuropeanpoliticallife.Buthehadat

leastshownthatitwascontingent,andthattherewasanalternative.HowtorealisethatalternativewasforGierkeacomplex,dialecticalandhighlyidealisticbusiness,theworkofalife-time.Figgissummarisedhissolutioninasinglesentence:

WhatisneedednowadaysisthatasagainstanabstractandunrealtheoryofStateomnipotenceontheonehandandartificialviewofindividualindependenceontheother,thefactsoftheworldwithitsinnumerable

14Ibid.,p.210.15Ibid.,p.206.16Ibid.,p.202.17Ibid.,p.207.18Ibid.,p.202.19Ibid.,p.204.

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bondsofassociationandthenaturalnessofsocialauthorityshouldbegenerallyrecognised,andshouldbecomethebasisofourlaws,asitisofourlife.20

WhatFiggisdidnotdoinFromGersontoGrotiuswasseektoelaboratethesenew-foundconvictionsintermsofgrouppersonality.Hesimplyasks'whethertheStatecreatesorwhetheritonlyrecognisestherightsofcommunities...whetherinmodernGermanphrasethecorporateunionbenotrealratherthanfictitious'.21However,hehadalreadyattemptedtogivesomethinglikeafullanswertothesequestionsinapaperhedeliveredtotheChurchCongressof1905underthetitle'TheChurchandtheseculartheoryoftheState'.Asitstitlewouldsuggest,Figgis'sconcerninthispaperwastheplaceofreligiousassociationswithinthepoliticalcommunityatlarge,andasinallhisotherwritinghedeclaresthat'thetolerantStateisthetrueState'.22Here,though,hemakesanexplicitconnectionbetweentheconditionsoftolerationandthenon-conditionalrecognitionofcorporatepersonality.The'secular'theoryofthestatewasforFiggiswhatGierkewouldcall'antique-modern':itrestedonnarrowjuristicpremises,pushedmoralconsiderationstooneside,andperceivedallgrouplifeasnothingmorethantheproductofartifice.Wherethestatewasunderstoodintheseterms(andFiggisnowunderstoodthesetermstobeAustin's),thelifeofgroupswithinthestatemightbeaprecariousone.ButitwasnotsimplyonconsequentialgroundsthatFiggistookissuewiththe'secular'viewofassociations;itwasalso,hebelieved,demonstrablyfalse.Forhewrites:'Thefactis,todenytosmallersocietiesareallifeandmeaning,apersonalityinfact,isnotanti-clerical,orilliberal,orunwise,oroppressiveitisuntrue.'23Thetruthwasthatallassociationshadapersonalityoftheirown,anditwastruthinthissensewhichFiggissetincontrasttotheclaimsofmere'legality'.Certainthings,heargues,maybetruelegallywhicharenonetheless

falseinabroadersense,as,forexample,thestatementthat'legally,theStatecouldestablishMohammedanismtomorrow'.24Soitiswith

20Ibid.,p.206.21Ibid.,p.204.22Figgis,'TheChurchandtheseculartheoryoftheState',ReportoftheChurchCongress(1905),191.23Ibid.24Ibid.,189.Infact.Austinusedasimilarexampletomakeasimilarpointaboutthesubordinationofnotionsof'legality'towiderconcerns.Hearguedthat'noman,talkingwithameaning,wouldcallaparliamentaryabolitionofeitherorbothoftheChurches[EnglishorScottish]anillegalact',butthatitwouldneverthelessbe'unconstitutional'(Austin,Theprovinceofjurisprudencedetermined,p.255).Austin'spointwasthatthesemanticsof

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theclaimthat'legally'therightsofgrouppersons'canbetreatedasthegrantoftheState'.25Thismighthaveajuristicbasis,butitcannotbethewholetruthofthematter,forthesimplereasonthatgroupsalsohaverights'inapracticalsense'and'actually',asdeterminedbythelivesthattheythemselveschoosetolead.Wherethesepracticaltruthsaredenied,associationscanbenothingmorethanfacadesfortheauthorityofthestate;theymustnotthereforebedenied,if'theChurchisnottovanishintoaroyalbenevolentfund,ordissolveintoanacademicdebatingsociety'.26Thismaylooklikeaconsequentialargument,butintruthitissomethingmore.ForFiggis'spointisthatabenevolentfundoradebatingsocietyaretwothingsthathischurchemphaticallyisnot,andthatnochurchcaneverbe.

FiggiscouldnothavewrittenthispaperwithouthavingreadGierkefirsthisdefenceofreligiousfreedomsrestsentirelyontheideathatallassociations,whetherreligiousornot,arepersons'inreality'.However,asinFromGersontoGrotius,thisisaversionofGierkeanGenossenschaftstheoriewhichgreatlysimplifiestheoriginal.Goneisthedialecticalcomplexity,whichdiscernslawineveryaspectoflife,andlifeineveryfacetoflaw.Instead,wearepresentedwithastraightcontrastbetweenwhatFiggiscalls'thefactsoflife'ontheonehand,and'mere'lawontheother.TheadvantageofsuchanaccountliesinitsverysimplicityitisnothardtoseethepointthatFiggisistryingtomake.ButthissamesimplicitymeansthattheaccountFiggisgivescannotonitsownbeconsideredacompleteone.Foritleavesoneveryobviousquestionunanswered.Ifgroupsreallyarepersonsirrespectiveofwhatlawyersandjuristswouldhaveusbelieve,whyshoulditmatterwhatlawyersandjuristssayonthesubjectofgrouppersonally?ThemainthrustofFiggis'sargumentisthatlifemustalwaystakepriorityoverlaw,factsovertheories,realityoverartifice.Yetifso,whatshouldgroupshavetofearfromtheattentionofindividualistsandfictionists,sincegrouppersonality,ifrealinFiggis's

sense,shouldinanothersensemakegrouppersonsuntouchable?TheanswertothesequestionsisnottobefoundinthetextofthepaperFiggisdeliveredin1905,norinthetextofthelectureshepublishedtwoyearslater.Rather,itliesintheimmediatebackgroundagainstwhichtheseworkswereproduced.Forinthe

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jurisprudenceshouldnotbeusedmistakenly,butnorshouldtheybemistakenforpracticalproposals.25Figgis,'TheChurchandtheseculartheoryoftheState',189.26Ibid.,192.

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yearsbetweenthepublicationofThedivinerightofkingsandthepublicationofFromGersontoGrotiusFiggishadnotonlydiscoveredGierke;hehadalsodiscoveredthatlifeandlawdosometimesclash,withpotentiallydisastrousconsequences.

III

TheclashwhichcausedFiggisconcernaboveallotherstookplaceinScotland,anditconcernedachurch.In1900theAssemblyoftheFreeChurchofScotlandhadelectedby643votesto27toenterintoaunionwiththeUnitedPresbyterians.TheFreeChurchitselfhadbeencreatedin1843followingasplitintheestablishedChurchofScotlandthen,aboutathirdofthechurch'smembershadbrokenawaytoformanewbody(inevitablybymeansofadeedoftrust),stillbelievingintheprincipleofestablishmentbutfreefromstatecontroloveritsinternalaffairs,andorganisedaroundastrictadherencetothetheologicaltenetsofCalvinism.Thedecisionof1900alteredthis,becausetheUnitedPresbyteriansweremoreliberalintheirinterpretationofCalvinismthanhadbeenthefoundersoftheFreeChurch;theywerealsoopposedtotheprincipleofchurchestablishment.Itwasforthesereasonsthattheminorityof27(whocametobeknownas'theWeeFrees')opposedtheunion,anddespitethesizeofthemajoritythatapprovedit,theytooktheircasetolaw,claimingthatthedecisionoftheAssemblyhadbeenultravires.TheWeeFreesarguedthattheFreeChurchcouldnotreconstituteitselfinthisway,becauseitsveryexistencewasdeterminedbythetermsofitsoriginalconstitution;wherethesetermswerealtered,thechurchmustceasetoexist;therefore,thechurchmustbelongtothose,howeversmallinnumber,whoupheldtheprinciplesofitsfounders.Theseweredeepanddifficultissues,andeventuallythecasereachedtheHouseofLords.There,aftermuchdeliberationonwhatwereoftenobscurequestionsoftheology,theLordsdecidedinfavouroftheWee

Frees,andawardedthemthenameoftheFreeChurch,alongwiththewholeofitspropertyandallitsbuildings.Unsurprisingly,thisdecisioncausedaconsiderableoutcry,anditprovedtobemoreorlessunworkableinpractice.27Finally,anactofparliamentwas

27OneofthelawyersforthenewUnitedChurch,TaylorInnes,lamentedthatthejudgmentoftheLordshad'hurl[ed]itselfthroughthelandlikeatornado,unroofingmanses,emptyingChurches,closingColleges,givingMissionHallstothemoles,andSundaySchoolstothebats'(quotedinK.R.Ross,ChurchandcreedinScotland:theFreeChurchcase

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requiredtosortoutthemess,andtoredistributethepropertyofthechurchinamoreequitablemannerbetweenthecompetingparties.28

ForFiggis,thedecisionoftheHouseofLordsinthecaseoftheFreeChurchofScotlandtheultimate'legal'decisioninthecasewassimplywrong.Itwasnotthatitwasanti-clerical(thoughFiggisremarkedontheincongruityofcivillawyersattemptingtointerpretCalvinisttextsonthechurch'sbehalf),northatitwasilliberal(thoughmanycalleditthat),noreventhatitwasunwise(thoughitmostcertainlywas);itwasuntrue.TheerrorlayintheLords'failuretoacknowledgethatthechurch,likeanychurch,hadapersonalityofitsown,andcouldnotthereforebeidentifiedwiththemerelyartificialpersonalitydescribedinthelegaldocumentsdrawnupatthetimeofitsformation.Byidentifyingthechurchwiththestricttermsofthosedocuments,thelawdeniedtoit,oranyotherchurch,thecapacitytochange,developandgrow,onitsownterms,inaccordancewiththelifethatitchosetolead.Thatchurches,alongwithmostotherformsofhumanassociation,werecapableofsuchdevelopmentwastoFiggisself-evident.Andnearlytenyearsaftertheoriginalcase,whenhecametoproducehisfinalworkofpoliticaltheory,ChurchesinthemodernState,hisindignationatthesheerwrongnessofthedecisionremained.Indeed,itistheScottishChurchcasewhichprovidesthebookwithmuchofitsimpetus.Init,Figgisasksofanychurch:

Does[she]existbysomeinwardlivingforce,withpowersofself-development?orissheamereaggregate,afortuitousconcourseofecclesiasticalatoms,treateditmaybeasoneforthepurposesofcommonsense,butwithnorealclaimtoamindorwillofherown,exceptsofarasthecivilpowerseesgoodtoinvestherforthenoncewiththeportionofunity?29

This,forFiggis,wasthekeyquestion;anditwastoprovideaclearanswertothisquestionthatheattemptedinChurchesinthemodernStatetoproduceacoherentGenossenschaftstheorieofhisown.

Butbeforelookingtoseewhatthattheorywas,itisworth

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19001904anditsorigins(Edinburgh,1988),p.1).Thismaybesomewhatmelodramatic,butitconveystheimmediateeffectofthefinaldecisioninthecast,whichwastodividethemateriallifeofthechurchfromthelivesofmostofitsmembers.28ThiswasTheChurches(Scotland)Actof1905,whichvestedthefundsoftheFreeChurchinaParliamentaryCommission,whosejobitwastodistributethosefundsasnearlyaspossibleinaccordancewiththespiritinwhichtheyhadbeenraised.29Figgis,ChurchesinthemodernState(London,1913),p.40.

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consideringinmoredetailtheScottishChurchcaseitself,whichwassocrucialtothedevelopmentofFiggis'spoliticalthought,andthereforetothedevelopmentofEnglishpoliticalpluralismasawhole.ThefirstpointtonoteisthatalthoughFiggisbelievedthatthepointatissuewasgrouppersonality,thisdidnotinvolvetheissueofthegroup'scorporatestatusunderstoodinanystrictlylegalsense.No-onebelievedthattheScottishChurchcasewastoberesolvedbydecidingwhetherornotthechurchwasacorporation.Itwasatrust,andthequestionwaswhetherornottheoriginaltermsofthetrustwerebindingonsuccessivegenerationsofthechurch'smembers.Inthissense,itwasnotacasewhichcanbefittedneatlyintotheheartofMaitland'sargumentsaboutgrouppersonality,sinceMaitlandbelievedthattheprimarypurposeofintroducingEnglish(andbyextensionScottish)lawyerstotheconceptoftheGenossenschaftwastoenablethemtoascribecorporatestatustogroupswithagreaterdegreeofaccuracy.Yetforthisveryreason,theScottishChurchcasehelpstoilluminatethepartofMaitland'sargumentwhichisleastclearthatis,itsconclusion,whereMaitlandmovesfromnon-concessionaryfictitiouspersonalitytoaconceptionofgrouppersonalityassomethingreal.TheFreeChurchofScotlandhadalreadyaddresseditselftotheissueofconcessionarypersonalityatthetimeofitsformationin1843thebreakintheestablishedchurchhadoccurredpreciselybecausesomeofitsmemberscouldnotacceptthestateinterferinginitsinternalaffairsasitwasusedtointerfereintheaffairsofcharteredcorporations.Althoughthedissidentsstillbelievedinthebroadprinciplesofchurchestablishment,theyutilisedthegeneralrulesoftrustlawtocreateagroupcapableofself-governance,andorganisedaroundprinciplesthatitsmembershadchosenforthemselves.Thesignificanceofthecaseof1903wasthatitseemedtosuggestthattheabilityofagrouptomakeuseoftheselegalfacilitieswasnotenough.Asaresult,itallowedFiggistogiveaclearanswertothequestionofwhetherthereisanyneedtomovefromaliberal

regimeofrule-governedgrouplifetoaworldinwhichthegovernanceofgroupsisdeterminedbythepersonalitythattheyreallypossess.ForFiggis,nosystemofrules,howeverliberal,couldsufficeonitsown,becauseanysystemofrulesboundthegroupofindividualsthatusedittothetermsunderwhichtheyusedit,andtherebydeniedthatgroupthecapacity,asasinglegroup,todevelop,orgrow.Theonethingthatgeneralrulesdonotallowforisinherentchange.Therefore,groupsorganisedinaccordancewithgeneral

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rulesmustbeartificial.Likemachines,theymaydomanyofthethingsthatnaturalmendo;buttheycannotchangeasmenchange,unlesssomeonestepsintochangethem.

WhatFiggisgivesusisastraightcontrastbetweengrowth,orlife,ontheonehand,andrules,orlaw,ontheother.Thisseparatingoutoflifeandlawmightseemlikeacuriouswayofapproachingwhatwasaprobleminlaw,butitiscertainlypossibletomakesenseoftheScottishChurchcaseinFiggis'sterms.Foritwasadisputebetweenthosewhounderstoodthechurchasanevolving,andthosewhosawitasafixed,entity.TheHouseofLords,perhapsunsurprisingly,camedownonthesideoffixity.Butbecause,asFiggissawit,lifeisalwaysstrongerthanlaw,theirdecisionwasunsustainable,eventhoughitwasnotwithoutcost.Thechurch,starvedofmaterialresources,continuedtoexistinthecontinuingactivities(andprotests)ofitsmembers,andeventuallythelawhadtorecognisethis,whichmeantrecognisingthatthe'legal'versionofeventshadbeenthewrongone.30Nevertheless,itmustbepointedoutthatiftheFreeChurchofScotlanddidhaveanorganicpersonality,itwasapersonalityofaratherpeculiarkind.Forthiswasapersonthathadfounditnecessarytopresentitselfbeforethecivilcourtsinordertohavedecidedthenatureofitspersonality,andthishadprovednecessarybecausethechurchhadbeenunabletodecidethematterforitself.Inallbuttherarestcases,thereisnoanalogyherewiththepersonsofthenaturalworld:31whenamanisunabletodecidewhichofvariouspersonalitiesheistobear,hemayendupbeforethecourts,butitwillnotbebecausehehasbroughthimselfthere;onthewhole,amanwhowishedtotakehimselftocourtwouldbeconsideredinsane.Inthisrespect,thereseemsgoodreasonforsayingthattheFreeChurchofScotlandcannothaveconstitutedasingleentity,asFiggiswouldhaveusbelieve,forifithadformedsuchan

30Itwas,however,oneoftheironiesofacasefullofironiesthatthis

recognitioncouldonlybeputintopracticebyrecoursetothetraditionaltoolofconcessionarytheory,thesovereign'act';astheScotsmannotedatthetime,itmightbethoughcurious,tosaytheleast,that'thelastoutcomeofthelongprotestagainstErastianismisthatthefundsandpropertyoftheFreeChurchofScotlandshouldbevestedinaParliamentaryCommission'(quotedinRoss,Churchandcreed,p.52).31Onepossibleanalogyiswithatrans-sexualwhowishestochangethesexgivenonhis/herbirthcertificateinordertotakeadvantageofthelegalbenefitsavailabletooneofthesexthattheyhavebecome(forexample,ifbecomeawoman,inordertomarryaman).Buttheanalogyisstillincomplete,becausethetrans-sexual'scaseisagainstthosewhoareresponsibleforthedrawingupofbirthcertificates(i.e.thestate)andnotthosepartsofhis/herownpersonthatwishtoremainthesexthattheywerebornwith.

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entity,thecaseofthechurchwouldneverhavecometocourt.ItiseasytolosesightofthissimplefactinthefaceofwhatmightbedescribedastheErastianaspectsofthecase.Itiscertainlytruethatthequestionofchurch/staterelationsplayedanimportantpartintheoriginaldispute.Itisalsotruethatthestate,intheformoftheLords,soughttodecidetheforminwhichthechurchshouldcontinueitsexistence.Butthesetwofactsareessentiallyunrelated.Thestatedidnotsetouttoimposeitswillonthechurch,nordiditinsistupondealingwiththetheologicalandotherissuesthatwereinquestion;thechurch,literally,broughtthematteruponitself.AndyetthisissomethingwhichFiggis'sownlanguagetendstoobscure.Hespeaksofthechurchbeinginvestedwithunitybythecivilpower'forthenonce';32hestatesthatthecaseoftheFreeChurchdemonstratesthattherightsofgrouppersonscannotbeguaranteed'whenitcomestothepinch';33hedeclaresthatanygroupwhichbehavesasthoughitpossessespowersofself-developmentis'liabletobehauledup'34beforethelaw.Butwhatbringsmatterstothepinch,whathaulsthewholebusinessupbeforethelaw,istheactivitytakingplaceinsidethechurch,andnotanythingthatisbeingdonebythestatetoit.Thesewereargumentsabout,butnotbetween,churchandstate.Thedisputetookplacewithinthechurchitself.

ThatthebasicmoraloftheScottishChurchcaseconcernedanassociation'sinternal,notitsexternal,relationsFiggiswasultimatelypreparedtoaccept.Heconcededthat,atbottom,suchcaseswereaboutwhathecalledagroup's'powersofexclusion';thatis,theyconcernedthequestionofwhetheranindividualshouldhavetheright'toremaininasocietypledgedtoonethingwhilehehimselfispledgedtotheopposite'.35This,though,putsthematterinratherastarkform.Anindividualneednotbeopposedtothefundamentalpurposeofhisassociation,nor,asinthecaseoftheWeeFrees,committedtobeliefswhichhisassociationnolongerwishesto

acknowledge,inorderfortheseissuestoarise;hemaysimplyobjecttosomeoftheuseswhichhisassociationmakesoftheresourceshehasputintoit.Itwasadisputeofthiskindwhichprovidedthepointatissueinanotherofthenotoriouslegaldecisionsoftheperiod,theso-calledOsbornejudgmentof1909.Inthisjudgment,bywhichFiggiswasalsogreatlyexercised,itwasdeclaredthatatradeunioncouldnotenforceapoliticallevycontrarytothewishes

32Figgis,ChurchesinthemodernState,p.40.33Ibid.,p.39.34Ibid.,p43.35Ibid.,pp.445.

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ofindividualmembers,howeverfewinnumber.Again,thiswasaprivatecase,broughtbyagroupwithinagrouptheWalthamstowbranchoftheAmalgamatedSocietyofRailwayServants,inthepersonofitssecretary,W.V.Osborneagainstthegroup'sgoverningbody,onthegroundsthattheactionsofthatbodywereultravires.Again,thecaseeventuallyrequiredajudgmentfromtheHouseofLords.Andagain,FiggisbelievedthattheconclusionarrivedatthereinfavourofOsborneandhisdissentingbranchwaspalpablyincorrect.Itimpliedthat'themembersoftheunionareamerecollectionofindividuals,whoareunchangedbytheirmembershipofthesociety,andcannotthereforehavethefundssubscribedtoapurposetowhich,eveninaminority,theyobject'.36YetwhenFiggiswritesthatthisminoritywastreatedasthough'unchanged',itoughttobesaidthatsuchwasself-evident,sincehadtheybeensochangedthematterwouldnothavecomebeforethecourts.Theproblemwaspreciselythatasmallnumberofmembersoftheunionwishedtoremainmembersofthespecificassociationthattheyhadindividuallyelectedtojoin(anassociationthatOsbornearguedwascommittedto'purelyTradeUnionwork'37).Figgiswascommittedtothebeliefthattheseindividualchoiceswereoflesssignificancethantheintegrityoftheassociationthateachhadhelpedbringintobeing.

ThesinglemoststrikingfeatureofboththeScottishChurchandOsbornecasesisprovidedbythenumbersinvolved.Ineachinstanceaverylargeassociation,havingdecidedonacourseofaction,wasseeminglyheldtoransombyaverysmallnumberofitsmembers.38ItwasthissheerincongruitywhichgaveFiggis'sargumentmuchofitsmoralforce.Butitispossible,asonerecentcommentatorhasnoted,tothinkofmore'difficult'instancesofathreattoagroup'sintegrity.39OnesuchoccurredintheUnitedStatesin1952.ThiswastheKedroffcase,whichconcernedthe

36Ibid.,p.65.

37SeeH.V.Emy,Liberals,radicalsandsocialpolitics(Cambridge,1973),p.252.38AlthoughitwasamatterofconsiderablecontroversywithinthelabourmovementatthetimeastowhetherOsbornereallydidrepresenttheopinionofonlyaveryfew.ThatcertainlywastheimpressiongivenattheTradesUnionCongressof1910,whereamotionattackingthejudgmentinthecasewaspassedby1.7millionvotesto13,000.Butageneralballotofallunionmembersin1914toldaratherdifferentstory:then,thedecisiontoraiseacompulsorylevyinordertofundLabourpartyelectioneeringwasapprovedbyamajorityof473,880to323,613.39SeeD.Nicholls,Thepluraliststate:thesocialandpoliticalideasofJ.N.Figgisandhiscontemporaries,secondedn(Basingstoke,1994),p.69.

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possessionoftheRussianOrthodoxcathedralinNewYork,andwhichhasbeentakenbysometounderminethewholeofFiggis'sargument.40ThecasearosefollowingadisputebetweenOrthodoxChristianslivinginAmericaandthechurch'sMoscowpatriarchate,concerningthedirectioninwhichthepatriarchsweretakingthechurchasawhole.Eventually,amajorityofthechurch'sAmericanmembersbrokefromMoscow,andclaimedpossessionoftheNewYorkcathedralonthegroundsthattheywerethechurch'struerepresentatives.ThisdecisionwasrecognisedinalawpassedbyNewYorkState,whichhadtheeffectofgrantingownershipofthecathedraltothedissidentbody.However,theSupremeCourtfoundthisstatutetobeunlawful,andreturnedthecathedraltotheminoritywhohadremainedincommunionwithMoscow.ThatthereareparallelsbetweenthisdecisionandthatintheScottishChurchcaseisevident,butthereisalsooneverysignificantdifference.IntheKedroffcase,itwasthemajorityofthechurch'smembersthatwishedtopreventthechurchfrom'changing'.Asaresult,itisnotatalleasytoknowonwhichsideFiggismighthavebeenexpectedtocomedown.Ontheonehand,themoralforceofhisargumentwouldseemtoallyhimwiththemajority,asthemoststrikingembodimentofthechurch'spersonality,orwill.Yet,crucially,unliketheFreeChurchofScotland,theOrthodoxChurchwasnotgovernedbymajorityrule;itwasgovernedfromMoscow,byitspatriarchs.Thereisthereforeacasetobemadeherefortheminority,onthegroundsthatminoritydecision-makingwasanintegralpartofthechurch'sself-chosenidentity.ThiswasthepositionadoptedintheSupremeCourt,whereitwasarguedthatthestatutepassedbytheNewYorklegislaturerepresentedanunwarrantedinterferenceintheinternalaffairsofareligioussociety,sinceitresultedintheeffectiveimpositiononthatsocietyofaformofmajoritarianrule.Underthesecircumstances,theadvocateofrealgrouppersonalityiscaughtinsomethingofabind:adecisiontoallowthechurchtodeveloponitsownterms(i.e.in

accordancewithitspreferredpractices)resultsinthealienationofthemajorityofitsmembers;meanwhile,adecisiontoletthose

40L.C.Webb,inhisessay'Corporatepersonalityandpoliticalpluralism',arguesthat'theKedroffcasemadeanonsenseoftheargumentofChurchesinthemodernState'(L.C.Webb(ed.),Legalpersonalityandpoliticalpluralism(London,1974),p.54).Hegoeson:'ThelessonofKedroff,surely,isthattoattributerealpersonalitytogroupsistocreatelogicalandpracticaldifficultiesofthesameorderasthosethatarisewhenastrictlyAustiniansovereigntyisclaimedfortheState'(ibid.).

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membersspeakforthechurchresultsinthestatecomingtochoosethechurch'spracticesforit.Whatismore,identifyingthevoiceoftheassociationwiththepreferencesofthemajorityentailsareversiontothemostfamiliarofallthe'fictions'ofcorporationtheory:thefictitiousnotionthatthemanyareequivalenttothewhole.Inthepast,thisnotionhadalwaysreliedupontheauthorityofthestatetogiveitforceitwasforthestatetodecidehowmanywouldbecountedenoughtospeakforall(inRomanlaw,thefigurewasnormallytwo-thirds).IntheKedroffcase,thesituationwouldseemtohavebeennodifferent.

TheKedroffcasedoesnotundermineFiggis'swholeargument,forthesimplereasonthatFiggis'sargumentisnotjustalegalone.Heuseslegalcasestosupporthisposition,buthisowncasecannotrestonthementirely,preciselybecausehebelievedthatlifeisalwaysstrongerthanlaw.WhattheKedroffcasedoesindicateisthatthepositionFiggiswishedtoadoptwasliabletobringwithitaseriesofhardchoices.Inparticular,itmakesitseemlikelythattheintegrityofgrouppersonalitywasitselfcontingentupongrouppersonscomingtofitaparticularmould.ThisindubitablywasthelessonoftheTaffValecase,thelastofthegreatlegaljudgmentstobediscussedbyFiggis,thoughthefirsttooccurintime.In1900theTaffValerailwaycompanyattemptedtosuetheAmalgamatedSocietyofRailwayServants(ASRS)fordamagesfollowingaseriesofstrikes.Upuntilthispoint,ithadbeenassumedthattradeunions,becauseunincorporate,wereexemptfromsuchclaims,andthatitwasindividualmembersalonewhowereliablefortheiractions.Thisleftthecommonfundsofeachunionmoreorlessuntouchablebyemployers.Butinthiscasethecompanyarguedthatthetechnicalityofunincorporatestatusshouldnotpreventtheunion,whichhadbeenbehavinginthemannerofacorporatebody,frombeingheldliablefortheactionsofitsagents.TheirclaimwasrejectedbytheCourtof

Appeal,butin1901thisdecisionwasoverturnedintheHouseofLords,andtheASRSwereorderedtopaymorethan£42,000indamages.Unsurprisingly,thisjudgmentcausedatleastasmuchcontroversyastheonethatwastofollowinthecaseoftheFreeChurchofScotland.Asinthatcase,thepointatissuewasthenatureofgrouppersonality,butinthiscasetheissuewasraisedinasomewhatdifferentway.First,theargumentsinthisinstancerelatedirectlytotheconcernsaddressedbyMaitlandinhisessaysonthesubjectofunincorporatebodies(oneofthesewaswrittenspecifically

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inorder'toassigntothisTaffValecaseitsplaceinalongstory'41).Thequestionwasnotoneofmoralororganic,butspecificallyofcorporatepersonality.Second,thiswasonejudgmentproducedbytheHouseofLordsofwhichFiggiscouldapprove.Byequatingtheactionsofindividualswiththeactionsofthegroup,eventhoughtheindividualsconcernedhadnotsoughttoidentifythemselveswiththegroupinthisway,thejudgmentascribedtogroupsthecapacitytogeneratearealpersonalityoftheirown.Corporatestatus,inthissense,wasnolongertobeviewedasaresourcemadeavailableinlawbutasafactoflifewhichthelawisforcedtorecognise.Third,thoughFiggisapprovedofthejudgment,thegroupinquestion,inevitably,didnot.FortheASRStheTaffValedecisionwaslittleshortofadisaster.Thiswasthetrulydistinctivefeatureofthecasethat,asFiggisadmits,corporatepersonalitywasascribedtothegroup'inspiteof[itsmembers']wishes'.42Tradeunionsdidnotwishtobeliablefordamagesfollowingastrike,andtheresultoftheTaffValejudgmentwastomakeitincreasinglydifficultfortradeunionstocarryoutthesortsofactivitiesforwhichtheyhadcomeintobeinginthefirstplaceinthewordsofonehistoryoftheperiod,itsimmediateeffectontheBritishlabourmovementwas'franklydisabling'.43Butitdidensurethattradeunionsweretreatedaspersons.

TheTaffValecase,liketheScottishChurchcase,canbeusedtoprovidesupportforthedoctrineofrealgrouppersonality.Itis,however,supportprovidedatacost.Theadvantagesthatgrouppersonalitybringswithitcanbeseentocomewithconstraintsalloftheirown;andtheseconstraints,liketheadvantages,dependuponthestateforconfirmation.Ofcourse,thisdoesnotmeanthatthestatecreatestheattributesofgrouppersonality;itsimplyconfirmsthem.Nordoesitmeanthatgroupsmustalwaysbepresentingthemselvesbeforethecourtsfordecisionsregardingtheirpersonalaffairs.Wheregroupsarefreefromcontroversy,eitherbetweenmembersorbetween

thegroupandtheworldoutside,theirpersonalaffairswillremaintheirownconcern.Butforagrouptoremainfreefromcontroversyitsmemberswillhavetodotheirutmosttopreservethecontinuouslifeoftheassociation,andtoavoidintroducingtothatlifeextraneousconcerns,whichiswhenthetroublebegins.The

41SeeMaitland,Collectedpapers,vol.III,p.271.42Figgis,ChurchesinthemodernState,p.179.43SeeR.C.K.Ensor,England18701914(Oxford,1936),p.378.

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doctrineofrealgrouppersonalitywouldseemtoencouragegroupmemberstovaluetheintegrityoftheirassociationaboveeverythingelse.Andyetitwasinthisdoctrine,Figgisbelieved,thatthekeytopoliticalfreedomlay.

IV

Theobviousresponsetoaclaimofthiskindistoaskwhyweshouldconsiderthistobefreedom.Butabetterquestionistoaskwhatsortofgroupwouldconsiderthisbeingfree,sinceitisapointonwhichFiggisisquiteclear.Suchagroupisonewithitsownwayoflifeanditsownmoralstandards,whichacceptsthatthosestandardsapplytoitselfalone,butwhichbelievesthatwheretheydoapplytheyapplyabsolutely.Suchagroup,inotherwords,isasectarianchurch.Figgis'sargumentrunsasfollows:theconventional,orconcessionary,theoryofgrouppersonalityimpliesthethesisthat'nochurchshouldhaveanystandardofmoralsdifferentfromthoseoftheState';44thisdeniestochurchestheirdefiningfunctions,whichinvolvestipulatingparticularmodesofbehaviourfortheirmembers,onthebasisofself-chosendoctrineandritual;45insofarastheydoperformthesefunctions,churchesexercise'realauthorityovertheirmembers';46assuch,theymustbedeemedtohaverealpersonalitiesoftheirown;however,churchescannotclaimauthorityoverthelifeofthestateasawhole,asthatwouldinvolveareturntotheauthoritariantendenciesofearlymodernpoliticaltheory;norcanchurchesseektoclaimauthorityoverthemembersofotherassociations,sincetheconflictsthatmustresultwillrequiretheinterferenceofthestateiftheyaretoberesolved;instead,'thebusinessofChristiansiswiththemoralstandardoftheirownsociety,andwiththemselvesasmembers';47while'itistheessenceoftheChurchtobedifferentfromtheworldandtoproclaimthatdifference';48so,realgrouppersonalityimpliessectarianism.

Whatisinterestingaboutthisargumentisnotitsinternallineofinference,whichissoundenough,buttheusewhichFiggismakesofitsconclusions.Forhebelievedthattherewasthebasisherefora

44Figgis,ChurchesinthemodernState,p.68.45Figgisusesasanexampletheinvasionofthe'rights'ofthechurchentailedbythe1851DivorceAct,whichallowedtheuseofchurchesforthemarriageofdivorcedpersons;andFiggiswarnedoffurtherpossibleencroachmentsifthestateweretocompelclergymentostandinsuchceremoniesagainsttheirwishes(seeibid.,pp.1418).46Ibid.,p.224.47Ibid.,p.130.48Ibid.,p.134.

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newtheoryofthestate,whathecalls'atrue,thatisarealistic,politicalphilosophy'.49Thenamehegavetothisphilosophywas'multipliedsectarianism',50andthoughthenameitselfdidnotcatchon,thephraseheusedtodescribethepoliticalconditionthatitpostulatesfaredratherbetter.Thatphrasewas'thecommunitascommunitatum',whichderiveddirectlyfromtheworldofmedievalpoliticalthought.Byit,Figgisunderstoodasocietymadeupofself-formedandself-governingassociations,eachofwhichco-existedinabroaderframework,itselfcapableofgeneratingasenseofcommunity.Thisbroadercommunitywasthestate,butalthoughbroader,itdidnotconditionthelivesofthoselessergroupsthatitcontained.Figgisacceptsthatthestatemustpossessadegreeofcoercivepower,inorder,asheputsit,'toensurethat[groups]donotoversteptheboundsofjustice'.51Butthestatewasnevertousethatpowertoimposeitswillonthelessercommunitieswithinit,andideallyitwasnevertousethatpoweratall,sincethegroupswithinitoughttobeconcernedwiththeirownaffairsalone,leavingtheboundsofjusticeintact.TheideaofthecommunitascommunitatumencapsulatedwhatFiggisunderstoodby'realism',andheassociateditaboveallwiththewritingofAlthusiusandGierke.InEnglanditwasanideathatwastobeassociatedwithFiggishimself,anditwasforthis,ratherthanthelesswieldy'multipliedsectarianism',thathecameintimetobeknown.

ThatFiggis'sideaofthecommunitascommunitatumisanobleoneishardtodispute.Butgiventhesectarianconceptionofgrouplifeonwhichitrests,itcanstillbeaskedwhetheritis,asFiggissupposed,a'realistic'onealso.Toanswerthisquestion,itisnecessarytobreakitdownintotwoparts.Thefirstpartconcernstherelationsofgroupswithinthestatetoeachother;thesecondconcernstherelationofeachgrouptothestateitself.Inbothcases,Figgispostulatesasocietyinwhichtherelationsbetweengroupsarepeaceablebecausetheaffairsofanyonegrouparenoconcernofanyother,thestateincluded.But

inneithercaseisthisvisionsustainable.Whereitisaquestionoftherelationsbetweenassociationsotherthanthestate,Figgisanticipatesdifficultiesonlywhenonegroupattemptstoencroachupontheterritoryofanother,atwhichpoint,heconcedes,thestatemayhavetointervene.Itisofcoursetruethatgrouppersons,likeindividualpersons,mayclash.Butitisalsotruethat

49Ibid.,p.225.50Ibid.51Ibid.,p.90.

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grouppersons,unlikeindividualpersons,containindividuals,whomaythemselvesclashwiththegroup.ThisisaneventualitytowhichFiggispayslittleattention,butitwasbyfarthelikeliersourceofconflict.Moreover,itwasthesourceofconflictinthecaseoftheFreeChurchofScotland,whichdidnotresultfromoneassociationdoingbattlewithanother,asindividualsmight,butinsteadstartedwhenoneassociationsoughttomergewithanother(asindividualscannot),andthenattemptedtoclaimarecalcitrantgroupofindividualsasitsown.Eventually,theargumentdidresolveitselfintoadisputebetweentwodistinctgroups(theWeeFreesandtheUnitedFreeChurch)overasinglesetofproperty.Butitsoriginslayintheclaimsmadebytwodistinctgroups(theoriginalFreeChurchandthenewUnitedChurch)overaparticularsetofmen.Oncethisisseen,itwillalsobeseenthatsimilarsituationsmayarise,notonlywhenanassociationchoosestochange,butwheneveranindividualorsetofindividualschoosestobelongtomorethanonegroup.This,ofcourse,isafrequentoccurrenceamanmaybelongtoatradeunionaswellasachurch,toachurchaswellasapoliticalparty,toapoliticalpartyaswellasatradeunion.Itdoesnotfollowfromitsfrequencythatconflictmustalsobefrequent,northattheseconflictswillalwaysendupincourt.Itdoesfollow,however,thatconflictwillalwaysbepossible,andthatthepossibilityofconflictsofthiskindwillonlydisappearwhenindividualsareprotectedfromtheclaimsandcounter-claimsofcompetingassociations.Thismaywellhappeniftheassociationstowhichindividualsbelongareallself-containedsects.Butasocietyinwhichindividualsareencouragedtojoinself-containedsectsisnotoneinwhichtheircapacitytoassociatewithoneanotherwillbeexploitedtothefull.

Figgis'sidealisedcommunitascommunitatumpresupposesthatmenarecertainabouttheassociationstowhichtheybelong,andthattheyonlybelongtoonesuchassociation.Italsopresupposesthatthelife

pursuedbyanyoneassociationhasnobearingonthelifepursuedbyanyother.Here,again,Figgis'scaserestsonhissectarianism.Inallowingthatthestateisentitledtoregulategroupswhentheycomeintoconflictwithoneanother,Figgisisassumingthatgroupswillnotconflictveryoften.Thisisbecauseheassumesthatgroupswillonthewholeconcernthemselveswithendswhicharetheirsalone,andwhichimposedemandsontheirmembersalone.Whenconflictsdoarise,itwillbebecauseseparateassociationshappentobepursuingsimilarends,andthereforewishtomakeuseofthesameresources

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(inthecaseoftheFreeChurch,thismeantthesamebuildings).ByhisuseoftheexamplesoftradeunioncasesliketheOsbornejudgment,Figgismeanstosuggestthatthisthesisisapplicabletogrouplifeasawhole.Butareallgroups,includingthosewithsuchovertlypoliticalendsastradeunions,reallycharacterisableintheseterms?Unlikechurches,tradeunionsexistinordertomakeclaimsonothersweretheirendsrealisablebytheirmembersalone,theywouldnotbetheassociationsthattheyare.Tobetoldthatthestatewillnotbecomeinvolvedingroupaffairssolongasthatgroupdisplaysnoconcernwiththeaffairsoftherestofsocietyisanunlikelyconsolationforanygroupwhoseformationwasbroughtaboutinordertosecuresomeeconomicorpoliticalresultrequiringatleastsomechangesinbehaviouronthepartoftherestofsociety.TheassociationswhichmostnearlyfitFiggis'smodelarethosewhichmaybeidentifiedasavowedlynon-politicalreligioussocieties,institutionsoflearningorofrecreation.Andacommunitymadeupoflessercommunitiesallofwhoseconcernsareotherworldly,orpurelyacademic,orpurelyrecreationalis,attheveryleast,asomewhatimprobablemodelofapoliticalsociety.

Ifweturnnowtothequestionoftherelationofanyoneofthesegroupstothestate,itisclearthatsimilar,ifdistinct,problemsarise.Again,Figgispresupposesthatstateandgroupcanoperatepeaceablyalongsideoneanotherbecauseeachwillbeoperatinginseparatespheres:thestateexistssimplyinordertoestablishcertainboundsofjustice,withinwhichgroupsarefreetopursuetheirself-chosenends;thestatedoesnotpursuesuchendsitself.Inthisrespect,FiggisenvisagessomethingclosetoOakeshott'sidealconceptionofthestate,understoodasanalogoustoasocietas.52There,purposiveassociationsareabletoflourishwithinaframeworkofrulesprovidedforthembythestate,therulesguiding,butnotcontrolling,theirendeavours.However,Oakeshottrecognisedthatthisrelationbetweenthestate

andothergroupswasconditionalonthestatebeingadifferentsortofassociationfromtheseothergroupsitwasarule-governedsocietas,theywereend-governeduniversitates,andthisaloneensuredthatneitherposedathreattotheother.Figgisdidnotmakethisdistinction.Hisstatewaspreciselythesamesortofassociationasthegroupsitcontained.Itwasacommunitascommunitatum;itwasnotasocietasuniversitatum.Figgisconceivedhisstatein

52ThisisapointmadebyDavidNichollsintheonlybook-lengthstudyofFiggis'spoliticalthought(seeNicholls,Thepluraliststate,pp.801).

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thesetermsbecauseofthelessonhelearnedfromGierke,thesamelessonwhichOakeshottchosetoignore:thatwhateveristrueofthestatealsoholdsfortheassociationswithinit,andthuswhateveristrueoftheassociationswithinitalsoholdsforthestate.ForFiggis,asforGierke,itwasaquestionnotofanalogy,butofreciprocity.Havinglearntthislesson,however,Figgiscannotescapefromitsconsequences.Hecannotclaim,asOakeshottdoes,thatthestateisinthebusinessofregulation,whilethegroupswithinitpursuesetgoals.Thegroupswithinhisstateare'communities',withgoalscertainly(thoughnotsetones),butalsowithrules,whichregulatethelivesthattheirmemberschoosetolead.Theyarenotsimply'enterprise'projects,towhichindividualsmayormaynotbecomeattachedduringthecourseofalife-time;theyareawayoflifeinthemselves.ThisiswhatFiggisunderstandsbyrealgrouppersonality,anditfollowsfromitthateachofthecommunitiestowhichmenbelongwillperformmanyofthetasksthatOakeshottidentifieswiththestatealone,aswellasgeneratingthatsenseof'loyalty'whichOakeshottidentifieswiththestatealone,suchthatwecanexpecteachsuchcommunitytohaveitsownsenseofwhatconstitutestheboundsofjustice.ItalsofollowsthatthestatewillhavetoperformmanyofthetasksthatOakeshottidentifieswithenterpriseassociations,asitseekstogenerateitsownsenseofcommunity.Overlapisinevitable.Andwhentwoormoreassociationsattempttoperformoneandthesametask,conflict,asOakeshottknew,canneverbefarbehind.

Figgisalludestothepossibilityofsuchconflict,butonlytobeabletodiscountit.Asalways,hisfocusisonthepositionofchurchesinthestate,andheinsiststhat,oncechurchesaregrantedpowersofself-development,'allothermattersbetweenchurchandStateareaquestionofdetail'.53Ofthetermsofthisself-development,hewritesthatachurchmustbeallowedtoexercisecompleteauthorityoveritsmembers,givenonly'therequirementsofcitizenshipinasecular

culture'.54Yetthese'requirements',likethe'detail'towhichherefers,arelikelytobejustwhatisatissue.Manychurches,tosaynothingofotherformsofcommunity,mayfindthatwhatthestateunderstandsbytherequirementsofcitizenshipliesatoddswithwhattheyexpectoftheirownmembers.Therearepoliticaltheorieswhichascribetogroupsandtotheirindividualmemberstherighttoresist

53Figgis,ChurchesinthemodernState,p.99.54Ibid.,p.90.

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theauthorityofthestateinsuchcircumstances,whentoacquiescewouldrequiretheabandonmentofstronglyheldprinciples.Thesearethetheorieswhichwouldallowcertainsortsofassociationstosetfortheirmembersmoralstandardswhichentailactsofcivildisobedience.However,thesetheoriesoperateinjustthatareawhichFiggisdismissesasdetailtheydealwiththedifficultyofbalancingthesociallydivisiveeffectsofdisobedienceagainsttherequirementsofthebroadercommunity.Thisdifficultyliesattheheartofpoliticaltheory,whichisnothingmorethatthestudyoftheproblemsposedbylivinginlargecommunities.Yetitcanonlybedealtwithifthetheoristispreparedtodifferentiatebetweendifferentkindsofgroupactivity,whichistoacknowledgethatnotallsuchactivityisofacertaintype.55Withoutthisacknowledgment,thedifficulty,whichcanhardlybedenied,mustsimplybecountedasillusory.Therecan,then,beapoliticaltheorywhichreinforcesadiversityofgrouplife,butFiggis's,becauseitignoresthepoliticalsideoftheproblem,isnotit.

