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Dr. Ram ManoharLohiya National Law University, Lucknow

Political Science

TOPIC:

The naxalite movement, the growth of the communist philosophy and the support from China, Pakistan and Nepal.

Submitted by :-Submitted to:-

Devraj SinghMs. Monica Srivastava

Roll No - 49(Political Science)

Index

S.No.

Topic

Page No.

1

Introduction

3

2

History

4

3

The Chinese Support

5-6

4.

India-China Power Game in Nepal and the Consequences

7-9

5.

Growth of Naxalism

10-16

7.

Conclusion

17

8.

Bibliography

18

Introduction

In a development that could have far reaching implication not only for Bihar and Jharkhand but also for other States, the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) and the Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist (People's War) merged in the united formation, the Communist Party of India (Maoist) CPI-Maoist, in September 2004. Both the groups have been the most powerful ones, accounting for about 88 percent of the countrywide Naxalite violence and 90 percent of the resultant deaths. The merger has resulted in further escalation in the level of Naxalite violence in these two States. For example, Bihar, where Maoists are active in approximately 30 out of 38 districts, was the worst affected States in 2004, with 155 Naxalite-related killing between January and November 30, 2004. Jharkhand, where Maoists are active in 18 out of 22 districts, ranked second, with 150 deaths as against 117 in 2003. The unification of Naxalite groups, largely interpreted as the beginning of a new phase in Naxalite movement in India, has also been influenced by the perceived success of Maoism in Nepal and activities of several front organizations in the last few years.

An attempt has been made in this project to map the trajectory of Naxalite movement in Bihar and Jharkhand in the light of current developments, historical experience and complex interplay of factors that have shaped the course of the movement. The paper argues that the course of the Naxalite movement in these two States would depend, to a great extent, on how it manages contradictions emerging out of complex interplay of the ideological commitment and various factors that have influenced the behavior of these groups at the grassroots level.

History

The term comes from Naxalbari a small village in West Bengal, where a section of Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) led by Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal led a violent uprising in 1967, trying to develop a "revolutionary opposition" in opposition to the CPI(M) leadership. The insurrection started on May 25, 1967 in Naxalbari village when a peasant was attacked by hired hands over a land dispute. Local peasants retaliated by attacking the local landlords and the violence escalated. Majumdar greatly admired Mao Zedong of China and advocated that Indian peasants and lower classes must follow in his footsteps and overthrow the government and upper classes whom he held responsible for their plight. He engendered the Naxalite movement through his writings, the most famous being the 'Historic Eight Documents' which formed the basis of Naxalite ideology. In 1967 'Naxalites' organized the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR), and later broke away from CPI (M). Uprisings were organized in several parts of the country. In 1969 AICCCR gave birth to Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).

Practically all Naxalite groups trace their origin to the CPI (ML). A separate tendency from the beginning was the Maoist Communist Centre, which evolved out of the Dakshin Desh-group. MCC later fused with People's War Group to form Communist Party of India (Maoist). A third tendency is that of the Andhra revolutionary communists, which was mainly presented by UCCRI (ML), following the mass line legacy of T. Nagi Reddy. That tendency broke with AICCCR at an early stage. During the 1970s the movement was fragmented into several disputing factions. By 1980 it was estimated that around 30 Naxalite groups were active, with a combined membership of 30 000.[4] A 2004 home ministry estimate puts numbers at that time as "9,300 hardcore underground cadre [holding] around 6,500 regular weapons beside a large number of unlicensed country-made arms".[5] According to Judith Vidal-Hall (2006), "More recent figures put the strength of the movement at 15,000, and claim the guerrillas control an estimated one fifth of India's forests, as well as being active in 160 of the country's 604 administrative districts."

Today some groups have become legal organizations participating in parliamentary elections, such as Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation. Others, such as Communist Party of India (Maoist) and Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Janashakti, are engaged in armed guerrilla struggles

The Chinese Support

On a grander geopolitical level, the Naxalites can be viewed through the prism ofChinese-Indian rivalry. The Naxalites adopted the ideology of Mao Zedong, the Chinese revolutionary and leader who converted China to communism and who had just begun the Cultural Revolution there in 1966. In the beginning of the Naxalite movement, there was mutual rhetorical support between the Maoist regime in China and the Naxalites in India. While there was little evidence of material support (and there is no indication of such support today), the advent and growth of the Naxalite movement certainly did serve Chinas goal of weakening its largest neighbour to the south.

