1

Strenghtening Cooperation on the Romanian Minority Issue in

Post-Euromaidan Ukraine

Autori: Dragos Dinu, Octavian Milevski

Proiectul Forumul civic Romnia Ucraina a fost finanat prin Programul Asisten oficial pentru Dezvoltare al Romniei i implementat n parteneriat cu UNDP Bratislava. Opiniile exprimate n acest raport nu reprezint poziia oficial a partenerilor acestui proiect.

2

Table of contents

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 3 2. Realities on the ground ................................................................................................... 5

2.1 Romanian and Moldovan? A question of de-archaizing ........................................... 6

2.2 The Language Law in Ukraine and its consequences ................................................ 8

2.3 The policy of acquiring citizenship/Romanian citizenship law ............................... 11 3. Conclusions and recommendations .............................................................................. 15

3

1. Introduction This policy brief is prepared in the framework of the Second edition of the Romanian

Ukrainian civil society Forum. The project is financed by the Romanian Ministry of

Foreign Affairs through the Official Development Assistance, supported by UNDP and

implemented in partnership by Romanian Centre for European Policies (CRPE) and

Institute of World Policy (IWP). The topic of minority rights and associated Ukrainian

policy on minorities generated interesting debates and discussions during the Civic

Forum in Kiev earlier this year. We took note of the different approaches and

perceptions of the Romanian and Ukrainian participants on this matter and decided that

we would prepare a policy brief to provide additional details on the main ideas

expressed during the Forum. This report should be analyzed in a wider perspective, as it

complements the other two policy memos1 prepared in the project.

The bilateral Romanian-Ukrainian agenda has been suffering from a mutual

understanding delay for over twenty years. During the past two decades, the two

neighbouring countries have hardly moved into the direction of each others interests

and towards common foreign policy objectives that could have been formulated for this

region. The issue of minorities remained one of the main stumbling blocks in the way of

a dynamic, mutually rewarding and comprehensive friendly relationship between the

two Central East-European countries.

In Romania, whether we refer to the state officials, the media, or a considerable part of

the intellectual sphere, the minorities issue still raises concerns. However, it should be

noted that this is not necessarily derived from well informed accounts on the ground. At

the same time, in Ukraine, the issue of the Romanian minority is often seen through the

lens of the Russian minority, the largest in the country, which is also an exaggeration

and unnecessary over-politicization of the issue, as the problems of the Ukrainian

1 Change in Kiev The need for a reset for the Romanian Ukrainian relation Experts proposals for a renewed bilateral agenda, Cristian Ghinea, Bianca Toma; A call for the EU Time to Step in - Ukraine expectations from the European Union, Alyona Getmanchuk, Sergiy Solodkyy

4

Romanians are not necessarily identical with those of the Russian minority.

After several attempts to get over this lasting issue during the last two decades, the

countries seem closer to the initial starting point rather than registering substantial

progress in reaching a sustainable solution on the matter. As a consequence, this

creates serious barriers to the normalization and development of bilateral relations. As

CRPE noted in a different report2, it is now time for a reset in the Romanian- Ukrainian

relation. Yet, on the practical and social level, the issue of the Romanian (speaking)

minority pertains more to the capacity to implement the legal norms both internally and

internationally, than to the alleged lack of will to meet each countrys concerns. What is

striking in this respect, is the reality on the ground in Ukraine wherein the minority

language often becomes an issue around election time, when various political actors try

to broker on the language marker for the sake of acquiring more votes, while the

population continues to live in the same multi-linguistic reality for decades without

many (if any) fears of assimilation or cultural extinction.

