Pol Sci. Project 2012

7/27/2019 Pol Sci. Project 2012

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CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

A PROJECT

ON

Balance Of Power

Subject: - Political Science

Submitted To:- Dr. S.P. Singh

Submitted By:- Priyanka Kumari.

Roll No:-780.

2nd

semester,

1st year


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am feeling highly elated to work on the topic Balance Of Power under the

guidance of my teacher. I am very grateful to his for the exemplary guidance. I would like

to enlighten my readers regarding this topic and I hope I have tried my best to pave the way

for bringing more luminosity to this topic.

I also want to thank all of my friends, without whose cooperation this project was

not possible. Apart from all these, I want to give special thanks to the librarian of my

university who made every relevant materials regarding to my topic available to me at

the time of my busy research work and gave me assistance. And at last I am very much

obliged to the God who provided me the potential for the rigorous research work.

At finally yet importantly I would like to thank my parents for the financial support.

Priyanka Kumari

1st

year


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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The project is basically based on the doctrinal method of research as no field work is done on

this topic. The whole project is made with the use of secondary source.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The aim of the project is to present a detailed study of Balance OfPowerthrough decisions

and suggestions.

SOURCES OF DATA:

The following secondary sources of data have been used in the project-

1. Books

2. Websites

3. Magazine


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TABLE OF CONTENT

Introduction

What is Balance Of Power

Causes Of Balance Of Power

Effects Of Balance Of Power

Conclusion

Bibliography


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INTRODUCTION

The concept of the balance of power is one of the oldest known theories in the study of

international relations. For many analysts it comes closer to any other single idea in

explaining the patterns of war and peace that have prevailed among nation-states for many

millennia. As a practical phrase it has been used more than any other as a guiding principle in

both explaining and predicting the workings of the international system since the formation

of Greek city-states. However, despite its durability, the term balance of power has been

subject to considerable criticisms, in part because of its lack of definitional precision. In

different epochs historians, political scientists, and statesmen have used the concept in

different ways and oftentimes with important differences in meaning. And just as frequently

the apparent contradictions, or at best confusion in usage, arises because of the lack of

uniformity with reference to contemporary notions of power. For some power it has usually

meant the application of military force, but sometimes also to economic superiority or

diplomatic persuasion to bring about an outcome desired by a specific nation, or group of

nations.

For others power is not a specific thing or activity, but the ability of a given political entity to

impose its will on another despite the resistance of the latter. Still a third group tends toconsider power as a more diffuse concept, whereby a given nation merely influences the

behaviour of one or more other states through the implementation of a declared (foreign)

policy. Finally, perhaps the simplest way of conceiving power has been stated as

follows:anything that establishes and maintains control of man overman. Unfortunately,

the semantic confusion regarding the evaluation of power is compounded by the fact that

there exists little agreement on how to quantify it.

Whichever one of these points of reference is used, it can be inferred that the term balance of

power suggests that at any given time power is distributed among nations so as to create a

state of equilibrium within the international system as a whole. As with equilibrium itself, the

balance of power also implies a phenomenon that is not static, but rather is constantly being

adjusted by the relative changing fortunes of nations so that new equilibriums are always in

the process of being created, or old states restored. Moreover like the notion of power,

beyond this basic intuitive understanding there exists a trackless swamp of alternative

interpretations of balance of power definitions. Many differ with one another with respect


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not only to how power is distributed, but how it is exercised as well. Fortunately, the seminal

work by Zinnias, An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories, cuts through the

historical maze of contending and conflicting ideas by distilling the essence of many balances

of power definitions. s he notes, the balance of power involves a particular distributi on of

power among the states of that system such that no single state or no existing alliance has an

overwhelming or preponderant amount of power, and that is how the term shall be

defined in this brief essay.

