Pointers 45

8/3/2019 Pointers 45

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V-44

POINTERS

On The Path of Knowledge

el Hitami


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CONTENTS

I. THE NATURE OF KNOWING

I.1. Experiencing as KnowingI.2. The Boundary Of KnowingI.3. Conditions for Knowing

II. THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWING

II.1. Acts of Knowing

II.2. The Known

II.3. The Knower

III. THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING

III.1. Concepts

III.2. The Conceptual Nature of the Known

III.3. The Conceptual Nature of the Subject

III.4. Perspectives

IV. THE GROUND

IV.1. Transcendent Modes of Knowing

IV.2. The Nature of the Background

IV.3. Pure Attention

IV.4. The Ground of Knowing

IV.5. The Ground of Identity


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I. THE NATURE OF KNOWING

I.1. Experiencing as Knowing

Human experience is limited to knowing the presence and

absence of the contents of sense perception, thinking and feeling -

nothing else can be experienced nothing else can be known.

oThe existence of sense objects, thoughts and feelings must beconfirmed by experience. That which cannot be experiencedcannot be judged as existing.

oExperiencing is not possible in the absence of knowing. Onlythat which is known can be experienced.

Sense objects, thoughts and feelings are experienced by

knowing them.

The presence and absence of the objective and subjective

aspects of knowing constitutes the totality of experience.

Knowing is a relational activity. An act ofknowing, the knower

and the known form a mutually interdependent, conceptually

related structure none of the three can be experienced on its

own, but only through their relation to each other.

- Without an act ofknowing neither the knower nor theknown can be experienced.

- Without the known neither the knower nor an act ofknowing can be experienced.

- Without the knower neither the known nor an act ofknowing can be experienced.


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o The perceiver, the thinker and the feeler appear anddisappear with their objects and the acts of knowing relating

them.; none of the three can be experienced if one of them is

missing. This clearly implies that:

- Either the knower, acts of knowing and the known do notexist as such, or

- Three words are used to describe one fact of experience a Knowing that appears as an act of knowing which is

necessarily differentiated into the known and the

knower.

[Knowing implies the experience of an act of knowing; an

act of knowing necessarily implies the existence ofsomething known; the known necessarily implies the

existence of a knowerto experience it].

The presence and absence of all acts of knowing as well as their

objective and subjective contents are experienced. It is reasonable

to assume that all these aspects are experienced by an unknowableground of Knowing (= unconditioned, pure Knowing)- a

Knowing that is somehow manifested through the

determinations of the three faculties of knowing.

oThrough the mediation of the faculties of knowing, Knowing istransformed into acts of knowing, the known and the

knower.

-Acts of knowing are experienced as sensing (=seeing,hearing, touching, tasting & smelling), as well as

thinking and feeling;

- The known is experienced as an object (= a senseobject, a thoughtor a feeling);

- The knower is experienced as the perceiver, thethinker and the feeler; [the three are integrated into

the knowing subject].


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In reality, what we experience is a transformational process:

- Knowing spontaneously manifests as a conceptuallystructured act of knowing expressing a relationbetween the knower and the known.

-Acts of knowing are projected, transformed anddifferentiated into multiple sense-, thought- and feeling

attributes related by Knowing and experienced as

knowable entities (= perceiver & sense objects, thinker

& thoughts or feeler & feelings).

I.2. The Boundary Of Knowing

The boundary ofexperience is set by its contents: which include

the presence and absence of :

- Acts of knowing: sensing (=seeing, hearing, touching, tasting,smelling), thinking and feeling.

- The known: is the objective content of experience; constitutedby: sense-objects (= forms-colors, sounds, texture, tastes, smells),

thoughts (= concepts, memories, expectations, opinions, beliefs,

judgments) and feelings (= emotions and volitions).

- The knower: is constituted by the subject (= the perceiver, thethinker and the feeler).

Presence of content is the manifestforeground of experience;

while absence expresses its contentless, changeless background.

o States of manifestation (= waking & dreaming) and non-manifestation (= dreamless sleep) constitute the domain of

experience.

o In the waking and dream states, manifestation is experiencedthrough the presence of the knower, acts of knowing and the


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known; while in dreamless sleep, as their background, is

experienced as their non-manifest absence.

o The determining faculties of knowing are active only withinthe waking and dream states. To claim that there can be anydetermination beyond the manifest foreground and non-

manifest background is a grave fallacy.

- A knowable entity can only be experienced through itsdetermining attributes (= qualities, characteristics,

properties).

- The presence of the knowing faculties is necessary todetermine the known and the knower.

- Determination can only function within the content ofexperience; hence, determinations cannot be set

beyond that domain.

The foreground of experience and its background are mutually

interdependent neither is conceivable without the other. Thecontent-full foreground can only appear on a content-less

background.

o The foreground can only be experienced through its opposition tothe background; it has no other determination. Due to the poor

definition of the background, attention is rarely directed to it.

Several aspects of the background may be experienced:

o When attention is directed to it, the background can beobserved within the foreground:


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- An object can only be perceived through the oppositionof what it is, to what it is not(= its otherness, its sub-field

of nonexistence, objectless space, soundless silence,

eventless time, thought-free stillness and feeling-less

peace, etc.).

