1

In 1868, the Tokugawa Shogun lost his absolute political power over Japan, and Emperor

Mutsuhito was restored as the supreme figurehead of the country. The primary cause of the Meiji

Restoration was the West’s colonial ambitions in East Asia during the first half of the 19th

century. Since Japan was still a feudal society in the middle of the 19th century, its military was

tremendously weaker compared to the armed forces of the Western Powers. Japan also lacked a

centralized government capable of defending itself against Western influence. Thus, the Meiji

Restoration was a defensive maneuver instituted by a faction of the political elite in order to

ensure the future prominence and independence of Japan. A variety of methods were employed

to ensure the rapid modernization and industrialization of Japanese society. Political

centralization and the rapid adoption of western practices allowed Japan to modernize at an

exceptionally fast pace. The political leadership’s combination of older societal traditions with a

highly focused modernization program ensured the widespread adherence of the population, and

the former ruling class (the Samurai) were effectively brought in to the new political order or

given reparations for sustained losses. However, when Japan’s traditional values and cultural

homogeneity merged with its newfound military and economic supremacy, it created the

foundation for future Japanese Fascism and Imperialism. Although the Meiji Restoration was a

necessary defensive measure to protect Japan’s sovereignty against the West, it had long term

belligerent effects on the country’s future political development.

The main cause of the Meiji Restoration was the threat posed by the West’s colonial

ambitions in East Asia. The leaders of the revolt were elitist revolutionaries attempting to avoid

being carved up by the Western Powers, which they had witnessed in China. They sought a

political system capable of countering the aggressive tactics of the Americans and Europeans.

2

Japanese political elites had observed the defeat of China by Britain during the Opium War in

1840 and realized “... the spears and swords of the Asians were no match for the weaponry of the

westerners” (Hua 4). In addition, Commodore Mathew C. Perry’s expeditions to Japan in 1853

and 1854 further demonstrated the country’s vulnerability. When Perry steamed into the waters

of Edo (modern-day Tokyo), the Japanese had never before witnessed steam powered gunboats

with such advanced military capabilities. Intimidated by this show of force and power, Japanese

negotiations with the United States “…produced a treaty that opened two ports to American trade

and provided for American consular representation in Japan” (Charlton 156). The treaty ended

Japan’s 250 year period of isolation and brought an influx of westerners into the country by the

end of the 1850’s who were not bound by Japanese laws but the laws of their own countries. This

ignited widespread xenophobia among the political elite who increasingly saw the powerful

westerners as a threat to their political and economic hegemony. Japan’s foreign policy of

isolation, Sakoku, made it politically and technologically obsolete compared to the West.

Isolated on an island and far from competition with Western States, the Japanese were still stuck

back in what resembled the European Middle Ages. They possessed no modern army or navy,

and the feudal and aristocratic nature of Japanese society made centralization almost impossible

under the Tokugawa Shogunate. During the Tokugawa Period, the local lords (daimyos) had

substantial independence and self-rule, and the Japanese Shogun had no effective way of

mobilizing and centralizing his country. National defense was also noticeably outdated and

limited since the Shogun could only call on the assistance of other feudal lords or use revenue

from his personal lands to raise armies. (Hua 6).

3

Furthermore, Japan’s predominately agricultural economy limited its capability of

defending itself against the West. Over eighty percent of the nation’s economy was agricultural,

and there were no industries to domestically produce arms and materials needed for national

defense. By 1868, fear of being controlled by a foreign power had become so extreme that a

revolt against the old political order was inevitable. The Tokugawa political system did not

possess the necessary powers to modernize Japan into a westernized nation-state and defend it

against Western interference, so “…samurai opposed to Tokugawa rule undertook what was in

effect a coup d’état” (Charlton 156). Without the threat of being controlled and manipulated by

outside forces, the Tokugawa Period would have most certainly survived longer than it did.