In the twentieth century balance of power theorists have been closely identified with the so-

called school of realism, or `Realpolitik of international relations. For the most part,

contemporary realist theory developed in response to the idealism, or ùtopianism embodied

in the Treaty of Versailles and the attempts by the leading world powers to create a lasting

peace in Europe following the end of World War I. During its formative period ùtopian or

normative theories of international relations became widespread and generally condemned

the behaviour of nation-states that allegedly was based on the calculus of power politics and

the pursuit of national interests. Instead ìdealists urged states to act in accordance with the

high moral principles established by international law and incorporated in the charter of the

League of Nations. According to the premises of utopian theory, which are inscribed in

eighteenth century Enlightenment thought, man is fundamentally good or, in the least,

capable of improvement through education and changes in his environment. At the

international level it was postulated that political behaviour could be altered so that nations

would subordinate the pursuit of power and national aggrandizement for the broader purposes

of collective peace and security. However, members of the realist school challenged the

corpus of these ideas, arguing instead that, as had Machiavelli in The Prince, that the raw

material of politics is entirely unrelated to morality or ethics. Rather they contended that it is

for rational reasons that states seek to increase their national wealth, military strength, andeven cultural influence at the expense of other states. Therefore, as had been the case

throughout human history, conflicts leading to war would continue to be inevitable, since

`human nature is essentially constant and unchanging. After World War II and the

development of thermonuclear weapons, the realist school adopted the concept of deterrence

which implied that war between the two great power blocs was not necessarily a certainty,

but would be determined by structural factors within the international states system. In

either case, or for that matter in any model of this system constructed by the adherent of

realism, it is assumed that international politics is played out in accordance with the theory it


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is a zero-sum game, so that any gain in net power by state A represents a loss for state B, or

any number of other states.

Against this background this paper shall seek to compare and contrast two balances of power

theorists, one representing the classical, and the other the modern era of political thought.

Although Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Hans J. Morgenthau are separated by nearly two

centuries, and although each subscribed to very different views on the nature of man, both

can be classified as realists in the sense that the term is used above. Moreover, both hold that

the balance of power concept was not only central to an understanding the conduct of

international relations, but ultimately to the preservation of the international states system.

However, it shall also be noted that each drew different conclusions regarding its contribution

to international peace and security.


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WHAT IS BALANCE OF POWER

A balance of power is a state of stability between competing forces. In international relations,

it refers to equilibrium among countries or alliances to prevent any one entity from becoming

too strong and, thus, gaining the ability to enforce its will upon the rest. This is a common

aspect ofpolitical realism, where self-preservation is a primary guiding principle. It often

leads to nations forging alliances with others due to expediency rather than shared ideologies.

During the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact frequently operated with a balance of

power in mind, fearful that "unbalancing" actions would trigger greater conflicts or even

nuclear war.

The balance of power is one of the most influential ideas in the theory and practice of

international relations and it plays a central role in both scholarly debates about international

politics and policy debates about the current dominance of the United States at the start of the

twenty-first century. Although it is often treated as a universal concept, theorizing about the

balance of power is almost entirely based on the experience of modern European history. The

theory has never been systemically and comprehensively examined in pre-modern or non-

European contexts.

The balance of power was defined by the nineteenth century radical, Richard Cobden, as a

figment of the imagination. His even more radical colleague, John Bright, denounced it as a

foul idol, the worship of which had loaded the nation with debt and with taxes. But the

dominant figure in mid-nineteenth century diplomacy, Lord Palmerton, derided both men for

their ignorance, and called it a doctrine founded on the nature of man. He explained that it

was in the interest of the community of nations that no nation should acquire such

preponderance as to endanger the security of the rest. The task of preventing any power

acquiring preponderance was one which weighed heavily on almost every British foreign

secretary during the period 1914 to 1939. Some would go even farther, and argue with the

Edwardian diplomat, Eyre Crowe, that concern for the balance of power has been the

predominant theme in British diplomacy since the time of Elizabeth I. The concept itself

certainly goes back that far, although it is debatable whether the same is true of Britains

concern for it.

Historians have generally dated the concept back to the wars between the Italian city states ofthe fifteenth century, tracing its first use to Guicciardinis 1561 History of Italy; but being


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founded on human nature, it is not implausible to see the Greek alliance against ancient

Troy as its earliest manifestation. The long period of Franco-Spanish rivalry from the

sixteenth to the eighteenth century encouraged the development of the idea of a self-righting

balance of power, as power ebbed and flowed first one way and then the other. But the

concept of the balance of power as part of the immutable law of nature received a jolt in the

Age of Enlightenment. If the scientific revolution questioned the whole notion of a static and

stable nature, then the late eighteenth century partition of Poland by Russia, Austria and

Prussia, questioned the whole notion of the balance as a stabilising force. If the three

Northern Courts could destroy Poland in the name of the balance of power, then the old

idea that the interests of individual states and of the states system as a whole were always

reconcilable, was plainly wrong. Napoleons decade of conquest at the start of the nineteenth

century confirmed this view, as he came close to making Continental Europe a French

colonial empire.

