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Military Outsourcing and US Overdependence Public Policy and Management Final Paper Spring 2014
Written by: Leonidas Ocampo
I. Introduction:
In times of war and peace, nations face many issues that revolve around
technology, information and knowledge. Some countries lack certain up-to-date and top
tier technology that is key for military efforts or the efforts of revamping a certain
industry domestically. Some countries lack the proper resources to acquire information
for better navigation in business endeavors. Others lack the proper skills base within their
country’s ranks to carry out tasks that are constantly developing in the international
community. Contracting out is an option many nations turn to when in need of resources
and services in a relatively quick fashion. Although not birthed, contracting has grown in
prevalence within the past 20 years and especially since the attacks on 9/11. The
involvement of PMF’s in war since the middle of the 20th century from 1950-1989 was
about 15 times as opposed to 1990-2000 where there was an estimated 80 cases.1 The US
government has been at the forefront of this movement by outsourcing endless tasks to
PMF’s (Private Military Firms) for assistance in both combative and supportive roles of
war.
1 Isenberg, David. Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy (PRIO: International Peace Research Institute, 2009)
In todays world the line between a “mercenary” and a “contractor” are one in the
same in the publics’ eye. There have been instances in the theatre of war that have
allowed the distinction between both to become blurred due to atrocities performed to
civilians or obvious breaches in scope of practice. A well-known example is the cruel
conduct involving US Military personnel as well as foreign contractors towards prisoners
in Abu Ghraib. As it currently stands the 1977 Protocol 1 Geneva Convention Article 7
holds 6 criteria to what a mercenary is and how it is usually distinguished from a
contractor.2 In essence, a mercenary is a foreign, usually armed (not necessarily though)
combatant that takes part in hostilities and receives substantial overcompensation from
the host Party for services provided. There are generally three categories that distinguish
the Private Military Firms and they are as follows:3
Military Combatant Companies: Tiny percent of all PMF’s, but receive the most public
attention. They provide the forces capable of combat.
Military Consulting Firms: Usually deal with training and advising as well as personal security
and bodyguard services.
Military Support Firms: Provide non-lethal aid and assistance with “weapons maintenance, tech
support, explosive ordinance disposal, intelligence collecting and analysis.”
2 Ibid3 Ibid
Understanding the private military firm definition is important when trying to
understand what scope or skills they work under and why they are appealing to
governments around the world. A private contractor provides the host with a set of skills,
equipment, team and efficiency that is more difficult to obtain within country. Whether a
government is in need of a support structure for missions with delicate tactical demands,
or personnel to operate very advanced technologies, contractors can provide people that
do those particular jobs for a living. If a government needs an organized base camp with
all necessities provided to house, feed and care for a battalion in Iraq they are able to
provide the employees to work for building the camp itself, catering, housing, linen
cleaning etc. Sometimes governments aren’t able to provide these requirements due to
issues with international laws, target country laws, lack of skills or employees within
government structure. As quoted in Martha Minow’s article, “The US can further own
policy through private contracts while technically maintaining it does not have US
involvement in said countries.”4 In exchange for this end-to-end service and organization,
governments pay money for these to be outsourced and organized through another firm
that “specializes” in this field and even larger amounts of money for employing them in
danger zones.
4 Minow, Martha. Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism and Democracy. (Boston College Law Review, 2005)
5 Schwartz, Moshe, and Joyprada Swain. Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis. (FAS, Congressional Research Device, 2011) CENTCOM Quarterly Census Reports; Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Boots on the Ground” monthly reports to Congress.
The problem that arises with contracting is the issue of knowing when a
government is becoming over-dependent and the problems that come with frequent
outsourcing, specifically, mismanagement and accountability. This paper raises the
question; is the US government too dependent on the military use of foreign contractors?
How does outsourcing management affect accountability in military affairs? This study
looks to establish a firm understanding of what points to over-dependence and what steps
can be taken in balancing out contracts. In the coming pages I will present the results
other authors have come to as well as the framework for my study on various different
scholars that deal with outsourcing military efforts, what leads to mismanagement and
accountability issues and how that can be seen as over-dependence? To conclude this
6 Ibid “Quarterly Census Reports; Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012”
study I will present alternative solutions that have been made clear by different authors as
well as my recommendations and concluding remarks to summarize my ideas and the
rationale behind them.
