Political Determinants of Violence in the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires

Alberto FöhrigUdeSA

October 2014

Research Questions, Hypothesis, Methods

This paper intends to provide some evidence and analysis about the links between politics, the police, and crime in the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires. It intends to provide criteria to explain significant variability in municipal crime rates.

Why violence? Dependent variable: crime against individuals excluding car accidents

Are political factors related to increases in violent crime?

What is the relationship between stability –measured as re-election rate for mayor´s – and fragmentation –measured as increased effective number of parties and intra-party fragmentation – with violence?

Hypothesis: The increasing number of political and drug trafficking groups competing for territory produce unstable agreements and tend to increase violence.

Mixed method approach. Panel data model with fixed effects and clustered errors combined with the qualitative study of court cases involving relationships between politics, police and crime.

2

Theoretical background: crime, the police and politics

Different authors (Saín, 2002; Tokatlian, 2011; Auyero 2012) have underscored the increasing links between certain political actors with criminal organizations in Argentina.

Gambetta (1996), Villareal (2002), Wilkinson (2004), Garay (2013), Osorio (2012), studied the relationship between politics and crime in different contexts. Snyder and Duran Martinez (2009) theorize under what conditions criminal groups are able to use state sponsored protection rackets to develop their activities.

Fajnzylber et.al. (1998) produced a classic study on the determinants of crime in Latin America in which they concluded that inequality more than poverty as well as GDP per capita rates had a significant impact on crime rates.

3

Theoretical background: Fragmentation as a Multilevel Game

• Politics and crime are both territorially defined and structured in multi level layers

• Consensus on fragmentation of the Argentine political system: 1. Decreasing levels of party nationalization (Jones and Mainwaring 2003, Leiras 2006)2. Increased ENP and Territorialization (Calvo and Escolar 2005, Leiras 2006)3. Lack of Congruence between the national and provincial party systems (Gibson and Suarez

Cao 2010)4. Intra-party fragmentation (Föhrig 2011, Föhrig and Post 2007)

• Mayor´s linked to the police in a variety of informal dimensions: – Influence police officers’ careers: they lobby the governor and may in fact veto the appointment of

police authorities in their districts given their previous records. – Influence their promotions and exonerations. – In operative terms they provide police with money and equipment. Operationally influence the

allocation of police resources given their monitoring capacities provided by surveillance cameras. – Mayors authorize commercial ventures to operate within the boundaries of their municipalities– Have privileged access to a key political asset: information. Bridge informational gaps.

4

Context

• The Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires concentrates a quarter of the country´s population

and is the second most violent area in the country (Lodola and Seligson, 2012: 128).

• Significant increases in crime rates, concentration of crime, and organized crime activities.

• The context in which this paper tests it empirical hypothesis is one in which the police informal regulation of criminal activity started to crumble as a consequence of the expansion of the drug market. The new market and institutional incentives in place generated the emergence of new organized crime organizations on the ground.

• Party system change: simultaneous influence of fragmentation and party predominance.

5

Drug´s Market

6

Cocaine Seizures in Argentina (kg. per year)

Source: UNODC, various years.

Drug Consumption by School Children

Source: OAS, 2013

Local Processing: 80 facilities producing different phases of drugs were shut down by enforcement agents between 2000 and 2006 (Sedronar, 2011).

Sinthetic Drugs: 600.000 pills production facility discovered in Mar de Ajo (2013) doubled total seizures in Ezeiza Airport since 2004.

