Policy Recommendations of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly ... · Assembly, which celebrated its 60th anniversary in 2015, brings together national par-liamentarians from the 28 members

Assemblée parlementaire de l’OTANNATO Parliamentary Assembly

RECOMMANDATIONS DE POLITIQUE GENERALE DE L’ASSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE DE L’OTAN – 2015

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY – 2015

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Policy recommendations of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly – 2015

The publication of this book has been funded by the Directorate for Security Policy

(SIPOL) – Swiss Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sports.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATO PARLIAMENTARY

ASSEMBLY – 2015

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATO PARLIAMENTARY

ASSEMBLY – 2015

Brussels – Geneva, 2016

Policy Recommendations of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly – 2015 (Brussels / Geneva: NATO Parliamentary Assembly / Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2016).

© NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2016 © Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2016 Cover Design: OGS Press ISBN: 978-92-9222-424-0

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FOREWORD Since its establishment in 2000, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) has enjoyed a lively and inspiring cooperation with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly across a wide range of subjects and outreach activities, not only in Rose Roth conferences conducted across Partnership for Peace nations, but in Annual Sessions, trainings for new parliamentarians, and the development of knowledge products and documentation on democratic gov-ernance and its associated best practices. Sixteen years on from the onset of cooperation, the need for capacity building in the realm of parliamentary over-sight of the security sector remains as pertinent as ever.

DCAF and the NATO PA, with the assistance of the Swiss Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports, are delighted to make this publication of 2015 NATO PA policy recommendations available to a larger public. Brussels and Geneva, September 2016 Dr. Philipp H. Fluri Deputy Director DCAF

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CONTENTS

Introduction 2015 – NATO’s Adaptation to a Deteriorating Security Environment ........... 1

Policy Recommendations Adopted by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 2015 ........ 5 Declaration 419 on NATO Enlargement ............................................................................ 5 Resolution 420 оn Addressing the Evolving Threat of Terrorism ...................................... 7 Resolution 421 on Countering Russia’s Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns .... 10 Resolution 422 on Solidarity with Ukraine ....................................................................... 12 Resolution 423 on Maintaining Support for the Wales Summit Initiatives ....................... 14 Resolution 424 on Economic Sanctions against Russia ................................................. 18 Resolution 425 on an Urgent Comprehensive and Unified Response to Crises in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) ................................................................... 20 Resolution 426 on Strengthening Security and Stability Through NATO’s Open Door and Partnership Policies .................................................................................................. 23 Resolution 427 on Climate Change and International Security ....................................... 25

Annex 1: The NATO Parliamentary Assembly ............................................................... 27

Annex 2: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) ............ 35

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Introduction 2015 – NATO’s Adaptation to a Deteriorating

Security Environment David Hobbs, Ruxandra Popa and Andrius Avizius 1

The year 2015 saw a further aggravation of the security challenges which had made 2014 a turning point for Euro-Atlantic and global security. Russia’s invasion and illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014—the first attempt by a European state to change international borders by force since the end of the Second World War—had opened a new chapter in international relations. Russia’s military activism only intensified throughout 2015, from Ukraine to Syria. Meanwhile, the terrorist organisation calling it-self the “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,” also referred to as “Daesh,” ISIS or ISIL 2 which had appeared on the world stage in 2014, continued to spread its hateful ideology and wreak instability in 2015, with repercussions far beyond the region, as evidenced by the tragic terrorist attacks in Paris in January and November, and a refugee crisis on an un-precedented scale.

The beginning of the year was marked by the escalation of Russia’s aggression in eastern Ukraine in support of so-called separatists. Despite a new agreement reached in Minsk on 12 February by the French, German, Ukrainian and Russian Heads of State and Government, the ceasefire remained elusive throughout 2015, and little progress was achieved in implementing the terms of the agreement. Russia also tightened its control over Crimea, while the human rights situation, and particularly the condition of the Crimean Tatar community, continued to deteriorate. The impact of the economic sanctions agreed by Western governments against Russia and its proxies in 2014 and renewed in mid-2015 was mixed: Russia’s economy showed signs of weakness, but the regime appeared prepared to reallocate resources in order to continue to fund its mili-tary ambitions abroad.

Indeed, 2015 saw an intensification of Moscow’s military build-up throughout the en-tire theatre from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean. This was coupled with a sophisti-cated propaganda and disinformation campaign using a broad array of methods—from direct fabrication of “facts” to setting up “troll factories”—to create confusion and support

1 David Hobbs is the Secretary General, Ruxandra Popa the Deputy Secretary General, and Andrius

Avizius the Director of the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security, of the NATO Parliamen-tary Assembly.

2 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Policy Recommendations of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly – 2015 2

anti-establishment forces internationally, while promoting anti-Western sentiments do-mestically.

The ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq also remained a major source of instability in 2015. Iraqi authorities and their international allies retook control of several areas of Iraq previously held by Daesh. However, the group retained a strong foothold in both Iraq and Syria, and sought to expand to other unstable areas from Libya to Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, Russia’s air campaign in Syria—launched in September 2015 in an effort to tilt the balance of forces back in favour of the Assad regime—added yet another layer of complexity to the conflict. Russia’s military involvement increased the risks of dan-gerous incidents, as evidenced by the downing in November 2015 of a Russian war-plane which was believed to have violated Turkey’s airspace. This serious incident led to a severe deterioration of Russia’s relations with Turkey and other NATO Allies. The fluid situation on the ground prompted the international community to launch, in October 2015, a new peace initiative—the International Syria Support Group—involving key global and regional players.

The turmoil in Syria and Iraq triggered the largest refugee and migrant crisis in Eu-rope since the Second World War. More than a million people—mostly Syrians, Af-ghans, Iraqis and Sub-Saharan Africans—arrived in Europe in 2015, seeking refuge and better living conditions. Nearly 4,000 migrants died trying to cross the Mediterranean. Disagreements on how to address this immense challenge exacerbated divisions among and within European countries.

The rise of Daesh and the spread of its radical ideology was also the catalyst for a new wave of gruesome terrorist attacks in Europe. France was hit particularly hard, with two major and well-prepared terrorist attacks in Paris in January and November 2015. These attacks propelled the threat of terrorism and radicalisation to the forefront of Eu-rope’s political agenda. They also highlighted the risks related to the so-called “foreign fighters”: tens of thousands of foreigners are believed to have joined the ranks of radical militant groups in Syria and Iraq since the fighting broke out in 2011. Several thousands of these came from Western democracies and could pose a security risk upon their re-turn.