II. Literature Review
Outsourcing can be seen as a very appealing option to a country with the appropriate
amount of money to make the arrangement. There are many benefits to outsourcing
military efforts such as the direct light it takes off of the host country when policy goals
don’t necessarily coincide with international laws or the status quo of international
community. The US military retaliated to the attacks on 9/11 in New York by entering
Iraq and “claiming” to end a war on terror and to restore peace and stability to the Iraq
and Afghanistan governments. Whether this policy goal is true is not the main concern,
however the use of outsourcing allowed them to have a greater presence within those
nations. By hiring private contractors in more supportive roles such as staging, camps,
security and transportation the government was able to decrease the amount of military
personnel being deployed out to these dangerous states. Although the US government had
enough money to outsource jobs to PMF’s, it wasn’t solely because they had the
economic resources. Various scholars are in contention on the reasons behind the ever-
increasing position the US takes in outsourcing but one thing that is common is that
outsourcing en masse can be harmful to the government in terms of domestic skills and
management levels and accountability issues for the many contracts in progress.
7
Losing the skill base domestically is a growing concern among scholars because it
shows that the government is over-dependent on outsourcing jobs. An idea of just how
many contractors the US government, specifically the DOD and the DHS employ is
reflected by the ratio between government and contractor personnel. In 1991 the
personnel to contractor ratio was 50:1 and in 2010 it became 10:1.8 If that is not
convincing enough take another example from the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) of the United States that is responsible for tracking all reports from US contracts
and domestic work. Armed contractors that weren’t dealing with security in Iraq were at
7 Ibid US CENTCOM 2nd Quarter FY2011 Contractor Census Report8 Lavallee, T. M., Civil-Military Integration: The Politics of Outsourcing National Security (Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, ProQuest, 2010)
15,278 and 70,000 in Afghanistan which added up to a total of $254 billion on contract
services alone.9
As noted in the graph above, the acquisition workforce saw a considerable decline
in just one decade of the 1990’s and plateaued for the next decade. This drop in
acquisition workforce was directly related to the budget reallocation as well as the
downsizing in government to rely on commercial services more heavily. As the US
government freed up the acquisition workforce, DOD spending skyrockets at the turn of
the century and maintained a climbing rate into the middle and end of the 2000’s.
Working in a blended workforce means that government personnel work directly
alongside contracted employees. This creates a few problems when the government
9 Ibid---GAO, 2008, Schwarts 2009)10 Schooners, Steven L., Daniel S. Greenspahn, Too Dependent on Contractors? Minimum Standards for Responsible Governance. (GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works, 2008) See, e.g., Gansler Commission, supra note 24, at 91.
workforce is understaffed or undertrained and they are working alongside professionals
who do specific contracts for a living. It splits the government employee thin across
many different jurisdictions of work. However, because the lack of government workers,
contract employees are allowed to make decisions in this blended workforce environment
that normally a government official would be doing. This causes issues in
implementation when guidelines, goals, procedures, rules, ethics etc., aren’t specifically
outlined. Government employees then have to overcompensate at some time to keep up
with foreign professionals.
With the change in reliance from workforce to services there has been a neglectful
attitude towards the procedures needed to counter balance such a change.11 For example,
training new specialists and retaining skilled professionals within country all to manage
incoming long-term contracts is of big concern.12 Incentive structures favor the contractor
personnel far more than government personnel as they get more rewards and benefits for
services. There is more focused and specialized training as well as compensation, travel,
benefits etc., all while government officials are restricted to a standardized government
payroll, benefits and training that fluctuate with every congressional meeting, bill and
policy decision. Due to a lack of skilled and experienced personnel within government,
many people decide to move towards the private sector and work as a contractor. In some
senses it is more profitable at the risk of stability and health. This creates a problem for
the average worker looking to be employed for their knowledge and expertise because it
makes the government’s restricted benefits less appealing.
11Ibid 12Ibid
Poor management over contracts is yet another problem widely accepted by scholars
because the US has been involved in problems regarding humanitarian rights, money
fraud/laundering and lack of oversight awareness out in the field. For example, at the
prison known as Abu Ghraib there was a serious lack of transparency when looking at a
top down structure of authority. Military personnel were working in cohesion with
contractors and didn’t have any idea of how to proceed in their duties. What were they
allowed and not allowed to do with the contractors, what was the scope of the contractors
contracts and their specifics duties on this certain objective? According to the Fay Report,
which essentially analyzed the scandals that occurred at the prison by contractors and US
military personnel alike, reported; “Military personnel did not receive guidance about
how to use contracted personnel and did not know the terms of the contracts nor their
procedures.”13 This demonstrates clear malpractice in one of the most essential parts of
military operations, which is communication. The military is run by commands and
objectives and if two groups of professionals get dropped into a location and know
nothing of the former and latter’s specifics, then it is obvious why this resulted into a
scandal and failed objective.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has been trying to put emphasis on the
financial and operational failures the US government has had over the past decade
regarding contracts.14 Problems in these two sectors are responsible for a massive amount
of money being put at risk for every contract being formed. Financial burdens make the
13 Schooners, Steven L., Daniel S. Greenspahn, Too Dependent on Contractors? Minimum Standards for Responsible Governance. (GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works, 2008) Schooner, supra note 18, at 563-64 (discussing the Fay Report).