Crime rates against individuals

7

0500

1000

0500

1000

0500

1000

0500

1000

0500

1000

1995 2000 2005 2010

1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010

Almirante Brown Avellaneda Berazategui Esteban Echeverria Ezeiza

Florencio Varela General San Martin Hurlingham Ituzaingo Jose C Paz

La Matanza Lanus Lomas de Zamora Malvinas Argentinas Merlo

Moreno Moron Quilmes San Fernando San Isidro

San Miguel Tigre Tres de Febrero Vicente Lopez

Crim

e r

ate

s a

ga

inst

indiv

idua

ls

yearGraphs by municipality

Intra-party fragmentation

8

12

34

12

34

12

34

12

34

12

34

1995 2000 2005 2010

1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010

Almirante Brown Avellaneda Berazategui Esteban Echeverria Ezeiza

Florencio Varela General San Martin Hurlingham Ituzaingo Jose C Paz

La Matanza Lanus Lomas de Zamora Malvinas Argentinas Merlo

Moreno Moron Quilmes San Fernando San Isidro

San Miguel Tigre Tres de Febrero Vicente Lopez

Intr

a-p

art

y fr

ag

men

tatio

n

YearGraphs by municipality

Reelection

9

02

46

02

46

02

46

02

46

02

46

1995 2000 2005 2010

1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010

Almirante Brown Avellaneda Berazategui Esteban Echeverria Ezeiza

Florencio Varela General San Martin Hurlingham Ituzaingo Jose C Paz

La Matanza Lanus Lomas de Zamora Malvinas Argentinas Merlo

Moreno Moron Quilmes San Fernando San Isidro

San Miguel Tigre Tres de Febrero Vicente Lopez

Ree

lect

ion

YearGraphs by municipality

Crime rate and effective number of parties

10

Graph. Distribution of Crime Against Individuals

0.0

02.0

04.0

06.0

08kd

ensi

ty td

p

200 400 600 800 1000x

Year 1995 Year 2003Year 2008

Graph. Distribution of the Effective Number of Parties.

0.2

.4.6

.81

kden

sity

nep

2 4 6 8 10x

Year 1991 Year 2003Year 2008

Methodology

Panel data model with fixed effects and clustered errors.

336 annual observations, comprising the 24 municipalities in metropolitan area of Buenos Aires between 1995 and 2008.

Dependent variable

Crime rate against individuals excluding car accidents

Independent variables

Energy rate consumptionNumber of students per inhabitant Margin of victoryEffective number of parties Cocaine seizureReelection Intra party fragmentation

Variables are expressed in logs.11

Panel Data Models

12

VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8

Energy consumption0.182 0.0676 0.0505 0.0176 -0.0496 -0.0640 -0.190 -0.187

(0.156) (0.202) (0.192) (0.203) (0.200) (0.206) (0.216) (0.221)

Number of students per inhabitant

-0.0934 -0.271** -0.181* -0.223** -0.307** -0.351** -0.228* -0.273**(0.109) (0.114) (0.0953) (0.105) (0.124) (0.125) (0.121) (0.124)

Margin of victory

-0.00474 0.00786 -0.00362 0.00106 0.0127 0.0160 0.000684 0.00457(0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0154) (0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0176) (0.0150) (0.0165)

Effective number of parties0.0811 0.0910* 0.151*** 0.154***

(0.0525) (0.0528) (0.0522) (0.0520)

Cocaine Seizures

0.130*** 0.117*** 0.140*** 0.128*** (0.0318) (0.0360) (0.0341) (0.0333)

Reelection0.124** 0.143** 0.141** 0.124** (0.0522) (0.0566) (0.0558) (0.0566)

Years in government

0.0592** 0.0532** 0.0691*** 0.0590** (0.0233) (0.0251) (0.0237) (0.0263)

Intra-party fragmentation -0.0452 -0.0312 -0.0909 -0.0685 (0.0530) (0.0541) (0.0607) (0.0630)

Deterministic trend0.0203*** 0.0215*** 0.0246*** 0.0254*** 0.0165*** 0.0175*** 0.0243*** 0.0244***(0.00446) (0.00489) (0.00451) (0.00479) (0.00468) (0.00473) (0.00490) (0.00505)

Constant 1.385 2.572** 2.343** 2.651** 3.527*** 3.719*** 3.970*** 4.090***

(0.884) (1.083) (0.972) (1.091) (1.001) (1.082) (1.042) (1.122)

Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336

R-squared 0.567 0.570 0.568 0.565 0.531 0.538 0.520 0.525

Number of muni 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24

Qualitative Analysis: Court Cases and Legislative Inquiries involving PPC

• Candela case: 1. Kidnapping and murder of a 11 year old by a police/drug dealers

mixed gang. Legislative Inquiry

• Ephedrine case:1. Triple homicide of Gral. Rodriguez. 2. Conviction of Martinez Espinosa (Maschwitz drug processing facility)3. Involvement of high ranking state officials4. Illegal financing of president Cristina Kirchner electoral campaign

2007

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Mechanisms

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Scenarios of bilateral monopoly between criminal organizations and political actors which produced stable agreements over time are broken.