In the face of these combined challenges, the North Atlantic Alliance focused on im-plementing the comprehensive agenda set by Allied Heads of State and Government at their Summit in Wales in September 2014. The cohesion and resolve demonstrated in Wales continued to guide NATO’s actions in 2015. The Alliance took important measures to strengthen its deterrent capabilities by, inter alia: establishing new head-quarters—NATO Force Integration Units—in six Central and Eastern European member states; augmenting considerably the NATO Response Force; creating the very high-readiness “Spearhead Force”; and conducting around 300 exercises, including Trident Juncture, the largest NATO exercise in over a decade. To address challenges on the southern flank, the Alliance deployed its AWACS early warning aircraft in Turkey, and increased capacity-building assistance to partners in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. In 2015, Allies also took important steps to stop the trend of decreasing

2015 – NATO’s Adaptation to a Deteriorating Security Environment 3

defence budgets, and move towards the targets of 2 % of GDP dedicated to defence, in-cluding 20 % for investment and R&D.

2015 was an important turning point for NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan. The Al-liance terminated its 11-year combat operation in December 2014, but remained en-gaged with a new mission—Resolute Support—dedicated to training, assisting and ad-vising Afghan security forces.

NATO also continued to contribute to stability in the Western Balkans, militarily through KFOR in Kosovo, and politically through the process of integrating new mem-bers. The year 2015 ended with the invitation issued by Allied Foreign Ministers to Montenegro to join the Alliance.

These complex developments all featured prominently on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s (NATO PA) agenda in 2015. While formally independent from NATO, the Assembly, which celebrated its 60th anniversary in 2015, brings together national par-liamentarians from the 28 members of NATO as well as their counterparts from a range of NATO partners. The Assembly meets at regular intervals and in different formats some 40 times a year, and adopts reports and policy recommendations which represent the collective views of around 250 parliamentarians from across the Alliance on the key issues on NATO’s agenda.

The policy recommendations featured in this volume provide the thread of the As-sembly’s own response to the multifaceted challenges which characterized the past year. While the NATO PA normally adopts policy recommendations only once a year at its annual session, the Assembly exceptionally adopted, at its spring session in Buda-pest, Hungary, in May 2015, and at the initiative of the Hungarian delegation, a Declara-tion on NATO Enlargement (419). In this text, the Assembly—which has traditionally been a staunch supporter of NATO’s Open Door policy—affirmed its support for Monte-negro’s membership, and recommitted itself to rendering aspirant countries all possible assistance to help them achieve their goal of NATO membership.

The other policy recommendations featured in this booklet were adopted during the Assembly’s annual session in Stavanger, Norway, in October 2015, and are based on the reports prepared by the Assembly’s five Committees: the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security; the Defence and Security Committee, the Economics and Secu-rity Committee, the Political Committee, and the Science and Technology Committee.

These 8 policy recommendations address the following themes: • Supporting a comprehensive and speedy implementation of the measures

agreed by Allied Heads of State and Government in Wales in September 2014 (resolution 423);

• Calling for a unified response to security and humanitarian challenges in the MENA region (resolution 425);

• Reiterating support for the Open Door policy and calling on aspirant countries to step up reforms (resolution 426);


• Condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its propaganda cam-paign as well as reaffirming the Alliance’s support for, and solidarity with, Ukraine (resolutions 421, 422 and 424);

• Urging the adoption of more robust international measures to combat the threat of terrorism (resolution 420);

• Acknowledging that climate change-related risks are significant threat multipli-ers that will affect the global security environment (resolution 427).

This latter resolution is an excellent example of the breadth of issues which Assem-bly members address. Their work focuses not only on immediate security threats, but also on the longer-term challenges to the security and well-being of their populations. In this regard, for over 25 years, the Science and Technology Committee has been instru-mental in raising awareness of the challenge posed by climate change, and the linkages between climate change and security. Resolution 427 underlined the Assembly’s sup-port for the objectives of the historic UN Climate Change Conference held in Paris in December 2015 (COP 21).

While these 8 policy recommendations constitute the formal expression of the As-sembly’s views, and, as such, are communicated to national parliaments, governments and NATO authorities, they are only one aspect of the Assembly’s multifaceted re-sponse to international events. For instance, in February 2015, the Assembly’s Bu-reau—its President and Vice-Presidents—issued a detailed statement on “Demonstrat-ing Alliance Cohesion And Resolve After Wales,” reaffirming the Assembly’s readiness to work closely with Allied governments and NATO authorities towards the timely im-plementation of the Wales Summit decisions.

The NATO PA President issued regular statements expressing his and the Assem-bly’s views on important international events, such as the signing of the Minsk II agree-ment or the formal invitation for Montenegro to join the Alliance. Assembly delegations conducted fact-finding visits to a number countries of special interest to NATO, including Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Qatar, the Republic of Moldova, Serbia, Sweden, Tajikistan, Tunisia, and Ukraine. A large seminar in Florence, Italy at the end of the year provided a timely forum to discuss dy-namics in North Africa and the Middle East with parliamentarians from all over the re-gion.

The Assembly thus played its full part in making the parliamentary voice heard in the face of a deteriorating security environment in 2015. We hope that this collection of the Assembly’s policy recommendations will help readers better understand the added value that parliamentary diplomacy can bring to decision-making in the areas of security and defence. The Assembly’s members are the democratically elected representatives of the people in all member states of the Alliance. Their voice is therefore also that of the Alliance’s citizens. This volume—as well as the Assembly’s website and social me-dia sites—is dedicated to them, and we would like to thank the Geneva Centre for Dem-ocratic Control of the Armed Forces for supporting its production.

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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS adopted by the

NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY in 2015

DECLARATION 419 on

NATO ENLARGEMENT * The Assembly, 1. Recalling its Declaration 409 on NATO Enlargement adopted at the spring session

in Vilnius in May 2014; 2. Reaffirming its full and continuous support for NATO enlargement and the member-

ship aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

**; 3. Noting that in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, NATO’s door re-

mains open for European countries ready and able to fulfil the requirements of NATO membership;

4. Acknowledging the renewal by Ukraine of its Euro-Atlantic aspirations; 5. Welcoming the Wales Summit decisions on the open door policy, including the re-

newed encouragement addressed to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugo-slav Republic of Macedonia,** the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package which helps Georgia to advance its membership of the Alliance, and the commitment to decide on Montenegro’s invitation by the end of 2015;

6. Stressing that NATO aspirants must continue with necessary preparations to fulfil the requirements of NATO membership as set out in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty;

* Presented by the Standing Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 18 May

2015, Budapest, Hungary. ** Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.