V

Intheend,Figgischoosestofallbackonhistory,orthe'facts',ashecallsthem.Thesearenotthefactswhichjustifypoliticaltheories,butthefactswhichrevealallpoliticaltheoriestobecontingentthe'truefacts...alwaysstrongerthanabstracttheories',56whichconstitutehistoricalreality.Gierkeusedhistory,andasenseofnationalhistoricalidentity,toprovidetheultimateframeworkwithinwhichtheproblemsofrelatingthestatetootherassociationsmightberesolved.Figgissimplyusesittoshowthatthereisnolegislatingforthewaysinwhichpeoplemaybeassociatedwithoneanother.BythetimehecametowriteChurchesinthemodernStatehenolongerwishedtoconstructatheoryofhistory,believingashebythendidthatalltheory,inwhateverform,wasliabletostiflediversity.Therewastobenomorestrivingfora'solution',whetherhistoricalornot.Therewere

just'thefacts',andthefactthatpoliticaltheoristscould

55ManyexamplesofthissortoftheorisingwereproducedintheUnitedStatesduringthe1962sand1970s,ofwhichperhapsthemostcelebratedisMichaelWalzer'sObligations:essaysindisobedience,warandpower(Cambridge,Mass.,1970).WalzercitesFiggisasamajorinfluence,butinfactgoesmuchfurtherinattemptingtosetoutthegroundsforevaluatingwhichsortsofassociations,foundedonwhichsortsofbeliefs,shouldbepermittedtoresistthestate'sattemptstocontroltheirmembers.56Figgis,ChurchesinthemodernState,p.66.

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donothingtocontainthem.Havingpromisedusarealisticpoliticalphilosophy,Figgishastocontenthimselfwithrealityontheoneside,andphilosophyontheother.

ThissensethattheoriesofthestatearechimericalistheoneconstantthemerunningthroughFiggis'swork,fromThedivinerightofkingstoChurchesinthemodernState.Finally,itbecomesthedominanttheme.AtnopointdidFiggismaketheattempttodispensewiththestatealtogether.Buthedidbecomeincreasinglyconvincedthatanyattempttoidentifyitsinstitutionalbasiswasfutile;itwasnever,inhisterms,tobe'reconciledwiththefacts'.57Inhisearliestwork,thesedoubtshadbeenovercomebyhisreadinesstoextractfromAustinatheoryoftoleration,allowingtheinstitutionalbasisofsovereigntytotakesecondplacebehinditsmoralbasisinthedivinelawofutility.Experience,coupledwithGierke,taughthimthatthiswaswishfulthinking,andbytheendAustinwasnothingmoretohimthananother'mereverbaltheory'.58Inhisearliestworkhehadalsoreliedonwhathecalledthere'thelawsofhistoricaldevelopment',toexplainhowtheconditionoftolerationhadbeenachievedinEngland.Thereliabilityofthese,too,hecametodoubt,buthereGierke,whoreliedonsuchlawshimself,hadnoalternativetoofferhim.Thislefttwopossibilities.Thefirstwastoembracethecondition,notoftoleration,butofitscounterpart,adegreeofdisorder,andthis,inpublic,Figgiscouldnotdo.Thesecondwasforhimtodonothing,andtosaynothingmore.Thisiswhathechose,andfollowingthepublicationofChurchesinthemodernStateFiggisgaveupwritingonthesubjectofpoliticaltheory,anddevotedhimselfinsteadtoreligioustopics,onwhichhebecameacelebratedlecturerinbothEnglandandtheUnitedStates.59Bydoingso,heallowedhimselftobereturnedtothepointfromwhichhehadoncetriedtoescapetoaveryEnglishrelianceontheabilityofpeopletomuddlethroughontheirown.

57Ibid.,p.84.

58Ibid.59ItwaswhiletravellingtoAmericaforalecturetourmJanuary1918thatFiggis'sboatwastorpedoed,andthoughhesurvived,itwasanexperiencefromwhichheneverrecovered.HediedonPalmSundaythefollowingyear.

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Chapter7BarkerandtheDiscreditedState

I

BythetimeFiggispublishedChurchesinthemodernStatein1913,itformedpartofanidentifiablemovementinEnglishpoliticalthought.ThiswasthemovementthatErnestBarkerwastoidentifyayearlateras'thenewfederalism',andbothMaitlandandFiggiswereseenbyBarkerasexponentsofthisdistinctnewcreed.OfFiggisBarkerwrotethathemadean'allyinthereligioussphere'1forthosewhowerecampaigningelsewhereforgreatergroupfreedoms,whetheronbehalfoftradeunions,localauthorities,ornationswithinnation-states;andoftheworkofFiggisandtheseothersBarkerhimselfmoreorlessapproved.Indeed,Barker'sPoliticalthoughtinEngland,thoughgivingspacetothefullrangeofrecentdevelopmentsinEnglishideas,makesitquiteapparentwheretheauthor'sownpreferenceslay.Inachoicebetween,forinstance,HerbertSpencer'sscientificindividualismandBernardBosanquet'smetaphysicalstatism,Barker'ssympathiesareclearlywiththelatter.2YetasbetweenBosanquet'sstark,andT.H.Green'smoreemollientviewoftheplaceofthestateinnationallife,Barker'schosetosidewiththelessstridentofthetwo.Hewas,inessence,amildidealist,philosophicallyconservative,politicallyliberal.Assuch,hefoundmuchinthenewfederalismhecouldadmiretheemphasisonthegroupasopposedtotheindividual('ifweareindividualistsnow',Barkerwrote,'wearecorporateindividualists'3),theinsistenceuponfreedomofassociation,thedistrustofcentralisedpowerandbureaucracy.Butitalsomeantthathehadhismisgivings.Asaliberal,he

1E.Barker,PoliticalthoughtinEngland,p.182.

2In1927Barkergaveexpressiontohissenseofdebtto'thelateDrBosanquet'sThephilosophicaltheoryoftheState...inalmosteverythingIhavewrittenonsocialmatters'(E.Barker,Nationalcharacterandthefactorsinitsformation(London,1927),p.136).3Barker,PoliticalthoughtinEngland,p.181.

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couldnotfollowthosewhowishedtogodownthepathofFrenchsyndicalismandmoveoutsideofthestate'sdomainaltogether.Thestatehadtoremainaswhathecalled'anecessaryadjustingforce',4inordertodistinguishbetween,andthendecideamong,theclaimsofdifferentgroups.Thefreedomsenjoyedbyallgroupswereofparamountimportance,buttheywerealso,Barkerknew,incommensurate,andliabletoclash.Meanwhile,regardingthoselikeFiggis,whoseinspirationwasdrawnlessfromFrancethanfromGermany,Barkerhadscruplesofamorephilosophicalkind.Hewasquitehappytoacceptthatgroupsunderthelawwerepossessedofajuristicpersonalityintheirownright.Whathecouldnotacceptwasthatthispersonalitymustbecounted,insomefundamentalsense,real.Thisdidnotmeanthatherejectedthecaseforrealgrouppersonalityoutofhand,northathediscountedtheadvantageswhichithadoveritsmostobviousrivals.Buthefeltthattheseweredeep,and,inEnglandatleast,unchartedwaters,whichwereliabletodrawpoliticaltheoriststowardsthesortsofabsoluteswhichcharacterisedGermanphilosophy,andwhichcausedBarkerdisquietthroughouthislife.'Wemustnot',hewrote,'pushtoofarourclaimsonbehalfofgrouppersons'.5Yetoncegiventhisproviso,andanotherconcerningwhathecalled'theneedsofadjustment',hewasreadytoacknowledgethat'alltheemphasisrecentlylaidonrightsofassociationssuggestlinesofthoughtwhicharevaluableandlikelytobefruitful'.6

WhatBarkerdidnotattemptinhis1914surveywastodevelopsomeoftheselinesofthoughthimself.Inpartthiswasaconsequenceofthebook'sformat(itwasashorthistorybook,almostatextbook7),andinpartaconsequenceofBarker'suneasinessaboutmetaphysicalspeculation.Nevertheless,thisuneasinesswassomewhatdifferentfromthekinddisplayedbyMaitland.Itwasnottheresultofmodesty,realorfalse,noroftrepidationaboutwhataforayintotheworldofGermanidealismmightinvolve.Itwassomethingmorelikea

consideredopinion.UnlikeMaitland,Barkerdidnotthinkofhimselfasamerelawyer,normerelyasahistorian,butasapoliticaltheoristalso.In1928hewastobecomethefirstholderofthechairinpoliticalscienceatCambridge.In1914hewasalreadytheauthorofasubstantialintroductiontothepoliticalthoughtofPlatoandAristotle,aswellasaworkonBergson.Barkerhadthingsofhisowntosayaboutthevariousformsofhumanassociation,andabout

4Ibid.,p.183.5Ibid.,p.180.6Ibid.7PoliticalthoughtinEnglandappearedundertheimprintoftheHomeUniversityLibrary.

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theparticularformofhumanassociationknownasthestate;hesimplylackedtheplacetosaythem.So,whilecontinuingwithhishistoryofpoliticalthoughtfromHerbertSpenceronwards,hebegantowriteaseparatepaperaboutthestateandtheplaceofgroupswithinit,whichsoughttolocatetheprobleminabroaderhistoricalcontext,andtoattemptsomesortofresolutionofit.HecompletedthispaperinMay1914,thoughitwasnotpublisheduntilFebruarythefollowingyear.ItstitlewasThediscreditedState',andinitwascontainedBarker'spersonalcontributiontothedevelopmentofthenewfederalism.

II

ThetaskBarkersethimselfin'ThediscreditedState'wastofindsomesustainablealternativetothetheoriesofgrouppersonalitythathadbeensetoutbyGierke,MaitlandandFiggis.Barkerwasconsistentlyresistanttotheideathatsomethingiscreatedwhenagroupofindividualscomestogether,andsoughtinsteadaformulawhichcouldconveya'onenesswithoutanytranscendentone'.8Theformulahearrivedatisthatofthe'organising'or'associatingidea':individualscometogetherinordertofurthersomeideathattheyshare,anditisinthelightofthatideathattheirjointendeavourshouldbedescribed.Thus,hesuggests,groupsarebesttobeunderstoodas'schemes'.9ThemeritofthisapproachforBarkerisitsinherentlyconsequentialistslant,whichallowsassociationstobeassessedintermsofwhattheydoratherthanwhattheyare.SoitbecomespossibletodistinguishbetweendifferentsortsofassociationsasBarkerasks,dowereallywanttocallallassociationspersons,allowingcriminalsocietieslikethemafiatoclaimthesamestatusasatradeunionorachurch?10ThegroundBarkerseekstooccupyissomewherebetweenthenotionofreal,andthatoffictitiouspersonality,andhewrites:'Ideasare,andarenot,fictions:theyhavehandsandfeet;buttheyarenotpersons,any

morethantheyare

8E.Barker,'ThediscreditedState',PoliticalQuarterly,5(1915),III.9Ibid.10Ibid.,113.ItisinterestingtonotethatHobbeswastroubledbythesamequestion,andthathisdistinctionbetween'privatebodiesregular,andlawful'(suchasthefamily),and'privatebodiesregular,butunlawful',wasdesignedtoaddressthisverypoint.Whatheunderstoodbythelatterwerebodiesofmenthat'unitethemselvesintoonepersonRepresentative,withoutanypublicAuthorityatall;suchasaretheCorporationsofBeggars,TheevesandGipsies,thebettertoordertheirtradeofbegging,andstealing'(seeHobbes,Leviathan,p.163).

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fictions.'11Byemphasisingtheseexternal,functionalpartsofthebody,Barkerisineffectdrawingattentiontothetwokeycharacteristicsofgroupactivityasheunderstandsit:thecapacitytodo,andthecapacitytomove,orchange.Hisconcernisthatorganisingideasshouldremainfocusedontheideaitself,andnotbecomepreoccupiedwiththebusinessoforganisation.Againstthosewhowouldsingleouttheideaofthestateasliabletostiflegrowthandsocialdiversity,Barkerwritesofallassociatingideas:'[They]havetheir...pathology...TheymaybecomemerebundlesofpaperswathedinredtapeTheymaybecomeofficechairsororganisingsecretaries.'12

WhatissignificantaboutBarker'saccountisthatitallowshimtodistinguishbetweenthestateandnon-stateorganisationsonthegroundsoftheirrespective'ideas'.Thestate,hewrites,isaseparate,distinctiveorganisingidea,foritistheschemeorideaof'lawandorder'.13Thisideaisamongthemostimportantofallpossibleschemesthroughwhichindividualsassociatewithoneanother,andatonepointBarkerdescribesitas'theideaparexcellence',14therebysettinghimselfapartfromthosewhowoulddiminishthestateregardlessoftheneedthatallcommunitieshaveofacommonadherencetotheideaoforder.Equally,though,byestablishingthatitisonlyoneidea,nottheonlyoneidea,Barkermakesclearthatotherschemesmaycompetewithitintheattempttosecureanequivalentholdovertheindividual.Indeed,hearguesthatsomeassociatingideas,particularlythoseofreligiousorganisations,wouldseemtoembraceahigherpurposethanthatofthestate,whoseendhedescribesatonepointas'theneedsofmereorderedlife'.15

WhereBarker'sargumentrunsintofamiliardifficultiesiswhenheattemptstocharacterisetherelationthatsubsistsbetweenthestateandotherassociations.Ofthisrelationhewritesasfollows:'WemayconceiveoftheStateas...aschemebasedonthepoliticalideaof

lawandorder;wemayconceiveitascontaining,oratanyratecoexistingwith,arichvarietyofschemesbasedonarichvarietyofideas.'16Oneobviousproblemwiththisformulationisestablishingasenseinwhichthestatecaneithercontain,orcoexistwith,theotherschemes,andyetremaintheorganisingideaof'order'.Thestate'spurpose,afterall,isexclusivelythatofprovidingorder;butthenotionsofbothcoexistenceandcontainmentseemtoimplythatorderisa

11Barker,'ThediscreditedState',113.12Ibid.,112.13Ibid.,113.14Ibid.,118.15Ibid.,120.16Ibid.,113.

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given,fororderrelatesheretotherelationshipbetweenthestateandotherschemes.Thereis,intruth,aparadoxhere:ifthestatecoexistswithotherschemes,thoseschemesmustbe'other'inthesenseofessentiallyunconcernedwithorder;iftheyareunconcernedwithorder,thestatecannotsimplycoexistwiththem,foritsexistenceisdefinedintermsofthemaintenance,or'organisation',oforder.Similarlyforthestatethatcontainsotherschemes:ifitcontainsthembyorderingthem,theiressentially'other'characterislost;ifitdoesnotorderthem,itscharacterasanorganisingideaislost.Thestate,astheorganisingideaoforder,isinasensetheorganisingideaoforganisation.Assuch,itisnotanorganisationwhichcanhaveitsideaorschemesimplycomparedtootherideasorschemes,fortheseothers,asorganisingideas,inevitablyundermineitsveryreasonforbeing.Barkercannotavoid,anymorethancouldHobbes,thedifficultiesthatarisewhenthestateisgiventhesameformalstructureasallothergroups,yetalsoanidentitywhichdependsuponallothergroupsbeinginsomesensestructuredbythestate.

ThewayBarkerattemptstofindroundthislogicaldifficultyisprovidedbyhistory.Hisapproachtothequestionoftherelationbetweenthestateandthedisorderedpanoplyofassociationallife,incontrasttoHobbes's,isnotfoundedonatimelesslogic.Instead,hesetsouttodescribeanevolutionary,ordialectical,relationshipinwhichtherequirementsofthepoliticalideaoflawandorderarebothdeterminedbyanddeterminantsofnon-politicalsocialexistence.Inthisway,heisabletoprovideasenseinwhichthestateideaandotherideasdocoexist,fortheyaretakentohaveacontinuouseffectononeanotherjustbecausetheyarenotequivalent.Lawandorderisanideawhichdependsuponthoseotherideaswhichithasasitspurposetoorder,sinceitcanonlyorderwhatexistsatanygiventime,andanyorderitachieveswillbeareflection,oratleastare-fashioning,ofthecontingentcircumstanceswhichfaceit.Barkerexpressesthisrelation

asfollows:'Therubricsoflawarenotreality;theyarecasesinwhichtoputreality;butthecasesmayfitrealitywellorbadly,andsincerealityhasawayofgrowing,theymayhelporhinderitsgrowth.'17Hedoesnotstipulatehowoneistodecideanorderofprioritybetweenthecasesandwhattheycontain,andsoitisfarfromclearwhatwouldcountasa'goodfit'.Allhewillsayisthatitis'afascinatingproblemhowfarlegal

17Ibid.,112.

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categoriesarecreatedbythedemandsofsocialgrowth,andhowfarlegalcategoriescreateorratherdeterminesocialgrowthitself'.18However,Barkerhasnoneedtoresolvethisproblemifhisconcernismerelytoestablishthatlawandthesubjectsoflawareinseparablydependentoneachother.Givensuchinterdependence,itisatleastthecasethattheoperationofthestateideacannotbeunderstoodapartfromtherichvarietyofotherschemeswhichhavegrownupandcontinuetogrowalongsideit.

Ifthishistoricalperspectiveprovidesasenseinwhichthestatecoexistswithotherassociations,itdoesnot,however,clarifyhowwearetounderstandtheneedsofthestatewhencomparedtotheneedsofotherassociations.Itdoesnot,inotherwords,telluswhenandonwhatgroundsitispossibletosayanythingabouttherolethatthestateshouldplay.YetBarkerdoeswishtomakesomegeneralclaimsabouttheappropriatenessandutilityofthepoliticalideaoflawandorder.Todoso,herequireswhatmustbecalledameta-perspectiveonthehistoricaldialecticoflawandgrowth,orderandchange.Havingdescribedlawasasetofcasestoholdreality,hewritesthat'theAustiniannotionofsovereigntyissuchacase'andgoeson:'Therealityitseekstocontainistheassociatingandorganisingideaoflawandorder.'19Austin,therefore,isproposingacaseinwhichtoputthe'rubricsoflaw',whicharethemselvescasesheisprovidingameta-case.Inthissense,Austinmaybeidentifiedwithpoliticaltheoryingeneral(andBarkerdoesidentifyhiminthisregardnotonlywithHobbesbutwithHegelaswell):heisattemptingtocontaintheideaoforderwithinafurtheridea,whichistheideaofpoliticaltheory.Here,then,wehaveaformof'containment'whichisclearlyopposedtoBarker'swishthattheideaofthestateshouldcontainarichvarietyofschemes,forthepointoftheAustiniannotionofsovereigntyisthatitpre-ordainsthesinglescheme(orrather,meta-scheme)thatholdsinrelationtotheorganisationoftheorganisingideaoforder.Aswill

perhapsbeevident,itisnotatalleasytostateclearlyhowweshouldunderstandthedifferencesbetweenorganisingideas,organisingideasoforder(states),andtheorganisationdonebyanideaoftheorganisingideaoforder(politicaltheory).Barkerdoesnotaltogetherconvincethathehasthoughtthecomplexitiesofhispositionthrough.However,hedoespostulateaclearparallelbetweenthedialecticalrelationofpoliticaltheorytohistorical

18Ibid.19Ibid.,119.

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circumstanceandthatoflawtogrowth.TheAustinianaccountofsovereigntyisnecessarilyone-sidedbecauseitisonlyonesideofadialecticalrelationjustaslawistiedtothe'reality'ofgrowth,sopoliticaltheoryistiedtothe'reality'ofchanginghistoricalconceptionsoftheassociatingideaoflawandorder.Itis,byBarker'slights,impossibletopre-determinetheprovinceofthestate'sactivities,forthestateisgrantedadifferingscopeforitsactivitiesindifferenteras.Thusastheideaofco-existencecanbeunderstoodasanaspectofhistory,so,also,cantheideaofcontainment,givingitasensedirectlyopposedtothe'containing'ambitionsofAustiniantheory:ourideaofthestateideashouldcontainarichvarietyofideas,fortheapplicationofthestateideavariesthroughouthistory.Barkeroffersthecontrastbetweentheneedsofearlymoderncommunities(particularlyofthesixteenthcentury)whosebasicsocialrequirementwastheestablishmentofastrongcentreofcontrol,andsomemoderncommunities(notablyearlytwentieth-centuryBritain)inwhichconceptionsofsocialexistenceasheterogeneouspointedtowardsadecentralisedvisionofpoliticalauthority.Earliertheoriesofthestateidentifieditwith'bare,unitarysovereignty';20latterly,attemptshadbeenmade(byadvocatesoftherealpersonalityofassociations,amongothers)toincorporatewithinthestateideaotherpicturesofpoliticalorganisation,therebyofferinganalternativetothecentralisingtendencyoftheoryfromaprevious,andfundamentallydifferent,age.Austin,byresurrectingtheideaofthe'bare'state,suffersbecausehecannotmouldhisthoughttoadifferent,andequallyreal,reality.Alooserconceptionofthestateissometimesthecasethatfitsthecasesoflawbest.

ItisbymeansofsuchanargumentthatBarkerisabletosuggestthatthestatehasbeen'discredited'.Thereismorethanonesenseinwhichthisphrasecanbeunderstood.Atitsmostliteral,itdenotesahistoricalconditionitreferstoperiodsinhistorywhenbare,unitary

sovereigntyhasbeensupersededbysomethingelse.However,thereisthefurtherimplicationthatourawarenessofthesehistoricalfactsentailsanewunderstandingofwhatthestateisacrosstime,oratleastofwhatitcannotbe.Whatisdiscreditedhereissomeentitynotjusttowhichthingshappen,butofwhichitispossibletospeakingeneraltermsofapprovalanddisapproval.Baker'sarticle,afterall,isnotjustaworkofhistory.Italsopurports

20Ibid.

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tobeaworkinpoliticaltheory.Whatneedstobeasked,therefore,iswhatsortofpoliticaltheoryBarker'sargumentconcerningtheorganisingideaoflawandorderiscapableofsustaining.Thismaybebrokendownintothreemorespecificquestions.Whatisthealternativetothebaretheoryofthestatesovereignty?Whyshoulditbeapproved?Howmightitbepromoted?

III

Thefirstoftheseisthemostdifficulttoanswer.PartofthatdifficultyderivesfromBarker'svaguenessonthesubjectofwhatanalternativeconceptiontoAustin'smightactuallyconceive.Hecallsit'polyarchism';21yethesaysnomoreofitsstructurestheformsoflaw-making,ofinstitutions,ofdemocraticproceduresgivenbysuchaconceptionthanthatitofferstheprospectof'afederalsortofthing'.22Butthedifficultyalsoarisesfromtheuncertaintyoftherelationbetweensuchaconceptionofthestate,andthestateideaitself,theorganisingideaoflawandorder.IsBarker'spolyarchismsomethingwhichiscontainedbytheterm'state'oneofitsvariablesorisitsomethingopposedtotheorganisingideaoflawandorder,andthereforetotheideaofthestateitself?InPoliticalthoughtinEngland,writtenatthesametimeas'ThediscreditedState',Barkerannouncesthat'theStateisalwayswithus'.23Further,inthesectiondealingwiththethoughtofT.H.Green,hedeclaresthat:'IfwechallengetheState,wemustchallengeitinfearandtrembling.Thepresumptionisalwaysagainstus.Thewholesystemofacknowledgedrightsisalmostcertaintoclaim,andtodeserve,ahigherallegiancethanthemostidealofidealrights.'24Thesuggestionofthesedeclarationsisthat'theState'referstowhateverorganisingideaoforderholdsswayforacommunity.Moreover,itdoesnotseemtobesomethingwhichcanbe'discredited'itsstatusisdeterminedbythefactthatitisacknowledged,andthereforepresupposesthatthe

processofascribingordenyingcredithasbeengonethrough,forthepresumptionisalwaysagainstus.ThisisapositionwhichmakesBarker'sidealistsympathiesreadilyapparent.Butitisalsoapositionwhich'ThediscreditedState'necessarilyrevises.Thatarticle,instarkcontrast,farfromassertingthestate'somnipresence,givesvoicetotheconvictionthatintheBritishinstanceithasneverreally

21Ibid.,120.22Ibid.,119.23Barker,PoliticalthoughtinEngland,p.250.24Ibid.,p.60.

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existed.25ThestatefromwhichtheBritishhavebeensparedappearshereas'asovereignandmajesticState...suchasHegelconceived'.26ItisthesovereignalsoofBodin,HobbesandAustin.27This,then,wouldsuggestthatthefederalsortofthingthatBakerseesastheantidotetoHegelianismandAustinianismisnotcontainedintheideaofthestate,butcontrastedtoit.Barkerappearsin1914tobearguingboththatpoliticallifeiscentredonthestate,andthatpoliticaltheorycandenythatthestateexists.

OneexplanationforthisseemingcontradictionwouldbethatBarkerchangedhismind.However,notleastbecauseBarkerhimselfgivesnoindicationthatthisisso,amoresatisfactoryaccountwouldbeonewhichsoughttoreconcilethesetwopositions.Onewaythismightbedoneistore-emphasisethetwolevelsatwhichtheargumentof'ThediscreditedState'operates.Ontheonehand,thestateisanideawhichisconstitutiveofpoliticalactivityitis'thepoliticalidea'.Ontheother,thestateisanideawhichpoliticaltheorytriestoorganise.ThechangesuggestedbyBarker'spositionin'ThediscreditedState'isnotoneofmind,butofemphasis:heemphasisesthedifferentwaysinwhichthepoliticalideaofordermayitselfbeorganised.Itisthecontentionof'ThediscreditedState'thatthepoliticalideaoforderplaysafluctuatingroleinthehistoryofacommunity,suchthatanyattempttocharacterisethatrolemustincorporateasenseofitsfluidity.Bypostulatingthisfurtherlevelofthought,Barkerhopestostrikeabalancebetweenhisconsciousnessasahistorianthatthestateisnotatimelessidea,andhisconsciousnessasapoliticalphilosopherthatthestateisanidentifiable,anddistinct,organisingidea.Inevitably,though,thisbalanceisnoteasytoachieve.Thereisatensionbetweenthesetwopositionswhichisunavoidable,andwhichisanaspectoftheparadoxoutlinedabove.Thestateisgivenasbothanentityandasamodeofthought.Theentityisalogicalconstruct;themodeofthoughtispartofahistoricalprocess.Thelogical

constructmustbefixedandrigid,forlogicistheimpositionoffixityandrigidityonevenrecalcitrantmaterial.Further,thefixityofthestateconstructistheideaoffixity,ororder.Thehistoricalprocess,meanwhile,mustbefluid,forhistoryplacesthevagariesofcircumstanceinthevanguard.Thetensionariseswhenapoliticaltheoristwhoembracesbothpositionsseekstodescribewhathappenstothe

25SeeBarker,'ThediscreditedState',101.26Ibid.27Seeibid.,1089.

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stateideatheorganisingideaoforderwhenideasofthestatearediscredited.

Barkerdemonstratesthatheisawareofthistension.Attheendofhispaperheconcedesthat'thediscreditoftheStateisasignthatithasdoneitsworkwell,andisdoingitsworkwell'.Andhegoeson:'TheStatewillcomeintocreditagain,witharush,atthedouble,assoonasitisseentobedoingitsworkbadly.'Theparadoxicalnatureofthesestatementsthediscreditedstateiscreditable,thecreditedstateoperatesdiscreditablycanonlybeunderstoodifthereareseentobetwoperspectivesfromwhichthequestionofthestate'sidentitycanbeapproached.Oneisphilosophical,andgivesusthestateastheideaoforder.Theotherishistorical,andgivesusavarietyofdifferentideasofthestate.Itissomeoftheselatterideasthatdodiscredittothestate,fortheymayseektodiscredittheideathatanideaofthestatecanbeinsomesensesovereignorsupreme.Whatgeneratestheparadoxisthatthehistoricalconditionsthatareconducivetothissortofthinkingtheconditionsconducivetopolyarchismmightthemselvesbedescribedastheconditionsoforder,sinceitisaprimarycharacteristicofpolyarchicthoughtthatittakesorderasagiven.Inotherwords,politicaltheoristswhopointtothepossibilityofdifferentgroupsco-existingoutsidetheframeworkofthesovereignstatedosoonlywhendifferentgroupscanbeseentoorderthemselves.Thisseemstopresupposethepriorityofthestateidea,forthestateideais,afterall,nothingmorethantheideaoforder.Whenorderislacking,ideasofthesovereignstateachieveprominence,andpoliticaltheoristsbecomeinvolvedinthebusinessofseekingorderthemselves.Butwhenorderisachieved,thoughideasofthesovereignstatemaybeundermined,thestateidea,bydefinition,isnot.Itsimplymovestothebackground.ItwasasahistorianthatBarkercametoseethis.Anditwasbecausehewasahistorianaswellasapoliticalphilosopherthathewasabletodescribethestateassomethingthat

canbediscredited,yetisalwayswithus,andwhendiscrediteddoingitsworkwell.

IV

ThepositionBarkeradoptsin'ThediscreditedState'isundeniablyacomplexone,anditnotalwaysclearthatBarkerhimselffullyappreciatedthedifficultiesofworkingthroughsuchanargumentasheconstructs.Thepurposeofhisarticlewastoclarify,thestatusof

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argumentsabouttheroleofthestate.However,thevarietyofapproachestotheroleofthestatewhichhisownargumentincorporatesdoesnotclarifytheissuesomuchasreinforceitscomplexity.WhatBarker'sargumentdoesclarifyistheconstraintsthatoperateuponthegeneralexercisehehadundertaken,whichwastoadoptastandpointfromwhichthestateidea,ideasofthestate,andideasopposedtothebareideaofthestatecouldallbereconciledwithinasingleintellectualperspective.Thatperspective,itturnsout,istheperspectiveofhistory.Assuch,itisnotapointofviewwhichoffersthepoliticaltheoristmuchprospectofbeingabletoexpressapreferenceforoneorotherformofpoliticalorganisation,norevenofbeingabletoformulateapoliticaltheoryofhisown.ThereisasenseinwhichBarkerbalksagainsttheselimitations.AtonepointhearguesthatpolyarchismisparticularlysuitedtotheEnglishwayoflife.TheEnglish,hesuggests,area'clubbable'people,28wellabletoorganisethemselvesintosmallgroupsandassociationswithoutneedeitherofthestateorofpoliticaltheorytoguidethem.YetthisinsistenceontheclubbabilityoftheEnglishservesonlytoreinforcethedistinctionfromwhichMaitlandandFiggishadtried,unsuccessfully,toescape:betweenpoliticaltheoryontheonehand,andtheabilityoftheEnglishtomuddlethroughwithoutitontheother.Moreover,itleavesBarker'sargumentdependentuponaparticularhistoricalcondition,thetemperamentalsuitabilityofaparticularnationtothestructureofthepolyarchic,ordiscredited,state.Therearetwoproblemswiththis.First,Barker'sargument,takenasawhole,embracesaformofhistorism,whichunderstandsallpoliticalconditionsasimpermanent.Second,whatispermanentinBarker'sargumentisthedialecticalreadinghebringstotheimpermanenciesofhistory.Heregardshistoricalconditions,organisingideasandpoliticaltheoriesasalltobeunderstoodasdependentupononeanother.Giventhisapproach,itishardtoknowhowthepoliticaltheoristcaninterveneinordertochampionhispreferredideaofthestate:itis,afterall,theapproachof

thebystander,anddependsuponasenseofdistancefromwhatisbeingviewed.Barkerappearstoacknowledgethisalso.Whenhewritesofrecenthistoricaldevelopmentswhichhaveledtotheunderminingof

28ThisnotionofclubbabilitywasathemetowhichBarkerreturnedthroughouthislife,uptoandbeyondtheSecondWorldWarForafullaccountofitsplaceinhispoliticalthoughtseeJ.Stapleton,'ThenationalcharacterofErnestBarker'spoliticalscience',PoliticalStudies,37(1989),17189.

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the'forcedandbareuniversal'ofstatesovereignty,hedeclares,notthatweshouldparticipate,butthat'weshouldrejoiceinitspracticalcriticismbythelogicoffact'.29Itis'fact'whichcriticisesanideasuchassovereignty,anditdoesso'practically',whichishistorically.Moreover,factcanalsoreinforceanidea,howeverforcedandbareitmightappeartotheonlooker.'ThediscreditedState'wasfinallypublishedin1915withthefollowingaddendum:

ThispaperwaswritteninMay1914.Ithasbeenleftasitstoodwithoutanybutverbalalteration.ItiscurioustoreflecthowdifferentlyonewouldhavewritteninJanuary1915.Germanyhasshownthatthesixteenthcenturyhasnotbeenaltogetheroverpastatanyrateinherowncase.

Andyetthefundamentalquestionsremainandwillemergewhenthewatersabate.Meanwhile,theStateisproclaiming,'Itisnecessarytolive'.Wehaveforgottenweareanythingbutcitizens,andtheStateishavingitshighmidsummerofcredit.30

Asahistorian,Barkerwasabletorecognisethecontingencyoftheclaimsthatwerebeingmadeonthestate'sbehalf.Butasahistorian,healsorecognisedthattherewasnothinghecoulddoaboutit.

29Barker,'ThediscreditedState',116.30Ibid.,121.

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Chapter8ColeandGuildSocialism

I

Infact,Barker'spredictionthatwiththeadventofwarthestatewouldenjoyitshighmidsummerofcreditprovedtobeonlyhalfright.Certainly,thewaryearsdidbringwiththemavastincreaseinthescopeofthestate'sactivitiesinthepursuitofanational,corporatewareffortitcametoemploymorepeople,levymoretaxesandregulatemoreactivitiesthanhadeverseemedpossiblebefore.Inthistransformationofthestateintoalarge-scale'enterprise'associationthelesserassociationallifeofitscitizenswasnotswampedaltogether.Avolunteerarmywasraisedbetween1914and1916whichcontainedmanybattalionswhosemembersweredrawnfromthesamelocality,thesameprofessionorindustry,andeventhesameclubsandchurches,suchthatunitsarosewithsubtitleslikeNorth-EastRailway,FirstFootball,ChurchLads,FirstPublicWorks,Empire,ArtsandCrafts,andForestofDeanPioneers.Theseweretheso-called'pals'battalions,andtheyweredesignedtodrawonthepolyarchicstructuresofBritishlife,tappingtheloyaltymenfelttowardslocalandprivatebodiesalongsidetheloyaltytheyfelttowardsthenationasawhole.ButalthoughtheBritisharmycouldclaimtobemadeupof'fellows'andtheir'fellowships',thisplurality-in-unityhadlittlebearingonthenationalcauseitself,andnoneonthewaysinwhichitwaspursued.Thesortofwarthesemenfoundthemselvesfightingmeantthattheyweregivenlittlemorethantheopportunitytosufferanddieforthegreatercommunityalongsidementheyhadknownbefore,andthemostobviousconsequenceofthe'pals'movementwasthatitallowedforsmallpocketsofnationallifetobedecimated,orworse.Itwas,inasense,thankstothe'clubb-ability'oftheEnglish

that1,880menfromthecityofBradford

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werekilledon1June1916,duringthefirsttwentyminutesofthebattleoftheSomme.1

Butaswellasanunspeakablebloodbathmanagedbythestate,the191418conflictwasalso,asonecontemporarytermedit,'aprofessors'war'.2Thereareanumberofwaysinwhichthisphrasecanbeunderstood.First,professorswereencouragedtomaketheirowncontributiontothewareffortbyexplaining,oratleastprovidingaglosson,whatwashappening.3Second,thosewhodealtwithideasfoundthatthewarhadchangedtheworldfromwhichthoseideasweredrawnandtowhichtheyapplied.Therewerefewwritingintheacademicjournalswhosoughttodisputetheclaimofonecontributortoa1917symposiumoftheAristotelianSocietythat'thepresentisoneofthefewscenesoftheturningpointsofhistory,whenunsuspectedforcescomeintoplay,andthechangelesslogicofthehumanbrainworkswithchangedpremises'.4ThisfeelingofbeingpresentatamomentofhistoricalcrisisdoesnotcorrespondtoBarker'sdepictionofthewarasanaspectoftheebbandflowofconceptionsofpoliticalorder.Rather,itwastheuniquenessofthemomentthatwasemphasised,andthesocialpossibilitiesitbroughtinitswakethatwereelucidated.AthirdsenseinwhichtheGreatWarwasaprofessors'warrepresentsaparticularviewofthesortofhistoricalturning-pointthathadbeenreached:formany,thewarwasawarofideas.Atitssimplest,thisviewaccordedanideatoeachofthemajorcombatants,andanticipatedthatthevictorwouldbeabletoimposeontheworldtheideaonwhosebehalfwarwasbeing

1Thebestshortatcountofthesignificanceofthe'pals'movementisgivenbyJohnKeeganinThefaceofbattle(London,1991).Hewrites:'PerhapsnostoryoftheFirstWorldWarisaspoignantasthatofthePals.Itisthestoryofaspontaneousandgenuinelypopularmassmovementwhichhasnocounterpartinthemodern,Englishspeakingworldandperhapscouldhavenoneoutsideitsowntimeandplace:atimeofintense,

almostmysticalpatriotism,andofthemarticulateelitismofanimperialpower'sworkingclass;aplaceofvigorousandbuoyanturbanlife,richindifferencesandinasenseofbelongingtowork-places,tofactories,tounions,tochurches,chapels,charitableorganizations,benefitclubs,BoyScouts,Boys'Brigades,SundaySchools,cricket,football,rugby,skittleclubs,oldboys'societies,cityoffices,municipaldepartments,craftguildstoanyoneofthosehundredsofbodiesfromwhichtheEdwardianBritondrewhissecurityandsenseofidentity'(Keegan,Thefaceofbattle,pp.21718).Whatisinterestingaboutthisdescriptionisthat,giveortakesomeoftheassociationsinvolved,itcorrespondsunerringlytoGierke'sGermanicideal.2SeeC.D.Burns,'Whenpeacebreaksout',InternationalJournalofEthnics,26(191516),91.3ErnestBarker,forexample,wasaregularcommentatorontheprogressofthewar,contributingmanylettersandarticletothenewspapers,mostonpatrioticorsentimentalthemes.Thesewerecollectedin1917,underthetitleMothersandsonsinwartimeandotherpieces(London,1917).4L.P.Jacks,G.BShaw,C.D.BurnsandH.Oakley,'Symposium:ethicalprinciplesofsocialreconstruction',ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,17(191617),293.

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waged.Bosanquetcalledthewarabattleof'conflictingphilosophiesofhistory',5andtherewerecertainlymanyprofessorsoneachsidewhowerepreparedtolineupbehindwhatmightbecalledanationalphilosophicalcause.6However,thewarofideaswasnotseensolelyasanextensionofwhattookplaceonthebattlefield.Therewasafurtherdisputeaboutthesimplefactthatsupposedlyadvancedindustrialnationswereresolvingtheirdifferencesonthebattlefield,andaboutwhetherideasmightbeinpartresponsibleforthis.Nordiditescapetheattentionofmanythatthesenationswere,intheoryatleast,sovereignstates.Asastaunchpatriotandwhole-heartedsupporterofthewareffort,BarkercouldbesatisfiedwithaperspectivewhichseemedtoleavethepoliticaltheoristpowerlesstodoanythingabouttheholdstatesexercisedovertheircitizensafterAugust1914.Butotherscouldnot.Forthem,thewarwasacalamitywhichwasasymptomaswellasacauseofthesupremacyoftheideaofthesovereignstate.TheydidnotbelievethatthesortsofissuesraisedbyBarkerinhisarticlecouldbeputtoonesidewhilethewarcontinued.Rather,theyfeltthatthecontinuationofwarthrewtheseissuesintosharperrelief.

Someofthe'professors'whobecameprominentwartimecriticsoftheideaofthesovereignstatelikeC.DelisleBurnsandA.D.Lindsayarenowmoreorlessforgotten.OtherslikeBertrandRussellandL.T.Hobhouse7arenot.Butforthepurposesofthisbookthemostsignificantchampionofpolyarchic,orfederalistic,

5B.Bosangquet,''ThefunctionoftheStateinpromotingtheunityofmaking',ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,17(191516),43.6See,forexample,Barkeretal.,Whywearewar,GreatBritain'scause(Oxford,1914),apropagandapamphletproducedbyagroupofOxfordhistoriansandcontainingachapteron'theGermantheoryoftheState'.7Russell'sTheprinciplesofsocialreconstruction(London,1916),drewheavilyonpolyarchicconceptionsofgrouplife,andsetgreatstorebywhat

couldbeachievedbygivingmoreautonomytoprofessions,tradesandotherbodies,andlesstothestateitself.Meanwhile,Hobhouse'sThemetaphysicaltheoryoftheState:acriticism(London,1918),containsperhapsthemostcelebratedofallattackson'theHegeliantheoryoftheGod-State'(bywhichhemeanttoincludeEnglishchampionslikeBosanquet).Itspreface,writtenduringanair-raidinthesummerof1918,drawsadirectconnectionbetweenthedestructionbeingwroughtandabookofHegel'sHobhousehappenedtobereadingatthetime.However,neitherRussellnorHobhousehadmuchtimeforquestionsofgrouppersonality.Indeed,HobhousewentmuchfurtherthanBarkerinexpressinghisreservationsaboutattemptstoattributetogroupsofindividualsapersonalityoftheirown,arguing:'Havingreachedtheconceptionofasuper-personalentity,weareinclinedtolookforthisentity,notinthevariedformsofassociatedlifewhichintersectandcutacrossoneanother,butinsomeparticularformofassociationwhichincludestherest'(Hobhouse,ThemetaphysicaltheoryoftheState,pp.2930).Thiswastobeoneofthemostfrequentlyvoiceargumentsagainsttheideaofrealgrouppersonality,anditwasonetheBarkeralsocameintimetoshare(seebelow,pp.21718).

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politicaltheoryduringthisperiodwastheyoungguildsocialist,G.D.H.Cole.Cole'sguildsocialismbothpre-datedandoutlastedthewar,albeitinneithercasebymuch.HisfirstbookwasTheworldoflabour,firstpublishedin1913,andinitweresetoutmostofthethemesthatweretoengagehimuntiltheendofthedecade.Colewas,fromtheoutset,asocialist,andassuchhereadilyacceptedtheMarxistviewofthetruevalueoflabour,avaluewhichcapitalism,committedtotreatinglabourasacommodity,wasunabletorecognise.WhatColecouldnotaccept,however,wasthattheremedyforthissituationwasnecessarilycollectivist,northatitledinevitablythroughthestate.Rather,hebelievedthatthesolutionlayinworkers'control,withseparategroupsofworkersexercisingpersonalcontroloverwhattheyproducedbytheirownlabour,andwiththestate,inconsequence,reducedtoapurelyregulatoryrole.Thesewerethethemesofguildsocialism,andtheadventofwardidnothingtodissuadeColeoftheirrelevance.AsMargaretColewritesinherhusband'sbiography,itwas,inthesloganofthetime,'Businessasusual'fortheguildsocialists,andthewar,'exceptinsofarasitconcernedtheindividualpersonally,wasanirrelevance,howeverenormous,totheirmainobjective,thereal"war"theywerepursuing'.8Indeed,thewarserved,ifanything,toaccentuateCole'speacetimeconcerns.Astheconflictprogressed,theBritishstatebecame,toCole'seyesatleast,anevermoreinefficient,evermoreexploitative,andevermoreaggrandisingorganisation,whichisjustwhatwassupposedtohappentoacapitaliststateinextremis.Inthe1917prefacetoasecondeditionofTheworldoflabour,Colewrotethat'questionswhichin1914seemedtohavebeenshelvedtillafterthewarhavebeenwithusmorethanever'.9Andhewenton,paceBarker,todeclare:'Weare,Ithink,entitledtoarguefromtheStateatwartotheStateatpeace.'10

Butalthoughthequestionsremainedthesame,thewaysinwhichColechosetoaddressthemdidnot.Inhisearliestwork,theanalysis

providedisessentiallyeconomic.Hedoes,itistrue,touchontheissueofcorporatepersonalityinTheworldoflabour,whereheannounces,approvingly,that'everywherewearefacedbytheuprisingofthegroup...everywherewearewitnessingthecreationofnewindividualitieswithinthestate'.11Butthisconceptofgroup

8M.I.Cole,ThelifeG.D.H.Cole(London,1971),p.71.9G.D.H.Cole,Theworldoflabour,fourthedn(London,1919),p.xxv.10Ibid.,pp.xxvixxvii.11Ibid.,p.19.

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individualityisnotonehechosetoexplorehimself,andhisanalysisoftheeconomicsofworker-controlledindustriesisdiffusedmorebyalatentromanticismthanitisbyanywiderphilosophicconcerns.Thewar,however,washardoilromance,andthemoregrosslywasmanifestedtheholdthattheideaofthesovereignstateexercisedoverthelivesofworkingmen,themoreColeturnedhisattentiontothequestionofthestate'sessentialnature,andtheessentialnatureofthoseotherassociationswhichmenmightchoosetoform.HegavehisviewsonthesesubjectsinpapersdeliveredbeforetheAristotelianSocietyin1915and1916,andintheintroductorychaptershewroteforhisbook-lengthpublicationsof1918and1920,Self-governmentinindustry,andGuildsocialismre-stated.Buttheyfoundfullestexpressioninthemostabstractofallhisworks,Socialtheory,whichalsoappearedtwoyearsafterthewarwasover.Therehedevotedhimselfexclusivelytowhathehadpreviouslycalledtheattemptto'createapoliticaltheorytofittheguildidea'.12Whatthistheorywasexactlywillbediscussedbelow.ButwhatColethoughtitwasisclear.ItrepresentedafurtheranceofwhathadbeeninspiredbyGierke,begunbyMaitland,takenonbyFiggis,andprecipitatelyabandonedbyBarker.13Itwasanattempttoconstructasustainablepoliticaltheorybasedaroundtheideaofthelifeofthegroup.