The events which started in late November 2013, also known as EuroMaidan, have

stirred the hope for a radical reformation of the Ukrainian state, a regeneration of the

normative pillars of the society, and creation of a constructive climate within the

country. One of the mainstays of the positive social climate has been the linguistic policy

in Ukraine, which is one of the most ethnically diverse countries of Europe. According to

the re-adopted 2004 constitution, a modified version of the 1996 constitution, Ukrainian

is the only state language of the country. This is not a problem in itself as long as there

are legal regimes for use of the languages of the minorities on the local level. The recent

attempt (dated 23rd of February) of the Ukrainian Rada to repeal the law that granted

minority languages the statute of official languages in local administration, if the

minority constituted more than 10% of the population, has stirred debates, although it

was immediately vetoed by the interim President of Ukraine, Aleksandr Turcinov. Some

Romanian officials have rushed to issue statements condemning the changes and

2 Ghinea, Toma, op cit

5

summoning Ukrainian authorities to reinstate the linguistic rights of the Romanian

minority, albeit Romania does not grant the same right to Ukrainian minorities living on

its territory, and in fact to any of the ethnic minorities in Romania.

In the meantime, a legislative proposal is being processed in the Romanian Parliament

regarding a simplified procedure for the attainment of Romanian citizenship for

Romanian ethnics abroad. Given that 2014 is an electoral year in Romania, we might

suspect that we are dealing with a politicization of the issue of minorities, once again

with the risk of creating dissensions in the relations with our neighbours. To our

knowledge, there have been no bilateral consultations with any of the neighbouring

countries on this issue, which means that, if adopted, it could constitute a reason for

further tensions between Romania and Ukraine.

As a result of the revolutionary events in Ukraine, a window of opportunity has opened

and Romania has become more and more aware of Ukraines importance and central

role in the region. Romanian authorities seemed to recently better acknowledge the

need for constructive ground to engage a neighbour with which it shares almost 700 km

of EU external border. Now more than ever, there is a need for greater fairness in

bilateral relations and more reasonable requests of both parties and, also, a need for

Romanian and Ukrainian officials to differentiate foreign policy from internal affairs and

domestic politics.

2. Realities on the ground On the whole, the bilateral minority issue can be roughly divided into three main

aspects: first, i) the recognition of the Romanians/Moldovans as one single minority,

without the dissociation between Romanians proper and Moldovans; second, ii) the

legal and practical environment for the use of the Romanian language; and third, iii)

granting of the Romanian citizenship to Romanian ethnics from Ukraine. Whilst in the

first two aspects the pressure stands on Ukrainian authorities, the main driver of the

issue in the third case is the Romanian state, which for certain reasons seems to have

6

overlooked some of the legal underpinnings of the Constitution of Ukraine. Finally, in

spite of the various legal provisions that set the terms for the use of Romanian

language, there is a huge gap in implementation, argued by the Ukrainian authorities as

mainly due to the lack of funding.

2.1 Romanian and Moldovan? A question of de-archaizing

According to the last Ukrainian census (2001) there are 410.000 Romanians/Moldovans

in Ukraine, which constitute 0.8% of the population. Out of the 0.8%, approximately

two-thirds are denominated Moldovans according to the census. In concrete figures,

150.989 are denominated Romanians and 258.619 are denominated Moldovans, a one

to three ratio. The Romanian minority is the third largest in Ukraine, although far

smaller than the Russian minority, which numbers approximately 8.3 million according

to the 2001 census. At the same time, the Ukrainian minority of Romania numbers

approximately 51.000, which makes for 0.3% of the population and ranks as the third

largest minority, although far behind the Hungarian one which numbers approximately

1.4 million. Thus, there are certain quantitative similarities between the Romanian

minority in Ukraine and the Ukrainian minority in Romania, as both constitute less than

1% of each countrys population, as depicted in the figure below.

0

0,2

0,4

0,6

0,8

1

1,2

1,4

0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000

Romanians / Moldovans in UKR

Ukrainians in RO

7

As it is obvious from the layout of the statistical data, in Ukraine there is a division of the

Romanian community into Romanians proper and Moldovans. While there are

situational grounds for naming some of the Romanian speakers Moldovans (indeed, a

part of the Romanians from Ukraine call themselves Moldovans), Ukraine commits itself

to an identity game which complicates the perception of Bucharest toward Kyiv. Either

on the grounds of an incomplete understanding of Romanian realities, or possibly as a

retaliation gesture, Kyiv has not been very responsive to this strongly symbolical aspect,

which bears deep roots into the perception of Romania about itself and its neighbours.