India was able to dampen the Naxalite movement significantly in 1971, but the regional belief that the government in New Delhi had robbed tribal groups of their land in eastern India persisted. The Naxalite movement continued in a somewhat dormant phase throughout the 1970s, 80s and early 90s. Violence resumed again in the late 90s and has been escalating in the years since.

The CPI (M)'s relationship with the North-East insurgent groups must be juxtaposed with the external support these groups receive. The on-going court proceedings in Bangladesh over the 2004 clandestine import of 10 truckloads of light and medium arms and ammunition reveal a wide network running through three countries.The case now involves top officers of the two most powerful Bangladesh intelligence agencies, the NSI and the DGFI. They were working with some top leaders of the then BNP-Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) government. The ULFA Commander-in-Chief Paresh Barua, who was in Dhaka till recently running the outfit's command centre from the capital city, was involved at every stage of this plan.Pakistan's ISI, from the level of Director General was running these covert operations. Underworld criminal Dawood Ibrahim, who lives in Karachi under ISI protection, was roped in. A communication and television company, ARY, based in Dubai became an active facilitator. ARY is owned by a Pakistani and known to have worked with ISI in supporting Al Qaeda and Taliban networks in the past.Finally, one of the NSI senior officers confessed to interrogators earlier in June that the entire consignment of arms and ammunitions was procured from China. It is a well established fact that ULFA and NSCN (I/M) leaders visit Kunming in China periodically to procure arms, ammunition and communication equipment. To travel abroad ULFA and NSCN leaders are given Bangladeshi passports under assumed names by the NSI. This was a most devastating terrorist plan to destabilize India.The discovery of the consignment at the Chittagong port was purely fortuitous. Even then, the case was kept under cover by the BNP-JEI government. The new Awami League government, led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina re-opened it in order to wipe out terrorism from the country.If the Indian Maoists are in an alliance with the North-East insurgents,it is highly likely they would be directly or indirectly in touch with the mentors of these insurgents. The Laskar-e-Toiba's (LET) king pin in Nepal, Mohammad Omar Madani, who is currently in Indian custody, has confessed that his task was to win over Naxal activists and send them to Pakistan for military and terrorist training. He had a substantial amount of money at his disposal for the job.

India-China Power Game in Nepal and the Consequences

A month after the visit to Nepal by Shyam Saran as special envoy of the Indian Prime Minister, a delegation of 21 senior Chinese leaders led by He Yong, vice-premier and secretary at the secretariat of the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, arrived in Kathmandu on September 11, 2010 on a six-day visit.

This is the highest-level Chinese delegation to visit Nepal since the beginning of the peace process. The visit also coincided with news about a controversial audio tape purportedly containing a conversation between Krishna Bahadur Mahara, International Bureau Chief of the Unified CPN-Maoist, and an unknown Chinese, in which Mahara is heard asking for 500 million rupees to buy off 50 lawmakers required to form the government under Prachandas leadership. This tape brought China into the internal political debate of Nepal for the first time. As of now, it is not known whether the tape is genuine or not. If it is genuine, then it indicates a serious shift in Chinas policy towards Nepal. It can be seen as the beginning of Chinese interference in Nepals internal affairs.

The Chinese have always adopted a pro-establishment policy towards Nepal. Experts emphasize that Nepal-China relations are based on the Five Principles, or Panchsheel, according to which China will not intervene in Nepal's domestic politics and Nepal will respect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity with respect to Tibet and Taiwan.

But the controversial audio tape violates the principle that China will not intervene in Nepals domestic politics. It also indicates that China seems to have adopted a proactive policy towards Nepal. China had always gained good faith in the Nepalese mind by pointing at Indian interference in Nepals internal affairs. The current visit of the Chinese delegation, coming close on the heels of the audio tape controversy, also indicates that China may involve itself more actively in Nepalese affairs and serve as a check on interference in Nepals internal matters by any other external powers (India).

These events are also taking place at a time when there is a souring of relations between China and India due to the denial of visa to the Indian Army's Chief of Northern Command Lt. Gen. B. S. Jaswal. There is also tension between India and China on the issue of stapled visas being issued to Kashmiris, the Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh, the issue of Dalai Lama, and so on. Thus, one can argue that China is taking such actions in Nepal to confront and counter-balance India and will continue to act similarly in other countries in Indias neighbourhood.