II

Inordertounderstandthisattempt,andtoseewhetheritwassuccessful,Cole'sworkisbestdividedbetweenhisexpositionofwhatwasanessentiallynegative,andwhatwasanessentiallypositive,thesis.Thenegativethesisrepresentshiscaseagainstthestateasithadbeenportrayedbyotherpoliticalphilosophers.ItwasmadeinthearticlesColewrotefortheAristotelianSociety,thefirstofwhich,entitled'Conflictingsocialobligations',drewaresponsefromoneofitstargets,BernardBosanquet.Thepositivethesiselaboratestheview

ofthestatethat'fits'theguildsocialistidea,andistobefoundinthebooksColewrotetowardstheendofthedecade.Thesetheses,andthetextsinwhichtheymaybefound,arenotself-contained;nonetheless,beforeseeinghowtheyoverlapitwillbeusefultotreatthemseparately.ThephilosophicalviewthatColesoughttooppose

12Cole,Self-governmentinindustry(London,1918),p.15.13ColegivesexpressiontohisdebttothefirstthreeofthesewritersintheintroductiontoSocialtheory(seeCole,Socialtheory(London,1920),pp.1011).

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wastheclaimthatthestateisanendinitself,andthereforecategoricallydistinctfromallotherformsofassociation.Todenythiswasnot,forCole,todenythatthestateisnecessary,butmerelytodenythatitisabsolute.Likemostofthe'newfederalists',Colewasnotasyndicalist,andheneverattemptedtoescapefromtheideaofthestatealtogether.14Whatheobjectedtowasthearbitrarinessoftheviewthatmadethestateanideadifferentfromallothers.Why,hewantedtoknow,shouldthestatebegrantedanultimacywhichisdeniedbothtotheentitieswhichmakeupthestate,andalsotothewiderworldofwhichstatesthemselvesformonlyapart?Ifsomethinggreaterthantheindividualissoughtinordertomakesenseofindividuality,whyshouldthatsomethinggreaterbethestateratherthanthegreatvarietyofotherorganisationstowhichtheindividualbelongs?15Moreover,Coletakesthisobjectiontoholdevengiventhepresenceofacommonwillwithinastate,andgrantingitsabilitytoactasacollectiveunit.Inotherwords,evenastateactingwiththeuniformityofpurposeexhibitedbythenationalcommunitiesofEuropeinwartime'doesnotexhausteithertheindividualityortheorganisableindividualityofitscitizens'.16

Coleusesthisargumenttopressthecasefortherecognitionofthe'manynon-governmentalformsofinternationalrelationsinart,religion,scienceand...economics'17justthoserelationswhichhadbeensweptasideinAugust1914.However,perhapsforthisreason,hisprimaryinterestisnotthegreaterperspectiveofworldwidecommunity,butthelesserperspectiveoftheindividual,whomayfindthatthedemandsmadeonhimbythestateconflictwiththedemandsmadebyotherassociationstowhichhebelongs.Internationalisttheoryseekstocontainthestatewithinanetworkofinterestswhichtranscendnationalboundaries;inthisway,theinterestsofthestateareshowntobepartial.Colealsosawthestateasapartialinstitution,butlessbecauseofthegreaterinstitutionsbywhichitcouldbecontained,

thanbecauseofthelesserinstitutions

14ThoughheneverwentquiteasfarasguildsocialistcolleagueS.G.Hobson,whoexhortedhisreaders'not[to]forgetthatguildsmenarenotsyndicalists;thattheybelieveintheStateasagreatspiritualandintellectualforce'(S.G.Hobson,Guildprinciplesinwarandpeace(London,1917),p.137).Colesympathisedwithmanysyndicalistaims,andinanappendixtooneofhisbooksheattemptedtoexplainthedifferencebetweenEnglishguildsocialismandFrenchsyndicalismassimplytheresultofthedifferentpoliticalandeconomicconditionsprevailinginthetwocountries(seeCole,Self-governmentinindustry,pp.30321).15SeeBurnsetal.,'Symposium:thenatureoftheStateinviewofitsexternalrelations',ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,16(191516),315.16Ibid.17Ibid.,324.

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whichmightalsocontaintheindividualcitizen.Hesawthestateasoneorganisationamongmany,andheaskswhetherthestatehasanygroundsforclaimingthattheindividualispre-eminentlyobligedtoit.Hisanswer,unsurprisingly,isthatitdoesnot.Thereasonsforthisaretwo-fold.First,thestatedoesnotobligetheindividualinamanneranydifferentfromthatofotherassociations,forthesealsosetruleswhichtheyexpecttobeobeyed,suchthatColesuggestsatonepointthat'thelawsofotherfunctionalassociationshavethesamebindingcharacterandsocialstatusasthoseoftheState'.18Second,thestatecannotexpresseveryaspectoftheindividual,withtheresultthatindividualswillalwaysformthemselvesintootherkindsofassociation;andColeisledtoask:'IsnottheveryexistenceofparticularassociationsasufficientproofthattheStatecannotfullyexpresstheassociativewillofman?'19

TheseargumentsofCole'sclearlyechothoseofFiggis.LikeFiggis,Colebelievedthattheattempttoprovideanultimateprincipleofstatesovereigntywasmisguided,thatman'ssocialnaturewasrepresentedbymorethanonetypeofassociationandthattheseotherassociationsshouldnotbeseenasnecessarilysubordinatetothestate.Further,Coleargued,likeFiggis,thatitispossibletoconceiveofnon-stategroupspursuingtheirinterestsinawaywhichdoesnotnecessarilybringthemintoconflictwithotherassociations,norwiththestate.InCole'seyes,themainculpritinfosteringprejudiceagainstassociationallifewasnotHobbes,butRousseau,whomhesawasputtingforwardtheviewthatallnon-statebodies,includingchurchesandguilds,'inevitablybecomepoliticalindefenceof[their]vestedinterests',andunlesscontrolledbecomeinvolvedin'conspiraciesagainstthepublic'.20AgainstRousseau,Colemaintainedthatgroupactivitieswerenotbydefinitionconspiratorial.Inthisrespect,ColedoesnotdifferfromFiggisinhisresponsetothesuggestionthatanobligationtoabodyotherthanthestatewillleadtodisorder.Both

pointoutthataflourishingassociationallifewithinapoliticalcommunityiscompatiblewithanorderedpoliticalcommunity,aresponsetobedistinguishedfromonewhichacceptsthatfreedomforassociationsfromstatecontrolmaymilitateagainstorder,butregardsdisorderasapriceworthpayingforsuchfreedom.Cole,likeFiggis,doesnotdetailthe

18Cole,Socialtheory,p.126.19Cole,'Conflictingsocialobligations',ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,15(191415),150.20Ibid.,1434.

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groundsonwhichanindividualmightbejustifiedindisobeyingthestatebecauseofanotherobligationandregardlessoftheconsequences.Instead,heconcentratesontheconditionswhichdeterminethatanon-stateassociationneednotattempttousurpthestate'sroleinthepursuitofitsowninterests.Theseconditions,however,aredifferentfromthosegivenbyFiggis,whoseaccountofassociationallifewasessentiallysectarian,andwhosemodelwasreligiousratherthaneconomic.Cole,thoughhecouplestradeunionswithchurchesinthecontextofhisgeneralargument,21hasashisbasicmodeltheguild,ortradeunion,whichisbydefinitionaneconomicassociation.Becauseeconomic,itsconcernscannotbedivorcedfromtheconcernsofthosewhoarenotitsmembers.Further,ifitsconcernsaretobereconcilablewiththeconcernsofthosewhoarenotitsmembers,thenthevariouseconomicconcernsofapoliticalcommunitymustbedeemednotmerelyinterdependent,butcomplementary.Coleachievesthisformofinterdependencebymeansoftheideaoffunction.

ItistheideaoffunctionthatsetsColeapartfromwriterslikeMaitlandandFiggis,whohadnousefortheterm.ItisalsothekeythatlinksCole'snegativethesistohispositivethesis.Indeed,thebasisofhispositivethesisisacritiqueofthenotionoftherealpersonalityofassociationsbymeansoftheideaoffunction.Colewaswaryofascribingtoassociationsastatustheydidnot,intheirparticularity,merit.Hedidnotwishtopromotetheviewthatthestatewaspartialincomparisontootherassociations,andwrote:'Itismywholepoint,notthatassociativeactsarewhollysocial,butthatStateactsarenot.'22Moreover,thispartialitysetallassociationsapartfromtheindividual.Inthelastmajorworkofhisguildsocialistperiod,Colemakesitclearthathedoesnotregardassociationsasrealpersons.InthissenseheisclosertoBarkerthanheistoFiggis,forhehasdecidedthatagroupofindividualsistobedefinedaccordingtoits'purpose',andheargues:

'Thereisnosuchthing,strictlyspeaking,asthe"will"ofanassociation,onlytheco-operatingwillsofitsmembers.'23Hecontinues:'Anassociationisnot,andcannotbe,inanyrealsense,a"person",becauseitisspecificandfunctional,notuniversal.'24WherehegoesbeyondBarkerisjustinthenotionoffunction,whichmeansmorethanspecificityofpurpose.Somethingmaybecalledfunctionalinrelation

21Seeibid.,158.22Ibid.,154.Hecallsthis'theparticularisationoftheState'(ibid.).23Cole,Socialtheory,p.22.24Ibid.,p.50.

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tootherentitiesifitspurposeisadaptedtotheirs.Inotherwords,associationsforColedonotmerelyhaveapurpose,astheymightforBarker;theyserveapurposeaswell.Theimportanceofthisdistinctioncannotbeoverstated.Ifthepurposesofanassociationhaveafunctionalrelationtothepurposesofotherassociations,thentheirpurposescannotconflict,anymorethanthepurposeoftheaxlecanconflictwiththepurposeofthewheel.Threequestionsareimmediatelysuggestedbythisreflection.First,whatisthefunctionofthestate?Second,whatdeterminesthefunctionofthestate,orofanyotherassociation?Andthird,canapoliticaltheoryfoundedastheideaoffunctionbeasatisfactoryone?

III

Cole'sanswertothefirstofthesequestionscomesintwoparts.Writinginthebroadestpossibleterms,hedeclaresthatthestate'sfunction'shouldbetheexpressionofthosecommonpurposeswhichaffectallthecitizens,roughlyspeaking,equallyandinthesameway'.25Subsequently,however,hespecifiesthatthesepurposesare'appetitive',26bywhichhemeansrelatedtotheconsumptionratherthantheproductionofgoodsneededbyall.Onthisaccount,themodernstatewastobecondemnedforexceedingthisfunctiondramatically.Ithadcometoconcernitselfwith'politicalandco-ordinatingratherthaneconomicactivities',27activitiesforwhichitspartialitymadeitmanifestlyunsuited.AsColeputsit:'Justasnomanoughttobethejudgeofhisowncase,sooughtnoassociation.Therefore,co-ordinationcannotbelongtothefunctionoftheState.'28Instead,thestateisoneofmanyfunctionalassociationswhichmustbeco-ordinatedbyagreaterbody.Thisbodywillbe'acombinationofassociations,afederalbodyinwhichsomeorallofthevariousfunctionalassociationsarelinkedtogether';29andofthisbodyColedeclaresthat'thejudiciaryandthewholeparaphernaliaoflawandthe

policemustbeunder[its]control'.30Coledoesnotdetailexactlyhowthisfederalbodywouldoperate,norwhatsortsofdecisionsitmightbeexpectedtomake.Hispurposeissimplyto

25Cole,'Conflictingsocialobligations',152.Twoyearslater,hewrote:'[TheState]exist[s]fortheexecutionofthatveryimportantclassofcollectiveactionswhichaffectallmembersofthecommunityinwhichtheyliveequallyandinthesameway'(Cole,Self-governmentinindustry,p.82).26SeeCole,Socialtheory,p.66.27Ibid.,p.86.28Ibid.,p.101.29Ibid.,p.134.30Ibid.,p.137.

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establishthatthetaskofreconcilingdifferencesbetweengroupscannotfalltoanyofthegroupsinvolved.

Cole'sdescriptionofthestateasfunctionallyappetitiveismeanttoformapartofhissocialandpoliticalphilosophy.ItisnotsimplyanaspectoftheguildsocialistcaseagainsttheeconomicandpoliticalinstitutionsofBritishlife;rather,itoccursinaworkhedescribesas'primarilyphilosophical'.31Whatmatters,therefore,islessthatthestatehasapurposewhichiseconomicthanthatitis,simply,'purposive'itiswhatOakeshottwouldterman'enterprise'association.ItisforthisreasonthatColecannotallowthestatetoplaythesortofrolethatFiggis,amongothers,wouldseemtodemandofittheroleofwhatOakeshottwouldterma'civil'association.Cole'sstatecannotmerelyestablishtherulesbywhichpurposiveassociationsguidetheirrelationswithoneanother,sinceitisonesuchassociationitself.Asaresult,Cole'sstatecannotconceivethetaskof'co-ordination'intermsofwhatFiggiswouldcallthesettingupof'boundsofjustice',butmustinsteadregardco-ordinationasamatterofconformingthepurposesofotherassociationstoitsown.Coledidnotfallintothetrapofbelievingthestatetobethesameasotherassociations(acommunitascommunitatum)yetatthesametimedifferent(asocietasuniversitatum).ButifCole'sstatecannotbeunderstoodasasocietas,norcanitbeunderstoodasanalogoustoauniversitasinOakeshott'sfullestsense.ThisisbecauseColerecognisedthatthepurposeswhicharecommontoallcitizensdonotcarrythesameweightwithallcitizens,andarethereforeoflessthanuniversalsignificance.Becauseindividualswillcommonlybelongtomorethanoneassociation,itcannotbeassumedthattheassociationtowhichtheyallbelongistheonethateachvaluesmosthighly.Itis,forexample,ineveryone'sinterestthatgoodsshouldbefreelyavailableforconsumption;butthisisofgreaterinteresttothoseforwhomconsumptionistheprimarybusinessoflife(thosewholiveofftheir

capital)thanitistothosewhoselivesareboundupwiththebusinessofproduction(thosewholiveofftheirlabour).Theselatterwillinevitablyfeelthatthepursuitofinterestscommontoallmusttakesecondplacebehindthepursuitofinterestsparticulartothem,forwithoutproperrewardfortheirparticularservicestheycannotmakeuseofgenerallyavailablegoods.Thestatethatservesthecommoninterestdoesnotservetheinterestsofall.Thisis,ofcourse,an

31Seeibid.,p.21.

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essentiallyeconomicargument.ButforColeithadaclearphilosophicalsignificance.

Itis,however,anargumentthatcontainsoneobviousflaw.ForalthoughColewishestodenytothestateitstraditionaltoolsofco-ordination'(itistohavecontrolofneitherthelawnorthepolice),hedoesnotwishtodispensewiththesetoolsaltogether.Yetifallassociationsarepurposive,andthereforeunfitforthetaskofco-ordination,towhomarethesetoolstobelong?Andifnottoanassociationofhumanbeings,thentowhat?Aswehaveseen,Colesuggeststhattheywillbelongtoa'federalbody'.Buthecannotexplainhowsuchabodyistobemadeup.Indeed,itistheimplicationoftherestofhisargumentthatno'body'canbeentrustedwithaco-ordinatingrole,sinceallbodies,includingthestate,arepartialbydefinition.ItcouldbesaidthatthesedifficultiesfollowfromCole'sconcertedattempttocombineovertguildsocialistpoliticswithanabstractedoverviewofpoliticallife.Butinfacttheyarelatentinhisabstractarguments,irrespectiveoftheirguildsocialistapplication.In'Conflictingsocialobligations',Coledefineshistermsasfollows:'theState'meansgovernment;'society'meansallorganisations,governmentandnon-government;and'community'meansallsociallife,whetherorganisedornot.32Thepurposeofthesedistinctionsistoestablishthatthestateisonlygovernmentthatis,onlyagovernment,thebodyofmenwhoholdthereinsofpoweratagiventimeandisnotthereforethedeterminantofthewholelifeofasociety,nevermindofacommunity.Indeed,Coledistinguishesthe'social'fromthe'political'intheseterms,regardingthelatterasrelatedtomeregovernmentalactivity,andoflessersignificanceinconsequence.Forinstance,heexpandsonafamiliarlydialecticalviewofthehistoryofideas'modernsocialtheory...isthroughoutbothareflectionofexistingpoliticalconditionsandanattempttojustifyvariousopinions'33toincorporateacleardistinctionbetweensocial

andpoliticalthought,arguing:'Thecurrentpoliticalcontroversiesturnedsocialphilosophyintopoliticalphilosophy:thinkingalwaysoftheState,philosopherssoughtnottheprincipleofsocialobligation,buttheprincipleofpoliticalobligation.'34Thepolitical,therefore,relatestothestate,whichmeansgovernment,whichmeansapartialbodyofmen.Asaresult,anddespiteCole'ssuggestionstothecontrary,thebusinessofco-

32SeeCole,'Conflictingsocialobligations',1445.33Ibid.,148.34Ibid.

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ordinationcannotbeleftinthehandsofanypoliticalbody,howeveritmightbeconstituted,sinceitisCole'sconvictionthatallsuchbodies,indeedallbodiesofmen,arepartialbydefinition.

IV

Ifthelifeofacommunityisnottobeco-ordinatedbyanyparticularbodyorinstitution,whatthenislefttoco-ordinateit?Theanswer,unsurprisingly,isthatwhatisleftiswhatColecalls'society',thesumtotalofallinstitutionsandorganisations,takenasawhole.Yetthisanswertooposesaproblem,foritishardtoreconcilewiththenegativesideofCole'sthesis,hiscaseagainstconventionaltheoriesofthestate.Thatcasewasdirected,aboveall,againstidealism,whichColedescribesas'thisintrospectivephilosophy'andofwhichhewritesthat'justasitvitiatesthestudyofindividualconsciousness,itisfataltopoliticaltheory,becauseitshutsuptheStateinthecircleofitsownideas'.35ColebelievedthatHegelianslikeBosanquethadglorifiedthestateattheexpenseofotherformsofassociation.Whatismore,hebelievedthatsuchglorification,aspractisedinGermany,hadledmoreorlessdirectlytothewarthatwasconsumingEurope.ThisidentificationofthetheoryofthemetaphysicalstatewiththetheoryoftheGermanstateColedescribingtheformeras'Prussophilphilosophy'36wasfairlycrude,evenbythestandardsoftheday.ButitalsoobscuredwhatwereinfactfargreatersimilaritiesbetweenBosanquet'sthoughtandthatofColehimself.37Cole'sfunctionalismwasdesignedtodispensewithsovereigninstitutions,andreplacethemwiththesovereigntyofassociationallifeingeneral.Asaresult,ithastorestonaholisticconceptionofsocialexistence,

35Burnsetal.,'ThenatureoftheState',311.36Ibid.,313.37WhichisnottosaythatColeandBosanquetdidnothaveverydifferentopinionsaboutthewarandhowtofightit.Cole,inthewordsofhiswife

Margaret,was'ofcourseaconscientiousobjector',thoughnever'a"pure"pacifist':hebelievedthatthereweresomethingsworthfightingfor,butthatanydecisionaboutwhetherandwhentofighthadtobeamatterofindividualnotcollectivejudgment,inparticular,hedetestedtheideaoffightingundertheauspicesofthestate,intheguiseofoneofitssoldiers('hisstronganti-authoritarianism...causedhimtodetestmilitarism,uniforms,rank,chainsofcommand')(seeM.I.Cole,ThelifeofG.D.H.Cole,p.72).Bosanquet,meanwhile,believedthatdecisionsofsuchimportancecouldonlybeamatterofcollectivenotindividualjudgment,andhadthereforetobemadeundertheauspicesofthestate.Inalectureentitled'PatriotismintheperfectState',hedescribesthestateas'thearkinwhichthewholetreasureoftheindividual'sheadandheartispreservedinaworldwhichmaybedisorderlyandhostile'(Bosanquet,'PatriotismintheperfectState',TheInternationalCrisis,1(1915),134).Hegoeson:'Lookedatthisway,ourcountry,theState,isallwehave'(ibid.).

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bywhichtheactionsofanyinstitutionorbodycanbeunderstoodasfunctionalaspectsofthegreaterwhole.Andthis,asBosanquetpointedoutinthereplyhewrotetoColein1915,wasjustwhattheHegelianconceptionofthestatewasdesignedtoconveyalso.InthisreplyBosanquetcharacterisestheHegelianstateas'constitutional',anditsconstitutionhedescribesasfollows:

Awholeofpartandorgans,allfunctional(asHegelofcourseperpetuallyinsisted)andallbearingononeanotherinveryvariousrelationsanddegreesofintimacy.It[theconstitution]lies...inhabits,conditions,recognitions.Noplebiscitecanexpressit;butitisthenearestthingtoanexpressionofthecommunity'swill.38

Bosanquetreinforcestheconnectionbetweenthefactoffunction,andthefactthatfunctionsareaspectsofagreaterunity,whichhecallstheconstitution,whichHegelcalledSittlichkeiten,andofwhichCole,thoughhedoesnotidentifyit,alsohasneed.

WhereBosanquetdiffersfromColeisinhisassertionthatthisconstitutionisrevealedintheconventionalformofthestate:'ItactsastheState,insofarasitsolvesconflictsbyauthority,thoughinacivilisedsocietythisisneverbybareauthority,butalwaysbyreasonspeakingwithauthority.'39Hegoeson:'Thecollectiveforceofthewhole,whenevokedbyemergency,eitherinternalorexternal,willcontinuetobeverygreatandcapableofdrasticoperation.'40Insuchstatementsasthese,anobviousgroundofdifferencebetweenBosanquetandColeemergesregardingtheirrespectivewillingnesstoallowthestatetoactforthewholecommunitywhenrequired.Whatisnotclear,however,iswhetherthisdifferenceissatisfactorilytobedescribedasonebetweendifferentpoliticalphilosophies.Bosanquet'sargumentinreplytoColeisthatthestate,thoughitisamanifestationofthewholeofsociety,andthusanaspectoftheconstitution,isnonethelessdistinctfromtherestofsociety,foritistheformtheconstitutiontakeswhenactionisnecessarywhenthereisconflict,in

anemergency.Inotherwords,thestate,forBosanquet,functionspolitically:itisthegeneralwillmademanifest,andmadecapableofimposingorderwhenrequired.Coledoesnotdisputethatcommunitiesshouldbeguidedbythegeneralwilloftheirmembers.Whathedisputesisthatthestatealwaysexpressesthiswill.Inonesense,thisisaconsequenceofColemeaningsomethingdifferentfromBosanquetby'thestate',suchthattheirviewsareinevitably

38Bosanquet,'AnoteonMr.Cole'spaper',ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,15(191415),162.39Ibid.40Ibid.,163.

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incommensurable.ButitisalsothecasethatColeisunhappywiththeideaofthegeneralwillfunctioningpoliticallyinanyform.Hesaysofitthatitisnot'amechanism'andgoesontoarguethat'thegeneralwillofthecommunitymustsuffersomeleakageassoonastheattemptismadetoconfineit',41Ifthegeneralwillcanneverbeconfinedtosomeinstitutionalform,thenithasnobearingonpoliticsatall,norontheissuesofpoliticalphilosophy.Indeed,Cole'scasemakesmostsensenotasargumentwithinpoliticalphilosophy,butoneoutside,oragainst,it.Thetraditionalquestionsofpoliticalphilosophythoseconcernedwithauthority,justice,punishmentandsoonpresupposeconflictsofinterest,andtheirsolutiontheinstitutionalresolutionofconflicts;Cole'sfunctionalismpresupposestheabsenceofsuchconflictsaltogether.InCole'sfunctionalsociety,differentgroupswouldhavelessneedofasovereignpoliticalinstitutionbecause,heannounces,'adivisionof[functional]sphereswouldobviatemanyoftheconflictsoftoday'.42Similarly,hedeclaresthataconsequenceofaproperlyestablishedfunctionaldemocracywouldbe'asubstantialandimmediatereductionintheuseofcoercion'.43Itcannotbethecase,however,thatsuchharmonyissimplyproducedbyadivisionoffunctionalspheres;itisintheverynatureoffunctionalismthatitcanonlyoperategivensuchharmony.Coledoesnottelluswhatgeneratesthisharmony.Allhedoesispresumeonit,inordertomakeacaseagainsttheexerciseofpoliticalauthorityinanyofitsconventionalforms.

Infact,Coleconcedesthatthe'possibilityofconflictcanneverbeavoidedaltogether'.44Whathewillnotacceptisthatitishistaskinexploringthenatureofsocialexistencetoconsiderwheretheseconflictswilloccur,andhowtheymightberesolved.Hewrites:'Ifamachinerepresentingthewillofsocietycanbedevisedtoharmonisetheoccasionalconflictsbetweenthevariousfunctionalauthorities,thatisnodoubtalltothegood.Butthedevisingofsuchmachineryis

notphilosophy,butscience.'45Andhegoeson:'Itremains...thephilosopher'stasktosaywheresovereigntyshouldlie,andthebusinessofthepracticalmantofindtherequisitemachinery.'46ThisunwillingnesstobecomeinvolvedinthemechanicsofsovereigntyisperhapstheclearestevidenceofGierke'sinfluenceonCole.Butalthoughdisdainfulofmechanisticconceptionsofgrouplife,Cole

41Cole,'Conflictingsocialobligations',156.42Ibid.,155.43Cole,Socialtheory,p.139.44Cole,'Conflictingsocialobligations',155.45Ibid.,155.46Ibid.,159.

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wouldnotembraceanyoftheorganicistalternativeseither.ForwhilebeinginfluencedbyGermanicpoliticalphilosophy,hewasalsodeeplydistrustfulofit,andregretfulofitsinfluenceonEuropeanpolitics.Hecouldnotacceptthatthesociallifeofacommunitycouldbegivenunifiedpoliticalexpression,whetherorganicorotherwise.Instead,hesoughttodispensewithpoliticsaltogether.Asaresult,Cole'spoliticalphilosophyisinfactsimplyethicalitaddressesitselftothequestiononlyofhowpeopleshouldbehave,regardlessofhowtheyaretobegoverned.Cole,quitesimply,wishedthatpeoplewouldbehavefunctionally.Beyondthis,hisconceptionofpoliticalphilosophylefthimnothingelsetosay.

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Chapter9LaskiandPoliticalPluralism

I

G.D.H.Cole'sfunctionalismmarksthefinalstageinthedevelopmentofGierke'sideasinanEnglishsetting.Indeed,bythetimeColehadfinishedtherewasnotmuchofGierkeleftgonewasthenotionofrealgrouppersonality,alongwiththeorganicism,theHegelianism,thehistoricalsweepandtheintellectualrigour,alltobereplacedbyverylittle.Nevertheless,ColedoesnotmarktheendofGierke'sinfluenceonEnglishpoliticalthoughtingeneral.Forwhileguildsocialists,andothers,weretryingtocometotermswiththenewlydistendedconditionoftheBritishstateinwartime,oneofCole'scontemporaries,andfellowfunctionalists,HaroldLaski,wasattemptingtopursueanacademiccareerinNorthAmerica.LaskileftOxfordin1914,andhavingbeenrejectedfromthearmyonmedicalgrounds,movedfirsttoMontreal,thentoHarvard,whereheremaineduntil1920.ItwasduringthisperiodthatLaskidevelopedthetheorywhichhecalledpoliticalpluralism,andhedidsoagainstanintellectualbackdropwhichdifferedintwoimportantrespectsfromitsEnglishequivalent.First,theAmericanexperienceoftheGreatWar,thoughpoliticallycharged,didnotraisetosuchanacutedegreethethemesofnationalidentityandnationalsurvivalwhichhadpolarisedpoliticalthoughtinEngland.Second,theUnitedStateswerecombinedinadurableandeffectivefederalstructure,suchthattheexpressionofafederalisticfeelingwaslesslikelytorepresentadistinctivetheoreticalstandpointthere.Indeed,AmericanlifeseemedalreadytoincorporatemuchofwhatwassoughtbyopponentsofstatesovereigntyinEnglandflourishingassociations(manyofthemprotectedbyaremarkablyliberallawoftrusts),stronglocalpolitical

structures,acleardemarcationofgovernmentalpowers.Inconsequence,theAmericansettingpro-

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videdatonceabroaderandanarrowercontextforLaski'sworkthanthatavailabletohiscontemporariesinEngland:broader,becausehisgeographicaldistancefromthesovereignstatesofEuropefreedhimfromthepotentialsubmersionofhisworkinargumentsaboutimmediatehistory;narrower,becausethesuccessoffederalisticideasinAmericarequiredsomethingmorethanamerefederalisticfeelingtoconveyacritiqueoftheideaofthestateingeneral.1Laski'spoliticalpluralismseeksabalancebetweenthesefreedomsandtheseconstraints.ItisanadvanceonthewartimeargumentsinEnglandsurroundingpoliticaltheory,notleastinitsterminology,whichconveys,morethan'federalistic','polyarchic'oreven'functionalist',2theimpressionofacoherentphilosophicaldoctrine.Nonetheless,itisalsosomethingofathrowbacktotheconcernsofthosewhowroteabouttheideaofthesovereignstatebeforethewar,forLaski'spluralismencompassesthemeswhichareaseasilyidentifiedwithMaitlandandFiggisastheyarewithBarkerorCole.LaskiinAmericawasatlibertytoreturntotheideasofpre-warEnglishpoliticalthought,andindoingsoattemptedtocreatesomethingnew.

WhatwasmostobviouslynewaboutLaski'sargumentswashisemploymentoftheterm'pluralistic'.Inusingit,notonlydidheprovideanameforwhathadbeenasomewhatheterogeneousbodyofthought,buthealsoalliedthatthoughtwiththeAmericanphilosophicaltraditioninwhich'pluralism'hadaparticularresonance.Itwould,however,beamistaketoassumethatwhatLaskibroughttotheideasofMaitlandorFiggiswassimplyapragmatisticbias.ItiscertainlytruethatLaskiderivedhisterminologyfromWilliamJames,whomhequotesapprovinglyinhisearliestworkonthesubjectofsovereignty.3Hewasnot,though,adiscipleofJames,ashemadeclearduringthecourseofhislengthycorrespondencewithO.W.HolmesJnr.,whereheannounced:'IamnotaJamesian

1KramnickandSheerman,intheirrecentbiographyofLaski,describe

Laski'sfirstmajorwork,Studiesintheproblemofsovereignty,as'apluralisthymntoAmerica'(KramnickandSheerman,HaroldLaski,p.104).Certainly,LaskididdescribeAmericanfederalismas'moreconsonantwiththepoliticalfactsthantheunitarytheoryfavouredbysomanyEuropeanobservers'(Laski,Studiesintheproblemofsovereignty(NewHaven,1917),p.270).Theworkasawhole,though,farfrombeingahymntoAmerica,isanattempttoconstructanaccountofthestateintermsgeneralenough,andradicalenough,tobeapplicabletoboththeAmericanandEuropeanexamples.2Laskididinfactemployallthesetermsatvariouspointsinhiswriting,though'polyarchic'heonlyusesonce(seeLaski,Thefoundationsofsovereignty(NewYork,1921),p.169).3SeeLaski,Studiesintheproblemofsovereignty,pp.8,10.

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byanymeans.'4'Pluralistic'was,forLaski,somethingofatermofconvenience,andthoughmuchwhichhebroughtunderitsumbrellasharedaformalresemblancetothetenetsofpragmatism,theresemblancewasfarstrongertotheworkofhistorianslikeMaitland,whoseconnectionwithWilliamJameswaspracticallynon-existent.Itishardlysurprisingthatamovementinpoliticaltheorywhicharoseoutofhistoricalinquiryandhistoristpreceptsshouldsharesomethingwithaphilosophicalcreedcommittedtotheviewthattruth-claimsarecontingent.Butitdoesnotfollowthatthelinkisacausalone.Laski's'pluralism'isinfactbestcharacterisednotbyitsetymologybutbyitsbroad,andbroadlyEnglish,rangeofsources,whichranaswideasLaski'sinterests,extendingfromchurchhistorytocontemporarylabourdisputes,andfromjurisprudencetoeugenics.5Laski'sworkbefore1920soughttobringtogetherthediversestrandsinrecentEnglishpoliticaltheorywhichhadmarkedtheattempttodotheideaofthesovereignstatesomeorotherformofdiscredit.HisargumentsechoMaitlandonthelawofcorporations,FiggisontheScottishChurch,Barkeronthehistoryofmodernpoliticalthought,Coleonfunctionaldemocracy.LaskiwasnomoreofaHegelianthanwasCole,buthedid,unlikeCole,findhimselfengagedinaformofsynthesis:hebroughttogetherideasandstylespreviouslydispersedamongdifferentauthors;heengagedwiththepoliticsoftheleftaswellaschurchpolitics;heswitchedbetweenhistorical,jurisprudential,philosophicalandpoliticalwriting;andhedidsoinamannerbothpartisanandaloof.6Twoquestionsneedtobeaskedaboutthissyntheticundertaking.First,wasanythingaddedtotheseideasinthemerefactoftheirbeingbroughttogether?

4H.J.LaskiandO.W.HolmesJnr,ThecorrespondenceofMrJusticeHolmesandHaroldJ.Laski,19161935,ed.MarkdeWolfeHowe,2vols.(London,1953),vol.1,p.71.5Laski,whoattheageofseventeenhadbeenGalton's'prodigy'(see

KramnickandSheerman,HaroldLaski,pp.348),didnotaltogethergiveuponhisearlymentor'sbeliefs.In1916hewrotetoHolmes:'Itseemstometobesouselesstobeconfidentwhenagainandagainwearegivenproofthatonlytheinbredqualitiesofmenreallycount,andthatyouspreadthesebyselectingthemforsurvival,andnotbybuildingPolytechnicsorstartingsettlementsintheslums'(Laski,Correspondence,vol.1,p.17).6Laski'sprosestyle,whichinitslaterincarnationwastoprovokeGeorgeOrwell,inhisfamousessayonpoliticallanguage,toaccusehimof'mentalvices'whichrenderedhisworktechnicallyandpoliticallyilliterate(seeOrwell,ThePenguinessaysofGeorgeOrwell(London,1984),pp.35567),wasmarkedduringthisperiodbyitsalmostparodicimitationsoftheconventionsofthetime:atendencytogeneralisationandaphorism,aself-consciousbreezinessalternatingwithaportentousreverenceforlearning;anoff-handerudition;wordiness.Atthesametime,hesawhimself,andwasoftenseenbyothers,assomethingofafirebrand(heeventuallylosthisjobatHarvardafterexpressinghissupportfortheBostonpolicestrikeof1919).Itprovedanuncomfortablecombination.

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Second,wasanythingaddedtotheminthefactoftheirbeingbroughttogetherundertheheading'pluralism'?

II

Laski'sstarting-pointwashistory.Hisfirstpublishedbook,Studiesintheproblemofsovereignty,consistsofaseriesofhistoricalessaysonnineteenth-centurycontroversiesintherelationsofchurchandstate.Inoneofthese,hewrites:

ItisnoanswertoassertthetheoreticalinfallibilityoftheStatetouswhopossesstherecordofhistory.Toacquiesceinitssin,tojudgeofitbycriteriaotherthanthoseofindividualactionistoplaceauthoritybeforetruth...Nodogmacanhopeforimmortalitysinceweliveinanageofreadjustmentandreconstruction.7

History,forLaski,fulfilledtworoles.First,becauseitsrecorddepictsactsratherthantheories,eventsratherthaninstances,theworthofinstitutionslikethestatewasrevealedtobe,attheveryleast,contingent.Itisforthisreasonthathistoryundercutsthepretensionsofthosewhowouldasserttimelessdogma.InaseparateessayinwhichLaskidescribestherecentexperiencesofassociationsbeforetheEnglishcourts(includingtheFreeChurchofScotlandandtheASRS),hewritesofeachcase:'Thesovereigntyoftheoryisreducedbytheeventtoanabstractionthatissimplyludicrous.'8Elsewherehedrawsthefamiliardistinctionbetweenabstractedtheoryand'thefacts',hismaintarget,equallyfamiliarly,beingAustin,whosejurisprudenceisdeemednotonlytolackconsonancewith'thepoliticalfacts',butalsodescribes'asovereigntysoabstract[astobe]practicallywithoututility'.9Theconnectionbetweensuchcharges,andwhatLaskireferstoasthe'sin'ofthestate,liesintheannexationofthemoraljudgmentoftheindividualbytimelespoliticaltheories,whicharethusasauthoritarianasthestatestheyliberatefromtheexigenciesofhistory.Laskiannouncessummarilythat'theAustinian

theoryofsovereignty,congenialenoughinitsabstractpresentation,wouldasafactbreedsimpleservilitywereitcapableofpracticalapplication'.10Anditisasaresultofthisdualflawinabstracttheorisingthefactthatitisbothredundantanddangerousthathistoryhasasecondparttoplay,asthesoleviablemeansofpursuingthequestionswithwhichabstractpoliticaltheory

7Laski,Studiesintheproblemofsovereignty,p.209.8Laski,Thefoundationsofsovereignty,p.166.9Laski,Studiesintheproblemofsovereignty,p.269.10Ibid.,p.273.

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hadbeentraditionallyconcerned.InoneofanumberofarticlesandreviewsonthisthemeintheNewRepublic,Laskideclaresthat'thehistoricmethod,initsfullestsense,seemstheonlyhypothesisofinvestigationjustifiedbythefactsweencounter'.11Laskidoesnottellusexactly.whathemeansby'thehistoricmethod,initsfullestsense',nordoeshetellushowthefactswhichjustifythehistoricmethodarearrivedat.Moreover,thedeclarationinitselfissomewhatambiguous,foritisnotclearwhetherhistoricalinquiryisbeingheldupinalimitingsense,asallmerelythatcanbejustified,orinanexpansivesense,asthatwhichisuniquelyjustifiedasamodeofexplanation.ThisambiguityisnotuniquetoLaski;itechoesthestrainrunningthroughtheworkofMaitland,FiggisandBarkeraswell.Laski,however,morethantheseothers,waswillingtoexplorewhatmightbemeantbythe'fullestsense'ofhistorybyattemptingtoincorporateavarietyofaspectsofthehistoricmethodinhiswork.Hisisanattempttoestablishnotonlythathistoryisjustified,butalsothefullextentofwhatcanbejustifiedbyhistory.

Laski'sessaysonnineteenth-centuryecclesiasticalhistoryconstituteasignificantpartofthisexplorationofthehistoricmethod.Theirpointistoshowthatthestatemaybechallengedbyreligiousassociations,bothinthesensethatthishashappenedandinthesensethatitoughttobeallowedtohappen.TheexamplesLaskiusesaretheDisruptionoftheScottishChurchin1843,theOxfordmovement,andtheprogressiveemancipationofCatholicsinBritain.Inmanyways,thisformofhistoryresemblesFiggis's:Laskiprovideshistoricalinstancesofthetractabilityofconflictsbetweenthestateanddissentinggroups,andalsodiscussestheargumentsofthosewhosoughttheoreticalballastforthepoliticalpositionsthatwereadopted;moreover,Laski'suseoftheexampleoftheScottishChurchproducesobviousparallelswithFiggis'swork.However,bothinthatexampleandintheothers,significantdifferencesemerge,themostobviousofwhichisthat

whileFiggiswasconcernedwithrecentdisputesamongmembersoftheFreeChurch,Laskiwritesaboutitsnineteenth-centuryfoundation.Indeed,Figgis'suseoftheScottishChurchcasewasasanadjunctto,ratherthananaspectof,hishistoricalwriting,whichexploredargumentsinmedievalandearlymodernthoughtincontrasttothedisputesofthemodernera.Figgis'shistorytoldthestoryofasea-changeinpolitical

11Laski,'Whatishistory?',NewRepublic,15(13July1918),324.

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thoughtwhichsetsapartthemodernerafromatimewhenchurchandstateco-existedinatheoreticalframework;Laski,meanwhile,tellsthestoryofthestrugglesofchurchandstatewithintheperiodwhoseadventFiggissoregrets.Laskiisnot,therefore,offeringthepossibilityofareturntoearlier,moresatisfactorypoliticalarrangements;rather,heisattemptingtodrawcomfortfromthedetailsofrecentecclesiasticalexperiencesatthehandsofthestate.

AconsequenceofthisisthatLaskichoosesexampleswhichillustratethecomplexitiesofmodernencountersbetweenchurchandstateafterall,hemustdemonstratethatmodernconceptionsofthestatearenotunequivocallyAustinianifheistodrawsustenanceforthecaseagainstthestatefromwithintherecenthistoryoftheseconceptions.AfurtherconsequenceisthatLaskichoosesexamplesinwhichthebattlelinesbetweenchurchandstatearefairlywelldrawn.Theyareallinstancesofactualorpotentialconflictbetweenareligiousorganisationandthegovernmentoftheday;theystandincontrast,therefore,tothosecasestheScottishChurchcaseof1900-4beingtheparadigmaticexampleinwhichbattlewasjoinedbetweenthemembersofanassociation,andthequestionaddressedwaswhatpartthestateshouldplayinthedispute.TheDisruptionoftheScottishChurchdidinvolveasplitwithinthatchurch,asthenamesuggests.Nonetheless,itresultedfromadisputebetweenagroupwithinthechurch,andthestate,overthestate'sroleintheappointmentofministers.Similarly,thefoundersoftheOxfordmovement,thoughinconflictwiththerestoftheAnglicanChurch,weredirectlyengagedwiththestate,notasanarbitrator,butasthefocusoftheirconcerns,foritwasagainsttheconstraintsofEstablishmentthattheirargumentsweredirected.ThefateofCatholicisminBritainraisessimilarquestions,thoughfromadifferentperspective:whatwasatissuewaswhetherthestateshouldallowitscitizenstobemembersofachurchwhoseleadershipwasnotboundtothestate;whatwasfearedwasthat

allowingasmuchwouldintheendbringCatholicsnotmerelyintoconflictwithmembersofotherreligiousbodies,butintoconflictwiththestateitself.Inevitably,thesethreeexamplesarenotalwayscomparable,andinthecaseoftheOxfordmovementitissometimeshardtoseparateadisputewithinthechurchfromadisputebetweenecclesiasticalandsecularauthority.YetitremainstruethatthesubjectmatterofLaski'shistoryestablishes,moredirectlythanFiggis's,theconnectionbetweenthechallengetothestateasanideaandactsofresistancetothesecular

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power.Laski'sisahistoryofdisobedience,andofthestate'sfearofdisobedience.

ThereisthebasishereforLaskitousethehistoryofthechurchesinthenineteenthcenturytoconstructatheoryofcivildisobedienceatheoryofwhenitislikelytooccur,andwhenitisjustified.However,nosuchtheoryemerges.Laskiprefacesandappendshishistoricalessayswithargumentsaboutthestateitself,andhowitshouldbeconceived,ratherthanconcentratingonthespecificactivitiesandbeliefswhichmightjustifiablybepursuedincontraventionofthestate'sauthority.Beforelookingattheseargumentsmoreclosely,itisworthconsideringthewaysinwhichthealternativeapproachsuggestedbyLaski'shistoricalwritingtowardsatheoryofdisobediencewouldinfactbeshaped,andconstrained,byhissubjectmatter,justasFiggisisshaped,andconstrained,byhis.ThemostimportantconstraintisonewhichFiggiswouldreadilyhaveaccepted:forthisremains,afterall,churchhistory.TheassociationswhichresistthestateinLaski'saccountarewithdrawingfromthestate,andfromtheworldofsecularconcerns,becausetheywishtobefreetopursuetheirownaffairsuntroubledbyoutsideinterference.Ifanything,theexamplesLaskichoosesreinforcemorestronglythananythinginFiggisthedividebetweenaworldlypoliticsandanotherworldlysectarianism;andinthecaseoftheOxfordmovementthereisadirectcontrastwithFiggis'streatmentoftheScottishChurchcase,inwhichhechampionedthosewhowouldallowthechurchtoevolveasapersonmightevolve,againstthosewhowouldtieittoitspast.AsLaskiwritesofNewmanandhiscolleagues:'TheOxfordmovementsetitsfacefirmlytowardsthepast...Theidentityofthechurch,infact,wastobefoundnotinitslifebutitstradition'(myitalics).12Thereisnotmuchroomforissuesofrealpersonalityhere,andnoristheremuchscopefordiscussingthequestionofanassociation'srelationswithotherassociations,forinthisandtheScottishinstance

theverybasisforresistancewasaclaimtocompleteself-sufficiency.InthecaseoftheCatholicrevival,theresultofwhichwastheassimilationofasupposedlyaliengroupintothecitizenry,Laski'saccountmakesclearthatthiswasbothpossibleanddesirablejustbecausereligiousbeliefsdonotnecessarilyhaveanybearingonpoliticalmatters.HequoteswithapprovalSidneySmith,whowrotethat'aslongastheyfoughtandpaidtaxes,and

12Laski,Studiesintheproblemofsovereignty,p.75.

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keptclearoftheQuarterSessionsandAssizes,whatmatterhowmanyfancifulsupremaciesandfrivolousallegiancestheychoosetomanufactureoraccumulateforthemselves'.13Moreover,LaskiqualifieshisargumentsaboutCatholicintegrationwithanasidewhichsets'theIrishdifficultyapart'.14TodismissthequestionofIreland,wheretheproblemsofreligiousconflictweremostpressing,andwhereitwasfarmoredifficulttodrawalinebetweenthereligiousandthesecularwhere,indeed,politicswereandaresectarianistodismissthewholerangeofdifficultiesthatarisewhenitisnolongerpossibletopresupposethatnon-stateorganisationswillonlyconcernthemselveswiththeirownaffairs.