- The absence of an object that was previously present isanother mode of the background.

Attention is attracted by the appearance of an object

from its absence and, to a lesser degree, its

disappearance after its presence.

o Certain modes of the background are retrospectivelyrecognized as:

- The gaps between two perceptions, two thoughts or twofeelings [which form the boundary necessary for

determining each].

- Dreamless sleep may be recollected only in hindsight,due to the absence of the determining acts of knowing.When attention is regained upon waking, the experience

of the absence of the knower, acts of knowing and the

known is reported.

o Under certain circumstances, the background may bedirectly experienced.

- Absence, as an objective emptiness, may be apperceivedwhen the content of experience is absent.

- A rarely recollected mode of the background sleeplesssleep- is experienced when attention awakes within

dreamless sleep and the absence of content is

consciously experienced.


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Experience is all-inclusive; there can be no beyond to

experience and hence, no within to it. Nothing can be

experienced other than the foreground and the background .

oDetermination(= the what?), space(= the where?), time(=the when?), causality(= the why?),agency & identity(= the

who?), and process & sequence (= the how?) - are

constituent conditions of experience; they are necessary

conditions for relating its phenomenal content.

What? where? When? Why? Who? and how? are valid

questions for understanding and relating the contents of

experience. They cannot be asked about the totality ofexperience, nor can they be used to relate that totality to

its constituents.

o The faculties of knowing determine all knowable attributesthrough acts of knowing. It cannot be denied that the

presence and absence of the faculties and acts of knowing are

experienced. The Knowing - that is aware of the

determining attributes and their corresponding faculties andacts of knowing cannot be determined by these attributes.

I.3. Conditions for Knowing

Alertness, interest, intent and attention are the subjective

aspects of human consciousness. The presence of these aspects is

a prerequisite for experiencing acts of knowing.

Attention can only be directed by intent. To activate

intent, there must be an interestin experiencing.

Withoutalertness, there can be no interest. In the

absence of alertness, consciousness reverts to

unconsciousness.


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Only that which is determined can be experienced. In the

absence ofdetermination(= definition, limitation) nothing can be

known. Sensory, thought and feeling attributes are determined

through the corresponding faculties of knowing.

What is not determined cannot be differentiated and,

therefore, cannot be experienced. In the absence of

determination, no object can be known.

Knowable entities (= the subject and its objects) are

mainly determined through their proper sets of

attributes, which define and differentiate them.

o Knowing exhibits a strong drive toward more determination(=definition, concreteness, clarity, precision). Weaker

determinations produce an urge that propels a drive toward more

definition. Higher degrees of definition monopolize attention.

Attention wanes with weaker determinations.

- Feelings constitute the least defined content of

experience;

- Thoughts are more defined than feelings, but less

defined than sense objects.

- The ultimate mode of determination occurs in the

perception ofsense objects. Due to their greater degree

of definition, sense objects attract more attention than

thoughts or feelings.

Since acts of knowing are relational in nature; they cannot occur

in the absence of the duality of the knower and the known.

Without a seer, no form or color can be seen. Without a

hearer, no sound can be heardand vice versa.

o A relation necessitates, at least, two entities. The nature ofknowing implies the separation of the knower from theknown, as well as relating the known to the knower.


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A relation can only be possible between -at least- two

distinct entities, [but not within a unity]. Unless the known

appears as separated from the knower, neither can be

related. Without the two aspects of separating and

relating, neither subject nor object can be experienced.

o To relate two objects, each has to be initially related thesubject. Only after knowing one object and then a second can

they be related [through the subject] to each other.

o The perceiver, the thinker, and the feeler have to be related,so that they may be experienced as a subject.

Oppositionis a primary condition for experiencing. The limitsreciprocally imposed by the opposites determine both:

- Existence is determined by inexistence, and vice versa.This opposition is essential in constituting experience.

- Likewise, the opposition between a subject and an objectdetermines each of them.

- All attributes depend on their opposites.

Multiplicity [expressed through difference and diversity] is a

condition for experiencing the particularity of a knowable entity.

o No single attribute can be experienced in the absence of otherattributes; no object can be experienced in the absence of otherobjects. This implies that all the contents of experience are

necessarily interdependent.

-The determination of the known depends on amultitude of diverse attributes (= properties, qualities,

characteristics, descriptors).

-No single attribute can be experienced in the absenceof other attributes.


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-An objectcan only be experienced in relation to otherobjects, but never by itself.

-A subjectcan only recognize itself in relation to othersubjects and objects. In the prolonged absence of other

subjects, the sense of individuality is lost.-The foreground of experience depends on its

background.

An object can only be clearly experienced on an empty

background. Space, as a mode of inexistence, is the background on

which spatial attributes appear. The concept of space regulates the

determination of spatial properties and relations.

Spatial attributes include: location, distance, dimensions,

movement, etc.. Space is the background on which these

spatial attributes appear.

- An empty spatial extension separates a visual objectfrom other objects and, thus, sets a boundary for each

object. Without this gap, objects becomeundifferentiated and, consequently, indiscernible.

- Within the visual field, space is the empty backgroundon which spatial attributes appear and by which they

are separated from each other.