7. Recalling that NATO enlargement poses no threat to any nation but rather en-hances the security and stability of the entire Euro-Atlantic region;

8. Stressing that the NATO enlargement process cannot be influenced by a third party, other than by Alliance and aspirant countries;

9. Highlighting the strong catalysing effect of the open door policy, and noting that this positive impact requires the open door policy to remain a realistic and credible prospect;

10. Convinced therefore that Allies must continue to affirm and demonstrate their com-mitment to the open door policy;

11. URGES the member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance: a. to maintain the Wales Summit commitment to the open door policy; b. to deliver the support agreed at the Summit for aspirant countries, and to decide

on Montenegro’s invitation by the end of 2015; c. to continue supporting the implementation of a Substantial NATO-Georgia Pack-

age and, in accordance with the Bucharest 2008 Summit decision, to take the next step in Georgia’s integration to NATO by granting it a Membership Action Plan;

12. URGES the governments and parliaments of the countries striving for NATO mem-bership to redouble their efforts to address outstanding issues on their path towards membership;

13. RECOGNISES the difficult environment, in which Ukraine appears against a back-drop of the unprecedented aggression by the Russian Federation, and ENCOURA-GES the Ukrainian Government and Parliament to put every effort into reforming the country according to democratic Euro-Atlantic standards.

14. PLEDGES, as it has done in the past, to render aspirant countries all possible assis-tance to help them achieve their goal of NATO membership.

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RESOLUTION 420 оn

ADDRESSING THE EVOLVING THREAT OF TERRORISM * The Assembly, 1. Condemning in the strongest terms the 10 October 2015 terrorist attack in Ankara

and expressing its solidarity with the people of Turkey in the face of this tragedy; 2. Deeply concerned that the threat of terrorism in all its forms, including home-grown

terrorism, has increased in recent years in the Euro-Atlantic area, as witnessed by terrorist attacks in Brussels, Ottawa, Paris, Copenhagen and Saint-Quentin-Falla-vier, inter alia;

3. Alarmed by the proliferation of violent extremist groups across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and beyond, and the extreme brutality and extensive, systematic abuse of human rights by these groups, in particular by Daesh and groups inspired by it;

4. Noting that these groups continue to threaten the security of neighbouring states, in-cluding members of the Euro-Atlantic community, primarily due to the so-called for-eign fighters phenomenon and the use of the online communication platforms to promote violence and extremist ideas;

5. Concerned about the rise of xenophobia, islamophobia and other religious preju-dices;

6. Commending the efforts of the international community to address the evolving terrorist threat, including the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 2178 to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, the renewed initiatives to establish Euro-pean Union-wide mechanisms to prevent terrorism, NATO’s efforts to improve threat awareness and preparedness of the Allies, as well as a number of significant meas-ures adopted on the national level in the Euro-Atlantic area to enhance national counter-terrorism capabilities, improve information sharing with relevant partners and assist countries in the MENA region with training, technical support and, when necessary, targeted military action against violent extremist groups;

7. Stressing that law enforcement measures alone are insufficient and need to be complemented by programmes focusing on the prevention of radicalisation and deradicalisation;

* Presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and adopted by the Plenary Assem-

bly on Monday 12 October 2015, Stavanger, Norway.


8. Emphasising the need to ensure that additional security measures do not undercut the values of freedom, democracy and human rights that underpin the North Atlantic Alliance;

9. Considering that a positive role is played by international support for development in those countries where social and economic problems, as well as inadequacy of local governments, corruption, lack of respect for human rights and the rule of law, create favourable conditions for terrorism expansion, particularly in Northern Africa and the Sub-Sahara region;

10. URGES the member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance: a. to continue strengthening NATO’s contribution to countering terrorism by

expanding its role as a platform for exchanging relevant information and best practices among the Allies and partners, as well as for jointly developing tech-nological counter-terrorism solutions;

b. to support the EU’s role in counter-terrorism, particularly by championing initia-tives such as the creation of the European passenger name record; the introduc-tion of an EU black list of terrorist suspects; the establishment of an EU terrorist finance tracking system; the strengthening of Frontex and Europol; the adoption of the Smart Borders package; the development of a European platform to im-prove the monitoring of extremist activity on the Internet; and the formation of a European tribunal specialising in terrorism offenses;

c. to improve, in co-operation with the international community, and in particular the EU and NATO countries, their efforts in supporting international development and capacity-building programmes, giving priority to those countries where ter-rorism takes advantage from social, economic and governance difficulties to ex-pand its influence;

d. to implement vigorously UN Security Council Resolution 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters and to support broader global counter-terrorism initiatives such as the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the 2011 Global Counterterror-ism Forum;

e. to improve and broaden intelligence information-sharing mechanisms among the Allies and to encourage horizontal co-operation of sub-national law enforcement agencies;

f. to invest adequately into the research and analysis of the phenomenon of home-grown terrorism;

g. to ensure the implementation of the 40 Recommendations by the G7 Financial Action Task Force, the purpose of which is to establish standards to combat money laundering and terrorism financing, and to assist countries that are not yet meeting these standards;

Policy Recommendations 9

h. to ensure that law enforcement agencies have the adequate funding and man-power and to invest in technological counter-terrorism solutions including those that improve railway transport security;

i. to consider augmenting national and sub-national counter-radicalisation pro-grammes and to share best practices in this area;

j. to mitigate the influence of extremist ideology and to facilitate counter-extremist narratives by curtailing the activities of hate preachers, supporting peaceful and moderate religious figures and encouraging the involvement of influential people such as musicians, sportsmen or bloggers who can appeal to the younger gen-eration;

k. to reinforce legal, parliamentary and civil oversight mechanisms regarding the use of surveillance and law enforcement agencies, and to exchange best prac-tices and lessons learned in this area;

l. to increase assistance to smaller European Allies as well as to partners in Europe, Asia and Africa, especially those with a large number of fighters return-ing from conflict zones, in addressing terrorist threats by augmenting the existing national intelligence, law enforcement and military capabilities of these countries.