Laski'sinterestinchurchhistoryhasbeendescribedas'concernàclef'.15Itisassumedthathewasreallywritingabouttherightofpoliticalandeconomicorganisationsnotably,tradeunionstoresiststatecontroloftheiraffairs.However,churchhistoryhassufficientdistinctivecharacteristicstomakethisaproblematicbusiness.Further,historyitselfisapeculiarvehicleforsuchanexercise.AsLaskiunderstoodthem,thepointofhistoricaleventsisthattheyaresingle,andhistoryisthemodeofexplanationdesignedtoreflecttheirsingularity.IfLaskihopedtodrawlessonsfortradeunionsfromchurchhistory,thesecouldnotbelessonswhichfitthecontoursofthathistory,fortheeventsdescribedwerenotmerelysingular,butalso,foronewhoseekstoestablishtheabilityoflesserassociationstoresistthestate,notalwayshelpful,thefailureoftheOxfordmovementtosteeracoursebetweentheAnglicanandCatholicChurchesbeingaobviousinstanceofthis.ForLaski'spurposessomethingneedstobeaddedtothestorytomakeitwork.Thissomethingisthepoliticaltheoryoftheeventsrelatedinit.Itisnotapoliticaltheorywhichjustifiesthestorythepoliticaltheoryofsectariancivildisobedience.Rather,Laskiuncoversthetheorywhichhetakestobelatentinthevariousstrugglesbetweenthestateand

otherassociationsthroughhistory,inordertoproducewhatmightbecalledahistoricalpoliticaltheory.

Ofcourse,thisphraseisstillambiguous.Itmaymeanthatpoliticaltheoryshouldbediscoverableinhistory;oritmaymeanthatitshouldaccordwithasenseofhistory.Thesetwointerpretationsmaybecharacterisedashistoricistandhistoristrespectively:theformersuggestinglawsofchangewhichgovernpoliticallife;thelatterthat

13Ibid.,p.127.14Ibid.,p.136.15M.Peretz,'Laskiredivivus',JournalofContemporaryHistory,1(1966),93.

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politicallifeshouldbeunderstoodascontingent.CertainlybothsensesareconsistentwithLaski'sownformulationoftheconnectionbetweenhistoryandtheoryassetoutinaNewRepublicarticleof1919,wherehewrites:'Historicalexperienceseemstodemonstratethevarietyofmeanstakenbymentosatisfytheirbestsocialselves.Ourbusinessistotrytomakethestructuralexpressionsofthoseselvesconformtothevarietytheyrequire.'16MuchofwhatLaskiwrotewhileinAmericamaybesaidtohavebeenafurtheranceofthisbusiness.Moreover,hetriedtofurtheritinbothsensesoutlinedabove.Ontheonehand,Laskisuggestedthathistoryprovidedevidencethatmenhavesoughttocreatepoliticalstructureswhichcanaccommodatevariety.Ontheotherhand,heputforwardaseriesofargumentsforthestructuralarrangementshebelievedbestsuitedthehistoricalevidenceofsocialvariety.Thedifferencebetweenthesetwopositionscanbesummarisedasfollows:onepositsthatpre-eminentamongthesocialselvesthatmenhavesoughtistheselfthatbelievesinvariety;theotherpositsthatthevarietyinmen'ssocialselvesrequiresavariegatedpoliticalcommunity,orwhatLaskiwastorefertoas'apluralisticstate'.ThisdifferenceraisesonesimplequestionregardingLaski's'historical'politicaltheory.Arewetolooktohistorytoprovideevidenceofpluralisticthinking,orarewetolooktohistorytoprovideevidenceforpluralisticthinking?Inotherwords,isthepluralisticstatesomethingmadebyhistory,orsomethingtobemadebecauseofhistory?Butthoughsimpletoask,thiswasaquestionLaskifoundverydifficulttoanswer.

Amongtheanswersheattempted,theonewhichfindsclearestexpressioninhischurchhistoriescomesinhisaccountoftheOxfordmovement,whoseproponentsaredescribedasputtingforward'anunconscioustheoryoftheState'.17Itisunconsciousbecauseitisbroaderthanthespecificclaimswhichconstitutedtractarianism,anditsbreadthispreciselyitspointitisatheoryofthestatewhichis

takentoallownon-stateassociationstherighttopursuetheirclaimsagainstthestate,irrespectiveofthecontentofthoseclaims.Asarguedabove,however,itisfarfromclearthatparticularclaimstoreligiousfreedomdoofferajustificatoryexampletoallwhohaveadisputewiththestate.Elsewhere,Laskiappliesthesameinterpretativepremisetotradeuniondisputeswiththestate,whichheviewsasformsofcompetitionbetweendifferenttheoriesofthestate.Unfortu-

16LaskiandW.Lippman,'AuthorityinthemodernState',NewRepublic,19(1919),150.17Laski,Studiesintheproblemofsovereignty,p.95.

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nately,thesetheorieswerenotspeltoutbytheparticipants,whosegoalswerenarrower.Yetifweaskwhatconceptionofthestateisimpliedbythegoalsoftradeunionsintheirdisputeswiththestategoalswhichareessentiallyeconomicitisnotaconceptionofsocialplurality,butofapliablestate,accommodatingtheneedsoftradeunionists.18Laskiacknowledgesasmuchwhenhesaysofthisnewtheoryofthestatethat'ittakesthetradeunionasthesinglecellfromwhichanentirelynewindustrialorderistobeevolved'.19Inthisregard,thetradeunionexampleisamirrorimageofthechurchdisputes:thechurchesLaskidiscussessoughtanindependenceforthepursuitofendswhichhadnobearingonthosewhowerenottheirmembers;thetradeunion,asaquintessentiallypoliticalorganisation,seeksitsfreedominordertorefashiontheeconomicrelationsofthewholepoliticalcommunity.Both,then,areunlikelychampionsofpoliticalpluralism,forinneithercaseisitclearthattheassociationinquestionregardeditselfassimplyoneamongagroupofassociations,eachpossessinganequalclaimonthestate.

Fortheargumenttowork,Laskihastofallbackonhistoricistassumptions:hehastolocatehistoricaldisputeswithinaframeworkofhistoricalchangewhichservestoelucidateintentionsandmotivesnotapparentintheactionsandstatementsofthehistoricalactorsthemselves.Thechampioningbythemofatolerant,variegated,pluralisticpoliticalsocietycanonlythentrulybedeemed'unconscious'.Intruth,suchassumptionspermeateagreatdealofLaski'swritinginthisperiod.Atsomepoints,herevertstoaclassicallydialectical,almostHegelianinterpretationofprogress.Forexample,hisresponsetothepossibilitythatacommunityofautonomousassociationswouldberivenbyconflictistostatethat'acommunitythatcannotagreeisalreadyacommunitycapableofadvance',20whichistopresupposethatthereisasuperficialitytoconflictwhenviewedinthebroadercontextofhistorical

development.SimilarpresuppositionsunderscoreLaski'streatmentofthequestionof

18AstrongerversionofthispointwasmadebyGrahamWallasinanargumentdirectedagainstguildsocialism.Wallascontraststhenarrownessofatradeunionoutlookwiththemuchbroaderscopeofinterestofthemodernstate,andwrites:'MrCole,itseemstome,preciselytransposestheactualtendenciesofthemodernStateandmodernorganisedvocations.ThegreatadvantageofthepresentStateisitsinsistenceonthe''differences"ratherthantheidentityofmen..."Identity",ontheotherhand,dominatesthewholehabitofTradeUnionandprofessionalthought'(G.Wallas,Oursocialheritage(London,1921),p.114).19Laski,AuthorityinthemodernState(NewHaven,1919),p.87.20Laski,Studiesintheproblemofsovereignty,p.24.

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grouppersonality.TheissuewasnotforLaski,asithadbeenforMaitlandandFiggis,pre-eminent.Butnordidheconsideritadistraction,asithadcometoseemtoBarkerandCole.Laskiwaswillingtoacceptthatgroupsofindividualshadapersonalitydistinctfromtheindividualpersonalitiesoftheirmembers,andthatthispersonality,farfrombeingamerefictionoflaw,shouldbecountedassomethingreal.HegaveexpressiontotheseviewsinanarticlehepublishedintheHarvardLawReviewin1916underthetitle'Thepersonalityofassociations'.Intruth,thisarticleislittlemorethanarestatementofideas,andcases,borrowedfromMaitlandandFiggis,anddressedupalittleforanAmericanaudience.Nevertheless,itisofinterestinitsownrightfortworeasons.First,itcontainstheearliestusebyanEnglishpoliticaltheoristoftheterm'pluralistic'todescribewhathadpreviouslybeencalled'polyarchic'or'federalistic'politicalstructures.21Andsecond,itcontainsaclear,ifproblematic,statementofwhatLaskiunderstoodtobetheconditionofaproperlyfunctioningpluralisticsociety.Atthecloseofhisdiscussionoftherelationbetweengrouppersonalityandstatesovereignty,Laskiwritesasfollows:'Weshallthensaythatthecorporation,beingarealentity,withapersonalitythatisself-created,mustbearresponsibilityforitsactions.OurStatemay,intheresult,bealittlelessHegelian,alittlelesssovereign,initsrightofdelegation.'22Whatisstrikingaboutthisstatementisthatitseemstoequate'responsibility'withakindoffreedom.Laskidoesnotwishassociationstobefreetodowhateveritistheywant;hewantsthemtobefreetounderstandwhateveritisthattheydo.Armedwiththisknowledge,theyaretobecome,notindependent,butinterdependent,astheybecomeawareoftheresponsibilitiestheyhavetoeachother.ThisiswhatLaskiunderstoodbyescapingfromthesovereigntyofthestate.Asaconceptionofgrouppersonality,itisperhapsascloseasanyarrivedatbyanEnglishtheoristtothespiritofGierke'soriginal.Butitisalso,forthisveryreason,distinctlyHegelian,sinceitwasHegel,betterthananyone,

whounderstoodfreedomasakindofresponsibility.TheproblemisthatLaskidoesnotseethis.InsteadhetreatsHegelasoneoftheadvocatesofthesovereignstateagainstwhomtheconceptionofapluralisticsocietyisdirected.Whatismore,heidentifiesHegel'sconceptionofthestatewiththatofatheoristforwhomfreedomwastheantithesisofresponsibility;thatis,he

21SeeLaski,Thefoundationsofsovereignty,p.157.22Ibid.,p.152.

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identifiesHegelwithHobbes.23HedoessowhenalludingtoHobbes'scomparisonbetweencorporationsandwormsinthebodyofthestate,fromwhichheconcludesthat'wehavemadeourStateabsorptiveinamystic,Hegelianfashion'.24Oncetwothinkerssodifferent,andsodifferentinwaysitwaspreciselyGierke'spurposetoelucidate,areconflatedlikethis,theforceofLaski'sargumentisentirelydissipated.UnlikeCole,LaskibelieveditwaspossibletoembracetheconceptofrealgrouppersonalityinadistinctivelyEnglishidiom,anduseittoconstructadistinctivelypluralisticpoliticaltheory.But,likeCole,hecouldnotbringhimselftocomprehend,nevermindtoembrace,theGermanicpreconceptionsonwhichtheconceptofrealgrouppersonalityrested.Instead,hesetthetwoupincrudeoppositiontooneanother.Theresultisthat,moresoeventhanCole's,Laski'sargumentisleftwithnowheretogo.

Intheend,wheretheargumentdidgowasjustdowntheroadthatColehadalreadymappedoutforit.Abandoningtheideaofgrouppersonality,Laskiresortedtotheideaoffunctioninordertocharacterisetheconditionspertaininginapluralisticpoliticalsociety.Inabookhepublishedin1919,Laskiarguedthatpoliticalpluralismrequired'adivision,notofpowers,butofpoweronthebasisoffunction',25centredaround'twobodiessimilarincharactertoanationallegislature',26onerepresentingtheinterestsofmenasconsumers,theothertheseparateinterestsofmenasproducers.Laskidoesnot,anymorethandidCole,elaborateonhowtheseinstitutionswouldworktogether.Iftheyarenottobecontrolledbysomehighersovereignbody,theassumptionmustbethattheirsuccessfulco-existencerestsontheinterdependenceoffunction.YetLaskiwillnot,indeedcannot,explainwhatgeneratesthisinterdependence.Hewillnotcountenancethepossibilitythatthestate,asanassociation,isitselfpossessedofapersonality,andthereforecapableofdevelopmentinitsownrightthat,heunderstood,wasHegelianism.Instead,he

simplyprovidesuswiththeimageof'asocietyinwhichauthorityisnothierarchicalbutco-ordinate'.27Thequestionofwhatitisthatco-ordinatesapoliticalsocietyisjustthe

23ForHobbes'Liberty,orFreedome,signifieth(properly)theabsenceof...OppositionandmaybeapplyednoleesetoIrrational,andInanimatecreatures,thantoRationall'(Hobbes,Leviathan,p.145).24Laski,Thefoundationsofsovereignty,p.168.25Laski,AuthorityinthemodernState,p.74.26Ibid.,p.88.27Ibid.,p.74.

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pointatissuehere,asitisinmostformsofpoliticalthought.Tosuggestonlythatitisco-ordinatedbythemannerinwhichitismadeupistobegthatquestionentirely.

III

WhatsetsLaskiapartfromColeisthathisargumentsaboutfunctionalassemblies,likehisargumentsaboutcorporatepersonality,areintendedtoformonlyoneaspectofhiscaseagainsttheconceptofstatesovereignty.Laski'spluralismwasnotsimplydesignedtodiscerninhistoryapoliticaltheorytofittheguild,oranyother,idea.Itwasalsointendedtoreflecthisviewsaboutthestatusofpoliticalideasingeneral.Foritisnotsimplythestate,norjustsociety,buttheworldasawholewhichLaskidescribesas'pluralisticbecauseitexistsintimeandspace'.28Thisisthehistoristsideofhisargument,anditdoesnotjustleadtoaseriesofclaimsaboutpoliticalorganisation;italsoleadstoasetofclaimsaboutpoliticaltheory,andthelimitsofwhatcanbesaidinit.Theselimitsfollowfromthecontingencyoftheexistencedescribedaspluralistic,andareconveyedbyLaskibymeansofaquotationfromWilliamJames'Howevermuchmaybecollected,howevermuchmayreportitselfaspresentatmyeffectivecentreofconsciousness,somethingelseisself-governedandabsentandunreducedtounity'29whichhethenreducestothesimplethesisthat'therearenoessentialconnections'.30Twosetsofconsequencesaretakentoflowfromthisclaim.First,politicaltheoryitselfcannotachievethedeterminacytowhichithastraditionallyaspired.Laskiurgesthatpoliticaltheorybecome'constantlyexperimentalist'(aphraseheborrowedfromJohnDewey)31andwritesofhisownpluralismthat'itdoesnottrytoworkoutwithtediouselaborationtherespectivespheresofStateorgrouporindividual'.32Second,politicalauthoritycannotbefixedeither.Laskidisputesanysuggestionthatthestatehasa'moralpreeminence'asaresultofwhich'youmustfuse

yourwillintoitsown'.33Rather,thestatemustearntheobedienceofitscitizensanditswill'isawilltosomeextentcompetingwithotherwillsand,Darwin-wise,survivingonlybyitsabilitytocopewithitsenvironment'.34ThisinvocationofDarwinisreminiscentofMaitland.ButwhereMaitlandmakestheallusiontonaturalhistoryinordertoask

28Laski,'Whatishistory?',324.29Laski,Studiesintheproblemofsovereignty,p.10.30Ibid.31Ibid.,p.23.32Ibid.33Ibid.,p.13.34Ibid.,p.14.

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'whetherwearenotalittlebehindtheageofDarwinifbetweentheStateandallothergroupswefixanimmeasurablegulf',Laskimakesitinordertoquestionwhetheranythingaboutthestateorothergroupscanbefixedinthefirstplace.Hisisthestrongeststatementinthebrieftraditiontowhichhebelongsofthecontingencyofallaspectsofpoliticalexistence.IfLaski'spluralismisanadvanceonwhatprecededit,thentheadvancemustliehere.WhatneedstobeconsiderediswhetherLaski'sthought,otherwisejustanamalgamoftheideasofothers,isfurtheredorcompletedbyhisinsistencethatanon-authoritative,or'pluralistic',stateisdemandedbythe'pluralistic'qualityoftheworldasawhole.

Theconclusionmustbethatitisnot.Withregardtothequestionofpoliticalauthority,Laskidoesshiftclosertoanarchismthanhispredecessors.35ThebasisofhisargumentissimilartothatofCole,inwhichheequatesourexperienceofthestatewithourexperienceofgovernment,andgovernmentwithapartialeconomicinterest.Laskiwritesthat'arealisticanalysisofthemodernStatesuggeststhatwhatwetermState-actionis,infact,actionbygovernment',36andinthesamespirithearguesthatthestate'isinrealitywhatadominantgrouporclassinacommunitybelievestobepoliticalgood'.37TheroutefromhereleadsColestraighttoguildsocialism,butforLaskiitalsoleadstotheassertionthat'thewilloftheStateobtainspreeminenceoverthewillsofothergroupsexactlytothepointwhereitisinterpretedwithsufficientwisdomtogaingeneralacceptance,andnofurther'.38Inotherwords,thestateisonlypreeminentwhereitisobeyed.Laski'spurposeinmakingsuchaseeminglycircularassertionistoemphasisethatitisthecontentofthestate'swill,andnotitsprovenance,thatisimportant,andhecontendsthat'itisamatterofdegree,andnotofkind,thattheStateshouldfindforitsdecreesmoreusualacceptancethanthoseofanyotherassociation'.39Theproblemwiththisargumentisthat,justbecauseitstopsshortof

35InApril1917LaskiwrotetoHolmes:'IhavediscoveredProudhonandIwantyoutosharethejoy.Reallyheisimmenseandhasallthevirtues...HistheoryoftheStatesatisfiesallmyanarchistprinciples'(Laski,Correspondence,vol1,p.81).Still,thiswasonlyoneofagreatnumberofenthusiasmsexpressedinthiscorrespondence,andwhateverProudhon'sinfluence,Laski'spoliticaltheorywasnotanunmodifiedexpressionofanarchistprinciplesIfthisbookunderplaystheinfluenceofFrenchpoliticaltheoryonLaskiandCole,itisbecauseitisanattempttodescribethewaysinwhichtheoristslikeLaskiandColetriedtouseGierkeanideastoconstructanalternativetotheanarchistictendenciesofFrenchsyndicalism.36Laski,AuthorityinthemodernState,p.30.37Ibid,p.87.38Laski,Studiesintheproblemofsovereignty,p.14.39Ibid.,p.17.

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anarchismithasbeencalled'contingentanarchism'40itreallyiscircular.Laskidoesnotstipulatethegroundsonwhichadecreeofthestateshouldbeignored,butmerelyannouncesthatifitwereignoreditwouldnotbeadecree.Heis,therefore,seekingtohaveitbothways,retainingthenotionsoflawandofstatehoodwhilesuggestingtheseverelylimitedauthorityofeach.Yetalawwhichdependsonitssubjects'agreementinallinstancestowhatitauthorisesisnotalaw,andwhenLaskisays'thereisnosanctionforlawotherthantheconsentofthehumanmind',41whatfollowsisthatlawisimpossible.Thisdoesnotmeanthatlawsmustalwaysbebackedbythesanctionofthestate(i.e.thattheymustalwaysbecommands).Butitdoesmeanthatevenwhenlawsoperateinan'enabling'capacity,theymustdosoontheirownterms,notonthetermsofthosewholiveunderthem.Thelawthatrequiresawilltobesignedbytwowitnessesdoesnotrequiretheassentofwhomeveritismakingthewill.Itmust,ofcourse,beuptoeachindividualtodecidewhethertheywishtoaccordwiththislaw,andthereforetomakeuseoftheresourcesthatthelawhastooffer.Buteveniftheofferisdeclinedbyeveryone,thelawitselfstillstands.Lawisonlypossibleifindividualactionsarejudgedbyformalcriteriadeterminedinlaw,andnotbytheindividualsthemselves.

ThedifficultywithLaski'spositioniswellencapsulatedinhiscomplaintthatfortoolongthelifeofindividualsandgroupshadbeenleft'unconnected...withtheconstructionofthoserulesofconductbywhichthatlifeisgoverned'.42Thispointisfamiliarenough,foritechoesFiggis'sinsistenceon'thefacts'becomingthebasisoflawaswellasoflife.Laski,perhaps,makesthepointwithmoreconviction,butindoingsohemerelyemphasiseshowlittleissaidbysuchademand.Toinsistthatlawsshouldbe'connected'tolifeisliketellingamap-makerthatheshouldbeaccurate.Ifhetakesthisadviceliterally,hismapwillbeonascaleof1:1,andthereforenotmuchofa

map.Ifwhathecreatesistobeuseful,thenthedegreeofaccuracyrequiredwillhavetodependuponsomeothercriterion.Soitiswithrulesofconduct,whichcannotbelife,anymorethanamapcanbealandscape,oragrammaraspokenlanguage.'Connectedness'inlaw-making,likeaccuracyinmap-making,isofcourse

40SeeB.Zylstra,Frompluralismtocollectivism:thedevelopmentofHaroldLaski'spoliticalthought(Assen,1970),pp.4850.'Contingentanarchism'isinfactanoxymoron,like'somewhatunique'.41Laski,Studiesintheproblemofsovereignty,p.14.42Laski,Thefoundationofsovereignty,p.44.

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avirtue,foritisindubitablythecasethatalawwhichstrikesachordwiththosewhoaregovernedbyitisagood.Equally,theconditionoflivingwellenoughtodowithoutlawsisaself-evidentlyworthyideal,asistheconditionofbeingabletoseefarenoughtodowithoutmaps.Thesegoodsontheirown,though,cannotactasguidestopoliticallifethe'political'referstoactionswhicharetosomeorotherdegreeunconnectedinLaski'ssense.Theproblemsofpoliticsaretheproblemsofdecidingwhatmayjustifiablybeleftunconnectedtowhat,andwhotowhom,with,whennecessary,whichsanctionsattached.

IfLaskidoesnotaddanythingbytheinsistencewithwhichhemakeshiscase,hedoesatleastextenditwithconsistencyintotherealmofquestionsabout,ratherthansimplywithin,politicaltheory.ForLaski,the'facts'shouldnotjustdeterminewhatstatesdo,butwhatpoliticaltheoristsdoalso:theyshould,Laskideclares,'becomeinductive-minded'and'make[their]principlesgrowoutofthefacts'.43ThisisLaski's'experimentalism',animportantcomponentofhispluralism,andaclearerstatementthananyotherinthepluralistictraditionthattheattackonthestatebringswithitcertainconsequencesforthewaythatthepoliticaltheoristshouldregardhimself.However,thismethodologicalpreceptisinitswaynomorehelpfulthananythingpreviouslysaidinthattradition,northananythingLaskisaysaboutthepreceptsthatshouldguidelaw-makers.LaskiwasnotadvocatingthatEnglishpoliticalthoughtembracewhatwas,andstillis,calledinAmericapoliticalscience.AtthetimeLaskiwaswritingAmericanpoliticalsciencehadinfactthrownupitsownschoolofpoliticalpluralism,originatingintheworkofA.F.Bentley,whichsoughttoanalysetheAmericanpoliticalprocessbylookingatthevariousgroupscompetingforinfluencewithinit.44Thiswas,essentially,asociologicalexercise,anditdependeduponcasestudiesofAmericanpressure-grouppolitics.ItdidnotinterestLaski.Hisallegiancewasto

adifferenttradition,ashemadeclearwhenhewroteoftheteachingofpoliticalscienceintheUnitedStates:'Innocountryintheworldispoliticssomuchtaught...butitoughttobeaddedthatrarelyisitsobadlytaught.Thegroundisalwayscoveredbuteverywheretheemphasisisondescriptionandnotprinciple.'45Laskiwaswritinginatradition,stretchingbackto

43Laski,Studiesintheproblemofsovereignty,p.13.44ThemostprominentrecentexponentofthisschoolisR.A.Dahl.45Laski,'Theliteratureofpolitics',NewRepublic,13(17November1917),6.

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Hobbesandbeyond,inwhichthecentralquestionisnotwhatmakesthisorthatstatework,buthowstatesshouldworkingeneral.Inthattradition,his'experimentalism'representstheadmonitionnotofapoliticalscientistbutofahistorianitconveyshissense,asanhistorian,thattheoriesarecontingentanddependuponthecircumstancesinwhichtheyareformulated.The'inductive-mindedtheorist',resistanttoaprioristicexplanations,issimplytheopen-mindedtheorist.Atthesametime,Laskididnotwishtodenudepoliticaltheoryofallprescriptiveforce.Hisarguments,ashehimselfadmitted,weredesignedtorefashionpoliticalstructures,forashewrote:'Theimpliedcorollaryofourpurposeisthewidespreaddistributionofpower.ItwillneedanewphilosophyoftheStatetosatisfytheinstitutionsthatpurposewilldemand.'46Thenewphilosophy,then,musthelporchestratenewpoliticalconditions.Laski'sinsistencethattheoryshouldbepursuedinductive-mindedlyisanexpressionoftheseconvictionsasensethatpoliticaltheoryiscontingent(historism),andasensethatpoliticaltheoryshouldreflecthistoricaldevelopments(historicism).Butitdoesnotaddanythingtothem,andnordoesitresolvethetensionbetweenthem.Laskiwasnotsimplyseekingtodescribeadialecticalprocessinwhichtheoryreactsoncircumstanceandviceversa;hewasalsowishingtoparticipateinit,diminishingcertainsortsoftheoryandbolsteringcertainkindsofcircumstance.Inthisrespect,anydifferencebetweenhimselfandGierke,Maitland,Figgis,BarkerorColeismerelyoneofdegree,notofkind.Andinthisrespect,adifferenceofdegreeisnodifferenceatall.Forthoughitmayfairlybesaidthatanabilitytoreasoninductivelyisapre-conditionofsuccessfulparticipationinpoliticallife,theinjunctiontotheoriseinductive-mindedly,howeverstronglyexpressed,doesnotonitsowndetermineeitherwherethetheoristshouldparticipate,orhow.

IV

In1920,HaroldLaskilefttheUnitedStatesandreturnedtoEngland,wherehetookupapostattheLondonSchoolofEconomics.Withthismovebeganalong,complexandwell-documentedintellectualjourney,onethatwastoend,followinganotherworldwar,withLaskichairmanoftheLabourparty,and

46Laski,Thefoundationsofsovereignty,p.29.

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themostfamoussocialistintellectualinBritain,ifnottheworld.Aspectsofthisstorywillbediscussedinwhatfollows.But1920alsomarkstheendofanintellectualjourneyofadifferentkind.Thiswasthejourneyofpluralisticideasingeneral,andGierke'sversionofpluralisminparticular,acrosstheintellectuallandscapeofEnglishpoliticalthought.Laskigavethismovementaname,yetbythetimetheideasreachedLaskitheyweremoreorlessexhausted,andtheywerecertainlyexhaustedbythetimehefinishedwiththem.Headdednothingtotheseideasbeyondhisobviousenthusiasm,whichwasnotenough.Whatismore,hedetractedfromthembyhisinabilitytodistinguishbetweenjuristicandmetaphysicaltheoriesofthestate,onwhichsomuchoftheforceofGierke'sargumentsdepends.BothLaskiandCole,likeBarkerandFiggisbeforethem,tookGierke'sideasinsomeunexpecteddirections.Butnoneofthem,andleastofallLaski,madethemanymoreconvincingbydoingso.

Still,in1920,Laskiwasveryfarfrombeingexhaustedhimself(hewasonlytwenty-seven),andnorhadheexhaustedthethingsthathewishedtosayaboutgroupsandthestate,individualsandtheircollectiveenterprises.Whathefound,followinghisreturntoEngland,wasthathecouldnolongersaytheminthefamiliarlanguageofpoliticalpluralism.By1920thelimitsofwhatcouldbesaidinthatlanguagehadstartedtomakethemselvesclear,eventoLaski.Where,exactly,thoselimitsaretobedrawnisthesubjectofthefinalpartofthisbook.Butbeforethen,weneedtoexamine,ifonlybriefly,thealternativemeansthatLaski,andothers,foundtodivestthemselvesoftheiropinionsonthesubjectofthestate'sessentialnature,andtheessentialnatureofthegroupswithinit.

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Chapter10TheReturnoftheState

I

ThesinglemoststrikingfeatureofthepluralistmovementinEnglishpoliticalthoughtistheabruptwayinwhichitends.DuringtheseconddecadeofthiscenturypluralisticideaswerethedominantinfluenceonpoliticaltheoryinEngland,andtherewerefewareasofintellectuallifethattheydidnottouchinoneformoranother.Then,in1920,thisinfluencesuddenlyceased.MaitlandandFiggiswere,ofcourse,bythistimedead;butmoresignificantly,neitherofthemhadsucceededinfoundingaschooloflike-mindedhistorianstopursuetheirinterestinthequestionofgrouppersonality.ThiswasafactlamentedbyLaski,whowrotein1925that'menlikeMaitlandperhapsthegreatestlegalgeniusinEnglandsinceBenthamwereneverabletogatheraroundthemdisciplestocarryontheirwork'.1YetLaski,onceapotentialdisciple,hadlongsincelostinterestinthesequestionshimself.AsearlyasFebruary1920hehadwrittentohisfriendHolmes,withtypicalmodesty:

ThereisonlyonemomentinhistorywherefeelingscomparabletominejustnowhavedevelopedwhentheHolyGhostknewthatwhateverJosephdidwastoolatebecausetheincarnationhadtakenplace.Inotherwords,Ihavebegunmynewbook,andIfeellyricalaboutit...I'vedecidedtocallitAgrammarofpolitics.2

Theplanforthebookwasalreadymappedout,andLaskiwasabletoannounce:'Chaptersontheimplicationsofcapitalism,syndicalism,socialismandguildsocialismfollowallofthemhavingthehonourofbeingrejected.'3ThisworkprovedtobethemajorintellectualprojectofLaski'slife,andthefirstofitsmanyeditionseventuallyappearedin

1925.Bythen,Laskihadsubstantially

1H.J.Laski,Agrammarofpolitics,fourthedn(London,1938),p.2762Laski,Correspondence,vol.1,p.244.3Ibid.

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modified,ifnotquiteabandoned,allthebasictenetsofhisearlierpluralism.Meanwhile,Cole,thedrivingforcebehindoneoftheideologiesthatLaskiaccordsthehonourofrejection,hadbeguntoloseinterestinquestionsofabstractpoliticaltheoryaltogether.In1920,followingabriefinternecinestruggle,theguildsocialistmovementinwhichhehadplacedhisfaithsuddenlycollapsed,andtheNationalGuildsFederationwasdisbanded.Dispirited,andatsomethingofalooseend,Colebegan,inthewordsofhiswife,'toturnhisattentiontothecollationandcollectionoffactsandtothewritingofLabourhistory'.4OnlyErnestBarkerremainedasprolificaftertheendofthedecadeashehadbeenduringit.Yetatnotimeduringthe1920sdidBarkerreturntowhathehadcalledinJanuary1915'thefundamentalquestions'thequestionsthatfollowfromthestate'sidentityasanassociation.Infact,no-onedid.From1920onwardstherewasno-oneinEnglandpreparedtofurtherthecaseagainsttheideaofthesingleunitarystate,anditssinglesovereignty.

Thisrapiddemiseinthesignificanceofpluralistideashastendedtobeexplainedinthelightofchangingpoliticalcircumstance,andofparticularhistoricalevents.FollowingtheconclusionoftheFirstWorldWar,thepreoccupationofmanytheorists,includingliberalslikeBarker,waswithpreventingaSecond,andtheirattentionwasdirectedtowardspracticaldevelopmentsinthefieldofinternationalrelations.Meanwhile,theendofthewararrivedwiththeBritishstatehavinggreatlyincreasedthescopeofitsactivities,andthoughtradeunionshadalsostrengthenedtheirpositionduringthewar,theeconomicslumpthatfollowedweakenedtheirauthoritywithoutcuttingbackonthatofthestate.Furthermore,theideaofthestatehadhadnewlifeinjectedintoit,forthoseontheleft,bythesuccessoftheBolshevikrevolutioninRussia.Duringthe1920s,thosetheoristsoftheleftstillseekingamoreprominentpoliticalrolefortradeunionsandotherlabourassociations,amongthemLaskiandCole,cameto

pintheirhopesontheminorityLabourgovernments.When,in1931,thesehopesappearedtobedashed,attentionwasdirectednottowardsthefailuresofthesovereignstatebuttowardsthefailuresoftheLabourparty,thefailuresofdemocracyandthefailuresofcapitalism.Suchthemes,quintessentiallyoftheinter-warperiod,didnotleavemuchroomforpoliticalpluralism.5

4Cole,ThelifeofG.D.H.Cole,p.132.5ForanaccountofthedemiseofpoliticalpluralisminthesetermsseeRodneyBarker'sPoliticalideasinmodernBritain(London,1978),chapters46Barkergoesontosuggestthatthe

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ButdevelopmentsinBritishpoliticallifecannottellthewholestory.Themostobviousreasonforthisisthatpluralistideascanneverbesaidsimplytohavereliedonfavourablepoliticalconditionsafterall,politicalpluralismwasconceivedinpartasachallengetotheovermightystate,andifpluralisticallymindedauthorsfoundthatthestatehadusurpedallauthorityinthe1920sand1930s,thatwasatleastasgoodareasonforpursuingtheirargumentsasforabandoningthem.Further,however,asthisbookhasargued,pluralistideascannotbeunderstoodasstandinginanysimplerelationtohistoricalcircumstance.Thepluralistswerethemselveshistorians,andtheirtheoriesofpoliticallifearoseoutofahistoricalunderstandingofpoliticalconditions.Forthisreasontheviewthatpluraliststookofthestateasanideawasnotjustaresponsetotheactivitiesofthisorthatstate;italsorestedonasetofargumentsabouthowpoliticaltheoryshouldberelatedtothetimesinwhichitwaspromulgated.Ifitwasdecidedthatpluralismnolongerseemedanappropriatevehicleforpoliticalthought,thisrepresentedacommentontheinternalworkingsofthepluralistcaseaswellasonthelifeofthenation.Andthisisnotsimplyaphilosophicaljudgment;ithasahistoricalbasisofitsown.ForoneofthedifficultieswithattemptingtoexplainthedemiseofpoliticalpluralismsolelyinthelightoftheexpandedauthorityoftheBritishstateisthatittendstodisregardasubstantialpartofthehistoricalevidence.Thisevidenceistheconsiderablevolumeofcriticismtowhichpluralistideasweresubjectedduringthe1920s,noneofwhichcanplausiblybereadas

(footnotecontinuedfrompreviouspage)

willingnessoftheoristslikeColeandLaskitoseekanaccommodationwiththenewlypowerfulBritishstatewasinsomesenseculpablehedepictsitassomethinglikeafailureofpoliticalwillLaskiinparticularissingledoutforcriticismforabandoninghisearlyattachmenttotheengagedpolemicismofpluralistslikeFiggisinordertopursuework

Barkerdescribesas'purelyreflectiveanddescriptive'(Barker,Politicalideas,p.97).ThepointofthisaccountistoprovideevidenceforBarker'sthesisthatitwassuchasLaskiwho,bytheirretreatintotheworldofacademicpoliticaltheory,andawayfromengagementwithmovementslikeguildsocialism,'allowedtheStatetostepoutofpoliticaldiscourseandtobecomethegreatunstudiedfeatureoftwentiethcentury,Britishpolitics'(ibid.,p.103).ItisaverystrangeargumentOfcourseitistruetosaythatthestatehasoftenbeentakenasagiveninmodernBritishpoliticallife.ButtoblamethisonLaski'sretreattohisivorytowerissimplyperverseIfanything,Laski'sthoughtsonthesemattersmoveintheoppositedirectiontothatascribedtothembyBarkertowards,notawayfrom,aformofpoliticaltheorywhichallowedthepoliticaltheoristtoprescribespecificpoliticalarrangementsratherthanhavingtodescribethosearrangementshappeningtoprevail.Certainly,asweshallsee,theLaskiofthe1920sand1930scanhardlybecontrastedwithsomeonelikeFiggisonthegroundsofthelatter'sgreaterwillingnesstogetinvolvedincontemporaryargument;andBarker'spictureofLaskiasanintellectualdilettante,slylyabandoningthebraveguildsocialiststothehazardsoftherealworldwithoutamuchneededideas-mantohelpthemout,isawhollyunconvincingcaricature.

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simpleapologiaforcontemporarystatepractice.MuchofthiscriticismcamefromAmerica,whereitappearedinthepagesoftheAmericanPoliticalScienceReview.6YetasmallbutsignificantportionofitcamefromEngland,andasignificantportionofthatcamefromtheformerpluraliststhemselves.Laski,ColeandBarker,allofwhomeventuallyreturnedtothequestionofthestate'struenature,eachrepudiatedthepluralistideasonwhichtheyhadpreviouslydepended.Theydidnotdothisbecausetheybelievedthatpluralistideashadbecomeold-fashioned.Theydidsobecausetheynolongerbelievedthatpoliticalpluralismcouldbemadetowork.

Laski,ColeandBarkerdidnotcometorepudiatetheirearlierpluralismforpreciselythesamereasons,andnordidtheydosointhesameways.Indeed,thecollapseofthepluralistmovementrevealedmorethananythingtheverydifferentpoliticalperspectivesofthosewhohadmadeitup.LaskiandColeeventuallybecame,intheirseparateways,Marxists.Barker,meanwhile,cametoembraceaformofconstitutionalism,basedonwhathecalled'thesovereigntyoflaw'.Yetalthoughtherewasalargepoliticalgulfbetweenthem(onethatwentbackalongway,andexpresseditselffirstinBarker'sreluctancetobethededicateeofLaski'sfirstbook),theirrespectivechangesofheartexhibitcertainfeaturesincommon.Eachofthemfoundinpluralismalimited,andlimiting,viewofpoliticallife.As

6ThesearticlesincludedE.D.Ellis,'ThepluralisticState',AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,14(1920),393409;F.W.Coker,'ThetechniqueofthepluralisticState',AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,15(1921),186213;G.H.Sabine,'Pluralism:apointofview',AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,17(1923),3450;E.D.Ellis,'Guildsocialismandpluralism',AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,17(1923),58496;ANDw.y.Elliott,'ThepragmaticpoliticsofMr.H.J.Laski',AmericanPoliticScienceReview,18(1924),25175.Thetoneofallthesearticlewasconsistentlyhostile,andtheircriticismtendedtotakeoneoftwoforms:eithertoclaimthatpoliticalpluralismwasanessentiallyvacuous

theoryCokerargued'therehasneverbeenanypoliticalphilosopherofanyera[amongwhomheincludesHobbes]whowouldattempttodenysuchfactsasthoseaddressedbyLaski'(Coker,'ThetechniqueofthepluralisticState',194);orthatithadsomeunforeseenimplications,varyingfromanarchism(Sabine)tofascism(Elliott).Forhistoricalpurposes,howeverthemostsignificantcriticismofEuropeanpluralismbyanAmericancamebefore1920,intheformofMorrisCohen'sarticle'Communalghostsandotherperilsinsocialphilosophys',JournalofPhilosophyandScientificMethod,16(1919),67390.Thisarticle,whichcriticizedtheconceptofrealgrouppersonality,wascitedbyLaskiin1947asoneofthereasonsforhissubsequentabandonmentofpoliticalpluralismLaskiwrotethathehadbeen'convertedbyProfessorCohen'spoweroflogicalanalysistoseetheerrorofmyways'(Laski,'MorrisCohen'sapproachtolegalphilosophy',UniversityofChicagoLawReview,15,(19478),577).Itshouldbesaid,though,thatitwasnotwhathereportedatthetime.In1919hewrotetoHolmesthatCohen'spaperwas'abrilliantpieceoflogicalcriticism;butIthoughtitshowedaprettycompleteignoranceofhistoryontheonehandandthepsychologyofadministrationontheother'(Laski,Correspondence,vol.I,p.223).TheessenceofCohen'scritiquehadbeenthat'theevilsofanabsoluteStatearenotcuredbyamultiplicationofabsolute's(Chone,'Communalghosts',689).

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theselimitsrevealedthemselves,eachofthemsoughtameansofunderstandingpoliticallifewhichdidnotconstraintheminthejudgmentsthattheywereabletopassonit.Theywerenotsimplytryingtomovewiththetimes.Theyweretryingtofindaformofpoliticaltheorywhichallowedthemtojudgewhethertheywishedtomovewiththetimesornot.Inotherwords,eachofthemcametobelieve,intheend,andregardlessoftheirownpoliticalperspectives,thatapluralisticperspectivepreventedthepoliticaltheoristfromexpressinghimselfatall.Thevariousroutesbywhichtheyseparatelyarrivedatthisconclusionformsthesubjectofthischapter.

II

ThefirstsignsofLaski'simpendingdisenchantmentwithpoliticalpluralismwereneitherphilosophicalnorpolitical;theywerepurelypersonal.InApril1918LaskiwroteareviewofG.D.H.Cole'sSelf-governmentinindustryfortheNewRepublic.Tothispointthetwomenhadseemedtobeobviousallies.Laski'sreviewmadeitclearthatthingswerenotquitesosimple.ForalthoughLaskicouldnotbringhimselftodisavowCole'sguildsocialistthesisaltogetherhepraisesitas'agenuineattempttoformulatethetransitionwearenowapproaching'7thetoneofthereviewisgrudging,anditispepperedwithcontemptuousasides:Coleisaccusedof'cheapflippancy',8andofhisstyleitissuggestedthat'everyreaderwillregretintrusionsdueeithertobadtemperorinsufficientknowledge'.9ThepersonalaspectoftheseremarkssetthegeneraltoneforLaski'srelationshipwithCole,whichbecameincreasinghostileafterhisreturntoEngland.Thedislikewaslong-lasting,anditwasmutual,asMargaretColemakesclearinherbiographyofherhusband,wheresherefersto'acurious,lifelongantagonismbetweenthetwo'.10Thisantipathywasnotintruthallthatcurious,sincebothmenwerevainanddifficult.Itsinterestforpresentpurposes,though,liesinitspossibleexplanatory

significance.ItseemstoofferaplausiblemotiveforLaski'sdistancingofhimselffromthosepluralistideaswhichseemedtoplacehiminthesamecampasCole.Indeed,BeatriceWebbsuggestedinherdiarythatjustsuchanexplanationmightliebehindLaski'srealignmentwithinthepoliticsoftheleftafter1920,writingthat'[Laski]dislikestheColesetintensely,anantagonismwhich

7Laski,'Industrialself-government',NewRepublic,14(27April1918),3912.8Ibid.,392.9Ibid.10Cole,ThelifeofG.D.H.Cole,p.201.

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perhapsmakeshimsympathetictoourstandpoint'.11Butthereremaintwoproblemswiththisversionofevents.First,itisdifficult,ifnotimpossible,toknowwhatwouldconstitutesatisfactoryevidenceformakingthisclaim,giventhatitpresupposesthesublimationofpsychologicalfactorsinabstractandimpersonalarguments.Second,itisthecasethatColewashimselfintheprocessofmovingawayfromhisguildsocialistbeginnings.Givenasmuch,someotherformofexplanationisneededitishardlypossibletopostulateaformoftheprisoners'dilemmainwhichbothLaskiandColeweresokeentobeseentobedifferentfromoneanotherthattheyendedupdoingthesamethingandanexplanationoffersitselfwhichisquiteconsistentwiththeavailableevidence:bothwerecomingtothinkpluralistideaswereunsatisfactoryinthemselves.CertainlythisissomethingwhichwasalsosuggestedbyBeatriceWebbinacommentonCole'spublicreticenceduringtheearly1920s,whenshedescribedhimas'strangledbystaledoctrines,stalenotbecausetheyareoldbutbecausetheyarenottrueandcannotbeembodiedinevents'.12Ofcourse,Webb'sjudgmentscannotthemselvesbeconsideredeitherimpersonalorimpartial.Nonetheless,sincebothColeandLaskiweretoprovideexplanationsoftheirdevelopmentastheoristsintermsoftheirchangedviewoftheoryandnotofeachother,toaccountforchangesonthebasisofthelatterismorelikelytocomplicatethantoclarify.

Unfortunately,ifwedoturntoLaski'sexplicitstatementsofhisdifferencesasatheoristwiththeColeset,theevidence,thoughample,isnotalwaysclearcut.TheverybreadthofLaski'sattackonColemakesitdifficulttoisolatetherootcauseofhisdisaffection.In1919hecriticisedCole's'defectiveterminology'andhis'irritatinginabilitytorealisethateveryconcepthehandlesisinfactahistoriccategory';13further,heargued,'theguildsocialistshaveyettorealisethatthematerialswithwhichtheyaretoworkarelargelypredetermined'.14In1920,hewrotethatguildsocialismwasunlikely

to'make[its]way'untilitsproponentscouldshow'thesameaccuracyinthefacts,thesamehistoricalperspective,thesamewidthofknowledgeasMrandMrsWebbdisplay'.15InthesameyearheaccusedColeof'naïveté'inassumingthat'everyworkmanwillbeas

11B.Webb,Diaries,ed.N.andJ.Mackenzie,4vols.(London,19825),vol.III,1905,-4,p.339.12Ibid.,vol.IV,192443,p.27.13Laski,'Nationalguilds',NewRepublic,18(22February1919),124.14Ibid.,125.15Laski,'Thehistoryoftradeunionism',NewRepublic,22(12May1920),359.