The European balance of power after Napoleon

The statesmen who defeated Napoleon knew that in order to really win the war against him

they needed to create and maintain a balance of power. This was done at the Congress of

Vienna in 1814-15. The Austrian Chancellor, Prince Metternich, and the British Foreign

Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, tried to create a balance of power which would both confine

France, and prevent Tsar Alexander I of Russia from exercising too much influence in the

affairs of Europe. Because they were self-consciously creating a balance of power rather than

punishing France, the settlement made at Vienna endured for longer than anyone could have

supposed. France was surrounded with buffer States, but otherwise treated leniently. Article

VI of the 1815 Treaty of Paris provided for periodic meetings of the Great Powers to discuss

problems of mutual interest, and at the first of these, in 1818, it was decided to readmit

France into the Concert of Europe. Despite differences of interpretation between Britain and

the Northern Courts, the balance of power was adjusted with some success without war until

1854. Even the Crimean War was, as we have seen, justified by Palmerton in the name of the

balance of power. Russia, it was felt, had become too strong and needed to be put under some

restraint. One of the central problems of nineteenth century history was trying to reconcile the

management of the balance of power with the demands from Italy and Germany for national

self-development. Napoleon III thought he could square the circle by championing Italian and


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German nationalism and, at the same time, channelling it into Europe shaped according to

French interests; this proved to be an illusion.

It was in the name of the balance of power that, faced with a rising Germany, Britain settled

her old imperial rivalries with France and Russia in the early twentieth century; it was in the

same cause that she went to war with Germany in 1914, despite the fact she had no treaty

commitment which bound her to this act. As Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, told the

Commons on 3 August 1914, a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of

any Power, necessitated a declaration of war.

It proved much more difficult than in 1815 to recreate a balance of power. It was a sign of the

triumph of nineteenth century liberalism (and American influence), that an attempt was madeto create an alternative to power politics in the form of the League of Nations. But the League

lacked the ability to enforce its will, and its enemies did not. Hitlers attempt to dominate the

Continent after 1939 demonstrated that any balance of power in Europe needed American

aid; Stalins attempt to dominate it after 1945 showed that a global balance of terror had

replaced the complicated diplomacy of the old regime in Europe.

The balance of power was primarily a product of the European ancient regime and was a

motivating force in nineteenth century diplomacy. During the Cold War era the concept was

adapted to symbolise the standoff between NATO and the forces of the Warsaw pact. With

the collapse of the bipolar world system in 1989, following the demise of the old USSR, the

balance of power, as a concept, has fallen on hard times although it might be as well to

rememberPalmerstonesobservation that it is human nature.


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CAUSES OF BALANCE OF POWER

The theory of the balance of power-where the distribution of power is equally shared amongst

the appropriate entities-is a concept crucial to the study of International Relations and of war.

When studied in relation to the nineteenth century, we can see that the concept is a major part

of both contemporary and modern literature, thinking and politics. When analysed in relation

to this era-a time where no general or systemic1 war occurred- the theory has been taken to

act as a cause of war, a condition of peace and an amalgamation of both. Arguably the final

conclusions are subjective, but there are several factors to be examined to gain a proper

overview of the theorys application to this time.

If we study it in relation to it being a cause of war, there are substantial areas where there is

evidence to suggest that this is a viable argument. The first of these is the so-called security

dilemma-a concept generally integrated within the balance of power. We can see that this

era was characterised by the view that since all states may at any time use force, all states

must be prepared to do so2. This climate of fear that was created manifested itself in arms

races, formation of alliances and in many cases open conflict. This was made possible by the

nature of the anarchic system of European international politics. This system, ever since the

Westphalia eradication of the Papacy and Holy Roman Empire as the leaders of European

policy was characterised by the lack of higher authority than the nation-state, meaning that

each entity was sovereign. The inference from this is well noted by analysts, and it is

therefore logical to suggest that in anarchy, security is the highest end 3. The lack of overall

authority meant that a self-help system of alliance and military force dominated the region

and the idea that war was a corollary of the balance of power4 with the consequence that it

was frequently turned to as a solution of a threat to the equilibrium of the international

system, which in turn substantiates the idea that balance of power theory acted as a cause of

war in the nineteenth century.