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RESOLUTION 421 on

COUNTERING RUSSIA’S PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS *

The Assembly, 1. Alarmed by the intensity of Russia’s propaganda and disinformation policies to-

wards its own population, its neighbourhood and beyond, using various local media outlets to spread anti-Western sentiment, hate speech, homophobia and xenopho-bia, which aim to weaken Euro-Atlantic solidarity, to justify aggression against neighbours and to obstruct their Euro-Atlantic integration as well as to boost the popularity of Putin’s regime;

2. Denouncing Russia’s misuse of the open and pluralistic nature of the free world’s media scene, while its own media space remains under the tight control of the gov-ernment;

3. Aware that Russia’s policy arsenal to influence and manipulate opinion abroad in-cludes, among other techniques, creating confusion in the information space by spreading unverified information and conspiracy theories; disseminating completely fabricated reports; employing so-called Internet trolls; infiltrating the expert and NGO scenes as well as “compatriot” communities; promoting a distorted version of history; and increasing Russia’s footprint in foreign media space;

4. Convinced that Russia’s propaganda campaigns pose both an immediate and a long-term challenge that requires an active response by Allies, including the promo-tion of strong counter-narratives;

5. Stressing that this response should not include counter-propaganda, and must re-main faithful to the values of democracy, human rights and freedom of the media;

6. Commending the efforts of NATO and the EU to address this challenge, in particu-lar the work of NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, including its increased assistance to Ukraine; the inauguration of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Ex-cellence in Riga; the preparation of the EU Action Plan on Strategic Communication; as well as the national efforts of NATO and EU member states and Eastern Euro-pean partners;

* Presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and adopted by the Plenary Assem-



7. URGES the member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance: a. to further reinforce relevant bodies within NATO and the EU in order to enhance

their ability to respond swiftly to the most blatant cases of disinformation, includ-ing the revision of policies regarding classified intelligence information such as satellite imagery to allow public diplomacy officers to use less sensitive informa-tion;

b. to facilitate the development of a coherent set of arguments refuting myths culti-vated by Moscow;

c. to establish platforms for the exchange of best national practices among the Euro-Atlantic community and for flagging potential information security threats;

d. to revisit legislation that strengthens legal counter-measures such as imposing fines for the use of hate speech and clear disinformation;

e. to encourage the world’s leading media outlets to develop a set of high journalis-tic standards and encourage independent global watchdogs to monitor how these standards are being followed;

f. to support international and national media initiatives in the Russian language, including launching a commonly-funded engaging and dynamic Russian-lan-guage TV channel;

g. to revisit legislation in order to increase transparency of the funding of the media, NGOs and think tanks;

h. to continue applying individual travel sanctions against the most active propa-gandists;

i. to promote innovative and inexpensive measures such as the greater use of hu-mour;

j. to invest in research and education on how to recognise, report and react to or-chestrated “trolling” attacks;

k. to increase capacity building assistance to partner countries including Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in the field of strategic communications;

l. to support the work of professional historians who can provide credible re-sponses to pseudo-scientific theories propagated by Moscow;

m. to encourage grass-roots civic initiatives that expose disinformation.

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RESOLUTION 422 on

SOLIDARITY WITH UKRAINE * The Assembly, 1. Reiterating its firm support for the government and the people of Ukraine in their

struggle for independence and territorial integrity and their pursuit of European and Euro-Atlantic integration;

2. Condemning in the strongest terms the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and Russia’s continuing military aggression in eastern Ukraine as well as the detention of Nadiya Savchenko, Oleh Sentsov and other Ukrainians since the beginning of the conflict, in blatant violation of Russia’s international obligations and commitments under the Minsk agreements;

3. Deeply disturbed by Russia’s disregard for human rights in the illegally occupied Ukrainian territories, including severe repression of the Tatar community and Ukrainian minority in Crimea;

4. Applauding the constitutional amendments in Ukraine designed to devolve more powers to local governments as a manifestation of Ukraine’s commitment to building an inclusive society;

5. Deeply regretting that Russian-backed separatist forces in eastern Ukraine are pre-venting Ukrainian local elections from taking place in areas under their control in contravention of the Minsk agreements; and calling on Russia to be co-operative in the development of an understanding on the modalities and timeframe of local elec-tions in certain areas of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions;

6. Deploring Russia’s decision to veto the plans for an international tribunal to investi-gate the downing of the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17;

7. Emphasising the need for diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict with Russia and welcoming the recent ceasefire as an important step, while recognising that these efforts should not compromise Ukrainian territorial integrity nor Ukraine’s inalienable right to determine its own place in the European and Euro-Atlantic order;

8. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance: a. to redouble efforts to help Ukraine at this critical juncture by increasing diplo-

matic, political, financial, economic, material and expert assistance both bilater- * Presented by the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security and adopted by the Plenary Assem-



ally and through bodies such as NATO, the EU and the NATO Parliamentary As-sembly;

b. to maintain political, diplomatic and economic pressure on Russia until Moscow fully implements its commitments under the Minsk agreements, convincingly demonstrates that it is willing to abide by international law, and ends the occupa-tion of Ukrainian territories, including Crimea;

c. to press Russia and separatist forces to lift all restrictions on the ability of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine to access to all areas of eastern Ukraine, including areas along the border with Russia, and report fully all rele-vant observations;

d. to encourage and support direct talks between Russian and Ukrainian repre-sentatives with the participation of international mediators in order to find a peaceful solution to the conflict;

9. CALLS on democratically elected Ukrainian politicians to continue to demonstrate the moderation and determination necessary to build an inclusive and tolerant soci-ety, and to establish the highest standards possible in matters of political, economic and judicial governance, and, in particular, to tackle resolutely the problem of cor-ruption.

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RESOLUTION 423 on

MAINTAINING SUPPORT FOR THE WALES SUMMIT INITIATIVES * The Assembly, 1. Recognising the changed security environment on NATO’s eastern and southern

flanks, requiring determined, comprehensive whole-of-Alliance responses; 2. Appalled by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and continued military interference in

Ukraine as well as by the occupation of the territories of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (South Ossetia) of Georgia, and troubled by the difficulties encountered so far to implement the provisions of the Minsk II agreement and the EU-brokered Rus-sian-Georgian ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008;

3. Supporting accordingly the advances made at the “Normandy Format” Summit in Paris on 2 October 2015 with a view to consolidating the ceasefire and implementing the political part of the Minsk agreements in accordance with a suitable timetable;

4. Remaining unified and vigilant vis-à-vis Russia’s ongoing attempts to use hybrid tactics to destabilize the eastern regions of the Alliance;

5. Alarmed by the increasing instability and rise of powerful, disruptive non-state armed groups throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) which have caused unprecedented levels of conflict, state failure and displaced populations;

6. Concerned by the increasing refugee flows from the MENA region toward Europe, posing some of the greatest challenges to all member and partner states in decades;

7. Recognising that, in the face of the new international security environment, solidar-ity among the members of the Euro-Atlantic community is as important today as it has ever been;

8. Acknowledging the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and the Defence Spending Pledge, announced at the September 2014 Wales Summit, as key initiatives neces-sary for the Alliance to rise to these current and future security challenges;

9. Commending all 28 Allies for contributing to reassurance measures in Eastern Europe, including continuous air, land and maritime presence and other meaningful military activity, but calling for greater efforts to address the challenges emanating from the increasing instability along the Alliance’s southern flank;

* Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Mon-

day 12 October 2015, Stavanger, Norway.