When the Tokugawa Shogunate utilized Western military intervention to subdue two rebellious

provinces that refused to accept Western trading concessions (these concessions limited the

power over their own foreign trade) in 1863, it made itself look militarily weak and subservient

to Western economic interests. Consequently, the Shogun “…organized a military campaign

against the province of Choshu” to redeem and reinforce his control over the country

(Trimberger 195). However, his plan had the opposite effect because he had lost general support

by allowing foreigners to use military force against Japanese citizens. The most powerful

provinces of the southwest (Satsuma, Choshu, and Tosa) formed an alliance against the

Tokugawa Government. Since these provinces provided the vast majority of imperial troops and

had acquired a superior quantity of guns by trading with Western arms dealers since 1859, it was

fairly easy for them to defeat the inferior Tokugawa force. Thus, the Tokugawa Shogunate’s

strict compliance with Western trading aspirations led to its ultimate downfall. (Jansen 36).

4

Moreover, Japan’s unique culture and the hierarchal social structure of Japanese society

kept the revolution relatively civil. Culturally, the Japanese commoners were extremely

compliant and deferential. The cultural and ideological homogeneity of Japan can be attributed to

its geographic location, an island. The Japanese have historically possessed a “…high degree of

national security unprecedented among major states” because they have been remarkably

isolated from outside influence and foreign ideas (Ward 582). This unique situation can be

confirmed by the fact that “…Japan is 99.3 per cent pure in terms of racial composition” (Ward

582). Immigration was never a problem, so Japanese rulers never had to deal with widespread

ideological or social disputes between ethnic groups. By keeping the public ignorant of other

ideologies and detached from external societies, the political elite could easily control and

brainwash the population. Instead of learning how to adapt to new social and philosophical ideas

that suddenly emerged in society, political elites could adjust new ideologies to their own

advantages which guaranteed their political supremacy. Both Confucianism and Buddhism were

successfully adapted to Japan’s national religion, Imperial Shinto. These philosophies, originally

introduced from China, were conformed to fit the cultural obedience and narcissism of Japanese

Shinto. The strict obedience to superiors and elders was taken from Confucianism, but the notion

of an absolute ruler losing or gaining divine favor was ignored since the Japanese Emperor was

viewed as a perpetual god. (Charlton 87). Buddhism was also employed to discourage

individualism, sponsor nationalism, and endorse obedience. Zen Buddhism (Japanese-style

Buddhism) taught followers to avoid conflict with others because all ideas and opinions were

essentially the same. While this philosophy made no rational sense, it “…fed into Japanese

nationalism” because it advocated being detached from the political sphere by simply

5

concentrating on becoming a good Japanese citizen (Charlton 91). Japan’s historical, cultural,

and territorial isolation created a population of commoners that was unusually obedient to

authority figures, docile and impartial when it came to political change, apprehensive about

foreign and unfamiliar ideas, and culturally narcissistic (the Japanese believed they were a

divinely chosen people). All of these aspects of Japanese culture allowed the dissenters to

overthrow the existing government without exciting the masses. After the Meiji Restoration,

these same values proved useful to the founders since they produced an extremely nationalistic

population that was willing to go to great lengths to preserve the sovereignty and prominence of

Japan from Western societies, which they saw as culturally inferior to their own even though

these societies possessed greater military and economic strength.

Since the revolution was a clash between political elites who already held power in the

existing regime, it did not possess the passionate and shortsighted radicalism that usually occurs

with mass uprisings. Thus, the Meiji Restoration can be described as a revolution or a civil war

between elites. The rebel leaders from the allied provinces possessed political and administrative

experience, and they saw the weakness and decentralization of the Tokugawa Regime as a threat

to Japan’s future national security; however, they did not seek to drastically alter many of the

paternalistic and traditional structures of Japanese culture. (Trimberger 202).

The high status and official authority of rebel bureaucrats, along

with their use of nationalistic appeals which incorporate traditional

political symbols and values, enable them to mobilize a small core

of elite supporters (bureaucrats, legislators, party officials, military

officers, etc.) and to neutralize the rest of the elite. Elites are most

likely to be neutralized when they are confused or unsure about the

6

revolutionary potential of the rebels…and when they fear national

disunity at a time of intense foreign threat. (Trimberger 196)

Because they already controlled military and bureaucratic resources of the old regime, the rebels

did not need to win support from the masses. Throughout the conflict, the peasants remained

passive and neutral, and the vast majority of the samurai also sat on the sidelines. This helped

reduce the amount of violence during the two Japanese Civil Wars of 1864 and 1868. As a result,

there were only a few conventional battles fought, and guerilla warfare was nonexistent. The

limited warfare allowed the Shogun to peacefully surrender his power in 1868. (Trimberger 199).