The Maoists have always looked towards China for help and support. But China had made it clear to them so far that it could help only if they are in government because of their pro-establishment policy. But in the past few months, it seems that the Maoist have been able to convince the Chinese that they would not come to power until Indian interference continues in Nepal. This may explain the new Chinese behaviour.

China has always been worried about chronic political instability in Nepal and the possibility of external powers using Nepal against its strategic interests. China viewed the monarchy as the most stable, credible and dependable partner and the mainstream political parties as pro-India. The King always played the China card effectively to counter Indian influence. Chinese security interests, which have been Chinas prime concern in Nepal, were also served by the King in the past. The King wielded tremendous power as the Commander-in-Chief of the army.

After Nepal became a republic, China lost its most reliable partner (Monarchy). It realized that it has to choose between two major political forces in Nepal, i.e., the democratic parties, which were mostly pro-India, and the Maoists, a large party with anti-India and anti-US sentiments.

While the Chinese were looking for a durable and dependable force in Nepal, the Maoists, looking for support from a strong power in the neighbourhood, approached China for help. The Maoists looked at China with sympathy due to their ideological affinities. Significantly, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist) promised in its election manifesto to set up eight new national highways linking Nepal to China. Interestingly, China did not support the Maoist party until they emerged as the single largest party in the Constituent Assembly election of April 2008. In fact, China was the only country to supply arms to King Gyanendra to suppress the Maoist insurgents when India, the US and the UK had refused to provide any such help.

China also found it expedient to cultivate the Maoists because of the growing tensions in Tibet, particularly after the March 2008 uprising. China wanted to curb the underground activities of some 20,000 Tibetan refugees settled in Nepal. As is well-known, Nepal is the most easily accessible entry point to Tibet and it has the second largest Tibetan refugee community in the world. China has traditionally alleged that international forces are conducting operations against China, through Tibetans based in Nepal. In this context, China was deeply concerned when six Nepalese Parliamentarians visited Dalai Lama in Dharamsala in February 2009. Only after this did China start establishing good relations with other political parties like the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) and the Madhesi Peoples Rights Forum apart from the CPN-Maoist.

It is well-known that even though Maoist leaders are posing themselves as anti-Indian, most are aware that at the end of the day they will have to deal with India, and that they cannot wish away the geographical, historical, cultural and socio-economic linkages between the two countries. It is almost certain that they will temper their policies towards India once they come to power. However, for the moment, the Indian policy of preventing Maoists from coming to power and the Maoist counter-tactic of mobilising popular opinion on the basis of growing anti-India sentiments in Nepal, seem to be pushing the Himalayan country deeper into uncertainty, which will not serve the interests of either country.

Interestingly, China and India have been competing for influence along the Nepal-China border. Soon after India provided development assistance of Rs. 100 million for the remote hill region of Mustang, China responded with financial assistance worth Rs. 10 million for construction of a library, science laboratory and school building with computers in Chhoser village (adjoining Jhongwasen district of Tibet) in the same region to counter Indian influence. The ambassadors of both countries have visited the area. China is also opening China Study Centres in Nepal along the Indo-Nepal border. Out of a total of eleven China Study Centres that China has built in Nepal so far, seven are along the Indo-Nepal border.

In response to the Chinese attempt to extend the railway link from Tibet till the Nepalese border, India is also planning to extend its rail links to Nepal along the border. India has announced assistance worth Rs. 10.88 billion for the expansion of railway service in five places along the India-Nepal border. The first phase of expansion is scheduled to start from Birjung of Nepal which is about 350 kilometres south of Tatopani, the place to be connected by China through railways. The power-game between China and India is thus slowly unfolding in Nepal.

In this context, the controversial audio tape incident has had its effect. It has benefited the anti-Maoist forces the most. The leak seems to have stopped the Madhesi parties from supporting Prachandas candidature as PM in the seventh round of voting. At a time when the Nepalese media was in overdrive to nail the Indian Embassy for its alleged intervention in Nepalese politics, the tape controversy has successfully diverted popular attention towards China.

Whether the audio tape is genuine or fake, it will affect the contour of Nepalese politics in the days to come. If China decides to play a proactive role in Nepal, it will definitely have serious implications for Indias security. The win-win situation for both India and China lies in respecting the buffer-status of Nepal between them. This will also ensure political stability.

After being in denial mode for months, the Nepalese Maoists have said they are extending "full support and cooperation" to the Naxalites in India, days after Home Minister P Chidambaram mentioned about a possible supply of arms from them.