10. Encouraged by the progress of the RAP via the enhancement of the NATO Re-sponse Force (NRF) and the rapid establishment, training and exercising of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), as a means of increasing Alliance readi-ness;

11. Noting that effective implementation of the RAP requires a robust, flexible and responsive NATO command structure with increased regional focus and enhanced situational awareness;

12. Welcoming the establishment of new multinational command and control structures, the NATO Force Integration Units, to support collective defence planning and assist with the multinational training and exercising of NATO forces in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania;

13. Approving of the enhanced exercise programme with an increased focus on collec-tive defence and incorporating hybrid threats and complex civil-military scenarios, but also recalling the need to maintain peak crisis response capabilities in parallel;

14. Applauding the organisation and launch of Trident Juncture Exercise 2015, qualify-ing elements of the NRF for rotational duties and proving the capabilities of the VJTF;

15. Expressing its appreciation to Germany, the Netherlands and Norway for leading the training and exercising of the interim VJTF, as well as its appreciation to Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, Turkey and France for agreeing to be VJTF framework nations in the coming years;

16. Welcoming efforts by the United States to support the RAP through the European Reassurance Initiative and other high-end military asset transfers;

17. Aware that NATO’s ability to reinforce host nation defences quickly along the east-ern flank depends inter alia upon the preparation of infrastructure, preposition of equipment and supplies, and designation of specific bases for use, and urges that this work should be accelerated;

18. Stressing the importance for NATO of strengthening co-operation with the EU, based on the complementarity of their respective capabilities;

19. Emphasising also the importance of NATO enhancing co-ordination with other re-gional institutions;

20. Confident that the implementation of the RAP will be a success, emblematic of the Alliance’s posture after the Wales Summit;

21. Noting the hybrid and distributed nature of current security threats on both the east-ern and southern flanks of the Alliance require Allies to invest in their national capa-bilities and shore up NATO’s situational awareness, mobility, and response time;

22. Cognizant that the NRF is only a small subset of the total national forces that may be called upon by NATO in an emergency and that the Allies need to maintain ade-


quate readiness of their forces in order to conduct NATO’s full range of missions; 23. Highlighting and reminding NATO member states of the importance of the Wales

Summit Defence Spending Pledge, and cognizant of the high cost of reassurance and deterrence measures necessary today and into the future;

24. Commending efforts of European Allies to contribute to defence capabilities through the NATO Framework Nations Concept and the launch of three multinational Euro-pean projects at the Wales Summit;

25. Underscoring that a strong European defence industry is critical not only to the development and maintenance of Alliance-wide capabilities, but also to address the growing problem of transatlantic and inter-European burden sharing;

26. Recognising the importance of the Alliance’s open door policy for the Alliance itself and for partner and aspirant countries to join the Alliance based on their will and readiness;

27. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance: a. to work to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets and to encourage Al-

lies to move toward the NATO guidelines that recommend spending 2 % GDP on national defence; and to dedicate at least 20 % of their spending on new equip-ment;

b. to demonstrate the political will and foresight to invest in their present and future defence forces, thereby strengthening their contributions to Alliance capability and readiness;

c. to seek the basis for agreement on the framework for the utilisation of elements of the Readiness Action Plan in sub-Article 5 situations, particularly regarding the authority to alert and stage NATO forces;

d. to work together to facilitate the rapid movement of equipment across European member states’ territories during contingency operations;

e. to plan for and understand the processes necessary for force deployment by individual member states;

f. to renew discussions about intelligence sharing with NATO civil and military leaders as a means of enhancing situational awareness across the Alliance;

g. to increase public outreach and education efforts to expand and build awareness and resilience among domestic populations as a means of resisting subversive tactics of hybrid warfare;

h. to reaffirm commitments to share the burdens of the Alliance’s costs and respon-sibilities, thereby strengthening fundamental and essential transatlantic and inter-European bonds of trust;

i. to continue to support and further contribute to the implementation of the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package which helps Georgia advance in its prepa-


rations towards membership in the Alliance, while welcoming the progress made on the Package, particularly the holding of the first NATO-Georgia exercise and the inauguration of the Joint Training and Evaluation Centre in Georgia (JTEC);

j. to provide support to partner states receiving refugees from the MENA region; k. to develop national cyber defence capabilities, and to continue to devise and en-

hance strategies of cyber defence co-operation among Allies and with relevant partner nations and organisations.

18

RESOLUTION 424 on

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA * The Assembly, 1. Acknowledging that Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, ongoing military aggres-

sion in Eastern Ukraine as well as other efforts to destabilise Ukraine are consistent with its aggressive posture toward its neighbours, including the occupation of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (South Ossetia), threaten European security, and constitute a serious violation of international law, including the UN Charter and Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances;

2. Noting Russia’s illegal aggression and support for armed groups in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine;

3. Expressing solidarity with Ukraine and determination to assist it in this difficult mo-ment;

4. Noting that Western sanctions on Russia represent a measured response to its transgressions of international law and send an important signal that “business as usual” is impossible as long as Russia persists in this policy line;

5. Affirming that these sanctions aim to express opposition to Russian actions, to sig-nal that there is a price to pay for its Ukraine policy, with the objective of fully imple-menting the Minsk agreements, and to pressure Russia to come to the negotiating table to settle current disputes related to Ukraine and to stop violating fundamental international norms and principles;

6. Applauding the European Council’s decision to extend sanctions against Russia as well as measures targeting dealings with Crimea and Sevastopol which Russia ille-gally occupies;

7. Recognising that Russia currently confronts an array of domestic economic difficul-ties linked to the falling price of energy, overreliance on energy exports, self-im-posed restrictions on trade with Western countries, the flight of capital due to wors-ening governance and corruption problems;

8. Acknowledging that the United States, Canada and the EU stand ready to take fur-ther measures if required;

* Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on

Monday 12 October 2015, Stavanger, Norway.


9. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance: a. to maintain the current sanctions regime on Russia concerning the situation in

Eastern Ukraine as long as the Minsk agreements are not fully implemented, and to maintain the sanctions concerning Crimea/Sevastopol as long as the annexa-tion is not ended;

b. to be prepared to toughen these sanctions if Russia fails to meet its obligations under the Minsk agreements;

c. to provide comprehensive support to the democratically elected government of Ukraine which is under enormous pressure from Russia;

d. to demonstrate political and economic solidarity with those countries suffering from Russia’s counter-sanctions and those non-NATO countries the economic and political freedom of which Russia now threatens;

e. to counter Russia’s highly misleading narrative about the nature of this conflict; f. to deny Russia the political leverage it seeks to exercise over the continent by di-

versifying Europe’s energy supply base and enhancing energy interconnections, thus reducing its reliance on Russian oil and gas;

g. to maintain channels of communication with the Kremlin and to work to find diplo-matic ways to resolve these serious tensions.