Additionally, the Meiji Government was successful at fulfilling its goals of

modernization for a variety of reasons. Foremost, the revolutionaries formed a highly centralized

government capable of instating and enforcing reforms that promoted modernization. Once the

war was won, the leaders of the revolution became Japan’s new Meiji Oligarchy. When they

came to power, they had no clear agenda about how to centralize the government and modernize

Japan. In 1868, they outlined their broader aspirations in the Charter Oath, the new constitution

of the Meiji Period. The emperor presented it to the nation in April of 1868 because he was seen

as a more legitimate political figure than the victors of the war. The Charter Oath stated the

government’s new goals of universal education, universal military conscription, and extreme

economic and military growth. It also re-enforced the idea that the emperor was the absolute

ruler of Japan and created two new legislative bodies. The legislatures were utterly powerless

and were used as political tools by the new oligarchs. The Upper Assembly consisted of

bureaucrats appointed by the emperor, and the Lower Assembly consisted of domain

representatives elected by the people (however only 1 percent of the wealthiest male citizens

7

could vote). Both houses had no power and could only present grievances and/or ideas to the

emperor. The main function of the assemblies was to centralize and consolidate the many

domains of Japan into one body. It also allowed the Meiji Oligarchs to address any grievances

and potential problems in a rebellious or dissatisfied province. Thus, the oligarchs had written a

“…constitution [that] was not to restrict the power of the State, but to increase it by channeling

potential and powerful elite opposition into the political process where it could be controlled and

co-opted” (Trimberger 202). The Meiji Oligarchs had the final vote, so they were running the

government from behind the scenes. While the new constitution made the government appear

somewhat democratic to outsiders, it was far from the political pluralism that characterized the

regimes of the U.S. and Britain. The Meiji Oligarchs eventually became known as the genro, the

unofficial decision-making body that had absolute authority and control of the government. With

power in the genro’s hands, the oligarchs could implement large reform programs to restructure

Japanese society. (Silberman 84). Significant centralization began in 1871 when the domains of

the feudal lords were formally abolished and changed into prefectures of the state. In 1872, the

armies of each domain were disbanded, and a national military was created based on universal

conscription. Every male citizen was expected to serve a minimum of three years, and this gave

the government a way to create a populace loyal to the new centralized state/emperor. A national

land tax system was also implemented to ensure that the government would have enough revenue

to execute the many programs and projects needed to industrialize and westernize the country. A

new legal system was also set up which nullified the unfair economic treaties made with Western

Powers during the Tokugawa Period, and tariffs were imposed to defend Japan’s new emerging

industries. (The Meiji Restoration and Modernization).

8

The mixing of traditional virtues with reform programs also reinforced the new

centralized government. Universal western-style education was put into action in 1872, but the

nationalism of Shinto (through the worship of the emperor) and the obedience of Confucianism

were also promoted through this new educational system. The Imperial Rescript on Education

became a standardized text ceremonially advancing Shinto rituals in order to promote the

worship of the Japanese State. (Charlton 160). While the central government did not directly

carry out the national education program, it monitored its application in all of the localities and

strictly enforced certain principles and values that promoted undying loyalty to the

state/emperor. The martial values of the old samurai elite were also kept intact, and soldiers were

expected to fight bravely and without fear to defend the honor of the Japanese emperor. The

traditional lifestyle of the peasants was left alone, and land reform was safely avoided. The

peasant class was already docile and passive, but the genro did not want to risk disrupting social

order in the countryside. Instead, the leaders relied on universal education, military conscription,

and propaganda to brainwash and persuade the more traditional rural populace.