This idea is closely linked to the next area of argument. Since it is true that powermatters

in a relative5, it encouraged statesmen to do as much as possible to solidify and strengthen

their own position. Consequently the use of alliances and coalitions was a fundamental

1p158, Schroeder, Paul, International Politics: Peace and War 1815-1914, in Blanning, T.,The Nineteenth Century: Europe

2P102, Waltz, Kenneth N. Chapter Six: Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power from Theoryof International Politics (1979)

3p126, Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979)

4 P88, Voss Gallic, Edward, Europes Classical Balance of Power(1955)

5P 68 Sobek, David, Chapter 3 Balance ofPower, inCauses of War(2009)


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strategy of the age. States would form alliances for immediate purposes and then switch

them when a better opportunity presented itself. Whilst this was perhaps not as fluid as the

preceding century, it was still a factor-for example Britain and Russia fought as allies against

France up to 1815, whilst forty years later (1854-56) Britain and France were now allies

fighting Russia. Whilst it was argued that this system encouraged peace, the obligations of

alliances resulted in war in areas outside purely national interests, a good example of which

would be the massive French contribution to Sardinia-Piedmonts cause in the 1859 war on

Austria. Therefore this adds to the idea that the concept of the balance of power acted as a

cause of war in nineteenth century Europe, as this quest for geopolitical

counterpoise6 therefore made war more frequent rather than less, as states had more areas

where conflict could-and did-arise.

Two fairly minor issues-tied in with the preceding arguments- also have an impact.

Imperialism, a dominant force in this era, had a considerable impact upon the balance of

power in Europe, despite most of the activity taking place outside the continent. Imperialism

arguably made the system unworkable and a general war more likely7, since the pursuit for

Empire by the European powers expanded the potential for competition from a regional to a

global level. The other factor that should be mentioned is the fragility of the balance.

Centred mainly on the unification of Germany, which created structural factors that made it

difficult to maintain the status quo8, the system was ultimately shown to be only as strong as

its participants who, in practice, failed to maintain the balance at the end on the century.

Whilst this is arguably the failure of the international equilibrium rather than the system

itself, it nevertheless acts as support (along with the imperialism factor) for the argument that

the concept of balance caused war.

Conversely however the balance of power can legitimately be considered to be a condition

for and component of peace. The first area of this argument centres on the clear leniency

shown to defeated powers at the conference table throughout the century. For example, at the

Congress of Vienna in 1815 France, despite putting Europe through almost two decades of

unprecedented bloodshed, was allowed to return to its pre-war borders, and subsequently

returned to Great Power status in the following decades. This was mainly due to the belief

that the balance of power theory had to be used for managing and restraining both opponents

6P72, Sebeka, David(2009)

7P188, Schroeder, Paul, (2000)

8P118 Little, Richard The Balance of Power in International Relations (2007)


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and allies9. In other words, no single state wished any other-even an ally-to gain an

opportunity to enhance its influence in a power vacuum that the defeat of a Great Power

(such as Napoleonic France) was bound to create. After the 1815 settlement the Great Powers

in the so-called Concert of Europe actively attempted, through Congresses and general

diplomacy to preserve the balance of power that was defined by the territorial settlement (of

1815)10. It should also be noted that this was regularly successful, as a study of the events of

1839-40 show where France, offended at its lack of inclusion in a four-Power intervention in

the failing Ottoman Sultans regime, took part in several actions that hinted that it was

preparing for war, but when the four power concert held fast, France backed down11.

Therefore we can see that the balance of power can be legitimately seen to be a condition of

peace in this area, as European desire to ensure the balance in the wake of conflict meant an

informal collective security system was established after major wars (with varying degrees of

success).

A further area of argument partially connected to the above section is that the system was

purported to generate stability12. There is a legitimate argument this is not the case-i.e that

the constant pursuit of balance resulted in the security dilemma discussed above. However,

there is evidence to suggest that this, at least in some cases, was true. Events such as the

suppression of French aggression in 1839-40 (discussed above) as well as European

interventions in the Ottoman Empire (despite a general opposition to its existence) support

this view. We can see that states were prepared to let small slights and long standing national

rivalries-that may have in preceding eras led to war-rest for the sake of wider strategic

stability. A good example of this would be Prussian Chancellor Bismarcks calculated mercy

towards the Austrians following their crushing defeat at Sadowa that was motivated not by

compassion but by a fear that the destruction of Austria would remove a useful political

entity that was holding down his south-eastern flank. This stance characterised by

Bismarcks concept ofrealpolitik(making decisions based on the practical reality rather than

ingrained preferences) has been described by some as a logicalresponse of European

statesmen to the problem of running a state system13. It is legitimate to say that it did in

many ways secure European peace much more frequently then had previously been possible.