Admitting that exchanges exist between the Maoists and the Naxals in India, a senior Standing Committee member of the UCPN-M CP Gajurel was quoted on Tuesday by Rajdhani daily as saying, "We have extended our full support and cooperation to the Indian Maoists, who are launching armed revolt." Talking to pro-Maoist journalists in Bara district of southern Nepal on Sunday. Gajurel, however, did not elaborate on what type of support they have extended to the Naxals.

Chidambaram had recently mentioned about the possible supply of arms from Nepalese Maoists to the Naxals in India.

The same newspaper had earlier carried a report that a Maoist leader had met Indian Maoist leader Kishenji at an undisclosed place in October.

Growth of Naxalism

Emergence of Organizations

Even a cursory glance at the trajectory of Naxalite movement in Bihar and Jharkhand would reveal that though it developed in the backdrop of rich tradition of peasant and tribal movementsboth during British and post-independence period it grew through its complex interaction with a number of local issues, which have defined the course of the movement. The basic demand of Naxalite movement during the early phase revolved around the issue of land relations, self-respect, respect for their women and payment of minimum wages. The organizations which espoused these demands could not evolve a common understanding on various strategic, tactical and organizational issues. Thus, we find the emergence of a number of Naxalite groups in the undivided Bihar.

The movement, which originated in the small town of Naxalbari in Darjeeling district, West Bengal had a direct impact on the undivided Bihar. Leading the movement in the State was the nine-member Bihar State Committee of Communist Revolutionaries, which began spreading its activities in various parts of the undivided Bihar. The Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML) came into existence in 1969. In early 1970s, some CPI-ML leaders began to establish contacts in Jehanabad and Palamu areas, but many of them were arrested during the emergency period in 1975. When these leaders were released during the Janata government in 1977, some of them organized themselves into CPI-ML (Unity Organization) in 1978. The same year, the Mazdur Kisan Sangram Samity (MKSS) was formed.

During the 1980s, three groups had major impact on Naxalite movement in Bihar: the CPI-ML (Liberation), the CPI-ML (Party Unity) and the MCCI. As early as 1982, the Bihar government in its Notes on Extremist activities-affected areas reported that as many as 47 out of a total of 857 blocks, spread over 14 districts were affected by the left wing extremist movement. The CPI-ML (Liberation), which political party in 1992. It was stated that the party does not rule out the possibility under a set of exceptional national and international circumstances, the balance of social and economic forces may even permit peaceful transfer of central power to revolutionary forces. It was, however, added that the party must prepare itself for winning the ultimate decisive victory through an armed struggle, though it had a formidable presence in the central parts of undivided Bihar, decided to function as an over ground admitted that the situation was not ripe for such a movement. Reports suggest that it still maintains underground squad in some regions. The party also has a string of organizations to mobilize students, women and workers. They are: All India Students Association, Bihar Pradesh Kisan Sabha, All India Coordination Committee of Trade Unions, All India Progressive Women's Association and Jan Sanskritik Manch.

Another prominent Naxal group, which emerged during the 1980s, was the CPI-ML (Party Unity). It tried to organize the peasantry as the main force of democratic revolution. They adopted the twin strategy of selective annihilation and economic blockade of landowners. In a major effort at the consolidation of left-wing activity, the CPI-ML (Party Unity) merged with the People's War Group (PWG) of Andhra Pradesh in 1998, to constitute the CPI-ML (People's War).

However, one Naxalite groups which had maximum impact on the course of Naxalite movement in Bihar, and in many sense represents the true character of the movement is the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI). The group, earlier known as the Dakshin Desh, was active, during the initial days in West Bengal and Gaya and Hazaribagh districts of undivided Bihar. In the perception of the MCCI, the struggle is fundamentally a movement for appropriating political power. Thus, the political education of the peasants reaches its completion when the peasants uphold the fact that fights for land is only a means to launch a war to capture of power.

During the late 1970s and 1980s, the MCCI concentrated its strength in Bihar; and with the perspective of building up peoples army and base area, the Bihar-Bengal Area Committee was set up. The emergency period suppressed their activities, but in 1978-79, they once again began to mobilize the peasants. Till 1982, the MCC was mostly underground. Gradually, the group began to operate through these mass fronts. In Bihar and Jharkhand, it maintained a string of front organizations, including the Naujawan Pratirodh Sangharsh Manch, Krantikari Budhijivi Sangh, Krantikari Sanskritik Sangh, Krantikari Chhatra League, Communist Yuva League, Naari Mukti Sangh and Mazdoor Mukti Sangh.