taxpayer suffer the most if lessons in failed contracted aren’t reflected upon and
improved in the future. Departure from standard protocol within contracts is common and
often not tracked properly due not only to states of emergency but for convenience sake
because there are no clear divisions aforementioned between government and contractor
functions.15
Another factor heavily contributing to mismanagement is the regulation of contracts
from within the US government. The AECA (Arms Export Control Act) is just one act
that was set to regulate the sales of arms during contracts. However this particular act
wasn’t designed for the long-term commitment of management but for the immediate
classification and tracking of contracts. According to Isenberg, PMF’s use the Foreign
Military Sales program to commence contracts with the US government and the AECA is
in charge of regulating such trades as well as offering the information for public
knowledge unless the president deems it necessary to withhold.16 The AECA “was
drafted primarily to regulate one-time arms sales contracts” which in one sense is a good
step towards more stringent regulation however, the scope of this act is far too narrow for
the amount of contracts the government is dealing with. 17 This highlights a problem of
the US government taking steps in the right direction but not with enough expertise or
foresight to compensate for the massive outsourcing industry they’ve created and
ineffectively been managing for a decade.
14 Minow, Martha. Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism and Democracy. (Boston College Law Review, 2005) 100615 Ibid16 Isenberg, David. Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy (PRIO: International Peace Research Institute, 2009) 17 Ibid
The graph above is another example of fiscal responsibility being handled in a
poor manner. This shows the US government annually increasing in procurement
expenditures and it’s compared to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). As clearly noted
within the table, Federal Procurement Spending’s far exceed that of the CPI
expenditures per year which leads to the question of responsibility of taxpayers
money as well as the sheer amount of contracts around each year.
All issues reviewed highlight the inability for proper management, accountability and
oversight and it is evident because the results are always brought to light by media outlets
when it comes to the conflicts in the Iraq and Afghanistan. Although many problems
spawn from absurd behaviors by US military personnel and contractors, there lies a
greater problem in the background. The entire practice of management and oversight of
18 Schooners, Steven L., Daniel S. Greenspahn, Too Dependent on Contractors? Minimum Standards for Responsible Governance. (GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works, 2008)
contracts is at fault because of the lack of transparency between policy decision makers
and agencies in charge of supervising the administrative and managerial functions of
personnel below them. With a proper system in place being directed top bottom, and with
time going by without serious restructuring and innovation, the expertise of contract
management in today’s evolving environment is being lost or used improperly in the
DOD (Department of Defense) and DHS (Department of Homeland Security). “The U.S.
government has only twice as many personnel overseeing contractors in Iraq, for
example, as it had during the l990’s for its Balkans contracts-even though there are now
15 times more contracts and the context is much more challenging.”19
III. What is causing the problem?
19 P. W. Singer, Outsourcing War, (Council on Foreign RelationsJSTOR, DOI: 10.2307/20034280)
20 Avant, Deborah, and Lee Sigelman, Private Security and Democracy: Lessons from the US in Iraq, Tess Experiments. (Routledge, 2010) Graph depicting the New York Times articles published on record comparing Military and PSC’s (Private Security Company) between 2003 and 2007 alone.
The problem at this time lies with the US government in the fields of accountability,
management and oversight, the lagging acquisition workforce and the competition that
spawns for a blended workforce environment. All these issues are interrelated and all can
be traced back to each other. For example with a poor management system there is very
little one can do if a scandal occurs with money laundering during contract approvals,
humanitarian rights violations on a mission with contractors or the poor construction of a
base in Iraq. Why is there poor management and oversight? There is a lack of acquisition
workforce regulators and auditors, skilled personnel adept to contract management and
seasoned agencies in charge of different fields of contract and military services. As a
result of this small workforce and skilled personnel, the US is forced to have a more split
work environment with many involved being contractors, which is referred to as a
blended workforce. Within a blended workforce, who is in charge? At what times? Under
what circumstances and under what power authority? What is the personnel’s jurisdiction
and expertise level in a certain position of finance, construction or military and support
service training? These issues all lead to accountability and who is rightly responsible,
who ends up taking the blame and who ends up being brought to court to face justice.