This not only assured the government of a maximal flow of food,

revenue, recruits, and urban bound emigrants from the countryside,

but also left them free to concentrate their attention and resources

on the building of the more critical urban aspects of the national

economy and the defense establishment. (Ward 580)

Also, because the peasant class had no political representation in the new government, there were

no adamant proposals to provide modern and extensive benefits to the commoners. This allowed

the genro to use the taxes generated by rural agriculture to finance and subsidize internal

improvements and new state-run and family owned industries (zaibatsus).

9

The genro was also able to placate the majority of the Samurai Class by either giving

them positions in the new government or by paying them reparations for their losses. While some

samurai adapted to the new system and found jobs in the new government or the emerging state-

run industries that were later privatized, many were reduced to poverty after their yearly stipends

were changed to government bonds and eventually became worthless. In 1872, the waning power

of the samurai led to the proposal that Japan should invade Korea and establish a feudal empire

to re-establish the old prominence of the Samurai Class. However, the Meiji Oligarchs dismissed

this idea because they did not the old order to threaten their new goals. The hope of the former

samurai ever regaining their past glory was crushed when the new Japanese Army, which was

trained using the latest Western military tactics and equipment, put down the Satsuma Rebellion

in 1877. After 1877, the process of modernization continued peacefully, and it was this political

and social tranquility that allowed the genro to rapidly and efficiently modernize Japan.

(Charlton 157). Another aspect of success was made possible by the Western Powers concerns

over other matters. “At the time of the Meiji Restoration, the United States’ Civil War had

recently ended and France and Britain were preoccupied with China affairs” (Hua 3). Hence, the

major Western powers that could have interfered in Japanese affairs were too preoccupied with

other dealings to impede in the domestic affairs of Japan.

Lastly, some of the traditional social structures were effectively adapted to validate and

the support the new political order. The new government was referred to as the Meiji Restoration

because the new political founders claimed to be restoring the rightful imperial and traditional

rule of the emperor. Even though the emperor held no real political power and was expected to

obey the demands of his advisors, the widely accepted idea that he was a descendent of the

10

Japanese Sun goddess, Ameterasu Omikami, sustained and justified the new founders’ rule since

very few citizens would be willing to challenge the authority of a god. (Charlton 87). “Meiji

rulers disestablished both the feudal domains and the traditional role of the samurai, while

extolling the virtues represented by the old order, such as veneration of the martial arts and

absolute loyalty to one’s superior” (Charlton 157). The Japanese ruling elites used myths and

stories of Japan’s past glory to create broad support for their new policy of national mobilization.

This propaganda was necessary because western practices were alien and strange to the vast

majority of the population, so the ruling elites exploited the idea that they were returning Japan

to its previous glory by adopting western applications. The new leaders needed to rally the

population in favor of policies that were radically different from the ones of the previous regime.

Instead of simply waiting for the Japanese people to catch up with the West, the new government

sought to use traditional aspects of society to create public adherence to its new policies. (Hua 8).

Their ability to do away with the traditional roles of the samurai and feudal lords while using the

traditional position of the emperor as an abstract symbol to unite the country indicates the

prudent pragmatism and skillfulness of the founders. The traditional cultural nationalism and

xenophobia that permeated Japanese society also made the process of modernization easier

because a firm cultural identity already existed.

Eventually, the Meiji Government came to an end when the emperor died in 1912. The

genro had become an unnecessary decision-making body since all of its stated goals had been

achieved by this time. The population had become westernized, and Japan was considered an

industrial power.

11

The genro as a decision-making body structure could not be

formalized or given legal constitutional existence. To do so would

have required an explicit if not formal set of criteria for

recruitment. Again, this would have raised the question of what

criteria could be used to supplant one that would disappear with

time (participation in the Restoration) and another that would be so

generalized (Western-style education) as to no longer be

sufficiently exclusive. (Silberman 92)

Both the general population and bureaucratic elites had completely adopted modernization as the

government’s primary policy goal, and all of the Charter Oath’s goals had been attained. Japan

had also guaranteed its national security by becoming a formidable military and imperial power.

Its new military prowess was displayed in two wars. While Japan easily defeated the Chinese in

1894, its victory against Russia in 1904 surprised the international community and placed Japan

on the world stage.