The MCC disagreed with the CPI-MLs approach of class annihilation. It accepted action against the class enemies. It advocated mass action in which conscious people enraged by class hatred would spontaneously participate in the annihilation of class enemies. But it was vehemently opposed to secret and indiscriminate killings by the squad. It carried out a number of massacres in the central parts of undivided Bihar. On October 7, 1986, the MCC killed 11 persons belonging to the upper caste Rajput community in Darmia village Aurangabad district in Bihar. On May 29, 1987, the MCC massacred 42 persons belonging to an upper caste Rajput family at Dalelchak-Baghaura village in Aurangabad district, Bihar. On February 12, 1992, the MCC massacred 37 members of the landowing upper caste Bhumihar community at Bara village, Gaya district in Bihar. On March 18, 1999, the MCC massacred over 34 upper caste Bhumihars in Senari village, Jehanabad in Bihar. On November 18, 1999, the MCC killed 12 persons in Latu village, Palamu in Jharkhand. On April 14, 2001, the MCC killed 14 persons at Belpu village, Hazaribagh district in Jharkhand.

One of the features of the Naxalite movement during that phase was bitter internecine clashes among these groups. The clashes between the MCCI and the CPI-ML (Party Unity) resulted in the death of hundreds of cadres of both the organizations in central and southern parts of undivided Bihar. After the rapprochement between the MCCI and the CPI-ML (PW), the main rivalry remains between the latter and the CPI-ML (Liberation), which after eschewing the path of armed revolution is increasingly finding it difficult to maintain its turf in its strongholds particularly Bhojpur and Patna districts of Bihar. The PWs growing influence in these districts has caused serious problems for the Liberation group. According to sociologist and former Naxalite, Mr. Sashibhushan, the Liberation, after giving up the annihilation line, has no solid means to cash in on the anger of the people against exploitation. Apart from ideological factors, these organizations were locked in bitter war of supremacy in a particular area.

Caste Dynamics and Sena Phenomenon

Apart from internal dissension and internecine clashes, the caste dynamics also influenced the movement since the 1980s. The polarization along the caste line deepened, when the dalits were mobilized by the left wing extremists and increasingly stereotyped as Naxalites by the upper castes who banded together. The result was a closing of ranks, not only among the richer and landowners, but also along caste lines that embraced every rung of the social ladder, down to the poorest of the caste men. It affected the organizational structure, mobilization strategy and activities of Naxalite groups at the grassroots level. If we examine the pattern of violence in Central parts of undivided Bihar, the entire confrontation was moulded by caste factor and not by class ideology. The Naxalite leaders also recognized the importance of caste in mobilization. As Dipankar Bhattacharya of the CPI-ML (Liberation) says that we can not afford to completely ignore the role of caste. Sometimes class struggles do overlap with caste war while on some other occasions class struggle relegated to background and caste violence does take place.

This complex pattern of Naxalite mobilization and counter mobilization on the basis of caste gave rise to what is generally called the Sena (private army of landowners) phenomenon in Bihar. Though armed gangs have been part of feudal history of rural India, Bihar is the only State in post-independence India where private armies of landowners exist. Most of these private armies emerged in late 1970s, and 1980s as a feudal response to the growth of Naxalite groups. Since then, an estimated 15 private armies have existed at various points of time in the State, including prominently: the Kuer Sena, the Bhumi Sena, Lorik Sena, Sunlight Sena, Bramharshi Sena, Kisan Sangh, Gram Suraksha Parishad and the Ranvir Sena.

Most of these Senas, with a limited cadre strength and area of operation, could not sustain their existence for long and eventually withered away. However, among all these, the Ranvir Sena emerged as the most dreaded and ruthless group. Over the years, the Ranvir Sena extended its influence to the Jehanabad, Patna, Rohtas, Aurangabad, Gaya, Bhabhua and Buxur districts, mobilizing the landed caste groups in these districts against the various left-wing extremist organisations. Over the years, the Ranvir Sena carried out a number of massacres in Central Bihar. On June 16, 2000, its cadres killed 34 persons at Miapur village, Aurangabad district. On April 21, 1999, 12 persons were killed at Sendani village, Gaya district. On February 20, 1999, 11 persons were killed at Narayanpur village, Jehanabad district. On January 25, 1999, 23 persons were massacred in Sankarbigha village, Jehanabad district. On December 1, 1997, 58 persons were massacred at Lakshmanpur-Bathe village, Jehanabad district. On April 10, 1997, 10 persons were killed at Ekbari village, Jehanabad. And on March 23, 1997, Ranvir Sena cadres killed 10 persons at Habispur village, Patna district. Though the Ranvir Sena claimed to have targeted only Naxalites, its victim, by and large, have been landless and poor peasants of the most backward castes.