As the time goes by, technology advances, political situations change, and different
skills are required to continue satisfying foreign policy decisions which means the US is
lagging behind. During the Clinton Administration, Vice President Al Gore suggested a
strategy of reducing the amount of “government payrolls” and contracting out services of
support roles to increase efficiency.21 In 1995 the Defense Science Board noted a
21 Isenberg, David. Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy (PRIO: International Peace Research Institute, 2009)
possibility to save up to $12 billion a year in outsourcing roles to PMF’s. By 2000 private
companies were competing for government work of over 450,000 jobs and by 2001 the
“Pentagon contracted workforce exceeded civilian defense department employees for
first time.”22 Now that the US experienced a significant downsizing in government,
specifically acquisition force reductions in the 1990’s, a trend of decline in skill as well
as management would occur.23
Although contracting out proved to be an ideal policy decision when speaking in
economical terms, the government and its experts failed to notice the problem in
outsourcing many of its supporting jobs to foreign countries. As Secretary Thomas E
White warned, there was not enough basic info to effectively manage these contracts.
Shortly after this statement in 2003 the Army reported to Congress that it had between
124,000 and 605,000 service contractors in employment. This brings up a shocking idea
of the mere confusion in estimates that ended up proving Secretary White’s warning to be
true. The US government was not prepared to be contracting out in such masse. With the
reallocation of money towards these contracts they were unable to continue providing
significant and up-to-date training to their government personnel in the United States.
The Acquisition workforce in the US is seen as those personnel who are involved in
the contract management process by means of auditors and regulators.24 Whether they are
22 Ibid23 Schooners, Steven L., Daniel S. Greenspahn, Too Dependent on Contractors? Minimum Standards for Responsible Governance. (GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works, 2008) 24Ibid
of government-hired personnel or outsourced personnel doesn’t make a difference until
the management of contracts becomes better outlined and successful. As claimed by the
Department of Homeland Security Inspector General (DHS IG), “part of the problem
stems from DHS never having conducted a comprehensive assessment of the proper
balance between its employees and contractors.”25 The DHS IG then went to conclude the
worst answer to this particular finding, “Instead, DHS, like other federal agencies, simply
hired contractors to supervise other contractors.”26 This is a clear breach in the command
structure and responsibilities of the people bringing in outsourced personnel. Without a
proper preliminary assessment of the benefits and risks of each contract, there will be less
information to base future decisions off of. Without informed decisions from practical
studies and research, the US government puts upon themselves a huge risk of failure by
diving headfirst through a closed door hoping to get to the other side in one piece. In
order to benefit most for US citizen tax dollar as well as the dollar of the DOD and DHS,
more attention needs to be focused on the contract itself, what is to be gained, in what
way, when, how and why all prior to making contracts. It all comes down to a solid,
mutually equal and beneficial plan for a successful and economically sound investment.
Another issue regarding the management of contracts comes from the simple
classification of commercial and “inherently” government functions. There are some
services where efficiency, quality of service and price are negotiable within different
companies that offer them. It is important to have a business sided mind-set when
privatizing however because the government is outsourcing and it is a matter of national
25 Ibid 1426 Ibid 14
defense, there should be a cohesion between the business and the military side of
services. For instance, the government sought to become more transparent, simple to
manage and easy to record, therefore they resorted to “paperless contracting, ceasing
printing of voluminous instructions for the DOD, and implementation of government
credit cards…”27 Companies and governments around the world have changed and/or are
still in the process of changing into paperless entities for the sake of keeping up with
technology and its uses data storage within hard drives.
An added example lies within American defense firms and the US government’s
policy goals towards them.28 It is common knowledge that quality over quantity comes
frequent in the mind of an informed businessperson. In the private sector, certain people,
businesses, nations etc., specialize in products and their sale. The US government hoped
to get American defense firms to consolidate their services, technologies all to better help
the military goals of the nation and national defense.29 This did occur, but with the
realization that going completely commercial puts the government at risk of becoming
too reliant and less skilled. By consolidating services, key business practices will be
blended with other businesses and their methods of operating. Original ideas will be lost
and the competition among defense firms will decrease. When the defense firms found
competition was declining they moved towards the commercial market and found a
greater market up for grabs with the requirement of less people and more technology to
be used instead. Through commercialization, in an effort to fulfill their contract, larger
27 Lavallee, T. M., Civil-Military Integration: The Politics of Outsourcing National Security (Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, ProQuest, 2010) 19228 Ibid 29 Ibid 193
defense firms are able to subcontract to smaller defense firms and miscellaneous other
firms for their skills and expertise. This is beneficial for the government as they find a
defense firm that can get the job done, but through the contract and subsequent sub-
contracting, costs rise and its difficult to continue management oversight in an
“inception” of contracts.