9P159 Schroeder, Paul (2000)

10P114 Little, Richard (2007)


12

P72 Sebeka, David (2009)

13P299 Voss Gallic, Edward (1955)


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The system was fragile and certainly not fool-proof-as events such as the Crimean War show-

but the pursuit of stability through diplomacy14 was nevertheless an integral factor of

European statesmanship, and therefore cannot be ignored when studying the impact of the

balance of power as a condition of peace, as acknowledgement of the issues of stability often

tempered hot-headed desires for war.

There is a final area, touched on above, that cannot truly be ascribed to either side, but should

nevertheless be examined when studying the impact of the balance of power in the nineteenth

century. This is the point that it was not always a decisive factor in European international

relations of the era-there was no balance of power rule that meant that states always acted in

a certain way when responding to certain triggers. If we study a single incident-the

unification of Germany in the early 1870s-we can add credence to this point. On this

occasion, Prussia, which had steadily been substantially growing in power for the last decade,

and had been a main protagonist in two European wars during this time (which is especially

damning considering the infrequency of war in the nineteenth century, as was noted in the

introduction) was allowed to attack and defeat France and use the political impetus to unite

the remaining southern states and create Imperial Germany. This event, which over night

made Germany the strongest power in Europe; thereby creating an intractable problem to the

European balance15 went unopposed by the other Great Powers. There was no international

condemnation or intervention as one may expect from states who had in 1815 agreed to

enforce the boundaries of nations collectively, mainly due to other factors (far too detailed to

go into here) which were influencing European politics at the time. Whilst only a single case,

it does serve to enforce the point being made, and although it may seem unnecessary to make

what could be seen by many to be a fairly obvious point-that the balance of power did not

always dictate matters- it must nevertheless be acknowledged if we are to consider the impact

of the balance of power on nineteenth century European war and peace effectively.

In conclusion, the balance of power played a crucial role in nineteenth century politics, as the

considerations of the theory impacted upon a wide range of policies, is they bellicose,

pacifistic or even indirect-such as the economic and technological advancement of the

nation. Subsequently the concept played a central part in the political thinking of the age as

well as the historical analysis of today. In relation to the question, we can see that

considerations of the balance of power impacted upon decisions to respond militarily-such as

the British involvement in the Crimea in 1856-as well as forming an integral part of the aims

14Wolfforth, Little & Kingman 2007, pp. 155185

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balance_of_power_(international_relations)#CITEREFWohlforthLittleKaugman2007http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balance_of_power_(international_relations)#CITEREFWohlforthLittleKaugman2007http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balance_of_power_(international_relations)#CITEREFWohlforthLittleKaugman2007http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balance_of_power_(international_relations)#CITEREFWohlforthLittleKaugman2007


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of Great Powers at the peace table-such as at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the ensuing

Concert of Europe. Therefore, it is to a large extent agreed that the balance of power was

both a cause of war as well as a condition of peace in the Nineteenth Century as it is difficult-

if not impossible-to attribute the theory wholly to either factor-which were in many ways

inseparable when applied to specific cases.


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EFFECTS OF BALANCE Of power

Assumptions behind the Balance Of Power:

In balance of power Power equilibrium is a rule and disequilibrium of power is an

exception.

Balance of power is realised by the active intervention of states, but not by God.

A balance of power policy to be effective must be changing and dynamic.

The balance of power is a game of great powers. Small powers are only spectators.

The balance of power policy assumes that the relative power positions of the various

states can be measured.

In balance of power system, the balancer holds the position ofsplendid solution.

Methods of maintaining the Balance Of Power

Alliances and Counter Alliances are necessary for operating balance of power.

Armament and disarmament can restore balance of power.

Acquision of territory is necessary for balance of power.

Compensation and partition are powerful means of maintaining balance of

power.

