Assess the policy impact of the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010. To what extent did it reduce the choices Britain had when it came to involvement regarding its strategic interests between 2010 and 2015?

Submit by: 24th February 2016

When the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) was published in 2010, it

was subject to broad criticisms. The overall objective of this case study is to assess

the policy impact that the 2010 SDSR had upon the strategic interests of the UK during

the period 2010 to 2015. The SDSR came with the then Defence Secretary, Liam Fox,

setting out his vision for the way in which the review “will make a clean break from the

military and political mindset of Cold War politic” (Fox. 2010), instead focusing upon

the main objective of the Government laid out in the National Security Strategy; “a

secure and resilient UK” (Parliament. House of Commons, 2010). The SDSR had

broad implications for the military in the United Kingdom, and therefore it can be

argued it lead to reductions in options available to the coalition government when

strategic interests were at stake. This essay will therefore evaluate the policy impact,

utilizing much of the work of Weiss (1979), Dunn (1981) and Knoepfel, Larrue, Varone

and Hill (2007), before developing the case study at hand and evaluating whether the

argument regarding the weakening of the options provided by the military has a firm

grounding.

What is policy impact?

Whilst the intended effects of a policy can vary hugely depending upon the situation

in which a policy is applied, it is widely understood that policies are implemented in

order to avoid either a negative consequence or to seek some positive benefit. With

this in mind, the effects of a policy can be split into two key areas: the intended

consequences and the unintended, with an important distinction being necessary

between the outputs of a policy and the outcomes of a policy (Knoepfel et al. 2007).

Dunn defines policy impacts as “changes in behaviour or attitudes that result from

policy outputs” (1981. p.280) and within this case study, the definition will be adopted

that policy impacts are an observed change in the public policy process which can

lead to the restarting of the policy-making process (Knill and Tosun, 2012.). This is

often as a result of a wide variety of reasons, with reasons ranging from those

suggested by Lindblom, namely cost and the fallible nature of analysis (1968), through

to the sheer amount of data available and the politicized nature of the process

(Parsons, 1995a; Hill, 1997).

The impact a policy has upon its desired sector can be observed and measured at

many levels throughout the subsequent policy creation processes, with the ultimate

goal often cited as an improvement in quality and efficiency through better

management of available resources (Common, 1995; Dunn, 1981.). With this case

study evaluating the impact which the SDSR has had, the empirical foundation (Hill,

1997) of the policy will allow the development of a natural feedback cycle, something

often desired. This cycle can be seen in governmental analysis of the SDSR 2010,

with the natural feedback utilized in the creation of its successor, the 2015 SDSR. By

drawing an assessment based upon the developments seen between the two reports,

along with various data sources made available by the government and Ministry of

Defence (MOD), conclusions can be drawn as to the extent to which the initial SDSR

may have lead to constraints upon the government and its actions in regards to the

strategic interests it held.

Although such analysis in regards to policy impact using the afore mentioned methods

may provide a certain degree of insight in regards to this specific case study, it is

important to acknowledge that, in alternate cases, there are potential barriers to

evaluation. These barriers are often not deliberate, instead being created by the very

reasons the analysis is occurring (Lindbolm, 1968; Parsons, 1995a; Hill, 1997). In turn

this develops into a focus which becomes too specific, highlighting issues due to

prejudices, rather than an analysis upon the amalgamated outputs and outcomes

which would be far more beneficial when viewing the impact that the policy has had

upon its intended beneficiaries, in this case society as a whole (Knoepfel et al. 2007).

In order to avoid partisan analysis, this evaluation will use raw data alongside

academic analysis to develop a cost-utility analysis (CUA) as laid out by Knoepfel et

al. (2007. pp.233-34).

The adoption of this form of analysis adds breadth to the analysis provided through

the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA), allowing the impact the 2010 SDSR has had

upon the armed forces to be highlighted effectively. The use of an economic method

of evaluation allows a direct comparison to be drawn between the costs of a policy

and the resulting consequences, and the CUA model allows the wider consequences,

or ripple effects, to be evaluated also. Key indicators can be highlighted, in this case

the strategic interests of the UK government, and the extent to which such indicators

are affected are evaluated and this ultimately becomes the extent to which the policy

has had an impact, and indeed what consequences can be attributed to the policy

(CDC, 2012; Knoepfel et al. 2007).