In the perception of Bucharest, this division between Romanians and Moldovans

produces and perpetuates a habitus that objectifies and de-structures the corpus of a

minority which is essentially one and the same. It is basically a dividing trick that serves

for nothing more than producing effects in nationalist circles in Kiev and feeding

stereotypes in Bucharest. At the same time, it fuels the complex of denial which exists

among Romanians vis--vis the Moldovan construct, largely considered an identity

engineering mechanism invented in the Soviet Union with the purpose to deny Romania

any legitimacy on the territory and Romanian speaking population in the Prut-Nistru

area.

Historic evidence suggests that geographically many Moldovans of Ukraine have never

passed through the identity modernization process of the 18-19th centuries. The

modernization of the language into the all-encompassing Romanian was realized initially

through grammar and took place in the newly created state of Romania. Thus, the

standardization of the language was the result of cultural-linguistic modernization of the

new state. Nonetheless, the linguistic standardization was not effected on the Romanian

population which had been incorporated in the Russian Empire. As a result, the real

standardization could take effect only by the end of the 20th century. For lack of this

complex socialization, a significant part of Romanians still call themselves Moldovans,

while for Romania the acceptance of modernization/standardization has the strongest

possible identity effect on the national psyche.

8

Thus, if Kyiv accepts this basic identity concern coming from Bucharest, it might be a

very positive sign and an indication of the capacity to understand why Romania still

cares so much about its minority. This is fundamentally a recognition game that

somehow could be compared to the even more difficult recognition game over who is

the rightful heir of Kyivan Rhus: Ukraine or Russia? However, in response, Bucharest is

obliged to put an end (especially in its official discourse) to any debates on the

possibility of the recreation of historical Great Romania or to any debates on unionism,

which impacts on the territory of Ukraine as well.

At the same time, Romania should ensure that people are free from any pressures in

declaring their ethnicity and should engage in constant dialogue and communication

with the Ukrainian authorities and the Romanian communities in Ukraine. Another

important aspect that was mentioned several times by the experts that CRPE has

consulted is that the Government in Bucharest should make no difference in approach

between those declaring themselves as Romanians and those that declare themselves

Moldovans.

2.2 The Language Law in Ukraine and its consequences The Law On Principles of the State Language Policy of Ukraine3, signed by former

president Yanukovich on August 8th, 2012, has generated one of the harshest security-

related debates on the Ukrainian political scene since its independence. It has been part

and parcel of a much larger debate than usually perceived in Bucharest, which tends to

see the issue as only pertaining to the Romanian minority. In reality, for Kyiv this is a key

security concern, in relations with Russia and the latters instrumentalization of the

Russian speaking population of Ukraine for geo-political manoeuvres.

3 Bulletin of the Verkhovna Rada (BVR), 2013, 23, st.218 - Official publication record

9

Article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine states that:

Clearly, the status of the Russian language is guaranteed in the supreme law of Ukraine

along with the right of other minorities to use their languages. During 2009-2010,

Yanukovich campaign included, among others, a legally redundant promise to offer

Russian language a special status in the administration and education sectors. It was, in

fact, a mechanism to attract the Russian speaking voters and trade on Moscows

rhetoric in defence of compatriots abroad. The law was signed in August 2012. Its

main provisions stipulated that, if the population of a minority exceeds 10% of a region

(Romanian and Moldovan are expressly mentioned), the minority has the right to use

their national languages in local administration, official documents of local

governments, schools and public

inscriptions.