Creation of buffer states between the powerful states fortifies the balance of

power.

Intervention for the installation of friendly governments in the recognition of

states.


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Balance of Power Deficit, Inability for Collective

Security

Balance of power is a realist view that currently maintains international order. Balance of

power is becoming questionable because of the advancements in weaponry and the growing

presence of nuclear warheads. Realists and neorealist believe that collective security will not

work as a foreign policy because there are too many factors that must be in order for it to be

successful. In the past, collective security has failed in the League of Nations and the United

Nations. The League of Nations gave veto power to all countries while the United Nations

gives veto power to only five powerful countries; Russia, the United States, the United

Kingdom, France, and China. This causes a problem because if any state has the power to

prevent a decision then it is a weaker collective security.Current international politics run on a balance of power approach. Many liberals believe that

eventually the United Nations will use collective security as a means for controlling states.

Collective security would only be successful if all the major powerful countries are involved.

Also, no country can have veto power because it will weaken the goal of collective security.

The countries involved will make any necessary sanctions, but if these sanctions hurt their

economies collective security will fail as it has in the past.

The collective security approach was first introduced for the League of Nations but had

originally been planned as a force to achieve peace with aggressors. The original goal was

changed before it was presented, to create perpetual peace between countries without the use

of force. When it was introduced, collective security was largely backed by the United States

and Great Britain. However, revolution was the main rule in the world and without firm

boundaries, collective security was not the right international policy. Collective security

could not unite its members and they would not do so themselves. The major states involved

were not willing to bind themselves and commit to the plan of collective security and peace

without force. This is the biggest reason why collective security cannot work and will not

work.

The world's most powerful and dominant countries are characterized by their economies and

militaries. Collective security can make a country seem less threatening. Unless all major

states agree to abide by the rules of collective security then not one will truly bind itself to its

goal. For collective security to work it must provide certainty for the major states. All change

would have to be by peaceful means. However with the advancement of nuclear weaponry


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and biological weapons, society is very far from achieving collective security as an

international policy.

In contrast to collective security, balance of power can be successful even with biological and

nuclear weaponry. Balance of power and its acceptance of war create a much greater problem

due to the weapon advancements of the 21st century. However, balance of power has recently

been in question. In international relations, states have two options they can perform with the

balance of power policy. The first is that a weaker state can join a stronger rival state, making

the more powerful state that they have joined with stronger. This is also called

bandwagoning. The second more common method, balancing, is when a stronger state joins a

weaker state to prevent or slow an opposing aggressor. An example of this would be the

United States and their position of siding with Israel in their war against the Palestinians.

Balance of power has been a main international policy for many decades. Hans Morgenthau

says, "a foreign policy based on the balance of power is one among several possible foreign

policies and that only stupid and evil men will choose the former and reject the latter".

Morgenthau believes that countries that oppose one another must not strive to find a balance

but attempt to be the superior and thus create equality, balance of power. Nuclear war is very

feasible and with its high possibility, balance of power can become less appropriate. One

guideline of balance of power is that states must stop fighting if it will eliminate an essential

state. This rule or regulation should and would make nuclear weapons work with balance of

power. All the weapon advancements in history have not yet caused balance of power to fail.

Chemical and biological weapons have been in existent for decades. During this time,

collective security has failed and balance of power has prevailed. Balance of power still holds

as the best policy for international order. Balance of power could fail if a major state

disagrees upon the importance of the preservation of state independence. If this would occur,

it would cause large-scale wars that would be far from controllable by the major states

because of weapons advancements.

I believe states should use balance of power because a country should have the ability to look

out for them foremost rather than getting permission from the United Nations. Collective

security would force countries to get international approval from the various powerful

countries in order to wage war and it would only be allowed in order to repel other

aggression. Since collective security is a liberal vision, the liberals believe in a different

method of international order in comparison to a realist view. Constant peace is very difficult


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to imagine in the current state of the world, but this is what collective security asks of all the

states involved.

Balance of power has been in effect since the 16 th century but the actual goal of the policy

has since disappeared. The United States have become dominant along with a few other states

and they have not formed coalitions to counterbalance. Many liberals believe

thatglobalizationhas caused balance of power to become inapplicable and they believe

collective security would be a better choice for international policy. However, collective

security is very uncertain because if states choose not to believe it will not work, and these

chances are very high.