The US government is making up for a reduced skill base and number of government
employees by contracting out many different positions to PMF’s around the world. At
first it was seen as a policy decision well suited in the long term to save money when
thinking about “legacy costs” government incurs through government employees.30 A
“legacy cost” in basic terms is the amount of money you are paying your civil servants
and veterans for working for the government such as health care, pensions etc. However,
they later realized that their skill base at home would suffer a hit because PMF’s were
doing their jobs for them.
Another problem when referring to a blended workspace is of ethics and value
systems. In a study done over privatization of schools and religious organizations it was
suggested to keep a central public value system in order to steer in the right direction.31
This allows goals to be created and guidelines to be administered all around a certain idea
or way of thinking. Privatization is a unique service as it gathers professionals from all
30 Schooners, Steven L., Daniel S. Greenspahn, Too Dependent on Contractors? Minimum Standards for Responsible Governance. (GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works, 2008) 31 Minow, Martha. Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism and Democracy. (Boston College Law Review, 2005)
walks of life, with immeasurable amount of experience when put together to achieve one
task. This is a direct line to success and results when used, administered and overseen
properly. Innovation and efficiency are stated to be among the benefits, however
immediately after these claims exclusionary practices, fraud and religious coercion comes
to play.32
While these are related to privatization of schools and religious organizations, any
kind of privatization is one in the same. There are reoccurring tendencies that happen in
any environment, such as the difference in logic and rationale when it comes to
proceeding with a task. In privatization of military services, value systems and attitudes
greatly affect the chain of command when you put a uniformed military person to work
next to a contracted individual. Unfortunately within the US government and its military
outsourcing ventures, there isn’t a common transparent view on how to achieve these
goals. Contracts should be based around the United States Constitution and abide by
international laws, however not much oversight is placed in the management and
execution of these contracts. When dealing with a classified assignment, generally it is of
national security or of great concern to the current state of affairs; which is why
discretion and results usually measure out more than values and a code of conduct.
The US government is in need of many reforms to battle their problems in
oversight and management. This is the core to where all other problems spawn.
Accountability in its essence is a result of management and oversight because the
leadership is what is questioned when tasks are accomplished successfully or not. What
32 Ibid 998
happens as a result of poor management in a top-to-bottom command structure in this
case can be directly blamed by the authority figures. Instead of doing research and
conducting an in depth internal review on proper methods of creating, administering and
closing contracts, he US is improvising in its military outsourcing game. In order for the
subsequent issues of a blended workforce, issues of ethics, the lack of an acquisition
workforce and presence of a low-skilled workforce to be fixed, there needs to be a
consistent methodology in US to Foreign contracting. In the following section I will go
over alternative solutions that authors have come up with that could significantly change
the way contracts are created, interpreted and implemented.
IV. Alternative Solutions
There have been many opportunities to change and alter the current system of
outsourcing within the US government for military services in order to make it more
transparent and efficient. Those opportunities haven’t been taken advantage of but it
doesn’t mean these options aren’t available at any time. The US government must adapt
to the changing environment of warfare in this world. Technology grows everyday, with
this technology less people are needed to be out on the front lines compared to wars of a
century before us. Although technology allows us a buffer in human physical
confrontation, natural and manmade law cannot be bypassed. A human rights violation
remains the same regardless of the context of which it was infringed. Little transparency
that causes mistakes down the road (days, weeks, months or years later) in
communication, implementation or results should still be accountable by the policy
makers in charge and not been scapegoated to the uninvolved. The resolutions and
recommendations proposed are those that address the issues of transparency within
contract management, accountability over contracts and their outcomes, the blended
workspace of contractors/uniformed personnel and lastly the acquisition workforce that
was reduced significantly in the 1990’s.