The SDSR 2010: What is it and why was it needed?

Within both the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties 2010 election manifestoes,

the 12-year hiatus between clear review of defence was seen as not only

unacceptable, but something of national importance to correct (2010; 2010). After the

formation of a coalition government, the key points were drawn together, forming the

basis for the National Security Strategy (NSS). This set out the aims of what the

‘Future Force 2020’ (Parliament, House of Commons. 2010) should be able to achieve

with the resources available. In the aftermath of the crippling financial crisis, much of

the debate surrounding the review focused upon the financial implications of such

commitments, citing that the UK could no longer afford to pursue everything it had

previously. This was proposed by some ministers as a direct consequence of the

period of time which had been allowed to pass since the Strategic Defence

Review(SDR) in 1998 (Fox, 2010), seen as the reasoning behind why the military had

become “over committed, under funded [and] under equipped” (House of Commons

Library. 2010. p.4).

Figure 1 highlights the steadily increasing and unmaintainable level of defence

spending during this 12-year hiatus, something which the SDSR aimed to address as

it was seen as “essential to prioritize what it [the military] does, where, when and with

whom” (House of Commons Library, 2010. p.30), whilst doing so in an affordable

manner. Both the NSS and the SDSR acknowledged the challenges faced by the

coalition, highlighting not only that operations in Afghanistan remain the priority until

2015 (ibid.) but that the balance between competing demands in an ever changing

strategic environment was in itself a cause for concern. The unfortunate financial strain

this placed upon the armed forces, impacting not only its size, but also its organisation,

structure and supporting logistics, bought this challenging situation to the fore of

governmental decision making, making the 2010 SDSR what is seen as sustainable,

realistic and still effective.

Outlining the strategic interests of the British government in 2010

Contained within the the NSS are the strategic concerns which the coalition

government sought to remain influential over, split into three spheres; totalling 15

individual concerns (HM Government, 2010). Although each concern requires

individual analysis to assess the impact the SDSR had upon it, it is these three spheres

which this case study will draw its evidence for the chosen method of CUA, creating

an overall assessment in line with the model described by Knoepfel et al. (2007). This

case study sees these three spheres as revolving around the tier system, as shown in

25.9 25.5 26.328.5 28.9

30.2 29.5 30.1 29.9 30.933.3 33.7

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1998/9

1999/0

2000/1

2001/2

2002/3

2003/4

2004/5

2005/6

2006/7

2007/8

2008/9

2009/10

£ (B

illion

)

FinancialYear

Figure1:BritishMilitarySpendingbetween1998and2010atcurrentLMU

Source:WorldDataBank.2016b

image 1, drawing clear lines as to the position the government adopts on key concerns

(HM Government, 2010. p.27). With of the NSS highlighting that the “most urgent task

it to return our nation’s (the UK’s) finances to a sustainable footing” (ibid. p.14), all

three of these spheres can clearly be evaluated using CUA and therefore a conclusion

can be reached using the “timely, relevant and independent insight” (HM Government,

2010. p.34) of academics alongside the CUA.

Documents released by HM Government (2010) make it clear that the economy and

the state of national finances had a direct impact upon strategic interests which the

government would prioritise. Large investment in order to achieve the long-term goals

in terms of defensive equipment capabilities has lead to a dichotomy between the

immediate goals compared to these grander aspirations. Arguably, this shifting in

interests to the short and medium term rather than the long-term goals has lead to a

budget focus skewed significantly towards current operations in Afghanistan

(Chatham House, 2010).

Source: HM Government, 2010. p.27

Image 1: Priority Risks as laid out in the National Security Strategy

What, if any, impact did the SDSR therefore have upon strategic interests?

Addressing each of the spheres in turn, the issues of highest concern are viewed as

much more immediate, not only in their impact but also in the response needed. This

is due to the unpredictable nature of not only natural disaster, cyber warfare/crime and

terrorism, but the wider consequences of such events. The SDSR focused upon the

‘Future Force 2020’ which has an emphasis upon expeditionary and rapid deployment

warfare, aiming to tackle issues and threats to strategic interests at their source rather

than within the UK territory (HM Government, 2010; Reeve and Street, 2015). This

shift in tasking has not only caused an overall reduction in the size of the military, as

seen in figure 2, but a reduction in the level of territorial defence (Reeve and Street,

2015).