20

RESOLUTION 425 on

AN URGENT COMPREHENSIVE AND UNIFIED RESPONSE TO CRISES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (MENA) *

The Assembly, 1. Deeply concerned about the continuing conflicts in Syria and Iraq which have trig-

gered a devastating humanitarian crisis with severe repercussions for regional and global security;

2. Appalled by the brutal and indiscriminate use of force as well as by the gross, systematic and widespread human rights violations by the regime of Bashar al-As-sad, as well as by Daesh and other parties to the conflicts in Syria and in Iraq;

3. Condemning Daesh’s destruction of cultural sites considered as historical and architectural treasures;

4. Commending Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) for hosting the overwhelming majority of refugees and internally displaced persons;

5. Recognising that many European countries are also confronted with an increasing inflow of refugees from the MENA region;

6. Noting that the number of returning foreign fighters is a key security concern for the countries in the MENA region, but also for other countries worldwide;

7. Alarmed that the rise of Daesh in Syria and Iraq is impacting the stability of the MENA region, particularly Libya which risks sliding into further anarchy and chaos, unless the Government of National Accord is formed without further delay, and deeply concerned about the security situation in Yemen which has become a veri-table safe haven for terrorist organisations following many years of dysfunctional governance and internal conflicts;

8. Convinced that any long-term settlement of these crises requires inclusive political solutions supported by all relevant international stakeholders, but that keeping up military pressure against Daesh and other extremist groups is essential in the mean-time;

9. Concerned that, in the absence of such a long-term settlement, the humanitarian

* Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 October

2015, Stavanger, Norway.


crises in the MENA region will only worsen, thereby fuelling a further deterioration of security and an increase in the number of refugees;

10. Affirming that dealing with the conditions that enable and support Daesh’s rise is a strategic priority that requires countries in the MENA region to pursue inclusive poli-cies and work together to stem the spread of extremist ideologies;

11. Concerned that Russia’s military intervention and support for the Assad regime escalates the war and complicates finding a solution in Syria, and alarmed about Russia’s violation of Turkish airspace and failure to co-ordinate its efforts with the international coalition against Daesh;

12. Welcoming the successful conclusion of the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear pro-gramme;

13. URGES the member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance, the EU, the international community and the governments of the countries in the MENA region:

a. to continue to support the international coalition’s efforts to neutralise the extrem-ist groups operating in Syria and Iraq;

b. to step up efforts to reach a comprehensive ceasefire and peaceful settlement of the conflict in Syria through a Syrian-led and inclusive political process, and to support the ongoing diplomatic efforts in this regard, including those by the United Nations Special Envoy;

c. to examine the possibility of the establishment of a no-fly zone and safe zones in Syria for the sheltering and protection of local communities and internally dis-placed persons;

d. to increase humanitarian aid significantly and facilitate the granting of asylum for refugees and internally displaced persons fleeing the wars in Syria and Iraq;

e. to provide support to partner states granting asylum to refugees fleeing the wars in Syria and Iraq;

f. to consider further measures, bilaterally and through NATO, to support Iraq in its fight against Daesh and other extremist groups;

g. to continue to press the government of Iraq to pursue an active policy of inclu-sion and reconciliation involving all religious and ethnic minorities of the country, and to monitor the implementation of that policy;

h. to work towards an agreement of all parties to the Libyan dialogue on the final text presented by UN Special Representative and Head of the UN Support Mis-sion in Libya (UN SRSG), Bernardino León, and to follow up by assisting Libya in the process of reconciliation, rehabilitation and stabilisation;

i. to improve the support to international development and capacity-building pro-grammes in the MENA region;


j. to develop a comprehensive policy approach to forces fighting Daesh, including the Kurdish Peshmerga (Iraq), which focuses on providing advice, training and assistance;

14. URGES NATO member states: a. to increase material and logistical aid to neighbouring countries that are hosting

hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees in order to improve their capability to deal with the refugee flows triggered by the Syrian crisis;

b. to strengthen co-operation with the UN in logistical and humanitarian matters in order to improve conditions in refugee camps in neighbouring countries;

15. CALLS UPON the Syrian regime: a. to end the violence against the Syrian people and strictly observe the principles

of humanitarian law and in particular to implement UN Security Council Resolu-tions 2139 and 2165 in order to guarantee humanitarian access and delivery;

b. to engage in a meaningful dialogue with all actors of the Syrian opposition willing to negotiate in order to achieve a viable political compromise;

16. CALLS UPON the government of the Russian Federation to cease its attacks on the Syrian opposition and civilians immediately and to focus its efforts on fighting Daesh, to co-ordinate its efforts with the international coalition against Daesh and to pro-mote a solution to the conflict through a political transition;

17. CALLS UPON the government and parliament of Iraq and all relevant parties of the country to build upon recent positive efforts to foster inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian reconciliation and to work together closely to defeat Daesh and other extremist groups, and put an end to human rights violations;

18. CALLS UPON all parties to the Libyan dialogue to agree to a swift and conclusive approval of the final text of a political agreement as presented by UN SRSG Bernar-dino León, to end the violent confrontation to the benefit of all Libyans and so that the new Government of National Accord can be formed without further delay;

19. ENCOURAGES the governments and parliaments of the MENA region: a. to fully back international efforts to defeat Daesh and other violent extremist

organisations, to block the flow of foreign fighters to the region and stem the spread of extremist ideologies and terrorism;

b. to use their influence to encourage political solutions to the conflicts in the region and to refrain from any action that might heighten tensions and aggravate the situation;

c. to work together in bringing the belligerents in Yemen to the negotiation table to ensure full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015), and to assist them in reaching a political settlement that leads to lasting peace.

23

RESOLUTION 426 on

STRENGTHENING SECURITY AND STABILITY THROUGH NATO’S OPEN DOOR AND PARTNERSHIP POLICIES *

The Assembly, 1. Commemorating the 20th anniversary of the Dayton Accords which ended the war

in Bosnia and Herzegovina and paved the way for a new era of stability and co-op-eration in the Western Balkans;

2. Recalling and commending NATO’s decisive role in restoring peace in the Western Balkans and in laying the foundations for lasting security and for the region’s inte-gration into Euro-Atlantic institutions;

3. Noting that the Dayton Accords led to the development of a robust crisis-manage-ment role for NATO and practical co-operation with partner countries;

4. Recognising and applauding the invaluable contributions that partner countries have made to NATO-led missions and operations since the first deployments in the Western Balkans;

5. Acknowledging the crucial role these partnerships play in the promotion of interna-tional peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond;

6. Underlining the complementarity of NATO’s Partnership and Open Door policies, and noting that the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of co-operative se-curity have advanced stability in Europe;

7. Stressing that NATO’s co-operation with partner countries rests on common values and aims to promote co-operation, confidence and stability, as well as increasing members’ and partners’ capacities to address new security challenges;

8. Reaffirming its full and continuous support for NATO enlargement and the member-ship aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,** as stated in its declaration 419 on NATO Enlargement adopted at its Budapest Session in May 2015;

9. Acknowledging the renewal by Ukraine of its Euro-Atlantic aspirations and saluting Kyiv’s efforts to implement comprehensive reforms despite ongoing aggression by the Russian Federation;

* Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Monday 12 October

2015, Stavanger, Norway. ** Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.