- Within the auditory field it determines theboundaries of sound, and is experienced as silence.

-Within the other sensory fields it becomes theabsence of the corresponding sensory attributes.

- Within the activities of thoughts, emotions andvolitions it is experienced as stillness, quietude or

peace.


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Time is the event-less background of temporal attributes and

relations; it is the temporal emptiness on which events make their

appearance, persist for a certain duration, undergo changes and

disappear.

Time separates and differentiates events.

Whatever is experienced has to endure through a

temporal span otherwise it cannot be experienced.

o Only temporal attributes can be phenomenally experienced.The inception, duration, change and termination of events

can be observed.

Temporal attributes include: past, present and future;

beginning and end; duration, sequence, and continuity;

change, movement and causality. Time is the background

on which these attributes occur.

o The experience of an object depends on its presence for a specificduration. Attention is attracted to what is believed to be real. The

perception of an object as real depends on the continuity of itspresence to the perceiver.

An act of knowing is an event originating, persisting and

ending in time. Without enduring for a minimum time

span, no knowable entity (=subject or object) can be

experienced.

oAttention is attracted to what it believes to be real. Theperception of an object as real depends on the continuity of its

presence to the perceiver.

o Temporal existence is characterized by change (= mutability,modification). Attention is attracted to new content and/or its

modification. In the absence of change, attention cannot be

maintained for long.


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Causality is a condition for experiencing the known and the

knower as enduring realities. This is achieved by ascribing causes

for objects, events and conditions and thus relating them to their

past..

A cause is a condition or an event that precedes another

event as an effect (=consequent). Causality is a derivative

of the concept of time. As a temporal function, the cause

appears as antecedent, the effect is considered as its

consequent result.

o Causality establishes the continuity of knowable entities.To maintain the factuality of an object or event, it must berelated to previous states of the object or past events as

their cause. Without relating the present content of knowing

[as an effect] to past content [as a cause], experience

becomes chaotic.

Agency is corollary of causality; an actor or doer is assumed tobe the cause of a particular act. The agent is considered as the

cause of its acts as well as of the objective changes activated

thereby.

The subject, the perceiver, the thinker, and the feeler are

different modes of agency.

II. THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWING

II.1. Acts of Knowing


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The contents of acts of knowing are experienced through the

three faculties of sensing, thinking and feeling. Nothing can be

known other than the presence and absence of the subjective and

objective determinations of these faculties; no determination is

possible when these faculties are inactive.

Sensing is the faculty by which external sense properties and

body sensations are experienced.

o Objective sense properties are reflected as modifications insubjective experience as seeing, hearing, etc.

Sensations and sense objects share the same basic

determinations. Sense properties determining a sense

object are reflected as subjective sensations through the

mediation of sense faculties and sense organs.

o The definition of a sense object exclusively by senseproperties is incomplete. Sense objects are perceived byrelating different sense attributes, [as well as thought and

feeling attributes] into a particular knowable entity.

Thinking and feeling attributes complete the definition of

sense-objects by providing the categories of identity,

relation, similarity, difference, causality and agency- as

well as judgments, reality, externality and otherness.

Thinking is the experiencing of related verbal and sensory

thought elements (= words/ images) as thought streams, concepts,

ideas, judgments, anticipations, recollections, opinions, beliefs, etc..


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A single thought can only be experienced as related to

other thoughts. To be experienced, a stream of thought has

to be conceptually related as a condition for experiencing

it.

o The presence and absence of sensing, thinking and feeling isobserved; by themselves, they cannot relate their elements

onlyKnowing can do that.

o While it is firmly believe that we directly experience senseobjects [including our bodies], or emotions and volitions - the

fact is that only of knowing are experienced.

FEELING is the faculty by which emotions and volitions are

experienced. Emotions include affections, sentiments,

dispositions, moods, passions, etc., Volition takes the form ofinterest, intent, choice, hope, desire, attachment, aversion, drives

Sets of predominately emotional or volitional attributes[together with sense and thought elements] constitute a

particular feeling.

o Emotions and volitions are experienced as subjectivemodifications in consciousness. To be experienced, a feeling has

to be cognized by thinking and related to internal (= bodily) or

external conditions.

To be experienced, Knowing implies its determination as an act

of knowing, the known and the knower - as necessary

consequents of its nature. These three appear as a single

conceptual transformation ofKnowing:

- Knowing implies the presence of acts of knowingactivated throughthe correspondingfacultiesof sensing,thinking and feeling;


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- An act of knowing implies the experience of a knowableobject(= a sense-object, a thought, or a feeling);

- An object can never be experienced on its own; it canonly be experienced within a relational context of

multiplicity and diversity of other objects.- A multiplicity of objects requires a knower (as a

subjective center) to relate them first to itself, and then

to each other;

- The knower is necessarily separated from- and relatedto the known through an act of knowing.

II.2. The Known

The known is experienced as sets of sense-, thought- and feeling

attributes. The known has two interrelated aspects:

- The external (= objective) aspect of the known includes:light, forms, sounds, smells, weight, texture, taste, etc.;- The internal (= subjective) aspect of the known includes:

body sensations, thought constructs, emotions and volitions.