On the contract management and transparent dealings, there should be steps taken in
addressing financial caps. In privatization there is a practice called share-in savings
contracts where the private firm provides service and in exchange, shares in the money
saved when compared to the previous method of delivering the service.33 For the US
government, this can be helpful in terms of saving money however left unchecked can be
a burden when checking the validity of the accounts and payments due as well as the
number of active share-in savings contracts. As Minow states “The lack of caps in these
contracts exposes the government to potentially limitless demands for payment by the
contractors.”34 In this recommendation, contract monitoring is key. By forcing contractors
to maintain records and accurate accounting figures (for accountability purposes) as well
as enforcing contracting tracking and monitoring by US government officials, the amount
of financial mistakes and frauds can be lessened.
Another key step towards successful contract management comes from informed
decision-making and analysis of the market and how the US government can come into
play in a safe but beneficial way. A market with competition is a market the US
33 Minow, Martha. Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism and Democracy. (Boston College Law Review, 2005) 100834 Ibid 1008
government would benefit from getting involved in, unfortunately its not the case with
PMF’s today. The market today is seen as “quasi-monopolistic” because PMF’s are able
to control every aspect of contracts.35 The New York Times study compared “new
contracts and payments to existing contracts” and determined “48 percent were
competitive in 2005, down from 79 percent in 2001.”36 This shows a great danger with
PMF’s and agencies that are looking to outsource. The power is leaning heavily towards
the PMF’s, which can explain why there is so much mismanagement and debauchery
with military contracts.
Military contracts are generally procured for either contingent or support purposes to
accomplish objectives that otherwise would be handled by the government or agency
applicable. There is no question that when the US government outsources, it’s for
important objectives that help their foreign policy, which is why paying the top dollar is
not an issue once or twice. However when outsourcing becomes more frequent and
PMF’s have this kind of unregulated market power, they can gradually alter contracts to
better suit them and raise the prices exponentially for services that require delicate and
unique arrangements. A two-part recommendation was to first work towards creating a
transparent market where “clients can pick and choose among different suppliers.”37
Second was to have transparent bidding processes, competing offers to be “systematically
compared” and the performance of suppliers to always be monitored.38 This is extremely
important when contract progress, quality of service and delivery are taken into account
for a formal report afterwards, in the event there is a need for measures to be taken
35 Isenberg, David. Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy (PRIO: International Peace Research Institute, 2009) 36 Ibid37 Ibid 2338 Ibid 23
against the supplier. Sanctions and formal reports will help greatly in creating a more
honest and efficient market with greater competition and transparency.
Creating a contract from scratch can be a difficult job, especially because you must
think of everything that will happen with regards to the services being offered, and put it
into the contract. It’s essentially a document that highlights the who, what, when, where
and sometimes the why of using a service. Although a difficult task, it is essential when
referring to finances and goal results. The US government is lacking a streamlined
approach to obtaining, and implementing contracts and therefore should take
recommendations from all over to find one that works after trial and error. There is a
seven- step guideline that was given as a recommendation for better organizing,
planning, creating and implementing the contract. It breaks down contracts into properly
researching the service in question, designing scope and limits of the contract, service
provided and finances. It then goes on to the drafting and contact stage with the
contractor. Once in play, it gives key points to look out for while invested in the contract
for efficiency oversight and quality assurance.
39
In addition to managing contractor performance, the author recommended the specific
considerations in “advice and guidance, quality assurance, compliance through
appropriate oversight, facilitation of invoicing and payment, the proper handling of
contingencies (and related modifications and terminations), the closing out of contractual
relationships and generally ensuring appropriate stewardship of the public’s scarce
resources.”40
To think of solutions that are more focused towards accountability issues lets have
a look the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which allowed Iraq to “have the primary
39 Schooners, Steven L., Daniel S. Greenspahn, Too Dependent on Contractors? Minimum Standards for Responsible Governance. (GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works, 2008) 1740 Ibid 17
Plan
Identify Requirement
s
Conduct Market
Research
Draft Specifications
and Solicitations
Manage Competitions
Draft, Negotiate and
award contracts
Manage Contractor
performance
right to exercise jurisdiction over United States contractors and United States contractor
employees. “41 There is more substance within the fine print that narrows the jurisdiction
and clarifies what the United States contractor is, but the point of this recommendation
was not for its rhetoric but for the principle it has. It is allowing the target country to
exercise its legal jurisdiction to contractor personnel entering its country. This measure
has been in place for sometime with varied success due to jurisdictional confusion of one
contractor hailing from country A, hired by country B but working from a firm in country
C.42 That is a difficult line to trace, however improving upon the judicial space within
military outsourcing is key not only for accountability sake on the governments part but
for the media attention it can garner from the public.