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interestedinthesuccessofhisguildasMrColehimselfistoconvinceusofthewholescheme'svalue'.16In1921hespoke,withparticularreferencetoCole,ofthe'facilepsychology'17and'viciousintellectualism'18ofsomeofthosewhosoughttoattacktheconceptofstatesovereignty.By1925hefeltabletodeclare,magisterially:'In1920,guildsocialismwasthefashionabledoctrineofitstime;itsinfluenceisnowalmostnegligible...anditisgenerallyagreedthatitisnotatheoryoftheState.'19Leavingasidethemalicethatobtrudes,threethingscanbesaidaboutthisseriesofcomplaints.First,theemphasisremains,asithaddoneinLaski'sovertlypluralisticwork,onthemeritsof'thefacts':Coleneedstobemore'accurate',more'knowledgeable',morehistoricallyconscious,less'intellectualist'.Second,ifthiscriticismcomesfromapluralistperspective,itmaybesaidtobeself-refuting,forLaski'sownfact-basedtheoryofthestatedoesnotachieveanymorewiththefactsthandidguildsocialism.Third,thiscriticismisvagueenoughtobecompatiblewithmorethanthepluralistconceptionofexperimentalpoliticaltheory.Inatechnicalsense,theinjunctiontoviewthecategoriesofpoliticaltheoryas'historic'andthematerialsas'pre-determined'isconsistentwith,andevensuggestiveof,historicismratherthanhistorismwithandofMarxismratherthan,say,pragmatism.Moregenerally,Laski'schargesagainstColemaybesaidtoadduptoapleafor'realism'insomethinglikeitscolloquialsense,a'pragmatic'willingnesstosticktotheavailablefacts.InaccusingColeofnaïveté,Laskiwouldseemtobedemandingalsoa'realistic'appraisalofhumannature,restingonalesssanguineviewofwhatisandisnotpoliticallypossible.ThatLaskiwasmostvehementinhisattacksonColeduring1920and1921,theperiodofhisowntransitionfromtheauthorwhohadpublishedAuthorityinthemodernStatetotheauthorwhowaspreparingAgrammarofpolitics,makesithardtoknowwhetherLaskicanbeaccusedofacertainhypocrisy(heprobablycan).Nonetheless,thesecomplaintsdonotneedtobeseeneitherastheexclusiveproduct

ofpersonalunpleasantness,norasevidenceofdoublestandards.Laski'spoliticalthoughtdidcometoemphasisehistoricalprogressoverhistoricalcontingency,andalsoacertainpracticalityoverwishfulthinking,suchthathisattacksonColecanplausiblybedescribedasrepresentativeofratherthaneitherdeterminativeof,orincompatiblewith

16Laski,'Democracyatthecrossroads',YaleReview,9(1920),801.17Laski,'Recentcontributionstopoliticalscience',Economica,1(1921),90.18Ibid.,91.19Laski,'PoliticalscienceinGreatBritain',AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,19(1925),99.

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hischangeofmindaboutthemeritsofpoliticalpluralism.Giventhecomplicatedmotivesinvolved,however,theyarenotthebestsourceofevidenceforLaski'sdevelopingideas.That,notsurprisingly,comesinhismajorpublicationsoftheperiod,whichmustbeassumedtorepresentthemostconsidered,andleastpersonalised,statementsofhisviews.

Themostcomplete,mostconsideredofallLaski'sbooksisAgrammarofpolitics.Init,Laskiacceptsthattheremustbeanassociationwhich'controlsthelevelatwhichmenaretoliveasmen',20andthatitisthisassociationwhichwecall'theState'.Thislevelofjurisdictionisrequiredbyan'identityofmen'snature';21inallsocietiesthereexistcertaininterestsheldincommon,thoughthisdoesnotentailanidentityinthecontentofindividualinterests,onlyintheirform,forallindividualssharemerelyadesirethattheirvisionofwhatisforthebestshouldbeaccordedanequalpotentialforfulfilment.Laskiresortstoanearlierterminologyashedeclaresthatindividual(orassociational)viewsofthegoodlifedonotthemselves'involveidentity...whatwemeetispluralisticnotmonistic'.22Butwherehedepartsfromhisearlierpluralismisinhisconsequentandexplicitrecognitionthatpluralisticinterestsdoneedtobeadjudicatedbetweenbyabodybearingsomeformofsovereignauthority,ifwearetogranttothoseintereststhesortofprotectionwhichtheyneed.Asaresult,Laskiispreparedtoconcedethatallsocialorganisationmusthaveatitsheart'asinglecentreofcontrol'23sothatthemembersofasocietycanknowexactlywhatsortofbodymayexercisepoliticalauthorityoverthem,andwhatsortofrelationbetweenthemandsuchabodythefactofpoliticalauthorityentails.ThesignificanceofthisconcessionisthatLaskiisnowwillingtoseparateoutthepoliticalfromthesocial,inawaywhichhisearlierpluralismdisallowed.Previously,hehadsoughttoarguethatthepoliticalwasjustoneaspectofthesocial,oneamongmanysuchaspects,asthestatewas

oneamongmanyformsofsocialassociation.InAgrammarofpolitics,hecomestoacceptthatthepoliticaldomainissomethingdistinctfromtherestofsocietyitisaseparatesphereinwhichvarioussocialissueshavetobedecided,andthusitisaspherewhichhastobeallowedtoexistonitsownterms.

ItdoesnotfollowfromanyofthisthatwhatLaskiwasseekinginAgrammarofpoliticswasthecompletedetachmentofthelifeofthestate

20Laski,Agrammarofpolitics,p.70.21Ibid.,p.27.22Ibid.,pp.2601.23Ibid.,p.69.

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fromthebroaderlifeofthesocietythatsurroundsit.Thereversewastrue.Havingacceptedthatthepoliticaldimensionofmen'slivesmustbekeptdistinctfromthelivesthateachofthemchoosestolead,Laskidevotesthemainpartofhisbooktoarguingthatthetwoshouldnonethelessremainascloseaspossible.Hedidnotacceptthattheseparationofthestatefromtherestofsocietymustleadtothedivorceoftheonefromtheother;instead,hesoughttoimbueeachwithasgreatanunderstandingoftheotheraspossible.So,Laskiputsforwardtheviewthatevenapluralisticsocietymustbereadytoembracewhathecalls'acorporatesenseofresponsibility'.24Someofthemeansbywhichhehopedtoachievethismustbecountedprimarilyethicalhecommendsasforthebestasituationinwhich'menwillprefertobeknownforwhattheydothanforwhattheypossess'.25Others,however,havearecognisablepoliticaldimension,aswhenhearguesthat'distinctionsofwealthandstatusmustbedistinctionstowhichallmenattainandtheymustberequiredbythecommonwelfare'.26Likewise,Laski'streatmentofwhatweshouldrecogniseasessentiallypoliticalquestionsthequestionsofwhatconstitutesgoodgovernmentisdominatedbyhisconcernthatgovernmentshouldremainopentothepluralityofconcernsofthosewholiveunderit.Heproposesavarietyofreformstohelpachievethisstrongerlocalgovernment,alesspartisanpress,uniformstandardsofeducation,areformedsecondchamber,27evenawrittenconstitutionandbillofrights(since'ideassofundamentalasthesecannotbelefttoachancemajorityinthelegislature'28).Alltheseideasaredesignedtoensurethatthestate,thoughpossessedofpoliticalauthority,cannotignoretheextra-politicaldimensionofthelivesofitscitizens.AsLaskisaysofhisstateanditsrelationtothevariousgroupsorganisedapartfromit:'ItwillbeopentotheStatetodenytheirwill,butitwillbethenatureofthis

24Ibid.,p.61.

25Ibid.,p.438.26Ibid.,p.157.ThemoststrikingfeaturesofthisstatementisthatitpreciselyforeshadowsthesinglemostcelebratedaxiominrecentEnglish-speakingpoliticaltheory,Rawls'secondprincipleofjustice,whichrunsasfollows:'Socialandeconomicinequalitiesaretobearrangedsothattheyareboth(a)reasonablyexpectedtobetoeveryone'sadvantage,and(b)attachedtopositionsandofficesopentoall'(SeeJ.Rawls,Atheoryofjustice,new'edn(Oxford,1973),p.60).27Infact,Laskiwassufficientlyreconciledto'asinglecentreofcontrol'thatherecommendedtheabolitionnotjustoftheLords,butofasecondchamberaltogether,regardingallformsofbicamerallegislaturesas'anhistoricalaccident'(Laski,Agrammarofpolitics,p.328).Itwas,hebelieved,'thesinglechambermagnicompetentlegislativeassembly[which]seemsbesttoanswertheneedsofthemodernState'(ibid.,p.340).28Ibid.,p.305.

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systemtomakethatdenialamuchmoredifficult,sometimesevenmoreperilousadventurethanitistoday.'29Justasindividualsandgroupsofindividualscannotlivesociallywithoutrecognisingthepoliticalresponsibilitiestheyallshare,soLaskiiskeentoestablishthatnopoliticalbodycanexistinignoranceofthesocialresponsibilitiesithastotheindividualsandgroupsofindividualswhoconstituteit.

Inthissense,thethemeofLaski'sworkremainsthatof'connectedness'.ButwhatdistinguishesAgrammarofpoliticsfromwhathasgonebeforeisLaski'srecognitionthat'connectedness'cannotbethesoleissueinsocialandpoliticaltheory.Atanygivenmomentthepoliticalwillneverbeequivalenttothesocial,sinceitisonthedistinctionbetweenthemthattheidentityofpoliticalauthorityfinallyrests.Asaresult,thequestionisnolongeroneofequatingthepoliticalwiththesocial,butratheroneofstrikingaproperbalancebetweenthem.ThisiswhatLaskiattempts.Indoingso,hedoesnotgiveuponhisearlierinsistencethathistoryisthekeytoatrueunderstandingofpolitics.Buttheemphasisofthatclaimnecessarilychanges,frompredominantlyhistoristtoovertlyhistoricist.Asapluralist,Laskihadsoughttounderstandthepoliticallifeofthestatepurelyintermsofthecontingenthistoricalconditionofthesocietythatcontainedit.Now,heexplicitlyacknowledgedthatstateandsocietystoodinadialecticalrelationtooneanother,eachreactingupontheotherandshapingtheotherovertime.Itwasthetaskofthepoliticaltheoristtomapthatrelation,inordertodecidewhereabalancemightbestbestruck.Nolonger,therefore,didLaskithinkhisjobwasdoneoncehehadestablishedthatabstractclaimstopoliticalauthorityaremeaninglessinthefaceofpoliticalcontingency.Instead,hebelievedhisjobwastousehistoryinordertodecidewhereandwhenclaimstopoliticalauthoritymightbestbeallowed.'Theanswerwemustseek',henowdeclared,'isonethatintelligentlyanticipates

thefutureasitreasonablyinterpretsthepast'.30

Withinthishistoricistframeworkthereisstillthescopefortwoverydifferentapproachestotheproblemsofpoliticaltheory.Ontheonehand,thetheoristmaydecidethathistaskistodescribetheinstitutionalmachinerywhichbestfacilitatesthebalancedinterplayofsocialandpoliticalforces.Ontheotherhand,thetheoristmaybelievethattherelationbetweenthesocialandthepoliticalhas

29Ibid.,p.430.30Ibid.,p.24.

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ossified,suchthatthemachineryitselfmustbetakenholdofinordertore-establishthefluidityoftherelationbetweenthem.Adecisionontheseissueswilldependonthetheorist'ssenseofhistory,andhissenseofhowitisprogressing.InAgrammarofpoliticsLaskiinclinedtowardstheformerviewhebelievedthatawell-groundedconstitutionaldemocracycouldsustainbotharesponsivestateandaresponsible,thoughpluralistic,society.However,thisconviction,whileprevailing,wasnotabsolute.ForLaskiwasawarethattheabilityofindividualstoorganisethemselvesintoapluralityofgroupswasitselfcontingentuponacertainlevelofmaterialequalityholdingforasocietyasawhole.Wherethatlevelhadnotbeenreached,therewasthelikelihoodthatthestatewouldberesponsivetoanarrowsectionofsociety,andsocietyresponsibletoapartialandnarrow-mindedstate.Inthesecircumstances,thepoliticalandthesocialceasetoadapttooneanother,andstarttocorruptoneanotherinstead.Laskiexpressedhisconsciousnessofthisdifficultyasfollows:'ThereisneverlikelytobeanenlightenedStateuntilthereisrespectforindividuality;butalsotherewillbenorespectforindividualityuntilthereisanenlightenedState.Itisonlytheemphasisonequalitythatwillbreakthisviciouscircle.'31WhenAgrammarofpoliticswasfirstpublishedheremainedhopefulthatthisemphasismightyetbeachievedwithintheframeworkoftheBritishparliamentarytradition,suitablymodified.Butby1931anylingeringoptimismhestillhadonthisscorefinallyevaporated.ThecollapseinthatyearofthesecondLabourgovernmentconvincedLaskithattinkeringwiththemachineryofparliamentarydemocracywouldnotproducethesocialchangesonwhichhisownvisionofpoliticallifeultimatelydepended.Sohedecidedthatitwasnecessarytotakeholdofthemachine.Hebecameanout-and-outMarxist,andhebegantoexploretheprospectsforrevolution(albeitwithoutviolence,somethinghecalled'revolutionbyconsent').32Fromthispointonheceasedtothinkofdemocracyandequalityastwosidesofthe

31Ibid.,p.172.32ExplainingexactlywhathemeantbythiswasnotalwayseasyforLaski,particularlyashenevergaveuponLabourpartypoliticsaltogether(althoughherefusedalloffersofasafeseat).Matterscametoaheadin1945,whenLaskifoundhimselftheparty'schairmanforaperiodthatincludedthegeneralelectioncampaign.Labour'striumphinthatyearwasnotLaski's.HewasaccusedinvariousnewspaperreportsofhavingchampionedviolentrevolutionfromaLabourpartyplatformduringameetinginNewark(thebannerheadlineintheDailyExpresson20Juneread'NewLaskisensation:socialismevenifitmeansviolence').LaskivehementlydeniedthesereportsandsuedtheNewarkAdvertiser,wheretheyhadoriginated,forlibel.Howeverhelostthecase,andatleastonebiographerhasblamed

(footnotecontinuedonnextpage)

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samecoin;onehadcometobeseenasthepricetobepaidfortheother.AndhegavevoicetothisconvictionintheprefacethathewrotetothethirdeditionofAgrammarofpolitics,publishedin1934,wherehedeclared:'Therecannot,inaword,bedemocracyunlessthereissocialism.'33

BythetimehehadarrivedatthisconclusionitwasevidentthatLaskihadmovedalongwayfromhispluralistbeginnings.Nevertheless,intheintroductorychapterhewrotetoafourtheditionofAgrammarofpoliticsin1938itwasnotthelengthofthisjourneybutitscontinuitythathewishedtoemphasise.There,hedescribeshisearlierpluralismas'astageontheroadtoanacceptanceoftheMarxianattitude'.34Hecommendsitforenablinghimtoperceivestatesovereigntyasnothingmorethan'aconceptofpower'.35Whatithadlacked,henowbelieves,wassufficientemphasison'thenatureoftheStateasanexpressionofclassrelations'.36Classlessnessmustcomefirst,beforethestatecanassumeitstrueplaceinrelationtotherestofsociety;butgivenclasslessness,thepluralistandtheMarxistcanagreethattheproperroleofthestateistoprovidethe'trulyfederalnatureofsociety'with'institutionalexpression'.37ThereissomethingtobesaidforthisaccountofLaski'sintellectualdevelopment,andnotjustthatitisLaski'sown.Butitisnotthewholestory.ForitissimplynottruethatLaskiwentfromthinkingofstatesovereigntyastheexerciseofpowertothinkingofstatesovereigntyastheexerciseofpowerbyaparticularclass.Rather,hemoves,asonecommentatorhasputit,'fromtheviewthathistoryshowsthatnogroupcanbesovereign...totheviewthatonegroupisasamatteroffactsovereign'.38Inotherwords,itwassometimebetweenhiscareerasapluralistandhiscareerasaMarxistthatLaskistartedtotakethepowerofthestateseriously.ThisistheprocessthatIhaveattemptedtodescribeabove.Asapluralist,Laskihadseenthestateasonegroupamongmany,withnoclaimtopre-eminence.Whathehadlackedwasanymeansof

describingtherelationbetweenthestateandothergroups,giventhatwhatdistinguishedthestatefromothergroupswasjustitsclaimtopre-eminence.Lackinganymeansofrenderingthestatesubordinatetosociety,hebegantoexplorethe

(footnotecontinuedfrompreviouspage)

thefinancialandotherdamagedonetohimforhisearlydeathin1950,attheageof56:seeG.Eastwood,HaroldLaski(London,1977),p.160.33Laski,Agrammarofpolitics,prefacetothirdedn.34Ibid.,p.xii.35Ibid.,p.xi.36Ibid.37Ibid.,p.xii.38H.M.Magid,Englishpoliticalpluralism(NewYork,1941),p.59.

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relationbetweensocietyandthestate,whichmeantacknowledgingthecategoricaldistinctionbetweenthetwo.Itwasfromthisperspectivethathecametoseethestateasanexpressionofclassrelationsthatis,asanexpressionoftheinterestsofaparticularclass.Inasense,thisbroughthimbacktowardshisoriginalpluralism.YethisconversiontoMarxismwasonlypossiblepreciselybecausehehadabandonedapluralisticviewoftheworld.Intheend,theMarxistviewofhistoryprovidedLaskiwithameansofsubordinatingthestatetotherestofsociety.Butitonlydidsobecausehehadcometoappreciatethewaysinwhichtherestofsocietycanbesubordinatedtothestate.

III

Cole'sretreatfrompoliticalpluralismwaslessspectacularthanLaski's,andconsiderablylesspublic.Nevertheless,itwasjustasfinal.Duringtheearly1920s,followingthedemiseoftheguildsocialistmovement,Colepublishednothingonthesubjectofsocialandpoliticaltheory,anddevotedhimselfinsteadtolivesofRobertOwenandWilliamCobbett,andtojournalism.However,in1926hedecidedtoreturntothethemeofconflictingsocialobligations,whichhadexercisedhimoveradecadeearlier.Hedidsoinapaperentitled'Loyalties',whichwasdelivered,aspreviously,totheAristotelianSociety.Init,Colereiteratesmanyoftheclaimsthathadcharacterisedhispluralisticconceptionofsociety,andhecontinuestoinsistthatthestateissimply'apracticalpoliticalinstrument',somethinghefeltwasstillunappreciatedby'mereacademicians'.39Whereheadmitstohavinghadachangeofheartisonjustthatpointwhichdeterminesthedifferenttitlesofhistwopapers:sincetheearlierpiece,hesays,hehascometoseetheproblemsofsocialexistencelessintermsofobligationsthanofloyalties.Thesignificanceofthischangeofperspectiveistwo-fold.First,itmarksanew,andexplicit,insistence

ontheprospectofsocialharmonytakingprecedenceoverthepossibilityofpoliticalconflict.Colecontraststhe'commonsentiment'and'livingimpulse'ofloyaltieswiththelegalisticimperativesofobligations,andhesuggeststhathisattentionwasonlyeverdrawntothepossibilityofconflictsbetweenthelatterbecausetheywereintheirnaturesoartificial.

39G.D.H.Cole,'Loyalties',ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,29(19256),152.

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Previouslyhehadwishedtosuggestthatitwasnothisbusinesstodecidehowspecificinstancesofconflictshouldberesolved;nowheopenlyadmitsthatitishistasktodemonstratetheiressentialsuperficiality.Inthenotionofmultipliedloyaltieshefindsanideasuggestive,albeitvaguely,ofsucharesult.ThisdoesnotmeanthatColenowconsidersconflictbetweengroupsofdifferentlyobligatedindividualstobeimpossible.Butitisthesecondconsequenceofhisnewunderstandingthathesquarelyidentifiessuchconflictsasdooccurwithmaterialforces.Hewritesthatitisnotadiversityofloyaltieswhichengendersconflictbutsimply'changesinthematerialenvironmentofmanandinhiscommandoverthatenvironment'.40Menwhoareloyaltoavarietyofcauseswillbecompelledtobehavewithdiscretionandjudgment;incontrast,menwholiveunderconditionsofscarcityandcompetitionwillfindit'hard[to]distributetheirloyalties'.41Ofthesetwostatesofaffairs,thefirstisofcoursetobepreferredtothesecond.

WhatColeproducesinthispaperisabifurcatedaccountofsocialandpoliticallife.Asgoalsheannouncestwodistinctsortsofharmonymenandgroupsofmenwithoneanother,andmenandgroupsofmenwithmaterialconditions.Inconsequence,heappearstoembracetwoverydistinctapproachestotheproblemsofpoliticaltheory.Ontheonehand,hisargumentsconcerningtheharmoniousrelationsofmenwithoneanothercoincidewiththebasictenetsofphilosophicalidealism,as,forexample,whenhestatesthat'theassociation,liketheindividual,musthavesomeknowledgeofits''place"ifitistosetupforitselfanysatisfactorystandardofsocialbehaviour'.42ColepersistsinseekingtomarkoffhisownthoughtsfromBosanquet's,buthismeansofdoingsoarguingthat'therationaltotalityoftheHegelianstateisnotbeingbutbecoming'andthatthevitalquestionthereforeis'howtobecome'simplyechothethoughtsofBosanquethimself,asexpressedinhisprefacetothethirdedition

ofThephilosophicaltheoryoftheState,publishedin1919.(There,respondingtothecriticismdirectedagainsthimbythepluralists,Bosanquetarguesthathisconceptionofthestateis'notunifiedbutunifying',withtheresultthat'someformofFederalismis

40Ibid.,168.41Ibid.,169.42Ibid.,162.ThisstatementhasstrongechoesofF.H.Bradley,whosechapteron'Mystationanditsduties'inhisEthicalstudies,secondedn(Oxford,1927)was,beforeBosanquet,themostforcefulandthemostnotoriousexampleofidealistpoliticalthought.

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stronglyadvocatedbytheauthor'.43)AnydifferencebetweenColeandBosanquetisnowpurelyterminological;bothagreethatthepoliticalspherethenarrowlylegalistic,themerelyobligatorymustbetranscendedbyabroader,andbroadlyevolving,socialunity,whateverthatunityiscalled.Yetontheotherhand,thebusinessofreconcilingmenwiththeworldofmaterialconditionswouldseemtopresupposeasubstantivedistinctionbetweenbroadlyevolvingsocialforces,andnarrower,legalisticconcerns.Mencomeintoconflictwithoneanother,Colebelieved,whenmaterialresourcesareinappropriatelydistributed,andthisoccurswhenpoliticalstructuresfailtoaccommodatethematerialneedsofthosewholiveunderthem.Theremedyforthissituationwasnotanidealisedvisionofsocialintegration.Rather,itwasasecureknowledgeofthewaysinwhichmaterialresourcesareproduced,thewaysinwhichmenattempttocontrolthatproduction,andthewaysinwhichthesetwomayclashovertime.AtthetimethatColewaswriting,thesecurestknowledgeofthiskindcamefromMarx,anditwastoMarxthatColeultimatelyturned.

'Loyalties',then,maybeseenasanattempttoreconcileCole'slingeringbeliefinthepoliticalharmonylatentinsocialheterogeneitywithanewfoundsensethatharmoniousrelationsbetweenmenarecontingentuponthepoliticalcontrolofthematerialworld.Itcanhardlybecalledasuccessfulattempt,forwhatitoffers,inessence,aretwodifferentdialecticalviewsoftheworlddialecticalidealismanddialecticalmaterialism,HegelianismandMarxism,metaphysicsandeconomicswhichhaveonthewholebeenregardedasopposed.(Thefactthatonehasitsrootsintheotherdoesnotmakeitanyeasiertoadheretobothsimultaneously.)Certainly,Colegivesnocompellingreasonfortheirbeingreconcilable,exceptthatitwouldbehelpfulifitwereso.Nordidhetrytoreconcilethemforlong.ThoughhispublishedoutputcameintheendtoexceedeventheprolificLaski's,

Coleceased,after1926,toconcernhimselfwithquestionsofthestate'sidealnature,asconceivedbytheacademicians.HelostinterestinBosanquet;hegaveuponmultipliedloyalties;andintheirplace,heconcentratedexclusivelyonthemeritsof,andappropriatetacticsfor,socialism.Hisviewsonthesequestionschangedovertime,thoughneverembracedMarxwithquitetheenthusiasmthatLaskishowed(inhisowntermshewasan

43Bosanquet,ThephilosophicaltheoryoftheState,p.lvii.

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'undogmaticMarxian'44).Furthermore,hisresponsetothecrisisof1931wasmoremoderatethanLaski's,andhepersistedinhisbeliefthatparliamentaryaction,notrevolution,offeredthebestprospectfortheBritishworkingclass.Yetdespitethismoderation,andnotwithstandingalifelongdistasteforoverweeningbureaucracy,Coleappreciated,inawaythatLaskididnot,thathismaturesocialismwasnotsimplyanextensionofhisearlierpluralistideas.Hedidnotreferoftentohisearlybeliefsafterhehadabandonedthem,butwhenhedid,itwaswithaclearsenseofwhathadchanged.In1929,lookingbackoverhispastintellectuallife,Coledescribedguildsocialismas'apolitically-mindedperson'sUtopia'.45Likeallutopianvisions,ithadanobviousappeal,butColehadcometoseeitasfatallyflawed,becauseitwas,inhiswords,'dominatedbytheideaofgovernmentasmoraldiscipline'.46In1926hehadbrieflytriedtorescuethisidea.Afterthat,heabandoneditaltogether.

Cole'sintellectualdevelopment,likeLaski's,hastobeunderstoodinhistoricalterms.ButlikeLaski,Colecannotsimplybeunderstoodasmovingwiththetimes.Whatchangedwasnotjusthistory,buttheviewthatpluralistslikeLaskiandColechosetotakeofhistoricalchange.Aspluralists,theyhademphasisedthecontingencyofhistoricalconditions,andthefactthattherewasnolegislatingforchange.Inplaceoftimelesspoliticalcertainties,theyhadreliedonaviewofsocietywhichallowedmenandgroupsofmenaninnate,idealcapacitytoorganisethemselves.When,induecourse,timesdidchange,astheydidwithincreasingspeedduringtheinter-waryears,pluralistslikeLaskiandColefoundthemselvespowerlesstodoanythingaboutit.Itwasthissenseofpowerlessness,morethananything,whichpersuadedthemthatchangehadtobelegislatedfor,andthismeantthattheyhadtogetinvolvedinthebusinessofthestate.Whatitdidnotmeanwasthateitherofthemfellbackontimelesscertainties.Cole,writingin1934,wasstillconvincedthat'we

needasthebasisforbotheconomicandpoliticalstructuresatheoryofhistoryderivedfromaninductiveconsiderationofthefactsandnotoneimposedapriorionthefacts'.47Buthewasalsoconvincedthatthistheorymustbehistoricist,nothistoristitmustresultinsomecertainknowledgeofthewaythathistorywasgoing.So,Cole

44SeeCole,WhatMarxreallymeant(London,1934),p.291.45Cole,ThenexttenyearsinBritishsocialandeconomicpolicy(London,1929),p.161.46Ibid.,p.160.47Cole,Somerelationsbetweeneconomicandpoliticaltheory(London,1934),p.83.

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concludes,'thetaskofmeninsocietyistoconstructforthemselveseconomicandpoliticalsystemswhichwillmakerationalactioneasybecausetheysquarewiththedevelopingconditionsofsociallife'.48Itisontheabilityofmenandgroupsofmentomakesenseofdevelopingconditions,notontheconditionalabilityofmenandgroupsofmentodevelop,thatCole'sviewofsocietycametorest.Ofcourse,everythingdependsonwhattheconditionsofhistoricaldevelopmentareactuallytakentobe.Cole,likeLaski,believedthatthemostconvincingaccountofhistoricaldevelopmentwasMarx's.Thisbelief,certainly,hastobeunderstoodasaresponsetothetimesthroughwhichtheywereliving.Butitshouldalsobeunderstoodassomethingofalastresort.Cole,likeLaski,turnedtoMarxonlywhenhehadbeenpersuadedthattobeapoliticaltheoristitisnecessary,intheend,totakepoliticsseriouslythatis,totakeseriouslythewaysinwhichmenandgroupsofmenseektocontrolhistorybyseekingtotakecontrolofthestate.

IV

SowecometoBarker,andthroughBarkerbacktoGierke.ColeandLaskilostinterestinGierkeassoonastheylostfaithintheirownparticularversionofthenewfederalism.ButBarkerneverlostinterestinGierke,despite,orperhapsbecauseof,thefactthatamongthepluralistshisexpectationsofwhatcouldbemadeofGierkehadalwaysbeenthemostmodest.BarkerkeptfaithwiththismodestpluralismlongafterColeandLaskihadabandonedtheirs.Yethe,too,felttheneedtodistancehimselffromitintheend.ThereismuchevidenceofthischangedperspectiveintheintroductionBarkerwrotetohistranslationofGierkein1933,towhichwewillturnshortly.Butthebestevidencecomesfromwhatisanessentiallyprivatesource.TheSeeleyhistoricallibraryinCambridgecontainsanumberofbooksfromBarker'spersonalcollection,oneofwhich,R.M.

MacIver'sThemodernState,49isheavilyannotatedin

48Ibid.,p.92.49R.M.MacIver(18821970)wasasociologistandpoliticalscientist,borninScotland,butwhospentthemajorityofhisworkinglifeinCanadaandtheUnitedStates.ThemodernState(Oxford,1926)wasthemostabstract,andinthatsensemostEuropean,ofallhisworks,beingconcernedwiththeidealrelationofstateandsocietyMacIverhimself,whowrotethebookwhileteachingpoliticalscienceinToronto,describeditas'abreakfromtheroutine'(seeMacIver,Asatalethatistold(Chicago,1968),p.88).ForanaccountofMacIver'spoliticalideasingeneral,seeD.Spitz,'RobertM.MacIver'scontributionstopolitical

(footnotecontinuedonnextpage)

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Barker'sownhand.ItisclearfromthesenotesthatthiswasabookthatBarkerreadmorethanonce,andinitsmarginsherecordsthemomentatwhichhisownconceptionofthemodernstatecamefinallytobealtered.

MacIver'sbookisofinterestinitsownright.Firstpublishedin1926,itwas,afterLaski'sAgrammarofpolitics,amongthemostwidelyreadworksofpoliticaltheorywritteninEnglishduringthatdecade.LikeAgrammarofpolitics,itsemphasisisontheconstitutionalunderpinningsofgovernment,thoughunlikeLaski,MacIver'sprimaryconcerniswithsocialpsychology,noteconomics(inthisrespect,MacIverisclosertoBosanquetthanheistoeitherLaskiorCole).Butforpresentpurposes,whatismostinterestingaboutThemodernStateisitstreatmentofgrouplife.InBarker'swords:'MacIverisanassociationist,butnotapluralist.'50WhatthismeansisthatMacIver,thoughinsistingontheimportanceofassociationswithinthestate,doesnotseektoplaceallassociationsonthesamefootingasthestate,andnordoesheconcernhimselfwithwhatmighthappenwhenthestateandotherassociationsclash.ForMacIver,thestatewasanassociationofacategoricallydifferentkindfromanyother.Heattemptedtoconveyhissenseofthisdifferenceasfollows:'TheStateis,asitwere,thepavedhighwayofsociallife,borderedbyfieldsandcities.Itisthecommonwaywhichservesthemall.'51Whatissignificantaboutthisimageisthesenseitgivesofthestateasaconduitto,ratherthananexpressionof,thegoodlife.Thatlifeisfoundintheassociationsthatmenformamongthemselves;itisthere,asitwere,thatmenliveandfindnourishment.Thestatesimplyenablesthemtomovefromoneversionofthegoodlifetoanother,anditallowsdifferentversionsofthegoodlifetoco-existinacommonsettingandinawarenessofoneanother.Inthissense,MacIver'simagecapturesexactlythespiritofOakeshott'scivitas.ForOakeshott,astateofthiskindconditionsbutdoesnotcontrolthe

waysinwhichgroupsofindividualschoosetolive,andexistspreciselyinordertogenerateamutualconsciousnessofthedifferencesbetweenthem.ThesamemaybesaidofMacIver's'pavedhighway',whichis,inOakeshott'sterms,nothingmorethanasetof

(footnotecontinuedfrompreviouspage)

theory',inM.Berger,TAbelandC.H.Page(eds),Freedomandcontrolinmodernsociety(NewYork,1954),pp.297312.50Barker,MacIver,p.484.(NotesinthisformrefertothepageinBarker'scopyofThemodernStateonwhichparticularannotationscanbefound.)51MacIver,ThemodernState,p.482.

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rulesgoverningconduct(forMacIveritissimply'law').Asaroad,thestatemapsoutforitscitizenshowtheyaretogetfromAtoB;whatitcannotdoistellthemthattheymustgofromAtoB,andnorcanitdecidewhetheritistoAortoBthateachofthemwishestogo.MacIver,unlikeOakeshott,doestalkofthestateasanexpressionofthegeneralwill.Yetthetermsinwhichhedoesso'notsomuchthewilloftheStateasthewillfortheState...notsomuchthewillofthecitizensasthewillofeachpersontobeacitizen'52arethoseofwhichOakeshott,whosecivesareboundnotbycommoninterestsbutbyacommonloyalty,wouldundoubtedlyapprove.

Barker,thoughhedoesnotexactlydisapproveofMacIver'sassociationism,doesmakeitclearthat,onafirstreadingatleast,hedidnotconsiderittogofarenough.Barkerremainedconvincedthatthestatewasanassociationlikeotherassociations,andwasthereforeliabletoclashwithotherassociationswheneveritspurposeconflictedwiththeirs.Whenthishappened,Barkerstilldidnotbelievethatthestateshouldbeallowedtotriumphonthebasisofanyclaimtouniversalityorpre-eminence.Assuch,heremainedapluralist.Hecouldnotacceptthatthestate,evenunderstoodaslaw,wascategoricallydistinctfromotherassociations,whichweresimplypurposive;thushecouldnotacceptthatthestatewassovereign.OfMacIver,henotes:'Helimitssovereigntybutnotlaw.Butinkeepingsovereigntyoflawhekeepssovereigntyassomethinguniversalandcoercive.'53Barkerstillwishedtocontainthestateintheworldofgroupsingeneral,nottocontaingroupsingeneralwithintheworldofthestate.HesummarisedhispositioninaremarkheappendstothelastpageofMacIver'sbook:

IbelieveinalimitedState.ButIthinkitislimitedbypersonsandthesovereignrightsofpersonsindividualorassociated.IdonotinvolveacommunitydistinctfromtheStateoralawsuperiortoit:Ionlyinvolvepersonsandtheirrights.54

That,atleast,washisviewin1926.Forunderneaththiscommenthesubsequentlyaddedthefollowing:'Ihavealteredmyviewsince[1931]toallowlawassovereign.'55Barkerdoesnottelluswhatitwasthatcausedhimtochangehismind.ButtheintroductionhewrotetoGierketwoyearslaterrepresentstheclearestpossibleattempttogivethischangeofmindpublicexpression.

Barker'sintroductiontohistranslationofGierke'sNaturallawand

52Ibid.,p.11.53Barker,MacIver,p.18.54Ibid.,p.488.55Ibid.

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thetheoryofsocietywasdesignedbothtocomplementandtooffsetMaitland'searlierintroductiontoPoliticaltheoriesofthemiddleage.LikeMaitland,BarkersetouttosketchthehistoricalbackgroundtotheideaswithwhichGierke'sworkdeals,althoughinthiscasetheemphasiswasonearlymodernnotmedievalthought,andonnaturalratherthanRomanlaw.LikeMaitland,BarkerindicatesthewaysinwhichGierke'streatmentoftheseideashasabearingonthefundamentalquestionsofpoliticalphilosophy.UnlikeMaitland,however,Barkerisquitewillingtoaddressthesequestionshimself.Indeed,heuseshisintroductiontoGierketosetoutwhathasbynowbecomehisownpoliticalphilosophy.Thisphilosophyisnotcomplicated,anditissummarisedbyBarkerinasinglesentence:'TheState',hedeclares,'isessentiallylaw,andlawistheessenceoftheState.'56Whatthisamountstoisthedoctrineofthesovereigntyoflaw,forBarkerinsiststhatthestateissimplyasocietyturnedintoalegalassociation'byvirtueofalegalactordeedcalledconstitution,whichhenceforthisthenormorstandard,andthereforesovereign'.57Assuch,itisadoctrinethatstandsinobviouscontrasttoAustinianism,whichannouncesthatlaw,farfrombeingsovereign,iswhateverthesovereigndeclaresittobe.Thiscontrast,andtheechoesinhislanguageoftheideaoftheRechtsstaat(where,inMaitland'swords,lawandstateexist'in,forandbytheother'),givetoBarker'sphilosophysomethingofaGierkeanflavour.YetitwouldbequitewrongtosupposethatthedoctrineofthesovereigntyoflawisincludedbyBarkerinhisintroductiontoGierkeinordertoexplicateGierke'sownthought.Thereverseistrue.BarkerarrivesatthedoctrineofthesovereigntyoflawinthecourseofhisintroductiontoGierkeaspartofacritiqueoftheideaonwhichGierke'swholedoctrine,includinghisparticularconceptionoftheRechtsstaat,ultimatelydepends.Thatideaistheideaofrealgrouppersonality.

Barkerbaseshiscritiqueofthenotionofrealgrouppersonsuponthe

distinctionhedrawsbetweenthreedifferenttypesofpersonality.Thefirstofthesehecalls'psychologicalpersonality',bywhichheunderstands'thepowerorcapacityofself-consciousnesswhichbelongstoasentientbeingawareofitsownsensations'.58Barkerisclearthattheonlypossiblebearersofpsychologicalpersonalityareindividualhumanbeings.ThesecondtypeofpersonalityBarkerdistinguishesis'moralpersonality',whichis,inhiswords,'builtupon

56Gierke,Naturallaw,p.xxvii.57Ibid.,p.xxiii.58Ibid.,pp.lxiilxiii.

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psychologicalpersonalitybuttranscendsthatonwhichitisbuilt'.59Moralpersonsarepsychologicalpersonswhohavecometorecognisethattheirpersonalityisnotunique,andwhotherebycometoshare'acommonlifeandcommonrulesoflife'.60(Intheseterms,theconditionofmoralpersonalityequatestowhatOakeshottwouldcalltheconditionof'civility'.)Becausemoralpersonalityisbuiltonpsychologicalpersonality,ittoocanonlybelongtoindividualhumanbeings.Finally,thereis'legalpersonality',whichis'apowerorcapacityforlegalactionacapacityrecognisedbylaw(andonlyexistingwhenrecognisedbylaw)fororiginatingsuchactionasbelongstotheschemeoflaw'.61Legalpersonalityhasanarrowerscopethaneitherpsychologicalormoralpersonalitybecauseitcanonlyexistwithintheconfinesofthestate.(UnlikeOakeshott,Barkerdoesnotassumethatmoralpersonality,orcivility,iscontingentupontheexistenceofthecivitas.)Inanothersense,however,legalpersonalityhasabroaderapplication,foritalonecanbelongtogroupsaswellastoindividuals.Groups,likeindividuals,arecapableofplayingthepartofpersonsunderthelaw.AndthisistheimagethatBarkeremploys'personation'or'theplayingofparts'.Hecompareslegalpersonstothedramatispersonaeofthetheatre,andthestatetothestageonwhichtheirlegaldramasareenacted.Theoriginsandbroaderimplicationsofthisimagewillbeexploredinthefinalpartofthisbook.Fornow,whatmattersistheconnectionitenablesBarkertoestablishbetweenindividualsandgroupsofindividuals.Groupsareindeedcapableofbearingthesamesortofpersonalityasindividuals,butonlybecauseindividualshavetheirownpartstoplaywithinthelifeofthestate.

Ifgroupsarecapableofbearinglegalpersonality,thenextquestiontobeaskediswhatsortsofgroupsshouldbearlegalpersonality.ToanswerthisquestionBarkerrevertstotheaccountofgrouplifehehadalreadygivenin'ThediscreditedState',wheregroupsweredescribed

as'schemes';now,employingslightlydifferentlanguage,hearguesthatgroupsmustbeunderstoodintermsoftheir'purposes',andjudgedaccordingly.Hereiterateshisearlierpointthatoneofthereasonsfordenyingthatgroupsarenecessarilylegalpersons(inthewaythatindividualhumanbeingsarenecessarilypsychologicalpersons)isthatitallowsustodistinguishbetweenthosegroupswhichare,andthosewhicharenot,deservingoflegalstatus.

59Ibid.,p.lxiii.60Ibid.61Ibid.

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(AndBarkermakesthefurtherpointthatindividualhumanbeingsarenotnecessarilylegalpersonseithersomemaybedeniedlegalstatusforreasonsofcustomorprejudice;othersmayforfeititastheresultofsomecriminalact.)Whatismore,Barkercontinuestoinsistthatthestate,asagrouporassociation,mustalsobeunderstoodintermsofitsownparticularpurpose.Thatpurposeiswhathehadpreviouslycalled'lawandorder',andnowreferstosimplyas'Law'.Whathaschanged,however,ishisunderstandingoftherelationbetweenthispurposeandthepurposesofothergroups.ForBarkernowacceptsthatthepurposeofthestatecannotbecomparedtothepurposesofotherassociations.Thestateexistsinordertoprovidethelegalframeworkwithinwhichotherpurposesco-exist,bethesethepurposesofindividualsorofothergroups.Thestate'spurpose,therefore,istoorderpurposesotherthanitsown.Thisdoesnotmeanthatitcreatesthem.Barkerisadamantthatlegalpersonality,thoughitdependsonthestate,doesnotoriginateinthestate,butinthelifethatexistsindependentlyofit(the'moral'life).Heacceptsthatlegalpersons,likethecharactersinaplay,aretheproductsofartifice.Butinanothersense,heclaims,theymuststillbecountedasreal,fortheyreflecttherealityoftheworldinwhichmenlive,andtheyhaveanenduringexistenceonlyinsofarastheyreflectthatworldaccurately.Legalpersons,liketheplayersinadrama,havealifeoftheirownwhatBarkercalls'apermanentbeing'62onlywhentheyarewelldrawn;thestate,likethestage,must'holdupamirrortonature'.63ThusBarkerisfarfromadvocatingareturntothe'concessionary'viewsagainstwhichGierke'sworkwasareaction.Butheisinsistingthattheworldofthestate,liketheworldofthestage,berecognisedforwhatitis,aworlddistinctfromtheworldinwhichmenlive,aworldcreatedbymentohelpthemmakesenseoftheworldinwhichtheylive,aworldwhichexistsonitsownterms.Barkerwillnotallowthedramasofindividuallivesthepsychologicalandmoraldramaswhichgenerateindividualpersonalitiestobeconfusedwiththeparticular

dramathatiscreatedforlegalpersonsbythestate.Norwillheallowthedramaofthestatewithallitspompandallitscircumstancetobeconfusedwiththelivesthatindividuals,singlyoringroups,pursueforthemselves.Thestatehasitsownparttoplay,thatofprovidingtheworldofpsychologicalandmoralpersonswithadefinitestructurewhereitisneeded.No

62Ibid.,p.lxxvi.63Ibid.,p.lxx.

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othergroupcandothis,anditcanonlybedonethroughlaw.Itisinthissense,andthissensealone,thatBarkerunderstandslaw,andthereforethestate,tobesovereign.

ItmightbesaidthatthisalterationinBarker'sviewsamountstolittlemorethanachangeofemphasis.Hewasalways,aswehaveseen,doubtfulaboutthevalueofascribinganecessary,orreal,personalitytogroups.Hewasalsoenduringlyaware,evenbeforetheGreatWar,thatthestatehaditsownnecessity,andwasinthatsenseitselfapermanentbeing.Butevenifonlyachangeofemphasis,Barker'sdoctrineofthesovereigntyoflawhasaparticularhistoricalsignificance.InhisintroductiontoGierke,Barkerreiteratestheconcernhehadexpressednearlytwentyyearsearlier,thatoneofthedangersofthedoctrineofrealgrouppersonalitywasitstendencytoslideintosyndicalism.HeknewverywellthatGierkewasnotasyndicalist,buthebelievedthattheinterpretationofGierke'sthoughtinEnglandhadbeendrawninthatdirection,andhecitesasevidenceFiggis'sChurchesinthemodernState(hehadbythistimemadepublicFiggis'sconfessiontohiminthegroundsofMirfield).However,syndicalismwasnolongerhisoverridingconcern.Thetheoryoftherealpersonalityofassociationsmayalso,hewrote,'keepothercompany';thatis,'itmaytrendtowardsthatverydoctrineoftheabsoluteStatefromwhichitissupposedtobeourrescue'.64Barkerhadcometobelievethatwheregroupsaretakentoberealpersons,realityitselfmaybeseenasbelongingnottoapluralityofgroups,buttoonegroupthattranscendsalltherest.Thisisimpossiblesolongasthestateisunderstoodasamerelylegalassociation,existingtoprovideaframeworkfortheco-existenceofmerelylegalpersons.Butitispossible,andevenprobable,wherethestateisconceivedasarealpersoninitsownright,withamind,andawill,ofitsown.InGermany,in1933,thestatewasbeingconceivedinjusttheseterms,thoughtheactualtermmostoftenusedwasnot'aperson'but'a

People',orVolk.GierkewasatheoristoftheVolk.Thatinitself,Barkerknew,didnotmakehimafascist(hiswas,inBarker'swords,a'rarefiedandqualifieddoctrine'65);butitdidleavethedoctrineitselfopentoabusebythosewhowere.ThisisjustwhatwastohappeninGermany.ItwaswhathadalreadyhappenedinItaly.There,Mussolini's'CorporativeState',whilepayinglip-servicetotheideaofthecommunitascommunitatum,hadsoonevolvedintothe

64Ibid.,p.lxxxiv.65Ibid.,p.lxxxiii.