Attributes are the basic elements that determine the

particularity of the known. Sense-objects, thoughts and feelings aredetermined by theirattributes. Everyknowable entity can onlybe

experienced as a set ofattributes.

Attributes are related to constitute an object. In the

absence of attributes, neither subject nor object can be

experienced.


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o Sense-, thought- and feeling attributes have to be related toconstitute an object. Both the knower and the known can only

be experienced as related sets of sense-, thought- and feeling

attributes.

o Different modes of the subject have to be separated from- andrelated to their corresponding objects [the perceiver to sense

objects, the thinker to thoughts and the feeler to feelings].

Objective attributes are reflected in subjective experience as

qualitative modifications in the subjects consciousness.

Subjective sensations are reflected as objective properties

and vice versa. Colors and forms are experienced as

modifications in seeing; pitch, loudness and timber are

experienced as modifications in hearing, etc.

o It is commonly assumed that the set of attributes constituting aknowable entity is grounded on a particular substratum (=

substance, essence, the thing-in-itsef). We can only experience a

knowable entity through its attributes, but not its substratum

which is an abstract idea.

Thesubstratum is the bearer of attributes and must be,

therefore, attributeless and, consequently, unknowable.

Though an abstraction, thesubstratum of a particular

knowable entity remains as a necessary unifying idea for

experiencing a subject or an object.

o The name designating an object is a symbol pointing to asubstratum, on which sets of attributes are experienced. The

name labeling a set of attributes is assumed to indicate a

particular entity.

o Any particular entity is experienced as a combination ofsense-, thought and feeling attributes.


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- No sense-, thought- or feeling attribute can beexperienced by itself, but only within the context of a

multiplicity of diverse attributes.

- An objectcan only be experienced as a combination ofsense, thought- and feeling attributes.

o Depending on the type of the object experienced, one group ofattributes or the other appears as dominant.

- When sense attributes predominate, sense-objects areperceived;

- When thought attributes predominate, thoughtconstructs are cognized;

- When emotional and volitional attributes predominate,feelings are intuited.

II.3. The Knower

The knower, as the subjectof knowing, is experienced as:

- The perceiver(= seer, hearer, etc.) of sense objects,- The thinker of thought constructs, and- The feeler of emotions and volitions.

o The knowers domain of knowing includes the presence andabsence of the faculties and acts of knowing and their

corresponding objects.

The knower is commonly believed to appropriate all acts of

knowing by identifying with-, and assuming ownership of-,

agency for-, and control of- the faculties of knowing.

o The knower is related to the known through the three faculties ofknowing, thus bringing it back and unifying it into its

subjectivity.


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-When Knowing is experienced as sensing, the known isexperienced as a sense-object and the knower appears as

the perceiver;

-When Knowing is projected as thinking, the known isprojected as a thought form and the knower appears asthe thinker;

- When Knowing is projected as feeling, the known isprojected as a feeling and the subject appears as the

feeler.

Although firmly believed to be an entity, the knower, in fact, is

only a function presumably responsible for:

- Coordinating the three knowing faculties by relating theircontent to a knowable object,

- Unifying the perceiver, the thinker and the feeler into aknowing subject,

- Relating diverse contents (To experience an object anumber of attributes have to be related and integrated intoa single entity),

- Establishing relationships between the known object andother objects.

Acts of knowingare believed to be exclusively subjective;only a

knower can know,the known cannot know. Whenever an object is

experienced, a subject, as its counterpart, appears to claim the

experience.

It may be tentatively assumed, that the knowerunifies

the occurrences of different object-bound acts of knowing

to produce the impression of unity in thesubject, as well

as the continuity of an individual self.


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Within manifestation, the knower appears as a persistent,

changeless unity; while the known can only be experienced within

a context of change, diversity, multiplicity and impermanence.

In fact, the perceiver, the thinker and the feeler appearand disappear with their corresponding objects. The belief

in the persistence of the knower is a belief structured by

memory.

Contrary to common belief, the known is experienced before the

knower; they are experienced sequentially, not simultaneously.

Attention can be directed either to the knoweror to the

known; but not to both at the same time. When attention

is directed to the known, it is diverted from the knower; if

directed towards the knower, the experience of the known

subsides [but persists as a memory]. The rapid fluctuation

of attention between the knower and the known creates

the impression of their co-existence.

o The knower can only be experienced in hindsight. After theappearance of an object, the knower is posited as a separate

entity responsible for the act of knowing.

The knower and the known appear to be mutually inter-

dependent; neither can be experienced in the absence of the other.

The known can only be experienced when a knower is present; the

knower can only be experienced when the known is present.


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e.g., The seer and the seen are mutually interdependent;

neither can be experienced in the absence of the other.

Seeing necessarily implies something seen [a visual form],

which in turn, implies a seer both related through an act

of seeing. Hearing necessarily implies something heard [asound], which, in turn, implies a hearer both related

through an act of hearing.

The knower is believed to be in possession of its faculties and

acts of knowing. As the experiencer, it is commonly assumed to be

the agentthat experiences sense objectsand/or events [as the

perceiver], thoughts [as the thinker] and feelings [as the feeler].