10. URGES member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance: a. to continue delivering the support agreed at the Wales Summit for NATO aspi-

rant countries, including support for implementation of the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package;

b. to extend Montenegro an invitation to join the Alliance; c. to reiterate the Wales Summit commitment to the Open Door policy at the next

NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016, and to consider taking the next steps to-wards the full membership of other aspirant countries—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—based on progress towards fulfilling the conditions set in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty;

d. to further increase diplomatic, political, financial, economic, material and expert assistance to Ukraine for fulfilment of its Euro-Atlantic aspirations;

e. to carry forward the adaptation and transformation of NATO partnerships initiated at the Wales Summit, prioritising values, joint responses to common challenges, capacity building and the further development of interoperability;

11. URGES the governments and parliaments of the countries striving for NATO membership to step up reforms and address outstanding issues on their path to-wards membership;

12. URGES the government of Georgia to implement fully the recommendations of Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 2077 (2015) and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Helsinki Declaration 2015 AS (15) D E;

13 URGES the government and parliament of Ukraine: a. to press ahead with the urgent political and socio-economic reforms needed to

address citizens’ needs and expectations for physical and economic security, effective and transparent governance, and respect for the rights of all Ukrainians;

b. to take full advantage of the assistance provided by NATO and the NATO Parlia-mentary Assembly.

25

RESOLUTION 427 on

CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY * The Assembly, 1. Convinced that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are the dominant cause

of the global warming observed since the mid-20th century; 2. Recognising that, without a concerted global response, climate change will have

severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems; 3. Stressing the urgent need for actions, measures and rules on climate change

mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building and transparency;

4. Endorsing the goal to keep the increase in global average temperature below 1.5° or 2°C above pre-industrial levels through deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions;

5. Underlining the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” and the need to turn this principle into concrete actions, fairly balancing emissions reductions and economic development;

6. Fully convinced that climate change-related risks will affect international security through increased natural disasters; stress on economic, food and water security; risks to public health; internal and external migration; and resource competition;

7. Acknowledging that climate change-related risks are significant threat multipliers that will shape the security environment in areas of concern to the Alliance and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations;

8. Recognising the need to supplement climate action with efforts to strengthen the re-silience of states and societies at risk through adaption measures, development and humanitarian aid, and peacebuilding and conflict prevention programmes;

9. Welcoming NATO’s Green Defence Framework and Smart Energy Efforts; 10. URGES member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

a. to negotiate an ambitious, legally-binding, rules-based, universal, flexible, bal-anced, sustainable and dynamic agreement at the December 2015 UN Climate Change Conference in Paris (COP21);

* Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on

Monday 12 October 2015, Stavanger, Norway.


b. to make every effort to live up to their climate goals and to periodically review and strengthen them within the framework of mechanisms allowing for the aforementioned maximum limit to be respected;

c. to shape national climate change policies so as to take into consideration the Post-2015 Development Agenda, with particular reference to the fight against poverty and to the sustainable growth of the planet;

d. to fully recognise climate change-related risks as significant threat multipliers in their foreign and security policies;

e. to subsequently increase the frequency of military and political consultations on climate change within NATO, including at NATO summits;

f. to examine how NATO’s co-operative security efforts can take into account cli-mate change-related risks, especially with NATO partners that are particularly vulnerable and exposed to climate change;

g. to fully support and enhance NATO’s Green Defence Framework and Smart En-ergy efforts.

27

Annex 1: The NATO Parliamentary Assembly

The Role of the Assembly Founded in 1955, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) serves as the con-sultative inter parliamentary organisation for the North Atlantic Alliance.

Bringing together members of parliaments throughout the Atlantic Alliance, the NATO PA provides an essential link between NATO and the parliaments of its member nations, helping to build parliamentary and public consensus in support of Alliance poli-cies.

At the same time, it facilitates parliamentary awareness and understanding of key security issues and contributes to a greater transparency of NATO policies. Crucially, it helps maintain and strengthen the transatlantic relationship, which underpins the Atlan-tic Alliance.

Since the end of the Cold War the Assembly has assumed a new role by integrating into its work parliamentarians from those countries in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond who seek a closer association with NATO. This integration has provided both political and practical assistance and has contributed to the strengthening of parlia-mentary democracy throughout the Euro-Atlantic region, thereby complementing and reinforcing NATO’s own programme of partnership and co-operation.

The headquarters of the Assembly’s 28-strong International Secretariat staff mem-bers is located in central Brussels.

How the Assembly Works The NATO PA consists of 257 delegates from the 28 NATO member countries. Dele-gates from 13 associate countries; the European Parliament; 4 Regional partner and Mediterranean associate member countries; as well as 8 parliamentary observers and 2 inter-parliamentary assemblies also take part in its activities.

The Assembly’s governing body is the Standing Committee, which is composed of the Head of each member delegation, the President, the Vice-Presidents, the Treasurer and the Secretary General.

The International Secretariat under its Secretary General, is responsible for all ad-ministration and the bulk of research and analysis that supports the Assembly’s Com-mittees, Sub-Committees and other groups.


The five Committees are: Civil Dimension of Security; Defence and Security; Eco-nomics and Security; Political; Science and Technology. They are charged with exam-ining all major contemporary issues in their fields. Other Assembly bodies include the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group to enhance parliamentary dialogue and understanding with countries of the Middle East and the North African region, the Ukraine-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council and the Georgia-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council. The NATO-Russia Parliamentary Committee was discontinued in April 2014.

The Committees and Sub-Committees produce reports, which are discussed in draft form at the Assembly’s Spring Session. The reports are then revised and updated for discussion, amendment and adoption at the Assembly’s Annual Session in the Autumn.

At the Annual Session, the Committees also produce policy recommendations – which are voted on by the full Assembly and forwarded to the North Atlantic Council. As well as meetings during Sessions, the Committees and Sub Committees meet several times a year in member and non-member nations where they receive briefings from leading government and parliamentary representatives, as well as senior academics and experts.

Financing The Assembly is directly funded by member parliaments and governments, and is finan-cially and administratively separate from NATO itself.