Both politics and drug trafficking involve a territorial and multilayered dimension.

Drug traffickers need specific territories in order to transport, elaborate and sell drugs. In order to do so they require “safe” portions of land which enable them to develop these activities with low risks of being caught by authorities. Because of geography, transportation difficulties, and communication costs criminal organizations act locally.

Mechanisms (II)

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Drug market forces increased the number of criminal organizations on the ground. As a consequence, the number of players on the market side increased over the last years.

Process of fragmentation: party factions that compete against each other in territorial disputes fighting for party power in a multilevel game. Relationships between party factions and criminal groups at the local level within the context of political competition influence increases in violence.

Re-election and fragmentation are simultaneously maintained through electoral system design: “listas colectoras” and “listas espejo” (Mustapic, 2013).

The increasing number of political and drug trafficking groups competing for territory within scenarios of either cooperation or competition between the two distinct activities produce unstable agreements and tend to increase violence.

Mechanisms (III)

• Senate endorses judges and prosecutors appointments• Governors appoint, remove and rotate in different settings police

agents.• Police does not enforce internal oversight• Mixed members gangs: police and drug dealers

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Conclusions

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The models presented in this paper show the significance of political variables to analyze crime.

Political variables on fragmentation and re-election of mayors show an impact over violence.

The longer actors stay on the ground, the greater their ability to develop ties of reciprocity, trust and reputation with the police and criminal groups. Re-election for mayors without restrictions seems to be a measure with negative effects over crime.

When scenario of stability for mayors (party predominance) and fragmentation of the political system coexists with market pressures for new organizations into the market, violence increases.

THANK YOU@afohrig

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Theorizing the relationship between politics and crime

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Scenario Indicator

Non violence

State sponsored protection racket High level of drug seizures, high level of domestic consumption

Lack of drug related criminal activity Low levels of seizures and low domestic consumption

Non-violent drug market High domestic consumption and low levels of seizures

Violence

Broken state sponsored protection racket due to the entrance of new players into the market or new state agencies intervening. Territorial disputes or succession conflicts and consequent fragmentation

Rise in the number of homicides among gang members in territorial disputes. Spatial concentration of homicides.

Open conflict between the state and criminal organizations

Increase in the number of criminal organizations disarticulated and their members imprisoned. Rise in the number of casualties.

Collusion with/diversification to other forms of organized crime

Rise in crime rates against property and individuals

Errors distribution

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Distribution of Crime rate against individuals (2008)

21

750570

559485

476538

587676

500

927

614

635677

582

427 623

474

286

640

502

367518

482

264

(629,927](548.5,629](479,548.5][264,479]No data

Effective number of parties (2008)

22

74

46

45

34

4

6

3

55

9

7 3

3

5

3

3

33

6

4

(5.5,9](4,5.5](3,4][3,3]No data

Intra-party fragmentation (2008)

23

42

12

13

11

1

2

1

22

4

2 2

2

2

1

2

21

3

1

(2,4](1,2][1,1]No data

Reelection (2008)

24

36

25

41

23

4

1

0

00

1

0 1

3

0

3

0

32

0

1

(3,6](1.5,3](0,1.5][0,0]No data

Energy consumption rate (2008)

25

285599364942

298304361316

271985212289

273297185186

148537

315148

204309

249891261239

208204

208571183996

233826

169818

140482

365641

243067128795

184597

144075

(279448,365641](223057.5,279448](184296.5,223057.5][128795,184296.5]No data