Various interpretations of the data associated to these reductions exist, however the

argument which this case study views as most relevant is that the SDSR has not

reduced its options in the conventional sense, merely tailored its armed forces in order

to meet the proposed strategic interests of the government. This interpretation is

supported by the need for better management and allocation as previously stated in

this case study when addressing the meaning of policy impact (Common, 1995; Dunn,

1981). With the increased focus upon the international events and consequential

influence gained as a result, the reaction of the armed forces in relation to natural

disasters has grown in significance, e.g. the reaction of HMS Illustrious to the crisis in

the Philippines in 2013 where the versatility was deemed “critical” (Greening, 2013).

Figure2:TotalArmedForcesPersonnelbetween1998and2013

The SDSR did however impact the possibility of certain actions in the conflicts in the

Middle East; initially Libya, and more recently Syria and Iraq. The UK has been

involved in aerial combat operations, either enforcing UN mandated ‘No Fly Zones’ or

providing tactical bombings of ISIS/ISIL/Daesh facilities, for much of the time period

since the SDSR was announced in 2010 and has been forced to do so without the

power projection capabilities of an aircraft carrier and harrier squadrons, something

cut immediately in the SDSR. This can be viewed as the clearest example in the

reduction of options made available to the government during the time frame in

question, and it is also an action which is possible to view through the CUA framework

as developed by Knoepfel et al. (2010). With the use of the CUA, the wider benefit of

this cost reduction measure can be seen rather than the direct ‘budget slashing’ which

such a controversial decision may be viewed as, especially as such action arguably

maintained the other priorities which are deemed to be within “Tier One” (HM

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Armed

ForcesPersonn

el(Total)

Source:WorldDataBank.2016a

Government, 2010. p.27), allowing the UK to maintain its Global Fire Power (GFP)

rating of 0.2747, ranking 5th globally (Global Fire Power, 2016). To this end, the

compromise between the power projection capabilities such an asset contributes

towards strategic interests and the economic benefits scrapping such an asset was

deemed to be weighted more in favour of the economic state of affairs when using the

CUA.

Conclusion

The afore mentioned occurrence is arguably the only limiting factor within the state of

affairs which the government deemed part of its strategic interests as according to

image 1. With this in mind, the conclusion can be drawn that although there was some

limiting of options available in specific operations, it is merely with hindsight such limits

can be seen and critiqued. At the time of such a review, the geopolitical climate was

comparable to the current situations faced, and although clear parallels can be drawn

in terms of the strategic interests, the priorities would have been ranked differently due

to the formulation of the coalition government compared to the current Conservative

one. With this in mind, the CUA of such a review can be justified when considering the

information available and the economic the situation globally. Ultimately the SDSR in

2010 provided the basis for the armed forces to develop, proving that the not all of the

decisions taken in regards to the defence of the United Kingdom are focused on the

short term; instead drawing upon multiple timeframes and ensuring that the strategic

interests of the next decade are addressed in a timely, cost effective and realistic

manner.