The Rose-Roth Programme A central part of the Assembly’s work is the Rose-Roth Programme of partnership and co operation – initially with Central and Eastern European countries but subsequently throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. This programme seeks to assist partner countries, mainly in the Balkans and the South Caucasus, through a challenging transition proc-ess, which involves the implementation of difficult political and economic reforms.

The Rose-Roth Programme involves a series of seminars focused on regional and topical security issues and training programmes for parliamentary staff and members of Parliament. The aim is to enhance parliamentary awareness, build contacts and provide experience and expertise. Particular attention is paid to promoting the principle of the democratic control of armed forces and to the development of effective parliamentary oversight of defence and the military.

The NATO Orientation Programme The NATO Orientation Programme is focused primarily on young or newly elected members of parliament from NATO and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) na-tions, as well as those newly assigned to security or foreign affairs responsibilities. The programme aims at providing an in-depth overview of the functioning and policies of NATO and SHAPE as well as of the Alliance’s evolving relationships with its many part-ners. The Programme was launched in 2000 and is held annually in Brussels.

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly 29

The Parliamentary Transatlantic Forum In 2001, growing concern about the apparent drift in transatlantic attitudes, perceptions and policies, prompted the Assembly’s Standing Committee to instigate a “Parliamen-tary Transatlantic Forum” to help identify the precise nature of the divergence in trans-atlantic thinking and to explore ways in which these differences could be redressed. The programme includes discussions with senior US administration figures and academic experts.

The Forum is held annually in Washington DC in co-operation with the National De-fense University and the Atlantic Council of the United States.

The Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group ∗

In the context of its outreach activities, the Assembly created in 1995 a Mediterranean Special Group with the aim of opening a political dialogue with legislators from countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The programme gradually expanded and received new impetus following the “Arab Awakening.” The Assembly has established relations with the Parliaments of six countries of the southern and eastern Mediterra-nean: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, as well as with the Palestinian National Council. Preliminary contacts have been established with Libya as well as with some countries of the Gulf and of the Sahel.

The yearly activities of the Group include a visit to the region, and two seminars, one of which is held in co-operation with the Italian Parliament. These meetings seek to en-hance parliamentary awareness of the problems of the region, promote a political dia-logue between parliamentarians, and ultimately provide experience and expertise to legislators from Maghreb and Middle East countries.

Sessions Two sessions are held each year—in the Spring and Autumn (“Annual”)—in different countries.

∗ Formerly referred to as the Mediterranean Special Group.


Membership of the Assembly Member Delegations

Member States Delegates

United States 36 France 18 Germany 18 Italy 18 United Kingdom 18 Canada 12 Poland 12 Spain 12 Turkey 12 Romania 10 Belgium 7 Czech Republic 7 Greece 7 Hungary 7 Netherlands 7 Portugal 7 Bulgaria 6 Denmark 5 Norway 5 Slovakia 5 Croatia 5 Lithuania 4 Albania 4 Estonia 3 Iceland 3 Latvia 3 Luxembourg 3 Slovenia 3

28 257


Associate Delegations

Ukraine 8 Austria 5 Azerbaijan 5 Serbia 5 Sweden 5 Switzerland 5 Finland 4 Georgia 4 Armenia 3 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Moldova 3 Montenegro 3 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ∗ 3

13 56

European Parliament Delegation

10

Regional Partner and Mediterranean Associate Member Delegations

Algeria 3 Morocco 3 Israel 3 Jordan 3 4 12

Parliamentary Observer Delegations

Assembly of Kosovo 2 Australia 2 Egypt 2 Japan 2 Kazakhstan 2 Palestinian National Council 2 Republic of Korea 2 Tunisia 2 8 16

∗ Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.


Inter-parliamentary Assembly Delegations

OSCE PA 2 PACE 2 2 4

Committees, Sub-Committees and Working Groups

Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security (CDS) Sub-Committee on Democratic Governance (CDSDG) Defence and Security Committee (DSC) Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities (DSCFC) Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Co-operation (DSCTC) Economics and Security Committee (ESC) Sub-Committee on Transition and Development (ESCTD) Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Economic Relations (ESCTER) Political Committee (PC) Sub-Committee on NATO Partnerships (PCNP) Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations (PCTR) Science and Technology Committee (STC) Sub-Committee on Technology Trends and Security (STCTTS) Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM) Ukraine-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council (UNIC) Georgia-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council (GNIC) NATO-Russia Parliamentary Committee (NRPC) (Discontinued as of April 2014)

Members of the Bureau of the Assembly President Hon. Michael TURNER (United States)

Vice-Presidents Paolo ALLI (Italy) Angelien EIJSINK (Netherlands) Lord JOPLING (United Kingdom) Thomas MARINO (United States) Sverre MYRLI (Norway)


Treasurer Marc ANGEL (Luxembourg)

Secretary General David HOBBS (United Kingdom)

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

3 Place du Petit Sablon | B-1000 Brussels Tel. : + 32 (0) 2 513 2865 | Fax: + 32 (0) 2 514 1847

E-mail: [email protected] Web site: www.nato-pa.int

35

Annex 2: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

DCAF at a Glance The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is one of the world’s leading centres in the area of security sector reform (SSR) and security sector governance (SSG). The Centre was founded in October 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss government.

DCAF’s membership includes 63 member states and six permanent observers. DCAF’s core services include: • Advisory support and practical assistance in the development and

implementation of policies in the area of SSG and SSR; • Assessment, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of SSG/R

projects; • Capacity-development and training; • Development of knowledge products, services, and tools for policy-makers and

SSR practitioners.

DCAF is based at the Maison de la Paix in Geneva with permanent offices in Beirut, Brussels, Ljubljana, Ramallah, Tripoli, and Tunis. DCAF has five operational divisions (Southeast Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa & Gender and SSR, Public-Private Partnerships, and the International Security Sector Advisory Team), as well as a research division. DCAF employs some 160 staff from almost 40 countries.

In 2015, DCAF’s overall budget reached 34.6 million Swiss francs – of which Switzerland financed 58 per cent and other member states and international organizations 42 per cent. All funding to DCAF is eligible as Official Development Assistance.

For detailed information about DCAF, visit www.dcaf.ch


Security Sector Reform Security sector reform is the political and technical process of improving state and human security by making security provision, management, and oversight more effective and accountable, within a framework of civilian control, rule of law, and respect for human rights. The goal of SSR is to apply the principles of good governance to security institutions. SSR is recognized as an essential peacebuilding tool and a means to help prevent conflict, strengthen rule of law, and establish a conducive environment for political, social, and economic development. www.dcaf.ch [email protected]

Documents

Policy Recommendations of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly ... · Assembly, which celebrated its 60th anniversary in 2015, brings together national par-liamentarians from the 28 members