The knower, assuming the function of agency, claims acts

of knowing, [although it is itself conceptually constituted

by a set of knowable elements and, therefore, knowable].

As an agent, it appropriates to itself the faculties and acts

of sensing, thinking and feeling.

o It may be tentatively accepted that the knower experiences thepresence and absence of the determining faculties of knowing [i.e., these faculties themselves are its objects]; it follows that

these faculties cannot be used to determine the knower.

o An agent(= actor, doer) must be an entity. An entity has to bedeterminable. If the knower cannot be determined, it cannot be an

entity; and hence, it cannot be an agentjust a function.

III. THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF

KNOWING

III.1. Concepts


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A conceptis a thought construct that is experienced by relating:

- Similar and different attributes to constitute a subjector an object,

- Individual thoughts in a chain of thoughts.- A particular objectto other objects,- The subjectto its objects.

Concepts can be categorized according to their degree of

complexity (=the number of attributes and levels of relations

involved) as:

o Simple concepts express a limited number of relationsbetween a set of attributes constituting a knowable entity.

A simple concept can be considered as the most basic act

ofknowing, experienced as an object. A particular sense-

object, thought or feeling can only be experienced as a

simple concept.

o Complex concepts express relations between sets of simpleconcepts. Categories and classes are such complex concepts.

e.g., man, animal, tree, society, universe, etc

o Regulative concepts are complex concepts of criticalimportance in ordering the content of experience.

e.g., space, time, causality, existence, experience,

knowledge, identity, etc

o Perspectives are higher order conceptual structuresconstituted by multiple complex concepts. Three main

perspectives can be identified:

- The objective perspective, where subjectivemodifications are seen as effects of objective reality.


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- The subjective perspective, where objects are seen ascaused by subjective acts of knowing.

- The transcendental perspective, where the subjectand its objects are seen as mutually interdependent.

III.2. The Conceptual Nature of the Known

The faculties of knowing, by themselves, cannot establish

relations. The diverse attributes constituting an object can only be

related through a mode ofknowing that transcends sensing,thinking and feeling [to form the concept of an entity].

If seemingly diverse attributes are related by a concept,

their nature cannot be different from the nature of the

concept relating them. The phenomenal nature of a

concept is thinking, and the basic nature of thinking is

Knowing.

No single attribute can be experienced in isolation. A particular

attribute can only be experienced within a context of other

attributes.

A particular sense property cannot be experienced apart

from other sense properties. Only sets of sense propertiescan be experienced.

o Since no particular attribute can be experienced, it logicallyfollows that we should not be able to experience a set of diverse

attributes constituting an object. This, however, contradicts the

fact that we do experience all sorts of attributes.


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To solve this paradox:

- To start with, it may be surmised that we experience therelation between the attributes not the attributes

themselves.- This poses an enigma: how can we experience relations

between attributes none of which can be experienced on

its own?

- Since we do experience diverse attributes, we mayassume that we experience neither the attributes

themselves nor their relation, but only a transformation

of Knowing into an act of knowing that has as its

content conceptually related attributes appearing as anobject.

Similarly, an objectcan only be experienced in relation to other

diverse objects - but never by itself.

A sense object cannot be experienced in isolation from

other objects. To be experienced, a sense-object must bedifferentiated from- and related to other objects.

In the same way, a particular thought or feeling can only

be experienced within the context of other thoughts and

feelings.

o If a particular object cannot be experienced in isolation fromother objects, it must be logically impossible to experience amultiplicity of objects. This contradicts the fact that we do

experience diverse objects.

o Since we cannot experience any single object except in relation toother objects, what is immediately experienced is the relation

between diverse objects expressed through a concept

manifested as a particular object.


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Only entities sharing the same phenomenal nature can be related.

Logically, it should be impossible to relate attributes or objects of

different natures. But the fact is that we do relate attributes and objects

of dissimilar natures.

o It follows that for a particular object to be experienced, all otherseemingly diverse objects must share the same natureotherwise

they could not have been related. Because all attributes and

objects are conceptual in nature, we are able to relate them

despite their phenomenal diversity.

It has been shown that acts of knowing are conceptually

structured. It follows that knowable entities are

experienced as related sets of conceptual attributes. The

phenomenal nature of concepts is thinking, and thinking

is a mode ofKnowing.

o We conclude:Knowing is the sole direct experience - and thatis the basic nature of all knowable entities. Knowing in its

transformation into an act of knowing necessarily implies the

indirect experience of a knowable entity as a concept - appearing

to us as an object.

III.3. The Conceptual Nature of the Subject

When closely examined, it is discovered that all the

determinations of the knower make it a knowable entity. Since all

attributes of the knower are experienced, it can be viewed as anobject.

The known can only be experienced as a set of sensations,

thoughts and feelings [conceptually integrated into a

perceiver, a thinker and a feeler who are unified as a

knowingsubject].


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The different aspects of the knower are experienced and,

therefore, may be considered as objects of knowing; in

other words, the knower itself is a knowable entity, an

object.

o Personal identity is attributed to the knower. When it becomesclear that the knower itself is a knowable concept, it may be

assumed that identity is more akin to the nature of acts of

knowing than to that of a knowable entity. But since the presence

and absence of acts of knowing are admittedly experienced, it is

realized the knower is of the same nature as Knowing.