Bibliography CDC (2012) Brief 5: Evaluating Impact In: CDC (2012) Policy Evaluation [Accessed 14/02/16] Available from http://www.cdc.gov/injury/about/policy/evaluation.html Common, R. (1995) The Agencification of the Civil Service in: Mullard, M. ed. (1995) Policy Making in Britain: An Introduction. Routledge, New York. pp.136-159 Conservative Party (2010) Invitation to Join the Government of Britain [Online] Pureprint Group, East Sussex. [Accessed 09/02/16] Available from: https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/activist%20centre/press%20and%20policy/manifestos/manifesto2010 Dover, R., Phythian, M. (2011) Lost Over Libya: The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review – An Obituary. [Accessed 09/02/16] Defence Studies, Vol. 11, No.3 pp.420-444. Available from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14702436.2011.630175 Dunn, W.N. (1981) Evaluating Policy Performance In: Dunn, W.N. (1981) Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction. Prentice Hall, New Jersey. pp.339-359 Dunn, W. N. (1981) A Framework of Policy Analysis In: Dunn, W.N. (1981) Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction. Prentice Hall, New Jersey. pp.34-63 Fisher, C. M. (1998) The Heuristics of Resource Allocation: How People Determine Priorities In: Fisher, C. M. (1998) Resource Allocation in the Public Sector: Values, Priorities and Markets in the Management of Public Services. Routledge, New York. pp.26-63 Forrester, J., Nilsson, M., Lee, C., Moora, H., Persson, L., Persson, Å., Peterson, K., Simon, J,. Tuhkanen, H. (2009) Getting to Policy Impact: Lessons from 20 Years of bridging Science and Policy with Sustainability Knowledge. [Accessed 09/02/16] Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm. Available from http://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/SEI-ResearchReport-Forrester-GettingToPolicyImpactLessonsFrom20Years-2009.pdf Fox, L (2010) Strategic Defence and Security Review [Speech at RUSI, London] 14 June. Available from https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/2010-06-14-strategic-defence-and-security-review Global Fire Power (2016) United Kingdom Military Strength [Accessed 14/02/16] Available from http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=united-kingdom Hallsworth, M., Parker, S. and Rutter, J. (2011) Policy Making in the Real World: Evidence and Analysis [Accessed 09/02/16] Institute for Government. Available from: http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20making%20in%20the%20real%20world.pdf

Ham, C. and Hill, M. (1984) Towards Implementation Theory? In: Ham, C. and Hill, M. (1993) The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire. pp.97-116 Hill, M. (1997) Conclusion: Evaluation and Accountability In: Hill, M. (2009) The Public Policy Process (5th Ed). Pearson Education Ltd, Harlow. pp.278-299 HM Government (2010) A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy. [Accessed 09/02/16] The Stationary Office, London. Available from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/national-security-strategy.pdf House of Commons Library. (2011) UK Defence and Security Policy: A New Approach? [Accessed 09/02/16] The Stationary Office, London. Commons Briefing paper RP11-10. Available from: http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/RP11-10 Knill, C., Tosun, J. (2012) Public Policy: An Introduction. Palgrave Macmillan, London. Knoepful, P. et al. (2007) Evaluating Policy Effects. In: Knoepfel, P., Larrue, C., Varone, F. and Hill, M. (2007) Public Policy Analysis. Bristol: The Policy Press. pp.221-250 Liberal Democrats (2010) Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010 [Online] Chris Fox, London [Accessed 09/02/16] Available from http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/ge10/man/parties/libdem_manifesto_2010.pdf Lindblom, C. E (1968) The Limits of Analysis In: Lindblom, C. E. and Woodhouse, E. J. (1993) The Policy-Making Process (3rd Ed). Prentice Hall, New Jersey. pp.13-22 Parsons, W. (1995a) Critiques of Policy Analysis In: Parsons, W. (1995) Public Policy: An Introduction to Theory and Practice of Political Analysis. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham. pp.433-456 Parsons, W. (1995b) Promise and Performance: Evaluating Impact and Outcomes In: Parsons, W. (1995) Public Policy: An Introduction to Theory and Practice of Political Analysis. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham. pp.600-6161995a)m Punyani, S. (2011) Rapporteur Report: The Economics of National Defence in an Age of Austerity. Meeting No. 3: One Year on from the SDSR. [Accessed 09/02/16] Chatham House, London. Available from: https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%20Security/171011report.pdf Weiss, C. H. (1972) Utilization of Evaluation Results In: Weiss, C. H. (1998) Evaluation (2nd Ed). Prentice Hall, New Jersey. pp.310-318

Weiss, C. H. (1979) The Many Meanings of Research Utilization In: Public Administration Review. [Online] pp.426-431 Available from: http://www.ualberta.ca/~dcl3/KT/Public%20Administration%20Review_Weiss_The%20many%20meanings%20of%20research_1979.pdf World DataBank. (2016a) Total Armed Forces Personnel, World Development Indicators. [Online] Available from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&type=metadata&series=MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS# [Accessed 09/02/16] World DataBank (2016b) Military Expenditure (Current LCU), World Development Indicators. [Online] Available from http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&type=metadata&series=MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS# [Accessed 09/02/16]