Although SOFA’s recommendation on adapting this Iraqi legal jurisdiction is not
well structured or developed at this time, the US and the international community should
put resources into developing this. By adapting contract law and creating a task force of
sorts for legal purposes, it will help expose any atrocities, acts of corruption and fraud in
the contracting network. This can then be held against the contractor service provider, not
only securing a legal means of prosecuting but also establishing a sense of control from
the consumers that place “reliable” stamps upon firms that are and aren’t. With an influx
of responsible and financially secure contracting, the scandals and heinous crimes can be
slowly stopped and brought to light by the media. Furthermore, money spent towards
contracts can be seen as more justifiable to the nations constituents. Outsourcing is a
41 Cotton, Sarah K., Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q. Burkhart, Megan Zander-Cotugno, Edward O'Connell, and Michael Webber. Hired Guns: Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom. (RAND, 2010) 1542 Ibid 15
topic not many Americans are savvy with, however knowing that there is justice being
brought and knowing exactly where a big chunk of the defense budget is going will help
calm down American citizens that are becoming restless with their governments spending
habits.
In regards to the acquisition workforce and the blended workspace US
government and contracted personnel face there is a recommended solution that
addresses both issues, and it is found within the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act. This act created the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office
(JCASO), which then established the requirement where the DOD has to “create a team
of contingency contracting experts that can be deployed to support military operations.” 43
According to this office it will allow these teams of contingency contracting experts to
support contracts out in the field in regards to planning and logistics that corresponds
appropriately to the current policy of the DOD. It helps it from the planning; organizing,
implementing and review stages to better analyze the whole situation and learn for the
future. This is an important initiative to have in place as it directly reflects the correct
steps the US government should be taking in order to streamline and make military
outsourcing more efficient.
On the note of specialized personnel with a knowledge of contracts, there is a
suggestion of “pre-deployment training” that would allow military personnel to learn the
43 Schwartz, Moshe, and Joyprada Swain. Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis. (FAS, Congressional Research Device, 2011) 21
contractor functions, and recommendations on how best to work together and understand
each other.44 There is predisposed thought among military personnel of either lust,
jealousy or envy towards contracting personnel due to the fact that in some cases, they
make more financially then the military uniformed personnel. This causes problems both
in and out of the workplace and can really infringe on the objective at hand. Also
questions of loyalty, ethics and motivation come into play, which is why a pre-
deployment training program can be very beneficial to US government personnel. It helps
increase morale; it clarifies objectives, risks and rewards as well as outlines the reason
why there are contractors in the first place. For the military personnel, this is invaluable
information as it allows them to play strengths and weaknesses of the contractors; they
are able to understand the situation in a more goal-oriented way that can really make the
difference. Not only is there is need for informed and skilled personnel both uniformed
and contracted but there is an even greater need for absolute cohesion between the two
parties in any military endeavor hoping for success.
V. Conclusion
Privatization of military services is no easy task although in times of war and peace, it
can be necessary for the purposes of important foreign policy goals. Should the
government not have the capabilities at home there is a growing market of PMF’s for hire
that is always working with the most advanced and up to date technologies and skilled
experts. The culmination of experience PMF’s hold within their employees is too great to
44 Cotton, Sarah K., Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q. Burkhart, Megan Zander-Cotugno, Edward O'Connell, and Michael Webber. Hired Guns: Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom. (RAND, 2010) 64-65
measure. However within this great power lies a very one-sided market of PMF’s that
have been known to exploit potential clients. This study isn’t to confirm the corruption
behind the PMF industry however it does well to point out ways in which it has in the
past. It has also provided recommendations for the US government in specific to follow
for it to benefit from outsourcing in the best possible way.
The problem this study addressed was factors that pointed to an over-dependence of
outsourcing on the part of the US government and the implications it held as well as ways
it could come back from this. So far I’ve managed to support the arguments made by
various authors that all pointed to problems within the acquisition workforce or lack
thereof. When outsourcing en masse there tends to be a lot of cooperation between the
contracted personnel and US military personnel which leads to a blended workspace of
different values, motives and objectives that all play together towards the final goal in
that particular contract. This generally creates problems when both parties aren’t on the
same page. Contract management and transparency issues are another issue that trickles
down to the previous arguments. Thinking in terms of constructing a house, you can have
the best construction workers, architects and city planners on the job but if all parties are
unaware of the others job description, entitlements and requirements, the house will have
a very poor infrastructure and it will lead to a sloppy end result of a house. Organizing
the way contracts are managed, outlining desired outcomes and also figuring out how
best to show accountability all through a transparent environment is key for the success
of a contract or the metaphorical “house” built earlier.