However, at the local level, in the regions

compactly populated by Romanians, the law

has produced few effects. The

implementation of the law has remained

wanting at best for lack of financial

resources and the number of public servants

capable of using Romanian has remained

the same. The true effect of the law was to

further politicize the debate on the language

while deflecting attention from issues of effective governance or be used by politicians,

including politicians representing the Romanian minority, for electoral mobilization. The

law on languages has not changed and had no real impact on the working and

functioning of the Romanian schools or of the Romanian newspapers.

The real problem has been not the use of language in administration, but the gradual

drop in numbers of Romanian schools (from 89 schools in 1991, to 70 at present), which

For the Romanians here, however, this cancellation (of the language law) is not at all scary. For them, nothing changes because none of them had ever seen an official act in Romanian. The number of employees who speak Romanian has not increased, and the lack of law enforcement was always blamed on the lack of money. Reportage by Laureniu Diaconu- Colintineanu for RFI Romania

10

could also have occurred due to objective

reasons the demographic changes, wherein

the number of Romanians has gradually

dropped in the last two decades, which is

consistent with a trend all over Ukraine. On

the other hand, the politics of assimilation or

Ukrainization has never stopped since

independence. This tacit policy of the

Ukrainian state has not been targeted

exclusively on the Romanian minority in the

country, however the replacement of

Romanian schools with Ukrainian ones has

been done through doubtful methods

whereby groups of parents would ask

authorities to replace the schools, invoking

reasons like lack of economic and career perspectives for the children who graduate

from Romanian schools. For truths sake, it must be mentioned that there have been

few protests from the Romanian community.3

As previously stated, at the end of February the Ukrainian Rada adopted a legislative

proposal to repel this law mostly as a measure of precaution against the Russian

minority, the largest in the country. Although the proposal was blocked by a veto of the

interim President, Romanian officials have issued statements to express concerns.

Although based on a misinformation of Romanian authorities, the statements issued, as

well as the media debates within these few days have revealed some interesting

aspects. While the Minister for the Relation with Romanians Abroad was expressing

concerns about the Romanian minority being deprived of the ability to use its native

language in official contexts, representatives of the Romanian community in Ukraine

were stating that, in reality, the Romanian community wasnt de facto enjoying this

right, due to poor implementation of the law and, possibly, to the artificial segregation

"I note with deep concern the decision of the Parliament in Kiev to repeal the law on regional languages. This decision prevents the Romanian minority in Ukraine from using their mother tongue in official settings. This is a flagrant violation of the rights of Romanians in Ukraine as individuals and as a community. A decision like this is not in accordance with European principles to which pro-European forces in Kiev have declared support and is incomprehensible in the context of recent political developments" Declaration by Cristian David, former Minister for the Relation with Romanians Abroad

11

between Romanian and Moldovan - speaking minorities, which affects turnouts in

census and therefore the possibility of the Romanian minority to claim its rights

commensurate with its size.

The short-lived debate thus showed that the Romanian community in Ukraine needs

more direct, financial support and targeted assistance from the Romanian government,

rather than grim political declarations and an extended law on citizenship. CRPE would

recommend a more coherent and strategic approach to support the Romanian

community in Ukraine (e.g., design, consult and implement a Strategy to support the

Romanian minority in Ukraine), and making use of the different policy instruments that

have proved efficient in other cases, such as scholarship programs, granting resources

for teaching Romanian in schools etc.

2.3 The policy of acquiring citizenship/Romanian citizenship law The constitution of Ukraine (Art. 4) stipulates that:

There is unique citizenship in Ukraine. The grounds of acquisition and stopping of

citizenship of Ukraine are determined by law.

According to the Law on Citizenship of Ukraine a number of positions explicitly proclaim

the impossibility to detain double citizenship. The first principle of the law (Art. 2 (1))

resides on the single citizenship while it expressly provides that If a citizen of Ukraine

has acquired the citizenship of (allegiance to) another state, or more than one other

state, such person shall be treated only as a citizen of Ukraine in legal relations with

Ukraine. Article 19 of the same law stipulates that voluntary acquisition of the

citizenship of another state by the citizen of Ukraine shall be treated as grounds for

deprivation of the citizenship of Ukraine.