The context of the Senas activities has been conditioned by an extreme polarization of State politics and the bureaucracy on the basis of caste. It had linkage with many top level politicians on the sole basis of caste loyalties. Since the landowner groups constituted a powerful political lobby entrenched in the government, the police and the bureaucracy, the pattern of state intervention and even the government approach to the conflict were conditioned selectively by these linkages.

However, in the last few years, the Sena has been sufficiently weakened particularly after the arrest of its chief, Brahmeshwar Singh at Patna on August 29, 2002. Reports also indicate that the Ranvir Sena has been at the receiving end for some time now, and has lost much of its earlier influence among upper caste land owners. One of the reasons is the increasing criminalization of the outfit.

Linkage with Mainstream Politics

Linkage with political parties has also conditioned the behaviour of Naxalite groups and this is reflected in their behaviour during elections and their relationship with mainstream political parties. Though these groups have been insisting on election boycott to wean people away from parliamentary politics, there has been a palpable change in their attitude towards elections. The behaviour of Naxalite groups during elections have suggested that their stated objectives have little role to play as far as grassroots mobilization of electoral support is concerned. In Bihar, during the recent State Assembly elections in February 2005, though the CPI-Maoists officially declared that the continuance in power of the ruling RJD is against the interest of the party, it, at the same time, admitted that the Naxalites and the RJD share the same social base. It has also reportedly alleged that Laloo Prasad Yadav has been trying to bribe its cadre and activists through Government contracts and projects. Alleging a nexus between the MCC and RJD, the CPI-ML (Liberation) says, MCC used to extend its support to the RJD in Bihar and JMM in Jharkhand during earlier elections. In the last elections some of their commanders were seen openly canvassing for the RJD candidates in Bihar. According to Saibal Gupta, secretary of the Asian Development Research Institute: "I won't say they are hand in hand. Because the social base of the RJD and MCC is the same, there is a natural coalition.''

Muscle power plays a critical role in elections in these states and the enormous clout wielded by Naxalite groups at the grassroots level has been one of the crucial instruments of influence in the electoral process. In Jharkhand, according to one estimate, the Naxalites are capable of influencing the election process in some 54 of the 81 Assembly constituencies. Unsurprisingly, Naxalite groups often use their influence to support candidates or political formations which provide them a favourable context for operation in the post election phase. Therefore, it is not surprising that their violence or threat of poll boycott never result in active boycott or a decline in vote percentage. Thus, for instance, during the April 2004 Parliamentary Election in Jharkhand, where the pre-poll campaign was marred by a series of attacks on security force personnel, the voter turnout was recorded at 55.71 per cent. Even in some of the worst-affected districts, including Palamu, Hazaribagh, Singhbhum and Lohardaga, the voter turnout ranged between 49 and 60 per cent. Similarly, many Naxalite dominated areas in Bihar registered an impressive voter turn out.

There are reports, moreover, that these groups have themselves contested the elections through proxies. For example, during the Panchayat (Village Council) elections in 2001, activists of both the PWG and MCCI contested in Jehanabad district. In the Parliamentary Elections of April 2004, a former 'sub-zonal commander' of the MCCI, Ramlal Oraon alias Veer Bhagat, contested as an independent candidate from one of the worst Naxalite-affected constituencies, Chatra in Jharkhand, and the voter turnout in some of the worst-affected Assembly segments recorded their highest turnout in the last 20 years. Clearly, despite the announcement of the unification, the factors that have historically influenced the behaviour of Naxalite groups still remain operative, and will continue to have a considerable influence during the election process.