In observance to the various authors studied and reviewed I’ve come up with one
recommendation that can help rationalize the goal of improving the current privatization
of military services within the US government’s foreign policy goals. There needs to be a
consistent mentality within the US government foreign policy and dealings with
contractors. Regardless of authority changes and the different mindsets of policy makers,
a pre-determined, long term reform plan should run its course without interruptions for a
successful rejuvenation of the privatization of military services. The revamping of this
industry, in my non-professional, strictly theoretical view, requires credibility to be built
up from both the clientele and the suppliers alike. Neither party will ever be in the mood
to deal with humanitarian scandals, issues dealing with tracking finances or the
corruption of either party, unless there is mutual trust and an equal sense of
responsibility.
In order to create an even playing field with both clientele and suppliers
conducting simple and organized contract transactions, firstly there must be a level of fair
competition within the market. A monopolistic market will do no public good. Although
PMF’s have many different reasons for competing within the market, there needs to be
some way to provide these services in a more just way. Privatized military services,
regardless of the time period, will always be a high demand and high income industry
therefore there is no risk in the future of potential revenue. In times of peace and war this
is a highly sought after service as it deals with an important natural and human law/right
which is protection of oneself and the people; therefore it runs no risk of being lost to the
ages
Organizing the industry, in specific, the way contracts are created,
monitored/tracked and eventually the quality of service provided is the first and most
crucial step towards having a successful and less troublesome outsourcing environment.
An idea is to “provide external endorsements of personal conduct” as mentioned by
David Isenberg.45 I agree with his belief that credibility amongst PMF’s and clientele
need to be transparent in the market environment so as to ensure the best quality service
is provided with the appropriate amount of money being exchanged. This may seem
unappealing to the PMF’s because they are enjoying a very underdeveloped industry and
some are exploiting its management complications very well. However for the benefit of
the international community and for the general public good, it would be a good idea to
focus on credibility similar to the way there is a Fair Trade stamp of approval for local
grown food supplies competing with big corporations. Not only does the Fair Trade
stamp of approval bring focus to the quality of service and the name of the supplier, it
allows the public to address problems themselves against the corporate elite who exploit
contract service. The average American citizen is just as involved with this credibility
fight as the US government is because it’s the taxpayers hard earned money at stake.
For the benefit of the US government and its constituents, starting a process with
the help of the international community would greatly benefit sovereign nations
everywhere. Although its important to address the problems at home prior to trying to
45 Isenberg, David. Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy (PRIO: International Peace Research Institute, 2009)
save the world and solve the worlds problems, it doesn’t hurt to partake in an
international movement, where in the long run will benefit not only nations but the
people they protect. Creating a more transparent and accountable privatized military
service environment will be a step in the right direction away from overdependence of
outsourcing services. I conclude that the US government is over-dependent on the
services of private military firms and it has greatly reduced the capacity and potential for
immediate change and reform.
The US, over the period of about 15 years has delved into the private military
service industry without properly preparing and doing market and environment research.
It shows with the constant reminders in the media of US related contractors or even
military personnel screwing up in missions, leaking information or committed crimes
because of the lack of transparency and knowledge from the hierarchical system of
command the US government’s DOD provides in the military and towards contracts
themselves. There has been a clear neglect of oversight and management of contracts,
with continued disappointing results because of a lack of monitoring contracts overtime.
The situation resembles a client so rushed that they ignore the contracts parameters being
spoken to them, send money towards the supplier and expect excellent results; all while
the supplier realizes its just another uneducated client whom they can take advantage of.
It is apparent that the lack of contract management and the contracting en masse has lead
to the US government military personnel to be held at a shocking disadvantage to their
privatized counter parts. Not only is there a lapse of 15 years where personnel could have
been training and learning from contracts being created, implemented and closed, there is
a clear divide between the US military personnel and the contractor personnel in the
workspace. With incentive structures favoring the contracted personnel, the US
government faces an issue of ongoing military enlistment and the benefits they can
provide to their own constituents prior to them deciding to go into the privatized work
force.
The US has dug itself a deep hole but has managed to maintain some sort of
control over its military capabilities at home. The first obstacle in its course is an internal
review to judge its faults when it comes to contract management and accountability. Once
the problem is addressed and it is common knowledge the self is in need of reform, all
problems will find solutions slowly thereafter.