To complete an act of knowing the knower has to be related to the

known. If both were of different natures, they could not have been

related.

- The fact is that the subject is unquestionably related to diversesense-objects, thoughts and feelings.

- Therefore, it can be concluded that the subject must be of thesame nature as all of its objects.

It is admitted that all thinking is conceptual. What may be

difficult to realize is that all acts ofknowing are essentially

conceptual in nature. Contrary to common belief, this would imply

that all contents of experience are concepts projected as the known

and the knower.

o If the knower, acts of knowing and the known are projected,transformed, differentiated and related by Knowing, their

nature can be nothing but Knowing.

o It follows that Knowing is the basic nature of sense-objects,thoughts and feelings as well as their knower/subject. The self

and the world are nothing but necessary conceptual

transformations ofKnowing.


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III.4. Perspectives

The objective perspective mainlyapplies to sense objects; it

views objective reality as the cause of subjective experience.

o All modifications in the objective and subjective realms areconditioned by causality. Modifications in consciousness are

seen as subjective effects of objective properties acting as

their causes.

o Sense objects are considered as the cause of the subjects sensory perceptions. Likewise, the subjects thoughts andfeelings are seen as effects of objective causes.

o The objective perspective agrees with the common senseview that thoughts and feeling are directly (immediately)

apprehended; while objective sense qualities can only be

known indirectly through the mediation of sense faculties and

organs.

o The reality of sense objects [as established throughagreement among normal observers] cannot be questioned.Accordingly, the objective domain is seen as separate from

the subjective and persists in its otherness regardless of the

subject.

o Sense objects are believed to have distinct intrinsic being(=essence, substance).

The subjective perspective considers spontaneous

modifications in the subjects consciousness as the direct cause of

objective experience.


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o All the contents of experience are viewed as ultimatelysubjective; the objective is no more than a projection of the

subjects consciousness.

oSubjective modifications are believed to be the only cause forobjective reality. When modifications in consciousness occur,

they are projected by the faculties of sensing, thinking and

feeling as the phenomenal world.

There is hearing- that is a spontaneous subjective

experience; thinking and feeling project that hearing as

an external sound and its source.

o It cannot be denied that all acts of knowing [and theircontents] are subjective in nature. Without a perceiver, no

sense object can be experienced. Without a thinker no

thought can be experienced. Nothing can be known without a

knowing subject.

The transcendental perspective views experience as a two-way

interdependently reflected subjectivity-objectivity,[but not

exclusively the one or the other].Modifications in the subject and

changes in the object faithfully reflect each other without one

being the cause of the other.

Objective attributes are directly reflected as

modifications in ones own inner sensibility which is theimmediate (= un- mediated or direct) mode of knowing.

o In manifestation, the subject and its objects, though reflectingeach other's content, have to appear as separate, otherwise

knowing, which is a relation, becomes impossible. The subject

- object duality constitutes a necessary transformation of an

act of knowing. They appear as a two, but emanate from a

non-dual ground.


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This can be verified by the fact that subject and object

appear and disappear together; neither can exist

separately, being two aspects of an act of knowing.

oAdmitting the validity of the objective and subjectiveperspectives according to the context of observation, thecontent of experience is viewed as identically subjective-

objective, - or contrarily, as neither subjective nor objective.

Both objective and subjective perspectives are valid

within their appropriate contexts. Both perspectives can

be used to view the content of experience by relying on the

concept of causality to explain the relation betweensubject and objects. Neither perspective, taken by itself,

can reflect the integrity ofKnowing.

o Knowing, manifesting as different acts of knowing,constitutes the essence of both subjectivity and objectivity.

While necessarily appearing as distinct, the subject and the

object reflect each other's contents completely. Objective

sense qualities are reflected as subjective sensations, and viceversa.

It is not difficult to see that in thinking and feeling the

subject and the object are interdependent though

appearing as separate (as: thinker/thought,

feeler/feeling).

oThe subject can only be experienced as a set of sensations,thoughts and feelings; while objects are experienced as the

content of the subjects sensing, thinking or feeling.

When sensing, as a subjective experience is examined, it is

discovered that the sensing function and the

corresponding sensation appear and disappear together.

Two terms, one subjective and the other objective, are

used to describe one unitary fact of experience.


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o Objective properties and subjective sensations completelycorrespond to each other. Experience shows that perceiving,

the perceiver and the perceived are a unity that reverts to

non-existence if any one of its constituents is absent.

Unless heard, a sound cannot be experienced; a form is

not experienced unless seen. In the absence of sound

there is no hearing, in the absence of a form there is no

seeing. Hearing and sound are one and the same fact

described subjectively as hearing and objectively as

sound; the seen and seeing are two words describing a

single fact of experience.

IV. THE GROUND

IV.1. Transcendent Modes of Knowing

Through the transcendent modes of knowing integral aspects

of experience may be apperceived. These modes of knowing

apprehend higher levels of integration of the contents of

experience. There are several levels of transcendent knowing:

- Existential apperceptionof the total content of a stateof manifestation (= acts of knowing, the knower and the

known).