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singlepersonalitàsuperioreoftheItaliannation-stateitself.This,Barkerbelieved,waswhatwasliabletohappenwhenevertheattemptwasmadetotranslatetheideaofthecommunitascommunitatumintopractice.66AmongtheEnglishpluralists,theideaofthecommunitascommunitatumwasinfactmostcloselyassociatedwiththe'syndicalist'Figgis.ThisdoesnotmakeFiggisinrealityafascist,67anymorethanitdoesAlthusius,towhomBarker,likeGierke,attributestheideainitspurestform.ButitdoesrevealbyhowfineathreadtheintegrityofGierke'srarefiedandqualifieddoctrinefinallyhangs.

Barkerbelievedthatthejobofpoliticalphilosophywastodescribethemeansofescapefromwhathecalled'thewildernessandthechaos'ofsocialexistence.68Chaosissimplyanarchy,ortheconditionoflawlessness.Wilderness,thoughrelatedtochaos,issomethingelse.Itistheconditionofexcessivelegality,whenlawcomestostifleandeventuallytodestroythelifethatsurroundsit.Thismayhappenifthestateisespeciallyparsimoniouswithitsgrantsoflegalpersonality,andthefreelyformedpurposesofmenaredeniedthesecurityoflegalrecognition.Butitmayalsohappenwherethelegalpersonalityofgroupsisrecognisedassomethingmorethanitreallyis,andbecomesconfusedwithlifeitself.Underthesecircumstances,thewayoflifeofthegroupthesupreme,transcendentgroupswampsandthendestroysallotherformsofpurposiveactivity.AsapluralistBarkerknewthatthewayoflifeofthegroupcouldneverbemorethatthewayoflifeofoneparticulargroup,whichasonegroupamongmanywasnothingmorethanacontingentexpressionofthepurposesofitsmembers;andasapluralistBarkerhadusedthisknowledgetochallengetheideaofstatesovereignty.Nowhesawtheneedtochallengetheideaofgroupsovereignty,andthetendencyofthatideatomakethecontingentinterestsofparticulargroupspoliticallysupreme.Theonlywayofdoingthiswastorescuethestatefromtheworldofcontingent

interests,andtosetitupasthe

66Seeibid.,plxxxv.67BarkerdoesnotcallFiggisafascist,butnordoeshestopveryfarshortofitOneofthefootnotestohisintroductiontoGierkereadsasfollows:'ItwillbenoticedthatDrFiggis...speaksofthetheoryofrealGroup-personalityas''theessenceofwhatistrueinmodernnationalism,andintheclaimsfortherightsofChurchesandofTradeUnions".Perhapshewasthinkingoftheclaimsofnationalminoritieswhenheusedthephrase"modernnationalism"Butthephrasemayequallyapplytotheclaimsofanationalmajoritytocontrolthewholeoflife'(ibid.,p.lxxxiv).ItshouldalsobeborneinmindthatMussolini,asBarkerwouldhavebeenaware,wasquitehappytodescribehimselfasasyndicalistinhisyouth.68Ibid.,p.lxxx.

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merelylegalarbiterofthoseinterests,withapurposethat,inBarker'sownwords,'existsbeyondspaceandtime'.69In1914Barkerhadwishedtoworkwithhistoryagainstthestate.In1933thetaskwastoworkwiththestateagainsthistory.That,betterthananything,tellsthestoryofEnglishpoliticalthoughtduringthefirstthirdofthiscentury.

69Ibid.,p.l.

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PARTIIITHEPERSONALITYOFTHESTATE

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ChapterIITheMaskofPersonalityTheEnglishpoliticalpluralistsdidnothaveanyespecialinterestintheworkofThomasHobbes.Theywere,ofcourse,awareofhimasatheoristofthestate,andtheywereasalarmedbyhisvisionofthestateastheywerebyany.ButtheydidnotmakeanyattempttoestablishwhatwasdistinctiveaboutHobbes'sviewofthestate,andnordidtheyrecognisethathistheoryofthestatewasatheoryofgrouppersonalityalso.Instead,theytendedtoequatehisideaswiththoseofothertheoristsofstatesovereignty,andindoingsotoglossoverthewaysinwhichHobbes'sideaswereunique.SoMaitlandidentifiedHobbes'sconceptionofthestatewiththecruderpictureprovidedbyHenryVIII,allowingthesovereignofeachtobeunderstoodsimplyasthelife-givingheadofabodypolitic.Figgis,asaformerAustinian,placedHobbesalongsideBodin,asoneof'thecreatorsofthemodernworld',1thoughasaformerAustinianhepreferrednottodwellonthisfact;Barker,meanwhile,bracketedHobbeswithAustinhimself,seeingeachasadvocatesofwhathecalledthe'bare'theoryofstatesovereignty.ColepreferredtodiscountHobbesaltogether,concentratinginsteadonRousseauasthelikeliestenemyofcorporatefreedom.AndLaskimadetheclumsiestequationofall,choosingtoidentifyHobbes'sviewoffreedomwiththeoneproducedbyHegel.AmongEnglishwritersofthisperiod,onlyBosanquetcameclosetoGierke'sunderstandingofwhatmadeHobbesdifferent.ButBosanquetwasnotapluralist.

Thisinability,orunwillingness,torecognisethedistinctivenessofHobbes'stheory.ofthestateextendstoBarker'sintroductiontoGierke.There,BarkerdescribesHobbesasarepresentativeofthe'dual'contracttheoryofgovernment'thefirstninety-ninecontract,by

onesortofcontract,withoneanother;andthentheycontract,by

1Figgis,GersontoGrotius,p.12.

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anothersort,withahundredthperson'2sofailingtoacknowledgethatitwaspreciselythissortofdoublecontractthatHobbes'saccountofpersonsandthingspersonatedwasdesignedtoavoid.Hobbes'sninety-ninecontractonlywithoneanother,notwiththeirsovereign,norwiththeLeviathanthattheirsovereignrepresents,andwhenBarkersaysthat'Leviathanishimself,afterall,includedinacontractualbracket',3heissimplywrong.Nevertheless,thereisonesenseinwhichBarkerdoesmanageinhisintroductiontoGierketoengagewithHobbesinawaythatnoneofhisfellowpluralistsmanaged.Thisisinhisuseofthe'mask'asametaphorforlegalpersonality.ItwaspointedoutearlierinthisbookthatHobbes'sconceptionof'fictions',andindeedof'authors',hassomethingincommonwiththemoreusualliterarysenseoftheseterms.ButHobbeswouldnothavethoughtofliteraryfictionsinthenovelistictermstowhichwearenowaccustomed.Hewouldhavethoughtofthetheatre.Moreover,itistotheimageofthetheatrethatthethirdplayerinHobbes'saccountofpersonsandthingspersonatedinevitablypoints;foralongsidetheauthorandthefiction,thereis,ofcourse,the'actor'.YetitwouldbewrongtosuggestthatthetheatresimplyprovidesanappropriatemetaphorforHobbes'sargumentsconcerningpersonsandtheirrepresentatives.AsBarkerpointsoutinhisintroductiontoGierke,theconceptofpersonalitydoesnotsimplybringtomindthetheatre;itactuallyoriginatedthere.TheEnglish'person'comesfromtheLatin'persona',andtheLatinevolvedfromtheGreek,where'person'originallysignifiedamask,wornbyanactoruponthestage.Thuspersonalityitselfwasoncethemetaphor,anditsapplicationtowhatweshouldnowthinkofastheworldof'personal'affairsdependeduponthecongruenceofthatworldwiththeworldofthetheatre.Individualhumanbeings,andthingsotherthanindividualhumanbeings,wereonceonlytobeunderstoodaspersonsinsofarastheiractionsmightbecomparedtotheactionthattakesplaceuponastage.Barkerknewthis,andhewouldhaveknownthat

Hobbesknewitaswell.

WeknowthatHobbesknewitbecausehetellsus.AsheexplainsinchapterXVIofLeviathan:

ThewordPersonislatine:insteedwhereoftheGreekshavepróswpon,whichsignifiestheFace,asPersonainlatinesignifiesthedisguise,oroutwardappearanceofaman,counterfeitedontheStage;andsometimesmore

2Gierke,Naturallaw,p.lxvi.3Ibid.

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particularlythatpartofit,whichdisguiseththeface,asaMaskorVisard:AndfromtheStage,hathbeentranslatedtoanyRepresenterofspeechandaction,aswellinTribunalls,asTheaters.SothataPerson,isthesamethatanActoris,bothontheStageandincommonConversation;andtoPersonate,istoAct,orRepresenthimself,oranother;andhethatactethanother,issaidtobearhisPerson,oractinhisname.4

Themanwhodidthemosttotranslatetheideaofpersonalityfromthetheatretothetribunal,andthencetoeverydayspeech,wasCicero,5andHobbesacknowledgesthisbyquotingdirectlyfromCicerotomakehispoint:itisacting,ortheplayingofparts,thatCicerohasinmind,'wherehesaies,UnussustineotresPersonas;Mei,Adversarii,&Judicis,IbearethreePersons,myown,myAdversaries,andtheJudges'.6ThesethreepersonscorrespondtothethreedifferenttypesofpersonthatHobbeshasalreadysoughttodistinguish:whenIactinmyownname,Iamactingasanaturalperson;whenIactinthenameofmyadversary,Iamactingasanartificialperson;andwhenIactinthenameofajudge,Iamactingasafictitiousperson,forIdonotrepresentoneparticularman,butallmen,orthestate.Ineachcase,theperformanceofanactionisequivalenttoanactofpersonation;andwheneverIperformanactofpersonation,whatIamdoingisputtingonamask.7

BarkerdoesnotrefertoCiceroinhisdiscussionofthetheatricaloriginsoftheconceptofpersonality,andnordoeshereferto

4Hobbes,Leviathan,p.112.5Infact,Ciceroemployedtheideaofthepersonainavarietyofdifferentwayswhenitwastakenoutsideofastrictlylegalcontext.G.W.AllportidentifiesfourinhisPersonality,apsychologicalinterpretation(London,1938)first,todescribethewaythatoneappearstoothers(butnothowonereallyis);second,todescribethepartthatoneplaysinlife;third,todescribeanassemblageofpersonalqualitiesthatfitamanforwork;andfourth,todescribeaformofdistinctionordignity(forexample,inastyleofspeechor

writing).6Hobbes,Leviathan,p.112.7PitkinpointsoutthatthesourceofthequotationthatHobbesusesheremakesitsomewhatinappropriate.ItcomesfromCicero's'Onthecharacteroftheorator',anditreferstothemomentwhentheoratortriestoimaginehimselfintothevariouspartsthatareplayedoutinalegalsetting,inordertoforearmhimselfagainsttheargumentshemightencounterthere.Inthissense,Pitkinsuggests,thereisnorepresentativeperformancetakingplaceintheHobbesiansense(i.e.noactinginanother'snamebeforeanaudience),onlyanimaginativeperformanceinsidetheorator'shead(seeH.Pitkin,Theconceptofrepresentation(Berkeley,1967),pp.245).PitkingoesontoarguethatHobbes'sconceptionofrepresentationisnot,infact,bestunderstoodintheatricalterm.Thereissomethingtobesaidforthisview,asweshallsee,withregardtotherepresentationbynaturalpersonsofartificialpersons.However,PitkinneglectstheothersortofrepresentationforwhichHobbesallowstherepresentationbyartificialpersonsoffictitiouspersonsandinthisregard,heraccountisincompleteAsweshallalsoset,therepresentationoffititiouspersonsbyactorsdoesfitthetermsofthestage.

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Hobbesbyname.Butininvokingtheideaoflegalpersonalityasakindofmask,itisclearthatBarkerisseekingtoreintroducetothequestionofgrouppersonalitytheclearcutdistinctionswhichmarkitsorigins,andwhichweredeployedbothbyCiceroandbyHobbes.Inparticular,bymovingbackfromthetribunaltothetheatre,Barkerhopestoraisethetwoquestionsonwhichhebelievesthewholeissueofgrouppersonalitymustturn.First,towhomorwhatdoesthemaskofgrouppersonalityattach?Second,bywhomorwhatistheattachingdone?JusthowclearcutaretheanswersthatBarkergivestothesequestionswehavealreadyseen:themaskisattachedto'purposes';themaskisattachedby'law'.Barker'sownpurposeingivingtheseanswerswastoescapefromthemetaphysicaluncertaintiesofthedoctrineofrealgrouppersonalitybyemphasisingtheartificeinvolvedintheattachingofmasks,whileyetcontinuingtoemphasisethatartificedoesnotentailarbitrariness.Thepointaboutmasks,forBarker,wasthattheycouldbewellorpoorlydrawn,andwellorpoorlychosen,asaplaycanbewellorpoorlywritten,andwellorpoorlycast.

Unfortunately,however,theseissuesarenotquitesoclearcutasBarkersupposed.Thetwoquestionsthatheaskseachcontainacertainambiguity,andthisambiguityisbroughtoutifwemakeexplicittheconnectionthatBarkerchosenottomake,betweenhisaccountofmask-wearingandmask-giving,andthatprovidedbyHobbes.Barkersupposesthattherelationbetweenamaskandthe'bearer'ofthatmaskisarelativelysimpleone,allowingustoseektoidentifytheparticularmenorthingstowhichparticularmasksattach.ButHobbesknewitwasmorecomplicatedthanthat,sinceheknewthatamaskmayattachtosomeoneorthingintwodifferentways.Ontheonehand,amaskmaybesaidtoattachtotheactorwhowearsit,andwhosewordsandactionsbringthemasktolife;ontheotherhand,itmaybesaidtoattachtotheparticularpartthatanactortakes

himselftobeplaying,andwhichthemaskitselfsymbolises.Thisdistinctioncanbeillustratedbymeansofasimpletheatricalexample.AnactorplayingKingLearmayfeelthatthepartrequireshimtowearacrownuponthestage.Thiscrownwillhaveneithertheactor'snortheking'snameonit,andwillinalllikelihoodhavebeenwornbyotheractorsplayingthepartofotherkings.Towhom,inthisinstance,dowewishtosaythatthecrownisattached?Isitwornbytheactor,whoprovidesitwithactions,orbyLear,whoprovidesitwithacharacterofitsown?Probably,we

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shouldwanttosayboth,butwecannotbydefinitionsaythatitis'worn'bybothinthesameway.ItisthisdistinctionwhichgivesrisetoHobbes'sdistinctionbetweenartificialandfictitiouspersons,andbetweenthedifferentsortsofauthorityrequiredineachcase.OnthesimplestHobbesianmodel,anactorwearsthemaskofanaturalperson,whoisthenauthor.Inthesecircumstances,theauthoristhemask,whichthenattachestotheactoralone.(Theactormayhimselfbetheauthor,ifhespeaksinhisownname,butthisdoesnotalterthebasicnatureoftherelation.)However,onthemorecomplicatedmodeloffictitiouspersonality,theactorwearsamaskwhichhasbeendrawnupbyanauthorinordertoallowfortherepresentationofsome'character'anincapableman,aninanimatething,afigmentincapableofrepresentingitself.Here,themaskisquiteseparatefromtheauthor,andisattachedbytheauthorbothtowhateverrequiresrepresentation(thefiction)andtowhomeveristodotherepresenting(theactor).Itisthisformofauthoritywhichbearscomparisonwith'authorship'inthetheatrethedramatistcreatesthemaskwhichcreatesthepartthattheactoristoplay.Thisneednotbeamaskinanyliteralsense:thelinesanactorisgiventospeak,justasmuchasthecostumehehastowear,constituteaformalrepresentationofthecharacteritishistasktorepresent.ThuswhenanactordeliversalineasLear,justaswhenhewearsacrownasLear,wemaylegitimatelyasktowhomthewords,orcrown,areattached.Istheauthorgivingthemtotheactor,orishegivingthemtothepart?Thisisbynomeansanunanswerablequestion,butthefactthatitisaquestiontowhichthereismorethanoneanswerissomethingthatBarkerchoosestoignore.

TheambiguitycontainedinBarker'ssecondquestionbywhomorwhatarethemasksattached?isofadifferentkind.Aswellassupposingthatthebusinessofattachingmasksisaninherentlysimpleone,Barkeralsosupposesthatthereisnooverlapbetweenthebusinessofattachingmasksandthebusinessofwearingthem.Yethe

acceptsthatmasks,whichareattachedtoassociationsinsofarastheyconstitute'purposes',arethemselvesattachedbyanassociation'thelegalassociation'whichhasitsownpurpose'law'.Asaresult,itisatleastpossibletoaskwhetherthisassociationmightnotrequireamaskofitsown.TheanswerHobbesgavetothisquestionwasquiteclear.Hislegalassociation,orcommonwealth,doesnotattachfictitiouspersonalitytootherassociations,forthesimplereasonthatitdoesnotitselfdoanything;itis,likeallassociations,

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incapableofactioninitsownright.Itis,inotherwords,nothingbutamask,whichiswornbytheactorknownassovereign.ThedifficultywithHobbes'sposition,aswehaveseen,isthatitishardtoknowhowthismaskisauthorised,sinceHobbesinsiststhatthefictitiouspersonalityofassociationscanonlybeauthorisedbythesovereign,whomustalreadywearthemaskofthecommonwealth.IfBarker'slegalassociationisitselftobeunderstoodasaperson,hetoomustexplainhowthatpersonalityistobeattained,giventhedependenceoflegalpersonalityonthepriorexistenceofthestate.Ofcourse,hecouldchoosetodenythathisstateisitselfaperson.Butifso,hewillthenhavetoexplainhowit,asanassociation,iscapableofattachingpersonalitytoothers.Forhehasalreadyinsistedthatassociations,lackingpsychologicalandmoralpersonality,areonlycapableofactingintheirownrightwhenpossessedoflegalpersonality.Ifthestatelackssuchpersonality,howcanitbecapableoftheactionrequiredtoattachpersonalityelsewhere?Barkertellsusthatthestateisanassociation,thatassociationsactaslegalpersons,andthatlegalpersonalityisattachedtoassociationsbythestate.Hehasthereforeeithertotelluswhatattacheslegalpersonalitytothestate,ortotelluswhatallowsthestatetoactintheabsenceofsuchpersonality.Thishefailstodo.

BydisregardingthesemorecomplexissuesinhisintroductiontoGierke,BarkereffectivelydiscountsthehistoryofEnglishpoliticalthoughtoverthepreviousthirty-threeyears.Indeed,itisreasonabletosuggestthatifmattershadbeenasclearcutasBarkerimagines,mostoftheproblemswhichengagedtheEnglishpluralists(includingBarkerhimself)needneverhavearisen.Infact,EnglishpluralismaroseoutofaperceivedneedtoaddresspreciselythosequestionswhichBarkerpreferredtoignore.Thepluralistswishedtoknowwhethergroupswerecapableofproducingtheirownlegalpersonality,(i.e.theirownmasks),andtheywishedtoknowwhetherthestatewas

alsoinneedofitsownlegalpersonality(i.e.amaskofitsown).ItistruethattheiranswerstothesequestionswerenomoresatisfactorythantheanswersBarkergivestohis.ItisalsotruethatbyreturningthelanguageoflegalpersonalitytoitstheatricaloriginsBarkerprovidesaconsistentmeansofunderstandingthesequestions.ButitisnottruethattheparticularuseBarkermakesoftheideaofthelegaldramaenablesustomakesenseofthedilemmasencounteredbythepluralists.Hisapproachistoosimplistic.Instead,somethingclosertothecomplexityofHobbes'saccountisrequired.Only

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withtheaidofsuchanaccountisitpossibletomakesenseofthefailureofpoliticalpluralisminitsownterms.

TomovefromBarkerbacktoHobbesisnotintendedtosuggestthatHobbes'ssolutiontotheproblemofgrouppersonalitywasafteralltherightone.Rather,itistosuggestthatanexaminationofthegapbetweenHobbes'ssolutionandBarker'smighthelpexplainwhytheproblemprovedsointractable.Thisiswhatwillheattemptedinthefinalpartofthisbook.ThetheatricalconceptsdeployedbyBarkerdoopenthewayforaphilosophicaloverviewofthehistorythathasgonebefore.Theyonlydoso,however,iftheyareusedinamoreexpansivemannerthanBarkerallows.ItisnecessarytogetawayfromtheparticularquestionsposedbyBarkertowhatisthemaskattached?bywhomisthemaskattached?andinsteadtoposetwowhichmakebettersenseinHobbes'sterms.What,weneedtoknowfirst,doesitmeanforagroupofhumanbeings'toplayapart'?Andsecond,whatisthepartthatisplayedbythegroupknownasthestate?

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Chapter12TheMaskoftheGroup

I

Whatdowemeanwhenwespeakofanactorplayingapart?Onthestage,itmeansthatanactorputsonthecostume,oruttersthewords,appropriatetoaparticularrole.Butdowewanttosaythatthe'playing'followsfromthemannerinwhichtheactormovesinhiscostume,orspeakshiswords,ordowewanttosaythatitfollowsfromtheparticularwordsandtheparticularmovementsthattheactorisrequiredtoperform?Dowe,inotherwords,wishtothinkoftheplayertakingchargeofthepart,oroftheparttakingchargeoftheplayer?Thisistheambiguitythatliesattheheartofthetheatricalconceptofthepersona,andithasitsrootsintheetymologyoftheterm.AsbothHobbesandBarkerpointout,thewordpersona,whichoriginally,denotedjustthemaskwornonstage,sooncame,bywhatBarkercalls'naturaltransference',1toreferalsototheactorwhoworeit.Thepossessionofapersona,therefore,mightdenoteoneoftwoconditions:itmightrefertothecapacityofanactortoperform,orinterpret,certainroles;alternatively,itmightrefertotheparticularroleitisgiventoanactortoperform.Inthefirstinstance,werecognisethepresenceofthepersonaonstageinthefreedomenjoyedbyanactortointerpretapartasheseesfit.Inthesecondinstance,werecogniseitintheconstraintsthatactupontheactor,bindinghimtotheperformanceofcertainactions.Thuswemaysayofpersonality,asofauthority,thatitspossessionhasnonecessaryconnectionwithfreedomofaction.Thatdependsupontheconditionsunderwhichitisassumed,andthetermsonwhichitisgiven.

Thisuncertaintyastowhatisinvolvedinthepossessionofapersona,

orpersonality,hascomethroughtocontemporaryusage.

1Gierke,Naturallaw,p.lxx.

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Thoughwenolongermaketheexplicitconnectionbetweenthepersonaandthemask,wecontinuetousetheterm'personality'toconjureupthesuperficialtrappingsofpublicperformancethosewholivetheirlivesinthepubliceyearefrequentlydescribedas'personalities',andexpectedtobehaveinthetheatricalmannerbefittingthatterm.Atthesametime,however,wepersistinusingtheideaofthepersontoprovideacontrasttothissenseofsuperficiality.So,forexample,thebehaviourofa'personality'maybecontrastedwiththatof'arealperson',andofaparticularindividualthepublicpersonalitymaybesetagainst'thepersoninside'.Whenitisappliedoutsideofthepurelypublicdomain,theterm'personality'ismoreoftenusedtorefertowhatisessentialinournaturesthantowhatisexternalinthisregard,itmakesperfectsensetospeakofour'personalities'makingeachofuswhatweare.Yetevenhere,inthepsychologicalsphere,aninherentambivalenceremains.Personality,whichiscommonlyusedtodenotetheessenceofindividuality,mayalsobeusedtodenotethefacethatanindividualpresentstotheworld.Itmaystill,therefore,beseenasamask,asitwasbyJung,whounderstoodpersonalitytobe'themaskthathidesindividuality'.2Forthisreason,itremainspossibletoconceivetherelationbetweenpsychologicalpersonalityandanindividual'struenatureintwoentirelydifferentways:ontheonehand,itcouldbesaidthatanindividual'spersonalityiswhatliesbehindhispublicmask;ontheother,itmightbearguedthatitisonlybystrippingawaythemaskofpersonalitythatwediscovertheindividualwithin.Thisdoublemeaningisareflectionofthedoublemeaningthattheideaofthepersonaonceenjoyedinthetheatre,whereitdescribedboththemaskandthemanbehindthemask.Anditisbecauseofthisdoublemeaningthatthenotionofgrouppersonalitycannotbeexplainedsimplybyequatingittothenotionoftheplayingofapart.Firstofall,weneedtodecidewhatwemeanwhenweusethatphrase.Arewetalkingaboutthepartorarewetalkingabouttheplayer?

II

Barker,thoughheappearsnottonoticeit,endsuptalkingaboutboth.Whenheintroduceshisanalogybetweenthestateandthestage,hedescribestheformeras'aplaceoflegalactors,allofwhom

2QuotedinG.W.Allport,Personality:apsychologicalinterpretation,p.40.

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playarole,andeachofwhommaybecalledadramatispersona';3here,personalitybelongstotheactor.Later,though,hedescribeslegalpersonalityas'amask...whichiscreatedbyanagency,andattachedbythatagencytoanobject';4here,personalitybelongstothemask.ItistruethatonHobbes'saccounttherearecircumstancesinwhichthesamepersoncanbesimultaneouslymaskandactor:thisoccurswheneveranaturalpersonactsinhisownname,therebyensuringthatthepersonoftherepresentative(theactor)andthepersonoftherepresented(themask)areoneandthesame.ButBarker'saccountofmask-wearingandmask-givingwasintendedtodistinguishbetweenlegalpersonalityandthoseformsofnaturalpersonality(psychologicalandmoral)whichbelongtotheindividualalone.Hecannot,therefore,equatetheactorwiththemask,sinceitwashiswholepointthatlegalpersonalitydoesnotbelongtotheindividual,butisattachedtoindividualsandgroupsbysomeexternalagency.Hobbes'sactorsarepersonswhowearthemaskappropriatetothesituationtheyfindthemselvesin,amaskbelongingeithertothemselvesortoanother.Barker'sactors,meanwhile,arepersonsonlyinsofarastheyareprovidedwiththeappropriatemask.

IfwelookcloselyatwhatBarkerissaying,itquicklybecomesclearthatheissayingsomethingverydifferentfromHobbes.Indeed,Barker'saccountofpersonsandthingspersonatedcanbesaideffectivelytoreversetheaccountgiveninchapterXVIofLeviathan.ForBarker,legalpersonalityisnotsomethingthatcomesinaseriesofmaskswornbyaseriesofactors.Rather,itisitselfamask,ormodus,whichbeingattachedtoanactorallowsthatactortospeakandactinthemannerofalegalperson.Hobbes'smasksallowactorstospeakandactinthenameofothers,whichrequiresthattheseothersbeinpossessionofnames;iftheyarefictions,theymustbegivennamesbyanauthor,sothatweknowonwhosebehalftherepresentativeacts.ButBarker'smasksimplyenablesactorstospeakandactinthename

oflegalpersonalityitself.ItisthedifferencebetweenanactorwhowearsacrowninordertoplaythepartofKingLear,andanactorwhowearsacrownsimplytoplaythepartofaking.Inthefirstinstance,thecrownhelpsuspickoutaparticularcharacter;inthesecond,ithelpsuspickoutaparticulartypeofcharacter.SoitiswithHobbes'sandBarker'smasks.For

3Gierke,Naturallaw,p.lxx.4Ibid.,p.lxxi.

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Hobbes,themaskbindsanactortotheparticularpersonwhosewordsandactionstheactorthenperforms;forBarker,themaskbindstheactortobehaveasthoughaperson,withtherightsanddutiesappropriatetothatrole.Asaresult,thetwomenarriveatdiametricallyopposedviewsofwhatisentailedbytheconceptofgrouppersonality.Hobbesunderstandsgroupstobecomepersonswhenanartificialperson(anactor)putsonthemaskofthegroup.Barkerunderstandsgroupstobecomepersonswhenthegroup(theactor)putsonthemaskofartificialpersonality.

InhisintroductiontoGierke,Barkerusesthisdefinitionofgrouppersonalitytoconstructanaccountofcorporatefreedom.Tobeginwith,hedistinguishesbetweenstateswhicharecharyintheirgrantofthemaskoflegalpersonality,andthosethatseektomakeitaswidelyavailableaspossible.AmongtheselatterhewouldincludetheEnglishstate,whichmadethemaskoflegalpersonalityfreelyavailableinthe1862CompaniesAct,incontrasttothosestates,likeGermany,whichremainedweddedtotheprinciplesoftheconcessiontheory.Barkerthengoesontodistinguishbetweenstateswhichprovideonlywhathecalls'themaskoffullcorporatepersonality'forgroups,andthosethatoffertogroupsachoiceofmasksorpersonae.5Again,theintendedcontrastisbetweenEngland,whichalongsidethemaskoftheuniversitascouldalsoofferthemaskofthetrust,andGermany,where,inBarker'swords,'theStatewaslessrichlyequipped'.6Barker'smessagehereisthatfreedomforgroupsdepends,firstofall,ontheirbeingabletotakepartinthelegaldrama,andsecond,ontherebeingmorethanonepartavailableinthatdrama,asanactor'sfreedomofexpressiondepends,firstofall,ontherebeingpartsforhimtoplay,andsecond,onhisbeinggiventhepartthatsuitshimbest.

ThetroublewiththisargumentisthatthesecondhalfofitthepartconcernedwithvarietiesofmasksmakesnosenseinBarker'sown

terms.Barker'sfundamentalpointisthatlegalpersonalityisamask;thatis,itisthemaskthatgroupsmustweariftheyaretobecomedramatispersonae.Howthencanitbepossibleforgroupsto

5Ibid.,p.lxxii.6Ibid.BarkerdoesnotmeantosuggestthateitherGermanlanguageorGermanlawwerelessrichlyequippedintheirstockoftermstodescribethegroupperse.Germanisnotoriouslyrepletewithwordswhichsignifygroupsandassociations,includingAnstalt,Gemeinschaft,Gesellschaft,Verbinding,Vereinigung,Verbandandsoon.Barker'spointisthatGermanlaw,underRomaninfluence,lackedavarietyofmeanstoprovidegroupswiththespecificappearanceofgrouppersons,andthis,ofcourse,wasGierke'sfeelingaswell.

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acquireapersonabyadoptingamaskotherthanthatofthepersona,themaskoflegalpersonality?Theanswermustbethatitcannot,unlesswearepreparedtoconfuse,asBarkerappearsto,thepersonagivenbythemaskwiththepersonaoftheactorwhowearsit.Groupscanonlywearavarietyofmasksiftheyareassumedalreadytopossessthepersonaofanactor,therebyrenderingthemcapableofplayingmorethanonerole.YetBarkerinsiststhatgroupsonlybecomeactorsinthelegaldramawhentheywearthemaskofthelegalperson.Legalpersonalityiseitheroneofthemasksthatgroupswearonstage,oritistheonemasktheywearwhenevertheyappearonstage.Itcannotbeboth.

Wecanillustratethispointifwereturntotheexampleoftheactor,thekingandthecrown.Ifanactormust(sayforconvention'ssake)wearacrownwhenheistoplayaking,hecannotplayakingifheiswearingsomethingotherthanacrown.Ofcourse,thisdoesnotmeanthatitisimpossibleforakingtoappearonstagewearinganyothersortofcostume(Learcanstillappearinrags,forexample).Butthiswillonlybepossibleifwealreadyknowthatheisaking.ItisthesameforBarker'sgroups.Iftheymustwearthemaskofpersonalityinordertobepersons,thennoothermaskwilldo.Iftheyaretowearothermasks,itmustbebecausewealreadyknowthemtobepersons.YetBarkertellsusofnowaytorecognisegroupsaspersonsunlessweseetheminthemaskoflegalpersonality.Whatresults,unsurprisingly,isathoroughlyconfusedargument,somethingthatisbestillustratedwiththeaidofBarker'sownexample,thatofthetrust.Atrust,asMaitlandknewonlytoowell,didnotturnagroupintoaperson.Indeed,itwasthewholepointoftrusteeshipthatgroupswereconsideredincapableofactinginthemannerofpersons,whichiswhatrequiredtheappointmentoftrusteestoactintheirinterests.Itisthereforeimpossibletoseehowagroupmightbesaidtoadoptthepersonaofatrust,sincetheabilitytoadoptanysuchpersonawould

negatetheveryneedfortrusteeship.Itis,instead,aseparategroupofindividualswhoseparatelyadoptthepersonaoftrustees,andtheyareabletodosopreciselybecauseeachisalreadyapersoninhisownright.BarkertriestotietheideaofthetrustintohisgeneralconceptionofmasksbyinvokingMaitland'scelebratedremarkthatthetrustisaformof'screen',7behindwhichallmannerofgroupactivitiescantakeplace.Butallheachievesbydoingsoisto

7Seeibid.

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revealhowcarefulonehastobeintheuseofthissortoflanguage.Forwhileitistruethatascreenisaformofmask,itisnotamaskinanythinglikethesensethatBarkerhasbeenusingtheterm.Ascreenmasksmerelybyconcealingwhatisbehindit;itdoesnotmaskbyprovidingrepresentationfortheactorwhostandsbehindit.Boththecostumesthatactorswearinthecourseofadrama,andthecurtainthatcomesdownattheend,maybesaidtoprovide'masks'fortheaction.Butwhereasonehelpsustounderstandwhatistakingplaceonstage,theothertellsusthatwhatistakingplaceonstageisnolongerourbusiness.Itwasasanaidtoconcealment,notasanaidtocomprehension,thatMaitlandunderstoodthetrusttooperate.

IfwewishtousethetheatricaloriginsoftheconceptofthepersontomakesenseoftheargumentsofMaitland,andothers,weneedtogetawayfromBarker'sviewthatlegalpersonalityisitselfamask,andreturninsteadtoHobbes'sviewthatlegalpersonsareseparatemasks,separatelywornbytheartificialpersonswhorepresentthem.Onceseenintheseterms,itbecomesclear,asitwastoHobbes,thattheimportantquestionsaboutgrouppersonalityareneitherwhichmask,norhowmanymasks,butratherwherethemasksaredrawnup,andhow.AndthisbecomesevenclearerifweuseHobbes'saccountofmask-wearingandmask-giving,ratherthanBarker's,toattempttodistinguishbetweenthefreedomsenjoyedbygroupsinvariouskindsofstates.

Thethreekindsofstateweneedtodistinguisharetheconcessionarystate(seenbyBarkerasthestatewithone,infrequentlydispensedmask),theliberalstate(seenbyBarkerasthestatewithone,frequentlydispensedmask),andthestatethatalsomakesprovisionfortrusts(seenbyBarkerasthestatewithmorethanonemask).InHobbes'sterms,theconcessionarystateisoneinwhichmasksareonlyprovidedforgroupsbyone,particularauthor.Intheatricalterms,wemaysayitiscomparabletoastageonwhichasingledramatist

putsonhisownplays.Thisimpliesnonecessarylimitastothenumberofpartsthatmaybedrawnup;butitdoessuggestthatnopartwillbedrawnupunlessthedramatistconsidersitappropriatetothedramahewishestoproduce.Inaliberalstate,meanwhile,maskscanbedrawnupasandwhenthereisademand.Thetheatricalanalogyforthiswouldbeastageonwhichthedramaisputtogetherbyallthoseinvolvedinthedrama,andwhowishtoseeparticularpartsbeingperformed.Again,thisdoesnottellusanythingaboutthenumberofpartsthatmaybeplayed(manypeople

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maydecidethattheyhavenointerestintheproduction);butitdoestellusthatthedramaitselfwillbeentirelyconditionedbythewishesofthosewhoexpecttobeinvolved,whetheronstage,backstageorsimplyintheaudience.Theliberalstatemightnotprovideforthemostcompellingtheatre.Butthiswillbecompensatedforbythesenseofinvolvementsharedbyallthosewhochoosetoparticipate.

Thecaseofthestatewhichallowsgroupstobeorganisedaroundadeedoftrustissomewhatdifferent.Becausegroupsrepresentedbytrusteesarenotpersons,thereisnoplacefortrustsinHobbes'saccountofpersonsandthingspersonated.Nevertheless,itisstillpossibletofindatheatricalanalogyforwhatisinvolved.Actorsperformingonthestagedonotalwaysneedtorepresentaparticularcharacterinordertobeseentoact.Whenadramaiswhollyimprovised,theactorsmaygivetheimpressionofactingoutapartmerelybydintoftheactionstheyperform.Soitiswithtrustees,whodonotrepresentanyoneorthinginparticular,butareabletogivetheimpressionthattheydosimplybyperformingtheirownactionsinaparticularmanner.Inimproviseddrama,unlikeindramasofamoreconventionalkind,everythingdependsupontheactitself,suchthatwecanknownothingaboutthecharactersinthedramauntilwehaveseenitbeingperformed.Similarly,wecanonlysaysomethingaboutthepersonalityofatrust'sbeneficiaryoncewehaveseenthemannerinwhichthetrusteesact.Ofcourse,trustees,likeimprovisingactors,cannotbeallowedtodoanythingtheylike,andiftheirperformanceistobeconvincingitwillhavetobeadaptedtotheexpectationsoftheaudiencethatwitnessesit.Buttrusteescancreatethepartthattheyareplayingthemaskthattheyseemtorepresentastheygoalong.Astatethatincludestrustsaswellascorporationsislikeastagethatallowsfortheproductionofunscripteddramasalongsidetheproductionofscriptedones.

Whattheseanalogiesdemonstrateisthatacoherentaccountofthe

variousfreedomsenjoyedbygroupscannotconcernitselfsimplywithvarietiesofmasksagreatmanymasksdonotnecessarilyequatewithagreatamountoffreedom,sinceitispossibletohavealargenumberofcorporationswithinwhatremainsaconcessionarystate.Nor,paceBarker,canacoherentaccountseektoidentifyoneparticularagencywithwhomthedistributionofmasksrests,andonwhomallfreedomistakentodepend.ThesortsoffreedomsBarkerwishestodistinguishdonotdependononeauthor,butonwhetherthedramahasonlyoneauthor,morethanoneauthor,orpossibly

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evennoauthoratall.Itisthisthatdeterminesthenatureandavailabilityoflegalpersonality.Thuswhatmattersforgroupsisnotthedistributionofmasksassuch.Whatmattersisthetypeofdramainwhichtheyaregoingtoappear.

III

Barker'sattempttoequatetheliberalityofstateswiththeavailabilityofthemaskoflegalpersonalitymakeslittleenoughsenseonitsownterms.ItmakesevenlesssenseifwerememberthatBarkerintendedittoformpartofanintroductiontotheideasofatheoristwhobelievedgrouppersonalitytobereal.Barker'saccountofgroupsandtheirpersonaemakesitimpossibletounderstandwhyGierke,oranyoneelse,shouldhavebotheredthemselveswiththeissueofrealgrouppersonality,sinceBarker'saccountmakesitclearthatunlimitedfreedomisquitecompatiblewiththedistributionofmasks,orfictitiouspersonality.Ifagroupcanacquirelegalpersonalitysimplybydonningtherelevantmask,whatcomplaintcanachampionofgroupfreedomandgroupidentityhaveagainstastatethatmakesthismaskavailabletoanygroupthatwantsit?Yet,aswehaveseen,thiswaspreciselythepointatissueforGierkeandforhisEnglishfollowers.Theydidnotacceptthatastatewhichofferedlegalpersonalitytoallgroupswasanadequatesubstituteforastateinwhichallgrouppersonalitywasunderstoodtobesomethingreal.Itwasthisinsistenceonsomethingmorethanmereaccessibilitywhichmadetheirthoughtdistinctive,butnothingBarkersaysinhisintroductiontoGierkeexplainswhytheyshouldhavefelttheneedtoinsistonitatall.

Wecanexplainit,though,ifwereverttotheaccountofgroupsandtheirpersonaeborrowedfromHobbes.Onthataccount,groupfreedomcanbeseentodependnotjustontheaccessibilityofmasksbutonthetypeofdramainwhichthosemasksweretoplayapart.

Differentdramasarecapableofgeneratingdifferentkindsoffreedom,yetitremainstruethatineachcasethefreedomenjoyedbyanyparticulargroupcanneverbesaidtodependuponthegroupitself.InHobbes'spreferredstatetheconcessionarystateallfreedomsinevitablyrestwiththeauthorofthedrama,whoissovereign.Buteveninaliberalstate,wheregroupsacquiremasksasandwhendesired,itisnotthegroupsthemselveswhodotheacquiring;rather,itisdoneforthembythoseindividualswhohave

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decidedtoprovidethegroupwithapersonalityofitsown.Nordoesthegroupwearthemaskitself;itiswornforitbyanactor,itsappointedrepresentative.Thegroupitselfdoesnothing,whichiswhatmakesitafiction,anddependsforeverythingonthenaturalpersons(itsmembers)whogiveitamaskandtheartificialperson(itsrepresentative)whowearsit.Inastate,meanwhile,whichallowsagroup'sintereststobehandledbytrustees,everythingcomestodependupontheactorsalone.Wheretheyareskilled,theymaycreateaveryclearimpressionofthegroupinwhoseintereststheyact;butasinanimproviseddrama,iftheactingisbad,thespellmaysoonbebroken,leavingnothingbehindbuttheexposedpersonsoftheactorsthemselves.AnditwasthisthatprovidedMaitlandwithhiscomplaintagainstthetrustnotthatitwasilliberal,orinaccessible,orimpractical,butthatitwasanadhoc,orhaphazard,business,dependingtooheavilyineachinstanceonboththestandardsoftheactorsandthetoleranceoftheaudience.Likewise,Maitland'sobjectionstothekindofliberallegislationexemplifiedbythe1862CompaniesActdidnotturnontheissueofgroupfreedomperse,butonthequestionofthepeopleinwhomitwasvested:hecouldhardlycomplainthatthe1862Actwaslimitinginitseffectoncorporatelife;buthecouldcomplainthatitleftthecrucialdecisionsinthewronghands,relyingontheindividualswhomadeupaparticulargrouptoinventforitacorporatepersonality,ratherthanrelyingforsuchpersonalityonthegroupitself.AsMaitlandhaddiscovered,invitingpeopletoincorporatetheirassociativeactivitiesintheformaldramaofthestatewasnotthesameasensuringthateveryoneandeverythingisrepresentedthere.Thedoctrineofrealgrouppersonalitywasdesignedtoensurethatgroupswouldbefreedfromtheirdependenceonauthorsandactors,howeverliberallydisposedthoseauthorsandactorsmightbe.Itwasdesignedtoensureallgroupsaplaceonthestageintheirownright.

Thedoctrineofrealgrouppersonalitywasalsodesigned,asweknow,totakeissuewithHobbes'sdoctrineofpersonsandtheirrepresentatives.Hobbeswasquiteclearthatgroupscouldonlybesecuredoftheirownpersonalityifotherpersonsnaturalorartificialwerepreparedtosecureitforthem.Maitland,likeGierke,wasadamantthatgroups,quagroups,mustsecureitforthemselves.ThuswhereHobbessawgrouppersonalityasamask,withaseparateauthorandactor,GierkeandMaitlandsawthegroupperson,ormask,asauthorandactorinitsownright.Inhistoricalterms,this

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meantadeparturefromHobbesian,orRoman,viewsofgrouppersonality,anditwashardlysurprisingthatGierkeandthosewhofollowedhimchosetoabandonthenotionofpersonalityasamaskaltogether.Inconceptualterms,however,itdoesnonethelessremainpossibletomakesenseofthedoctrineofrealgrouppersonalityinHobbesiantermsthatis,inthelanguageof'authors','actors'and'masks'.ForitisimportanttorememberthatHobbesdidallowformaskstobetheirownauthorsandtheirownactors,ifonlywhentheyarewornbythenaturalpersonthattheyrepresent.Anaturalpersonis,asaperson,amask,butisalso,asanaturalperson,authorandactorofthewordsandactionsperformedinthatmask.Wemaythereforesayofrealgrouppersonsthatiftheyaretobeboththemask,andtheauthorof,andactorin,themask,theymustpossesstheirmasksinthemannerthatnaturalpersonspossesstheirs.Onceseenintheseterms,itbecomesclearthatthecentralquestionispreciselythequestionthatBarker'saccountofmask-wearingandmask-givingbegs.Howcanagroup,whosepersonalityisgiveninamask,alsobethepersonresponsibleforwhatisdoneinthatmask?Anditalsobecomesclearthattheanswertothisquestiondependsontheanswertoanother.Howcananaturalperson,whosepersonalityisgiveninamask,alsobethepersonwhoisresponsibleforwhatisdoneinthatmask?Inotherwords,ifnaturalpersonsaremasks,wheredothemasksofnaturalpersonalitycomefrom?

Theansweristhattheycomefromlife:themasksofnaturalpersonsaredescribedinthelivesthattheylead.Whenamanspeaksforhimself,hespeaksforthepersonwhochooseswhatissaid,suchthatthemaskthathewearsisindistinguishablefromthewordsandactionsthatheperforms.Ifwewishtorecognisethemask,wecanlookonlytothewordsandactionsperformedinit.Thisisnottosuggestthatthemasksofnaturalpersonsareimprovisedimprovisationinvolvestheattemptbyanactortocreatetheimpressionofaseparatepersona

distinctfromhisown.Themasksofnaturalpersonscreatenoimpressionbeyondtheimpressioncreatedbytheactionsoftheactorhimself.Ofcourse,onHobbes'saccount,naturalpersonscanberepresentedbyartificialpersons,inwhichcasetheactorwillbewearinganaturalmaskwhichisnothisown.Butevenhere,wewillonlybeabletoidentifythemaskifwehavesomeawarenessoftheactionsperformedthelifelivedbythenaturalpersontowhomitbelongs.Ifonemanthreatensanotherinthenameofathird,thethreatwillbeunderstoodtobelongnotjusttoaname,but

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toapersonweassociatewithcertainactions(thatishowwemakesenseofthethreat).Iftheownershipofathreatisunderstoodwithoutreferencetotheactionsoftheauthor,itwillbebecauseithasbeenissuedonbehalfofsomethingthatisjustanameafictitiouspersonratherthananaturalone.Andathreatwillonlybeissuedonbehalfofapersonthatcannotactifsomeotherpersonorpersonshaveestablishedthetermsonwhichactionscanbeperformedforthem.Thedifferencebetweennaturalpersonalityandfictitiouspersonalityisthatthemasksofnaturalpersonsaredescribedintheiractions,whilethemasksoffictitiouspersonsaredescribedintheconstraintsthatactonthepersonswhorepresentthem.