Romanian policy of granting citizenship to those whose ancestors had once detained it

and were deprived of it without consent has been a reality since at least the 2000s.

12

While the moral grounds can be accepted on a case by case basis, the law does not take

into account the legislation of Ukraine with respect to double citizenship, its interests,

perceptions and historic background. These sensitivities seem not to be openly

discussed between the two countries, giving the impression that Romania is not fully

aware of the situation. The policymakers in Kiev are really concerned with this, mainly in

relation to the Russian community and the ethnic Russians that hold Russian citizenship,

and are thus treating Romania in the same manner.

As argued in a CRPE policy memo4 analyzing the Romanian policy of regranting

Romanian citizenship, the procedure is not arbitrary, nor very simple. It is organized on

a case-by-case analysis, documents are to be provided and assessed to prove that the

respective person had Romanian citizenship before or that his/ her ancestors have hold

it etc. This policy is not based on ethnicity, but on previous detaining of Romanian

citizenship. Romania should explain these arguments very well to the Ukrainian

partners. At the same time, the issue of double citizenship and the way it is treated

under the Ukrainian legislation should be made clear to the potential Romanian ethnics

that might be interested in regaining the citizenship.

Another important aspect deals with the issue of the number of citizenships that

Romania has re-granted for those living in Ukraine Romanian Government should

make public for the Ukrainian authorities the real number of citizenships. It would

become obvious for everybody that this is not a problem of a relevant magnitude and

should not trigger any real concern from the Ukrainian government (it is expected that

the number is an insignificant fraction from what happened with the Russian

citizenships).

4 Politica romneasca de redobndire a ceteniei n comparaie cu alte state din UE (The policy for regaining Romanian citizenship. A comparison with other EU Member States), CRPE Policy Memo 22, June 2011

13

However, the latest developments in both countries have the potential to increase the

tensions on the bilateral relation on this matter. In Ukraine, a draft proposal, no. 4116,5

was submitted for discussion in the Rada on February 7, 2014 with the intention to

amend the Penal Code and criminalize the detaining of double citizenship. The proposed

penalty for this is 3 to 10 years imprisonment.

In Romania, a legislative proposal to amend and supplement Article 11 of Law no. 21 of

1 March 1991 on Romanian citizenship6 initiated at the end of 2013 and currently under

debate in the Parliament, intends to further ease the attainment of Romanian

citizenship for Romanian ethnic minorities in other countries, based not on the principle

of historical retribution (as was the case until now), but on ethnicity.

The proposed new provision states that Romanian ethnics that belong to minority

groups like linguistic minorities or ethnic groups existing in other states, regardless of

the ethnonym used, who speak Romanian, may be granted Romanian citizenship upon

request, with the possibility of keeping foreign citizenship and establishing their

residence in the country or keeping it abroad, provided that the conditions laid down

in art. Article 8. (1).b), c) and e) ' are met.

This change is meant to ensure that Romanians in Serbia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Macedonia,

Albania, Greece, and people living in more remote areas, such as Transnistria, are able

to obtain Romanian citizenship upon request through a simplified procedure. It is worth

mentioning that the consultation process has started, however, it is obvious now that

not all the stakeholders have been involved and not all possible impacts were taken into

account.

5 Initiatied by Batkivscina political party and registered under 6 The initiative is undertaken by all parties in the Romanian Parliament, being based on art. 7 of the Romanian Constitution, article governing the legal status of Romanians abroad, according to which 'the state supports the strengthening of links with Romanians

living abroad and shall act to preserve, develop and express their ethnic, cultural,

linguistic and religious identity, while respecting the law of the State that they are

citizens of'

14

CRPE strongly advocates for the preservation of the current principle of historical

retribution and re-granting of the Romanian citizenship. We should improve the current

procedure, make it faster, less bureaucratic and cumbersome when possible, but

preserving the principle behind it Romania does not grant citizenship based on

ethnicity, but on the grounds of historical retribution.