A variant of this stand referred to as lucid dreaming takes

place when, during a dream, it is realized that one is

dreaming, and purposefully allows the dream to continue.

- Non-existential apperception of the emptybackground upon which acts of knowing appear.


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This can be experienced when one suddenly becomes alert

in dreamless sleep and, also, in the state of cognitive

extinction (= Nirvikalpa Samadhi).

-Integral apperception: has as its domain the totality ofexperience (= existence & inexistence =manifestation &

non-manifestation = the foreground & the background).

In what is referred to as the Natural State of

Knowing, the total domain of existence and

inexistence is integrally apperceived. Directing

attention to the un-manifest background - as well as

the manifest foreground, the integral content ofexperience (= existence and inexistence)is

experienced.

IV.2. Pure Attention

Depending on how intent directs attention, three levels ofknowing can be experienced:

- Normally, attention is directed toward a particular object orevent this is the common taste of knowing automatically

experienced by most people; e.g., a particular sound.

- A less common taste of knowing is experienced whenattention is directed toward the particular act of sensing,

thinking or feeling; e.g., hearing itself, instead of only the

sound.

- A rarer taste of knowing is experienced when attention isdirected toward the empty background of an act of

knowing; e.g., the silence underlying a sound.


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WhenAttention is directed upon itself, acts of knowing are

dissolved into an attributeless ground ofPure Attention (=

attention attentive to itself). Attention, somehow, merges into

Knowing[as awareness, pure consciousness, or unconditioned

Knowing].

Complete absorption in itself,returns attention to its

ground: Pure Attention - a state empty of all content, a

state where the knower and the known disappear.

o Since Pure Attention is attributeless and contentless,theoretically, it should not be possible to experience it; oddly, it

does have a very peculiar taste to it.

The genesis of experience may be visualized through an

examination of the arising of a thought from Pure Attention.

Normally, it is difficult to maintain pure attention for long. As soon

as attention wavers, a thought arises spontaneously, Pure

Attention is transformed into an act of thinking and attention isexclusively directed to its content.

Pure attention spontaneously becomes an act of knowing,

projecting an object and a corresponding subject. Notice

how the background of deep sleep is spontaneously

transformed into a dream.

o Wherever attention is directed, it faces transformations of PureAttention in one manifest form or another.

It may be thatPure Attention somehow becomes active,

and an intense interest for experiencing spontaneously

arises the interest generating a strong intent to be and

to know the intent directing attention toward an act of

knowing, and focusing it on an object .


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IV.3. The Ground ofKnowing

Both the known and the knower are concepts experienced

through transformations of an act of knowing. Tentatively, it

may be stated that:

- What is more directly experienced than the known isthe knower;

- What is more directly experienced than the knower isthe act of knowing;

- Since the presence and absence of all acts of knowingare experienced, there must be a Knowing that

directly experiences them. (= A Ground ofKnowingthat experiences itself as acts of knowing).

o Knowing is omnipresent; it persists under all circumstances.Knowing persists:

- Whether sense objects, thoughts and feelings appear,change or disappear

- Whether the faculties and acts of sensing, thinking andfeeling arise or subside

- Whether the perceiver, the thinker and the feeler appear anddisappear.

o The Knowing that is aware of the presence and absence of actsof knowing is the ultimate ground ofKnowingan awareness

that experiences itself in identity as differentiated acts of knowing

which are experienced as the known and the knower.

The ground ofKnowingis content-less and, therefore,indeterminate; it is neither something nor nothing. Itexperiences itself by itself in identity [an undifferentiated knower-

knowing-known]. This may also be partly verified by examining the

state of dreamless sleep.


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Absence of acts of knowing is shared by dreamless sleep

and the ground ofKnowing- the difference is that the

former is experienced [in hindsight], but the latter cannot

be experienced.

Knowing [as the awareness of the presence and absence of allattributes], can have no attributes; nor can it be completely

inexperienced, since it constitutes the most intimate experience. It

may be assumed thatKnowing has the capacity of experiencing

itself by itself.

Knowingis a living dynamic process of an indefinable

nature, spontaneously projecting its infinite content and

withdrawing it [a verb, not a nameable entity].

o Attribute-less, unconditioned and indefinable, the ground ofKnowing cannot be related to the content of experience (=

manifestation and non-manifestation, self and world).Knowing

cannot be the agent for-, nor the source of existence and

inexistence.

All relations are experienced through concepts; that

which apperceives the presence and absence of all

concepts cannot be itself a concept.

o Knowing does not generate acts of knowing; these acts are itsvery nature Knowing shines as acts of knowing. Acts of

knowing are transformed into the known and the knower.

As the ultimate ground of experience, unconditionedKnowing

can only be acknowledged as an absolute certainty but,

theoretically, cannot be experienced by any faculty of knowing.


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Existence is the manifest foreground of experience;

inexistence is the background of existence; an undeniable,

but unknowable Knowing is aware of both existence and

inexistencethe Ground of Knowing.o Certainty is possible only in the absence of acts of knowing,

[where certainty and uncertainty become irrelevant]. Because

experiencing of the presence and absence of acts of knowing

cannot be denied, the Knowing -which is aware of the

presence and absence all acts of knowingis an absolute

certainty.