Anumberofthingsfollowfromthisdistinction.First,itisonlythenaturalpersonconcernedwhocantrulyknowwhatisrepresentedbythemaskoftheirownnaturalpersonality.Thatmaskwillbesetoutoverthecourseofalife-time,anditisonlythosewhohaveseenitdescribedoverthecourseofalife-timewhocanrecogniseitwithcertainty.Fornaturalpersons,itislifeitselfthatisthedrama,andthedramaofeachlifewillbedifferent.Manyotherswillreceivemanydifferentglimpsesofeachlife,butnonecanbesureofwhatthemaskrepresentsunlesstheyhaveseenitall.Wherethereisdoubtaboutwhatisrepresentedbythemaskofafictitiousperson,certaintycanbeachievedbyreferringtothe'letters'or'laws'bywhichthatpersonalityisauthorised.Butwherethereisdoubtaboutwhatisrepresentedbythemaskofanaturalperson,certaintycanonlybeachievedbyreferringtothelifethatthatpersonhasled.Second,naturalpersonality,inthissense,canonlybelongtoindividualswhoarecapableofperceivingtheirlivesasakindofdramaticunity.Iftheactionsofanindividualareessentiallydisconnectediftheyareinstinctiveratherthanintended,sequentialratherthanconsequentialitwillproveimpossibleforanyonetodescribeaccuratelywhatisbeingrepresentedbythemaskofnatural

personality.Behindthemasktherewillbenothingbutafragmentaryordisjointedpersona.Naturalpersonalityrequirespurposiveactionstoberelatedtoasenseofpersonalidentity,anditwasforthisreasonthatHobbesdidnotconsiderchildren,madmenorfoolstobenaturalpersons.8ThuswhatHobbescallsnaturalpersonsmustbewhatBarkercalls'moral'ones.Finally,ifgroupsaretobepossessedofmasks,orpersonae,

8Thisis,ofcourse,anargumentrelatingonlytoresponsibilityforactions.Ithasnobearingonthequestionoftherightsofchildren,madmenorfoolsHobbesallowedthatthesemightbeturnedintofictitiouspersonspreciselysothattheycouldbeaffordedrightsunderthelaw.

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comparabletothemasks,orpersonae,ofnaturalpersons,itmustbebecausetheytooarecapableofgeneratingpersonalityoutoftheactionsthattheyperform.Groupscanonlybepersonsasindividualscanbepersonsiftheyarecapableofactingouttheirown,personaldramas.

Thequestionofwhetheragroupcanactoutadramaofitsownmakingmustbedistinguishedfromthequestionthataskssimplywhetheragroupcanact.EvenHobbesallowedthatgroupscouldact,sinceheacceptedthatassembliescouldbeartificialpersons,actingonbehalfofothers.Inthesameway,therecanbenodoubtthatgroupsofindividualsarecapableofplayingasinglepartonthestagethechorusinclassicaltheatreconstitutesasingleroledespitethefactthatitisplayedbyagroupofactors.However,whattheHobbesianassemblyandtheclassicalchorushaveincommonisastrictrelianceontheconventionsofrepresentationinordertobeabletoacttheactorswhoplaythechorusmustspeakinunison,andthoughthemembersofanassemblyneednotliterallydolikewise,theywillhavetofallbackontheconventionofmajorityvotingiftheyaretobeabletospeakwithasinglevoice.Thedoctrineofrealgrouppersonalitydemandssomethingmorethanthis.Itdemandsthatgroupsactforthemselves.Foritisthewholepointofthedoctrineofrealgrouppersonalitythatgroupsshouldnotbeforcedtorelyonformallyconstitutedrepresentatives,bethoserepresentativesindividualsorassemblies,butshouldinsteadberepresentedbythethingsthattheydo.ItistruethatHobbesallowsforthesamegroupofindividualstobebothrepresenterandrepresented,aswhenacorporationisrepresentedbyanassemblymadeupofallitsmembers.Whathedoesnotallowisthatthesetwogroupsshouldbeconsideredthesameoneisartificial,builtoutoftheconventionsofmajoritydecision-making,theotherfictitious,describedinletterswhoseauthoritycomesfromelsewhere.Thedoctrineofrealgrouppersonalityinsiststhatthey

reallyarethesame,thatitistherepresentedgroupthatisresponsibleforrepresentingitself.Andifthisistobeso,thentherepresentedgroupmustbeabletoactindependentlyoftheactionsofitsauthorisedrepresentatives,withalife,andcharacter,allofitsown.

Inthecaseofthepersonaeofthetheatre,theideathattheymayhavealifeoftheirown,apartfromthelifethatisgiventothembyauthorandactor,isnotuncommon.Wecan,andoftendo,thinkofthecharactersinShakespeareandramaexistingoutsideoftheplays

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inwhichtheyappear.9So,forexample,itispossibletoimagineKingLearasapersonexistingapartfromformalactsofrepresentation,andthereforetoimaginehimcapableofvariousformsofactioninhisownright.ButcanweimagineKingLearcapableofthespecificactiondemandedofnaturalpersons,whichistheactofrepresentationitself?Canwe,inotherwords,imagineKingLearplayingthepartofKingLear,asnaturalpersonsplaytheirownpartsinthecourseoftheirnaturallives?Itisthedistinctiveattributeofnaturalpersonsthattheycanassumeresponsibilityfortheactionsperformedintheirnamebyperformingthoseactionsthemselves.YetitmakesnomoresensetothinkofKingLearassumingresponsibilityfortheplayingofKingLearthanitdoestothinkofKingLeartakingovertheroleofHamlet.Theonepartcannotplaytheother,becauseeverypartmustbeplayeditself.Thisishowwerecognisetheparttobeafiction.So,whenweimagineLeartohavealifeofhisown,whatwearedoingisnothingmorethanconstructingourownrepresentationofLear.WeknowitisnothingmorethanarepresentationbecauseitisimpossibletoimaginehowourimaginedLearwouldtakeoverthepart,oranyotherpart,forhimself.

WhatistrueofKingLearwouldseemtobetrueofgroupsalso.Wecanimaginegroupsleadinglivesoftheirown,butitisveryhardtoimagineagrouptakingchargeofitsownlife.Whatweareimaginingissimplyarepresentationofthegroup,andweknowitisarepresentationbecauseitisimpossibletoimaginethegrouprepresentinganythingelse.Thuswhatwearedoingwhenwepicture,say,achurchleadingalifeofitsownisinfacttopicturealifeforthatchurch.Wecannotimaginehowthechurchmighttakecontrolofthatlifebecausewecannotimaginewhatthechurchiswithoutthepicturewehavepaintedofit.Thisisindirectcontrasttowhathappenswhenwepicturethelifeofanaturalperson:then,thenaturalpersonmayprovebytheiractionsthatthepictureisthewrongone.Achurch

cannotdothishoweverharditsrepresentativesmaytrybecausewithoutthepicturewehaveofthechurchwecannotrecognisewhatitisforthechurchtoact.So,forexample,whentheFreeChurchofScotlandbecamedividedaboutwhat

9'Muchhasbeenwrittenduringthepasttwohundredyearsaboutthe'characters'ofShakespeare,andthepersonsofhisplays,thedramatispersonae,havebeenconsideredasthoughtheyhadalifeoftheirown,couldexistoutsidetheplay,withalifebeforetheplaybeginsandafteritends'(G.Williams,Personandpersona:studiesinShakespeare(Cardiff,1981),p.1).

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constitutedthelifeofthatchurch,itwasnotadisputethatthechurchcouldresolvebysomeactionofitsown.Whatconstitutedsuchactionwaspreciselythegroundofdispute,anditcouldonlyberesolvedbysomeoutsideauthoritydecidingbetweenthedifferentrepresentationsofthechurchprovidedbythecompetingparties.ThechurchitselfwasnomorecapableoftakingadecisionofthiskindthanLearhimselfmightbecapableofdecidingbetweenthecompetingclaimsoftwoactorstryingtorepresenthim.Thatiswhatmakesthepersonalityofthechurchafiction.

Itisthis,then,thatconstitutesthefallacyofthedoctrineofrealgrouppersonality,thatitconfusesourabilitytoimaginegroupshavingtheirownpersonalitywiththeabilityofgroupstodecidethatpersonalityforthemselves.Werewewillingtoattributetheabilitytomakesuchdecisionstotheproductsofourimagination,thefallacywoulddisappear.Awillingnesstodojustthattoattributeself-consciousnesstotheproductsofourconsciousnessisoneofthecharacteristicsofthehighestformsofidealism.Itisthereforeonlythehighestformsofidealismthatcansavethedoctrineofrealgrouppersonality.Onlyifwearepreparedtoattributeasenseofpersonalidentitynotjusttoindividualslikeourselves,buttotheindividualsimaginedbyindividualslikeourselves(or,alternatively,toacceptthatallindividualslikeourselvesaremerelyimaginedbyourselves,avariantonthehighestformsofidealism),willitbepossibletoconceiveofgroupsactingintheirownname.Ifwethinkintheseterms,itwillalsobepossibletoconceiveofKingLearactinginhisownnameLearplayingthepartofLearandalsotoconceiveofLearactinginanother'snameLearplayingthepartofHamlet.However,itmustbesaidthatoncewearepreparedtoacceptthatShakespeare'sLeariscapableofplayingthepartofShakespeare'sHamlet,wewillbepreparedtoacceptanything.

IV

ThereremainsonefurtheraspectofBarker'sargumenttobeconsidered.Indescribinglegalpersonalityasamask,Barkerpointsoutthatitisamaskwornbyindividualsaswellasbygroups.Becauseitisamask,itmaybecountedakindoffictionBarkerconcedesthat'thetermpersonafictaisnotaltogetherwrong'10yetif

10Gierke,Naturallaw,plxii.

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wewishtocallitafiction,wemustbepreparedtorenderfictitiousthelegalpersonalityofindividualsaswellasgroups.Barkerispreparedtodothis,andhecitesasevidencethelargenumbersofindividuals,includingallslaves,whohaveatonetimeoranotherbeendeniedlegalpersonalitybytheirstatestosupporthiscontentionthateventhelegalpersonalitiesofindividualcitizensare'judicialcreations,orartifices,orfictions'.11However,hedidnotmakethispointinordertoshowuptheephemeralqualityofthelegalstatusenjoyedbyindividualmenandwomen(particularly,onemightsay,women).Hemadeitinordertoshowthatalthoughinsomesenseafiction,thelegalpersonalityofgroupswasjustassubstantial,justastangible,asthelegalpersonalityofindividualsthatitwas,inanothersense,justasreal.ThiswasnotapointthatBarkerchosetopress,concernedashewastomaintainhisdistancefromthedoctrineofrealgrouppersonalityinallitsforms.Nevertheless,itisanimportantone,foritsuggeststhatitmightyetbepossibletoconstructamodifiedcaseforthedoctrineofrealgrouppersonalityonthebasisofourunderstandingofthelegalpersonalityofindividuals.Ifwethinkthatpersonalitysufficientlytangibletocountassomethingmorethanafiction,thenwewillhavetothinkthesameofthepersonalityofgroups.

AcaseofjustthiskindisalludedtobyBarker,anddiscussedbyGierke,inthepagesofNaturallawandthetheoryofsociety.ThiswastheargumentputforwardbytheGermanjuristSamuelPufendorf(163294),whocontendedthatalthoughnaturalpersonality(inanarrow,physicalsense)couldonlybelongtothenaturalman,moralpersonalitycouldbelongbothtoindividualsandtogroups.Pufendorfunderstoodmoralpersonalitytobeamodus,orformofmask,yethewasalsoclearthatitdidnotconstituteapersonaficta,sincethattermappliedonlywhenamaskwasattachedtosomewhollyinappropriateobject.(BarkergivesasanexampleofapersonafictainPufendorf's

sensethemodusthatwasgrantedbyCaligulatooneofhishorseswhenhemadeitsenator.12)Truewhichistosay'real'moralpersonalitycomesintobeingwhenevertheappropriatemaskisascribedtosomeobjectcapableofbeingaccommodatedinarationalschemeofunderstanding.Theidealschemeofunderstanding,forPufendorf,wasalegalsystem,andwithinalegalsystemcouldbeaccommodatedboththepersonamoralissimplex(theindividual)andthepersonamoralis

11Ibid.12Seeibid.,p.119.

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composita(thegroup).Insofar,therefore,asthelawisabletothinkofgroupsactinginthemannerofmoralpersons,weshouldbeabletothinkoftheirpersonalityassomethingreal.

However,Pufendorf'sargumentisfarmorecomplexandfarmoresubtlethananybriefsummaryherecanconvey.ItborrowedfromboththeGermanictraditionchampionedbyGierkeandtheRomantraditionexemplifiedbyHobbes(forwhichreasonGierkeremainedunconvincedbyit13),andtherebyarrivedataconceptionofpersonalitywhichcannoteasilybeassimilatedtoanyother.Forpresentpurposes,asimplerandmoreserviceableinstanceofthissortofargumentistheonegiveninPatrickDuff'sPersonalityinRomanprivatelaw,whichwaspublishedfiveyearsafterBarkerpublishedhiseditionofGierke.ThoughDuff'sbookisconcernedonlywiththetheoryofthepersonproducedbytheRomanstheauthorconcludingthattherewasnotheory,onlyaseriesofpracticalapplicationsitdoesattempt,likeBarker's,tosetoutthebackgroundtosomemorerecentEnglishargumentsconcerningthepersonalityofassociations.LikeBarker,Duffisreluctanttocomedownonthesideofoneorotherofthecompetingtheories,preferringtosuggestthatthewholetruthofgrouppersonalitywasnomoretobecontainedbyasingleEnglishtheorythanitwasbyasingleRomanone.Nevertheless,hewaspreparedtomakeonesubstantiveclaimregardingthevexedquestionofwhetherornotgrouppersonsmightbethoughtofas'real'.EnglishfollowersofGierke,fromMaitlandonwards,hadpresupposedthatalthoughthefictiontheoryneednotimplytheconcessiontheory,theconcessiontheorynecessarilyimpliesthefictiontheory.Duffentirelyreversesthislineofreasoning.Hesuggeststhatalthough'aFictionistmustbelieveintheneedofConcessiontoinsistonConcession...doesnotimplyabeliefinFictionism'.14Thefirstofthesecontentions,forwhichDuffoffersnoevidence,isinfactfalse,sinceitisquitepossible,aswehaveseen,toregardthe1862CompaniesActasan

instanceoffictionismwhilestillregardingitasmakingabreakwiththe

13Gierkearguedthatthepersonamoraliscompositacouldnotbestrictlyequivalenttothepersonamoralissimplex,sincePufendorfinsistedthattheformerstillhadtobebuiltoutofthelatterthatis,ithadtobebuiltoutofindividuals,bymeansofcontracts.Gierke'sjudgmentonPufendorfisessentiallythesameashisjudgmentontheothergreatGermanistofnaturallawtheory,Althusius,andhesuggeststhat'theindividualisticbasisof[Pufendorf's]thoughtpreventshimfromachievinganythingmorethanapurelyformalassimilationofthegroup-persontotheindividual'(ibid.,p.120).14P.W.Duff,PersonalityinRomanprivatelaw(Cambridge,1938),p.235.

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concessiontheory.Insupportofthesecond,however,Duffwritesasfollows:

ToastudentofRomanlawitmustbeobviousthatlegalPersonalitycanbeatoncerealandconceded;forhehasaclearexampleplainlybeforehiseyes.TheStatecouldconfer'legal'personalityonaslave;inearlyRomeallmanumissionwascontrolledbytheState,buttherewasnothingfictitiousaboutafreedman'spersonality.AllPersonalityatRomewascreated,andcreatedbytheState,exceptthatofacivisRomanusingenuus,butno-onecoulddenythatafreedmanwasarealPerson.15

Whatistrueofindividuals,Duffimplies,canbetrueofgroupsaswell.

ThisargumentisonethatclearlyfitsthemodeloutlinedbyBarker.LegalpersonalityiseffectivelyunderstoodbyDuffasamaskasa'character'or'mode'whichisgivenoutbythestatetosuchindividualobjectsasitseesfit.Theseobjectsmustbereal,itisimplied,becausethestatewillonlyattachthemaskofpersonalitytosuchobjectsasitunderstandstobereal.Itistherealityofthemanwhowearsthemaskthefreedslavewhomakesfortherealityofthepersonalitythatisgivenbyit.Certainly,thisisanargumentthatmakesbettersenseinBarker'stermsthanitdoesinHobbes's.ThecitizensinHobbes'scommonwealthdonothavethemaskofpersonalitygrantedtothembytheirsovereign,actinginthenameofthestate;rather,theygranttheirownpersonalitiestothesovereigninorderthathemightactinthenameofthestate.Theindividualswhodohavetheirpersonalitygrantedtothembythesovereign(children,madmen,fools)areinreceiptofthisconcessionpreciselybecausetheyhavenorealpersonalityoftheirowntheirpersonalityisafiction.Here,theconcessiontheorycertainlyimpliesthefictiontheory.AllotherindividualswithinHobbes'sstatealreadypossesstheirownpersonality,whichwhenrepresentedbythesovereigncommitsthemtoactinaccordancewiththesovereign'scommands.Asaresult,there

canbenodistinctioninaHobbesiancommonwealthbetweenfreedmenandslaves,sincetherearenopersonswithinthecommonwealthwhomaybesaidtolackalegalpersonality.Thechildren,madmenandsoonwhodependuponthestateforlegalpersonalityarenotslaves,becausetheyarenotpersonsinthefirstplaceitismeaninglesstothinkofthembeingdeprivedofsomethingtheycannotbydefinitionpossessforthemselves.Nootherindividualcanbecountedaslave,becauseallotherindividualsarein

15Ibid.,pp.2356.

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thesamelegalposition,committedwhererequiredtoactinaccordancewiththeactionsoftheirsovereign,andwherenot,freetodoastheyplease.Moreover,asHobbesmakesquiteclear,whenrequiredbythesovereigntoperformsomeactionwhichwillresultinthelossofpersonality(forexample,tosubmitoneselftodeathinbattle),theindividualisatlibertytoresist.ItisthisthatmakesHobbes,despiteeverything,aliberal,atleastsofarasindividualsareconcerned.

Duff'sargumentholdsforslaves.Thefactthatitholdsforslaves,however,doesnotinitselftellusthatitholdsforgroupsaswell.Indeed,Duff'sargumentonlyholdsforslavesbecausewearewillingtothinkofslavesaspersonswhohavebeendeniedtheirpersonality.Ifitistoholdforgroupsitmustbebecausewearealsowillingtothinkofgroupsaspersonsdeniedtheirpersonality.Yetthisistheverypointatissue,anditisatissuebecause,asHobbesdemonstrates,itispossibletothinkofgroupsinquitedifferentterms,asbeingsomethingotherthanpersons,andashavingapersonalitynotgivento,butinventedforthem.Dufffailstoaddressthispoint,andbecausehefailstoaddressit,hefailstoprovideanyreasonforsupposingthatwhatistrueofslavesistrueofgroups.Thatwouldrequiresomethingmore,someconcreteevidencethatgroups,likeslaves,aretobeunderstoodaspersons-in-waiting,ratherthanbeingunderstood,likechildren,madmenandfools,aspersonsonlybyafictionoflaw.

ThetruthisthatDuff,likeBarker,hasfailedtorecognisethatthereismorethanonewayofunderstandingthebusinessofmask-wearingandmask-giving,andthatthereforethereismorethanonewayofunderstandingtheactofconcession.Ontheonehand,concessioncanbeseenasthebusinessofgrantingtosomeoneorthingpermissiontoactinthemannerofaperson.Here,theconcessionistotheactor,whomwemustunderstandtoberealifthemaskofpersonalityistobewornatall.Ontheotherhand,concessioncanbeseenasthe

businessofgrantingtosomeoneorthingthepretenceoftheirownpersonality,therebyenablinganactortoactforthem.Here,theconcessionistowhomeverorwhatevertheactorrepresents,andwemustunderstanditasafiction,ifonlytoexplaintheneedforanactortorepresentit.Inthefirstinstance,thestatehastodecidewhetherornotitwantsaparticularactortowearthemaskofpersonality.Inthesecondinstance,thestatehastodecidewhetherornotitwantsthemaskofaparticular

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persontobewornatall.Itisthedifferencebetweenallowinganactortoplaythepartofaking,andlookingforanactortoplaythepartofKingLear.Itisalso,intheoryatleast,thedifferencebetweenconcedingpersonalitytoslavesandconcedingpersonalitytogroups.

Boththesemeansofgrantingpersonalityareexamplesofconcessionbecauseineachcaseitislefttothestatetodecidehowmanypersonsthereshouldbewithinthestate.Thesignificanceofthedifferencebetweenthembecomesmoreapparentifwelooktoseewhathappenswhenthestaterenouncesitsabilitytomakethisdecision.OnDuff'smodel,itmustbesupposedthatwhenthestateceasestoconcedepersonality,itallowsthemaskofpersonalitytobeattachedautomaticallytoallwhoarecapableofwearingit.Certainlythisiswhathappenswhenastateabolishesslavery.Ofcourse,decisionswillstillhavetobemadeconcerningthenatureoflegalpersonalitytherightsanddutiesoflegalpersonsvaryfromstatetostate(RomanfreedmendonotbearthesamelegalpersonalityasBritishcitizens)anddecisionswillstillhavetobemadeaboutthoseindividuals(childrenandsoon)whoareincapableofbearingtherightsanddutiesoflegalpersons.Butthestatewillnolongerbeinthebusinessofcreatinglegalpersonswhereoncetherewerenone.OntheHobbesianmodel,however,thestatethatrenouncesconcessionaryactivitycontinuestobeinvolvedinthebusinessofcreatingpersons.Thisisbecause,ontheHobbesianmodel,therearenopersons-in-waitingtowhomlegalpersonalitycanautomaticallybeascribed.Whenthestaterenouncesitsabilitytoconcedepersonalityitsimplyrenouncesitsrighttodetermine(inletters)whenfictitiouspersonsareinvented.Ithasstilltoanswerthequestionofhowtheyaretobeinvented;inotherwords,ithasstilltodecidehowlegalpersonsaretoberecognised(inlaws).Whenthemaskoflegalpersonalityisunderstoodtobelongtoallactorsinthestate,wecanrecogniseallactorsaspersonsbeforeweknowwhatisrepresentedbythemaskof

legalpersonality.Butwhenallactorsinthestateareunderstoodtowearthemaskofparticularpersons,wecannotrecognisethosepersonsuntilweknowwhatthemasksrepresent.Therefore,evenwhentheHobbesianstatedecidesnottodrawupanymasksitself,adecisionstillhastobemadeaboutthepersonsthatthemasksrepresent.Andthisiswhyitispossibletohaveafictiontheorywhichisnotalsoatheoryofconcession.Astatemaydecide,astheBritishstatedecidedin1862,thatitnolongerwishestosetlimitstothenumberofgroupsthatcanbecomepersonsinlaw.

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After1862,anygroupcouldbecomeacorporation.Butthisdidnotmeanthatthemaskofcorporatepersonalitycouldsimplybeattachedtoanygroup.Thestatestillhadtocreateanidentityforgroupsthatwouldberepresentedascorporationsaname,anaddressandsoonanditstillhadtoinsistthatanidentityofthiskindwouldonlybegiventothosegroupsthataccordedwiththeprinciplesofgroupactivitylaiddownbythestate('sevenpersonsassociatedforanylawfulpurpose').The1862Actdidnotpresentgroupswithcorporatepersonality;itshowedthemwhattheywouldhavetodoiftheywantedtoinventone.

Itcouldbesaidthatthestateanystatedoesexactlythesameforindividuals,insistingonaname,anaddress,aformalidentityinlaw.Butinsofarasstatesdocreatetheidentityofindividuals,whattheyarecreatingarefictions.DuffcannotarguethatthepersonalityoftheRomanfreedmanisrealifitisalsotruethatthatpersonalitybelongssimplytoaname.Thepersonalityofthefreedmanisrealonlybecauseit,likehisname,attachestosomethingreal,somethingthatwecanidentifyapartfromthemask.IfDuff'sargumentistoapplytogroups,therefore,itmustbebecausetheidentityofthegroupissimilarlyclear.However,ifwelooktotheargumentsthathavesurroundedtheideaofgrouppersonality,wecanseethatitisthequestionofgroupidentitythatcausesthemostproblems.Forexample,theScottishChurchcaseof19004,tofitwithDuff'smodel,wouldhavetoturnontheissueofwhetherornotaparticulargroupwastoberecognisedasaperson.Itdidnot.ItturnedonthequestionofwhichoftwogroupswastoberecognisedasaparticularpersonthepersonoftheFreeChurchofScotland.Thestatehadtodecidewithwhichofthesegroupsthatpersonwastobeidentified.TheincidentinthehistoryoftheChurchofScotlandwhichappearsbettertofitDuff'smodelistheDisruptionof1843,whenagroupwithinthechurchsoughttobreakawayasagroupinitsownright.

Butthoughthegroupsucceeded,itdidnotsucceedonDuff'sterms.TheFreeChurchofScotlandwasnotagroupseekingthelegalstatusofaperson(itdidnotatallwishtobecomeacorporation);itwasagroupseekingpersonallegalidentity,anditwasgrantedthatidentitybythestate,inlaw.Weknowitwasgrantedbythestate,inlaw,becauseitwastothestatethatthecompetingpartieswentsixtyyearslaterinordertohavethequestionofthatidentityresolved.Ofcourse,itcouldbeargued,asitwasatthetime,thatthechurchshouldhavebeenprovidedwithanidentitywhichalloweditto

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decideitsidentityforitself.ButastheKedroffcasedemonstrated,evenanidentityofthatkindeventhemostopen-endedofallidentitiesissimplyanotherkindofinvention.

Duff'sargumentdoesnotworkasitstands.Groupsarenotobviouslycomparabletofreedmenandslaves.Weretheytobe,itwouldhavetobedemonstratedthatagrouphasarealidentitycomparabletothatoftheindividualman.Therearetwowaysthiscouldbedone.Itmightbearguedthatgroupsarecapableofhavingtheiridentitiesdeterminedapartfromthelaw,andofcomingbeforethelawaspotentialpersonsintheirownright.Thereissometruthinthis.Weareallcapableofascribinganidentitytoagroupafamily,afootballclub,achurch,anationwithoutthehelpofthestate.Thedifficultyisthatthereisnoreasontosupposethatwithoutthehelpofthestatetheidentityweascribetoanygroupwillbethesame.Thealternativeistoarguethateventherealidentityofindividualsisdeterminedbythepersonalitygiventhembythestate.Inthiswayitcouldbeclaimedthatthefreedman,thoughrealenoughinhisownright,neverthelesshasnoidentityapartfromthepersonathatisgiventohimbythestate.Itwouldthenbepossibletoarguethatgroups,constitutedastheyarebyrealthingsrealhumanbeings,realbuildings,realactivitieshavetheirrealidentitiesdeterminedbythepersonathatisjointlyattachedtothosethingsbythestate.So,forexample,theidentityofagroupwouldbefixedbythefactthatitisacorporation,astheidentityofamanmightbefixedbythefactthatheisacitizen.Thedifficultywiththisargumentisthatitrequiresthatlegalpersonalitywillhavetodomorethansimplyconditionhowindividualsact.Itwillhavetodeterminewhotheyare.Tobeacitizen,astobeacorporation,willnotsimplybetobeprovidedwithamodeofaction;itwillbetobetoldwhatactionstoperform,whattosay,whattodo,whattobe.Thepartwillhavetotakeovertheplayer,sothattheplayercanhavenoexistenceapartfromthepart,andlawwillbecomethewholeoflife.

Inthisrespect,Barkerwasquitecorrect.Eveninmodifiedform,theprospectsofferedbythedoctrineofrealgrouppersonalityarestillthoseofchaosorwilderness.

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Chapter13TheMaskoftheState

I

WehavedealtwithwhatBarkercallsthe'objects'towhichmasksattach.What,then,ofwhathecalls'theattachingagency',thestate?Initially,Barkerishappytodescribeallthestateasastage,justasheistodescribeallthepersonswithinitasactorstreadingacrossitsboards.Theliteralimageofthestage,however,israthertoopassivetoconveythatsenseofagencyonwhichBarker'sideaofthestatedepends.Soheextendshisanalogytotakeinthoseagentsthedramatistandtheproducerwithwhomresponsibilityforthestagingofanydramarests,andhecomparesthetasksthatarefacedbythesetwowiththetasksfacedintheproductionoflegalperformancesbythelegislatorandthejudgerespectively.1Inthissense,Barkerattemptstoidentifythestatenotjustwiththesiteofthelegaldramabutwiththebusinessofstagingit.Thereis,though,afurtherextensionofthistheatricalimageryforwhichBarkerhastoallow.Althoughhechoosesnottodwellonthispoint,henotesthatthereareoccasionsonwhichthestatehasitselftoappearintheguiseofalegalperson.Thiswillhappenwheneverthereistheneedtoholdthestateresponsibleinlawfortheperformanceofparticularactions,whetherintheprivatesphere(say,therepaymentofdebts)orinthepublic(say,thepunishmentofcriminals).WhatBarkerdoesnotexplainishowthiscanhappen.Howcanthestatebeprovidedwithamaskofitsown?OnBarker'sownaccount,thestateisresponsiblenotinlawbutforit,forthestagingofthedramaratherthanfortheplayingofaparticularpartintheplay.Itisthisthatallowshimtocallthestateastage,sinceitistheroleofthestatetomakeitpossibleforotherstoactoutthepartsthatareassignedto

1SeeGierke,Naturallaw,p.lxxi.

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them.Yetifthestateistobealegalperson,thestagehassomehowtoriseupandwalkacrossitsownboards.Thestate,whichisastage,hastoplayapartonthestagethatisthestate.

Inthetheatre,almostanythingispossible.Actorscanappearonstagedisguisedaspartsofthescenery,onlytocometolifewhentheactionrequires.Theindividualsresponsibleforthedramathedramatist,theproducer,thestagemanagerandsooncanalsotakepartasactors,assuminganyandeveryroleastheyseefit.Alternatively,adramamaycontainwithinitpartsentitled'dramatist','producer'etc.,eachtobeplayedbyadifferent,oreventhesame,actorthereisabsolutelynoreasonwhyastageshouldnothaveperformedonitarepresentationoftheproductionofaplay.Onething,however,isnotpossible.Thepersonorpersonswhoareresponsibleforadramacanneverappearonstageintheguiseinwhichtheyareresponsibleforit.Ifaplaywrighttakespartinoneofhisownplays,wedonotseehimonstageastheplaywright,butratherinwhateverrolewithinthedramahehaschosentoadopt.Ifanactorappearsonstageintheroleof'playwright',wedonotseehimperformingintheroleoftheplaywrightwhowasresponsibleforthedramainwhichtheroleappears.Thisistrueeveniftheroleistakenbytheplaywrighthimself.Nocharactercanappearonstagetotakeresponsibilityforthedramainwhichthatcharacterisinvolved;werethistohappen,thedramawouldcollapse.Foritis,aswehaveseen,impossibletoimagineacharacterinadramaintheactofdrawinguphisownpart,justasitisimpossibletoimagineonecharacterinadramacomingtoplaythepartofanother.Onceweareshownonstagethemeansbywhichthedramahasbeenbroughttothestagethemechanicsoftheproduction,theartificebehindthefictionwhatwearewitnessingisnolongerthedramaitself,simplyanexplanationofit.

Therefore,ifthepartofdramatististobeincludedwithinthedrama,itwillhavetofollowthatthedramatistisnotresponsibleforthe

dramainwhichheappears.Ifweseethepartof'playwright'beingperformedonstage,andthecharacterintheactofwritingpartsforaplay,itmustbeassumedthatheiswritingpartsforanotherplay,andthatwhatwearewitnessingisthecreationofadramawithinthedrama.Oncethisisestablished,thenabsolutelyanythingispossibleitwillevenbepossibleforKingLeartoplaythepartofHamlet,iftheproductionoftheoneplaycomessomehowtoincludewithinitaportrayaloftheproductionofthe

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other.2Butthiswillonlybepossiblebecausetheplaywithintheplayissimplypartofawiderdrama,anditisthosewhoareresponsibleforthewiderdramawhoareultimatelyresponsibleforthesecondaryoneaswell.ThisisthedifficultywithanyattempttoportraythestateasalegalpersoninBarker'sterms.Ifthestateistohaveapartinthelegaldrama,itmustfollowthatthereisawiderdramathantheoneproducedbythestate.Yetitisthestate,andthestatealone,whichBarkerunderstandstoberesponsibleforthelegaldramaasawhole.Thedilemmaisclear.Ifthelegaldramaissimplyaplaywithinaplay,somethingneedstobesaidaboutwhereultimateresponsibilityforthedramalies.Yetwithoutultimateresponsibilityforthelegaldrama,itisnolongerclearwhatroleisleftforthestate.Afterall,oncethescenerystartstomove,itceasestobescenery;thatroleistakenonbywhateverformsthebackdroptothemovementsthatfollow.

ThisdilemmaisbynomeansuniquetoBarker.ThebestillustrationofitisprovidedbyHobbes.WithintheHobbesiancommonwealth,thesovereignisunquestionedauthorofwhateverlegaldramatakesplacethere.Nolegalpersonscancomeintobeingexceptontheauthorityofthesovereign,withtheresultthatallperformancesundertakeninthenameofsuchpersonsmustultimatelydependontheauthorityofthesovereign.Thisistheconditionofjuristicorder:nopartwillberepresentedonstageunlessthesovereignhasdecideditbelongsthere.Whatthisensuresisthatthelegaldramawill,ifnothingelse,beorderlytherewillbenoconfusionaboutwhoisresponsibleforit,noraboutwhatcanandcannotbeseenonstage.Whatjuristicordercannotensure,however,isthatthedramawillbeagoodone.Itmaybe,ofcourse:agoodauthorwillseektohaveportrayedonstagepartsthatarebothwelldrawnandwellmatched,flexibleenoughtosuittheiractorsand

2TheideaoftheplaywithintheplayisofcourseafamiliaroneinShakespeareandrama,notjustbecauseplaysareputonwithinplays(A

midsummernight'sdream,Hamlet),butalsobecausecharactersarefrequentlytobeseen'playingapart'duringthecourseofaplay.ThebestexampleofthisisprobablyHenryIV,PartIandII,alongwithHenryV,inwhichtheactingoutofrolesbythedramatisperaonaeisthedominanttheme(Halactsouttheroleofwastrel,asheislatertoactouttheroleofking).CharactersinShakespeareandramacanalsoactouteachother'sparts,andnotsolelyforthecomedicpurposesofimpersonation.InHenryIV,PartI,Act2,Scene4,FalstafftakesontheroleofHal,andHaltakesontheroleofhisfather,theking,inaforeshadowingofthemoreseriousbusinessthatistofollow.However,thisispossiblepreciselybecausewhatweareshownisaplaywithintheplay,orchestratedbytheauthorofthedramaasawhole.TheonethingShakespeareancharacterscanneverbeseentodoistostepoutofonedramaandintoanother.

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familiarenoughtosuittheiraudience.Butallthatjuristicorderensuresisthattherewillbeanauthor,andonlyoneauthor,andthatthedramawillbewhateverthatauthorwishesittobe.Hobbescanofferadviceastohowanauthorshouldproceedwithhistask(ashedoesinchapterXXXofLeviathan);buthecannotdotheauthor'sworkforhim.Itispossible,therefore,thatthisworkwillbebadlydone,andthatwhatisauthorisedwillseemarbitrary,unconvincing,evennonsensical,stultifyingforactorsandaudiencealike.Ifthishappens,bothactorsandaudiencemusteithermakethebestofwhattheyaregiven,orattempttoavoidthelegalstagealtogether.Underthetermsofjuristicorder,thereisnoalternative.

Aswellasbeingauthor,however,Hobbes'ssovereignisalsoanactor.Inonesense,thismakeslittledifferencetotheabove.Mostoftheactingdonebythesovereigntakesplaceinthenameofthosenaturalpersonswhohavecovenantedtotreatthewordsandactionsofthesovereignastheirown.Whenthishappens,thesovereignsimplyputsonthemaskofthenaturalpersontowhomhespeaks,compellingthatpersontotreathiswordsascommandsandhisactionsasbinding.Thereisnodramaticdimensiontothisperformance.Thesovereignisundernoobligationtoprovideaconvincing,oraccurate,orevenconsistentrepresentationofthepersonrepresentedbythemask.Allthatisrequiredisthattheindividualwhoprovidestheaudienceforthewordsandactionsbeingperformedshouldrecognisethemaskashisown.Hemayfindwhatisbeingdoneinthatmaskconfusing,orarbitrary,orevennonsensical,buthavingagreedtoletthesovereignwearthemaskhehasnochoicebuttorecognisetheperformanceashisown,andtoendureit.

This,though,isnottheonlyformofactingundertakenbythesovereign.Hobbesalsostatesthatthesovereignshouldactinthepersonofthecommonwealth,andinthisregarditisquitepossibletospeakofadramaticdimensiontothesovereign'sperformance.The

personofthecommonwealthisafiction,andassuchhasanidentityapartfrombothactorandaudience;itis,afterall,amaskwhichnonewillbeabletorecogniseastheirown.Becauseitisafiction,actorandaudiencesovereignandsubjectsmustsharesomecommonunderstandingofwhatisbeingrepresented.Inthisinstance,therefore,thepossibilityofrepresentationdependsuponthesovereignbeingseentoactinamannerwhichbefitsthemaskthathewears.Wherethesovereigndisregardsthemask,thepersonofthecommonwealthdisappears.Butwherethesovereignchoosesto

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recognisethemaskasitisrecognisedbytheaudience,thepersonofthecommonwealthmaycometolife,andtheaudiencecometounderstandthatsovereigntyissimplytheactingoutofaparticularrole.

Thisistheconditionofmoralorder.Itenablessovereigntytobecomesomethingmorethanthearbitraryexerciseofpower,foritrequiresthatthesovereignconditionhisactionstoaccordwiththeexpectationsplacedontherolethatheperforms.Torepresentthepersonofthecommonwealth,thesovereignhasnotmerelytoact,buttoputonanact,anditisthisthatmakesitpossibletothinkofsovereignty,inHobbes'spreferredterms,asan'office'.However,aswesawinchapter2,theconditionofmoralorderraisesaparticulardifficultyforHobbes.Thedifficultyisthatitisnotcompatiblewiththeconditionofjuristicorder,whichrequiresthatthesovereignbeauthorofallfictitiouspersons,ratherthanplayingthepartofonehimself.Ofcourse,itisquitepossibleforthesovereigntoinventapartforhimselfinthelegaldrama,asitisforaplaywrighttocasthimselfinhisownplay.Butwecannotarriveatmoralorderbyallowingthesovereigntoauthorisethepersonofthecommonwealth,sincemoralorderdependsuponourabilitytorecognisethepersonofthecommonwealthinanyactperformedbythesovereign,includinganyactofauthorisation.3Toarriveatmoralordertheactsofauthorisationundertakenbythesovereignmustthemselvesformpartofawiderdrama.Anauthorcanonlyberepresentedonstageifthepartsthatheisseentocreatebelongtoadramawithinthedramainwhichheappears.Therefore,moralordermustrenderthelegaldramagivenbyjuristicorderthedramaauthorisedbythesovereignnothingmorethanaplaywithinaplay.Andifso,ultimateresponsibilityforthelegaldramamustbeseentolieelsewherethanwiththesovereign.

3Hobbesallowedthatthesovereignmightappearbeforethecivilcourtsifacasecouldbemadeonthebasisoflawsdrawnupbythesovereign

himself:'IfaSubjecthaveacontroversiewithhisSoveraigne,ofdebt,orofpossessionoflandorgoods,orconcerninganyservicerequiredathishands,orconcerninganypenalty,corporall,orpecuniary,groundedonaprecedentLaw;hehaththesameLibertytosueforhisright,asifitwereagainstaSubject;andbeforesuchJudges,asareappointedbytheSoveraign.ForseeingtheSoveraigndemandethbyforceofaformerLaw,andnotbyvertueofhisPower;hedeclareththereby,thatherequirethnomore,thanshallappeartobeduebythatLaw'(Hobbes,Leviathan,pp.1523).Thisiscomparabletoasituationinwhichtheauthorofaplay,havingcasthimselfinoneoftheroles,canberequiredtospeakthelinesthathehaswrittenforthatrole.WhatHobbescouldnotpossiblyacceptwasthesovereignappearingbeforethecourtstoansweracasemadeagainstthelawsthemselves;andthiswouldbetheanalogyrequirediftheauthorofaplayhadtoappearonstageinordertoactouttheroleofauthor.

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Theresultisaseriesofchoices.Juristicordercanonlybeguaranteedbythesingleauthorityofasinglesovereign,whichwillensurethatthelegaldramaofthestateproceedswithoutinterruption,butcanprovidenoassurancesthatitwillproceedinaconvincingorcoherentfashion.Moralorderbindsthelegaldramaintoabroaderdrama,therebyensuringthatitmustmeetthebroaderdemandsthatcometobeplacedonit.Itonlyachievesthis,however,bytranscendingthesingleauthorityofthesinglesovereign.Whothenisresponsibleforthebroaderdramainwhichthesovereignauthorplaysapart?Oneobviousansweristosuggestthatitmustbetheresponsibilityofanotherauthorofanotherkind,possiblyofthekindexemplifiedbyHobbeshimself.Butthissimplyreintroducestheproblemofarbitraryauthorityatoneremove,asHobbeshimselfwouldhaverecognised.Whatguaranteeistherethatthedramascriptedbyapoliticalphilosopherwillbemoreconvincingthantheonethatmightbescriptedbyasovereign,iftheonlydemandplacedonthephilosopheristhatthemorallifeofthestateshouldbehisresponsibilityalone?Moralorderrequiresthatthecharactersportrayedonthestageofthestateemergeoutofthesharedconcernsandsharedbeliefsofallthosewhoparticipateinthelifeofthestate,whethersovereignorsubject.Thisisperfectlypossiblewherethemembersofacommonwealthhaveasharedbeliefinthepersonalityofthecommonwealth,theroleplayedbythesovereignmaybeboundintothemorallifeofthestateasawhole.Butwhatitcannotbeiscertain.AsHobbeswasalltooaware,thebeliefswhichpeopleshare,thoughpowerful,arebynomeansuniform,suchthatanydramawhichdependsuponsharedbeliefsmayquicklydegenerateintoaseriesofconflictingclaimstoauthority,andultimatelyintochaos.Andthisistrue,asHobbeswasalsoaware,wherevertheultimatedramaisplayedout,whetheramongactors,whetheramonglawyers,whetheramongphilosophers.Theonlycertainguaranteeofuniformbeliefisthearbitraryauthorityofasingleauthor,beitexercisedinanarrowlylegalorabroadlymoral

setting.Theonlymeansofevadingthatauthorityistoriskthebreakdownoforderaltogether.

II

ThiswastheproblemfacedbytheEnglishpluralistsintheirvariousattemptstocircumscribetheroleofthesovereignstate.Theone

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constantthemerunningthroughtheworkofthepluralistswasadistrustofarbitrarysovereignauthority.Butthoughreluctanttoallowonesovereignbodytherighttoauthorisethelifeofthepoliticalcommunityasawhole,theydidnotwishtodispensewiththestructuresofthestatealtogether.Noneofthemwaswillingtocountenancedisorder.Instead,theysoughttolocatetheexerciseofjuristicauthoritywithinabroadermoralsetting,sorenderingthebodyresponsibleforitpartofadramaforwhichtheultimateresponsibilitylayelsewhere.Theproblemwasdecidingwhereresponsibilityforthisbroaderdramadidinfactlie.Ifthesovereignstateissimplyoneassociationamongmany,itisperfectlypossiblethateveryotherassociationwillhaveadifferentideaofthepartthatoughttobeplayedbythestate.Topreventthis,someformalstructuremustbeprovidedwithinwhichtheroleofthestatecanbeidentified.Yetifthisstructureexistssimplytoprovidegroupslikethestatewithaformalidentityoftheirown,thereisnothingtopreventitfrombeingasarbitraryasthejuristicstructuresitisdesignedtotranscend.Certainlythisisnotpreventedbythemerefactofthebroaderstructuresbeingassembledbypoliticalphilosophers,whocanbequiteasarbitraryasthesovereignsaboutwhomtheywrite.Tomovefromanostensiblyjuristictoanostensiblymoralsettingforthedramasofpoliticallifemeansnothing,solongasthemoralsettingseemsdesignedspecificallytoorderthejuristiclifeofthestate.