Other practices on citizenship in Ukraine - The Polish experience

Just like in the case of Romania and Ukraine, the Polish experience also takes root in the

WWII events and its aftermath. In 1951, Poland revoked citizenship to all the Poles

which resided east of the Curzon Line as a result of Soviet annexation. Thus, the Poles

east of the Line were naturalized as Soviet citizens and upon the disintegration of USSR

became citizens of Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Russia. All in all, an

approximate number of 1 million Poles were left without their natural right to be part of

the Polish political nation at the beginning of the 1990s. One more category of deprived

former Polish citizens has been at stake - the Jews from Poland, who in 1968 were

purged from Poland and revoked the citizenship. The Polish minority of Ukraine

currently numbers 144,130 and constitutes 0.3% of the entire population.

The Polish Charter (Karta Polaka) was established in December 2007 in order to settle a

series of political, judicial and symbolic issues to people of Polish descent who do not

detain Polish citizenship. It grants a number of rights specific of Poles with Polish

citizenship, but it imposes specific limits.

15

3. Conclusions and recommendations In an interview of the Ukrainian ambassador to Romania, Teofil Bauer, the minority

issue has been quoted as one of the main three problems in the bilateral relations, the

other two being the Krivoy Rog Plant historic debts and the Bystroe canal. While these

problems are surely real, the problem of minorities has been inflated either for the sake

of internal consumption in the public sphere, or because there has been a lack of frank

dialogue and inclination to compromise.

Romanian officials should draw a clear line between internal affairs and foreign policy

and, in fact, should take the needs of the Romanian minority in Ukraine into account

and push for their fulfilment: schools where they can learn in their native tongue, a

University where they can be taught in Romanian; the recognition of diplomas obtained

by Ukrainian citizens in Romania; a branch of the Romanian Cultural Institute in Ukraine;

more possibilities for the Romanian minority to travel to Romania (as it can travel to

Moldova, without visas).

As argued extensively throughout the paper, several core issues need to be addressed

by the two countries, in a stepwise approach, in order to strengthen the cooperation on

the minorities issue:

First of all, the Romanian government should avoid applying double standards for their

treatment of citizens that declare themselves part of the Romanian ethnic minority and

those who declare Moldovan ethnicity. A commitment from the Ukrainian authorities to

enhance dialogue with the communities and ensure that there is no pressure being

manifested against declaring their ethnicity would clearly signal the acceptance of the

legitimate identity concern expressed by Romania. However, Bucharest should

consistently avoid any debate, particularly in the official discourse, regarding the

boundaries of historical Great Romania, since any reference to the re-integration of the

territories that shared Romanian language and culture can be perceived as impacting to

the territory of Ukraine as well.

16

The second core issue regards the law on State Language Policy of Ukraine and

instruments for supporting the Romanian minority in Ukraine. Our recommendation is

stressing out the need of focusing on direct, financial support and targeted assistance

from the Romanian government, rather than giving grim political statements or

changing the citizenship law. More specifically, a constructive approach would entail

designing a more coherent strategy for supporting the Romanian minority, based on

consultation and social dialogue, coupled with making use of the targeted policy

instruments that have proved efficient, for instance scholarship programs and granting

resources for teaching Romanian in schools.

Finally, the procedure for re-granting of the Romanian citizenship should be simplified

by removing the cumbersome bureaucratic barriers. Importantly, the underlying

principle of historical retribution ought to be preserved, Romania does not offer

citizenship based on ethnicity, but on historical retribution. However, there is

substantial need for improvement in case of improving the communication with both

Ukrainian authorities, and the Romanian communities in Ukraine.

Romanian Center for European Policies 2014

Str. Stirbei Voda nr. 29

Et. 2, Bucuresti 1

office@crpe.ro

www.crpe.ro

Tel. +4 0371.083.577

Fax. +4 0372.875.089