Uncertainty reigns over all the content of experience, where

error is always a possibility. The content of acts of knowing

may be true or false, but the fact that: There is a

Knowing that knows the presence and absence of my acts

of knowing [regardless of the truth or falsehood of their

content] is an absolute certainty actually, the only

certainty.

There can be no discernible cause for the transformation of theGround ofKnowing into acts of knowing. The transformation is

spontaneous and causeless. Knowing experiences itself as acts of

knowing and, therefore, it has no relation with them [since a unicity

cannot form a relationship with itself];

- it has no source or location, no beginning and no end;-

it does not manifest in definite stages or through a particularprocess;

- it has no boundaries [no within and no beyond];- it has neither a cause, nor a separate content [as its effect];- it has neither reason, meaning nor end-result in its

transformation.

No what? where? when? how? why? or who? - Notice the

spontaneous transformation of deep sleep into a dream.


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o We may speculate that the ground ofKnowing, through an all-powerful drive toward experiencing itself- a passion for being, an

infatuation with self-identity: I am- somehow reveals itself

spontaneously through acts of knowing.

IV.4. The Ground of Identity

Normally, in the absence of a subjective identity, there can be no

differentiation of the subject from the object; and, therefore, acts of

knowing [which are relational by nature] cannot take place.

o Subjective identity relates and unifies the different attributes andmodes of the knower;one cannot think intelligently about these

without integrating them into a subject as their functional center.

To make experience meaningful, the perceiver, the thinker,

the feeler and their objects have to be related and

coordinated through a phenomenal centerasubject.

o Relations between multiple and diverse knowable entities canonly be established through the centralizing function of a self-

image. To establish a relation between objects, each has to be

first related to a center:

Two visual attributes (e.g., shape & color) can only be

experienced as a visual object after relating each to the

seer; two or more seen objects can only be related by firstrelating each to the seer.

Phenomenal identity appears as a self-image, expressed as I

am, and mainly constituted by:

- The perceiver, the thinker and the feeler [conceptuallyunified as thesubject];


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- The physical body, the I-concept and the feeling ofpresence [conceptually unified into an individual entity];

- Diverse personal attributes associated with the I-concept,such as: life history, nationality, education, social roles, etc.

[conceptually unified into apersonal identity]

o The different modes of the self-image are related throughmemory and identified with a persistent sense ofI am-ness.

The self-image assumes agency (= doer-ship) as the

knower, subject, doer or actor. As a subject the self-image

assumes the roles of the perceiver (= the seer, hearer, etc.),

the thinker and the feeler.

All subjective attributes are integrated into a self-image and areclearly knowable their presence and absence are experienced.

They constitute the phenomenal aspect of the ground ofIdentity.

It can be clearly observed that all aspects of the self-image aredetermined by acts of knowing. Clearly, the presence and absence

of all aspects of the self-imageare experienced. That which

experiences the self-image - and all the faculties and acts of

knowing attributed to it - is postulated as the ground ofIdentity(=

the I-principle, Selfhood).

o I am aware of the presence and absence of my self-image, i.e.,- Myself as a body, as an I-concept and as a feeling of

presence;

- Myself as a subject: a perceiver, a thinker and a feeler;- My faculties and acts of knowing;- My three states of: waking, dreaming and sleeping,- Memories of my past and anticipations of my future,


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o The ground of Identity can neither be objective nor subjective[despite the fact that it is felt as very subjective]; nor is it

something or nothing,[since it is aware of both].

The constituents of a self-image are knowable; their

presence and absence are clearly observed. That which

experiences these aspects of the self-image is an absolute

certainty, yet remains indefinable. It is neither personal

nor impersonal- since it is the ground on which all modes

of identity arise and subside.

There can be no doubt that there is an awareness of my self-image as well as my acts of knowing [whether these are true or

false, right or wrong, real or illusory].I know that Iknow is a fact

that is not subject to doubt.

More accurately expressed: I, as theground ofIdentity, is

the undeniable awareness of the presence and absence of

my self-image and all of my acts of knowing.

The ground ofIdentity cannot be experienced as somethingknown; neither can it be the experiencer [or the knower], as the

latter is also experienced.

One can experience all the modes of subjectivity but not the

ground of Identity. Being indeterminate, the ground of

Identity is unknowable but, nevertheless, an undeniable

certainty. Problems arise when this groundis identified with

theself-image.

The determining faculties which define all knowable entities[including my self-image]cannot possibly define that which is

aware of their presence and absence.


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- Theground ofIdentity is an unknowable ground on whichsubjective attributes are manifested; therefore, it should

necessarily be devoid of attributes.

- Pure Attention is also attributeless and, hence, inseparablefrom the ground ofIdentity.

- Similarly, the ground of Knowing is also, necessarily,devoid of attributes and cannot be differentiated from either

the ground ofIdentity or from pure Attention.

o In the absence of attributes, one unknowable cannot bedifferentiated from another. Since the grounds of Knowing,

Attention and Identity are all attributeless, they cannot be

differentiated and are one and the same as the unknowable-undeniable GROUND OF BEING.

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