Thisproblemmanifestsitselfintheverynatureoftheideathatthepluralistssoughttotranscendtheideaofthesovereignstate.Theconceptofsovereignty,asborrowedfromHobbesandpareddownbyAustin,wasanarrowlyjuristicone,andtothepluralistsitseemedhighlyarbitrary.ItalsoseemedarbitrarytoBernardBosanquet,whosepoliticalphilosophywasdesignedtotranscendlegalisticnotionsofauthorityandtosetthemagainstthebroadermoralauthoritygeneratedbythepoliticalcommunityasawhole.YetBosanquet's

politicalphilosophyseemedarbitrarytothepluralistsaswell.Ignoringthesetting,andseeingonlytheclaimtoauthority,thepluralistscametoidentifyBosanquetwithAustin,andtoregardhisconceptionofthestatetooassomethingthatneededtobetranscended.BothAustinandBosanquetwerefelttobemakingexcessiveclaimsonbehalfofwhatwassimplyonebodyamongmany,eventhoughforAustinthatbodywasa'portion'ofsociety,whereasforBosanquetitwassocietyinitsentirety.Whatwasneededinsteadwas

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aconceptionofauthoritywhichwouldbe,inLaski'sterms,'co-ordinate'ratherthan'hierarchical',withabroadersourcethananysinglebodycouldgiveit.This,though,waspreciselywhatBosanquethadsoughttoachievebytakingultimatepoliticalauthorityawayfromthesovereignportionanddispersingitacrosssocietyasawhole;itwassimplythathehadcontinuedtorefertohisfinalco-ordinateauthorityas'theState'.IfBosanquet'stheoryofthestatewasmerelytobetranscendedashehadsoughttotranscendAustin's,thentheresultmustbearegress.Foranyconceptionofauthority,whetherhierarchicalorco-ordinate,constitutesaclaimmadeonbehalfofwhoeverorwhateveristodotheauthorising;andwhateverthatperson,groupofpersons,orgroupofgroupsiscalled,andhoweveritisdescribed,theactofauthorisationitselfwillseemarbitrarytothosewhoremaindeterminedtoseetheroleofauthoraspartofawiderdrama.

AwayoutofthisdifficultyissuggestedbyGierke,throughhisidealisedconceptionoftheRechtsstaat.IntheRechtsstaatthereisnoneedtoisolateasinglesourceofauthority,sinceauthorityderivesfromeveryactthateverymemberofthestateperforms,uptoandincludingthepersonofthestateitself.Asaresult,itispossibletoidentifythemaskofthestatewiththeactionsperformedbythestate,asitwillbepossibletoidentifythemaskofanyothergrouporpersonwiththeactionsthattheyperformthereisnoneedtoidentifytheauthor,becausewhereallpersonsarereal,allmasksauthorisethemselves.Whatweareleftwithisasettinginwhichlifeitselfbecomesthedrama,withthepartsthatareplayedemergingfromthelivesthatareled.However,theidealconceptoftheRechtsstaatdependsonawillingnesstoacceptthateverythingdonebyeveryindividualandeverygroupmakessenseindramaticterms.TheEnglishpluralistscouldnot,orwouldnot,acceptthis.Theysawthatwherethereisnodistinctionbetweenwhattakesplaceonstageand

whattakesplaceoffbetweenauthorisedandunauthorisedactionstheresultscannotbeotherthanarbitrary.Ideally,ofcourse,everyaspectofeverylifemaycohereinsuchawayastoappeartheworkofasingleauthor.Butinreality,itisjustaspossiblethatthelivesofdifferentindividualsanddifferentgroupswillmakenosensetoeachother;oralternatively,thattheirliveswillstarttorevolvearoundthelifeoftheindividualorgroupwhoseperformanceseemsthemostcompelling,whosevoiceisclearest,whoseactionsaremostvisible,whosedemandsaremoststrident,theindividualor

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grouparoundwhomallperformanceswillcomeintheendtobeordered.Andbecausetheformalstructuresofauthorityhavebeendispensedwith,therewillbenothingthatanyonecandoaboutit.

Unmovedbytranscendentidealism,theEnglishpluralistswereforcedtolooktowardshistorytoprovidetheframeworkwithinwhichallclaimstoauthoritymightbetranscended.Throughhistory,allimmutableclaimswererevealedtobecontingent,eachonejustoneaspectofabroaderdrama.ThiswasastrueofBosanquet'stheoryofthestateasitwasofAustin'stheoryofsovereigntybothseemedmeaninglessapartfromthehistoricalconditionswhichdeterminedtherolethataclaimtoauthoritymightplay.Inthisway,historywasabletoprovideasettinginwhichtheauthorityofanygivenstate,inwhateverformittook,remained'chimerical',anillusionwhichitwaslefttohistorytosustainortoexplode.However,justbecauseultimateresponsibilityfortheparttobeplayedbythestateresidedwithhistory,itwasimpossibletobecertainwhatpartthestatemightbeexpectedtoplay.AsErnestBarkerdiscovered,historycouldbeasarbitraryasanyothersovereign,andtheroleofthestatemightbetransformedbyitovernight,sometimesliterally,ashappenedinPrussiabetween14and15July1870,andinBritainbetween3and4August1914.Therewasnothingtoguaranteethatthespectaclepresentedbyhistorywouldbeacoherentone,solongasallauthoritywasseentorestwithhistory,andnothingtoexerciseauthorityoverit.

Itwasthis,then,thatnecessitatedthemovefromhistorismtohistoricism.Ifthepluralistsweretocontainthestatewithintheframeworkofhistory,theyhadsomehowtoorderhistorysoastoprovidethestatewithacoherentrole,andtobeginwith,theylackedthemeanstodoso.Maitland,FiggisandBarkerfellbackonvariantsonthethemeofnationalcharacter,bywhichtheywereabletopointuptheabilityoftheEnglishtoputthestateinitsplace,butnottoestablishwhatthatplacewas.Asaresult,everythingdependedonthe

contingentarrangementsthatweremadewithingroupsandbetweengroupstosecureforthestateitslimitedrole;everythingdependedontheabilityoftheEnglishtoimprovisegrouplifeamongthemselves.Thiswasthethemeof'clubbability',ormorebroadly,'trust'.ThesortofhistorysetoutbyMaitland,FiggisandBarkersuggestedthattheEnglishhadbeenparticularlyadeptatthiskindofimprovisation.Butsolongasitremainedimprovisation,thehistoriancoulddonomorethansitbackandadmiretheperformance,inthe

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hopethatitwouldcontinue;andthepartplayedbythestatecouldneverbequitesecurefromonemomenttothenext.Meanwhile,ColeandLaskilackedeventhisrudimentaryfaithintheabilityoftheircountrymentoarrangemattersforthemselves.Theywishedsimplytousehistorytopointuptheneedfor'inductive-minded'thinking,wherebyallclaimstoauthoritymightbeseentodependuponthecircumstancesunderwhichtheyaremade.Inthisway,itwashopedthatthestatemightbeprovidedwitharolewhichtiedittothelivesofthosewhoweretoexperienceit.Yetthisinsistenceamountstolittlemorethanawishtoseethestategivenarolethatisotherthanarbitrary,somethingwhichisverydifferentfromdecidingontherolethatthestateshouldplay.Totellapoliticaltheoristtothink'inductive-mindedly'isliketellinganauthorthathemusttakeaccountofhisaudienceandwhileitmaybetruethatawillingnesstotakeaccountofone'saudienceisapre-conditionofsuccessfulauthorship,theinjunctiontodosodoesnottelltheauthorwhatheistosay,orhowheistosayit.

ColeandLaskicametorecognisethis,andinduecoursetheycameroundtoadifferentviewofhistory,whichwastheviewprovidedbyMarx.Insodoing,theywereabletoimbuehistorywithaplot,andtoprovidethestatewithaclearlydemarcatedrole.Ultimately,thedramawastoculminateinthedisappearanceofthestatefromthestageofhistoryaltogether.Buttoreachthatpoint,itwasnecessarytoensurethattherolemappedoutforthestatewasproperlyactedout,andthismeantthatthedramahadtobecarefullystaged.Thestatecouldonlyassumeitsproperroleifauthoritycouldberestoredtotheproducersofthedrama,andtheproducersofthisdramaweretheMarxiststhemselves.Historycouldprovidethebroadersettingthatwasneeded,therefore,butonlyonthebasisofanunambiguoushierarchyofauthority,whichis,afterall,thehallmarkofeveryMarxiststate.ForthoseconvincedbyaMarxistreadingofhistory,thisauthority

willultimatelyproduceagenuinelyuniformmoralorder,andtherebyputanendtotheprospectofaregress.Butforthosewhoremainunconvinced,itwill,inevitably,seemasarbitraryasanythingthathasgonebefore.

AmongtheselastwasBarker,forwhomtheattractionsofMarxismwereneververygreat.Intheend,Barkermanagedtoresistthepullofhistoricisminallitsforms,andhecametorecognisethatitwasthesearchforauniformmoralorderthatwastheillusion.Themoralperspective,asheinsistedinhisintroductiontoGierke,

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belongsonlytoindividuals,andindividuals,necessarily,differ.Ifthatperspectiveistobeuniform,itcanonlybebecauseaformofjuristicorderhasbeenimposedonthemorallifeofindividuals,renderingitasarbitraryasthenarrowjuristicexistenceitisdesignedtotranscend.Therefore,thepreservationofthemorallifedependsuponsomedistancebeingmaintainedbetweenitandthejuristicstructuresthatprovideitwithorder.ThiswasthepositionatwhichBarkerhadarrivedin1933.Thestate,heargued,hastobefreedfromtheexigenciesofthemorallife,andfromthehistoricalbackdropagainstwhichthatlifeisplayedout;ithastocreateaseparate,narrow,potentiallyevenanarbitraryworldofitsown.Barkerstillhopedtodiminishthepotentialforarbitrariness,byprovidingthestatewithaplaceintheworldthatithadcreated,asapersononthelegalstageinitsownright.Butthoughhehopedforit,hecouldnotexplainhowitmightbedone.Sohefoundhimself,in1933,inapositionthathadfirstbeensetoutbyThomasHobbes,inhisLeviathan.

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Chapter14ConclusionManyoftheargumentswithwhichthisbookhasbeenconcernedbelongtoapastage.Wenolongerhearmuchabout,orseemmuchtocare,whetherchurchesareorarenotpersonsintheirownright.Wedostill,ofcourse,hearagreatdealaboutthelegalstatusoftradeunions,butwedonothearthequestionofthatstatusaddressedinthelanguageoflegalpersonality.1Infact,mostoftheclearcutdistinctionsonwhichtheconceptoflegalpersonalitydependshavebeenlostunderthewelteroflegislationthatmarksthiscentury,allofitnecessarilydesignedwithwhatMaitlandwouldcall'convenience'inmind.Therehave,forexample,beenmanycompaniesactssincetheactof1862,andeachonehasbeenconcernedwithpracticalissuesoverandaboveanyabstractones.Asaresult,wenowhavetruststhatcanincorporatecorporations(manycharitiesarenowlimitedcompanies)andcorporationsthatcanincorporatetrusts(intheformofpensionfundsandsoon),whilethequestionsofcorporateidentityandcorporateliability,thoughmorepressingthanever,havealsobecomeevermorecomplex.Amidstallthislegislation,muchhashappenedtoenhancethefreedomsenjoyedbygroupswithinthestate,andmuch(notablythetradeunionreformsofthe1980s)todiminishit.Whathasnothappenedisanythingthatmighthelptoclarifywhatthesefreedomsareinabstractorphilosophicalterms.Andwhatistrueofgroupswithinthestateisalsotrueofthestateitself.Thelasthalfcenturyhasseenenormous

1AfactthatErnestBarkerhimselfseemedtoacknowledgeinaseriesoflectureshepublishedin1951,basedonacoursehehaddeliveredinCambridgeinthelatterhalfofthe1930s.Inthepublishedversionhewrites:'Therealquestion,inanydiscussionoftherelationoftradeunions

totheState,isnotthequestionofwhethertheyarepersons,ofwhateversortorcharacter...The''being"ofthegroup(personornot-person?and,ifaperson,whichsortofperson,themoralorthelegal?)isirrelevanttothatquestion:theonethingrelevantiswhatthegroupdoes,whatitsactivityis,andwhetherthatactivitycan,andshould,beregulatedbylaw'(Barker,Principlesofsocialandpoliticaltheory(Oxford,1951),p.75).

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changesinthescopeofthestate'sactivities,thenumberandvarietyofagenciesthroughwhichitacts,andthemannerandlikelihoodoftheirappearancebeforethecourts.No-onenowdoubts,orevenconsiders,whetherornotthestatecanhavealegalidentity.Instead,welooktothespecificidentityofspecificagencies,asandwhentheycomeunderthejurisdictionofparticularcourtsandparticularlaws.IfwewishnowtoaddressthesortsofquestionsthatwereaddressedbyMaitland,weshouldhavetoacceptthattheabstractconceptofgrouppersonalityisoflittleornohelp;theanswerslieinthedetails.

Nevertheless,itisalsotruethatamongthemoregeneralconcernsvoicedbytheEnglishpluralists,manyhaveacquiredacontemporaryresonance.ThoughEnglish-speakingpoliticaltheoristsnolongerconcernthemselveswiththedifferencebetweennaturalandartificialpersonality,orthedifferencebetweenfictitiousandreal,theydoshowanincreasinginterestinthequestionofthestate'sproperrole,andtherolethatmightbeplayedbyvoluntaryassociationsalongsideit.Inrecentyears,thishasledtoanumberofattemptstoreviveinterestintheworkoftheEnglishpluralists,whoseideasareseenashavingbeenunjustlyneglected.2Thisbookhasnotsoughttoputforwardanargumentofthiskind.Themovementthathasbeendescribedheredidnotdisappearthroughculpableneglect,butbecauseoftheveryreallimitationsoftheideasthemselves,limitationswhichbecamecleartotheirproponentsaswellastotheircritics.Thehistoryofpoliticalpluralismisthehistoryofaseriesofunsatisfactorysolutionstoasetofintractableproblems,andthisbookhasbeenanattempttoexplainwhythisshouldhavebeenso.Ifithasbeensuccessfulinthatattempt,itwillbeapparentthatthereislittletobegainedfromseekingtoreinstatepluralistideasinacontemporarysetting.Earlytwentieth-centurypoliticalpluralismdidnotsucceedonitsownterms,nevermindonours.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatthehistoryofpoliticalpluralismhasnobearingoncontemporarydisputesinpoliticaltheory.

Thereare,inparticular,twoconclusionswhichcanbedrawnfromthehistorythathasbeensetouthere.

Thefirstconcernscurrentattemptsbypoliticaltheoriststodiminishthepartplayedbythestateineachofourlives.Manyoftheargumentsthatareputforwardinthisregard,whetherbroadly

2SeeespeciallyD.Nicholls,Thepluraliststate:thesocialandpoliticalideasofJ.N.Figgisandhiscontemporaries,secondedn(Basingstoke,1994),andP.Q.Hirst,Thepluralisttheoryofthestate:selectedwritings(London,1989).

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philosophical(communitarianism)ormorenarrowlypolitical(newLabour),haveapuzzlingquality.Thepuzzleisthattheattempttodiminishtheroleofthestateincertainareasofourlivesseemsonlytonecessitateitsincreaseinothers.So,forexample,thegreatertheemphasisplacedonvoluntaryassociations(suchasthefamily,forcommunitarians;orvoluntarypensionschemes,fornewLabour),thegreatertheconstraintsthatcometobeplacedonthewaysinwhichtheseassociationscanoperate.Thisisathemethathasrecurredthroughoutthisbook.Aswehaveseen,theattempttoenhancetheroleofvoluntaryassociationsdoesnotresultinadiminutionoftheauthorityofthestate;itmerelyrelocatesit.Theonlywayinwhichthepartplayedbythestatecanbediminishedisbymarkingoffanareaofsocialexistenceintowhichtheauthorityofthestatedoesnotrun.Andifwedothis,weshallhavetoacceptthatwecanhavenocontroloverwhatgoesonthere.Thisdoesnotmeanthatdisorderwillinevitablyfollowindividualsandgroupsofindividualsmaybeperfectlycapableofimprovisingakindoforderamongthemselves.Butwhatthatorderiswewillonlydiscoveraftertheevent,asahistoricaltruth;therecanbenoprior,logisticalguarantees.Theonlyguaranteescomeaboutwhensomeoneorthingispreparedtodotheworkofthestateforit.Andinthesecircumstances,thoughtheactorsmaychange,andthenamesmaychange,thenatureoftheroleitselftheroleofauthornecessarilyremainsthesame.Thisinturndoesnotmeanthatitmakesnodifferencewhereandhowpoliticalauthorityisexercised;findingreliableauthorsandconvincingsettingsfortheexerciseofauthorityistheverystuffofpolitics.Butitdoesmeanthattherelocationofthedramafromanarrowly'statist'toamorebroadlymoral,orcommunitarian,settingdoesnotinitselfalterthetermsofthedrama,oritspotentialforarbitrariness.Itisbythepotentialforarbitrarinessthatwerecognisesomeone,orsomething,actingintheroleofthestate.

Thesecondconclusionconcernsattemptsbysomehistoriansofideastodecidewhethersuchathingas'thestate'existsatall.Thesearguments,whichgobackasfarasCollingwood,3areaddressedtothequestionofwhetherthereareanyperennialproblemsinthehistoryofideas.Usingtheideaof'thestate'asanexample,ithas

3SeeR.G.Collingwood,Anautobiography(Oxford,1939),especiallypp.613.ThemorerecentrangeofargumentsonthistopicarecontainedinJ.Tully(ed.),Meaningandcontext:QuentinSkinnerandhiscritics(Cambridge,1988)(foraspecificdiscussionofHobbesand'thestate'seepp.3741).

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beenarguedthatdifferenttheoristsatdifferentperiodshavemeantsuchdifferentthingsbythisideathatitismeaninglesstospeakofitinuniformterms(whatisthestate?whatistheroleofthestate?);insteadweshouldlooktoseewhatindividualtheoristsmighthavemeantbyit(whatdidHobbesmeanby'thestate'?whatdidLaskimeanby'thestate'?).Thehistorysetoutinthisbookoffersmuchthatsupportsthisthesis.Thedifferenttheoristsdiscussedheredidhaveverydifferentideasofwhatwasmeantby'thestate',anditwasoftenthisthatprovidedthemaingroundofdifferencebetweenthem(asforexamplebetweenthepluralistsandBosanquet).Moreover,ashistoriansthemselves,theEnglishpluralistsrecognisedthefutilityoftryingtopopulatethelandscapeofpoliticalthoughtwith'immutable'ideas,anditwastheirsenseofthecontingencyofsuchideasthatprovidedtheirownargumentswithmuchoftheirmomentum.YetitisalsotruethattheEnglishpluralists,inseekingtomoveawayfromthetimelessconceptsof'state'and'sovereignty',foundthemselveshavingtofaceafamiliarproblemtheproblemofauthority,assetoutbyHobbes.Intheirattemptstotranscendconventionalnotionsofpoliticalauthority,thepluralistsrevealedthevarietyofdifferentsettingsintowhichtheideaofthestatemightbetransplanted.Butthoughthesettingsmightvary,theproblemremainedthesame.Wecannotknowhowanyparticulartheoristfeltabouttheproblemofauthorityunlessweareabletorecognisethesettinginwhichhesoughttoaddressit,therebyenablingustounderstandwhathemeantbytheideaofthestate.Equally,though,wehavetorecognisethattheproblemisapersistentone,andthatitisbecauseofitspersistencethatdifferenttheoristshavesoughttoaddressitindifferentways.Inpoliticaltheory,almostanythingispossible,andauthoritycanbeclaimedbyalmostanyone,fromhistorianstolawyers,fromphilosopherstopoliticians.Becauseitcanbeclaimedbyalmostanyone,wecanneverbecertaininadvancewhatanyonemeansbytheideaofthestate.Butbecausewecannotbecertainwhatismeantby

anidea,itdoesnotfollowthattherearenoperennialproblemsinthehistoryofideas.Politicaltheoristsmeandifferentthingsbytheideaofthestatebecausetheyrecognisetheclaimsofothertheoriststobearbitrary;theyseemarbitrarybecausetheydonotappeartosolvetheproblem.Thetrulyperennialproblems,afterall,aretheinsolubleones.That,inasense,ishowpoliticaltheoryworks.

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Jacks,L.P.,Shaw,G.B.,Burns,C.D.andOakley,H.,'Symposium:ethicalprinciplesofsocialreconstruction',ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,17(191617),25699

Laing,R.M.,'Aspectsoftheproblemofsovereignty',InternationalJournalofEthics,32(19212),120

Laski,H.J.,'Thepersonalityofassociations',HarvardLawReview,29(191516),40426

'TheapotheosisoftheState',NewRepublic,7(1916),3024

'TheresponsibilityoftheStateinEngland',HarvardLawReview,32(191819),44772

'ThepluralisticState',PhilosophicalReview,28(1919),56275

'ManortheState',Nation,110(January1920),1467

'Democracyatthecrossroads',YaleReview,9(1920),788803

'Recentcontributionstopoliticalscience',Economica,1(1921),8791

'LeninandMussolini',ForeignAffairs,2(1923),4354

'PoliticalscienceinGreatBritain',AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,19(1925),969

'Machiavelliandthepresenttime',QuarterlyReview,53(1927),5770

'Bosanquet'stheoryofthegeneralwill',AristotelianSocietySupplementaryVolume,8(1928),4661

'Theprospectsofconstitutionalgovernment',PoliticalQuarterly,1

(1930),30725

'Reflectionsonthecrisis',PoliticalQuarterly,2(1931),4669

'Thepresentpositionofrepresentativedemocracy',AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,26(1932),62941

'Theobsolescenceoffederalism',NewRepublic,98(1939),3679

'MorrisCohen'sapproachtolegalphilosophy',UniversityofChicagoLawReview,15(19478),57587

Laski,H.J.andLippmann,W.,'AuthorityinthemodernState',NewRepublic,19(1919),14950

Lindsay,A.D.,'TheStateinrecentpoliticaltheory',PoliticalQuarterly,1(1914),12845

'TheStateandsociety',TheInternationalCrisis,2(1915),92108

'Sovereignty',ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety,27(19234),23554

'Bosanquet'stheoryofthegeneralwill',AristotelianSocietySupplementaryVolume,8(1928),3145.

Machen,A.W.,'Corporatepersonality',HarvardLawReview,24(191011),25367and34765.

MacIver,R.M.,'Ethicsandpolitics',InternationalJournalofEthics,20(190910),7286

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Malcolm,N.,'Hobbes,SandysandtheVirginiaCompany',HistoricalJournal,24,297321

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Martin,K.,'ThereturnoftheState',Economica,6(1926),408

Mellone,S.H.,'TheScottishChurchcaseanditsethicalsignificance',InternationalJournalofEthics,15(19045),3619

Morrow,J.,'Ancestors,legaciesandtraditions:BritishIdealisminthehistoryofpoliticalthought',HistoryofPoliticalThought,6(1986),492515

Muirhead,J.H.,'RecentcriticismoftheIdealisttheoryofthegeneralwill',Mind,33(1924),16675;23341;3618

Oakeshott,M.,'Theconceptofaphilosophicaljurisprudence',Politica,3(1938),20322;34562

Oakley,H.D.,'Theideaofageneralwill',TheInternationalCrisis,2(1916),13863

Peretz,M.,'Laskiredivivus',JournalofContemporaryHistory,1(1966),87101

Russell,B.,'Theethicsofwar',InternationalJournalofEthics,25(191415),12742

Sabine,G.H.,'TheconceptoftheStateaspower',PhilosophicalReview,29(1920),30118

'Pluralism:apointofview',AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,17(1923),3450

Spitz,D.,'RobertM.MacIver'scontributionstopoliticaltheory',inM.Berger,T.AbelandC.H.Page(eds.),Freedomandcontrolinmodernsociety,NewYork,1954,297312

Stapleton,J.,'ThenationalcharacterofErnestBarker'spoliticalscience',PoliticalStudies,37(1989),17189

'Englishpluralismasculturaldefinition:thesocialandpolitical

thoughtofGeorgeUnwin',JournaloftheHistoryofIdeas,3(1991),66584

Tugwell,R.G.,'GuildSocialismandtheindustrialfuture',InternationalJournalofEthics,32(19212),2828

Urban,W.M.,'Thenatureofthecommunity',PhilosophicalReview,29(1919),54761

Wadia,A.R.,'TheStateunderashadow',InternationalJournalofEthics,31(19201),31937

Weeks,J.,'Thepoliticsofpluralism',BulletinoftheSocietyfortheStudyofLabourHistory,32(1976),5966

Wilde,N.,'TheattackontheState',InternationalJournalofEthics,30(191920),34971

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Zimmern,A.E.,'ThesupremacyoftheState',NewRepublic,12(1917),4950

Page274

H.J.Laski'sNewRepublicBookReviews

'Realisticsocialphilosophy',11(7July1917),2834

'AnEnglishradicalism',13(3November1917),256

'Theliteratureofpolitics',13(17November1917),68(ofsupplement)

'LordActon',14(23February1918),11719

'Industrialself-government',14(27April1918),3912

'LabourandtheState',15(1June1918),1312

'Whatishistory?',15(13July1918),3234

'TheresponsibleState',16(14September1918),2034

'ThenewState',18(8February1919),612

'Nationalguilds',18(22February1919),1234

'ThewarState',18(8March1919),1889

'Constitutionaldocuments',18(26April1919),42930

'Constitutionalgovernment',19(24May1919),1267

'Rousseau',19(16July1919),3634

'Agreatchurchman',20(20August1919),956

'Thehistoryoftradeunionism',22(12May1920),35960

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UnpublishedMaterial

Stapleton,J.,'Academicpoliticalthoughtandthedevelopmentof

politicalstudiesinBritain,19001950',D.Phil.thesis,UniversityofSussex,1985

Page275

INDEX

A

actions,9,1618,223,11415,174,250

actors,78,2245,227,2306,23843,2478,2526,264

Allport,G.W.,225n.5

Althusius,Johannes,437,48,54,57,90,1301,144,218,245n.13

AmalgamatedSocietyofRailwayServants(ASRS),139,1412,180

AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,198

anarchism,80,83,1901,198n.6

AristotelianSociety,163,166,207

Aristotle,3,50n.34

associationism,21213

associations,3,2960,160,208

ascommunities,1438,186

asfellowships,35,44,46,512,55,57,589,612,131

aspersons,34,11,14,2831,37,4850,513,656,8990,946,10510,11518,136,140,151,1878,187,21517,23343,24450

asschemes,1529,215

assects,1438,183

'enterprize,14,147,162,171

functional,16972,1756

inlaw,1316,2531,3940,4850,659,8990,1017,10812,11518,1314,13543,21517,2337,240,24450

Aubrey,John,15n.19

Austin,John,725,78,79,80,81,823,96,112,1258,132,149,1556,1578,180,223,2578,259

authority,authors,78,2931,93,143,174,18990,224,227,230,23541,2526,25761,264,265

B

Bacon,Francis,15,79

Barker,Ernest,x,166,1689,25961,262n.1

and'federalism',80,150

andFiggis812,1501,160,21718

andtheFirstWorldWar,161,1623,259

andGierke,64,65,151,211,21319

andHobbes,1545,158,2239,230,2323

andLaski,812,178,181,187,1934

andMacIver,21113

ashistorian,161

aspoliticaltheorist,1512,196

onpersonality,151,1523,164n.7,21417,2249,230,2317,2437,250

onthestate,15361,1623,198,213,21619,2278,2315,2513

Barker,Rodney,196n.5

Bentham,Jeremy,73n.16,195

Bentley,A.F.,192

Berlin,Isaiah,83n.43

Bismarck,Ottovon,60n.51,61

Black,Antony,54n.39,60n.48,61n.52

Bodin,Jean,15,34,158,223

bodies,214,153

'politic',269,74

Bolshevikrevolution,196

Bosanquet,Bernard,769,80,823,96,150,164,166,1735,2089,223,2578,259,265

Bradley,F.H.,208n.42

BürgerlichesGesetzbuch(1896),62,65

Burns,C.DeLisle,164

C

Calvin,Jean,15

ChildSupportAgency,111n.57

Church,Anglican,132,143,182,184

inBritain,66,1814

Church,RussianOrthodox,14011

churches,978,127,1323,135,13941,1436,1478,152,168,179,1806,2423,262

Cicero,2256

civildisobedience,1478,183

civilwar,12

civitas,14n.16,21,212,215

Dei,47

Page276

Cohen,Morris,198n.6

CokerF.W.,198n.6

Cole,G.D.H.,x,85,123,223

andBosanquet,166,1735,2089

andLaski,177,178,179,18790,1934,199202,207,209,211

asfunctionalist,16976,177

asguildsocialist,1656,171,196,199201

asMarxist,198,20911,260

onthestate,16676,20611

Cole,Margaret,165,173n.37,199

Collingwood,R.G.,264

Collini,Stefan,76n.26

command,72,11215

Commonwealth,97,103

personof1112,1624,323,3941,256.seealsostate

communitarianism,264

communitascommunitatum,130,1448,171,21718

CompaniesAct(1862),65,10910,116,233,238,245,2489,262

'concessiontheory,28,49,66,93,94,105,216,2459

constitutionalism,constitutions,104,174,198,203,214

contract,12,24n.48,3840,42,44,46,489,667,72,2234

'co-operative'movement,60

CorporationoftheCityofLondon,25n.50

corporationssole,20n.32,97102

corporations,3,14,2531,667,76,903,956,97,99,1023,106,10812,11314,11518,121,136,179,1978,233,236,250

covenant,78,11,12n.11

Cromwell,Thomas,15

crowds,26,33

Crown,the,97,99100,102,103,104

D

Dahl,R.A.,192n.44

Darwin,Charles,95,18990

democracy,42,196,2056

Dewey,John,189

divinerightofkings,126

Duff,P.W.,117n.62,24550

E

Elliot,W.Y.,198n.6

Elton,Geoffrey,124

Emstelegram,60n.51

Erastianism,137n.30,138

F

family,3,27,31,40,49,67,250

FamilyLawBill(1995),111

fascism,120,122,198n.6,21718

federalism,712,7980,150,152,1778,187,2089

fellowship,35,44,46,512,55,57,589,612,131,162.seealsoGenossenschaft

Fichte,Johann,15

fiction,fictionism,30,224,243,2456,249,252.seealsopersons,fictitious

Figgis,J.N.,x,178,179,196n.5,223,259

andBarker,812,1501,160

andCole,166,1689

andGierke,812,1246,130,1314,144,1489,21718

andtheKedroffcase,13941

andMaitland,80,123,1246,128,131,136,1423

deathof,149n.59,195

onAlthusius,1301

onAustin,1258,132,149

oncommunitas,communitatum,1448

onpersonality,1323,136

onScottishChurchcase,1348

ontradeunions,1389,1412

FirstWorldWar,85,161,1625,173,1778,196,217

Fisher,H.A.L.,123

Forsyth,M.,6n.1,12n.13

France,81,151

Franco-Prussianwar,60,259

FredericktheGreat,kingofPrussia,15

FreeChurchofScotland,1348,140,1456,179,1823,2423

Disruptionof,1802,249.seealsoScottishChurchcase

function,functionalism,16976,177,1889

G

generalwill,767,78,1745,213

Genossenschaft,357,44,46,514,579,612,656,68,69,93,95n.20,131,136

Germanism,Germany,4,357,50,514,579,602,65,70,712,916,106,132,151,161,173,176,188,21718,233

Gierke,Ottovon,x,xi,4,66,68,76,789,166,175,187,193,244

andGermannationalism,602,712

ashistorian,536

Barkeron64,65,151,21319,224

deathof,85

Figgisand,1246,130,1314,144,1489

Maitlandon,906,97,100,106,1078,109

onAlthsius,437

onHobbes,34,3743,44,467

onmedievalthought,4750

ontheGenossenschaft,46,513

ontheRechtsstaat,524,569,11819,258

Page277

translatedintoEnglish,63,645,701,789,845,123,177,194,237,245

Green,T.H.,76,150,157

Grotius,Hugo,130

groups,seeassociations,corporations,crowds

guildsocialism,1656,171,177,190,195,199201,207,210

guilds,60,1689

H

Hart,H.L.A.,11215

Hegel,G.W.F.,15,34,569,62,76,77,155,158,164n.7,174,1878,2089,223

HenryVIII,kingofEngland,1001,223

Herrschaft,Herrschaftsverband,36,55,131

Hirst,P.Q.,263n.1

historicism,83,94,122,126n.5,184,186,193,2046,210,259

historism,83,84,122,126n.5,160,184,193,204,210,259

Hobbes,Thomas,x,xi,5,4950,52,66,69,85,94n.17,95,1089,121n.63,152n.10,168,188,261,265

andAustin,725,223

andBarker,1545,158,2239,230,2323

andstatepersonality,xi,1112,1624,301,323,3841,54,1002,2278,2536

Gierkeon,34,3743,44,467,546,77

Maitlandon,1002,223

Oakeshotton,1516,25,30,323,345

onauthority,78,2931,93,224,227,2359,2536,265

onpersonality,persons,67,11,678,923,2249,230,232,23541,2468,2536

onsovereignty,1012,1624,2631,32,113,2234,228,2536

Hobhouse,L.T.,164

Hobson,S.G.,167n.14

Holmes,O.W.,Jnr.,178,190n.33,195,198n.6

HouseofLords,125n.4,1345,138,139,1412,203n.27

Hume,David,95n.20

I

idealism,1501,173,208,243,2589

InnocentIV,pope,912

Ireland,72,184

J

James,William,84,1789,189

JockeyClub,66,110n.56

John,Michael,62n.53

Jung,Carl,231

jurisprudence,71,745,778,128,132n.24

K

Kant,Immanuel,15

Kedroffcase(1952),13941,250

Keegan,John,163n.1

Kramnick,Isaac,178n.1

Kulturstaat,54n.39

L

Labourparty,139n.38,193,196,205,264

Laski,H.J.,x,123,223

andBarker,812,178,181,187,1934

andCole,177,178,179,18790,1934,199202,207,209,211

andFiggis,178,179,1813,187,191,1934

andGierke,81,177,187,193

andMaitland,81,178,179,181,187,189,1934,195

ashistorian,1806

asMarxist,198,2057,260

aspluralist,17780,18594,196,198n.6,202,2046

assyndicalist,812,1901

careerof,177,179n.6,1934,196n.5

deathof,205n.32

onHobbes,1878,223

onpersonality,183,1878

onthestate,18091,2027,265

law

andorder,312,36,1539,216

civil,1819,50

conceptof,11215,11921,1912,2245,250

English,6571,8990,91,97107,10912,11518,233,2489

'folk',36,91

German,357,39,62,65,68,91,934,233

natural,6,17,3847,40,556,72,214

positive,75

private,14,16,33,35,4850,53

public,39,53

Roman,1316,357,39n.8,4850,556,612,68,8990,913,97,141,214,239,2456,248

Lear,King,2267,232,234,2423,248,252

Leviathan,6,10,1516,1724,2631,323,37,38n.3,39,41,42,44,101n.37,119,224,232,254,261

polemicalpurposeof,12,25

Leviathan,the,205,40,41

Lindsay,A.D.,164

LloydsofLondon,110n.36

localgovernment,1034,203

Locke,John,79

LondonSchoolofEconomics,193

LouisXIV,kingofFrance,102n.42

loyalties,31,323,147,20710

M

MacIver,R.M.,21113

Page278

Maitland,F.W.,x,166,169,178,179,262

andFiggis,801,1246,128,131,136,1423

andGierke,64,65,66,79,80,906,100,106,1078,109,214

andLaski,81,178,179,181,187,189,1934,195

and'real'personality,8990,956,1057,10812,11521

andRechtsstaat,96,11821

ashistorian,90,1223,179

aslawyer,8990,151

deathof,128n.9,195

oncorporationsole,97102

onHobbes,1002

ontrusts,6670,1035,2345,238

Malcolm,Noel,29n.68

marriage,10912,11718,143n.45

Marx,Karl,15,60,61,209

Marxism,198,201,2057,20911,260

masks,2249,23041,2434,2479,251,2546

Meinecke,Friedrich,83n.43,126n.5

Mussolini,Benito,217

N

nationalism,5862,712,21718

NewRepublic,181,185

Newman,CardinalJohn,183

Nicholls,David,146n.52,263n.2

O

Oakeshott,Michael,1316,246,30,323,345,47,53,54n.39,118,1467,171,21213,215

order,313,456,131,1539,2536,261

organicism,205,3941,46,48,50,935,176

Orwell,George,179n.4

Osbornejudgment(1909),1389

Oxfordmovement,1813,184,185

P

pacificism,173n.37

'pals'battalions,1623

parliament,27,205,210

partnership,13,24n.48,39n.8,667

persona,personae,224,2301,2334,237,240,241,250

personaficta,seepersonality,persons,fictitious

personality,persons,xi,34,2301

artificial,611,2931,37,42,97,103,225,235,23841,244,263

comparedtobodies,213,289,153

comparedtomasks,2249,23243

fictitious,713,14,16,18,2931,37,4850,66,73,8990,913,97,101,103,1067,1089,121,132,136,141,1523,187,225,2278,23850,2545,263

legal,78,21517,2327,2434,252

moral,21415,232,240,2445

natural,67,9,37,52,97,101,225,23841,244,254,263

psychological,21415,231,232

real,37,467,52,66,8990,956,107,108,11521,133,136,140n.40,143,151,152,169,183,1878,198n.6,217,23850,263

Pitkin,H.,6n.1,225n.7

pluralism,623,64,79,17780,18594,1969,2012,2046,210,212,21718,223,2289,25660,2635

Americanconceptof,192

plurality-in-unity,37,41,478,52,71,123

Polizeistaat,61,96

polyarchism,1579,160,178,187

Popper,Karl,83,94

pragmatism,84,179,201

Proudhon,PierreJoseph,190n.33

Pufendorf,Samuel,2445

R

Rawls,John,203n.26

Reception,912

Rechtsstaat,524,55,579,612,63,70,83,845,96,108,11819,120,

130,214,258

representation,represenatives,6n.1,712,279,423,678,101,225,232,235,238,2412

Romanism,seelaw,Roman

Rousseau,Jean-Jacques,15,423,77,168,223

Russell,Bertrand,164

S

Sabine,G.H.,198n.6

Savigny,FriedrichKarlvon,923

ScottishChurchcase(19004),125,1348,140,142,180,1813,249

sectarianism,sects,1438,183

Shakespeare,William,2413,253n.2

Sheerman,Barry,178n.1

Sittlichkeiten,174

Skinner,Quentin,264n.3

slavery,slaves,244,2468

Smith,Sidney,183

societas,1316,246,313,34,357,39,48,54,69,118,146,171

sovereigns,sovereignty,53,96,1559,161,175,178,213,218,2234,257

andnaturallaw,3847,56,131

Austin'saccountof,725,80,124,1268,130,149,1556,180,223,257,259

Bosanquet'saccountof,768,80

Hobbes'saccountof,1012,1624,2631,32,3942,50,723,100,2234,2467,2536

Page279

Spencer,Herbert,94n.17,150

Spinoza,Baruchde,15

stage,seetheatre

Stapleton,Julia,160n.28

state,the,xii

asassociation,3,1316,2631,33,447,97,131,1438,15361,1678,16976,190,202,206,212,213,257,262

asauthority,2931,2356,2526,25761,264

ascentreofcontrol,2027

asconstitution,174

ascorporation,1415,25,95,1056,121n.63,217

asgovernment,172,190

aslaw,96,11821,1539,213,214,21619,250

asnation,5962,164,21718

asorganization,4750,7677,120,1545

asperson,xi,1112,1624,301,323,3841,42n.17,534,1023,164n.7,217,2278,2516,261

assovereignty,734,96,1267,131,1556,1589,180,187

asstage,21516,2318,2516,258

astrust,1035

churchand,127,1323,135,1436,1478,1814

'concessionary',2489

existenceof,2645

pluralistic,189.seealsoRechsstaat

Stephen,Leslie,90,100

StockExchange,66,110n.56

syndicalism,802,121,122,151,167,190n.35,195,21718

T

TaffValecase(19001),1412

theatre,21516,2246,229,23043,2516,257,260

tractarianism,185

tradeunions,1389,1412,1456,152,169,184,1856,196,218n.67,262

trusts,669,91,1035,136,177,2336,238,259

Tuck,Richard,45n.24,56n.42

U

UnitedStatesofAmerica,74,75,834,1778,1923

unity-in-plurality,37,46,712

universitas,1316,246,30,34,357,3940,4850,54,69,91,99,118,120,146,171,233

utilitarianism,725,1278,149

V

VirginiaCompany,29n.68

W

Wallas,Graham,186n.18

Walzer,Michael,148n.55

war,6,1718,31.seealsocivilwar,FirstWorldWar,Franco-Prussianwar

Webb,Beatrice,199,200

Webb,L.C.,140n.40

WeeFrees,134,138,145

Page280

IDEASINCONTEXT

EditedbyQUENTINSKINNER(GeneralEditor)LORRAINEDASTON,WOLFLEPENIES,J.B.SCHNEEWINDandJAMESTULLY

1RICHARDRORTY,J.B.SCHNEEWINDandQUENTINSKINNER(eds.)PhilosophyinHistory

Essaysinthehistoriographyofphilosophy*

2J.G.A.POCOCKVirtue,CommerceandHistory

Essaysonpoliticalthoughtandhistory,chieflyintheeighteenthcentury*

3M.M.GOLDSMITH

PrivateVices,PublicBenefitsBernardMandeville'ssocialandpoliticalthought

4ANTHONYPAGDEN(ed.)ThelanguagesofPoliticalTheoryinEarlyModernEurope*

5DAVIDSUMMERS

TheJudgmentofSenseRenaissancenationalismandtheriseofaesthetics*

6LAURENCEDICKEYHegel:Religion,EconomicsandthePoliticsofSprint,17701807*

7MARGOTODD

ChristianHumanismandthePuritanSocialOrder

8LYNNSUMIDAJOY

GassenditheAtomistAdvocateofhistoryinanageofscience

9EDMUNDLEITES(ed.)

ConscienceandCasuistryinEarlyModernEurope

10WOLFLEPENIES

BetweenLiteratureandScience:TheRiseofSociology*

11TERENCEBALL,JAMESFARRandRUSSELLL.HANSON(eds.)PoliticalInnovationandConceptualChange*

12GERDGIGERENZERetal.TheEmpireofChance

Howprobabilitychangedscienceandeverydaylife**

13PETERNOVICKThatNobleDream

The'objectivityquestion'andtheAmericanhistoricalprofession*

Page281

14DAVIDLIEBERMAN

TheProvinceofLegislationDeterminedLegaltheoryineighteenth-centuryBritain

15DANIELPICKFacesofDegeneration

AEuropeandisorder,c.1848c.1918*

16KEITHBAKERApproachingtheFrenchRevolution

EssaysonFrenchpoliticalcultureintheeighteenthcentury*

17IANHACKINGTheTamingofChance*

18GISELABOCK,QUENTINSKINNERandMAURIZIOVIROLI(eds.)MachiavelliandRepublicanism*

19DOROTHYROSSTheOriginsofAmericanSocialScience*

20KLAUSCHRISTIANKOHNKETheRiseofNeo-Kantianism

GermanAcademicPhilosophybetweenIdealismandPositivism

21IANMACLEAN

InterpretationandMeaningintheRenaissanceTheCaseofLaw

22MAURIZIOVIROLI

FromPoliticstoReasonofStateTheAcquisitionandTransformationoftheLanguageofPolitics

12501600

23MARTINVANGELDEREN

ThePoliticalThoughtoftheDutchRevolt15551590

24NICHOLASPHILLIPSONandQUENTINSKINNER(eds.)PoliticalDiscourseinEarlyModernBritain

25JAMESTULLY

AnApproachtoPoliticalPhilosophy:LockeinContexts*

26RICHARDTUCKPhilosophyandGovernment15721651*

27RICHARDR.YEODefiningScience

WilliamWhewell,NaturalKnowledgeandPublicDebateinEarlyVictorianBritain

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28MARTINWARNKE

TheCourtArtistTheAncestryoftheModernArtist

29PETERN.MILLER

DefiningtheCommonGoodEmpire,ReligionandPhilosophyinEighteenth-CenturyBritain

30CHRISTOPHERJ.BERRYTheIdeaofLuxury

AConceptualandHistoricalInvestigation*

31E.J.HUNDERTTheEnlightenment's'Fable'

BernardMandevilleandtheDiscoveryofSociety

32JULIASTAPLETONEnglishnessandtheStudyofPolitics

TheSocialandPoliticalThoughtofErnestBarker

33KEITHTRIBEGermanEconomicThoughtfromtheEnlightenmenttotheSocial

Market

34SACHIKOKUSUKAWATheTransformationofNaturalPhilosophy

TheCaseofPhilipMelancthon

35EditedbyDAVIDARMITAGE,ARMANDHIMYandQUENTINSKINNERMiltonandRepublicanism

36MARKKUPELTONEN

ClassicalHumanismandRepublicanisminEnglishPoliticalThought15701640

37PHILIPIRONSIDE

TheSocialandPoliticalThoughtofBertrandRusselTheDevelopmentofanAristocraticLiberalism

38NANCYCARTWRIGHT,JORDICAT,LOLAFLECKandTHOMASUEBEL

OttoNeurath:PhilosophybetweenScienceandPolitics

39DONALDWINCH

RichesandPovertyAnIntellectualHistoryofPoliticalEconomyinBritain,17501834*

40JENNIFERPLATTAHistoryofSociologicalResearchMethodsinAmerica