Financial Incentives and growing criminalisation

Their muscle power, enormous presence at the grassroots and a collusive arrangement with a section of politicians, government officials and contractors offer huge financial incentive to these groups. And this is facilitated by inability of the state to enforce its writ in Naxal-affected areas. These groups are able to hold jan adalats (kangaroo courts) and administer instant justice, leaving the administration gaping.The extremists impose levy on government projects. The collection ranges from forest contractors, businessmen, civil contractors, villagers and government officials including police in some areas. The Naxalites have also threatened the Golden Quadrilateral project in their areas of influence. As a result, progress in these areas is probably the slowest of the GQ stretches. In fact, the Naxal fear is not restricted to this area or to the PM highway alone. They have also threatened companies such as Steel Authority of India Limited-run iron ore mines at Megahahatburu. Although, the Naxalites claim that they are fighting an ideological war, they are basically involved in making money. Smuggling of woods, taking cut from government officials from development fund and extortion have become main business of Naxalites.

The dwindling role of ideology and financial incentive has led to growing criminalization of the outfit. In many cases, the local commanders due to lack of proper ideological indoctrination and lure of money behave like ordinary criminals. Stories of deviations and degeneration of Naxalite groups appear regularly in media. Degeneration in Naxalite movement resulted in emergence of protection racket. Moreover, a number of persons with criminal backgrounds have joined the movement to secure some safety from the law. In addition, there are a number of examples of land having been captured by Naxalite outfits.

State Response

One of the important factors that have sustained this self-sustaining dynamics of Naxalite violence in Bihar and Jharkhand is the lack of proper state response and failure of the administrative machinery at the grassroots level. As a result, in many areas government officials do not even attend their offices due to the threat posed by Naxalites. In these areas, development works are executed more often than not on paper. In August 1999, special House Committee of the Bihar Legislative Council which was asked to study the chain of violence and counter violence in Central Bihar, said the lack of political will and determination on the part of State in tackling extremism head on, its failure to set up agencies unafraid to step into the disturbed regions and political affiliations of the extremist groups with mainline parties are some of the reasons for the aggravating extremist violence in Bihar.

No proper attempt has been made to equip police force properly to deal with the threat. Even in Jharkhand, where the successive governments relied heavily on police operations to neutralize the armed groups, proper attention was not paid to this aspect. The police operations suffer due to lack of adequate and appropriate equipment - including basics such as automatic weapons, landmine detectors, transport and communications; a proper intelligence network at the grassroots level; and better protection to police officers and personnel in the Naxalite affected areas. Therefore, it is not surprising that despite large-scale arrests under the POTA, the government was not able to contain the violence. In Bihar also, lack of resources is a major handicap. The extremist groups on the other hand, are well trained and possess even sophisticated arms. On April 16, 2003, the then Director General of Police, DP Ojha, made an official statement before the Press that the State police were not equipped well enough to prevent extremist violence in Bihar. He said. How can one expect the police force to contain the extremists? They dont have even matching fire power, lack standardised police pickets and are deprived of state-of-art communication system besides bullet-proof vehicles and mines-protected vehicles?

The surrender policy announced by the government has not had desired results. Apart from poor implementation of the scheme, the fear of retribution by Naxals is the reason for poor records in surrender. Maoists have been ruthless in dealing with the deserters and any activist who felt tempted by the surrender package must be ready to face the consequences.

Another important reason for the growth of Naxalite movement has been the governments inability to implement land reforms. The village economy supports nearly three-fourths of the States population, yet it remains one of the most exploitative in the world. The landowners were politically very influential and were largely responsible for poor implementation of the policy.

Conclusion

I would like to conclude this project by saying that it was a great learning experience for me. The project gave me a chance to build upon my existing knowledge. I came across several cases related to the topic and thus got a chance to appreciate various great events.

This project of mine gives a summary of almost all laws related to naxal movement and communism.

This project explores the vastness of the problem and the need therefore to take steps to counter the problem as soon as possible.

The project pervades the space of the help to the naxals, their movement and the spread.

It highlights all related topics in the light of recent events.

Bibliography

I would like to thank the web designers from whose sites I have taken material for my project.

They are:

Websites/URls:

http://naxalwatch.blogspot.com/http://www.airwebworld.com/articles/index.php?article=1202

http://qna.rediff.com/questions-and-answers/does-china-support-naxalites-and-n-e-terrorists/16159968/answers

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/we-support-the-indian-naxals-concede-nepal/536712/

http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news/We-support-the-Indian-naxals-concede-Nepal-Maoists/536712/

http://sify.com/news/who-helps-the-naxals-news-features-jgzpnneehee.html

http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/06/25/when-will-india-attend-to-naxalism/