Balance of power is not evident within the greatest of powers, United States, China, and

Russia. If Russia and China were to create a coalition against the United States to create a

balance of power it would disrupt their economic situations and only hurt themselves.

Collective security will falter with the lack of agreement from major states, but balance of

power is struggling for the same reason. Countries seek to expand their own power rather

than create equality. With the current state of the world economy, and the current military

actions, a foreign policy based on balance of power is what the world must strive for because

collective security is currently not an option. Until nuclear sanctions are set and most

importantly met by states, and states fully comply and agree to collective security; collective

security will not be able to control international order.

Balance of power has been in place since the 16th century when Henry VIII tried to create

equality between France, Spain, and England. Balance of power has kept international order

since then as the main foreign policy. Collective security, the weaker policy that liberals wish

was in place, has tried to become the international policy for states but has failed. With

weapon advancements: nuclear, biological, and chemical, balance of power has become

difficult to achieve. Great powers such as the United States have grown while other countries

have not created coalitions to balance. Realists believe that collective security cannot work

and the only policy that will work is balance of power. Liberals feel that peace without force

can be successful if the greatest powers in the world agree by all rules and believe in

collective security in its entirety. The decision comes down to the states who have the power

and control, if they choose to believe in the liberal's method collective security can survive in

a violent world, otherwise it will falter like it has in the past League of Nations and United

Nations.
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CONCLUSION

After disappointing itself for decades, India is now on the verge of becoming a great power.

The world started to take notice of India's rise when New Delhi signed a nuclear pact with

President George W. Bush in July 2005, but that breakthrough is only one dimension of the

dramatic transformation of Indian foreign policy that has taken place since the end of the

Cold War. After more than a half century of false starts and unrealized potential, India is now

emerging as the swing state in the global balance of power. In the coming years, it will have

an opportunity to shape outcomes on the most critical issues of the twenty-first century: the

construction of Asian stability, the political modernization of the greater Middle East, and the

management of globalization.

Although India's economic growth has been widely discussed, its new foreign policy has

been less noted. Unlike their U.S. counterparts, Indian leaders do not announce new foreign

policy doctrines. Nonetheless, in recent years, they have worked relentlessly to elevate India's

regional and international standing and to increase its power. New Delhi has made concerted

efforts to reshape its immediate neighbourhood, find a modus Vivendi with China and

Pakistan (its two regional rivals), and reclaim its standing in the "near abroad": parts of

Africa, the Persian Gulf, Central and Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region. At the

same time, it has expanded relations with the existing great powers -- especially the United

States.

India is arriving on the world stage as the first large, economically powerful, culturally

vibrant, multiethnic, multireligious democracy outside of the geographic West. As it rises,

India has the potential to become a leading member of the "political West" and to play a key

role in the great political struggles of the next decades. Whether it will, and how soon,

depends above all on the readiness of the Western powers to engage India on its own terms.

In an attempt to disprove the balance of power theory, some realists have pointed to cases in

international systems other than modern Europe where balancing failed and hegemony arose.

Wolfforth, Little and Kaufman, point to the failure of state like units to balance against to

balance againstRAssyria in the first millennium BCE; the Hellenic successor states of

Alexander the Greatome; and theQin dynastyin medievalChina. They state that systemic

hegemony is likely under two historically common conditions: First when the rising
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hegemony develops the ability to incorporate and effectively administer conquered territories.

And second, when the boundaries of the international system remain stable, and no new

major powers emerge from outside the system. When the leading power can administer

conquests effectively so they add to its power and when the systems borders are rigid, the

probability of hegemony is high.


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Bibliography

Christensen, Thomas J.; Snyder, Jack (1990), "Chain Gangs and Passed

Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity", International

Organization

Howard, Sir Esme (May 1925), "British Policy and the Balance of

Power", The American Political Science Review

Kelley, Charles W.; Wittkopf, Eugene R. (2005), World Politics: Trendsand Transformation (10th ed.), p. 503

Sheehan, Michael (2000), The Balance of Power: History & Theory,

Rutledge, p. 35 Wolfforth, W.C.; Little, R.; Kaufman, S.J.; et al. (2007), "Testing

Balance-Of-Power Theory in World History", European Journal of

International Relations

Sheehan, Michael (2000), The Balance of Power: History & Theory,Rutledge, p. 35

Documents

Pol Sci. Project 2012