However, Japan’s new imperial and military strength was dangerous given the nature of

the Meiji Period’s culture. The Meiji Government’s emphasis on cultural superiority and

nationalism combined with “the Meiji elites’ lack of confidence with the fact that Japan had

always lived under the shadow…of China in pre-modern times” produced a highly insecure

political culture that constantly felt threatened by outsiders (Hua 17). Japanese desires for the

acquisition of Korea were a result of China’s weakness and the fear that Korea would be seized

by a European Power, which would threaten Japanese security. Also, when the Western Powers

in China forced Japan to give up the rights it had gained on the Liaotung Peninsula after the

Sino-Japanese War in 1894, the Japanese government was angered and believed it had to build

up its military strength even more to combat Western power. Japanese political development

12

increasingly became fascist and mobilized for war. The government’s subsidizing of military

industries created an immense military-industrial complex that become progressively more

uncontrollable. The propagation of Imperial Shinto and Japanese cultural superiority had evolved

into an irrepressible force that threatened to turn a once isolated society into an imperial monster.

In the beginning, the Meiji Oligarchs had only intended it to use nationalist propaganda to unite

society around its principles of westernization and modernization; however, even though Japan

was secure from most Western Powers, it continued to increase its military expenditures. In the

future, the Japanese Military would use its great bureaucratic and political strength to seize

political power and implement an extreme form of imperialism founded on cultural supremacy

and unsubstantiated national security concerns. (The Meiji Restoration and Modernization).

In conclusion, the Meiji Restoration highlights the dangers with rapidly modernizing very

traditional and culturally homogeneous societies. The government only adopted Western

political ideas that would secure its standing and mobilize the population in support of its new

policies. However, without introducing other Western ideas, such as liberalism and pluralism,

Japanese society was unable to moderate itself when it had secured its sovereignty and security

from the Western Powers. In other words, the Japanese infatuation with cultural superiority and

nationalism directly justified Japan’s colonial ambitions. If the leaders had allowed pluralism to

occur earlier in the Meiji Period and given widespread representation to the population, Japan’s

political development might have been more introverted and less concerned about national

secuirty. Instead of concentrating all of its efforts on military and industrial buildup, it might

have been moderated by demands from the lower classes. Yet, given the historical hierarchal

social structure of Japanese society and the obedience and subservience commanded by Japan’s

13

existing religious and philosophical ideas, it is hard to know whether this would have ever been

possible. While the Meiji Government was able to effectively westernize and strengthen Japan,

its embracing of traditional Shinto nationalism and obedience sparked fascist political

development that was highly xenophobic and culturally narcissistic.

Works Cited:

Charlton, Sue Ellen M. Comparison Asian Politics. 3rd. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010.

Print.

Hua, Shiping. "The Meiji Restoration (1868) and the Late Qing Reform (1898) Revisited:

Strategies and Philosophies." East Asia: An International Quarterly 21.3 (2004): 3-22.

Academic Search Complete. EBSCO. Hampden-Sydney Library, Hampden-Sydney, VA.

22 Sept. 2010 < http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN

=17394922&site=ehost-live>

Jansen, Marius B. "JAPAN LOOK BACK." Foreign Affairs 47.1 (1968): 36-50. Academic

Search Complete. EBSCO. Hampden-Sydney Library, Hampden-Sydney, VA.

18 Nov. 2010 < http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN

=5803167&site=ehost-live>

Silberman, Bernard S. “Bureaucratic Development and the Structure of Decision-Making in the

Meiji Period: The Case of the Genro.” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Nov.

,1967): pp. 81-94. Association for Asian Studies. 1 Oct. 2010 <http://www.jstor.org/stabl

e/2051677>

"The Meiji Restoration and Modernization." Contemporary Japan: A Teaching Workbook.

Columbia University, East Asian Curriculum Project, n.d. Web. 18 Nov 2010.

<http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/japan/japanworkbook/modernhist/meiji.html>.

Trimberger, Ellen Kay. "A THEORY OF ELITE REVOLUTIONS." Studies in Comparative

International Development 7.3 (1972): 191-207. Academic Search Complete. EBSCO.

Hampden-Sydney Library, Hampden-Sydney, VA. 22 Sept. 2010 < http://search.ebscoho

st.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=13659529&site=ehost-live>